Albertus Magnus, also known as Albert the Great, was one of the mostuniversal thinkers to appear during the Middle Ages. Even more so thanhis most famous student, St. Thomas of Aquinas, Albert’sinterests ranged from natural science all the way to theology. He madecontributions to logic, psychology, metaphysics, meteorology,mineralogy, and zoology. He was an avid commentator on nearly all thegreat authorities read during the 13^th Century. He wasdeeply involved in an attempt to understand the import of the thoughtof Aristotle in some orderly fashion that was distinct from the Arabcommentators who had incorporated their own ideas into the study ofAristotle. Yet he was not averse to using some of the outstanding Arabphilosophers in developing his own ideas in philosophy. His superiorunderstanding of a diversity of philosophical texts allowed him toconstruct one of the most remarkable syntheses in medievalculture.

• 1. Life of Albert the Great
• 2. Philosophical Enterprise
• 3. Logic
• 4. Metaphysics
• 5. Psychology and Anthropology
• 6. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences
• 7. Ethics
• 8. The Influence of Albert the Great
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature: Works by Albert the Great
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life of Albert the Great

The precise date of Albert’s birth is not known. It is generallyconceded that he was born into a knightly family sometime around theyear 1200 in Lauingen an der Donau in Germany. He was apparently inItaly in the year 1222 where he was present when a rather terribleearthquake struck in Lombardy. A year later he was still in Italy andstudying at the University of Padua. The same year Jordan of Saxonyreceived him into the Dominican order. He was sent to Cologne in orderto complete his training for the order. He finished this training aswell as a course of studies in theology by 1228. He then beganteaching as a lector at Cologne, Hildesheim, Freiburg im Breisgau,Regensburg, and Strassburg. During this period he published his firstmajor work,De natura boni.

Ten years later he is recorded as having been present at the generalchapter of the Dominican Order held in Bologna. Two years later hevisited Saxony where he observed the appearance of a comet. Some timebetween 1241 and 1242 he was sent to the University of Paris tocomplete his theological education. He followed the usual prescriptionof lecturing on theSentences of Peter Lombard. In additionhe began writing his six partSumma parisiensis dealing withthe sacraments of the Church, the incarnation and resurrection ofChrist, the four coevals, human nature, and the nature of the good. Hetook his degree as master of theology in 1245 and began to teachtheology at the university under Gueric de Saint-Quentin. St. ThomasAquinas became his student at this time and remained underAlbert’s direction for the next three years. In 1248 Albert wasappointed regent of studies at thestudium generale that wasnewly created by the Dominican order in Cologne. So Albert, along withThomas Aquinas, left Paris and went to Cologne. Thomas continued hisstudies under Albert in Cologne and served asmagisterstudium in the school as well until 1252. Then Thomas returned toParis to take up his teaching duties while Albert remained in Cologne,where he began to work on the vast project he set himself of preparinga paraphrase of each of the known works of Aristotle.

In 1254 the Dominican order again assigned Albert a difficult task.He was elected the prior provincial for the German-speaking provinceof the order. This position mandated that Albert spend a great deal ofhis time traveling throughout the province visiting Dominicanconvents, priories, and even a Dominican mission in Riga. This taskoccupied Albert until 1256. That year he returned to Cologne, but leftthe same year for Paris in order to attend a General Chapter of hisorder in which the allegations of William of St. Amour’sDepericulis novissimorum temporum against mendicant orders wereconsidered. A little later Pope Alexander IV asked Albert to go toAnagni in order to speak to a commission of Cardinals who were lookinginto the claims of William. While engaged in this charge Albertcompleted his refutation of Averroistic psychology with hisDeunitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Afterwards Albertdeparted for another tour of the province of Germany. In 1257 hereturned to the papal court, which was now located in Viterbo. He wasrelieved of his duties as prior provincial and returned again toCologne as regent of studies. He continued to teach until 1259 when hetraveled to Valenciennes in order to attend a General Chapter of hisorder. At that time, along with Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentasia,Bonhomme Brito, and Florent de Hesdin, he undertook on behalf of hisorder an extensive discussion of the curriculum of the scholasticprogram used by the order.

The next year of his life found Albert once again appointed to anonerous duty. In obedience to the wishes of the pope Albert wasconsecrated a bishop of the Church and sent to Ratisbon (modernRegensburg) in order to undertake a reform of abuses in that diocese.Albert worked at this task until 1263 when Pope Urban IV relieved himof his duties and asked Albert to preach the Crusade in the Germanspeaking countries. This duty occupied Albert until the year 1264. Hethen went to the city of Würzburg where he stayed until 1267.

Albert spent the next eight years traveling around Germany conductingvarious ecclesiastical tasks. Then in 1274 while he was traveling tothe Council of Lyons Albert received the sad news of the untimelydeath of Thomas Aquinas, his friend and former student of manyyears. After the close of the Council Albert returned toGermany. There is evidence that he traveled to Paris in the year 1277in order to defend Aquinas’ teaching, which was under attack atthe university. In 1279, anticipating his death he drew up his ownlast will and testament. On November 15, 1280 he died and was buriedin Cologne. On December 15, 1931 Pope Pius XI declared Albert both asaint and a doctor of the Church. On the 16^th of December1941 Pope Pius XII declared Albert the patron saint of the naturalsciences.

2. Philosophical Enterprise

An examination of Albert’s published writings reveals somethingof his understanding of philosophy in human culture. In effect heprepared a kind of philosophical encyclopedia that occupied him up tothe last ten years of his life. He produced paraphrases of most of theworks of Aristotle available to him. In some cases where he felt thatAristotle should have produced a work, but it was missing, Albertproduced the work himself. If he had produced nothing else it would benecessary to say that he adopted the Aristotelianphilosophical-scientific program and subordinated it to the Neoplatonic tradition. Albert’sintellectual vision, however, was very great. Not only did heparaphrase “The Philosopher” (as the medievals calledAristotle) but Porphyry, Boethius, Peter Lombard, Gilbert de laPorrée, theLiber de causis, and Ps.-Dionysius. Healso wrote a number of commentaries on the Bible. In addition to allof this work of paraphrasing and commenting, in which Albert laboredto prepare a kind of unified field theory of medieval Christianintellectual culture, he also wrote a number of works in which hedeveloped his own philosophical-scientific-theological vision. Hereone finds titles such asDe unitate intellectus,Problemata determinate,De fato,De XV problematibus,De natura boni,De sacramentis,De incarnatione,De bono,De quattuor coaequaevis,De homine, and his unfinishedSumma theologiae de mirabilis scientia Dei.

Albert’s labors resulted in the formation of what might becalled a Christian reception of Aristotle in the Western Europe.Albert himself had a strong bias in favor of Neo-Platonism,and hiswork on Aristotle shows him to have had a deep understanding of theAristotelian program. Along with his student Thomas Aquinas he was ofthe opinion that Aristotle and the kind of natural philosophy that herepresented was no obstacle to the development of a Christianphilosophical vision of the natural order. In order to establish thispoint Albert carefully dissected the method that Aristotle employed inundertaking the task of expounding natural philosophy. This method,Albert decided, is experientially based and proceeds to drawconclusions by the use of both inductive and deductivelogic. Christian theology, as Albert found it taught in Europe restedfirmly upon the revelation of Sacred Scripture and the ChurchFathers. Therefore, he reasoned, the two domains of human culture aredistinct in their methodology and pose no threat to each other. Bothcan be pursued for their own sake. Philosophy was not to be valuedonly in terms of its ancillary relation to theology. As recentresearch has shown, Albert subordinated his use of Aristotle to hisunderstanding of the Neoplatonic view of reality that he found in thewritings of Pseudo Dionysius and theLiber de causis. He sawall of reality in terms of the Neoplatonic categories of exit andreturn, which he referred to in his writings with the termsexitus,perfectio, andreductio. Thisschema gave him a framework into which he could develop the scientificinsights of Aristotle. But within this framework he insisted that natural science must investigate the causes that are operating in nature as based on empirical evidence.

3. Logic

Albert carefully prepared a paraphrase of Aristotle’sOrganon (the logical treatises in the Aristotelian corpus). Hethen used the results of this paraphrase to address the problem ofuniversals as he found it discussed in the philosophical literature anddebates of the medieval philosophical culture. He defined the termuniversal as referring to “ … that which, although it exists in one, is apt by nature to exist in many.”^[1] Because it is aptto be in many, it is predicable of them. (De praed., tract II,c. 1) He then distinguished three kinds of universals, those thatpre-exist the things that exemplify them (universale ante rem), those that exist in individual things (universale in re), and those that exist in the mind when abstracted from individual things (universale post rem).

Albert attempted to formulate an answer to Porphyry’s famous problemof universals—namely, do the species according to which weclassify beings exist in themselves or are they merely constructionsof the mind? Albert appealed to his three-fold distinction, notingthat a universal’s mode of being is differentiated according to whichfunction is being considered. It may be considered in itself, or in respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or another.^[2] Both the nominalist and realist solutions to Porphyry’s problem arethus too simplistic and lack proper distinction. Albert’s distinctionthus allowed him to harmonize Plato’s realism in which universalsexisted as separate forms with Aristotle’s more nominalistic theory ofimmanent forms. For universals when considered in themselves(secudum quod in seipso) truly exist and are free from generation, corruption, and change.^[3] If, however, they are taken in reference to the mind (refertur adintelligentiam) they exist in two modes, depending on whetherthey are considered with respect to the intellect that is their cause or the intellect that knows them by abstraction.^[4] But when they are considered in particulars (secundum quod est inisto vel in illo) their existence is exterior to as well as beyond the mind, yet existing in things as individuated.^[5]

4. Metaphysics

Albert’s metaphysics is an adaptation of Aristotelianmetaphysics as conditioned by a form of Neo-Platonism. His reading theLiber de causis as an authentic Aristotelian text influencedhis understanding of Aristotle. It seems that Albert never realized theNeo-Platonic origin of the work. As with the other works of Aristotlehe prepared a paraphrase of the work entitledDe causis et processuuniversitatis, and used it as a guide to interpreting other worksby Aristotle. However, he also used the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius tocorrect some of the doctrine found in theLiber de causis.

Albert blends these three main sources of his metaphysics into ahierarchical structure of reality in which there is an emanation offorms directed by what Albert calls “a summoning of thegood” (advocatio boni). The good operates metaphysicallyas the final cause of the order of forms in the universe of beings. Butit is also the First Cause. And its operation in the created order ofbeing is discovered as an attraction of all being back to itself.“We exist because God is good,” Albert explains, “and we are good insofar as we exist.”^[6] Thus the balanced relations of the exit and return of all thingsaccording to classical Neo-Platonism is skewed in favor of therelationship of return. This is because Albert, as a Christianphilosopher, favors a creationist view of being over the doctrine ofpure emanation. Rejecting also the doctrine of universal hylomorphismAlbert argues that material beings are always composite in which theforms are inchoate until they are called forth by the ultimategood. Spiritual creatures (excluding man) have no materialelement. Their being summoned to the good is immediate and final. Thesummoning of the inchoate forms of material beings, however, is notdirect. It depends upon the intervention of the celestial spheres.

The First Cause, which Albert understands as God, is an absolutelytranscendent reality. His uncreated light calls forth a hierarchicallyordered universe in which each order of being reflects this light.God’s giving existence to creatures is understood by Albert as their procession from him as from a first cause.^[7] At the top of this hierarchy of light are found the purely spiritualbeings, the angelic orders and the intelligences. Albert carefullydistinguishes these two kinds of beings. He basically accepts theanalysis of the angelic orders as found in Pseudo-Dionysius’ treatiseof the celestial hierarchy. The intelligences move the cosmic spheresand illuminate the human soul. The intelligences, just as the order ofangels, form a special hierarchy. The First Intelligence, as Albertcalls it, contemplates the entire universe and uses the human soul, asilluminated by the lower intelligences, to draw all creatures into aunity.

Beneath the angels and intelligences are the souls that possessintellects. They are joined to bodies but do not depend on bodies fortheir existence. Although they are ordered to the First Intelligenceso as to enjoin contemplative unity on the entire cosmos, Albertrejects the Averroistic theory of the unity of the intellect. Eachhuman soul has its own intellect. But because the human soul uniquelystands on the horizon of both material and spiritual being it canoperate as a microcosm and thus can serve the purpose of the FirstIntelligence, which is to bind all creatures into a universe.

Finally there are the immersed forms. Under this heading Albertestablishes another hierarchy with the animal kingdom at the top,followed by the plant kingdom, then the world of minerals (in whichAlbert had a deep interest), and finally the elements of materialcreation.

One important aspect of Albert’s metaphysics appears in hiscommentary on Aristotle’Metaphysics. In this workAlbert relies heavily on both Averroes in hisLong Commentary onthe Metaphysics and Avicenna’sPhilosophiaprima. While the commentary of Averroes is an almost literalanalysis of the text of Aristotle, Avicenna’s analysis oftendeparts from this literal approach and incorporates ideas thatAvicenna found in Aristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics. Albert seems to be using Averroes when he isparaphrasing Aristotle’s text, but relies on Avicenna when hedeparts from the paraphrasing. As a result of this usage Albertproceeds to develop his own ideas of first philosophy as outlinedabove. This can be seen for example in his analysis of the fifth bookof theMetaphysics in his digression on unity found intractate 1, chapter 8. Following Avicenna he argues that unity cannotbe an essential feature of any substance.

5. Psychology and Anthropology

Albert’s interest in the human condition is dominated by hisconcern with the relationship of the soul to the body on the one handand the important role that the intellect plays in human psychology. According to Albert, man is identified with his intellect.^[8] With regard to the relationship between the soul and the body Albertappears to be torn between the Platonic theory which sees the soul asa form capable of existing independently of the body and theAristotelian hylomorphic theory which reduces the soul to a functionalrelationship of the body. With respect to human knowing, for example,he maintains the position that the human intellect is dependent upon the senses.^[9] In order to resolve the conflict between the two views Albert availedhimself of Avicenna’s position that Aristotle’s analysiswas focused on the function and not the essence of thesoul. Functionally, Albert argues, the soul is the agent cause of thebody. “Just as we maintain that the soul is the cause of theanimated body and of its motions and passions insofar as it isanimated,” he reasons, “likewise we must maintain that thelowest intelligence is the cause of the cognitive soul insofar as itis cognitive because the cognition of the soul is a particular result of the light of the intelligence.”^[10] Having been created in the image and likeness of God it not onlygoverns the body, as God governs the universe, but it is responsiblefor the very existence of the body, as God is the creator of theworld. And just as God transcends his creation, so does the human soultranscend the body in its interests. It is capable of operating incomplete independence of corporeal functions. This transcendentalfunction of the soul allows Albert to focus on what he believes is theessence of the soul—the human intellect.

Viewed as essentially an intellect, the human soul is an incorporealsubstance. Albert divides this spiritual substance into two powers—the agent intellect and the possible intellect.^[11] Neither of these powers needs the body in order to function. Undercertain conditions concerning its powers the human intellect iscapable of transformation. While it is true that under the stimulus orillumination of the agent intellect the possible intellect canconsider the intelligible form of the phantasms of the mind which arederived from the senses, it can also operate under the sole influenceof the agent intellect. Here, Albert argues, the possible intellectundergoes a complete transformation and becomes totally actualized, asthe agent intellect becomes its form. It emerges as what he calls the“adept intellect” (intellectus adeptus).^[12] At this stage the human intellect is susceptible to illumination byhigher cosmic intellects called the “intelligences”. Suchillumination brings the soul of man into complete harmony with theentire order of creation and constitutes man’s naturalhappiness. Since the intellect is now totally assimilated to the orderof things Albert calls the intellect in its final stage of developmentthe “assimilated intellect” (intellectusassimilativus). The condition of having attained an assimilatedintellect constitutes natural human happiness, realizing all theaspirations of the human condition and human culture. But Albert makesit clear that the human mind cannot attain this state of assimilationon its own. Following the Augustinian tradition as set forth in theDe magistro Albert states that “because the divinetruth lies beyond our reason we are not able by ourselves to discoverit, unless it condescends to infuse itself; for as Augustine says, itis an inner teacher, without whom an external teacher labors aimlessly.”^[13] There is thus an infusion involved with divine illumination, but itis not a pouring forth of forms. Rather, it is an infusion of an innerteacher, who is identified with divine truth itself. In his commentaryon theSentences Albert augments this doctrine when he arguesthat this inner teacher strengthens the weakness of the humanintellect, which by itself could not profit by externalstimulation. He distinguishes the illumination of this interiorteacher from the true and final object of the intellect.^[14] Divine light is only a means by which the intellect can attain its object.^[15] This is consistent with his emphasis upon the analogy of divine lightand physical light, which pervades so much of his thinking. Itfollows, then, that in the order of human knowing there are first ofall the forms that are derived from external things. They cannot teachus anything in any useful way until the light of an inner teacherilluminates them. So light is the medium of this vision. But the innerteacher himself is identified with the divine truth, which is thefinal object and perfection of the human intellect. In hisSumma, however, Albert makes further distinctions concerningthe object of human knowing. Natural things, he tells us, are receivedin a natural light, while the things that the intellect contemplatesin the order of belief (ad credenda vero) are received in alight that is gratuitous (gratuitum est), and the beatifyingrealities are received in the light of glory.^[16] It seems that Albert has abandoned the position that evennaturalia require divine illumination. Strictly speaking, hehas not abnegated his earlier position.Naturalia may verywell still require the work of a restorative inner teacher. In theSumma, however, Albert is anxious to stress the radicaldifference natural knowing has from supernatural knowing. He hasalready established this difference in his study of the humanintellect (De intellectu) where he tells us, “Some[intelligibles] with their light overpower our intellect which istemporal and has continuity. These are like the things that are mostmanifest in nature which are related to our intellect as the light ofthe sun or a strong scintillating color is to the eyes of the bat orthe owl. Other [intelligibles] are manifest only through the light ofanother. These would be like the things which are received in faithfrom what is primary and true.”^[17] But in both natural and supernatural knowing Albert is careful tostress the final object and perfection of the human intellect. Thisleads naturally to a consideration of Albert’s understanding ofethics.

6. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences

In the first section of hisCommentary on Aristotle’sPhysics Albertus Magnus discusses the possibility of the study ofnatural science. If science could only study particulars, Albertargues, then there would be no science in the sense of thedemonstration of necessary causes because there would be as manysciences as there are particulars. But particulars, Albert goes on topoint out, belong to definite kinds (species) and these can be studiedbecause their causescan be demonstrated. Species have commonattributes and a determined subject of which the attributes can bedetermined with necessity. Thus science is possible.

And this conviction about science being possible, as opposed to thePlatonic and Neoplatonic tendency to discount the world of particularreality, and its presumed unaccountable changeableness, was not just atheoretical position on Albert’s part. He devotes a great deal ofhis time and attention to the actual empirical study of therelationships between attributes and natural subjects. Furthermore, heorders such study into what today would be called the “naturalsciences”. Besides the study of the heavens and the earth andgeneration and corruption that he found in Aristotle, he adds the studyof meteors, the mineral, animal, and vegetable kingdoms.

Albert inherited astronomy as part of the scholastic curriculum knownas thequadrivium. But his interest in this sciencewas not merely conceptual; he was also interested in using mathematicalcalculations and conferring with astronomical tables to study thenature of celestial bodies. He was concerned with the constellations,the sizes of planets and stars and their positions and movements in theheavens. He seems to have known about astronomical instruments,particularly the astrolabe, but gives no clue as to what method ofinvestigation he used to carry out his studies. He did make it clear,however, that the principles of physics had to be applied to celestialbodies, which he regarded as natural physical bodies moving in realspace.

Besides studying the properties of the celestial bodies themselves, healso was concerned with their effects on terrestrial objects. Forexample, he seems to have understood that the tides on earth wererelated to celestial bodies.

After astronomy, Albert develops a particular order in which heproposes to study the other sciences. In hisMeteora, heexplains that sublunary moveable bodies can be studied in three ways.First, in so far as they come into and pass out of being (generationand corruption). Then they must be investigated with respect to theirmixture with other moveable bodies. And lastly, they need to be studiedwith respect to their contraction to the mineral, vegetable, and animalspecies. This last phase of his plan, however, is where Albert made hisown contribution to the development of modern science as it is knowntoday. That is, he undertook his own empirical investigations into themineral, plant, and animal kingdoms.

Albert’sTreatise on Minerals (De mineralibus)shows that he undertakes his own observations and did not merelycollate authorities on the topic. He studies different kinds ofminerals and metals as well as rare stones. Beginning with the mineralkingdom, he notes the properties of each mineral specimen, includingwhere it was found along with its cause or causes. Next, he deals withrare stones, investigating the powers of these specimens along withtheir causes. He then produces an alphabetical list of a large numberof these more precious stones. Throughout the treatise, Albert iscareful always to proceed from the effects or properties of the mineralworld to hypotheses concerning their causes. It is clear from his textthat he himself made a number of studies (experiments) with differentminerals.

Next, Albert studies the plant kingdom. In hisTreatise onPlants (De vegetabilibus), as in hisTreatise onMinerals, he combines his own observations with those of otherauthorities, providing an alphabetical list of plants as he did forstones in hisTreatise on Minerals. But he adds a long sectionon the cultivation of plants. He makes the interesting observation thatthe properties of certain plants are caused by celestial bodies. Healso indicates the medicinal properties of certain plants, although heis careful to point out that his principal concern is in understandingthe nature of plants based on a study of their properties andvirtues.

Albert’s interest in the natural order concludes with hisinvestigations of the final level of natural beings, the animalkingdom. HisTreatise on Animals (De animalibus)involves Aristotle’s studies of animals as well as material takenfrom Thomas of Cantimpré’s encyclopedicOn the Natureof Things (De natura rerum). But Albert inserts his ownstudies of animals into the treatise. He investigates the causes of theproperties of different kinds of animals based on their operations andpowers. Again, Albert organizes a kind of dictionary of animals basedon their various species, listed in alphabetical order as he had donein the other special sciences.

It seems to have been of considerable importance to Albert to do twothings in developing his scientific investigations. First, to reviewand organize the authorities in each of the branches of science andsecond to test by his own experience the claims made by theseauthorities. In this way, he was careful to accommodate readers whowere used to consulting authorities instead of experience by providinga context in which he could introduce his new findings.

7. Ethics

Albert’s ethics rests on his understanding of human freedom. Thisfreedom is expressed through the human power to make unrestricteddecisions about their own actions. This power, theliberumarbitrium, Albert believes is identified neither with theintellect nor the will. He holds this extraordinary position becauseof his analysis of the genesis of human action. In his treatise on man(Liber de homine) he accounts for human action as beginningwith the intellect considering the various options for action open toa person at a given moment in time. This is coupled by the willdesiring the beneficial outcome of the proposed event. Then theliberum arbitrium chooses one of the options proposed by theintellect or the object of the will’s desire. The will then moves theperson to act on the basis of the choice of theliberumarbitrium. Brutes do not have this ability, he argues, and mustact solely on their initial desire. Hence they have no power of freechoice. In his later writings, however, Albert eliminates the firstact of the will. But even so he distinguishes theliberumarbitrium from both the will and the intellect, presumably sothat it can respond to the influences of both these facultiesequally. Thus the way to ethics is open.

Albert’s concern with ethics as such is found in his twocommentaries on Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethics. Theprologues to both these works reveal Albert’s original thoughtson some problems about the discipline of ethics. He wonders if ethicscan be considered as a theoretical deductive science. He concludes thatit can be so considered because the underlying causes of moral action(rationes morum) involve both necessary and universalprinciples, the conditions needed for a science according to theanalysis of Aristotle that Albert accepted.^[18] Therationes morum are contrasted by him to the mereappearance of moral behaviour.^[19] Thus virtue can be discussed in abstraction from particular actionsof individual human agents. The same is true of other ethicalprinciples. However, Albert maintains that it is possible to refer toparticular human acts as exemplifying relevant virtues and as such toinclude them in a scientific discussion of ethics.^[20] Therefore, ethics is theoretical, even though the object of itstheory is the practical.

Another concern that Albert expresses is how ethics as a theoreticaldeductive science can be relevant to thepractice of thevirtuous life. He addresses this problem by distinguishing ethics as adoctrine (ethica docens) from ethics as a practical activityof individual human beings (ethica utens).^[21] The outcomes of these two aspects of ethics are different heargues. Ethics as a doctrine is concerned with teaching. It proceedsby logical analysis concentrating on the goals of human action ingeneral. As such its proper end is knowledge. But as a practical anduseful art ethics is concerned with action as a means to a desired end.^[22] Its mode of discourse is rhetorical—the persuasion of thehuman being to engage in the right actions that will lead to thedesired end.^[23] Albert sees these two aspects of ethics as linked together by thevirtue of prudence. It is prudence that applies the results of thedoctrine of ethics to its practice.^[24] Ethics considered as a doctrine operates through prudence as a remotecause of ethical action. Thus the two functions of ethics are relatedand ethics is considered by Albert as both a theoretical deductivescience and a practical applied science.

Albert goes beyond these methodological considerations. He addressesthe end of ethics, as he understands it. And here his psychology bearsfruit. For he embraces the idea that the highest form of humanhappiness is the contemplative life. This is the true and proper endof man, he claims. For the adept intellect, as noted above, is thehighest achievement to which the human condition can aspire. Itrepresents the conjunction of the apex of the human mind to theseparated agent intellect. In this conjunction the separated agentintellect becomes the form of the soul. The soul experiencesself-sufficiency and is capable of contemplative wisdom. This is asclose to beatitude as man can get in this life. Man is now capable ofcontemplating separated beings as such and can live his life in almoststoical detachment from the concerns of sublunar existence.

8. The Influence of Albert the Great

Albert’s influence on the development of scholastic philosophy in thethirteenth century was enormous. He, along with his most famousstudent Thomas of Aquinas, succeeded in incorporating the philosophyof Aristotle into the Christian West. Besides Thomas, Albert was alsothe teacher of Ulrich of Straßburg (1225 – 1277), whocarried forward Albert’s interest in natural science by writing acommentary on Aristotle’sMeteors along with his metaphysicalwork, theDe summo bono; Hugh Ripelin of Straßburg(c.1200 – 1268) who wrote the famousCompendium theologicaeveritatis; John of Freiburg (c.1250 – 1314) who wrote theLibellus de quaestionibus casualibus; and Giles of Lessines(c. 1230 – c. 1304) who wrote a treatise on the unity ofsubstantial form, theDe unitate formae. The influence ofAlbert and his students was very pronounced in the generation ofGerman scholars who came after these men. Dietrich of Freiberg, whomay have actually met Albert, is probably the best example of theinfluence of the spirit of Albert the Great. Dietrich (c. 1250 –c. 1310) wrote treatises on natural science, which give evidence ofhis having carried out actual scientific investigation. His treatiseon the rainbow would be a good example. But he also wrote treatises onmetaphysical and theological topics in which the echoes of Albert canbe distinctly heard. Unlike Albert he did not write commentaries onAristotle, but preferred to apply Albertist principles to topicsaccording to his own understanding. On the other hand Berthold ofMoosburg (+ c. 1361) wrote a very important commentary on Proclus’Elements of Theology, introducing the major work of the greatNeo-Platonist into German metaphysics. Berthold’s debt to Albert isfound throughout his commentary, especially with regard tometaphysical topics. Many of these Albertist ideas and principlespassed down to thinkers such as Meister Eckhart, John Tauler, andHeinrich Suso where they took on a unique mystical flavor. TheAlbertist tradition continued down to Heymeric de Campo (1395 –1460) who passed it on to Nicholas of Cusa. From Nicholas the ideaspass down to the Renaissance. The philosophers of the Renaissance seemto have been attracted to the Albert’s understanding of Neo-Platonismand his interest in natural science.

Bibliography

Primary Literature: Works by Albert the Great

• Opera Omnia, P. Jammy (ed.), 21 volumes, Lyon, 1651.
• Opera Omnia, E. Borgnet (ed.), 38 volumes, Paris: Vives,1890–9.
• Alberti Magni Opera Omnia edenda curavit Institutum AlbertiMagni Coloniense Bernhardo Geyer praeside, Münster:Aschendorff, 1951–.
• Book of Minerals, Dorothy Wyckoff (trans.), Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1967.
• Commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, SimonTugwell, O.P. (trans.), in S. Tugwell,Albert and Thomas:Selected Writings, New York: Paulist Press, 1988.
• On the Causes of the Properties of the Elements, IrvenM. Resnick (trans.), Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010.
• Über den Menschen (De homine), Henryk Anzulewicz andJoachim R. Söder (trans.), Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,2004.
• Métaphysique, Livre XI, Traités II etIII. Texte latin en vis-à-vis Traduction, introduction etnotes, par Isabelle Moulin. Sic et Non. Paris: Vrin, 2009.
• Questions concerning Aristotle’s OnAnimals. Tr. Irven M. Resnick and Kenneth F. Kitchell, Jr. TheFathers of the Church: Medieval Continuation, 9. Washington, D.C.: CUAPress, 2008.

Secondary Literature

• Aertsen, J., 1996, “Albertus Magnus und die mittelalterlichePhilosophie,”Allgemeine Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie, 21: 111–128.
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• History of the Dominican Order
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• Alberti Magni E-Corpus, electronic texts of Albert the Great, maintained at the University of Waterloo

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Acknowledgments

The author and editors would like to thank Martin Pokorny for noticingan inaccurate statement (Section 5) about the relationship between manand his intellect. The statement has now been corrected.