Richard Price (1723–1791) was a prominent dissenting ministerand a leading figure in philosophical and political thought in thesecond half of the eighteenth century. As well as publishing on a widerange of subjects, including ethics, politics, theology, andprobability theory, he also greatly advanced work on actuarial tables,which enabled insurers to predict more accurately the life-expectancyof people in their differing circumstances. His passionate commitmentto the cause of liberty led him to take a prominent public role invarious campaigns, including a remission of the penalties onnon-conformists, and in support of both the American and the Frenchrevolutions. His defense of the latter prompted a famous reply byBurke, as well as defenses by his friends Paine andWollstonecraft.

• 1. Life, Works, and General Overview
• 2. Price’s Moral Philosophy
  • 2.1 Overview
  • 2.2 Moral Epistemology and Metaphysics
    • 2.2.1 The battle with sentimentalism
    • 2.2.2 The battle with sentimentalism: defense
    • 2.2.3 The battle with sentimentalism: offense
  • 2.3 Necessary moral principles
  • 2.4 Virtue
    • 2.4.1 Virtuous motivation
    • 2.4.2 Supererogation
    • 2.4.3 Promising
• 3. Theology
  • 3.1A priori Arguments for God’s existence
  • 3.2 Natural Theology
  • 3.3 Miracles
• 4. Liberty
  • 4.1 Free will, rationality, and moral agency
  • 4.2 Determinism and agent-causation
  • 4.3 Political Liberty
    • 4.3.1 Religious Liberty
    • 4.3.2 Civil Liberty
• 5. Influence
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
    • Works by Richard Price
    • Influences on Price
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life, Works, and General Overview

Price was born in Llangeinor, Wales, the son of a dissenting minister.He was initially educated privately, but after the death of hisparents was encouraged by an uncle to attend the dissenting academy inMoorfields, London. In 1744 Price became family chaplain to GeorgeStreatfield at Stoke Newington. His duties were not onerous, leavinghim ample time for study. It was here that he began what became hismost important work:A Review of the Principal Questions inMorals (1758; 3^rd. ed. 1787). In its main doctrinesPrice was strongly influenced by Ralph Cudworth, whoseTreatiseConcerning Eternal and Immutable Morality was publishedposthumously in 1731. In 1757 Streatfield died and, his financialcircumstances having improved, Price married Sarah Blundell in June ofthat year and became, shortly after, the minister in Newington Green,where he remained for most of his life.

Price became a leading figure in liberal intellectual groups,especially the “Bowood Circle”, which was named after thehouse of its leader, Lord Shelburne, and included Joseph Priestley andBenjamin Vaughan. He also belonged to the group that Benjamin Franklindubbed the “Club of Honest Whigs”: a dining grouprevolving round John Canton, which included some other members of theBowood Circle. Other prominent visitors or acquaintances included theeminent politicians, Lord Stanhope, William Pitt the Elder, and theprison reformer John Howard, as well as David Hume, and AdamSmith.

Price was a keen supporter of both the American and Frenchrevolutions. In early 1776 he publishedObservations on the Natureof Civil Liberty, followed byAdditional Observations inthe next year. In 1784 he addedObservations on the Importance ofthe American Revolution. Price’s support of the coloniesearned him the friendship of many of the leading figures in therebellion, including Franklin, Jefferson, Adams, and Paine. Hissupport led to his being invited by the Continental Congress to assistin the financial administration of the States, and to his beingawarded an honorary LL.D. by Yale University (1781, the other honoreethat year being George Washington), to add to the honorary doctorateshe had already received from Aberdeen and Glasgow Universities. WhenLord Shelburne became Prime Minister in 1782 he offered Price the postof his private secretary, which Price refused.

His published sermon,A Discourse on the Love of our Country(1789), defending the French revolution, ignited a pamphlet war,including Burke’s famous and furious response inReflectionson the Revolution in France (1790), as well as equally passionatedefenses by his friends Thomas Paine inRights of Man (1791),and Mary Wollstonecraft inA Vindication of the Rights of Men(1790).

A central aspect of Price’s dissension from the doctrines of theChurch of England was his rejection of Trinitarianism. For theTrinitarian, the Godhead is three persons in one substance, so thatChrist is fully God as well as fully man. For the Socinian, bycontrast, Jesus is merely human: a supreme teacher and exemplar of howto live, but nothing more. Price takes a position between theseextremes. Christ is creator and judge, who descended from heaven andbecame man. He is not God, but the Messiah, and is on no account to beworshipped. When it comes to Christ’s redemptive power, Priceagain steers a middle course between the Socinian view that Christsaves by precept and example, so that his death was not necessary tosalvation, and the Calvinist claim that redemption is wholly the workof God, who saves whom he will save, and damns whom he will damn (seeRomans 9:18). For Price, salvation requires the cooperationof both parties. The sinner must of his own free will repent andstrive for righteousness, but God is notrequired to acceptrepentant sinners, for repentance does not wipe out the consequencesof sin. God wipes out all guilt as a reward to Christ for his perfectobedience.

In line with Cudworth, Clarke, and many others, Price rejectedtheological voluntarism: the view that the precepts of morality dependon God’s will. The fundamental principles of morality arenecessary, and thus eternal and immutable. The standard objection tothis view is that it limits the sovereignty of God by making himsubject to moral demands that are not dependent on him. Price’sresponse to this difficulty lies in his claim that, since Godis eternal truth and reason, and since reason must recognizemoral obligations, moral constraints are part of God’s nature,and not distinct from it. Nothing external to God constrains him.

In addition to his writings on ethics, theology, and politics, Pricecorresponded at length with Joseph Priestley on the topic of freewill; their correspondence was published in 1778. He was also apioneer in probability theory, and edited Thomas Bayes’ majorworkAn Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine ofChances (1763). As a consequence of his important introduction toBayes’ essay he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in1765. His statistical work led to an interest in demography andactuarial calculations. His foundational book,Observations onReversionary Payments (1771) was in use for about a century, aswas his life table compiled by data he drew from a study ofNorthampton. HisEssay on the Population of England(2^nd ed. 1780) influenced Thomas Malthus. His concern aboutthe failure of successive governments to tackle the mounting nationaldebt led to his publication, in the same year, of hisAppeal tothe Public on the Subject of the National Debt (1771), which mayhave influenced William Pitt the Younger to re-establish the sinkingfund for the extinction of the national debt.

It is Price’s views on ethics that remain most relevant tocontemporary philosophy, so that will be the central focus of thisentry, which will also cover his political theory, theology, and hisposition on free will.

2. Price’s Moral Philosophy

2.1 Overview

Price can be classified as an Ethical Intuitionist in two respects.First, he rejects empiricism about our acquisition of knowledge, andespouses an intuitionist epistemology in ethics. Empiricists aremistaken in thinking that all knowledge has its basis in experience.There are a number of substantial necessary truths, essential torational thought, which cannot be established by empirical methods,but which can be known by reflection, because they are self-evident.Careful reflection on them is both necessary and, in appropriatecircumstances, sufficient to warrant belief in their truth. Thesenecessary truths include, as well as mathematical and metaphysicaltruths, some fundamental moral principles. In the course of a detailedand very helpful account of Price’s epistemology, Bengson et.al. (2022) report that Price was the first to use the term‘intuition’ to describe the judgments, including moraljudgments, by which we know these necessary truths. Things and stateshave essences, and their essential natures are revealed to us inintuition. In the case of ethics, the nature or essence of a type ofaction determines whether such an action is obligatory, forbidden, orpermissible. Intuitions are fundamental, in the sense of not beingderived or deduced from something more basic. Nor are they hunches, orcommonsensical beliefs, but “non-sensory presentational states.Such states have several characteristic features, being conscious,contentful, non-factive … baseless, fundamentallynon-voluntary, and compelling” (Bengson et. al., 8).

Empiricism is also mistaken in its account of concept acquisition.There are certain simple concepts that cannot be acquired byabstraction from sensory data or from reflecting on the mind’sown operations. Among these are the basic concepts of ethics denotedby words such as: “right”, “wrong”,“good”, “bad”, “obligation”. Whilenothing in experience itself answers to these concepts, they can begrasped and applied correctly by the understanding to pick out genuineproperties of agents and actions. Since we possess these moralconcepts, which cannot arise in the ways that empiricists allow, theempiricism to which Locke and Hume subscribe must be false.

Are these sufficient grounds for rejecting empiricism as amethodology? If moral concepts were alone in presenting a difficultyfor empiricism, there might be grounds for maintaining thatepistemology, and either denying that there are moral concepts, or atleast denying that we have moral knowledge. Price’s mainargument against empiricism about concept acquisition consists infinding what Mackie later called companions in guilt; i.e., otherconcepts which are indispensable, and which we happily use, thatcannot be explained on empiricist epistemology of this sort.Price’s rather familiar examples include: solidity, substance,power, cause, duration, inertia, infinity, number, identity, equality,and all modal concepts. If empiricists are successfully to defendtheir methodology they must either show that the concepts in questioncan be explained on their epistemology, or bite the bullet and denythat we do have any clear understanding of concepts like these or, atleast, that our ideas about such matters are confused or misleading.For Price, by contrast, it is theunderstanding (a branch ofreason), and not sense experience, that is the source of suchconcepts.

Price is also an Intuitionist in a second and quite different sense inthat he embraces pluralism about basic duties. Those of a utilitarianpersuasion held that all our duties were founded in one fundamentalduty: to be benevolent, in the sense of promoting the well-being ofall parties impartially. Price denies this. He contends, first, thatwe have a duty to give preference to the welfare of some rather thanothers; second, that there are duties that are quite distinct frombenevolence. On the first count, we have positional duties to God, toourselves, and to those with whom we have a special relationship. Onthe second, there are some duties, such as gratitude, veracity, andjustice, which are quite distinct from benevolence. Indeed, Priceclaims, our duties to God do not even include benevolence; it does notmake sense to suppose we canbenefit God, or increase hishappiness, by our obedience and worship.

Price recognizes that our various duties may conflict in a particularcase: the only way to prevent harm may be to lie; acting justly may beimprudent, and so on. He maintains that in some cases one duty isclearly weightier than another and no perplexity arises. But there aremany cases where it is not clear what is the right thing to do, andconscientious people may differ as to which duty should give way insuch cases. There is, however, always a determinate answer to thequestion of which action is right, but as finite creatures we may lackpenetration and wisdom to discern it. Wedgwood (2024) contends thatboth claims follow from Price’s account of the nature of moralproperties. Rightness and wrongness are features oftypes ofaction that belong to them necessarily in virtue of their nature oressence. Where moral considerations conflict, the essence of therelevant type of act will be correspondingly complex, but that essencewill still yield a determinate answer as to whether that act is rightor wrong. Moral disagreement is to be explained, not by appeal to anyvagueness in moral reality, but in the limits of our capacity to graspwhat is determined by a complex essence. Doubt and disagreement aboutwhat we should do in a particular case should not infect ourconfidence in the existence of a determinate and objective moraltruth.

2.2 Moral Epistemology and Metaphysics

As a moral realist, Price rejects all forms of ethical voluntarism,both theological and secular. He also rejects any account that basesmorality on self-interest, as well as the sentimentalist theories ofHutcheson and Hume. A central plank in his arguments against the firsttwo of these positions is what would later become known as the OpenQuestion Argument. Indeed it is Price, and not Moore, that should becredited with its discovery. Price’s challenge, likeMoore’s, poses a dilemma for his opponent. Either the opponentis offering an account of what constitutes rightness and wrongness, orshe is offering an account of whatmakes actions right andwrong. Either answer leads to difficulties. Embracing the first hornleaves the proponent open to the Open Question Argument.

As to the schemes which found morality on self-love, on positive lawsand compacts, or the Divine Will; they must either mean, that moralgood and evil are only other words foradvantageous anddisadvantageous,willed andforbidden. Orthey relate to a very different question; that is, not to thequestion, what is the nature and trueaccount of virtue; butwhat is thesubject-matter of it.

As far as the former may be the intention of the schemes I havementioned, they afford little room for controversy. Right and wrongwhen applied to actions which are commanded or forbidden by the willof God, or that produce good or harm, do not signify merely, that suchactions are commanded or forbidden, or that they are useful orhurtful, but asentiment concerning them and our consequentapprobation or disapprobation of the performance of them. Were notthis true, it would be palpably absurd in any case to ask, whether itisright to obey a command, orwrong to disobey it;and the propositions,obeying a command is right, orproducing happiness is right, would be most trifling. (R16)

(As Raphael points out, it is clear from the rest of the book that by“sentiment”, Price here means opinion, not feeling.)

If, however, the self-interest theorist, or the utilitarian, takes thesecond horn, and is propounding a substantial moral theory about whatmakes actions right or wrong, then she will have to show that hertheory survives critical reflection. Is it really true that we have noreason to do anything unless it is in our self-interest, or unless itproduces happiness? Price is confident that the answer to thesequestions is in the negative, but they can be answered only by carefulthought about our actual moral judgments.

Whether Price’s argument is successful depends on the soundnessof the Open Question Argument about which there is continuingdisagreement. Price has, however, other arguments againstsentimentalism in particular, which is his main target in this book.The disagreement concerns the metaphysical status of moral attributes:are they genuinely properties of actions and agents, or are they bestunderstood as projections of our feelings or sentiments onto actionsand agents?

2.2.1 The battle with sentimentalism

Throughout the eighteenth century there was considerable disagreement,which continues today, between sentimentalists and rationalists, aboutthe basis or origin of morals. On the sentimentalist side were those,such as Hutcheson and Hume, who thought that our moral faculty wasgrounded, not in our ability to reason, but in our capacity toexperience emotions, and pleasure or displeasure—in short, inour sentiments. “Morality is more properly felt than judgedof” (Hume 1739–40: 470; Book III, Part I, Section 2). Weare so constituted that we take pleasure in contemplating somecharacters and actions, while we are displeased by others. Reason doesindeed play a role in moral agency, but a subordinate one. Once ourfeelings have selected our ends, then we need to use reason to findsuitable means to those ends. Despite some differences, most humansshare many of their basic emotional responses; we tend to care aboutthe same things. It is in virtue of this widespread agreement thatthere can be a shared standard of morality. But such agreement iscontingent; we can imagine agents very different from ourselves intheir emotional make-up. If other agents share our moral outlook itwill not be in virtue of our common rationality, but as a result oftheir having a similar range of affective responses to us.

A main strength of sentimentalism is the apparent ease with which itcan explain how our moral attitudes typically motivate us. Since moralattitudes are expressions of the affective rather than the cognitivesides of our nature, there is nothing puzzling about how our desiresand aversions, likes and dislikes, approvings and disapprovings, canplay a motivational role. Rationalism, by contrast, is frequentlycharged with being unable to explain the connection between moralityand motivation. On the rationalist account, it seems, it must bepossible to know what is right or wrong and not care in the least.

In opposition to sentimentalism were ranged those, such as Cudworth,Clarke, Balguy, and Price, who adhered to the more traditional viewthat moral distinctions are perceived by reason, and that reason hasauthority to direct our lives. Reason tells us what goals we shouldaim at, as well as how best to achieve them. There is no mystery aboutmoral motivation. As rational beings, we are motivated to do what werecognise we have reason to do, and we have reason to do those thingsthat are morally required of us, and to eschew what is morallywrong.

2.2.2 The battle with sentimentalism: defense

Price offers both defensive and offensive strategies againstsentimentalism. On the defensive side, he tries to meet the followingobjections to his view.

1. How can reason, rather than our feelings of approval anddisapproval, be the origin of our moral concepts?
2. How can we discern moral properties and make true moral claimsabout them?
3. What is the connection between feeling and cognition?
4. How can reason move us to act?

I briefly discussed the first two questions in§2.1. It turns out that the last two are connected.

Sentimentalists claim that we adopt a moral stance in virtue of ourhaving feelings of approval or disapproval towards an object, action,or practice. Price maintains that this gets things the wrong wayround: we have feelings of approval towards an action or a person,because we apprehend that the action is right, or the personmorally praiseworthy.

I cannot perceive an action to be right withoutapproving it;orapprove it, without being conscious of somesatisfaction and complacency. … Tobeholdvirtue is toadmire it. (R 59)

When we are conscious that an action isfit to be done, orthat itought to be done, it is not conceivable that we canremainuninfluenced, or want amotive to action.… An affection or inclination to rectitude cannot be separatedfrom the view of it. (R 186–7)

Further, to recognize an action as right, or wrong,is torecognize that one has an obligation to do it, or refrain from doingit.

[V]irtue,as such, has a real obligatory power. (R 105)

From the account given ofobligation, it follows thatrectitude is alaw as well as arule to us;that it not onlydirects, butbinds all, as far asit is perceived … Reason is the guide, thenatural andauthoritative guide of a rational being. (R 108)

How absurd it is to enquire, whatobliges us to practisevirtue? … [I]t is the very same as to ask, why are weobliged to do what we areobliged to do. (R 110)

In the passages above, Price is making three claims that are, on hisview, inseparable. The first is an espousal of motivationalinternalism about obligation. To recognize an action as morallyrequired (or forbidden)is to be motivated to do it (orabstain from doing it). The second is a claim about the connectionbetween cognition and feeling: the recognition of the moral characterof an actionnecessarily arouses appropriate feelings in us.We cannot, for example, knowingly breach the moral law withoutsuffering remorse and pain. Thirdly, he takes it that, if we aremorally obliged to act then we are obliged to act, period.Why? Because the principles of morality are principles of practicalreason; thus we have decisive reason to do what morality requires. Forsome philosophers, the question of what I ought to do has a moral anda deliberative reading. Once I have determined whatmoralityrequires of me, the deliberative question of what, all thingsconsidered, I should do is still open. Price denies this gap. For himthe question of why I ought to do what I morally ought to do makes nosense, for it is simply asking why I ought to do what I ought.

In more modern parlance, Price is claiming that, in our practicaldeliberations, the notions of obligation and duty, right and wrong,arenormative ones. Normative features are internally tied to(motivation to) action, since to think one ought or should dosomething is to think there are decisive reasons to do it, and tothink there is decisive reason to do something is,ceterisparibus, to do it. This analysis supplies Price with an answer tothe challenge that Rational Intuitionists are unable to explain howawareness of moral facts is sufficient to motivate us. Although moralweakness may cause us to fail to do what we recognize we have decisivereason to do, no rational creature can be wholly unmoved by theawareness that she has such reason, and if she fails to act she isless than fully practically rational in this respect.

These claims are, of course, controversial, and there is no space todiscuss them here. But we might note that Price’s position is asold as Western Philosophy itself. It is, at its heart, a Platonistview of value. Rational beings cannot fail to love and be moved bywhat is good; if they love less than they should it is because theyare not fully rational agents.

2.2.3 The battle with sentimentalism: offense

Hutcheson, and following him, Hume, hold that there is an implantedmoralsense, the deliverances of which guide us in matters ofmorals. For Hutcheson, there are more than the five senses. As well astouch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing, there is, for example, thesense of beauty. Certain objects afford aesthetic delight, whileothers disgust us. The operation of all senses depends on the actualconstitution of human nature, and that is a contingent matter. It isperfectly conceivable that, like the dung beetle, we should find thesmell of faeces attractive. Similarly, on this view, the structure ofour moral sense depends on contingent facts about our affectiveresponses. It is this aspect of the view that Price finds mostintolerable: had our emotional reactions been different then we wouldhave had a different moral sense, which would have been no better orworse than the one we have—simply different.

Are our moral judgments the product of sense or of understanding?Price’s main argument for the latter view is an appeal to moralphenomenology. It is, he asserts, “scarcely conceivable”that on careful introspection someone should ascribe to the viewthat

when he thinks gratitude or beneficence to beright, heperceives nothingtrue of them, andunderstandsnothing, but only receives an impression from asense. (R44)

In short, Price offers the by now very familiar challenge to thesentimentalist or expressivist to explain how it is, if her view iscorrect, that we speak and think as if moral judgments are true orfalse independently of what anyone feels on these matters.

The moral sense theorist offers our awareness of color, sound, andsmell as a model or analogy by which to understand the sentimentalistaccount of moral properties.

Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heatand cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities inobjects, but perceptions in the mind. (Hume 1739–40: 469;III.i.1)

That is, they are akin to secondary rather than primary qualities.Price, in his criticism of the moral sense theorist fastens on to thisanalogy. However, the cogency of Price’s objections is somewhatclouded by the fact that both parties subscribe to a controversial andrather implausible account of secondary qualities. To appreciate thispoint, we need to say more about the then widely accepted distinctionbetween primary and secondary qualities that had its origin inLocke.

Our sense-organs enable the mind to receive ideas of objects andevents in our immediate environment. Some of these ideas, those of theprimary properties or qualities, such as shape, size, and solidity,are both caused by and standardlyresemble those qualities asthey actually are in the objects themselves. Thus the computer screenI am looking at nowlooks oblong andis oblong.Under ideal conditions, the way the primary qualities of an objectappear accurately represent its real nature, both as portrayed bycommon sense and as understood by scientific investigation. Bycontrast, the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble theproperties in the object that cause us to have those ideas. There isnothing in the objects themselves that resembles our ideas of color,sound, and so on. The story, as revealed by scientific investigation,of what is going on in the physical world when someone sees a redball, or smells the aroma of their morning coffee, would not mentioncolors or smells at all. Rather, the objects in question are soconstituted that, in suitable conditions, they emit waves or particlesthat stimulate the sense-organs in certain ways causing us to have thecharacteristic secondary quality experience. The full scientificaccount of how this happens is complicated, more complicated thanpeople in Locke’s time realized, but however the story goes,there will be nothing in the world at all like colors-as-we-see-them,or sounds-as-we-hear-them. Since the ideas of secondary qualities thatarise in our minds when our sense-organs are stimulated depend on thenature and constitution of our sensory apparatus, as well as on thenature of external reality, it follows that creatures whosesense-organs differ from ours would have a different kind of secondaryquality experience. Nor is this merely a thought experiment; it seemsthat insects, for example, make color distinctions that do not matchours in significant respects.

So far, the theory has talked about theideas of secondaryqualities, and their relation to the physical goings on that lead tothese ideas arising in the mind. But whatare colors, sounds,and smells? Two accounts can be found in Locke. First, there is thedispositional theory: secondary qualities are powers or dispositionalproperties in the object to produce certain ideas in us. Thus to saythat something is, for example, red is to say that it has a capacityor power, based in the physical microstructure of its surface, tocause the characteristic idea of red in normal human observers instandard conditions. Second, there is the subjective theory: colors,sounds, etc. arenot in objects; rather, they are identifiedwith the ideas in the perceiving subject caused by those objects. Bothaccounts exist in tension in Locke, though it is now generally agreedthat the former view represents his “official” position.The dispositional account has the advantage of preserving the truth ofmany of the things that we want to say about secondary qualities: foran object standardly retains a power even when it is not beingexercised. Salt is soluble whether or not it is immersed in water; redobjects remain red under lighting conditions that make them look adifferent color, or even in the absence of light. But the subjectiveaccount gained considerable currency through the writings of Berkeleyand Hume, who took it to be the one Locke was offering.

The subjectivist allows that we do normally take colors, sounds, andsmells to be properties of things existing outside of us; similarly,we take right and wrong, vice and virtue, to be properties of actionsand agents. In both cases, the sentimentalist claims, we are mistaken,and in virtue of a similar mechanism in each case. We project thecontents of the mind on to reality; or, as Hume rather charmingly putsit (1739–40, 167; 1.3.14), the mind has a tendency to“spread itself on external objects”. In both cases,reflection shows that, contrary to the way they are presented inexperience, these features in fact have no existence outside the mind.If we can be mistaken in the case of secondary qualities, we canequally be mistaken in the case of moral qualities, so the moralphenomenology to which Price appeals is no more decisive in the onecase than the other. Since Price accepts the subjective account ofsecondary qualities, he would seem to be vulnerable to thisriposte.

In response, Price denies that the two cases are parallel. The reasonwe must reject the phenomenology in the case of secondary qualities isthat the ascription of them to objects is seen, on philosophicalexamination, to beincoherent. This is not so in the case ofmoral properties. Since it makes sense to suppose that they areproperties of actions and agents, we have no reason, in their case, toreject the phenomenology as mistaken.

Acoloured body, if we speak accurately, is the sameabsurdity with asquare sound. We need no experience to provethat heat, cold, colours, tastes, etc. are not real qualities ofbodies; because the idea of matter and of these qualities areincompatible. But is there indeed any such incompatibility betweenactions andright? Or any such absurdity inaffirming the one of the other? Are the ideas of them as different asthe idea of a sensation and its cause? (R 46)

What is it about secondary qualities that makes the supposition thatthey are properties of matter absurd? Price’s argument has twopremisses. First, only conscious beings can have sensations:

Sensations, as such, are modes of consciousness, or feelings of asentient being, which must be of a nature totally different from theparticular causes which produce them. (R 46)

Second, colors, sounds, tastes, smells, are sensations. Price uses theexample of pleasure and pain to illustrate the point. The entry of theknife into the body causes the person to feel pain, but it is absurdto think that the pain might be a property of the knife; pains canonly be a property of conscious perceivers. But the colors we see andthe sounds we hear are equally sensations. Therefore, it isincoherent to suppose that they might be properties ofmatter.

This argument appears to beg the question. Price’s objectioncomes to this: we knowa priori that realism is an error inthe case of secondary qualities, but it remains anopenquestion whether it is an error in the case of moral properties.But the sentimentalist can maintain that, strictly speaking, the oneidentification is as much a metaphysical error as the other, though wemake them often enough in ordinary life. It only seems to Price to bean open question in the moral case because he rejects the metaphysicsof the sentimentalist. But that is precisely what is in dispute. Ifmoral properties are affective responses, it is incoherent to ascribethem to objects.

There is much that is confused in this dispute between Price and thesentimentalists. Conscious states are properties of the perceiver, andnot of the perceived object, but the claim that colors, sounds, andsmells are essentially conscious states is not well supported. Norshould the ideas of these properties be classified assensations, on the model of pleasure and pain. It isnoteworthy that, whereas no-one supposes that the sensations ofpleasure and pain can be predicated of whatever causes the pain, thisis not true of colors, tastes, and sounds. But if it is as absurd tosuppose that a body is colored as it is to suppose that what causes uspain is itself in pain, why is the first identification so often madeand the second not? There must be some difference between the twocases that explains this tendency, but any such difference casts doubton the claim that they should be regarded as being equallysensations.

Suppose the sentimentalist were to switch to the more plausibledispositional account of both secondary qualities and moralproperties. Colors, tastes etc. really are properties ofobjects—it is just that they are dispositional and notcategorical, as we might at first be tempted to suppose. Similarly,actions really are right and wrong, but these are dispositional,rather than categorical, properties. Certain features of actions andagents are apt to arouse feelings of approval or disapproval inus.

If we adopt the dispositional account, it might seem that Price hasnow lost any dialectical advantage. In both the perceptual and themoral cases the theory lines up with the phenomenology. Broad (1971:208) plausibly claims, however, that Price would also have rejectedthe dispositional theory of moral properties. One of Price’sprincipal objections to the sentimentalist account is that it makesthe truth of moral claims contingent on our natures—and ournatures might have been very different. On this view, what we approveor disapprove of depends on

apositive constitution of our minds, or … animplanted andarbitrary principle by which arelish is given us for certain moral objects and forms andaversion to others. (R 14)

This objection applies as much to the dispositional as to thesubjective account. Especially worrying for a theist like Price, thereis no reason to suppose on the sentimentalist view that God shares ourmoral sentiments. Indeed, Hume had already drawn this conclusion in aletter to Hutcheson (Hume [L], 38–40 = Volume I, Letter 16, 16March 1740).

Indeed Price goes further and claims that, were sentimentalism true,God would have an attitude of complete moral indifference toeverything that happens. For he knows that all actions and states arein themselves neither right nor wrong, neither good nor bad;nor, lacking our emotional nature, can he be supposed to make moraldiscriminations based on feeling.

The subjective and the dispositional sentimentalist models are equallyvulnerable to Price’s implanted sense complaint; on eitheraccount the standard of correctness for our moral judgments is set byour contingent human nature. Price, by contrast, insists that moralprinciples are necessarily and not merely contingently true. Whatmakes them true issolely theintrinsic nature ofthe actions or character that they characterize. To use a more modernparlance, Price is a moral realist, who holds that there arestance-independent moral facts.

2.3 Necessary moral principles

If there are necessary moral principles, it might seem that they mustbe exceptionless. If lying is, in virtue of its nature, wrong, thenall lying is wrong. And the same will hold for any other principles.But such moral rigorism seems deeply implausible. While some (mostnotably Kant) have bitten the bullet, most of us believe that thereare circumstances in which it is permissible, or even required, tolie. Price agrees. Principles can conflict and none automaticallytrumps the others. Which principle should govern our actions willdepend on the circumstances. In some cases of conflict, it is clearwhat morality demands. But in many cases it is not: “doubtarises; and we may thus be rendered entirely incapable of determiningwhat we ought to chuse” (R 167). The lack of clarity here isepistemic, not metaphysical: “Truth and right in allcircumstances, require one determinate way of acting” (R 167).But since what that way is can be unclear, there can be disagreementsbetween right-minded people about what to do. None of this, however,impugns our knowledge of the fundamental principles.

The principles themselves, it should be remembered, are self-evident;and to conclude the contrary … because of the obscurityattending several cases wherein a competition arises between theseveral principles of morality, is very unreasonable. It is not unlikeconcluding, that, … because it may not in some instances beeasy to determine what will be the effect of different forces,variously compounded and acting contrary to each other; therefore wecan have no assurance what any of them acting separately will produce,or so much as know that there is any such thing as force. (R 168)

Price has, in effect, anticipated Ross’s celebrated distinctionbetweenprima facie duties and duties proper, even down tousing the same analogy about conflicting forces to illustrate thedistinction.

2.4 Virtue

2.4.1 Virtuous motivation

What is it to be virtuous? A virtuous act is one that is motivated bythe sense of duty—a recognition of what morality requires andforbids. What of actions that are motivated by other concerns? WhilePrice denies any moral worth to actions not motivated by a sense ofduty, he seems to allow that, where motives are mixed, moral creditshould be given to the degree to which considerations of dutymotivate.

Butinstinctive benevolence is no principle of virtue, norare any actions flowing merely from it virtuous. … All actions… appear to have as much less moral value, as they are derivedmore from natural instinct, and less attended with reflexion on theirreasonableness and fitness. (R 191)

How is it that humans so often ignore the call of duty? The answerlies in the other motivational forces in our nature, such asself-love, desires, and the emotions, which can conflict withdutifulness. But we are not helpless in the face of these impulses; wecan resist at least some of them at will, and we can learn to controlthem better by developing our character. How our character develops isto some extent under our control because personality traits can bestrengthened or weakened by practice. Since we are imperfectlyrational, we should strive to modify our desires and feelings so thatit is easier for us to do our duty.

But in what does our duty consist? Price distinguishes between what heterms abstract and practical virtue, or what was later (by Prichardand Ross) called objective and subjective duty. An agent’sobjective duty is what she is morally required to do, given the actualfacts of the case; her subjective duty lies in what she should do,given herreasonable beliefs about the facts of the case. Itis for succeeding or failing to do one’s subjective duty thatone should be praised or blamed, for an imperfect agent cannot berequired to avoid all errors of fact.

2.4.2 Supererogation

What is it to beperfectly virtuous? Is it sufficient simplyto perform all our duties, or is there something even better, as manyhave supposed: meritorious acts of heroism or saintliness that exceedwhat is morally required and are singled out for special praise? Pricemaintains that there are no such supererogatory acts—acts thatgo beyond the call of duty. Why? Price holds that any action must beeither right (i.e., required), or wrong, or indifferent.Supererogatory actions do not fit this pattern. They are not requiredbut their performance is not morally indifferent. Rejecting thesupererogatory leads Price to a counter-intuitive conclusion.

To aim at actingbeyond obligation, being the same withactingcontrary to obligation; and doingmore thanis fit to be done, the same withdoing wrong. (R 124)

If we find this doctrine harsh, there are two possible responses. Thefirst is to add a further category to Price’s tripartitedistinction. Price suggests that some may wish to deny that“right” and “obligatory” are co-extensive.

All right actions are not so in precisely the same sense; and it might… be granted, that some things are right in such a sense as yetnot to be our indispensable duty. (R 120)

Price’s only comment on this approach is that it would underminea symmetry between “right” and “wrong” as heis using them. It allows cases where an action is right but notrequired, but there are still no cases in which an action is wrong butnot forbidden. Price does not reject this approach but thinks itunnecessarily complicated.

He prefers to retain his original tripartite structure, but to softenany apparent harshness by further explanation. Many of ourobligations, such as that of being benevolent, are framed only ingeneral and vague terms. How and when we fulfill them is, to someextent, up to us. Since it is unclear exactly how much is required ofus by way of kind deeds, a truly virtuous person will err on the sideof generosity. The praise we bestow on them is not, as the proponentof supererogation supposes, because they exceeded the demands of duty,but because they showed such scrupulous care to ensure that they didnot fall short of what was required of them. This solution has theadvantage of explaining why the heroic or saintly frequently claimthat they were, after all, only doing their duty, rather than claimingthat they were exceeding it.

2.4.3 Promising

Most of Price’s claims are defensible, and many have beenadopted by other prominent thinkers in the Intuitionist tradition. Butthere is one issue on which he has generally, but not universally,been held to have gone astray: namely, the source of our obligation tokeep our promises. Instead of taking it to be a distinct species ofduty, Price holds that “fidelity to promises isproperly a branch or instance ofveracity” (R155). We must distinguish, Price claims, between statements about thepresent and statements about the future. Expressing an intention or aresolution to act does not, Price allows, give rise to obligation.

For when I say I intend to do such and such, I affirm only a presentfact.—But topromise, is to declare that such a thingshall be done. … In this case, it is not enough toacquit me from the charge of falsehood, that Iintend to dowhat I promise, but it must be actually done, agreeably to theassurances given. (R 155)

Price allows that I can confidently and reasonably make predictionsabout events outside my control that subsequently turn out to befalse, without being guilty oflying. But in the case ofactions that lie within our power

the falsehood must be known and wilful, and entirely imputable to ourown neglect and guilt. (R 156)

This view has been attacked on a number of counts. First, acts oflying are datable; when someone lies they do so at a particular time,in a particular place, and to a particular audience. While thecontent of a false assertion may concern the future, the lieoccurs at the time of utterance. If someone fails to do what they saidshe would, she does not lie at that later time, for at that later timeshe asserts nothing. Nor does she lie when she says she will do itbecause,ex hypothesi, she sincerely believed at that timethat she would, if it were in her power. If the deed does not followher words she may be guilty of many things: weakness of will, orlaziness, cowardice, pusillanimity, depending on the circumstances. Ifshe has led someone to rely on her earlier assertion, she may beaccused of breach of faith, or going back on her word. But what she isnot guilty of islying. She would only be guilty of that ifshe was not expressing a sincere belief when she made the originalassertion.

Second, Price’s view fails to account for the fact that promisesare madeto particular individuals. Suppose Shakira promisesTom, in the presence of Miguel, that she will pick him up at theairport when he returns from his journey. Miguel later discovers thathe is flying in to the airport at the same time as Tom and awaitsShakira’s arrival hoping for a ride. Each has taken Shakira ather word and relied on her for transport home. On Price’saccount, if Shakira does not show up (without an adequate excuse) thenshe has lied to both of them, and hence both have the same cause forcomplaint. However, Tom has a complaint against Shakira thatMiguel does not have, for Shakira’s promise was to Tomand not to Miguel. It is Tom that she has let down, and not Miguel.Arguably, Miguel hasno complaint against Shakira. Hereasonably believed that she would show up, but she had offered him noassurances. Further, only Tom can let Shakira off her promise, whileMiguel has no such power.

There are, indeed,lying promises, but these are ones wherethe promisor has, at the time he makes it, no intention of carrying itout. If my promise is sincere but I fail (without adequate excuse) tofulfill it I may be a scoundrel, but not alyingscoundrel.

These are weighty criticisms, but they may be uncharitable to Price.Though veracity is, of course, the virtue that concerns truth, Pricehas a wider conception of what it involves than merely avoidinglying.

Under this head, I would comprehend impartiality and honesty of mindin our enquiries after truth, as well as a sacred regard to it in allwe say; fair and ingenuous dealing; such an openness and simplicity oftemper as exclude guile and prevarication, and all the contemptiblearts of craft, equivocation and hypocrisy; fidelity to ourengagements; sincerity and uprightness in our transactions withourselves as well as others; and the careful avoiding of all secretattempts to deceive ourselves, and to evade or disguise the truth inexamining our own characters. (R 154–5)

This is a good description, perhaps, not of the narrower notion ofveracity, but of the wider virtue of honesty (or straightforwardness,or trustworthiness). And one might reasonably describe someone whofails to keep their word as dishonest. Moreover, guile and deceptionneed not involve lying. Iago does notlie when he leavesDesdemona’s handkerchief for Othello to find. And there is being“economical with the truth”, and casuistry of all kinds.Understood thus, there is nothing untoward in Price grouping thesedesirable qualities together. But “veracity”, with itsnarrow implication of truth-telling, does not happily cover this widerange of characteristics and Price often forgets his officialdefinition and equates honesty with truthfulness.

Part of what Price is doing is to resolve a puzzle raised by Hume intheTreatise.

[S]ince the act of the mind, which enters into a promise, and producesits obligation, is neither the resolving, desiring, nor willing anyparticular performance, it must necessarily be thewilling ofthatobligation, which arises from the promise. Nor is thisonly a conclusion of philosophy; but is entirely conformable to ourcommon ways of thinking and of expressing ourselves, when we say thatwe are bound by our own consent, and that the obligation arises fromour mere will and pleasure. The only question, then, is, whether therebe not a manifest absurdity in supposing this act of the mind, andsuch an absurdity as no man cou’d fall into, whose ideas are notconfounded with prejudice and the fallacious use of language.(1739–40: 516–7; III.ii.5)

Hume’s puzzle is: how can I, by a mere act of will,create anew obligation? In making a promise, I would thereby declare thatI am creating an obligation to do something, that was previouslymorally indifferent. I would somehow make it the case that I am nowunder an obligation I was not under before. Yet nothing about the actI promise to do has changed. How can mere words transform the morallandscape?

Price agrees with Hume that obligations cannot be created simply by anact of will, but denies that this is the correct conception ofpromising. He first tackles this problem when defending hisanti-voluntarist account of obligation. On his view, which he takesfrom Cudworth, each action has a nature in virtue of which it isrequired, forbidden, or indifferent.

No will … can renderany thing good and obligatory,which was not so antecedently, and from eternity. (R 50)

If an act is morally indifferent, then no mere act of will can changeits moral status. Price considers the objection that the command ofGod, or a sovereign, may do just that. Price replies:

It is true, the doing of any indifferent thing may become obligatory,in consequence of a command from a being possessed of rightfulauthority over us: But … in this case, the command produces achange in the circumstances of the agent, and that what, inconsequence of it, becomes obligatory, is not the same with whatbefore was indifferent. (R 51)

As Price puts it, the “matter of the action” remains thesame, but it now falls under a moral law that it did not before. Invirtue of changed circumstances, what was previously indifferent canbecome an instance of gratitude, or obedience to a lawful command or,indeed, an instance of promise-keeping. In this last case we shouldnot suppose

that our own will or breath alters the nature of things by making whatis indifferent not so. … All that the promise does, is,… to cause that to be aninstance of right conduct [inearlier editions, Price writes ‘of a general and eternal duty]which was not so before. (R 51)

Price’s answer to Hume is that, though we cannotcreatean obligation by our mere will and pleasure, we canplaceourselves under an obligation by what we do or say, includingwhen what we say expresses our will. On this central point, Price iscorrect. As we have seen, Price holds that the species of obligationunder which I place myself in promising is veracity. It may be thatthe moral category of honesty or trustworthiness would better capturewhat Price wants to say, but that is of comparatively secondaryimportance.

3. Theology

Price’s writings on theology and philosophy of religion areextensive and complex. After a brief discussion of his views aboutGod’s nature and the arguments for his existence, this sectionwill focus on those aspects of his views that bear on morality, andhis discussion of the credibility of miracles.

3.1A priori Arguments for God’s existence

Price appended to theReview a “Dissertation on theBeing and Attributes of the Deity”, in which he largely followsSamuel Clarke’sa priori arguments to show that theremust be a first cause that is perfect in every respect. He begins witha version of the well-known argument from contingency, which proceedsfrom things that exist contingently to something that existsnon-contingently, i.e., necessarily. Price accepts the argument butholds that previous writers have not properly explained the nature ofthe necessity of God’s existence. The necessity in question isnot what he terms “relative” or“consequential” necessity, as when we say there must be acause of every effect. Rather,

the impossibility of not existing implied in thenecessity ofGod’s existence is … an impossibility appearingimmediately, and carrying its own evidence with it; animpossibility in thenature of the thing itself. (R 287)

Price then goes on, in short order, to deduce several conclusions.First, that the “necessity of God’s existenceimplies that it is necessary … to the veryconceptionof all other existence” (R 288). What can be conceived without adivine ground can be conceived as existing alone. Such beings“might be conceived to existwithout him, which is thesame as conceiving him not to exist, and consequently, with thepossibility of his non-existence” (R 288), which last,Price has argued, is impossible.

What exists necessarily can have no limits or imperfections. For whatis limited could have had different limits, and so the limited hasonly contingent existence. Finally, and for our purposes mostimportantly, a necessary being does not possess its properties, asother things do, byparticipation in those properties assomething distinct from it. Suppose, for example, God were to beomnipresent by existingin every part of space, then we couldconceive of infinite spacewithout him. But if space weredistinct from him we would need an explanation of why he existed inall of it, rather than in some part, or in none. The same, Price says,is true of God’s relation to all his attributes, which he mustpossess

in a manner peculiar to himself. He is intelligent, not by theapprehension of truth, but bybeing truth. (R290)

And so on, for all his other attributes.

There can be numberless beings who are powerful, wise and benevolent;but there can be butone being of whose nature, power, wisdomand benevolence in necessary union and forming one idea, are theessential attributes. (R 295)

Price did not publish this piece for some time, and remained concernedthat the “particular imperfection of language” renderedhim “incapable of stating [his view] with sufficient correctnessand clearness” (R 286). It is indeed rather puzzling. His viewis clearly influenced by the neo-Platonism which, presumably, he getsfrom Cudworth. Necessary truths depend on the Forms, on theirself-identity. The Forms constitute a purely intelligible realm, andother things are intelligible only in so far as they participate inthe Forms. Since the Forms are purely intelligible beings their modeof being, the manner in which they exist is by being thought. Thatwhich thinks the Forms, namely God, is that in which they are. Theycannot exist independently, because their very being is to be a partof his nature. And it is his own nature governs his will.

Be that as it may, Price’s account of God’s nature enableshim to deal with a standard objection to those who reject the DivineCommand Theory of morality. If we conceive of morality as a set oftruths that are outside God’s control, are we not demeaningGod’s sovereignty, by supposing that there is something bothexternal to him and co-eternal with him? Price’s answer is thatGod’s rectitude consists, not in obeying some principles that hedid not create, cannot change, and must accept, but rather in simplyfollowing his own nature.

3.2 Natural Theology

Like Cleanthes in Hume’sDialogues, Price holds thatbelief in a Designer is immediate and irresistible. “Thisvisible universe … isself-evidently, an exhibition ofthe power and wisdom of a powerful and wise cause” (R 285) Butwhat of his moral qualities? Although in his introduction to the“Dissertation”, Price claims thata posterioriarguments also show the Designer to be good, in Chapter X of theReview, Price strikes a cautious note. There may be much moreof good than bad in the works of that Designer, but we might wonderwhether that is sufficient grounds for drawing conclusions about theDesigner’s moral character. For a malicious being could producehappiness, and perhaps the Designer grants us happiness now only tofrustrate our expectations in order to increase our misery later bycontrast to our present state. Price himself thinks that, despite suchpossibilities, we are justified in inferring God’s goodness fromhis creation but accepts that such inferences are open to cavil.However, as a moral realist, Price does not need to rely on argumentsfrom the distribution of good and bad things in the world. For ifbenevolence is, in itself better than malice, justice than injustice,and so on, and if an intelligent mind must both recognize and beguided by these thoughts, then we can knowa priori that Godis morally perfect.

Nevertheless, it is a striking fact that virtue is not alwaysproportionately rewarded, nor vice punished. Price is more realisticon this point than Butler who said “Self-love then, thoughconfined to the interest of the present world, does in generalperfectly coincide with virtue” (1729: Sermon 3, para. 8 [2017:36]). Not only do the virtuous often suffer and the vicious flourish,but the virtuous are open to peculiar psychological sufferings ofwhich the vicious know nothing. They may suffer from an overscrupulous conscience, from guilt, and consciousness of their ownunworthiness.

It can scarcely be denied with respect to wickedness, that it wouldvery frequently be much better for a man, (I mean for his own presentease) to bethoroughly wicked thanpartially so. (R259)

So much is this the case that Price contends

this world appears fitted more to be a school for theeducation of virtue, than a station of honour to it. (R257)

What may we infer from these rather dismal facts with respect to afuture life? If we are moral sentimentalists, nothing. But if weaccept moral realism then we know that a wise Designer will also be amorally good one. From this we may conclude that there is some futurescene of life in which these imbalances between virtue and reward willbe rectified. We cannot, however, infer that this future life will beendless, for the injustices of this life could be rectified in afinite time.

That we are to be delivered to from death to a new life that shallnever end ofcomplete happiness, this is unspeakablymore than any arguments from distributive justice can teach us toexpect. (R 263)

It is revelation alone that can assure us of God’s graciousnessin this respect.

3.3 Miracles

Price’s illuminating discussion of Hume’s notorious attackon the credibility of miracles is informed both by his interest inprobability theory, and by his good sense. Hume’s argument, in anutshell, is that there can never be sufficient reason to believe in aviolation of a law of nature because we know,a priori, thatany evidence from testimony for the occurrence of a miracle will beoutweighed by our evidence from long experience that such things donot happen. Our confidence in the reliability of testimony and ourconfidence in some generalization being a law of nature have the samesource: experience. But whereas we have often found testimony to befalse, the experiences on which our belief in a law of nature isfounded are exceptionless. If there were exceptions, we would concludethat we were not dealing with a law of nature. So we always have moreevidence that a miracle did not occur than that it did. Hume presentsus with a characteristic fork. If what is reported would violate a lawof nature, then we should not give credence to the report. If what isreported is merely uncommon, then we might have sufficient evidence tobelieve it, but the event would not be miraculous.

Price disputes four claims, on which he thinks Hume’s argumentrests. The most important are the first three.

1. “That the credit we give to testimony, is derivedsolely from experience”
2. “That a miracle is a factcontrary toexperience”
3. “That the previous improbability of a fact is a proofagainst it, diminishing, in proportion to the degree of it, the prooffrom testimony for it” (D 389).

Price’s rebuttals are as follows.

1. Our confidence in the reliability of testimony rests, and shouldrest, not only on the frequency with which testimony has beenconfirmed balanced against the frequency with which it has beendisconfirmed, but also on our knowledge of the character(s) of thosebearing witness, and of people in general.

   One action, or one conversation with a man, may convince us of hisintegrity and induce us to believe his testimony, though we havenever, in a single instance, experienced his veracity. (D 399)

2. “A miracle is more properly an eventdifferent fromexperience thancontrary to it” (D 402). Testimony toan unusual event, while it provides evidence for the occurrence ofthat event, does notcontradict our experience of whathappened before, or even conflict with it. We would continue to be asjustified as we were previously in believing that this kind of eventhad not happened before. Prior uniform observation is notexperiential evidence against the occurrence of the unusual.“[I]t can be no part of any one’s experience, that thecourse of nature will continue always the same” (D 402). Werethis not so, we could never have reason to believe that something wepreviously took to be a law of nature was not in fact one.
3. Price argues that it is very common for “the slightesttestimony to overcome an almost infinite improbability” (D 406).The prior probability of many common facts is extremely low, yet theevidence of testimony is sufficient to confirm them. Take an examplewhere the prior probability can be calculated: the odds against anyparticular distribution of cards in a game of Bridge are enormous. Yetthe testimony of the players as to what was in each hand is quitesufficient to establish that as a fact. What is more, Price argues,variations in the prior improbability of the event are irrelevant whenit comes to the weight of testimony. “The only causes offalsehood in testimony are the intention to deceive, and the danger ofbeing deceived” (D 415). But the degree of prior improbabilitydoes not increase or diminish either of these.

   Improbabilities …as such, do not affect thecapacity of testimony to report truth. They … shouldnot be considered as acounter-evidence invalidating, inproportion to their degree, its reports.—But tho’ this istrue, it by no means follows, that they may not in many circumstancesaffect thecredit of testimony, or cause us to question itsveracity. (D 417)

As Hume pointed out, mankind are lovers of the marvelous, andraconteurs delight in feeding that credulity. If someone reports atruly astonishing event, especially if it redounds to thenarrator’s credit, or supports some ideology she is keen topromote, that may lead us “to question the faithfulness of areport, and give just ground to suspect a design to misrepresent orexaggerate” (D 420). Price points out, however, that this onlyapplies when the reporter is aware of the marvelous nature of theirtale.Mere coincidence does not diminish the evidentialweight of testimony.

[W]ere a person to tell us that … at the time of drawing alottery, he happened to hear his age, the day of the month, and thedate of the year drawn together, we should scarcely believe him,tho’ we know that he was not more unlikely to hear these numbersdrawn, than any other particular numbers. But if the same person wasonly to tell us the numbers themselves, and the coincidence whichstrikes us was entirely our own discovery, we should have just thesame reason for believing his account, as if there had been no suchcoincidence. (D 422–3)

The upshot is that, in Price’s view, the debate about thecredibility of the miracles on which Christianity is founded, shouldneither focus on the abstract possibility of evidence for miracles,nor on their prior improbability, but, rather, on the particularquestion of whether the Apostles were either deceived or werethemselves deceivers. Price, needless to say, is confident of victoryon this ground, though others may demur.

4. Liberty

Price distinguishes four different sorts of liberty all of which, heclaims, have a common theme.

The first two concern the issue of free will and moral responsibility;the second two concern issues of political governance. Nevertheless,Price contends, they are all forms of liberty because “there isone general idea that runs through them all; … the idea ofself-direction or self-government” (P 22)

4.1 Free will, rationality, and moral agency

Price distinguishes, in a way that anticipates Kant, two ways in whichmy action may be free: the first, physical liberty, is freedom tochoose; the second is moral autonomy. Freedom of choice is requiredfor agency and hence for moral responsibility. But that freedom allowsus to act wrongly as well as rightly, to be irrational as well asrational, to go astray as well as to go aright. When we go astray,Price contends, by doing something we know we shouldn’t, we feelourselves unfree, in that we have lost control. We lack self-masteryor moral autonomy: we have succumbed to temptation, instead of obeyingthe moral law. As with Kant, moral autonomy is the triumph of bothrationality and morality over countervailing desires, since we alwayshave most reason to fulfill our moral obligations. Price contendsalso, in good Platonic fashion, that when we follow virtue we do whatwe (really) want. It is fairly common to distinguish those parts ofone’s personality with which one identifies, and that are takento be its central core, and those impulses that are seen as external,alien, or even threatening. The metaphor of addiction or enslavementis virtually irresistible in explaining this distinction: we are underattack by passions which can take control of us if we are not careful,so that we no longer do whatwe want to do, but what thesealien forces or siren voices tempt us to do. If we give in too oftenwe will have lost the battle and our autonomy; we will no longer be incharge of our own lives, but succumb to what we reject, and even hate.Some philosophers hold that the agent has considerable choice indetermining which parts of her personality are central and whichperipheral. Price claims, however, that the central core of ouridentity is metaphysically fixed.

[What] is most properly aman’s self … is… not his passions, but his reason or his judgment, prescribingwhat is right, and prohibiting what is wrong. The conscience of a manis the man; the reflecting principle is our supreme principle. It iswhat gives our distinction as intelligent creatures; and whenever weact contrary to it, we violate our natures, and are at variance withourselves. (Price 1816: 208, quoted in D. O. Thomas 1977: 170)

In short, physical liberty is a necessary condition of the capacity todirect one’s actions at all; moral liberty is exercising thatagency to direct one’s actions as normative realityrequires.

4.2 Determinism and agent-causation

There is much to suggest that Price is a libertarian who deniespsychological determinism and embraces agent-causation instead. It iswe, and not our psychological states, that determine ouractions. The self stands above the fray, as it were, and decides whichreasons or motives we will act on. The following passages aretypical.

Determination requires an efficient cause. If that cause is the beinghimself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longerhis determination; that is,he is no longer thedeterminer, but the motive, or whatever else any one will say to bethe cause of the determination. To ask, what effectsourdetermination, is the very same with asking who did an action, afterbeing informed that such a one did it. (R 181–2)

[It is] very plain, that motives can have no concern ineffecting [the agent’s] determination … Whatwould be more absurd than to say, that our inclinations act upon us,or compel us; that our desires and fearsput us into motion,orproduce our volitions; that is, areagents? (R183n)

D. O. Thomas (1977: 160–2) points out, however, that there arepassages in Price in which he appears to embrace psychologicaldeterminism, of which this is one of the most striking.

Were we thoroughly acquainted with the heart of a man, the turn of histemper, and the make of his mind, we should never want experience toinform us, what he will do, or how far he is to be trusted (R 28).

Solving these difficulties is beyond the scope of this entry, but wemight note that while causal determinism (whether physical orpsychological) entails that, in principle, all events are completelypredictable, including human actions, the entailment does not run theother way. What is predictable need not be causally determined.Consider God, the morally perfect agent. He will always act accordingto the dictates of reason, and thus has moral freedom to the highestdegree. This need not preclude his having freedom of choice, however.Price’s view is that he has thepower, the physicalliberty, to do or abstain, but hischaracter is such that hewill not do the wrong thing. (R 206)

What of finite agents? In the passage from which the quotation comes,Price is contrasting our belief that phenomena are regularly connectedwith each other with a real understanding of why this is so.

The whole meaning of accounting for a fact, implies something in thenature of objects that includes a connexion between them, or a fitnessin certain ways to influence one another. …While we only seeone thing constantly attending or following another, withoutperceiving the real dependence and connexion … we arenecessarily dissatisfied. (R 27)

Given this context, Price may be claiming simply that, were we tounderstand the light in which an agent saw all the considerationsrelevant to acting, we would know how he would choose. That may becompatible with the agent’s character being self-formed by hischoices.

Here are two difficulties for Price’s claim that understandingthe light in which someone saw their action would enable us to predictwhat they would do. First, it is questionable whether weak-willedactions are fully intelligible. Although the agent has reasons forwhat he does, they do not explain his making the worse rather than thebetter choice. Second, if we are genuinely able to form and change ourcharacters through our choices, then there must be occasions on whichwe act out of character. If there is real freedom of choice even Godmight not know with complete certainty what we will do (though thisview, known as Open Theism, might be unpalatable to Price).

4.3 Political Liberty

Price’s writings on religious and civil liberty are voluminous.Many are largely of historical interest, as they deal with issues ofthe day, rather than broad principles. The main claims of his socialand political philosophy are briefly summarised in what follows.

4.3.1 Religious Liberty

Price’s reasons for advocating complete freedom of religion arenumerous, but familiar. All religious tests for public officeencourage persecution of the nonconformists as well as hypocrisy, bygiving incentives for outward subscription to something not believed.They interfere with conscience, which is a private matter between anindividual and his deity. Above all, they hinder the greatEnlightenment project of the onward march of reason and thedestruction of all forms of superstition. Toleration is insufficient,for that implies that society recognizes one creed but toleratesothers. Full freedom should be extended to all religions, not justdifferent Christian denominations.

4.3.2 Civil Liberty

Price’s political philosophy is, broadly speaking, in line withLocke’s, but he follows it through to more radical conclusions.The legitimacy of a government (though not of other hierarchicaldistinctions) stems from the consent of the governed. Whereas in Lockethe people have a right to rebel only if there is a breach of thesocial contract, for Price they retain the right to alter their formof government as they wish. Direct democracy is the most desirableform of government, but in larger states democracy has perforce to berepresentative. However, those elected are to be more delegates thanrepresentatives, subject to instructions from their constituents (P25).

It is not clear how far Price thinks the franchise should be extended.The logic of his position would seem to suggest universal suffrage,but Price is no real advocate for it. He shares a common concern aboutthe qualifications of the uneducated and dependent to be voters.Writing of the election of British Members of Parliament before theGreat Reform Act of 1832, Price complains not only of the small sizeof the electorate, but also that voters are often drawn from the“meanest persons”, the “lowest of the people”.One worry was that, insofar as they were dependent on landowners oremployers, their vote would not be genuinely independent. Priceappears never to have suggested extending the suffrage to women,perhaps because he thought them too ill educated and too dependent ontheir husbands or other male relatives. in this respect, Price’sattitude to the status quo is much less radical than that of hisfriend Mary Wollstonecraft.

Civil liberty, for Price, concerns the autonomy of a community orstate to make its own laws, free from outside interference. Importantas this is, especially in the context of the American Revolution, itraises the question of what constitutes a distinct community orsociety. Does any dissident group constitute a community with theright to secede? This is an issue that has occasioned much violenceand bloodshed, including the secession of the Southern States in 1860and, in our own day, Scottish, Basque, and Irish independence. Theomission of a discussion of this seriously weakens his politicalphilosophy.

Oddly, Price does not include the liberty of the citizen as well asthe liberty of a country in his original definition of civil liberty.A country that governs itself can still be internally deeplyrepressive. Price became aware of this deficiency, and expanded hisaccount inAdditional Observations (P 76–100).

A citizen is free when the power of commanding his own conduct and thequiet possession of his life, person, property and good name aresecured to him by being his own legislator … a government isfree when constituted in such a manner as to give this security. Andthe freedom of a community or nation is the same among nations thatthe freedom of a citizen is among his fellow-citizens. (P 82)

The best ways to secure a free government are the following:

1. all parts of the state should be represented in the governinglegislature
2. the representatives must be freely chosen by the electorate
3. the representatives must be independent of any outside source ofpower
4. they should be subject to frequent re-election
5. they should be accountable to their constituents in all theiracts

These proposals may now appear fairly modest, but few societies matchup to them. For example, the power of corporate owners and lobbyistsin funding elections in the United States breaches clause 3. Theexistence of dependent territories, such as Puerto Rico, breachesclause 1. The existence of the House of Lords in the United Kingdombreaches clauses 2 and 4. Revolutionary for the time, Price’ssuggestions remain radical even today.

5. Influence

Although Price was influential in his lifetime in many areas, thatinfluence soon waned, and few of his works were reprinted after hisdeath. His immediate impact on discussion of the events surroundingthe American and French revolutions was large, but naturally faded asthose upheavals slipped into history. He died before the excesses ofthe French revolution, which had been predicted by Burke. As a resultof the success of his predictions, Burke acquired an immensereputation, while Price’s was eclipsed. There is no doubt thatPrice, along with others in the “Age of Reason”,exaggerated the degree to which people would pay attention to rationalprinciples and reasonable solutions. There seems little to suggestthat his writings had a long-term impact on political philosophy.Nevertheless, liberal-democratic societies have embraced many ofPrice’s causes; in that sense, in the longer term, Price couldbe seen as being on the side of history after all.

His influence on the Unitarian movement also faded. His version ofArianism, in which Christ was seen as having most of the supernaturalattributes of the second person of the Trinity without actually beingGod, gave way to the Socinian view, championed by Priestley, whichstressed the straightforward humanity of Jesus. His reputation inactuarial work and demography suffered from his mistaken claim thatthe British population was in decline. Even his beloved project ofreducing or eliminating the national debt by means of a sinking fundfell out of favor.

His main legacy is, of course, in moral philosophy, but even here itis unclear how much direct influence he had. Some of the themes inA Review, especially issues to do with moral motivation andresponsibility, find distinct echoes in Kant, but that comes fromsympathy of outlook, rather than influence. And Price’sepistemology and metaphysics are wholly different from Kant’s,despite Hastings Rashdall’s exaggerated claim that theReview “contains the gist of the Kantian doctrinewithout Kant’s confusion” (1907: 81 fn 1). The mainfeatures of Price’s epistemology, and his pluralism about moralprinciples, emerge again with the British Intuitionists who flourishedin the first half of the twentieth century. While we know that C. D.Broad and Hastings Rashdall both rated Price very highly, there is nodirect evidence that Prichard, or even Ross (whose views most closelyresemble Price’s) had read him, though it seems likely theydid.

Interest in Price was to some degree revived by books by Roland Thomas(1924), Carl Cone (1952), Lennart Åqvist (1960), W. D. Hudson(1970) and D. O. Thomas (1977). Since then there has been a steadytrickle of articles on aspects of Price’s work, but no realgroundswell of interest, despite another revival in the fortunes ofIntuitionism towards the end of the twentieth century. In 1977 thePrice-Priestley Newsletter was founded; it morphed later intoEnlightenment and Dissent, which ceased publication in 2016.However, resources for the study of Price have been greatly enhancedby the untiring work of D. O. Thomas who not only edited Price’spolitical writings but, together with Bernard Peach, produced acomplete edition of Price’s correspondence. In 2023 there was atricentennial conference on Price in Cardiff. It is hoped that theproceedings will be published.

Bibliography

Primary Literature

Works by Richard Price

There is currently no up to date complete edition of Price’sworks. The relevant historical editions of his works discussed in thisarticle are:

• 1759,Britain’s Happiness, and the Proper Improvement ofit, London: A. Millar and R. Griffiths.
• [D] 1768 [1777],Four Dissertations, London: A. Millarand T. Cadell. The fourth edition is 1777. [D available online]
• 1778,Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, andthe Debts and Finances of the Kingdom, London.
• 1778,A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism, andPhilosophical Necessity, (with Joseph Priestley), London: J.Johnson and T. Cadell.
• 1781,A Fast Sermon, London: T. Cadell.
• 1787a,A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,London: T. Cadell.
• 1787b,Sermons on the Christian Doctrines as received by thedifferent Denominations of Christians, London. [Price 1787b available online]
• 1816,Sermons on Various Subjects, in William Morgan(ed.),The Works of Dr. Richard Price. With Memoirs of HisLife, London: R. Rees,available online.

Modern Editions are:

• [R] 1948,A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,D. D. Raphael (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• [P] 1991,Political Writings, D. O. Thomas (ed.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139170239
• The Correspondence of Richard Price, D. O. Thomas andBernard Peach (eds), Durham NC: Duke University Press / Cardiff:University of Wales Press.
  • 1983,Vol. 1: July 1748 – March 1778
  • 1991,Vol. 2: March 1778 – February 1786
  • 1994,Vol. 3: February 1786 – February 1791

Page numbers for quotations from Price are taken from three editions.Page references prefaced by R are to Raphael’s 1974 edition ofA Review. Those prefaced by P are to the 1991 collection ofPrice’s political writings. And those prefaced by D are to the1777 edition ofFour Dissertations.

Influences on Price

• Balguy, John, 1734,A Collection of Tracts, Moral andTheological, London: J. Pemberton.
• Butler, Joseph, 1729 [2017],Fifteen Sermons(2^nd ed.) London: John and Paul Knapton inJosephButler: Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics, DavidMcNaughton (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
• –––, 1736 [2021],The Analogy of Religion,Natural and Revealed, London: John and Paul Knapton inJosephButler: The Analogy of Religion, David McNaughton (ed.), Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Clarke, Samuel, 1728 [1998],A Discourse Concerning the Beingand Attributes of God, the Unchangeable Obligations of NaturalReligion, and the Truth and Certainty of the ChristianRevelation, London: James & John Knapton. Extracts inSamuel Clarke: A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of Godand Other Writings, E. Vailaiti (ed.), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• Cudworth, Ralph, 1731 [1996],A Treatise Concerning Eternaland Immutable Morality, London: James and John Knapton inATreatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, with A Treatise ofFreewill, Sarah Hutton (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1996.
• Hume, David, 1739–40 [1978],A Treatise of HumanNature, inDavid Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, PeterH. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
• –––, 1777 [1975],An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals, inDavid Hume: Enquiries ConcerningHuman Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals,Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
• –––, [L]The Letters of David Hume (2vols.), J.Y.T. Greig (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932.
• Hutcheson, Francis, 1725 [2008],An Inquiry into the Originalof our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises, London: W.and J. Smith inFrancis Hutcheson: An Inquiry into the Original ofour Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises, W. Leidhold(ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
• –––, 1728 [2002],An Essay on the Nature andConduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on theMoral Sense, Dublin: J. Smith and W. Bruce inF. Hutcheson:An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections.With Illustrations on the Moral Sense, A. Garrett (ed.),Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002.
• Locke, John, 1690 [1975],An Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding inThe Works of John Locke: An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1975.
• Paley, William, 1785,Principles of Moral and PoliticalPhilosophy, London: R. Faulder
• Reid, Thomas, 1764 [1997],An Inquiry into the Human Mind, onthe Principles of Common Sense, inThe Edinburgh Edition ofThomas Reid, Derek Brookes (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh UniversityPress, 1997.
• –––, 1785 [2002],Essays on the IntellectualPowers of Man, inThe Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid,Derek Brookes and Knud Haakonssen (eds.), Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press, 2002.
• Shaftesbury, Lord, 1714 [1999],Characteristics of Men,Manners, Opinions, Times inShaftesbury: Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times, Lawrence E. Klein (ed.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
• Smith, Adam, 1759 [2010],The Theory of Moral SentimentsinAdam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Amartya Sen(ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 2010.
• Wollaston, William, 1724 [1978],The Religion of NatureDelineated (New York & London: Garland Publishing,1978).

An extensive collection of extracts from the above authors can befound in:

• Raphael, D. Daiches, 1969,British Moralists1650–1800, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Secondary Literature

• Aiken, Henry David, 1954, “The Ultimacy of Rightness inRichard Price’s Ethics: A Reply to Mr. Peach”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14(3):386–392. doi:10.2307/2104110
• Ameriks, Karl, 2021, “Dignity Beyond Price: Kant and hisRevolutionary British Contemporary”,Kant Yearbook, 13:1–27. doi:10.1515/kantyb-2021-0001
• Åqvist, Lennart, 1960,The Moral Philosophy of RichardPrice, Copenhagen: Gleerup, Lund, and Munksgaard.
• Barnes, Winston H. F., 1942, “Richard Price: A NeglectedEighteenth Century Moralist”,Philosophy, 17(66):159–173. doi:10.1017/S0031819100003326
• Bengson, J., T. Cuneo, and R. Shafer-Landau, 2023, “PriceanReflection,”British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 31(4): 744–761. doi:10.1080/09608788.2021.2007846
• Broad, C. D., 1945, “Some Reflections on Moral-SenseTheories in Ethics”,Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, 45(1): 131–166. Reprinted inBroad’sCritical Essays in Moral Philosophy, David Cheney (ed.), London:George Allen & Unwin, 1971, pp. 188–222.doi:10.1093/aristotelian/45.1.131
• Canovan, Margaret, 1978, “Two Concepts of Liberty:Eighteenth Century Style”,The Price-PriestleyNewsletter, 2: 27–43. [Canovan 1978 available online]
• Cone, Carl B., 1952,Torchbearer of Freedom: The Influence ofRichard Price on 18th Century Thought, Lexington, KY: UniversityPress of Kentucky.
• Crisp, Roger, 2018, “Richard Price on Virtue”, inVirtue, Happiness, Knowledge: Themes from the Work of Gail Fineand Terence Irwin, David O. Brink, Susan Sauvé Meyer, andChristopher Shields (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,252–268.
• Cua, A. S., 1966,Reason and Virtue: A Study in the Ethics ofRichard Price, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.
• Darwall, Stephen, 1998, “Price, Richard(1723–91)”, inRoutledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, London: Routledge.doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DB057-1
• Dickinson, H. T., 2005, “Richard Price on Reason andRevolution”, inReligious Identities in Britain,1660–1832, William Gibson and Robert G. Ingram (eds.),London: Routledge, 231–254.
• Duthille, Rémy, 2012, “Richard Price on Patriotismand Universal Benevolence”,Enlightenment and Dissent,28: 24–41. [Duthille 2012 available online]
• Earman, John, 2000,Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argumentagainst Miracles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/0195127382.001.0001
• –––, 2002, “Bayes, Hume, Price andMiracles”, inBayes’s Theorem, Richard Swinburne(ed.), (Proceedings of the British Academy, 113), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 91–109.
• Elazar, Y., 2022, “The Downfall of all Slavish Hierarchies:Richard Price on Emancipation, Improvement, and RepublicanUtopia,”Modern Intellectual History, 19: 81–104.doi:10.1017/S1479244320000293
• Frame, Paul, 2015,Liberty’s Apostle: Richard Price, HisLife and Times, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
• Holland, J. D., 1968, “An Eighteenth-Century Pioneer RichardPrice, D.D., F. R. S. (1723–1791)”,Notes and Recordsof the Royal Society of London, 23(1): 43–64.doi:10.1098/rsnr.1968.0009
• Hudson, W.D., 1970,Reason and Right: A Critical Examinationof Richard Price’s Moral Philosophy, London:Macmillan.
• Hunt-Bull, Nicholas, 2004–7, “Richard Price andFrancis Hutcheson—Does a Moral Sense Theory Make EthicsArbitrary”,Enlightenment and Dissent, 23: 24–44. [Hunt-Ball 2004 available online]
• Irwin, Terence, 2008,The Development of Ethics, vol. 2,Oxford: Oxford University Press: 714–53.
• Laboucheix, Henri, 1970 [1982],Richard Price:théoricien de la révolution américaine, lephilosophe et le sociologue, le pamphlétaire etl’orateur, (Etudes anglaises 37), Paris: Didier. TranslatedasRichard Price as moral philosopher and political theorist,Sylvia and David Raphael (trans.), Oxford: Voltaire Foundation at theTaylor Institution, 1982.
• Morgan, William, 1815,Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. RichardPrice, London: R. Hunter. [Morgan 1815 available online]
• Olson, Jonas, 2014, “Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism:Reviewing Price’sReview”,PhilosophicalPapers, 43(3): 429–445.doi:10.1080/05568641.2014.976443
• Owen, David, 1987, “HumeVersus Price on Miraclesand Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the BayesianCalculation”,The Philosophical Quarterly, 37(147):187–202. doi:10.2307/2220337
• Page, A., 2011, “‘A Species of Slavery’: RichardPrice’s Rational Dissent and Antislavery,”Slavery andAbolition, 32(1): 53–73.
• –––, 2018, “War, Public Debt and RichardPrice’s Rational Dissenting Radicalism,”HistoricalResearch, 91(251): 98–115.
• Passmore, J. A., 1951,Ralph Cudworth: An Interpretation,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Chapter 8: Cudworth and theBritish Moralists).
• Peach, Bernard, 1954, “The Indefinability and Simplicity ofRightness in Richard Price’s Review of Morals”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 14(3):370–385. doi:10.2307/2104109
• –––, 1955, “History of Philosophy asJustifiable Interpretation a Reply to Henry Aiken”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16(1):113–120. doi:10.2307/2103453
• –––, 1978, “On What Point Did RichardPrice Convince Hume of a Mistake? With a Note by HenriLaboucheix”,The Price-Priestley Newsletter, 2:76–81. [Peach 1978 available online]
• –––, (ed.), 1979,Richard Price and theEthical Foundations of the American Revolution, Durham, NC:University of North Carolina.
• –––, 1980, “Hume’s Mistake”,Journal of the History of Ideas, 41(2): 331–334.doi:10.2307/2709465
• Peterson, Susan Rae, 1984, “The Compatibility of RichardPrice’s Politics and Ethics”,Journal of the Historyof Ideas, 45(4): 537–547. doi:10.2307/2709372
• Poitras, Geoffrey, 2013, “Richard Price, Miracles and theOrigins of Bayesian Decision Theory”,The European Journalof the History of Economic Thought, 20(1): 29–57.doi:10.1080/09672567.2011.565356
• Price, H. S., 1986, “A Few Observations on David Hume andRichard Price on Miracles”,Enlightenment and Dissent,5: 21–37. [H.S. Price 1986 available online]
• Prior Arthur N., 1949a,Logic and the Basis of Ethics,Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Prior 1949a available online]
• –––, 1949b, “Propriety and Truth: (1)Preliminary History”, in Prior 1949a: ch. 6.
• –––, 1949c, “The Naturalistic Fallacy: TheHistory of Its Refutation”, in Prior 1949a: ch. 9.
• Raphael, D. Daiches, 1947,The Moral Sense (Chapter 8:Richard Price), London: Oxford University Press.
• Rashdall, Hastings, 1907, “Intuitionism”, inTheory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy,second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, vol. 1, ch. 4. [Rashdall 1907 available online]
• Raynor, David, 1981, “Hume’s Mistake—AnotherGuess”,Hume Studies, 7(2): 164–166.doi:10.1353/hms.2011.0565
• Schneewind, Jerome B., 1998, “Price’sIntuitionism”, inThe Invention of Autonomy: A History ofModern Moral Philosophy (Section ii of Ch. 18, “Against aFatherless World”), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9780511818288
• Schroeder, M., 2014, “The Price of Supervenience,” inM. Schroeder,Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation andExpression in Ethics (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press,pp. 124–144. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713807.003.0007
• Sidgwick, Henry, 1902, “Modern, Chiefly English, Ethics:Later Intuitionism, Price”, inOutlines of the History ofEthics for English Readers, fifth edition, London: Macmillan,(ch. 4, sec. 11) pp. 224–6. [Sidgwick 1902 available online]
• Stephen, Leslie, 1876, “The Intellectual School”,“Price’s Review”, “The Intellect and theEmotions”, “Result of his Teaching”,§§12–14 of Chapter 9 (“Moral Philosophy”),Section II “The Intellectual School” ofHistory ofEnglish Thought in the Eighteenth Century, first edition, London:Smith, Elder, & Co., Vol. II, pp. 12–14. [Stephen 1876 available online]
• Stephens, John, 2000, “Conscience and the Epistemology ofMorals: Richard Price’s Debt to Joseph Butler”,Enlightenment and Dissent, 19: 133–146. [Stephens 2000 available online]
• Thomas, David Oswald, 1976,Richard Price1723–1791, Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
• –––, 1977,The Honest Mind: The Thought andWork of Richard Price, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2005, “Price, Richard(1723–1791)”, inOxford Dictionary of NationalBiography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, version of 26 May2005. doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/22761
• Thomas, David Oswald, John Stephens, and P. A. L. Jones, 1993,A Bibliography of the Works of Richard Price, Aldershot:Scolar Press.
• Thomas, Roland, 1924,Richard Price, Philosopher and Apostleof Liberty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wedgwood, R., 2024, “Pricean Ignorance,”BritishJournal for the History of Philosophy, 1–22.doi:10.1080/09608788.2024.2334763
• Zebrowski, Martha K., 1994, “Richard Price: BritishPlatonist of the Eighteenth Century,”Journal of the Historyof Ideas, 55: 17–35.
• Zebrowski, Martha K., 2000, “‘We may venture to saythat the number of Platonic Readers is considerable’: RichardPrice, Joseph Priestley, and the Platonic Strain in Eighteenth CenturyThought”,Enlightenment and Dissent, 19: 193–213. [Zebrowski 2000 available online]

Biographies

The earliest of the biographies of Price is by his nephew, WilliamMorgan (1815) who worked with Price for the last twenty years of hislife on actuarial matters. Although it contains some inaccuracies, itis by far the most detailed contemporary source. A modern edition,edited and with an introduction by D. O. Thomas, constitutes thecomplete contents of the journal Enlightenment and Dissent 22 (2003).R. Thomas (1924) interweaves biography with discussion of his ideasand influence. It devotes considerable space to Price’sinfluence on actuarial practice and on the politics of his day. Cone(1952) has a similar structure, but is more detailed than Thomas 1924.Written from an American perspective it casts light on Price’sinfluence in the framing of the Constitution of the USA. Thomas 1976is a very brief but engaging study. Frame’s (2015) magisterialvolume is the first to take a purely chronological approach to itssubject seeking to place Price and his work firmly in their historicalcontext. It makes full use of Price’s correspondence and hisshorthand journal to give the fullest picture to date.

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Other Internet Resources

• Richard Price, Wikipedia entry.
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Related Entries

Butler, Joseph: moral philosophy |Cambridge Platonists |Clarke, Samuel |Hume, David |Paine, Thomas |Reid, Thomas: ethics |Scottish Philosophy: in the 18th Century |Shaftesbury, Lord [Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of] |Smith, Adam: moral and political philosophy |Wollstonecraft, Mary

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful to Eve Garrard and John Roberts for theirconsiderable help and encouragement.