While sport has been practised since pre-historic times, it is arelatively new subject of systematic philosophical enquiry. Indeed,the philosophy of sport as an academic sub-field dates back only tothe 1970s. Yet, in this short time, it has grown into a vibrant areaof philosophical research that promises both to deepen ourunderstanding of sport and to inform sports practice. Recentcontroversies at the elite and professional level have highlighted theethical dimensions of sport in particular. Lance Armstrong’s useof performance-enhancing drugs raised new issues in the ethics ofcheating, middle-distance runner Caster Semenya has challengedprevailing rules around sex classification in sport, and OscarPistorius’s prosthesis has problematized the distinction betweenable-bodied and disabled sport. While philosophical analysis may helpto achieve a deeper understanding of sport, such analysis may alsoilluminate problems of philosophy beyond sport, ranging from thenature of skill to the ethics of altruism.

This entry proceeds in three sections. Section 1 introduces thephilosophy of sport with particular emphasis on the history ofsystematic philosophical thinking about sport. Section 2 examines thenature and value of sport, and it considers the main normative theoriesof sport developed in the literature. Section 3 addresses a cluster oftopics that are central to the philosophy of sport, including:sportsmanship; cheating; performance enhancement; violent and dangeroussport; sex, gender, and race; fans and spectators; disabilitysport; and the aesthetics of sport.

• 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Background: Sport, Culture, and Philosophical Thinking
  • 1.2 History of the Philosophy of Sport
• 2. What is Sport?
  • 2.1 Formalism
  • 2.2 Conventionalism
  • 2.3 Broad Internalism (Interpretivism)
• 3. Topics in the Philosophy of Sport
  • 3.1 Sportsmanship
  • 3.2 Cheating
  • 3.3 Performance Enhancement
  • 3.4 Violent and Dangerous Sport
  • 3.5 Sex, Gender, and Race
  • 3.6 Fans and Spectators
  • 3.7 Disability Sport
  • 3.8 The Aesthetics of Sport
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction

1.1 Background: Sport, Culture, and Philosophical Thinking

Human communities have engaged in sport for reasons as diverse asamusement, religious worship and political stability (Baker, 1988).Ancient Sumerians and Egyptians practised sport to prepare themselvesfor war. So too did ancient Greeks and Romans, for whom sport also hadimportant religious and social signification. For instance, inClassical Greece, athletic contests (gymnikoiagones)provided an arena for the cultivation and demonstration of excellence(arete). This pursuit of excellence through sport played amajor role in Hellenistic culture, where striving for perfection inbody and mind served as one of the society’s principal unifyingactivities (Lunt & Dyreson, 2014). Likewise, in the Mayancivilization, ballgames served religious, social, and politicalpurposes such as providing a common bond while downplaying differencesand conflict arising from local diversity (Fox, 2012).

Philosophers have reflected on the nature of sport at least sinceAncient Greece. Plato and Aristotle viewed sport as a key component ofeducation and, by extension, human flourishing (Reid, 2011,26–80). An educated Greek must find harmony between body andmind by, among other things, engaging in athletic contests. Reflectionon the role sports play in human life and culture continued duringRoman times and the medieval era. In Rome, sports were understoodinstrumentally as tools to train warriors. For instance, the fifthbook of Virgil’s Aeneid is devoted to the celebration ofcontests of speed and strength with an emphasis on preparing Romansfor war. In medieval times, despite losing relevance in the publicsphere, sport played a significant role in Christian imagery (Reid,2011, 81–106). For example, inCity of God, Augustine(14.9) referred to the apostle Paul as ‘the athlete ofChrist’. Thomas Aquinas, like Plato and Aristotle, advocated forthe need to cultivate body and soul to flourish as human beings(Kretchmar et al., 2017, 93–120).

In early modernity, sport regained prominence in public life, notleast on account of its potential to cultivate human excellence andpromote the good life. Renaissance schoolmasters included sport intheir curricula. Even Protestant thinkers, often thought to have beenopposed to leisurely activities such as sports, embraced the practiceof athletic activities for formative purposes (Reid, 2012). MartinLuther and John Milton advocated for the utilization of sportactivities to educate individuals and train Christian soldiers(Overman, 2011). During the Enlightenment, drawing on the empiricists’emphasis on the cultivation of bodily capacities to achieve accuratesensory data, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued for the need to exercise anddevelop body and mind harmoniously (Andrieu, 2014). Rousseau’spedagogical theory, along with several others, was implemented in the19th-century Victorian England and Germany, where sports were valued ascharacter-building activities. Inspired by these pedagogicalphilosophies, Baron Pierre de Coubertin founded the Olympic Movement,regarding Olympic sport as a ‘philosophy of life which placessport at the service of humanity’ (IOC 2019; see also McFee 2012;Parry 2006).

In contemporary society, sport plays a central role in the lives ofcountless players, coaches, officials, and spectators. The teaching ofsport is part of national school curricula, sports news forms part ofour national media, and sport has been deployed as a public policymeasure to address everything from anti-social behaviour to obesity.However, despite the role sport has played throughout human history,the philosophy of sport as an academic sub-discipline did not developuntil the middle of the 20th century. We recount some of thefield’s history now.

1.2 History of the Philosophy of Sport

The philosophy of sport was pre-dated and inspired by the philosophyof play, most notably Johan Huizinga’sHomo Ludens(1938). However, sport is a distinctive type of play and not everyinstance of sport is an instance of play (Suits, 1988), so sportrequires independent philosophical analysis. In the philosophy of sportliterature, myriad characterizations and definitions of the nature andscope of the field have been proffered (Torres, 2014, 4–5). For PaulWeiss, the philosophy of sport provides an ‘examination of sportin terms of principles which are to be at once revelatory of the natureof sport and pertinent to other fields – indeed, to the whole ofthings and knowledge’ (Weiss, 1971, vii-viii). According toRobert G. Osterhoudt, first editor of theJournal of the Philosophyof Sport, this branch of Philosophy is committed ‘tothe presentation of genuinely philosophical examinations, or reflectiveauthentic examinations of the nature of sport … and systematicdiscussions of issues peculiar to sport until they are reduced tomatters of a distinctly philosophical order’ (Osterhoudt, 1973,ix–xi).

R. Scott Kretchmar (1997) has suggested that, from the 1870s to the1990s, the philosophy of sport evolved from being a sub-branch of thephilosophy of education to being a field of study in its own right.During this time, the field went through three phases: the‘eclectic’ phase, the ‘system-based’ phase andthe ‘disciplinary’ phase. In the eclectic phase, alsoreferred to as ‘philosophy-of-education period,’philosophies of education laid the ground for the philosophical studyof sport. Challenging the dominant intellectualist pedagogicaltradition, philosophers such as William James, Edward L. Thorndike, andJohn Dewey emphasized the value of play, games, and sport in preparinghuman beings for achieving good lives. Physical educators Thomas D.Wood and Clark Hetherington, among others, built upon thesephilosophers to develop what was called ‘The New PhysicalEducation,’ a pedagogical movement aimed at showing that physicaleducation should become an integral part of overall human education.These educators, despite contributing little to philosophicaldiscussion, helped to generate an era where physical education wasrequired in most educational programs.

In the ‘system-based period,’ pedagogical concernsmotivated the philosophical analysis of sport and physical exercise.However, the protagonists of this phase, such as Elwood Craig David andEarle Ziegler, relied on a method that placed greater weight onphilosophical modes of analysis. They began by describing and comparingdifferent philosophical systems, distilled them to the basic conceptsand positions that related to physical education, and finished bydrawing practical implications and pedagogical recommendations. Theiremphasis on philosophical systems created a fertile ground for thedevelopment of the philosophy of sport. As William J. Morgan (2000,205) notes, this shift in emphasis led to the progressive displacementof science and pedagogy as the main pillars of physical educationcurricula, and it facilitated a broader approach to the study ofphysical exercise and sport that gave pride of place to cultural andhistorical dimensions.

This evolution within physical education departments during the‘disciplinary phase’ facilitated the emergence of thephilosophy of sport as a discipline in its own right. The PhilosophicSociety for the Study of Sport (PSSS) was formed during the celebrationof the 1972 Eastern Division conference of the American PhilosophicalAssociation (APA) in Boston; the organization’s name was changedto International Association for the Philosophy of Sport (IAPS) in1999. The Society founded a scholarly journal, theJournal of thePhilosophy of Sport (JPS), and established that the mission of theSociety and the Journal was ‘to foster interchange andscholarship among those interested in the scholarly study ofsport’ (Fraleigh 1983: 6). Weiss’ contribution to the formationof the discipline in its early stages was crucial. With the publicationofSport: A Philosophic Inquiry in 1969, Weiss, a philosopherof international repute, demonstrated that sport provided a fertileground for philosophical inquiry. Along with Weiss, other pioneers ofthe philosophical analysis of sport were Eleanor Metheny (1952, 1965)and Howard S. Slusher (1967), who also helped to consolidate thenascent sub-discipline by publishing monographs in the philosophy ofsport.

Early philosophy of sport divided along ‘analytic’ and‘continental’ lines. Klaus V. Meier (1988), Bernard Suits(1977), and Frank McBride (1975, 1979) focused on the possibility ofproviding individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions forsomething to be a ‘sport’. They drew on tools fromanalytical philosophy to analyse the use of the term‘sport’ (in both plain and academic language) and toattempt to identify traits common to all sports. Early philosophers ofsport also examined sport phenomenologically. R. Scott Kretchmar, DrewH. Hyland, and Robert G. Osterhoudt, among others, drew on the works ofEugene Fink, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georg W. F. Hegel, MartinHeidegger, and Edmund Husserl to study the nature of sport by focusingon the lived experiences of those individuals engaged in it.

More recently, the philosophy of sport has transitioned into a‘hermeneutic’ or ‘applied philosophy’ phase(Lopez Frias, 2017; McNamee, 2007). The field took a‘practical’ turn in the 1990s. The work of AlasdairMacIntyre, especially his seminal workAfter Virtue (1984),played a key role in this shift among philosophers of sport towardsnormative issues. Drawing on MacIntyre’s concept of‘social practice,’ philosophers of sport aimed to identifythe intrinsic goods and excellences of sport in order to assess andcritique sport and related ethical issues such as doping, cheating,and sportsmanship.

Classic debates concerning the nature of sport and the phenomenologyof participants’ experience have not been abandoned, however. As wewill show later (section 2.1), the debate on the nature of sportremains central. Indeed, the rise of electronic games (so-called‘eSports’) has reignited discussion of the definingelements of sport and, more broadly, the contrast between traditionalgames and digital games (Conway, 2016). In particular, philosophersof sport have explored the question of whether eSports test physicalskills (Van Hilvoorde, 2017; Holt, 2016), the implications of theinstitutionalization of eSport competitions (Hemphill, 2005; Parry,2018), and moral engagement in digital gaming (Edgar, 2016).

Still more prominent is the phenomenology of sport. The rapidprogression of computational science and neuroscience has had aprofound influence in the philosophy of sport, encouraging exponentialgrowth in publications concerning skill acquisition in sport(Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2016), the mind-body relationship (Gerberand Morgan, 1979), and sport experience (Breivik, 2014). The aestheticsof sport has also flourished in recent decades by focusing on twothemes (Edgar, 2014): the nature and relevance of aesthetic qualities(e.g. beauty, ugliness, grace, and strength) to the experience ofpractising and watching sport (see also Kreft, 2012; Lacerda andMumford, 2010; Lacerda, 2012) and the consideration of sport as an artand its relationship to art (see also Best, 1974, 1985; Elcombe, 2012;Gaffney, 2013). So, while still an emergent field, the philosophy ofsport has progressed quickly in developing central methods andpreoccupations.

2. What is Sport?

Philosophical theories of sport take descriptive or normative forms.Broadly speaking, descriptive theories attempt to provide an accurateaccount of sport’s central concepts, and normative theoriesattempt to provide an account of how sport should be. Normativetheories of sport are broadly classified as either‘externalist’ or ‘internalist.’ Externalisttheories of sport understand sport as a reflection of larger socialphenomena. Heavily influenced by Marxism and structuralism, externalistphilosophers take the nature of sport to be determined by principlesfrom other practices or the larger society. William J. Morgan (1994)identifies three types of externalist theories: ‘Commodificationtheory,’ ‘New Left theory,’ and ‘Hegemonytheory.’ In Commodification theory, sport is understood as acommodity with use- and exchange-value. When sports are commodified,they are viewed not as having inherent characteristics worthy ofprotection, but solely according to the economic profit that they cangenerate (Sandel, 2012; Walsh and Giulianotti, 2007). The mainproponents of the New Left theory theory are Bero Rigauer (1981),Jean-Marie Brohm (1978), Rob Beamish (1981), Richard Lipsky (1981), andPaul Hoch (1972). They understood sport materialistically by focusingon the role that sport plays in the genesis and reproduction of socialhistory, mostly by exploring the connection between labor, economicinfrastructure, and sport. Hegemony theories of sport attack thereductive and deterministic character of the New Left’s analyses ofsport. Hegemony theorists such as Richard Gruenau (1983) and JohnHargreaves (1986) explore the role that cultural practices andprocesses play in shaping the nature of sporting practices, whileemphasizing the value of human agency.

Externalist accounts of sport tend to be regarded as deflationarybecause they deny, or overlook, that sport has independent value. Theyunderstand sport’s value solely in instrumental terms (Ryall,2016). Internalist theories of sport do not analyse sport based onother social practices or historical processes. Rather, they aim toidentify the distinctive values and purposes of sport thatdifferentiate it from other social practices. Proponents of internalismacknowledge the influence on sport of other practices and the largersociety, but internalists argue that sport is a practice with its owndistinctive value and internal logic. Thus, the primary goal ofinternalism is to uncover the intrinsic normative principles of sport.A central task within the philosophy of sport has been to develop anadequate internalist normative theory of sport. At a minimum, such atheory should articulate sport’s non-instrumental value and itshould provide guidance on appropriate standards of both conduct withinsport, and sporting rules and practices themselves. Internalist viewsare typically classified into the following three categories:formalism, conventionalism, and broad internalism (or interpretivism).We examine each in turn now.

2.1 Formalism

Formalism conceives of sport as constituted solely by written rules:a sport is just the set of written rules that govern it. On this view,there is no need to look beyond the written rules to determine whetheran activity is a sport (e.g. is tennis a sport?), whether an activityconstitutes the playing of a certain sport (e.g. are they playingtennis or squash?), or whether a particular move is permitted within aspecific sport (e.g. is kicking the ball permitted in tennis?).

Bernard Suits’The Grasshopper: Games, Life andUtopia (1978 [2014]) is regarded as the seminal formalist text(Hurka, 2005)^[1]. Suits attempts to refute Wittgenstein’s claim that, as a‘family-resemblance’ concept, ‘game’ resistsdefinition. On Wittgenstein’s view (1958, sect. 66–67), itis not possible to specify individually necessary and jointlysufficient conditions for something to constitute a game. Instead,games are endlessly varied, and, while some games may share featuresin common with some other games, there is no single element that isshared by all games. Contra Wittgenstein, Suits argues that there arefour elements common to every game: goals, means, rules, and a certainattitude among the gameplayers.

Games are goal-directed activities. Every game has two distinctgoals: a ‘lusory’ goal and a ‘pre-lusory’ goal.The pre-lusory goal is a specific state of affairs that game playerstry to bring about: placing the ball in the hole in golf, crossing thebar in the high jump, and crossing the line in the marathon. These canbe achieved prior to the formation of a game. For example, I can placea golf ball in a hole even if no game of golf has begun, or I can jumpover a bar even if no high jump competition is underway. The lusorygoal is winning. This can be achieved only in the context of anorganised game.

The second element of any game is the means. Every game restrictsthe methods that gameplayers are permitted to use to achieve thepre-lusory goal. Golfers are not allowed to drop the ball into the holewith their hands; high jumpers are not permitted to vault the bar usinga trampoline, and marathon runners are forbidden from completing therace using a bicycle. The means permitted in games are always‘inefficient’ for the achievement of the pre-lusory goal.For example, if the goal of boxing is to incapacitate one’sopponent for a count of ‘10’, it would be much moreefficient to attack her with a baseball bat or to shoot her with a gunthan having to punch her above the waist wearing gloves. If thegoal of soccer is to put the ball into the goal, it would be much moreefficient to kick, head, and carry the ball rather than only kickingand heading it. Means permitted within a game are the‘lusory’ means, and those prohibited are the‘illusory’ means.

The third element of a game is the (constitutive) rules. Rulesprovide a complete account of what means are permitted and notpermitted within the game. They establish what means can be employed toachieve the pre-lusory goal of the game. These limitations on thepermitted means make the game possible, for they erect (unnecessary)obstacles that participants attempt to overcome in the game. Forinstance, boxing rules disallow the use of weapons, such as knives orfirearms. This ensures that the sport is a punching contest. The lawsof soccer permit the use of any body part other than the arms so thatthe ball is played predominantly with the feet. In addition toconstitutive rules, Suits argues, there are rules of skill, whichestablish how to play the gamewell. Such rules are rules ofthumb that a coach may advise a player to follow to help her betterexecute the skills of the sport (e.g. keep your eye on the ball, followthrough after impact, accelerate through the finish line).

The final element of gameplaying is attitudinal. Suits argues that,to play a game, one must have the ‘lusory attitude’.Players must commit themselves to playing in accordance with the rulesthat constitute the game just so that the game can take place. The typeof motivation must be a particular kind (or at least mustinclude motivation of a particular kind): players must respectthe rules because they wish to play and they endorse the formalist viewthat breaking the rules necessarily ends the game. It is not sufficientto be motivated to respect the rules, for example, to ensureone’s good reputation or to compete for a‘sportsmanship’ award. So, in the absence of the lusoryattitude, it is quite possible, according to Suits, for a player to actin accordance with the rules without actually playing the game. Theplayers accept the constitutive rules because, in the absence of suchacceptance, no game is possible. On this view, if someone decided thatshe would break the rules whenever she could do so undetected, then,according to Suits, she is not really playing the game – even ifno opportunity to break the rules undetected ever arose. She mightappear to be playing the game, but, in the absence of anacceptance to bind herself to the constraints imposed by theconstitutive rules, she would not count asreally playing thegame.

The four elements in Suits’ analysis of games culminate in thefollowing definition:

To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs,using only means permitted by the rules, where the rules prohibit useof more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where therules are accepted just because they make possible such activity.(Suits, 1978 [2014, 43])

Suits also offers a shorthand definition: ‘playing a game isthe voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’ (Suits,1978 [2014, 43]). Suits’ account of games has attracted much criticalattention. Principal among the objections raised are that games are notconstituted by their constitutive rules only (D’Agostino, 1981;Russell, 1999) and that gameplaying does not require strict adherenceto constitutive rules (i.e. some rule-breaking can be consistent withgame-playing) (Lehman, 1981; Fraleigh, 2003).

Suits draws on his definition of games to provide a definition ofsport. He defines sports as ‘games of physical skill’(Suits, 1988, 2), incorporating the elements of his earlierdefinition of game and adding further elements that are distinctive tosport as compared to other types of games. In particular, a gamebecomes a sport by meeting the following criteria: ‘(1) that thegame be a game of skill; (2) that the skill be physical; (3) that thegame has a wide following; and (4) that the following achieve acertain level of stability’ (Suits, 1973 [2007]). Thus, theoutcome of the game must be dependent on the exercise of physicalskills. This is what differentiates sporting games from card games orchess, for example (see Kobiela, 2018 and Hale, 2008). In the latter,the way the body is moved is irrelevant, and what matters are themoves made (either with cards or pieces on the board). Indeed, suchgames can be played in non-physical spaces such as virtual reality andby non-human players such as computers. However, in soccer or boxing,the skillful control of the body is essential to the achievement ofthe goal of the game.

The third and fourth criteria in Suits’ definition demand thatsports are widely followed institutionalized games. A sport isinstitutionalized when its norms and codified rules are established andenforced by formal associations or organizations. Theinstitutionalization criterion is often employed in sociological andhistorical analyses of sport. For example, historian Allen Guttmann(1978) argues that bureaucratization and rationalization are definingcomponents of modern sports. Sport philosophers, however, have remainedskeptical about the possibility of defining sports as institutionalizedgames. For instance, Klaus V. Meier (1988) rejects theinstitutionalization criterion. For him, the institutionalizationaspect is not a defining element of sport, but rather a contingent onethat ‘adds color and significance to particular sports’(Meier, 1988, 15). In his view, should soccer lack internationalfollowing and institutions to establish and enforce the rules of thegame, it would still be a sport.

In ‘Tricky Triad,’ Suits revises his original definitionof sport from ‘The Elements of Sport’, redefining sportsas

… competitive events involving a variety of physical (usuallyin combination with other) human skills, where the superiorparticipant is judged to have exhibited those skills in a superiorway. (Suits, 1988: 2)

In this definition, Suits narrows the scope of the concept of‘game’ and distinguishes between two types of sports:‘refereed games’ and ‘judged performances.’That is to say, whereas in his earlier definitionall sportsare games, in his revised definitiononly some sports aregames, other sports are performances. Soccer, basketball, tennis, andAmerican football are games, while gymnastics, figure skating, anddiving are performances. The key difference between the two, accordingto Suits, is that games have constitutive rules, whereas performanceslack constitutive rules and have only rules of skill. Thus, for Suits,games consist in overcoming obstacles erected by the constitutiverules, whereas performances centre on the approximation of an ideal orperfect performance. For example, soccer players play the ball withtheir feet cooperatively as a team to put the ball into the opponent’snet. Using the feet, working as a team, and facing an opponent are theobstacles erected by the rules of soccer. For Suits, there is nothinglike these in performances. Figure skaters do not attempt to overcomeobstacles. Rather, they try to approach an ideal performance thatmanifests virtues such as power, grace, and imagination.

This revised definition sparked a classic debate in the philosophyof sport between Suits and Meier. The latter criticized Suits’ reviseddefinition of sport and defended the original one. For Meier (1988),Suits’ original definition is correct because what Suits calls‘performances’ also have constitutive rules. For example,gymnasts perform their acrobatics in a specific space, utilisingcertain equipment. Kretchmar agrees with Meier that both types ofsports are games, but acknowledges that performances place moreemphasis on aesthetic criteria, calling them ‘beautifulgames’ (Kretchmar, 1989). Despite criticism, Suits’ definitionsof games and sport serve as the point of departure for mostcontemporary philosophical theorising about sport, thereby making Suitsthe most influential figure in the discipline.

Turning to formalism more generally, adherents of this view takerules to be the normative cornerstone of a proper ethical analysis ofsport. They define the rightness and wrongness of conduct within sportsolely in terms of rule-following. Strict formalists contend that onecannot play the game and break the rules at the same time (i.e. the‘logical incompatibility thesis’). If gameplaying requiresadherence to the rules, then any rule violation – intentional orotherwise – marks an end to the game. Formalists oppose strategicfouling and doping because both practices involve breaking the rules(Moore, 2017a; Morgan, 1987; Pérez Triviño, 2014).

Formalist analyses of sport hold important similarities to debateswithin the philosophy of law about the nature of law. Indeed, the worksof philosophers of law such as Ronald Dworkin and H. L. A. Hart, aswell as philosophical analyses of rules such as those of Immanuel Kantand John R. Searle, have been influential within formalism (Kretchmar,2001; Torres, 2000).

Formalism has been criticised as an inadequate normative theory ofsport on account of its failure to recognise non-rule based norms insport. As formalists do not recognise normative reasons internal tosport other than the rules themselves, they lack criteria to evaluateexisting or proposed rules as well as criteria to evaluate actions notcontemplated in the rulebook. Kretchmar attempts to salvage formalismfrom this criticism by drawing on both Suits and Searle. In Kretchmar’sview, critics of formalism overlook the fact that games and,afortiori, constitutive rules are created to serve a function: toprovide engaging, artificial problems. Games are made by humans forhumans. Human biological nature is, in Searle’s terms, a ‘brute fact’that gamewrights consider when creating the rules. They craft gamesthat fit human capacities to present a ‘just right’ challenge(Kretchmar, 2015a). Otherwise, games would fail to perform theirfunction. Kretchmar argues that Suits’ account already containsthe resources necessary to discharge this evaluative function of anadequate normative theory of sport. Suits argues that when games set anextremely difficult or extremely easy obstacle, individuals loseinterest in playing them (Kretchmar, 1975). Such games, then, fail tofulfil their goal of providing players with a worthy set of obstaclesto overcome.

Another criticism that has been levelled against formalism is theapparently implausible implication of the logical incompatibilitythesis that any game in which a rule is broken ends at the point atwhich the rule-breaking occurs. If rule-breaking is incompatible withgameplaying then any foul or accidental transgression of the ruleswould cause the game to end. For instance, a 100m sprint would ceasewhen a runner makes a false start. A basketball game would terminatewhen a player commits a strategic foul to prevent an opponent fromscoring in a fast break. A tennis match would end whenever a shot ishit out. Formalists have attempted to overcome this objection bydistinguishing between ‘constitutive rules’ and‘regulative rules’. The latter allow the game to bereinstated following a transgression of the rules by determining howthe game is to be restarted (e.g. restarting the race, a free kick, asecond serve) and how rule-breakers are to be penalized (e.g.disqualified from the race, a penalty kick awarded to the opposingteam, the loss of a point). For Graham McFee (2004b), this constitutiverule/regulative rule distinction does not address the objectionadequately, as it remains unclear when a rule is constitutive orregulative. For instance, an outfield player in soccer using her handsto stop a counterattack would be considered a strategic foul and,therefore, judged according to a regulative rule. However, if playersconstantly used their hands, the game would become either impossible(e.g. all players are eventually sent off) or a different game (e.g.rugby or handball). Thus, according to McFee, rules must be understoodbased on how participants use them in specific contexts. However,formalism does not provide the resources to make these contextualdiscriminations. What criteria should we use to evaluate the rules of asport? When should we change the rules of a sport? Can we evaluate apurported need for rule change without appealing to some considerationother than the rules themselves?

2.2 Conventionalism

Conventionalism attempts to address the limitations of formalism byrecognizing the normative significance of unwritten rules of the game.For conventionalists, rules do not exhaust the sources of normativereasons within sport. Conventionalists argue that rules (whetherconstitutive or regulative) cannot determine their own application andthey fail to provide guidance for all possible eventualities in a game(e.g. situations that were not envisioned by the rule makers). Inaddition, a strictly rule-centric approach fails to account for theexistence of unwritten norms that supplement the rules. Such normsexist independent of, and sometimes in conflict with, the formalrules.

Conventionalists argue that an adequate account of sport must appealto collectively agreed-upon norms called ‘conventions.’Fred D’Agostino, the pioneer of conventionalism, maintains that theconventions that operate within a game constitute the‘ethos’ of the game. The ethos of a game is the ‘setof unofficial, implicit conventions which determine how the rules of agame are to be applied in concrete circumstances’(D’Agostino, 1981, 15). Thus, from a conventionalist perspective,sports comprise both formal rules and conventions. For example, insoccer, convention dictates that the ball must be put out of play whenany player requires medical attention. No written rule demands thatplayers kick the ball out of play in such circumstances. However, anyplayer who failed to do so would be subject to blame and rebuke.Conventionalism is better equipped than formalism to describe andunderstand how sports are actually practiced in specific contexts. Forinstance, despite playing the same game, amateur soccer players in apick-up game and professional players in the World Cup final apply therulebook differently (e.g. amateurs often suspend the offside rule,whereas the rule is crucial at the professional level). Likewise, thenon-contact and travelling rules in basketball are applied differentlydepending on the context.

Critics acknowledge that conventionalism is a fruitful descriptivetheory of sport, but point out that its normative implications areproblematic (Ciomaga, 2013). For instance, much as formalism lacks theresources to distinguish good from bad rules, it has been objected thatconventionalism too lacks ‘critical edge,’ for it fails toprovide the resources necessary to distinguish good from badconventions (Simon et al., 2015). That a convention in fact operates ina sport does not settle the question of whether it should operate. Inshort, conventionalists seem to take the status quo as normative. Animplication of conventionalism would seem to be, then, that manifestlyobjectionable conventions (e.g. ‘never pass the ball to a blackperson’ or ‘spit at members of the opposing team wheneverpossible’) could be normative on a conventionalist scheme.

Drawing on David Lewis’ and Andrei Marmor’s work on conventions,conventionalists have attempted to address this objection bydistinguishing ‘deep’ from ‘surface’conventions (Morgan, 2012). This view is called ‘deepconventionalism’. Surface conventions are what Lewis called‘coordinating’ conventions. Their main function is to help individualsto resolve recurrent, collective problems. For instance, Morgan arguesthat, when participating in a game, players may encounter situationsthat require collective decisionmaking related to the application of aspecific rule or an event that disrupts the flow of the game. To solvethese problems, participants harmonize their action by agreeing touphold the same unwritten rules.

Deep conventions do not relate to problem solving and coordination.Rather, they are ‘normative responses to deep psychological and socialneeds for playing sports’ (Morgan, 2015, 39). Put differently, deepconventions shape sports into the various historical and social formsthey have taken. For instance, the principles and ideals underlying theamateur view of sport, according to which participants engage in thegame chiefly for the love of it, are deep conventions. Thus, asport’s deep conventions determine the point of that sport andprovide a rationale for playing the sport in a specific way byestablishing what counts as normatively intelligible and justifiablewithin that sport. For example, amateur athletes often view sport as aperfective enterprise pursued for its own sake. They play sport for thelove of the game not for instrumental benefit. The amateur’semphasis on the intrinsic value of sport contrasts with theprofessional’s view of sport. For professionals, sport tends tobe viewed as a serious, instrumental occupation, that is, a means toearn a living (Morgan, 2015, 40–41). Thus, amateurs and professionalsevaluate differently practices such as training, doping, andstrategising. While professionals embrace conduct that increases theirchance of victory, amateurs are often more discerning, rejectingpractices such as professional coaches and strategic fouling on thegrounds that they are detrimental to the emphasis of the appreciationof the practice itself, not the instrumental goals achieved through it.

In response to critics of conventionalism, Morgan has argued thatdeep conventions provide evaluative criteria by which the moralstanding of surface conventions can be assessed. However, it remainsunclear whether Morgan responds satisfactorily to criticisms that havebeen leveled against deep conventionalism (Moore, 2018). How can deepconventions be distinguished from surface conventions? Does deepconventionalism only shift the ‘critical edge’ problem tothe deep convention level? What resources does deep conventionalismprovide to evaluate deep conventions?

2.3 Broad Internalism (Interpretivism)

In contrast both to formalists who see sport as constituted by rulesonly and conventionalists for whom sport is constituted by rules andconventions, broad internalists maintain that sport is constituted byrules, conventions, as well as underlying intrinsic principles(Russell, 1999; Simon et al., 2015). According to Robert L. Simon, oneof the pioneers of this view, ‘broad internalism claims that inaddition to the rules of various sports, there are underlyingprinciples that might be embedded in overall theories or accounts ofsport as a practice’ (Simon, 2000, 7). Intrinsic principles are key forbroad internalists, as they provide the foundation for interpreting orunderstanding sport practices. Such principles are ‘presuppositions ofsporting practice in the sense that they must be accepted if oursporting practice is to make sense or, perhaps, make the best sense’(Simon et al., 2015, 32). Formalists and conventionalists fail to givedue recognition to the idea that rules and conventions must beinterpreted and applied so as to respect and promote normativeprinciples that determine the point of the practice.

Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist theory of law holds that law must beinterpreted in accordance with principles (e.g. justice) without whichlegal practice would not make sense. Interpretivism heavily influencedSimon’s formulation of broad internalism. This is perhaps unsurprisingas several broad internalists consider sport to constitute a type oflegal system with its own jurisprudence (e.g. Russell. 2015). OnSimon’s view, sport is interpreted by appealing to intrinsicprinciples, separate to rules and conventions, that define the logic ofthe practice. Justice and competitive excellence are examples of suchprinciples. Without them, Simon’s argument continues, the sportingpractice would not make sense. Drawing on different understandings ofthe intrinsic principles that underlie sport, three broad internalistapproaches have been formulated: contractualism, the ‘respect forthe integrity of the game’ account, and mutualism.

The contractualist approach holds that sports are made possible byan implicit social contract among participants. Agreement to partake inthe practice and abide by a specific set of rules and conventionsprovides normative validity to the rules and conventions upheld duringthe game. For instance, Warren P. Fraleigh argues that sports are madepossible not only by the rules, but also by the fact that players agreeto follow them (Fraleigh, 1984). Inaugural events prior to sportingevents symbolize such an implicit pact. In the Olympic Games, forexample, countries parade with their respective national flags duringthe opening ceremony and, as in the Ancient Olympic Games (Miller,2006), competitors swear an oath, agreeing to abide by the rules andthe spirit of fair play.

The ‘respect for the integrity of the game’ approach wasproposed by Robert Butcher and Angela Schneider (Butcher and Schneider,1998). It focuses on identifying a game’s interest, that is, theinterests of the game itself separate to the interest of players. Theseinterests, so the argument goes, must be respected by all involved. Thegame is regarded as an intrinsically valuable entity which demandsrespect. To flesh out the idea that a game itself may have interests,Butcher and Schneider draw upon Kretchmar’s theory of sport as acontest aimed at comparing the participants’ performances and AlasdairMacIntyre’s notion of ‘social practice.’ Combining theseviews, Butcher and Schneider argue that a game is an activity in whichparticipants test each other both to discover who is superior in thatsport and to achieve certain goods and excellences internal to thepractice. These goods and excellences are connected to the distinctivenature of sport and the participants’ experiences while engagedin them. For instance, the ability to kick a ball skillfully – tomake a beautiful pass – is an intrinsic good of soccer.

The foundation of the mutualist view is the understanding ofsporting competition as a ‘mutually acceptable quest for excellencethrough challenge’ (Simon et al., 2015: 47). Robert L. Simon, Cesar R.Torres, and Peter F. Hager have provided the most detailed account ofthis approach. They argue that mutualism is the philosophical theorythat best conceives sport.

John S. Russell provides a similar account of sport, whereby

… rules should be interpreted in such a manner that the excellencesembodied in achieving the lusory goal of the game are not underminedbut are maintained and fostered. (Russell, 1999, 35)

For Russell, as for Simon, broad internalism ‘generate[s] a coherentand principled account of the point and purposes that underlie thegame, attempting to show the game in its best light’ (Russell, 1999,35).

By way of illustration, Russell (1999) recounts a baseball matchfrom 1887 between Louisville and Brooklyn in which a Louisville player,Reddy Mack, who had just crossed home plate interfered with a Brooklyncatcher, preventing him from tagging another Louisville runner. Whilethe interference was ongoing, another Louisville player crossed homeplate. Crucially, at the time of the game, the rules prohibited onlybase runners from interfering with fielders. However, when Mackinterfered with the Brooklyn fielder, he was no longer a runner,because he had crossed the home plate. So, the rules did not explicitlyprohibit Mack from interfering with the fielder. If the umpire followedthe rules strictly, then Mack’s interference should have beenallowed, and the runner who followed Mack to home plate should not havebeen ruled out. However, as Russell notes, following the rules in thisway would have invited further interference of fielders by non-baserunners, so the game would likely have descended into a‘nine-inning-long wrestling match’ (Russell, 1999: 28). Toprevent such an outcome, the umpire read into existence a rule thatprohibited non-base runners from interfering with fielders. So, hecalled out the runner who made it to home plate following Mack. Thisexercise of discretion was not subsequently overturned, and itprecipitated a rule change to prohibit non-base runners frominterfering with fielders. Indeed, it seemed necessary to depart fromthe rules to protect the nature of the sport. The umpire might beunderstood to have considered the purpose of the sport in deciding howhe should rule on this incident. Baseball is a sport that testsexcellence in running, batting, throwing and catching – but notwrestling. The umpire interpreted (and amended) the rules in light ofthe sport’s underlying purpose. In short, the umpire had toappeal to principles that underlie the rules and conventions to decidehow the rules should be applied, and, in this case, to read a rule intoexistence. In inventing a rule to govern this situation which therulemakers had likely never countenanced, the umpire protected theintegrity of the game. For broad internalists, this exampledemonstrates the necessity of appeal to principles that precede therules and conventions.

Broad internalist accounts closely connect sport to the pursuit ofexcellence, as they typically view the fundamental purpose of sportingcompetition to be the display of sporting excellence. The connectionbetween competition and excellence allows mutualist philosophers todevelop a critical-pedagogical view of sport’s competitivenature. This view challenges the strong emphasis placed on victory atthe elite level. For Simon, when victory is overemphasized, sports areseen as ‘zero-sum’ games (Simon, 2014), that is, games where only thevictor can benefit from participation.

On the mutualist view, sports are ‘non-zero-sum’ games. All playerscan benefit from participation, even those who lose. Throughcompetition, players push each other to perform and improve. While onlyone player or team can win, all can benefit from competing, ascompetition can provide an avenue to more fully perfect one’sabilities. When sport is at its best, competitors strugglecooperatively for excellence. On this view, the intrinsic principles ofsport do not revolve around the pursuit of victory, but the cultivationof excellence. Drawing on MacIntyre, mutualist philosophers argue thatthe goods more directly connected to victory are external to thepractice, whereas those linked to excellence are internal (McFee,2004a). Mutualism is an Aristotelian-inspired teleological account ofsport, whereby the purpose of sport is understood to be the promotionof human flourishing. This view of sport resonates with that of theOlympic Movement and its founder Pierre de Coubertin (Loland,1995).

Broad internalism has been criticised on three principal grounds:for failing to adequately acknowledge the importance of history to aproper normative account of sport; for its reliance on interpretiveprinciples that are too vague to provide any practical guidance todecisionmaking in sport (Morgan, 2016); and for delivering anincomplete account of sport (Kretchmar, 2015b; Nguyen, 2017). Drawingon Thomas Nagel, Morgan argues that broad internalism provides a ‘viewfrom nowhere’ notion of sport that fails to acknowledge the historicaland social situatedness of sporting practices (Morgan, 2012). Kretchmarcontends that broad internalism provides a restrictive view of sportbuilt upon the value of work and excellence (Kretchmar, 2016). On thisview, we should be pluralists, not monists, about the intrinsic valueof sport. Excellence captures some of sport’s intrinsic value,but it is only a partial account. Paraphrasing Russell, mutualism showssport in only one of its best lights.

3. Topics in the Philosophy of Sport

In this section, we explore the central philosophical problems thatarise in sport and how they have been addressed in the literature. Inparticular, we chart the landscape of the following seven leadingethical problems: (a) sportsmanship; (b) cheating; (c)performance-enhancement; (d) dangerous and violent sport; (e)sex, gender, and race; (f) fans and spectators; (g) disability sport;and (h) sport aesthetics.

3.1 Sportsmanship

Sportsmanship is the quintessential sporting virtue. It has alsobeen thought important to civic and cultural life beyond sport (Sabl,2008). Nevertheless, the concept has received little philosophicalattention. The literature on sportsmanship converges on the view thatthis virtue requires more than mere compliance with formal rules.However, there are two principal disputes in the literature: whethersportsmanship is a virtue at all levels of sport or just at therecreational level and whether sportsmanship is a unified concept or acluster of distinct virtues.

The traditional point of departure in the sportsmanship debate isJames W. Keating’s ‘Is Sportsmanship a MoralCategory?’ (1965). On this account, there is a moral distinctionbetween ‘sport’ (recreational sport) and‘athletics’ (competitive sport). Standards of ethicsappropriate to sport at the recreational level are not equivalent tothose appropriate at the competitive level. Indeed, conduct appropriateto the recreational sport may be morally objectionable at thecompetitive level and vice versa. This moral discontinuity betweenrecreational and competitive sport extends to sportsmanship.Specifically, as the goal of recreational sport is ‘pleasantdiversion’, the essence of sportsmanship in that context is‘generosity’ (Keating, 1965, 34). This requires theparticipant always to try to increase the enjoyability of the activityboth for themselves and for other participants. In athletics, where theoverriding goal is ‘honorable victory’, sportsmanshiprequires ‘fairness’. The type of fairness in question isformal fairness – ‘equality before the law’ (Keating,1965, 34). An equal and impartial application of the rules, as dictatedby formal fairness, purportedly helps to ensure that competitionfulfills its purpose as a test of athletic excellence and that victorycorrectly tracks athletic superiority (Keating, 1965, 34).

Keating’s distinction between sport and athletics has beencontested. Simon et al. (2015) have suggested that this distinction istoo sharp. A given contest can contain elements of both sport andathletics. Moreover, sportsmanship requires more than, as Keatingsuggests, generosity to opponents or fidelity to the rules. Not onlydoes sportsmanship require respect for the principles that underpinmorally defensible competition, it also requires positive action toprotect and promote these principles. Randolph Feezell (1986) offers anunderstanding of sportsmanship that seems to combine both, assportsmanship is understood as the mean between excessive seriousnessand excessive playfulness in sport.

Diana Abad (2010) argues that sportsmanship should not, as typicallyassumed, be treated as a unified concept. Instead, sportsmanship isconstituted by four irreducible elements: fairness, equity, good formor honour, and the will to win. These elements are not onlyanalytically distinct but also potentially incompatible. However, sheargues that such conflict between these values can be resolved bystriking an appropriate ‘balance’ between the conflictingelements.

3.2 Cheating

In contrast to sportsmanship, cheating represents, at least primafacie, the chief form of moral failure in sport.

Cheating has proved to be a notoriously difficult concept to define.A commonsense understanding of cheating as the ‘intentionalviolation of the rules to gain a competitive advantage’ isreplete with difficulties (Green, 2006; Russell, 2017). For example, ifcheating is necessarily a type of rule violation, what of theviolation of conventions and other norms not captured by the formalrules? If cheating must be aimed at the attainment of competitiveadvantage, what of intentional rule-breaking that aims to rectify anearlier injustice (e.g. cheating or refereeing error) that advantagedone’s opponent?

Leaving aside definitional issues and turning to the moral status ofcheating, moral objections to cheating typically rest on two principalarguments. The first invokes the logical incompatibility thesis –the idea that rule-breaking is not compatible with game playing,because game playing requires strict adherence to the rules (see sect.2.1). This argument could justify a prohibition of only forms ofcheating that involve rule-breaking: it could not ground anobjection to cheating that involves the violation of conventions orbroad internalist principles. The second argument relies on the ideathat cheating is an attempt to gain an unfair advantage, that is, anadvantage not permitted under the agreement between players or the setof norms by which players are expected to abide (Gert, 2004).Fairness-based objections may not ground a prohibition to‘retaliatory’ or ‘compensatory’ cheating thatis undertaken to re-establish fairness following an injustice that hasplaced a competitor at an unfair disadvantage (Kirkwood, 2012).

The moral impermissibility of cheating has been challenged fromseveral directions. The case of cyclist Lance Armstrong has provided afocal point for some of this debate (Moore, 2017b; Pike and Cordell,forthcoming): is cheating wrong if one’s competitors (or at least asignificant proportion of one’s competitors) are also cheating?That is, does one’s duty not to cheat cease if one’scompetitors do not discharge their duty not to cheat? Here the problemof ethics in non-ideal theory (i.e. acting in conditions of onlypartial compliance with justice) arises in sport.

Oliver Leaman has argued that cheating can become part of the skilland strategy of a game, thereby adding to the game’s excitementand interest for both players and spectators. If cheating is acceptedas part of the game such that all competitors recognize cheating as anoption (whether or not they avail of that option), then concerns overequality and justice do not arise (Leaman, 1981) In thesecircumstances, according to Leaman, cheating would be morallypermissible.

Hugh Upton (2011) has gone further to suggest not only that cheatingmay be morallypermissible in certain circumstances but thatone may be morallyrequired to cheat. This moral requirementarises specifically in team sports where, from a duty of loyalty, aplayer may owe her teammates maximum effort to win the game subjectonly to the requirements of fair play that are routinely observed inthe sport. To observe standards of fair play that are not usuallyobserved in the sport may be ‘self-indulgent’,demonstrating an undue concern for one’s own ethical propriety atthe expense of one’s teammates. On this view, the duty not to let downone’s teammates may imply a duty to cheat.

Finally, it is worth noting the related discussion of‘gamesmanship’. This is a term used to denote conduct thatfalls short of cheating (as it does not violate the formal rules) butis morally dubious nonetheless. Such acts might include theintimidation of one’s opponent, the manipulation of officials, orthe intentional disruption of an opponent’s preparations (e.g.coughing just as she is about to putt). Gamesmanship may add a test ofone’s psychological robustness to the sporting contest, but thismay diminish the contest as a test of athletic excellence (Howe, 2004).While such conduct is not formally proscribed, it speaks to a questionthat every athlete must ponder: what should I be prepared to do towin?

3.3 Performance Enhancement

Athletes have attempted to improve their performances by deploying avariety of different performance enhancers, ranging from pharmaceuticalsubstances (e.g. anabolic steroids) to equipment (e.g. full-body 100%polyurethane swimsuits), with genetic manipulation seemingly justaround the corner. Which, if any, performance-enhancing methods shouldbe allowed in sport? Is there any good reason to restrict their use, orshould athletes be free to use whatever methods they choose? Thisdebate cuts to the very heart of questions regarding the purpose ofsporting competition and what counts as excellent athletic performance(Møller, Hoberman, and Waddington, 2015).

The most widely discussed form of enhancement is the use of performance-enhancing drugs (i.e. ‘doping’). There are three sides in the doping debate: ‘pro-doping’, ‘anti-doping’, and ‘anti-anti-doping’ (McNamee2008; Murray 2016: 128–133). Those who regard doping as a morallyacceptable practice that should not be banned from sport arepro-doping. For them, the use of performance-enhancing methods orsubstances is justified because it aligns with the idea that a central purpose of sport is tostrive to be better or, more broadly, it aligns with a natural human impulse tocreate tools to achieve our goals (Brown, 1980, 1984; Møller,2009; Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton, 2004). For instance, Savulescu etal. argue: ‘Far from being against the spirit of sport,biological manipulation embodies the human spirit – the capacity toimprove ourselves on the basis of reason and judgment’ (Savulescuet al., 2004, 667). Pro-doping arguments typically rely on the claimthat doping is morally equivalent to the use of other sports technologyor medical interventions that are widely accepted in sport (e.g.cushioned running shoes, graphite tennis rackets, or Lasik eyesurgery). If we are willing to allow their use, so the argument goes,then it would be irrational to preclude the use ofperformance-enhancing substances (Murray, 2018).

The anti-doping side argue that restriction on the use ofperformance-enhancing methods is justifiable. They typically appeal toany of the following arguments: (a) performance enhancement runscounter to the intrinsic nature of sport by undermining its centralpurpose – the cultivation and display of sporting excellence(Devine, 2011; Sandel, 2007); (b) performance enhancement compromisesthe fairness of competition by providing its users with an unfairadvantage (Douglas, 2007; Loland, 2002); (c) performance enhancementexerts a negative and dangerous influence on society, especially young people, by spreading acceptance of drug use (Pound, 2006); (d)performance enhancement is intrinsically immoral as it is theexpression of a morally corrupt character or violates a moral value(e.g. authenticity or naturalness) (Bonte and Tolleneer, 2013;Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2009); and (e) performance enhancement isharmful to participants (Hølm, 2007; Kayser and Broers,2015; Savulescu, 2015).

Finally, proponents of the anti-anti-doping view object morally to thepractical implications of anti-doping regulations (especially withregard to policing the use of performance enhancing drugs). On thisview, a ban on performance-enhancing drugs should not be imposed, evenif justifiable in principle, because the implementation of such a banwould necessarily involve morally objectionable practices.Anti-anti-doping arguments criticise the fight against doping on thegrounds that it costs too much (in both economic and moral terms) andsecures insufficient benefit in terms of the promotion of complianceand the identification of non-compliance with anti-doping rules (Kayseret al., 2005, 2007). Advocates of this view may endorse principledobjections to doping but believe that the institutional requirementsfor policing such a ban are not morally justifiable. Such an objectionincludes concerns that the institutional framework associated withanti-doping involves the violation of athletes’ rights (Tamburrini,2013), that anti-doping policy too closely resembles a criminal justicesystem (Kornbeck, 2013), and that the normative assumptions thatunderpin anti-doping campaigns are morally problematic.Anti-anti-doping advocates propose alternative regulations that ofteninvolve the legalization of currently banned substances and methods(Pérez Triviño, 2013; Tamburrini, 2000b; Tamburrini andTännsjö, 2005; Tännsjö, 2009) or the adoption of aharm-reduction approach (Kayser et al., 2005, 2007).

3.4 Violent and Dangerous Sport

Exposure to the risk of significant physical harm is intrinsic to participationin many sports. The category of ‘dangerous sport’ includesnon-violent sports such as free solo rock-climbing and downhill skiing,collision sports such as American football and rugby union, and combatsports such as boxing and mixed martial arts. What is the value ofdangerous sports, and how, if at all, should the state regulate suchactivities through public policy?

Russell argues that dangerous sports manifest distinctive forms ofvalue (2005). Their value lies in the perfectionist ideal of‘self-affirmation’, whereby we challenge and resist theordinary bounds of our lives and attempt to extend those boundaries tosurpass the apparent limits of our being (Russell, 2005). Russellfurther argues that these kinds of sports can be of particularpractical benefit for children. Such activities place children in acontext in which they must confront danger, thereby preparing the childfor adulthood, as well as helping the child to discover and affirmaspects of her selfhood (Russell, 2007).

Others have suggested that, in their current form, collision sportssuch as American football and combat sports such as boxing should bebanned by the state. Nicholas Dixon (2001) has argued on autonomy-basedgrounds that boxing which involves blows to the head should be banned,but boxing that limits the permissible target area to the area betweenthe waist and the head should be permitted. Others have defended thestatus quo on the grounds that any attempt to criminalise boxing willlead to the sport moving underground where more harm may result(Warburton, 1998).

Pam Sailors (2015) has argued that American football, both at theprofessional and amateur levels, is morally objectionable, though shestops short of proposing its prohibition. She grounds this objection onharm to the players, the objectification of the players, and the harmsdone by players to non-players. Angelo Corlett (2019) has argued, morenarrowly, that a prohibition of American football at theinter-collegiate level could be justified on account of the largehealthcare and medical costs that must be borne by the general publicarising from associated injuries. Mike McNamee and Francisco JavierLopez Frias have called for caution regarding the proposed prohibitionof American football and other collision sports that pose the risk ofpermanent brain injury. In particular, they critically analyzearguments for the elimination of such sports that draw on Mill’sconsensual domination principle. These arguments equate the decision ofplaying football with that of selling oneself to slavery (consensualdomination). According to Lopez Frias and McNamee (2017), human beingsshould be allowed to pursue the kind of lives that they have reasons tovalue, even if that involves consensual domination. For them, thenature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify thesacrifice of future autonomy. Moreover, they challenge the idea thatCTE-related injuries are morally equivalent to harms that arise fromconsensual domination. In a latter paper, Lopez Frias and McNameepropose that one possible solution to the debate over the reform orprohibition of such sports should have at its centre the concept of‘social good’ (Lopez Frias and McNamee, 2019).

3.5 Sex, Gender, and Race

Sporting competition has traditionally been sex-segregated along thebinary ‘male/female’ distinction, and challenges to theprevailing understandings of sex and gender have been heard within thesporting community since the 1960s. Two principal questions withregard to sex and gender arise in sport: is sex segregation in sportingcompetition morally justifiable? If so, in what category should transand intersex athletes compete?

The starting point for the sex segregation debate is JaneEnglish’s ‘Sex Equality in Sport’ (1978). Englishconsiders what equality of opportunity between the sexes requires insport. She argues that a just society would incorporate a greatervariety of sports than at present. Specifically, sports that reward‘women’s distinctive abilities’ (English, 1978, 227)(e.g. flexibility, low centre of gravity) would be more numerous. Ongrounds of self-respect, women should enjoy roughly half of the‘basic benefits’ of health and recreation. This includesthe right to equal facilities. This would require significantre-ordering of how resources are distributed between the sexes withinsport. Ultimately, however, English advocates a (qualified)retention of binary sex segregation in sport. The contours of thisdistinction have been challenged by intersex, trans, and non-genderedathletes who do not fit comfortably into either category. The question‘Who is a sportswoman?’ (Camporesi, 2017) has never beenmore contested.

To police sex segregation in competition, sports authorities haveadopted a variety of approaches to sex verification at different timessince the 1930s. These have included visual tests, chromosometests, and testosterone tests. The prevailing approach to theeligibility of trans women to compete in women’s events does notpreclude those who are biologically male from competing inwomen’s sport, but it requires that their testosterone levelremains below a certain threshold for a period prior to andcontinuously throughout their time competing in women’scompetition (IOC, 2015). The requirement that trans, as well asintersex, women whose natural testosterone level is above the permittedthreshold must undergo hormone treatment (i.e. androgen suppressivetherapy) to bring their level below that threshold has been criticisedas the unnecessary medicalisation of healthy athletes and a violationof the principle of beneficence in medical ethics. (Camporesi, 2016).Critics have suggested that athletes should not be required to meetcertain physiological criteria to be eligible to compete in aparticular gender category. Proposals sympathetic to this view haveincluded that athletes should be allowed to compete in the gendercategory with which they identify (Davis and Edwards 2014); that transwomen athletes should be allowed to compete in women’s sport but,to mitigate unfair advantage, should be subject to a handicap based oneffective testosterone levels (Bianchi, 2017); and, finally, thateligibility should be determined by legally recognised gender (McKinnonand Conrad, forthcoming)

At the heart of this debate is whether trans women enjoy an unfairadvantage over cis female athletes (i.e. athletes who were assigned the sex offemale at birth and whose gender identity is female). Some have suggested that testosterone has not beenproved to provide an advantage in competition (Camporesi, 2016) or thatthe advantage it provides, even if unfair, may be tolerably unfair(Devine, 2019). Moreover, no attempt is made to regulate otherbiological and genetic variations that provide a clear performanceadvantage. For example, there is no attempt to exclude or regulateathletes with Marfan syndrome. However, the long limbs and flexiblejoints associated with that condition provide a clear advantage forswimmers, basketball players, and volleyball players. It has beensuggested that, if there is no morally relevant difference betweenadvantages that result from sex and those that result from otherbiological and genetic variations, why should testosterone levels beregulated when other such variations relevant to sporting performanceare not (Camporesi 2017; Camporesi and Maugeri 2016)?

A more fundamental challenge has been levelled at the veryinstitution of sex segregation in sport. It has been proposed that theorganisation of sport should be indifferent to an athlete’s sex, so men and women should compete with and against each other. On this view,rather than retaining sex segregation, which involvesdiscrimination against women as well as complex questions concerningthe proper categorization of intersex, trans, and non-genderedathletes, we should eliminate sex segregation altogether, and sportshould either be open (not segregated at all) (Tamburrini, 2000a, ch.6; Tännsjö, 2000) or segregated along dimensions other thansex such as weight, height, haemoglobin level, or testosterone level(Knox et al, 2019).

Aside from the sex segregation question, there has been muchdiscussion of sport as a site of gender politics. The role that sportplays in the construction of gender (including gender hierarchies) wastaken up in Iris Marion Young’s classic paper ‘ThrowingLike a Girl’ (1980) which explores the modalities of feminine bodilyexistence for women in contemporary society. Young’s centralclaim is that such modalities of feminie movement, motility, andspatiality have as their source not anatomy or physiology but theparticular situation of women, which is shaped by sexist oppression(Young, 1980). The framework developed by Young has inspiredphenomenologies of female embodiment in particular sports such assurfing (Brennan, 2016) and climbing (Chisholm, 2008), which delineatethe oppression of women within these sporting communities arising fromprevailing sexist notions of the female body. Young has also arguedthat, as long as women’s bodies are understood as objects, theyare excluded by the culture from sport. This cultural exclusion ofwomen from sport, in turn, creates a masculine bias within sport, whichprecludes the exhibition of sport’s potential humanity (Young,1979). There has also been discussion of whether the very nature ofcompetiton – a central feature of sport – is masculinistand inherently incompatible with feminism (Davion, 1987).

Compared to the well-developed literature around sex and gender insport, issues around race and sport have received surprisingly littleattention in the philosophy of sport literature (with exceptionsincluding disparate articles by Mosley, 2003; Lapchick, 2003; andMarqusee, 2003). However, recent political activism by Americanfootball star Colin Kaepernick to highlight systematic racism in theUnited States against African Americans has inspired philosophical workabout race and sport, and the ethics of political activism by athletes(Brackett, 2017; Klein, 2017; Marston, 2017; Sailors, 2017; and Rorkeand Copeland, 2017).

Several Foucauldian post-structuralists and existentialists haveexplored the connections between hegemonic racial power structures andsport (Early, 2007). For instance, writers such as Grant Farred (2018),Erin C. Tarver (2018), and Katrhryn E. Henne (2015), have exploredthemes around sports and white (and/or colonial) hegemonic interests.They have examined whether sport and the engagement of minorities insport perpetuates and promotes white privilege and white interests(Henne, 2015). They have also critiqued the hegemonic forcespurportedly used by the institutionalized and corporate structure ofsport to discipline and exploit minorities, especially in professionalsport and American college sport (Hawkins, 2001; Farred,2018).

3.6 Fans and Spectators

What is the best way to watch sport? Is our fascination with andadmiration of elite sportspeople morally defensible? The debate aboutthe most valuable form of spectatorship has revolved around whether the‘purist’ model of spectator is superior to the‘partisan’ model. Purists derive aesthetic pleasure fromgood play. They appreciate a virtuoso performance irrespective of theperformer, that is, irrespective of which team or athlete delivers it(Dixon, 2016). Purists have no allegiance to any particular team butappreciate feats of athletic excellence on their merits only. Theyappreciate good play, as one might appreciate a work of art withoutknowing or caring about the identity of the artist. For purists, aproper appreciation of the spectacle is paramount, and allegiance to aparticular team threatens to undermine a proper appreciation ofsport.

Chief among the criticisms of purism (Russell, 2012; Feezell, 2013;Mumford, 2011, 2012) is its neglect of partisanship. Partisans espousethe virtue of supporting a particular team, even when that team playspoorly. Loyalty is paramount to partisans, and they follow their teamthrough good times and bad.Partisans typically support their favoured team zealously, and theycheer for their team’s success. For partisans, it matters thattheir team wins, even if they display less, or a lower form of,athletic excellence than the opposition.

Some have argued that the admiration of individual sporting heroes,characteristic of purist spectators, is morally problematic. On thisview, enthusiasm and awe surrounding the achievements of elite athletesare not morally respectable. Indeed, such attitudes reflect afascistoid ideology (Tännsjö 1998, 2005). Admiration forwinners in sport involves the celebration of strength and, inevitably,the expression of contempt for weakness. Strength is understood as atrait for which one is not responsible but which has its origin ingenetics (Tännsjö 2005), so admiration for athletes based ontheir strength is thought fascistoid. On this view, in admiring thevictor(s), we cannot but demonstrate contempt for the loser(s):admiration for the former and contempt for the latter are two sides ofthe same coin.

It has been argued against Tännsjö’s account that itis descriptive rather than normative. At best, Tännsjödescribes how spectators do behave, not how they should behave.Moreover, admiration for the winner does not necessarily imply contemptfor the loser, and by extension, for the weak. ContraTännsjö, there is no necessary link between these twoattitudes. Our admiration of elite athletes need not rest on anappreciation of their excellence understood solely in terms of strength(Tamburrini, 2000, ch. 5), as admiration for sports stars, properlyunderstood, is only to a limited extent admiration of them because oftheir physical strength (Persson, 2005).

3.7 Disability Sport

‘Disability sport’, also referred to as‘Paralympic sport’ or ‘sport for athletes withdisabilities or impairments’ contrasts with sport for able-bodiedpersons. The two principal ethical questions that arise regardingdisability sport are: 1. What criteria should be used to classifydisability athletes in competition?; and 2. Should disability athletes,specifically those with prosthetic limbs, be allowed to compete withable-bodied athletes?

Who may be considered a Paralympic athlete? In order to compete indisability or Paralympic sport, one must be classed as having adisability. The notion of disability is a contested concept (Boorse2010, 2011; Nordenfelt 1987, 2007). It is unsurprising, then, that,what counts as a disability for the purpose of sport and how tocategorise those with disabilities for the purpose of competition arematters of some dispute (Edwards and McNamee 2015). For example, for anathlete to qualify as a disability athlete, must her disability bepermanent, or could it be temporary? Could the disability be onlysomewhat impairing or must it be profoundly impairing?

Central to this dispute is whether it is preferable to adopt a‘functional classification system’, which would grouptogether athletes with different disabilities but similar abilitylevels, or a ‘disability-specific classification system’,which would group together athletes with similar types of disabilitiesdespite different capabilities. At least for the purposes of thequadrennial Paralympic Games, this question cannot be addressedadequately in isolation from the proper aims of the ParalympicMovement, including whether these aims are in contrast with, or even intension with, those of elite able-bodied sport.

The second question concerns the appropriate relation betweendisabled and able-bodied sport. Specifically, should disabled athleteswho use prosthetic limbs be allowed to compete in able-bodied sport?Oscar Pistorius was controversially permitted to compete in the 400mat the Olympic Games in 2012 (in addition to the 2012 Paralympic Games)despite using carbon-fibre prosthetic legs. Some objected that hisprosthetic legs conferred him with an unfair advantage while othersquestioned whether the prosthetics precluded him from‘running’ in the relevant sense at all (Edwards, 2008).

Finally, the practice of Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs) operatesin elite able-bodied and disability sport to allow athletes withchronic or temporary illness to use medication for therapeutic (asopposed to enhancement) purposes that they would otherwise be prohibitedfrom using. This practice has proved controversial as thetherapy/enhancement distinction is difficult to specify with precision(Daniels, 2000), and the system has been criticised as open to abuse.However, if the use of such substances were denied across the board,athletes with chronic conditions, for example, would effectively beexcluded from sport on account of being unfairly disadvantaged (Pike,2018).

3.8 The Aesthetics of Sport

While the ethical analysis of sport has been the central preoccupationof recent philosophy of sport, the last two decades has seen a revivedinterest in the aesthetic analysis of sport (Edgar, 2013b; Lacerda,2012a). The study of aesthetics and sport has focused on two principalareas. The first concerns the relevance of aesthetic qualities to theexperience of playing and watching sport. Does sport elicit aestheticvalues? If so, what are these values and are they inherent to or onlyincidental to sport? The second examines the relationship betweensport and art. Is sport one of the arts? If so, what makes sport anart? An early precursor of these discussions is C. L. R. James’(1963) classic,Beyond a Boundary. In his seminal analysis ofcricket, James explores the identity between sport and art, arguingthat both yield aesthetic pleasure because they have been created tobe beautiful.

Related to both of these concerns is whether the aestheticappreciation of sport is distinctive, that is, different in kind toother forms of aesthetic appreciation. For Joseph Kupfer (1975), sporthas multiple purposes. One of these purposes is to create aestheticallypleasant experiences. Stephen Mumford (2011) observes that theaesthetic values elicited by sports depend on the physical demands thateach sport makes of participants. However, in Mumford’s view, allsports yield aesthetic experiences related to bodily motion and grace,high-level abstract forms, drama, and innovation and genius. Edgar(2012, 2013a) criticizes this view as narrow because it connects sportonly to values related to harmony, neglecting the fact that sport isalso ugly. Since sport yields aesthetic pleasure, James (1963) arguesthat sport should be seen as one of the arts. More recently, Spencer K.Wertz (1985; 1985), Hans Ulrich Gumbretch (2006), and Wolfgang Welsch(1999) have supported the idea that sport has aesthetic qualities andthat sport should be regarded as an art. However, some have deniedsport’s artistic credentials.

Eliseo Vivas (1959, p. 228) contends that, unlike aestheticexperiences, sport cannot be experienced disinterestedly. To do so, onemust bracket an essential feature of sport: competition. For MaureenKovich (1971), if athletes and spectators focused on the aestheticaspects of sport, their preoccupation would be the observation andcreation of art in movement rather than on scoring and winning. Themain purpose of sport is to meet physical challenges and to compareoneself to others in doing so. For instance, in the high jump, the goalis to clear the bar by jumping over it. Athletes compete to see who canjump the highest, not the most beautifully. Dick Fosbury introduced the‘flop’ not because it was more beautiful than previoustechniques (i.e., scissors, western roll, and straddle jump), butbecause it was more effective (2007). To ignore the essentialcompetitive elements of sport in favor of aesthetic principles is tofail to take sport seriously. To strengthen this claim, Paul Ziff(1974) argues that some sporting events have little or no aestheticvalue. Often, athletes play dirty and achieve ugly victories. Insupport of this view, David Best (1974, 1985) argues that most athletesprefer an ugly victory than a defeat where they have performedgracefully. On this view, not only is aesthetics inessential to sport,but the pursuit of aesthetic purposes can undermine the achievement ofsport’s main goals. Thus, Ray Elliot (1974) posits that thegoddess of sport is not Beauty but Victory. Creating beauty shouldnever be the main goal of sport. Aesthetics is incidental in sport,whereas, in art, it is the principal aim. Therefore, sport is not anart.

A further challenge to the idea that sport can be art is that artconcerns something beyond itself, whereas sport concerns play andnothing in real life beyond play. For instance, an actor playing Hamletis not Hamlet in real life. They represent the modernindividual’s existential struggle. By contrast, a point guard inbasketball is actually a point guard; point guards do not representanything outside the game of basketball. In response, Kevin Krein(2008) and Tim L. Elcombe (2012) have argued that, like art, sportsconvey values and meanings external to sport that represent, or presentan alternative to (in the case of non-traditional sports such asclimbing and surfing), the culture in which sport practitioners findthemselves. In Terrence J. Roberts’ (1995) view, athletes are‘strong poets.’ They expresses something about our lifesituation as embodied agents (Mumford, 2014). Drawing on Nelson Goodman(1978), philosophers such as Edgar, Breivik, and Krein understand sportas worldmaking, that is, sport embraces and refigures symbolic worldsoutside of sport, opening up new ways of describing, or making, suchnon-sporting worlds. Sport provides resources for re-describing thenon-sporting world. Building upon this view of sport, Edgar (2013a)argues for a shift from sport aesthetics to sport hermeneutics, thatis, to the interpretation of the meaning of sport and how that meaningis interpreted (see Lopez Frias & Edgar, 2016).

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