The term “toleration”—from the Latintolerare: to put up with, countenance orsuffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of ornon-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considersto be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they shouldnot be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which wespeak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parentstolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates theweaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent, a church tolerateshomosexuality, a state tolerates a minority religion, a societytolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives andreasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken intoaccount.

• 1. The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes
• 2. Four Conceptions of Toleration
• 3. The History of Toleration
• 4. Justifying Toleration
• 5. The Politics of Toleration
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Concept of Toleration and its Paradoxes

It is necessary to differentiate between a generalconceptand more specificconceptions of toleration (see also Forst2013). The former is marked by the following characteristics. First,it is essential for the concept of toleration that the toleratedbeliefs or practices are considered to be objectionable and in animportant sense wrong or bad. If thisobjection component(cf. King 1976, 44–54 on the components of toleration) ismissing, we do not speak of “toleration” but of“indifference” or “affirmation.” Second, theobjection component needs to be balanced by anacceptancecomponent, which does not remove the negative judgment but givescertain positive reasons that trump the negative ones in the relevantcontext. In light of these reasons, it would be wrong not to toleratewhat is wrong, to mention a well-known paradox of toleration(discussed below). The said practices or beliefs are wrong, but notintolerably wrong. Third, the limits of toleration need to bespecified. They lie at the point where there are reasons for rejectionthat are stronger than the reasons for acceptance (which still leavesopen the question of the appropriate means of a possibleintervention); call this therejectioncomponent.All three of those reasons can be of one and the samekind—religious, for example—yet they can also be ofdiverse kinds (moral, religious, pragmatic, to mention a fewpossibilities; cf. Newey 1999, 32–34 and Cohen 2014).

Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that there aretwoboundaries involved in this interpretation of the concept oftoleration: the first one lies between (1) the normative realm ofthose practices and beliefs one agrees with and (2) the realm of thepractices and beliefs that one finds wrong but can still tolerate; thesecond boundary lies between this latter realm and (3) the realm ofthe intolerable that is strictly rejected. There are thus three, notjust two normative realms in a context of toleration.

Finally, one can only speak of toleration where it is practicedvoluntarily and is not compelled, for otherwise it would be acase of simply “suffering” or “enduring”certain things that one rejects but against which one is powerless. Itis, however, wrong to conclude from this that the tolerant need to bein a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the toleratedpractices, for a minority that does not have this power may very wellbe tolerant in holding the view that if it had such power, it wouldnot use it to suppress other parties (cf. Williams 1996).

Based on these characteristics, we can identify three paradoxes oftoleration that are much discussed in philosophical analyses of theconcept, and each one refers to one of the components mentioned above.First, there is theparadox of the tolerant racist, whichconcerns the objection component. Sometimes people argue that someonewho believes that there are “inferior races” the membersof which do not deserve equal respect should be “moretolerant.” Thus the racist would be called tolerant if he curbedhis desire to discriminate against the members of such groups, say,for strategic reasons. Thus if (and only if) we considered toleranceto be a moral virtue, the paradox arises that an immoral attitude (tothink of other “races” in such way) would be turned intopart of a virtue. What is more, the racist would be more“tolerant” the stronger his racist impulses are if only hedid not act on them (cf. Horton 1996). Hence, seen from a moralperspective, the demand that the racist should be tolerant has a majorflaw: it takes the racist objection against others as an ethicalobjection that only needs to be restrained by adding certain reasonsfor acceptance. It thus turns an unacceptable prejudice into anethical judgment. From this it follows that the reasons for objectionmust be reasonable in a minimal sense; they cannot be generallyshareable, of course, but they must also not rest on irrationalprejudice and hatred. The racist, therefore, can neither exemplify thevirtue of tolerance nor should he be asked to be tolerant; what isnecessary is that he overcome his racist beliefs. This shows thatthere are cases in which tolerance is not the solution tointolerance.

Second, we encounter theparadox of moral tolerance, whicharises in connection with the acceptance component (for variousanalyses of this paradox, see Ebbinghaus 1950, Raphael 1988, Mendus1989, Horton 1994). If both the reasons for objection and the reasonsfor acceptance are called “moral,” the paradox arises thatit seems to be morally right or even morally required to tolerate whatis morally wrong. The solution of this paradox therefore requires adistinction between various kinds of “moral” reasons, someof which must be reasons of a higher order that ground and limittoleration.

Third, there is theparadox of drawing the limits, whichconcerns the rejection component. This paradox is inherent in the ideathat toleration is a matter of reciprocity and that therefore thosewho are intolerant need not and cannot be tolerated, an idea we findin most of the classical texts on toleration. But even a brief look atthose texts, and even more so at historical practice, shows that theslogan “no toleration of the intolerant” is not justvacuous but potentially dangerous, for the characterization of certaingroups as intolerant is all too often itself a result of one-sidednessand intolerance. In a deconstructivist reading, this leads to a fatalconclusion for the concept of toleration (cf. Fish 1997): Iftoleration always implies a drawing of the limits against theintolerant and intolerable, and if every such drawing of a limit isitself a (more or less) intolerant, arbitrary act, toleration ends assoon it begins—as soon as it is defined by an arbitrary boundarybetween “us” and the “intolerant” and“intolerable.” This paradox can only be overcome if wedistinguish between two notions of “intolerance” that thedeconstructivist critique conflates: the intolerance of those who liebeyond the limits of toleration because they deny toleration as a normin the first place, and the lack of tolerance of those who do not wantto tolerate a denial of the norm. Tolerance can only be a virtue ifthis distinction can be made, and it presupposes that the limits oftoleration can be drawn in a non-arbitrary, justifiable way.

The discussion so far implies that toleration is anormativelydependent concept. This means that by itself it cannot providethe substantive reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. Itneeds further, independent normative resources in order to have acertain substance, content, and limits—and in order to beregarded as something good at all. In itself, therefore, toleration isnot a virtue or value; it can only be a value if backed by the rightnormative reasons.

2. Four Conceptions of Toleration

The following discussion of four conceptions of toleration is not tobe understood as the reconstruction of a linear historical succession.Rather, these are different, historically developed understandings ofwhat toleration consists in that can all be present in society at thesame time, so that conflicts about the meaning of toleration may alsobe understood as conflicts between these conceptions (cf. Forst2013).

1. The first one I call thepermission conception. Accordingto it, toleration is a relation between an authority or a majority anda dissenting, “different” minority (or variousminorities). Toleration then means that the authority gives qualifiedpermission to the minority to live according to their beliefs oncondition that the minority accepts the dominant position of theauthority or majority. So long as their being different remains withincertain limits, that is, in the “private” realm, and solong as the minority groups do not claim equal public and politicalstatus, they can be tolerated on pragmatic or principledgrounds—on pragmatic grounds because this form of toleration isthe least costly of all possible alternatives and does not disturbcivil peace and order as the dominant party defines it (but rathercontributes to it); and on principled grounds because one may think itis morally problematic to force people to give up certain deep-seatedbeliefs or practices.

The permission conception is a classic one that we find in manyhistorical writings and in instances of a politics of toleration (suchas the Edict of Nantes in 1598) and that—to a considerableextent—still informs our understanding of the term. According tothis conception, toleration means that the authority or majority,which has the power to interfere with the practices of a minority,nevertheless “tolerates” it, while the minority acceptsits inferior position. The situation or the “terms oftoleration” are hierarchical: one party allows another partycertain things on conditions specified by the first one. Toleration isthus understood aspermissio negativa mali: not interferingwith something that is actually wrong but not“intolerably” harmful. It is this conception that Goethe(1829, 507, transl. R.F.) had in mind when he said: “Toleranceshould be a temporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition. Totolerate means to insult.”

2. The second conception, thecoexistence conception, issimilar to the first one in regarding toleration as the best meanstoward ending or avoiding conflict and toward pursuing one’s owngoals. What is different, however, is the relationship between thesubjects and the objects of toleration. For now the situation is notone of an authority or majority in relation to a minority, but one ofgroups that are roughly equal in power, and who see that for the sakeof social peace and the pursuit of their own interests mutualtoleration is the best of all possible alternatives (the AugsburgPeace Treaty of 1555 is a historical example). They prefer peacefulcoexistence to conflict and agree to a reciprocal compromise, to acertainmodus vivendi. The relation of tolerance is no longervertical but horizontal: the subjects are at the same time the objectsof toleration. This may not lead to a stable social situation in whichtrust can develop, for once the constellation of power changes, themore powerful group may no longer see any reasons for being tolerant(cf. Rawls 1987, 11, Fletcher 1996).

3. Different from this, the third conception of toleration—therespect conception—is one in which the toleratingparties respect one another in a more reciprocal sense (cf. Weale1985, Scanlon 1996). Even though they differ fundamentally in theirethical beliefs about the good and true way of life and in theircultural practices, citizens recognize one another as moral-politicalequals in the sense that their common framework of social lifeshould—as far as fundamental questions of rights and libertiesand the distribution of resources are concerned—be guided bynorms that all parties can equally accept and that do not favor onespecific ethical or cultural community (cf. Forst 2002, ch. 2).

There are two models of the “respect conception,” that of“formal equality,” and that of “qualitativeequality.” The former operates on a strict distinction betweenthe political and the private realm, according to which ethical (i.e.,cultural or religious) differences among citizens of a legal stateshould be confined to the private realm, so that they do not lead toconflicts in the political sphere. This version is clearly exhibitedin the “secular republicanism” of the French authoritieswho held that headscarves with a religious meaning have no place inpublic schools in which children are educated to be autonomouscitizens (cf. Galeotti 1993).

The model of “qualitative equality,” on the other hand,recognizes that certain forms of formal equality favor thoseethical-cultural life-forms whose beliefs and practices make it easierto accommodate a conventional public/private distinction. In otherwords, the “formal equality” model tends to be intoleranttoward ethical-cultural forms of life that require a public presencethat is different from traditional and hitherto dominant culturalforms. Thus, on the “qualitative equality” model, personsrespect each other as political equals with a certain distinctethical-cultural identity that needs to be respected and tolerated assomething that is (a) especially important for a person and (b) canprovide good reasons for certain exceptions from or general changes inexisting legal and social structures. Social and political equalityand integration are thus seen to be compatible with culturaldifference—within certain (moral) limits of reciprocity.

4. In discussions of toleration, one finds alongside the conceptionsmentioned thus far a fourth one which I call theesteemconception. This implies an even fuller, more demanding notion ofmutual recognition between citizens than the respect conception does.Here, being tolerant does not just mean respecting members of othercultural life-forms or religions as moral and political equals, italso means having some kind of ethical esteem for their beliefs, thatis, taking them to be ethically valuable conceptions that—eventhough different from one’s own—are in some way ethicallyattractive and held with good reasons. For this still to be a case oftoleration, the kind of esteem characteristic of these relations issomething like “reserved esteem,” that is, a kind ofpositive acceptance of a belief that for some reason you still find isnot as attractive as the one you hold. As valuable as parts of thetolerated belief may be, it also has other parts that you findmisguided, or wrong (cf. Raz 1988, Sandel 1989).

To answer the question which of these conceptions should be theguiding one for a given society, two aspects are most important. Thefirst one requires an assessment of the conflicts that require andallow for toleration, given the history and character of the groupsinvolved; and the second requires an adequate and convincing normativejustification of toleration in a given social context. It is importantto keep in mind that the (normatively dependent) concept of tolerationitself does not provide such a justification; this has to come fromother normative resources. And the list of such resources, speakingboth historically and systematically, is long.

3. The History of Toleration

In the course of the religious-political conflicts throughout Europethat followed the Reformation, toleration became one of the centralconcepts of political-philosophical discourse, yet its history reachesmuch further back into antiquity (for the following, see esp. Forst2013, part 1; cf. also Besier and Schreiner 1990, Nederman 2000,Zagorin 2003, Creppel 2003, Kaplan 2007 and Bejan 2017). In stoicwritings, especially in Cicero,tolerantia is used as a termfor a virtue of endurance, of suffering bad luck, pain and injusticeof various kinds in a proper, steadfast manner. But already in earlyChristian discourse, the term is applied to the challenge of copingwith religious difference and conflict. The works of Tertullian andCyprianus are most important in that respect.

Within the Christian framework, a number of arguments for tolerationhave been developed, based on charity and love for those who err, forexample, or on the idea of the two kingdoms and of limited humanauthority in matters of religious truth, i.e., in matters of thedivine kingdom. The most important and far-reaching justification oftoleration, however, is the principlecredere non potest nisivolens, which holds that only faith based on inner conviction ispleasing to God, and that such faith has to develop from within,without external compulsion. Conscience therefore must not be andcannot be forced to adopt a certain faith, even if it were the trueone. Yet, Augustine who defends these arguments in his earlierwritings, later (when confronted with the danger of a schism betweenRoman Catholics and the so-called Donatists) came to the conclusionthat the same reasons of love, of the two kingdoms and of the freedomof conscience could also make intolerance and the use of force into aChristian duty, if it were the only way to save the soul of another(esp. Augustine 408, letter # 93). He cites numerous examples ofreconverted Catholics to substantiate his position that the proper useof force combined with the right teaching can shake men loose from thewrong faith and open up their eyes so as to accept thetruth—still “from within.” Accordingly, individualconscience can and sometimes must be subjected to force. Christianarguments thus both form the core of many modern justifications oftoleration and yet are janus-faced, always bound by the superior aimto serve the true faith. Similar to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas laterdeveloped a number of reasons for limited and conditional toleration,drawing especially strong limits against tolerating any form ofheresy.

The question of peaceful coexistence of differentfaiths—Christian, Jewish and Muslim—was much discussed inthe Middle Ages, especially in the 12^th century. Abailardand Raimundus Lullus wrote inter-religious dialogues searching forways of defending the truth of Christian faith while also seeing sometruth—religious or at least ethical—in other religions. InJudaism and Islam, this was mirrored by writers such as Maimonides orIbn Rushd (Averroes), whose defense of philosophical truth-searchingagainst religious dogma is arguably the most innovative of the period(see esp. Averroes 1180).

Nicolas of Cusa’sDe Pace Fidei (1453) marks animportant step towards a more comprehensive, Christian-humanistconception of toleration, though in the conversations amongrepresentatives of different faiths his core idea of “onereligion in various rites” remains a Catholic one. Still, thesearch for common elements is a central, increasingly important topicin toleration discourses. This is much further developed in Erasmus ofRotterdam’s humanist idea of a possible religious unity based ona reduced core faith, trying to avoid religious strife about whatErasmus saw as non-essential questions of faith(adiaphora).

In contrast with this “irenic” humanist approach, Lutherdefended the protestant idea of the individual conscience bound onlyto the word of God, which marks the limits of the authority of thechurch as well as of the secular powers of the state (Luther 1523).The traditional arguments of free conscience and of the two kingdomswere radicalized in this period. The protestant humanist SebastianCastellio (1554) attacks the intolerance of both Catholic andCalvinist practices and argues for the freedom of conscience andreason as prerequisites of true faith. In this period, decisiveelements of early modern toleration discourse were formed: thedistinction between church authority and individual religiousconscience on the one hand and the separation of religious and secularauthority on the other.

Jean Bodin’s work is important for the further development ofmodern ideas of toleration in two ways. In hisSix Books of aCommonweal (1576), he develops a purely political justificationof toleration, following the thought of the so-calledPolitiques, whose main concern was the stability of thestate. For them, the preservation of political sovereignty tookprimacy over the preservation of religious unity, and toleration wasrecommended as a superior policy in a situation of religious pluralityand strife. This, however, does not amount to the (late modern) ideaof a fully secular state with general religious liberty. More radicalstill is Bodin’s religious-philosophical work on theColloquium of the Seven (1593), a discourse amongrepresentatives of different faiths who disagree about fundamentalreligious and metaphysical issues. For the first time in the traditionof religious discourse, in Bodin’s work there is no dominantposition, no obvious winners or losers. The agreement that theparticipants in the conversation find is based on respect for theothers and on the insight that religious differences, even though theycan be meaningfully discussed, cannot be resolved in a philosophicaldiscourse by means of reason alone. Religious plurality is seen hereas an enduring predicament of finite and historically situated humanbeings, not as a state to be overcome by the victory of the one andonly true faith.

Marked by bitter religious conflicts, the 17^th centurybrought forth a number of toleration theories, among them threeparadigmatic classics: Baruch de Spinoza’sTractatusTheologico-Politicus (1670), Pierre Bayle’sCommentairePhilosophique (1686) and John Locke’sA LetterConcerning Toleration (1689). In his historical critique ofbiblical religions Spinoza locates their core in the virtues ofjustice and love and separates it from both contested religious dogmasand from the philosophical search for truth. The state has the task ofrealizing peace and justice, thus it has the right to regulate theexternal exercise of religion. The natural right to freedom of thoughtand judgment and to “inner” religion cannot, however, beentrusted to the state; here political authority finds the factuallimits of its power.

Bayle’sCommentaire is the most comprehensive attemptto refute the arguments for the duty of intolerance that go back toAugustine (and especially his interpretation of the parable“compel them to come in,” where the master orders hisservants to force those who were invited to the prepared supper butdid not attend to come in; see Luke 14, 15ff.). In his elaborateargument against the use of force in matters of religion, Bayle doesnot primarily take recourse to the idea that religious conscience mustnot and cannot be forced, for he was aware of the powerful Augustinianarguments against both points (cf. Forst 2008 and Kilcullen 1988).Rather, Bayle argued that there is a “natural light” ofpractical reason revealing certain moral truths to every sincereperson, regardless of his or her faith, even including atheists. Andsuch principles of moral respect and of reciprocity cannot be trumpedby religious truths, according to Bayle, for reasonable religiousfaith is aware that ultimately it is based on personal faith andtrust, not on apprehensions of objective truth. This has often beenseen as a skeptical argument, yet this is not what Bayle intended;what he suggested, rather, was that the truths of religion are of adifferent epistemological character than truths arrived at by the useof reason alone. Connecting moral and epistemological arguments inthis way, Bayle was the first thinker to try to develop a universallyvalid argument for toleration, one that implied universal tolerationof persons of different faiths as well as of those seen as lacking anyfaith.

In important respects, this is a more radical theory than the (muchmore popular and influential) one developed by Locke, whodistinguishes between state and church in an early liberal perspectiveof natural individual rights. While it is the duty of the state tosecure the “civil interests” of its citizens, the“care of the soul” cannot be its business, this being amatter between the individual and God to whom alone one is responsiblein this regard. Hence there is a God-given, inalienable right to thefree exercise of religion. Churches are no more than voluntaryassociations without any right to use force within a legitimatepolitical order based on the consent of the governed. Locke draws thelimits of toleration where a religion does not accept its proper placein civil society (such as Catholicism, in Locke’s eyes) as wellas where atheists deny any higher moral authority and thereforedestroy the basis of social order.

In the 18^th century, the conception of a secular state withan independent basis of authority and the distinction between theroles of citizen and believer in a certain faith were furtherdeveloped, even though Locke’s thought that a stable politicalorder did require some common religious basis persisted (with a fewexceptions, such as the French materialists). In the course of theAmerican and the French Revolutions a basic “natural”right to religious liberty was recognized, even though theinterpretations of what kind of religious dissent could be tolerateddiffered.

Thinkers of the French Enlightenment argued for toleration on variousgrounds and, as in Bodin, there was a difference between a focus onpolitical stability and a focus on religious coexistence. In hisOn the Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu argues for thetoleration of different religions for the purpose of preservingpolitical unity and peace, yet he warns that there is a limit to theacceptance of new religions or changes to the dominant one, given theconnection between a constitution and the morality and habits of apeople. In hisPersian Letters (1721), however, he haddeveloped a more comprehensive theory of religious pluralism. Thedifference between the two perspectives—political andinter-religious—is even more notable in Jean-JacquesRousseau’s writings. In hisSocial Contract (1762), hetries to overcome religious strife and intolerance byinstitutionalizing a “civic religion” that must be sharedby all, while in hisEmile (1762) he argues for the primacyof individual conscience as well as for the aim of a non-dogmatic“natural religion.”

The idea of a “religion of reason” as an alternative toestablished religions for the sake of overcoming the quarrels betweenthem was typical for the Enlightenment, and is found in thinkers suchas Voltaire, Diderot and Kant. In his parable of the rings (which goesback to medieval precursors) in the playNathan the Wise(1779), G. E. Lessing offers a powerful image for the peacefulcompetition of established religions that both underlines their commonancestry as well as their differences due to multiple historicaltraditions of faith. Since there is no objective proof as to theirtruth for the time being, they are called upon to deliver such proofby acting morally and harmoniously until the end of time.

John Stuart Mill’sOn Liberty (1859) marks thetransition to a modern conception of toleration, one that is no longeroccupied with the question of religious harmony and does not restrictthe issue of toleration to religious differences. In Mill’seyes, in modern society toleration is also required to cope with otherforms of irreconcilable cultural, social and political plurality. Milloffers three main arguments for toleration. According to his“harm principle,” the exercise of political or socialpower is only legitimate if necessary to prevent serious harm done toone person by another, not to enforce some idea of the good in apaternalistic manner. Toleration towards opinions is justified by theutilitarian consideration that not just true, but also false opinionslead to productive social learning processes. Finally, tolerationtowards unusual “experiments of living” is justified in aromantic way (following Wilhelm von Humboldt), stressing the values ofindividuality and originality.

The story of toleration would have to be continued after Mill up tothe present, yet this short overview might suffice to draw attentionto the long and complex history of the concept and to the many formsit took as well as the different justifications offered for it. Seenhistorically, toleration has been many things: An exercise of love forthe other who errs, a strategy of preserving power by offering someform of freedom to minorities, a term for the peaceful coexistence ofdifferent faiths who share a common core, another word for the respectfor individual liberty, a postulate of practical reason, or theethical promise of a productive pluralistic society.

4. Justifying Toleration

Many of the systematic arguments for toleration—be theyreligious, pragmatic, moral or epistemological—can be used as ajustification for more than one of the conceptions of tolerationmentioned above (section 2). The classic argument for freedom ofconscience, for example, has been used to justify arrangementsaccording to the “permission conception” as well as the“respect conception.” Generally speaking, relations oftoleration are hierarchically ordered according to the firstconception, quite unstable according to the conception of“coexistence,” while the “esteem conception”is the most demanding in terms of the kind of mutual appreciationbetween the tolerating parties. In each case, the limits of tolerationseem either arbitrary or too narrow, as in the esteem conception,which only allows toleration of those beliefs and practices that canbe ethically valued.

Accordingly, in current philosophical discussions of toleration inmulticultural, modern societies, the “respect conception”is often seen as the most appropriate and promising. Yet in thesediscussions, toleration as “respect” can be justified indifferent ways. An ethical-liberal, neo-Lockean justification arguesthat respect is owed to individuals as personally and ethicallyautonomous beings with the capacity to choose, possibly revise andrealize an individual conception of the good. This capacity is to berespected and furthered because it is seen as a necessary (though notsufficient) condition for attaining the good life (cf. Kymlicka 1995).Hence the argument presupposes a specific thesis about the goodlife—i.e., that only an autonomously chosen way of life can be agood life—which can, however, reasonably be questioned. One maydoubt whether such a way of life will necessarily be subjectively morefulfilling or objectively more valuable than one adopted in a moretraditional way, without the presence of a range of options to choosefrom. Apart from that, the ethical-liberal theory could lead to aperfectionist justification of policies designed to further individualautonomy that could have a paternalistic character and lack tolerationfor non-liberal ways of life. In other words, there is the danger ofan insufficient distinction between the components of objection andrejection mentioned above (section 1).

Thus, an alternative, neo-Baylean justification of the respectconception seeks to avoid a particular conception of the good life,relying instead on the discursive principle of justification whichsays that every norm that is to be binding for a plurality of persons,especially norms that are the basis of legal coercion, must bejustifiable with reasons that are reciprocally acceptable to allaffected as free and equal persons. Such persons have a basic“right to justification” (Forst 2012a) which gives themthe power to reject one-sided ethical or religious justifications forgeneral norms. For a complete argument for toleration, however, thisnormative component has to be accompanied by an epistemologicalcomponent which says that ethical or religious reasons, ifreciprocally contested, cannot be sufficient to justify the exerciseof force, since their validation depends on a particular faith thatcan reasonably be rejected by others who do not share it; its validityreaches into a realm “beyond reason,” as Bayle said (seealso similar arguments by Rawls 1993, ch. 2, and Larmore 1996, ch. 7).Thus toleration consists of the insight that reasons of ethicalobjection, even if deeply held, cannot be valid as generalreasons ofrejection so long as they are reciprocallyrejectable as belonging to a conception of the good or true way oflife that is not and need not be shareable. While such a distinctionbetween ethical reasons for objection and stronger, morallyjustifiable reasons for rejection tries to overcome the “paradoxof moral tolerance” (see section 1 above), the “paradox ofdrawing the limits” would be solved by seeing as tolerable allsuch views or practices that do not violate the principle ofjustification itself (see Forst 2013).

With such a reflexive turn in the debate about toleration, a number ofquestions arise as to the alleged superior validity of the principleof justification and the plausibility of a neo-Baylean epistemologydistinguishing between faith and knowledge. Can there be an impartialjustification that is not in the same way a “party” to thecontest of ethical truths and world-views? Might there be thepossibility, using a phrase John Rawls (1993) coined in the context ofhis theory of justice, of a “tolerant” theory oftoleration that is at the same time substantive enough to ground andlimit toleration?

5. The Politics of Toleration

Any concrete use of the concept of toleration is always situated inparticular contexts of normative and political conflict, especially insocieties that are transforming towards increased religious, ethicaland cultural pluralism – even more so when societies are markedby an increased awareness of such pluralism, with some cultural groupsraising new claims for recognition and others looking at theirco-citizens with suspicion, despite having lived together for sometime in the past. These social conflicts always involve group-basedclaims for recognition, both in the legal and in the social sphere(see generally Patten 2014, Galeotti 2002). Contemporary debate hasfocused on questions of respecting particular religious practices andbeliefs, ranging from certain manners of dress, including the burka,to certain demands to be free from blasphemy and religious insults(Laborde 2008, Newey 2013, Nussbaum 2012, Leiter 2014, Taylor andStepan 2014, Modood 2013, Forst 2013, ch. 12). The general questionsraised here include: What is special about religious as opposed toother cultural identities (Laborde and Bardon 2017)? When is equalrespect called for and what exactly does it imply with respect to, forexample, norms of gender equality (see Okin et al. 1999, Song 2007)?What role do past injustices play in weighing claims for recognition,and how much room can there be for autonomous forms of life in adeeply pluralistic society (Tully 1995, Williams 2000)?

Other connected and intensely debated issues of toleration includefree speech and “hate speech,” (Butler 1997, Waldron 2012,Gerstenfeld 2013) as well as the ways in which new forms of digitalcommunication change the nature of social and political discourse(Barnett 2007).

Finally, in light of Goethe’s remark that to tolerate also meansto insult, those working from the perspective of a critical theory oftoleration discuss how power can be exercised not only by denyingtoleration but also by disciplining when granting toleration (Brown2006, Brown and Forst 2014). As much as a politics of toleration aimsto express mutual respect, it also involves disagreement, mutualcriticism, and rejection. We still face the challenge of examining thegrounds and forms of a politics of toleration as an emancipatory formof politics.

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