Movatterモバイル変換

The Multiple Relation Theory

For defenders of the Russellian Multiple Relation Theory, a standardbelief-ascription, ‘\(S\) believes that \(p\)’ isunderstood to state the holding of a certain cognitive relationbetween \(S\) and the designata of the components of‘\(p\)’, rather than a relation to a proposition.

We will discuss two questions for the Russellian: (1) Does it have theproblems of standard conceptualist theories? and (2) Does it reallyavoid the Substitution Problem and the Objectivization Effect?

Because Moltmann’s theory is the most detailed Russellian theoryin the literature, it will be our chief focus.

Problem 1. Conceptualist theories of a kind of entity, theFs, etc. conceive of the Fs as in some way dependent on the mind. Suchtheories encounter problems, then, when the entities in question seemto have properties that are incompatible with mind-dependence. Russellconceded that “you have to say you believe propositions.”(1918, 223) You have to say, in other words, that many ordinarystatements using special NPs or nominals for propositions can be true(these include nominal relative clauses, quantifiers, and nominalcomplements of the form ‘the proposition that p’). But howcan the likes of “\(S\) believes the proposition that\(p\)” be true, unless belief is a relation to propositions?

The Russellian answer is that propositions exist as derived objects.Moltmann develops the idea in following way. Propositions are“attitudinal objects”. An attitudinal object is an objectof the form \(f(R, p, x)\), where \(R\) is a kind of attitude, \(p\)is a “structured proposition” (essentially, an ordered\(n\)-tuple of the appropriate sort), and \(x\) is an agent or kind ofagent. This attitudinal object exists iff the agent \(x\) (or an agentof the kind \(x)\) stands in \(R\) to the constituents of \(p\). Theattitudinal object’s existence, then, is derived from attitudesin a clear sense. Moreover, it derives its key semantic features fromthose of the structured proposition it is, in part, derived from. Itis aqua-object, in the terminology of Fine (1980).

Moltmann introduces kinds of agents in order to explain how sentencessuch as ‘I believe what Mary believes’ can be true. Therelevant attitudinal object (“proposition”) won’t bemy standing in the belief relation to certain individuals andproperties, but rather there being some agent of kind \(A\) standingin the belief relation to these things. To explain how sentences suchas ‘I accept what Mary just denied’ may be true, Moltmannallows the relation component \(R\) in some attitudinal objects toshrink to something as thin as “entertaining.” So therelevant attitudinal object would be there being some agent of kind\(A\) standing in the entertaining relation to such and such things.Or, in Moltmann’s notation, the relevant attitudinal object is\(f(R_{\ent}, p, A)\), where \(f\) is a function taking theentertaining relation, \(R_{\ent}, a\) structured proposition \(p\),and a kind of agent \(A\) as arguments and returning there being anagent of kind \(A\) standing in \(R_{\ent}\) to the constituents of\(p\).

Now for the possible problem. Moltmann’s attitudinal objects maynot be as plentiful as one might like. Consider the sentence‘There are truths that no one has or will entertain’. Thisis presumably true. But there cannot be appropriate attitudinalobjects to make it true. To make it true, an attitudinal object\(f(R_{\ent}, p, A)\) would have to exist despite the fact that noagent of kind \(A\) (or any other kind) entertains the components of\(p\). And Moltmann-propositions will presumably not satisfy intuitivegeneral principles about propositions. For example, propositionhoodwill not be closed under elementary logical operations (conjunction,disjunction), and true propositions may sometimes lack instanceswitnessing to their truth.

In effect, Problem 1 merely brings out the force of the Easy Argumentsfor mind-independence and abstractness, which are discussed in Section7.

Problem 2. Does the Russellian theory avoid the SubstitutionProblem and the Objectivization Effect? Compare these twoinferences:

1.

\(S\) believes that \(p\).

2.

S believes the proposition that p.

If 1 is true, then 2 is true. Compare:

3.

\(S\) holds that \(p\).

4.

\(S\) holds the proposition that \(p\).

If 3 is true, 4 will not be true. What accounts for thedifference?

Let us examine how Moltmann’s theory treats these inferences.Her full account requires technical resources which we do not havespace to discuss. Our treatment of it will therefore be rather rough.Why does the inference from 1 to 2 succeed, for Moltmann? The answeris as follows. If 1 is true, then there is an attitudinal object\(f(R_{\bel}, p, S)\). Moreover, context supplies a function \(f_c\),which, in effect, “thins” this attitudinal object. \(f_c\)takes \(\langle R_{\bel}, p, S\rangle\) into \(\langle R_{\ent}, p,A\rangle\). Applying \(f\) to the latter gives us a proposition,\(f(R_{\ent}, p, A)\). 2 is therefore true because it states thatthere is an attitudinal object \(f(R_{\ent}, p, A)\) such that it is athinning of some attitudinal object \(f(R_{\bel}, p, S)\). But whydoes the inference from 3 to 4 fail? Why doesn’t context providean \(f_c\) that thins the attitudinal object \(f(R_{\holds}, p, S)\)into \(f(R_{\ent}, p, A)\), thus insuring that from the truth of 3,the truth of 4 follows? Presumably, this can only be explained bypositing that ‘holds’ in 4 means something different thanit does in 3, and in particular that ‘holds’ exhibitsobjectivization in 4. And we will want to be told why objectivizationoccurs in 4 but not in 3. The interested reader should consultMoltmann (2003, 2004, 2013).

Return to Propositions