Adolf Reinach was a leading representative of so-called“realist” phenomenology. So pivotal was his role inshaping the early phases of the phenomenological movement that manyyoung scholars saw in Reinach their real teacher in phenomenology.Although his life was tragically cut short at the age of 34 in 1917,Reinach’s production is remarkably wide and diverse in itsthematic breadth, touching on issues of relevance to general ontology,philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of law, philosophy oflanguage, philosophy of physics, philosophy of religion, and otherdisciplines. Lucidly clear, profoundly insightful, and preciselyargued, Reinach’s contributions represent some of the bestresults that can be achieved through the phenomenological approach tophilosophizing.

• 1. Life and Works
• 2. Reinach’s Realist Phenomenology
• 3. General Ontology: Objects and States of Affairs
• 4. Social Acts and Normativity
• 5. Reinach’s Legacy
• Bibliography
  • Works by Reinach
  • References and Further Readings
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Works

Adolf Reinach was born into a prominent Jewish family in Mainz,Germany in 1883. In 1901 he enrolled at the Ludwig MaximilianUniversity in Munich to study law, psychology, and philosophy. Fouryears later he submitted his dissertation, which was entitledOnthe Concept of Causality in the Criminal Code, and written underthe direction of Theodor Lipps. During this time, Reinach joined theAcademic Society for Psychology—a group of youngphilosophers who gravitated around Lipps. This group included JohannesDaubert, Alexander Pfänder, Theodor Conrad, Moritz Geiger, amongmany others. In 1909 Reinach moved to Göttingen, where hecompleted his Habilitation onEssence and Systematics ofJudgment under Edmund Husserl’s sponsorship. During hisyears in Göttingen, Reinach inspired and influenced the so-calledMunich and Göttingen Circles of Phenomenology.

Between 1909 and 1913 Reinach published an important series of longarticles. These include:On the Theory of Negative Judgment(1911), which is a condensed summary of his lost Habilitationdeveloping his theory of judgment and of states of affairs;Kant’s Conception of Hume’s Problem (1911), wherean account of metaphysical necessity is presented; andPremeditation; its Ethical and Legal Significance (1912/13),which provides a description of epistemic and practical agency. In1913 he published his masterpieceThe Apriori Foundations of theCivil Law (Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichenRechtes), which appeared in the first volume of theYearbookfor Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, which Reinach hadfounded and edited together with Moritz Geiger, Edmund Husserl, MaxScheler, and Alexander Pfänder. In this monograph, Reinach offersan account of many fundamental concepts concerning our shared socialworld, including normativity, proxy agency, property, positive law,and speech acts such as promises, orders, requests, andenactments.

After the declaration of war in 1914, Reinach enlisted in the Germanarmy, and only some letters and philosophical sketches from the waryears have survived. Shortly after he was baptized into theEvangelical Church, he died in battle in Flanders in 1917. His deathprofoundly influenced the future history of the phenomenologicalmovement. Herbert Spiegelberg writes:

Independently of each other, the Göttingen students ofphenomenology like Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, AlexanderKoyré and Edith Stein, in their accounts of this period, referto Reinach, not to Husserl, as their real teacher in phenomenology.Hedwig Conrad-Martius even goes so far as to call him thephenomenologistpar excellence… It was his death inaction in 1917 rather than Husserl’s going to Freiburg which cutshort not only his own promise but that of the Göttingenphenomenological circle. (1982: 191–192)

Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith’s critical edition ofReinach’s work includes all his publications as well as hisunpublished manuscripts. In this latter material, one can find thetext of the lecture he gave in 1914 in Marburg entitledConcerningPhenomenology, which can be considered a manifesto of realistphenomenology.

Many of Reinach’s ideas have been rediscovered by contemporaryphilosophers, often without awareness of his philosophical work andsignificance. Notable examples of this include his theory of socialacts, which predates similar theories developed by Austin and Searle;the thesis that metaphysical necessity is grounded in essences; thedistinction between social and moral normativity; the idea thatacquiring knowledge is asui generis act of the mind; thedescription of the psychological sense of commitment; and hisrecognition that there are genuinely social entities, which areneither physical nor psychological (examples being the claim andobligation that arise through an act of promising).

2. Reinach’s Realist Phenomenology

Reinach sees himself as developing a distinctive approach tophilosophy with the goal of being faithful to what is given indifferent kinds of experience (linguistic, religious, moral,perceptual, emotional, aesthetic, and so forth). Reinach argues thatsome of these experiences have the power to make their subjectacquainted with objects and their “a priori” or“essential structures(Wesenszusammenhänge)”. Thus, Reinach writes:

We can surely take it as generally granted that there arenoself-evident and necessary relations of essence in the causalrelations of external events. However it is, to speak with Hume, thatwe come to know that fire produces smoke, this issurely notintelligibly grounded in the essence of fire, as it lies in theessence of the number 3 to be larger than the number 2. (1913a [1989:155], English translation 2012: 15, emphasis added)

As this passage illustrates, Reinach draws a fundamental distinctionbetween contingent anda priori, i.e., general andmetaphysically necessary states of affairs. Three ideas, here, shedlight on Reinach’s understanding of phenomenology.

First,a priori states of affairs are grounded in the verynature, or essence, of their underlying or “founding”objects (Reinach 1911b; for contemporary discussions of this idea, seeFine 1994a, 1994b, 1995 and Mulligan 2004). For example, 3 is largerthan 2 in virtue of its essence; orange lies between red and yellow invirtue of its essence; promises generate obligations in virtue oftheir essence; and remorse presupposes the memory of a past wrongdoingin virtue of its essence. Since each and every object, being theobject that it is, carries an essence or a nature, each and everyobject is embedded in somea priori or essential structure.Importantly, such structures are mind-independent states of affairs:they are not ascribed, imposed, or projected onto the world; rather,they are grounded in the nature of the entities themselves. This isnot, however, to say that the mind, for Reinach, does not have thecapacity to create entities, as we will see in his account of socialand institutional entities.

A core aim of phenomenology is thus to accurately describe theapriori states of affairs that we find in the world. Each andevery object carries an essence, but not all essences are of equalinterest to the phenomenologist, whose attention goes to thoseessences which have a higher degree of intelligibility or ofphilosophical significance (von Hildebrand 1976: 128–136). Thetask of investigating such philosophically significant essences opensup an almost inexhaustible domain of eidetic research for thephenomenologist:

the realm of thea priori is incalculably large … [andthis] opens up for investigation an area so large and rich that stilltoday we cannot see its boundaries. (1914 [1989: 546], Englishtranslation 2012: 215f)

In defending the existence ofa priori states of affairs,phenomenological realists thus believe that they have established anew kind of research agenda for philosophy, illustrated inReinach’s investigations into the essences of mental states(emotions, intentions, perceptions, judgments…), the nature ofsocial and institutional entities (obligations, claims, rights,property…), the nature of movement, and many more. All theseinvestigations should be understood as contributions to correspondingeidetic disciplines (eidetic psychology, eidetic social ontology,eidetic physics, and so on).

Second, to invoke essences in metaphysical explanations “doesnot mean anything dark or mystical” (1913a [1989: 144], Englishtranslation 2012: 5). Essences are objects of a particular kind: theyare, as the next section clarifies, ideal objects. Hence, essences,just like objects of other sorts, can—at least inprinciple—be apprehended, grasped or cognized by a subject(Reinach 1911c [1989: 104], English translation 1982: 325).Importantly, Reinach denies that the intuition of essences requiresany special epistemological technique (as the later Husserl argued).We can intuit essences in experiencing just a single instance: forexample, in making a promise (in realizing a specific instance of theessence of promise), the promisor can understand that all instances ofpromises, by necessity, are directed to an addressee. To put thisdifferently, the subject understands that, as a matter of necessity,there can be no promise that is not directed to some promisee. Infact, Reinach goes so far as to claim that we don’t even need toexperience an actual instance of the essence: in some cases, an act ofimagination can make the essence known to the imagining subject. Hewrites:

I can now, in this moment, convince myself with complete certainty ofthe fact that orange lies qualitatively between red and yellow, ifonly I succeed in bringing to clear intuition for myself thecorresponding natures. I need not have reference to some senseperception, which would have to lead me to a place in the world wherea case of orange, red, and yellow could be found. Because of this, notonly—as is often pointed out—does one need to perceivemerely a single case in order to apprehend the a priori laws involvedin it; in truth, one also does not need to perceive, to“experience”, the single case. One need perceive nothingat all. Pure imagination suffices. (Reinach 1914 [1989: 543], Englishtranslation 2012: 157; see also 1912/13 [1989: 285])

It is important that Reinach not be misunderstood on this point. He isnot suggesting that the job of the phenomenologist starts and endswith intuitions of essences. Quite the contrary: the intuition shouldbe proved to be veridical, the revealed essence adequately understood,its relations with other essences described, the conditions of itsinstantiation clarified.

The third idea is that essences may or may not be instantiated. It iscontroversial in the literature whether or not this idea commitsReinach to Platonism (DuBois 1995; Baltzer-Jaray 2009). But it can beargued that, if it does (see Salice 2009; B. Smith 1987), then Reinachwould not be embracing a naïve form of Platonism. For instance,Reinach explicitly rejects a notion of essences that would generateany form of third man argument. In his article,The Supreme Rulesof Rational Inference According to Kant of 1911, he observes thatessences (what he calls there “general concepts”) do nothave the same properties as the objects that instantiate them. Henotes that it would be an ontological mistake to assume that essencesare the same sorts of things as the entities that have them. Forinstance, the judgment that “the triangle has three sides”does not convey the idea that the essence of the triangle itselfinstantiates triangularity—for that would be nonsensical.Rather, the judgment should be understood as expressing the thoughtthat “everything that is a triangle has three sides”. Itis this general and necessary state of affairs that is the specificobject of oura priori knowledge.

3. General Ontology: Objects and States of Affairs

By endorsing the view that the two most general categories in formalontology are those of object and state of affairs, Reinach refines anumber of ideas that were already circulating at his time (Husserl1900/01; Meinong 1904, 1910).

Objects (Gegenstände) are either real or ideal. Realobjects are either physical or mental. So, for instance, a volcano isa physical entity: it is an individual that is extended in both timeand space. By contrast, the perception of a volcano is a mentalentity, which is also an individual, but extended only in time. Hence,what gives unity to the category of real objects is that all realentities are both temporal and individual.

Ideal objects are atemporal: they are unaffected by the passage oftime. An important distinction Reinach draws within this category isbetween sortal and non-sortal essences (1911 [1989: 57], Englishtranslation 1994: 87f, see also 1913b [1989: 420]). Qualities, i.e.,non-sortal essences or characterizing properties, like redness orsweetness, do not allow us to count things (or they do so only inassociation with the count noun “thing”). By contrast,sortal essences help us in counting (one whale, a second whale, athird whale…). Objects are instances of types or essences,while “moments” (individualized properties or“tropes”) are instances of qualities (see Reinach 1912[1989: 361]).

The combination of an object with its moments is called by Reinach an“underlying situation [zugrundeliegerTatbestand]” or a “unitary complex[Einheitskomplex]” (compare the use of the term“complex” by Russell and Wittgenstein, see Potter 2008,esp. 102–108). So, for instance, the singular term “therose” refers to an object, where “the red rose”points to a complex that is constituted by the rose together with itsmoment of redness. Importantly, any complex “founds”states of affairs: in this example, the red rose founds the being-redof the rose. States of affairs (Sachverhalte—anotherterm used by Wittgenstein) are categorically different from objectsand complexes, as the following considerations show (many of theseideas are presented in Reinach 1911c [1989: 112–120], Englishtranslation 1982: 332–346).

First, states of affairs either obtain or not, whereas objects (and,by extension, complexes) either exist or not. Reinach does notelaborate on this point, but it stands to reason that a state ofaffairs obtains if and only if its underlying complex exists. Thepoint is made by his close friend Theodor Conrad: “Clearly onecan … say correctly [that states of affairs subsist] only ifthe (external) situation [Tatbestand] really is objective…” (Conrad 1953–1954). For instance, the being-red ofthe rose obtains if and only if the red rose exists.

Second, states of affairs are either positive or negative, whereasobjects do not exhibit any analogous dichotomy. States of affairs arenegative or positive in virtue of their unique structure, which isconstituted by a predicative component: “the being-F ofx”. A negative state of affairs is one whosepredicative component is affected by negation: “thenot-being-F ofx”. Since states ofaffairs are the only entities constituted by a predicative component,and since the negation only affects predicative components, onlystates of affairs can be negative. Two consequences follow from thisidea:

• Since objects do not carry a predicative component, and sincenegation only affects predicative components, there are no negativeobjects. Essences, qualities, or complexes are objects and hence thereare no negative essences, qualities or complexes.
• States of affairs require an object that saturates or“completes [ergänzt]” their predicativecomponent. The number of saturating objects varies depending on thenature of the predicative component. In addition to monadic states ofaffairs and polyadic states of affairs (i.e., relations), Reinachdefends the controversial claim that there are also genuinelyimpersonal states of affairs (1908). So, for instance, the proposition“it rains” refers to a state of affairs that, according toReinach, is impersonal. (We will come back to this idea inSection 5.)

Reinach argues that the principle of non-contradiction is grounded inthese two properties of states of affairs (obtaining vs non-obtaining;being negative vs being positive): either a positive state of affairsobtains, or its negative contradictory does. Insofar as the principleof non-contradiction applies to states of affairs, it is anontological principle and must be distinguished from the principle ofbivalence, which is a logical (not an ontological) principle assertingthat any declarative proposition is either true or false. The twoprinciples are, however, closely related: a proposition is true if andonly if the corresponding state of affairs obtains. To put thisdifferently, states of affairs are truth-makers, whereas propositionsare truth-bearers.

Reinach maintains further that, just like the principle ofnon-contradiction, many other principles, which are traditionally heldto be logical in nature, are in fact ontological because they hold ofstates of affairs (1911c [1989: 138 fn 1], English translation 1982:376). For instance, the theory of deduction(Schlußlehre), traditionally conceived as a branch oflogic, in fact belongs to ontology since it concerns states ofaffairs. Reinach shows this by pointing out that the relation ofground and consequent, which is fundamental to the understanding ofdeduction, holds among states of affairs and must be distinguishedfrom causality. For instance, the being-mortal of all humans is theground—not the cause—of Socrates’ being mortal.Events, by contrast, stand in relations of causality, but they neverenter relations of ground and consequent. A first billiard ballhitting a second ball is the cause—not the ground—for themovement of the second ball.

Two other properties of states of affairs are of importance.

First, states of affairs can instantiate modal properties. Theseinclude alethic properties such as possibility and necessity. We havealready seen that a state of affairs is necessary when it is groundedin an essence. Furthermore, states of affairs can also instantiatedeontic properties: for instance, something can be permissible orobligatory. (We will come back to the deontic properties of states ofaffairs in the next section.)

Second, Reinach also suggests that states of affairs are eitheratemporal (for example, the fact that 3 is bigger than 2) or temporal(for example, the fact that the tree is blossoming). The temporalityof states of affairs has a specific nature: states of affairs are intime, even though, in contrast to events, they do not unfold in time.He writes:

events, for example thunder, unfold themselves [konstituierensich] in time, things do not, but a thingis in time.Accordingly, states of affairs do not unfold themselves in time, buttheyare in time because they are equipped with temporaldeterminations. (1910 [1989: 352])

How do we come to know states of affairs? Reinach claims that theseentities can be given to us in perceptual acts of a specific kind.When we report a perception by using a that-clause (“I perceivethat this animal is barking”) or a qualifier followedby a property (“I perceive this animalas adog”), then we are reporting an instance of cognizing or ofcoming to know something (Erkennen, Reinach 1911c [1989:118], English translation 1982: 342). Given that states of affairs areeither positive or negative, it follows that, if certain psychologicalpreconditions are fulfilled, one can also perceive or come to knownegative states of affairs. If, e.g., I open the fridge with theexpectation of finding a can of beer unbeknownst of the fact thatsomebody already drank it, then I can perceive thatthere is nocan of beer in the fridge. Importantly, this experience is not abelief (or conviction,Überzeugung) because belief ispolar (I either believe or disbelieve something). But cognizing is notpolar: either I cognize something or I do not cognize at all. Also,beliefs endure, whereas acts of cognizing are episodic. Thisdifference, however, should not let us overlook the importantrelations between the two experiences. In particular, acts ofcognizing can motivate beliefs, Reinach argues: the perception thatthere is no beer in the fridge can motivate you to believe that thereis no beer in the fridge. And the act of rehearsing that belief inconscious and linguistic thought by uttering the words “there isno beer in the fridge!” is an act of assertion(Behauptung). Because of the basic and fundamental role thatsui generis acts of cognizing play in making us acquaintedwith states of affairs, some authors have claimed that Reinachanticipates the so-called knowledge-first approach in epistemology(see Mulligan 2014; on the knowledge-first approach, see Williamson2000).

Reinach’s description of states of affairs and objects belongsto general ontology. Yet, his contributions to ontology are notlimited to this area of research. In particular, he must be creditedfor uncovering the specific ontology of social and institutionalentities (in a philosophical exercise that nowadays goes under thelabel of “social ontology”). Consider a promissory obligation (Verbindlichkeit), forexample the obligation to meet you at the pub at 5 p.m., which isgenerated by my promising that I will meet you at the pub at 5p.m.

This obligation is discharged, which means that it ceases to exist, atthe moment I honor it by meeting you at the pub. But if it can bedischarged, this means that the obligation was there in the firstplace. Hence, the obligation is an entity, which invites the questionconcerning its ontological nature: do obligations fall under thecategory of object or under that of state of affairs? If they wereobjects, then they would be either real or ideal.

If obligations were real objects, then they must be either physical ormental. But obligations are not physical objects for they are notextended in space (one cannot stumble upon an obligation; obligationscannot be seen, heard, set on fire).

The question then is whether obligations are mental objects. Reinachfirst considers whether they are beliefs. They are not, he claims,because having a belief about an obligation does not obligate thebeliever: the belief can, for example, be about someone else’sobligation. Also, my belief about my obligation can bemistaken—I have the belief, but there is no obligation. Reinachthen considers whether an obligation boils down to a subjective senseof commitment. Interestingly, and anticipating much literature on thematter (see Michael 2022; Tomasello 2020), he insists that feelingslike the sense of commitment (and the sense of entitlement) do indeedexist and play a crucial role in our psychology (within phenomenology,Stavenhagen 1931 amplifies on this topic). But such feelings do notcoincide with obligations—for feelings are warranted or not:just as my fear of the barking dog in front of me is warranted only ifthe dog is dangerous, so my feeling of commitment towards you iswarranted only if I have an obligation towards you, and thisobligation is then in addition to my feeling. In general, Reinachcontends that any hypothesis which aims at reducing obligations tosubjective experiences is doomed to misfire. To illustrate the point,imagine accepting a car loan and agreeing to pay back the loan over a36-month period. The very fact that an obligation (or a claim) maylast for years without change shows that it survives (and, in fact,that it is independent of) changes in the bearer’s psychology:the bearer can forget the obligation, can lose consciousness, can evendie, but none of these impacts the existence of the obligation. But ifobligations are neither mental nor physical, then they are not realobjects either.

This result leads to the question of whether obligations are idealobjects. But again, the answer here is in the negative, given thatideal objects are atemporal, whereas obligations exist in time (allthese arguments are to be found in 1913a [1989: 147–150],English translation 2012: 8–11).

Are promissory obligations states of affairs? Interestingly, Reinachpoints to several similarities between the two. For instance, he tellsus that obligations stand in relations of ground andconsequent—the existence of a promise (which is a state ofaffairs) is a ground (not a cause) of an obligation (Reinach 1913a[1989: 155], English translation 2012: 15). Also, promissoryobligations appear to be relations (and, thus, polyadic states ofaffairs): they hold between a promisor, a promisee, and the content ofthe promise; they also are associated in every case with promissoryclaims as their converse relations. Further, as we have seen, Reinachconsistently argues that obligations, like some states of affairs, arein time (although they do not unfold in time). Nowhere, however, doeshe explicitly state that promissory obligations and claimsare states of affairs.

4. Social Acts and Normativity

In theLogical Investigations, Husserl develops a thesisadvanced by Franz Brentano, according to which intentionality, i.e.,the property of being directed towards an object, is a crucial powerof the mind. Based on this notion of intentionality, Husserl arguesthat, since language essentially serves to express intentionalexperiences, all uses of language essentially are referential. So, forexample, the sentence “this is a whale” uttered by asubject while they perceive a whale expresses their subjectiveperception of the whale and, hence, refers to the intentional objectof the perception (which is the perceived whale). To accommodatenon-declarative sentences like promises, questions or commands in thisconceptual framework, Husserl maintains that these sentences expressbeliefs about the subject’s inner experience. For instance, myquestion “what time is it?” expresses my belief that Ihave the desire to know the time and, hence, refers to that desire(the desire being the intentional object of my belief). Similarly, mypromise to you “I’ll be at the pub at 5 p.m”.expresses my belief that I have the intention of being at the pub at 5p.m. and, hence, refers to that intention.

It was in critical reaction to such theses that Reinach developed histheory ofsocial acts (B. Smith 1990), a theory which bearsstriking similarities to the theory of speech acts later developed byAustin and Searle in the 1960s. Compare promising and reportingone’s intention to do something. According to Reinach, these twoexperiences belong to the category of what he calls“spontaneous” acts: these are acts which involve asubject’s bringing something about within his own psychicsphere, as contrasted with passive experiences of, say, feeling a painor hearing an explosion (1913a [1989: 158], English translation 2012:18). Yet, there is a crucial difference between these two spontaneousacts, namely that they have different conditions of success. Inparticular, the promise is successful if it generates a promissoryobligation for the promisor and a claim for the promisee. We will comeback to this point below, but for now it is important to highlightthat the report of an intention does not stand under similar criteriaof assessment. Forming an intention and reporting it are not acts thataim at the generation of obligations and claims.

Once this first point is established, one can unearth another crucialdifference between the two acts. For an act of promise to besuccessful, that is, for it to generate a claim and an obligation,this act must be registered by its addressee. For unless the promiseehas heard the act that has been directed to them, the promise will nothave the mentioned consequences. This peculiar property, which Reinachcalls “the need of being heard(Vernehmungsbedürftigkeit)”, is one that thepromise shares with a vast number of acts like apologizing,commanding, accusing, answering, asking, requesting, informing. Thoseacts and only those acts, which are in need of being heard, areclassified by Reinach as “social acts”. All social actshence require a linguistic utterance or some other overt performanceof a non-natural and rule-governed sort that is addressed to anaddressee. This thereby serves the fulfillment of their need of beingheard, which is a necessary condition for them to achieve theireffects.

None of this applies to intentions (nor to their mere reports, as itdoes not apply also to acts such as cursing, blessing, forgiving, andso forth). This is not, however, to say that promises and intentionsare unrelated. Quite the contrary: a promise always presupposes theintention to perform the action that has been promised. If such anintention is not present, one issues merely a sham promise, which isnot a promise at all (as a false friend is not a friend). Reinachspeaks in this context of the “pseudo-performance(Scheinvollzug)” of a promise (1913a [1989: 162],English translation 2012: 22). Similar considerations apply to allsocial acts: to be authentically performed, each social actpresupposes a non-social, internal state on the part of the speaker.Thus an act of questioning presupposes uncertainty about the contentof the question (otherwise it is a rhetorical question, i.e., aquestion to which the questioner already knows the answer); an act ofinforming presupposes belief in the content of the information on thepart of the informer; and so on.

Reinach discusses a plethora of social acts inThe A PrioriFoundations of the Civil Law, including commanding, requesting,warning, questioning and answering, informing, enacting, revoking,transferring, granting, and the waiving of claims. But he devotes mostof his attention to the act of promising. His account of promise isrich and insightful, but a few ideas merit extra consideration.

The first idea is that, for Reinach, promises generate promissoryobligations in virtue of their nature. Promises bring aboutobligations because of what they are: obligation-generators. Promisingis asui generis phenomenon that was discovered and notinvented. This can also be seen in the contrast between promising andthose elements of a code of law which truly are constructed, forexample specific rules concerning primogeniture or the discharging ofliens. In holding this view, Reinach rejects any attempt of tracingthe nature of promises back to other allegedly more well-understoodaccounts of obligation-generation, including via: useful socialpractices (Hume 1739), social institutions (Searle 1969), expectationtriggers (Scanlon 1990), solicitations of trust (Friederich &Southwood 2011), and joint decisions (Gilbert 2018). Hewrites:

Strictly speaking, we are not proposing anytheory ofpromising. For we are only putting forward the simple thesis thatpromising as such produces claim and obligation. One can try, and wehave in fact tried, to bring out the intelligibility of this thesis byanalysis and clarification. To try to explain it would be just liketrying to explain the proposition, 1 × 1 = 1. It is a fear ofwhat is directly given, a strange reluctance or incapacity to look theultimate data in the face and to recognize them as such, that hasdriven unphenomenological philosophies, in this as in so many othermore fundamental problems, to untenable and ultimately to extravagantconstructions. (1913a [1989: 188], English translation 2012: 46)

In insisting on the intrinsic capacity of promises to elicit normativeconsequences, Reinach by the same token also insists that promisesgenerate obligations and claims even when they have an immoralcontent: immoral promises are promises and thus they commit thepromisor and entitle the promisee. This important idea requires twocomments for further elaboration.

First, Reinach recognizes that the promissory obligation only is asufficient,pro-tanto reason for keeping the promise and thatthepro-toto reason results from the aggregation of variousother reasons to which the promisor is exposed. To begin with, thepromisor is subject not only to the promissory obligation generated bythe promise, but also to the moral duty to keep the promise.Crucially, if the content of the promise is immoral, then the promisoralso stands under the moral duty of omitting the promised action.

Second, in determining the factors that resolve this issue, Reinachdraws a distinction between what might be called “social”normativity and “axiological” normativity (of which“moral normativity” is subspecies alongside aesthetic andepistemic normativity). Promises and other acts of the mind generatesocial normativity (social obligations, claims, norms…).Axiological normativity, in contrast, is grounded in values (1913a[1989: 152f], English translation 2012: 13f). He writes on this point:“it is morally right that a morally valuable thing exists, andthe contradictory state of affairs is morally not right[unrecht], etc.” (Reinach 1913a [1989: 153 fn 1],English translation 2012: 49). Importantly, the morally right state ofaffairs that a morally valuable thing exists implies theduty(Verpflichtung) to realize the morally valuable thing(Reinach 1989i: 291ff, Eng. trans 99f). For instance, the action ofhelping a friend in dire straits is valuable. It therefore is morallyright to help a friend in dire straits. But this just means that oneought to help a friend in dire straits, which is a state ofaffairs marked by a particular kind of deontic modality(ought-modality). Each of these entities can motivate the moral actionto help the friend, but they do so in different ways, all of whichbear on the moral evaluation of the agent. Thus for example the agentwho acts solely on a duty (without awareness of its underlying value)is morally less praiseworthy than the agent who is solely motivated byfeeling the value, and maybe even without explicit awareness of thecorresponding duty (see von Hildebrand 1916).

Values are not valuings. The latter are psychological experiences, theformer ideal objects that can be exemplified in the world. As for allobjects, so it is at least in principle possible to grasp values. Theexperience in which values are given to us is feeling: e.g., we feelthe generosity of an action, the beauty of a landscape, the cruelty ofa practice, the elegance of a movement, the vibrancy of a department,the obscurity of a philosophical text. Feeling is not emoting,however. For one can feel values, without emotionally responding tothe felt value. For instance, one can feel the injustice of a givenaction without any indignation at the unjust action.

Importantly, values stand in a hierarchical order: some values arehigher than others (1913b [1989: 485–515]). Reinach shares theconcept of a hierarchy of values with several phenomenologists,including von Hildebrand, and particularly Scheler (for a comparisonbetween Reinach and Scheler, see J. Smith 2017, esp. 174–178).Higher values ground stronger duties, lower values weaker duties. Theidea that duties have degrees of strength can now be brought to bearon the issue of immoral promises: if a subject promises an immoralaction, are they morally compelled to keep the promise? It depends,argues Reinach: if the duty to omit the action is stronger than theduty to honor the promise, then the promisor ought not to actaccording to their promise (1913a [1989: 186f], English translation2012: 45).

5. Reinach’s Legacy

Reinach’s ideas have been influential in shaping the thoughts ofmany early phenomenologists. One of those who most clearly andgenerously recognizes his debt towards Reinach is his close friendDietrich von Hildebrand, who picks up and advances many of hisinsights. Most importantly, von Hildebrand develops an ontology thathas the notion of value at its very core. This notion is explored withregard to its implications for our understanding of ethics (vonHildebrand 1959) and aesthetics (1977–1984), the foundations ofwhich require values as indispensable and fundamental elements. Byexpanding on Reinach’s remarks about deliberation (1912/13), vonHildebrand contributes to our understanding of the phenomenology ofaction by distinguishing different kinds of conative experiences(desire, willing, intention) and their role in shaping our conduct(see his 1916; this is a project, which is pursued further by HansReiner in his 1927). Von Hildebrand also elaborates on Reinach’sidea of social acts by claiming that some of our emotions arein-need-of being heard. Romantic love, for example, which is only oneparticular kind of love, strives to be understood by its addressee(1930). Furthermore, he develops Reinach’s knowledge-firstapproach to epistemology in terms that are more explicit than thoseused by Reinach himself: the act of coming to know something,according to von Hildebrand, is factive insofar as it always makes itssubject acquainted with a fact (1976).

Von Hildebrand follows Reinach, too, in arguing that philosophicalknowledge is first and foremost knowledge ofa priori statesof affairs, meaning: states of affairs that are grounded in essences.This preoccupation with the very notion of essence is characteristicof the philosophical work of many early phenomenologists. An entirebattery of publications on this topic, all of which refer to Reinach,were produced in the decades between the two World Wars. The mostnotable are by Jean Héring (1921), Roman Ingarden (1925),Herbert Spiegelberg (1930), and Wilhelm Pöll (1936).

All of these works aim to illuminate the meaning of the term“essence”, which Reinach considered to be ambiguous(1912). One attempt at disambiguation is based on the idea that the“individual essence” of an entity (the essence that makesan entity the individual entity that it is) should be set apart fromits “essentiality” (the essence that makes it an entity ofthe kind it is). These two notions should then be furtherdistinguished from the essence in the sense of “idea”(this is the essence considered as such, i.e., as a stand-alone entityin isolation from its instances).

Reinach’s theory of states of affairs has also sparked a debateamong phenomenologists focusing on whether Reinach’s maximallyrealist position about states of affairs should be moderated in someway to render it ontologically more parsimonious. For instance, somehave argued against the idea of negative states of affairs (Ingarden1964–65, see: Chrudzimski 2012), others against the idea ofimpersonal states of affairs (Pfänder 1921). Daubert draws adistinction between the state of affairs as such (described along thelines of Reinach’s notion of unitary complex) and the variousways in which the state of affairs can be apprehended andconceptualized (states of affairs “as cognized”, “asquestioned”, “as commanded”, and so on, seeSchuhmann 1987). Maximilian Beck (1938) rejects the idea of state ofaffairs as mind-independent entities altogether by claiming that theseentities merely depend on minds.

Reinach’s investigations into legal and social entities has alsoinfluenced a number of phenomenologists. His theory of promises is atthe basis of Wilhelm Schapp’s theory of contracts (1930) and hasbeen reactivated recently to account for economic exchanges (Massin& Tieffenbach 2017; Salice 2022). Social acts are also discussedby Edith Stein in her account of the state (1925, seeGonzález-Di Pierro 2016; Taieb 2020) and by Gerda Walther inher account of social groups (1923, see Salice & Uemura 2018).

These are just a few specific examples of ways in which Reinach hasshaped the phenomenological movement. However, Reinach also exerted amore general influence on the distinctive way in which earlyphenomenologists used to philosophize. Exactly in accordance withReinach’s understanding of phenomenology, they focus on veryspecific problems in exchanges that often span decades. The disciplineof phenomenology, on Reinach’s view, can neither be reduced tothe activity of a single individual (or “ego”), nor shouldit be conceived on the model of a “rigorous science”.Rather, it is a collaborative exercise, which follows a specificphilosophical method (De Santis 2022).

Reinach concludes his Marburg talk of 1914 with these words:

To future generations it will be just as unintelligible that anindividual could devise philosophies as it is today that an individualmight devise natural science. When continuity within philosophicalwork is attained, then that developmental process within world historyin which one science after another separated off from philosophy willbe realized within philosophy itself. Philosophy will become arigorous science, not in that it imitates other rigorous sciences, butrather by keeping in mind that its problems require a peculiar method,the working out of which is the task of centuries. (Reinach 1914[1989: 550], English translation [modified] 2012: 165)

Reinach’s historical role in forming and propelling thephenomenological movement is still not fully appreciated. But perhapseven more importantly, the same can be said of his systematicinsights: many of his ideas still wait to be re-activated withincontemporary debates especially in areas such as the philosophy ofmind, philosophy of action, axiology, philosophy of law, and socialontology.

Bibliography

A. Works by Reinach

German

• 1989,Sämtliche Werke. TextkritischeAusgabe [Collected Works: Critical Edition], edited byK. Schuhmann and B. Smith, 2 volumes, Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
• 1921,Gesammelte Schriften, Halle: Max Niemeyer.

Quoted in this entry

• 1908 [1989h], “Über impersonale Urteile”.Collected inReinach 1989: 347–350. English translation by Barry Smith, 1982, “OnImpersonalia”, inParts and Moments. Studies in Logic andFormal Ontology, Barry Smith (ed.), Munich: Philosophia Verlag,346–350.
• 1910 [1989g] “Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit inSachverhalt”. Collected inReinach 1989: 351–354.
• 1911a [1989e], “Die obersten Regeln derVernunftschlüsse bei Kant”. Collected inReinach 1989: 51–66. English translation by James M. DuBois, 1994, “TheSupreme Rules of Rational Inference in Kant”,Aletheia. AnInternational Journal of Philosophy, 6: 70–97.
• 1911b [1989a], “Kants Auffassung des HumeschenProblems”,Zeitschrift für Philosophie undphilosophische Kritik, 141: 176–209. Collected inReinach 1989: 67–94. English translation by J.N. Mohanty, 1976,“Kant’s Interpretation of Hume’s Problem”,Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 7(2): 161–188.doi:10.5840/swjphil19767230
• 1911c [1989d], “Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils”.Collected inReinach 1989: 95–140. English translation by Barry Smith, 1982, “On theTheory of the Negative Judgment”, inParts and Moments.Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Barry Smith (ed.), Munich:Philosophia Verlag, 315–346, 351–377.
• 1912 [1989j], “Die Vieldeutigkeit des Wesensbegriffs”.Collected inReinach 1989: 361–364.
• 1912/13 [1989i], “Die Überlegung: ihre ethische undrechtliche Bedeutung”. Collected inReinach 1989: 279–311. English translation by James Smith and Mette Lebech,2017, “Reflection: Its Ethical and Legal Significance”, inAdolf Reinach. Three Texts on Ethics, James Smith and MetteLebech (eds), Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 45–164.
• 1913a [1989b], “Die apriorischen Grundlage desbürgerlichen Rechtes”,Jahrbuch für Philosophieund phänomenlogische Forschung, 1(2): 685–847.Collected inReinach 1989: 141–268. English translation by John F. Crosby, 2012,“The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law” inTheApriori Foundations of the Civil Law. Along with the lecture“Concerning Phenomenology”, John F. Crosby (ed.),with an introduction by Alasdair McIntyre, Berlin: De Gruyter,1–142. [Reinach 1913 available online (German)]
• 1913b [1989f] “Einleitung in die Philosophie”.Collected inReinach 1989: 369–514.
• 1914 [1989c], “Über Phänomenologie”,lecture. Collected inReinach 1989: 531–550. English translation by Dallas Willard, 2012,“Concerning Phenomenology” inThe Apriori Foundationsof the Civil Law. Along with the lecture “ConcerningPhenomenology”, John F. Crosby (ed.), with an introductionby Alasdair McIntyre, Berlin: De Gruyter, 143–166.

B. References and Further Readings

• Austin, John L., 1962,How to Do Things with Words(William James Lectures 1955), Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.
• Baltzer-Jaray, Kimberly, 2009, “Adolf Reinach is not aPlatonist”,Symposium: Canadian Journal of ContinentalPhilosophy, 13(1): 100–112.doi:10.5840/symposium20091316
• Beck, Maximilian, 1938,Psychologie. Wesen und Wirklichkeitder Seele, Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff’s UitgeversmaatscappijN.V.
• Burkhardt, Armin (ed.), 1990,Speech Acts,Meaning, and Intentions: Critical Approaches to the Philosophy of JohnR. Searle (Foundations of Communication and Cognition =Grundlagen der Kommunikation und Kognition), Berlin/New York: W. deGruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110859485
• Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 2012, “Negative States of Affairs:Reinach versus Ingarden”,Symposium: Canadian Journal ofContinental Philosophy, 16(2): 106–127.doi:10.5840/symposium201216230
• Conrad, Theodor, 1953–1954,Überblick über dieim Wintersemester 1953/54 und Sommersemester 1954 in der“Münchener Philosophischen Gesellschaft”durchgeführten phänomenologischen Untersuchungen überdas Wesen der phänomenologischen Methode als spezifischem Zugangzur Philosophie, unpublished, Ana 378, V 2; transcribed byDaniele De Santis, forthcoming inThe New Yearbook forPhenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (Volume 22),London: Routledge.
• Crosby, John F., 1983, “Reinach as a PhilosophicalPersonality”,Aletheia. An International Journal ofPhilosophy, 3: xi–x.
• –––, 1990, “Speech Act Theory andPhenomenology”, inBurkhardt 1990: 62–88.
• De Santis, Daniele, 2022, “Theodor Conrad, ZumGedächtnis Edmund Husserls (Ein unveröffentlichter Aufsatzaus der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek)”,HusserlStudies, 38(1): 55–66. doi:10.1007/s10743-021-09289-8
• DuBois, James M., 1994, “An Introduction to ‘TheSupreme Rules of Rational Inference According to Kant’”,Aletheia. An International Journal of Philosophy, 6:70–80.
• –––, 1995,Judgment and Sachverhalt: AnIntroduction to Adolf Reinach’s Phenomenological Realism(Phaenomenologica 132), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.doi:10.1007/978-94-015-8470-8
• –––, 2002, “Adolf Reinach: Metaethics andthe Philosophy of Law”, inPhenomenological Approaches toMoral Philosophy (Contributions to Phenomenology 47), John J.Drummond and Lester Embree (eds), Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer,327–346. doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9924-5_17
• Fine, Kit, 1994a, “Essence and Modality: The SecondPhilosophical Perspectives Lecture”,PhilosophicalPerspectives, 8: 1–16. doi:10.2307/2214160
• –––, 1994b, “Senses of Essence”, inModality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth BarcanMarcus, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 53–73 (ch. 5).
• –––, 1995, “The Logic of Essence”,Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24(3): 241–273.doi:10.1007/BF01344203
• Friedrich, Daniel and Nicholas Southwood, 2011, “Promisesand Trust”, inPromises and Agreements: PhilosophicalEssays, Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,275–292.
• Gilbert, Margaret, 2018,Rights and Demands: A FoundationalInquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oso/9780198813767.001.0001
• González-Di Pierro, Eduardo, 2016, “The Influence ofAdolf Reinach on Edith Stein’s Concept of the State:Similarities and Differences”, inEdith Stein: Women,Social-Political Philosophy, Theology, Metaphysics and PublicHistory (Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life4), Antonio Calcagno (ed.), Cham: Springer International Publishing,93–105. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-21124-4_9
• Héring, Jean, 1921, “Bemerkungen über das Wesen,die Wesenheit und die Idee”,Jahrbuch für Philosophieund Phänomenologische Forschung, 4: 495–543.
• Hume, David, 1739,A Treatise of Human Nature, London:John Noon. Modern edition,David Hume: A Treatise of HumanNature, second edition, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge and P. H.Nidditch (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245872.book.1
• Husserl, Edmund, 1900–01,Logische Untersuchungen,2 vols., Halle a. d. S: M. Niemeyer; second edition, 1913; translationof the second edition asLogical Investigations(International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method), J. N.Findlay (trans.), London/New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1970.
• Ingarden, Roman Witold, 1925, “Essentiale Fragen. EinBeitrag zum Problem des Wesens”,Jahrbuch fürPhilosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, 7:125–304.
• –––, 1931,Das literarische Kunstwerk. EineUntersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik undLiteraturwissenschaft, Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931; third edition,1965; translated asThe Literary Work of Art, G. G. Gabowicz(trans.), Evanston, IN: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
• –––, 1964–65,Der Streit um dieExistenz der Welt, Tübingen: Neimeyer Verlag.
• Massin, Olivier and Emma Tieffenbach, 2017, “The Metaphysicsof Economic Exchanges”,Journal of Social Ontology,3(2): 167–205. doi:10.1515/jso-2015-0057
• Meinong, Alexius, 1904, “ÜberGegenstandstheorie”, inUntersuchungen zurGegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, A. Meinong (ed.), Leipzig:Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1–51; collected inMeinong 1968: Vol. II: 481–535.
• –––, 1910,Über Annahmen, secondedition, Leipzig: johann Ambrosius Barth; collected inMeinong 1968: Vol. IV: xv–xxv and 1–384.
• –––, 1968,Gesamtausgabe, 7 volumes, Rudolf Haller and Rudolf Kindinger(eds.), with help from Roderick M. Chisholm for the last 3 volumes,Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt.
• Michael, John, 2022,The Philosophy and Psychology ofCommitment, London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315111308
• Mulligan, Kevin (ed.), 1987,Speech Act andSachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of RealistPhenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.doi:10.1007/978-94-009-3521-1
• –––, 2004, “Essence and Modality: TheQuintessence of Husserl’s Theory”, inSemantik undOntologie: Beiträge zur philosophischen Forschung(Philosophische Forschung; Philosophical research 2), Mark Siebel andMarkus Textor (eds.), Frankfurt: Ontos, 387–418.doi:10.1515/9783110327236.387
• –––, 2014, “Knowledge First — aGerman Folly?”, inLiber Amicorum Pascal Engel, JulienDutant, Davide Fassio, and Anne Meylan (eds), Genève:Université de Genève, 380–400 (ch. 25). [Mulligan 2014 available online (pdf)]
• Pfänder, Alexander, 1921, “Logik”,Jahrbuchfür Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 4:139–494. [Pfänder 1921 available online]
• Pöll, Wilhelm, 1936,Wesen und Wesenserkenntnis.Untersuchungen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Husserls undSchelers, München: Reinhardt.
• Potter, Michael D., 2008,Wittgenstein’s Notes onLogic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215836.001.0001
• Reiner, Hans, 1927,Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität.Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem derWillensfreiheit, Halle: Niemeyer.
• Salice, Alessandro, 2009,Urteile und Sachverhalte. EinVergleich zwischen Alexius Meinong und Adolf Reinach,München: Philosophia Verlag.
• –––, 2022, “Wilhelm Schapp and theStandard Theory of Exchanges”, inVassilicos and Erhard 2022: 132–150.
• Salice, Alessandro and Genki Uemura, 2018, “Social Acts andCommunities: Walther Between Husserl and Reinach”, inGerdaWalther’s Phenomenology of Sociality, Psychology, andReligion (Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences 2),Antonio Calcagno (ed.), Cham: Springer International Publishing,27–46. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97592-4_3
• Scanlon, Thomas, 1990, “Promises and Practices”,Philosophy & Public Affairs, 19(3): 199–226.
• Schapp, Wilhelm, 1930,Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht, Einephänomenologische Untersuchung (Volume I), Berlin-Grunewald:Rothschild.
• Scheler, Max, 1913,Der Formalismus in der Ethik und dieMateriale Wertethik, Halle: Niemeyer; translated, fifth edition,asFormalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A NewAttempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism(Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & ExistentialPhilosophy), Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (trans.), Evanston,IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
• Schuhmann, Karl, 1987, “Johannes Dauberts Kritik der‘Theorie des negativen Urteils’ von Adolf Reinach”,inMulligan 1987: 227–238.
• Schuhmann, Karl and Barry Smith, 1987, “Adolf Reinach: AnIntellectual Biography”: inMulligan 1987:3–28.
• Searle, John R., 1969,Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophyof Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173438
• Smith, Barry, 1987, “On the Cognition of States ofAffairs”, inMulligan 1987: 189–225.
• –––, 1990, “Towards a History of SpeechAct Theory”, in A.Burkhardt 1990: 29–61.
• Smith, James, 2017,Wert, Rechtheit und Gut: AdolfReinach’s Contribution to Early Phenomenological Ethics (AdFontes = Studies in Early Phenomenology 7), Nordhausen: TraugottBautz.
• Spiegelberg, Herbert, 1930, “Über das Wesen der Idee.Eine ontologische Untersuchung”,Jahrbuch fürPhilosophie Und Phänomenologische Forschung, 11:1–228.
• –––, 1982,The Phenomenological Movement: AHistorical Introduction, third revised and enlarged edition,(Phaenomenologica 5/6), Hague/Boston: M. Nijhoff.
• Stavenhagen, Kurt, 1931,Achtung alsSolidaritätsgefühl und Grundlage von Gemeinschaften,Riga: Verlag der Buchhandlung G. Löffler.
• Stein, Edith, 1925, “Eine Untersuchung über denStaat”,Jahrbuch für Philosophie undPhänomenologische Forschung, 7: 1–124; Englishtranslation by M. Sawicki, 2006,An Investigation Concerning theState, asThe Collected Works of Edith Stein (Volume 10),Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications. [Stein 1925 available online]
• Taieb, Hamid, 2020, “Acts of the State and Representation inEdith Stein”,Journal of Social Ontology, 6(1):21–45. doi:10.1515/jso–2019-0017
• Tedeschini, Marco, 2015,Adolf Reinach. La fenomenologia, ilrealismo, Macerata: Quodlibet.
• Tomasello, Michael, 2020, “The Moral Psychology ofObligation”,Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43: e56.doi:10.1017/S0140525X19001742
• Vassilicos, Basil and Christopher Erhard (eds), 2022,“Reinach and Contemporary Philosophy”, inThe NewYearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, XIX,London: Routledge, 1–174 (Part 1). doi:10.4324/b23065
• Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, 1916, “Die Idee der sittlichenHandlung”,Jahrbuch für Philosophie undPhänomenologische Forschung, 3: 126–252.
• –––, 1930,Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft,Untersuchungen über Wesen und Wert der Gemeinschaft,Augsburg: Haas & Grabherr; reprinted in his GW: vol. IV(1975).
• –––, 1959, “Ethik”; reeprinted in inhis GW: vol. II.
• –––, [GW] 1971–1984,Dietrich von Hildebrand Gesammelte Werke, 10 volumes,Dietrich von Hildebrand Gesellschaft (ed.), Stuttgart:Kohlhammer.
• –––, 1976, “Was ist Philosophie?”,in his GW: vol. I.
• –––,Ästhetik, 2 volumes
  • 1977, 1. Teil, in his GW: vol. V
  • 1984, 2. Teil, in his GW: vol. VI
• Walther, Gerda, 1923, “Zur Ontologie der sozialenGemeinschaften”,Jahrbuch für Philosophie undPhänomenologische Forschung, 6: 1–158.
• Williamson, Timothy, 2000,Knowledge and Its Limits,Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001
• Zaibert, Leo and Barry Smith, 2007, “The Varieties ofNormativity: An Essay on Social Ontology”, inIntentionalActs and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s SocialOntology (Theory and Decision Library), Savas L. Tsohatzidis(ed.), Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 157–173.doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2_7

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Other Internet Resources

• Adolf Reinach, 1914, “Concerning Phenomenology”, translation of “Über Phänomenologie” by DallasWillard, 1969.
• Adolf Reinach on States of Affairs and Negative Judgments, includes an annotated bibliography of writing by and on Reinach,edited by Raul Corazzon.
• Barry Smith,Papers on Adolf Reinach, including an on-line version of the 1987 intellectual biography withKarl Schuhmann.
• Bavarian State Library (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, English pages). The siteprovides information about the inheritances (Nachlässe)of early phenomenologists.
• Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research), hosted atThe Open Commons of Phenomenology.
• The Open Commons of Phenomenology. The website includes a database of early phenomenologists and makesavailable some of their publications.

Related Entries

analytic/synthetic distinction |a priori justification and knowledge |Brentano, Franz |Husserl, Edmund |Ingarden, Roman |metaethics, normativity in |nature of law |nature of law: natural law theories |phenomenology |phenomenology: of the Munich and Göttingen Circles |promises |properties |Scheler, Max |social ontology |speech acts |states of affairs

Acknowledgments

Alessandro Salice’s sincere thanks go to Jason Dockstader andDanny Forde for reading previous drafts of this entry and to DanieleDe Santis, who made his transcription of Theodor Conrad’sunpublished manuscript (Ana 378, V 2) available for quotation.