Process theism typically refers to a family of theological ideasoriginating in, inspired by, or in agreement with the metaphysicalorientation of the English philosopher-mathematician Alfred NorthWhitehead (1861–1947) and the American philosopher-ornithologistCharles Hartshorne (1897–2000). For both Whitehead andHartshorne, it is an essential attribute of God to be fully involvedin and affected by temporal processes. This idea contrasts neatly withtraditional forms of theism that hold God to be or at least conceivedas being,in all respects non-temporal (eternal), unchanging(immutable,) and unaffected by the world (impassible). Process theismdoes not deny that God isin some respects eternal,immutable, and impassible, but it contradicts the classical view byinsisting that God isin some respects temporal, mutable, andpassible. The views of Whitehead and Hartshorne should also bedistinguished from those that affirm that the divine being, by an actof self-limitation, opens itself to influence from the world. Someneo-Thomists hold this view and a group of Evangelical Christianphilosophers, calling themselves “open theists,” promotesimilar ideas. These forms of theism were influenced by processtheism, but they deny its claim that God isessentially in agive-and-take relationship with the world. Moreover, process theism isa genuinelyphilosophical theology in the sense that it isnot grounded in claims of special insight or revealed truth but inphilosophical reflection. Specifically, process theism is a product oftheorizing that takes the categories of becoming, change, and time asfoundational for metaphysics. The metaphysical underpinning of processtheism is often called process philosophy, a label suggested by thetitle of Whitehead’s magnum opus,Process and Reality.In order to bring out this philosophy’s emphasis on relatedness,many scholars follow Bernard Loomer in calling it process-relationalphilosophy. Whitehead’s preferred expression for hismetaphysical viewpoint is “the philosophy of organism.”This article concerns primarily the concept of God in process theism,although we shall conclude with a brief discussion of arguments forthe existence of God in process thought.

• 1. Historical Notes on Process Theism
• 2. God and Creativity
• 3. Real Relations in God
• 4. Dual Transcendence in Whitehead and Hartshorne
  • 4.1 Whitehead on the two natures of God
  • 4.2 Hartshorne on existence and actuality
• 5. Panentheism
• 6. Divine Power and the Problem of Evil
• 7. Divine Knowledge and the Problem of Future Contingents
• 8. Transforming Traditional Theism and Process Theism
• 9. Arguments for the Existence of God in Process Theism
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Historical Notes on Process Theism

Although Whitehead was Hartshorne’s senior by thirty-six years,the two men began seriously to develop their ideas about God inwritten form at roughly the same time. In his Harvard doctoraldissertation (1923), Hartshorne argues for the existence of a God thatis the eminent exemplification of relational and social values.Whitehead’s writings on the concept of God appear only after1924, when he moved to America. Between the publication ofScienceand the Modern World (1925) andProcess and Reality(1929)—a time of intense creativity for Whitehead—hearticulated his metaphysical system, including the concept of God.During Whitehead’s first year at Harvard, Hartshorne was inEurope for his second year as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow. When hereturned to Harvard in 1925 he was given the dual assignment ofediting the papers of Charles Sanders Peirce and of serving asWhitehead’s assistant. After 1940 Hartshorne became the primaryconduit for Whitehead’s theistic ideas. Indeed, the elaborationand defense of process theism fell largely to Hartshorne and hisstudents at the University of Chicago (1928–1955), EmoryUniversity (1955–1962), and the University of Texas at Austin(1962–2000). So great was Hartshorne’s influence that somescholars try to rescue Whitehead from a too Hartshorneaninterpretation. This fact should serve as a warning thatHartshorne’s version of process theism is not the same asWhitehead’s. We shall see that Hartshorne’s treatment oftheism owes much to Whitehead’s metaphysics while departing fromit in ways that the Englishman would not accept.

Hartshorne accepted the task of chronicling process theism’shistory and showing its importance as a significant alternative toclassical theism, pantheism, atheism, and other lesser known optionsin philosophical theology. His 1953 anthology (republished in 2000),Philosophers Speak of God, edited with the help of hisstudent William L. Reese, is a massive critical study of the varietiesof concepts of God as they relate to process theism. The book includesselections from and commentaries on a wide range of thinkers fromWestern and Eastern traditions, both well-known and obscure. It issafe to say that Hartshorne’s vigorous efforts on behalf ofprocess theism are the single most important factor in eroding theconsensus among philosophers that an eternal, immutable, andimpassible deity should be considered normative for philosophicaltheology. More recently, Daniel Dombrowski has examined the history ofthe concept of God through the lens of process philosophy (Dombrowski2016).

Philosophers Speak of God demonstrates that Whitehead andHartshorne are not the sole representatives of process theism,although they are its chief exponents. Buddhism, with its twinemphases on impermanence and dependent origination, is arguably themost sophisticated ancient form of process philosophy. Buddhistphilosophers criticized the notion of a timeless absolute without,however, developing a form of process theism (e.g. Arnold 1998).Whitehead remarks that his concept of God has more richness than theBuddhist concept of nirvana and that his philosophy of religion couldbe viewed as an effort to “true up” the Buddhist idea(Johnson 1983, 8). Hartshorne maintains that aspects of process theismare in Plato’s later writings—specifically, theSophist, theTimaeus, and theLaws—but they are never brought together into acoherent theory. Hartshorne sees process theism as providing theneeded coherence (Dombrowski 2005 and Viney 2007).

In the generation immediately preceding Whitehead, C. S. Peirce(1839–1914) and William James (1842–1910) closelyanticipated process theism and served as important influences on itsdevelopment. There was also a cross fertilization of ideas from someof Whitehead’s contemporaries: Henri Bergson (1859–1941),Samuel Alexander (1859–1938), and William Ernest Hocking(1873–1966)—Hocking was one of Hartshorne’s teachersat Harvard. Philosophers and religious thinkers who independentlyformulated aspects of process theism in the twentieth century include:Bernardino Varisco (1850–1933), Nicholas Berdyaev(1874–1948), Mohammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Martin Buber(1878–1965), Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955), EdgarSheffield Brightman (1884–1953), Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan(1888–1975), Sri Aurobindo (1892–1950), Hans Jonas(1903–1993), and Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–1972).

Because process theists reject the idea of a deity whose moralcharacter is ever questionable, John Stuart Mill’s essay,“Theism,” isnot an anticipation of processtheism. By parity of reasoning, Peter Forrest’s proposal of aGod that grows from pure power to pure love is not a version of theismthat process theists would find appealing (Forrest 2007). Some of thecentral themes and arguments of process theism, however, are evidentin less well-known thinkers scattered throughout history. One canmention the names of Levi ben Gerson (1288–1340), Fausto Socinus(1539–1604), Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854),Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), Rowland Gibson Hazard(1801–1888), Jules Lequyer [or Lequier] (1814–1862),Lorenzo D. McCabe (1817–1897), and Otto Pfleiderer(1839–1908). Some might count G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)as a forerunner of process theism, but his case is not clear. The ideaof development is central to Hegel’s thinking about the AbsoluteSpirit. On the other hand, his philosophy was more influential inushering in what he himself called “the death of God” thanin providing a clearly articulatedtheistic alternative toclassical theism (cf. Küng 1980, 138–42). It is also ironicthat it was much less in the positive influence of Hegelian idealismthan in the negative reactions to it that process philosophy, and byimplication process theism, matured in the twentieth century.

Philosophers and theologians who have published a monograph defendingsome variety of process theism informed by Whitehead or Hartshorneinclude: Henry Nelson Wieman (1884–1975), Bernard Meland(1899–1993), Paul Weiss (1901–2002), Norman Pittenger(1905–1997), Daniel Day Williams (1910–1973), John Moskop,William L. Reese, John B. Cobb, Jr., Schubert Ogden (1928-2019), EdgarA. Towne (1928-2018), Eugene H. Peters (1929–1983), BowmanClarke (1927–1996), Joseph Bracken, Burton Z. Cooper, MarjorieHewitt Suchocki, Gene A. Reeves, Lewis S. Ford (1933-2018),André Gounelle, Rem B. Edwards, Delwin Brown (1935–2009),David A. Pailin, Franklin I. Gamwell, Forrest Wood, David Ray Griffin,James A. Keller, Jorge Luis Nobo (1940-2019), Tyron Inbody, Carol P.Christ, George L. Goodwin, Barry Whitney, Santiago Sia, Jay McDaniel,George W. Shields (1951-2020), Donald Viney, Catherine Keller, DanielA. Dombrowski, Anna Case-Winters, Kurian Kachappilly, Gregory A. Boyd,Roland Faber, Thomas Jay Oord, Donna Bowman, Derek Malone-France,Monica A. Coleman, and Julia Enxing; Williams, Reese, Cobb, Ogden, andPeters were Hartshorne’s students at Chicago; Clarke and Edwardsstudied with him at Emory; Nobo was Hartshorne’s student atTexas.

2. God and Creativity

The question of the metaphysical relation of God and creativity is awatershed between process theism and more traditional forms of theism.Process philosophy, modifying a statement from Plato’sSophist (247e), affirms that the most concrete realbeings—in Whitehead’s language, actual entities—arecharacterized by the power to actand to be acted upon (Platosays real beings actor are acted upon). In processmetaphysics no actual entity is wholly determined by the activity ofanother; or phrased positively, every actual entity retainssome power of self-determination, however minimal or slightit may be. According to this view, to have power in relation to othersis to have power in relation to other entities with some degree ofpower. This is process philosophy’s doctrine of universalcreativity. Hartshorne says, “To be is to create”(Hartshorne 1970, 1, 272). The logic of the matter does not change ifGod is included in the metaphysical scheme. For process theism, God isthe supreme or eminent creative power, but not the only creativepower. Thus, process theists speak of God and the creatures asco-creators (Hartshorne and Reese 1953 [2000, 140]; Hartshorne 1967a,113).

Process theism’s doctrine of creativity differs from that ofclassical theism according to which God alone is genuinely creative.Thomas Aquinas says that in the proper sense of the word, only Godcreates (Summa Theologica I, Q 45, a. 5). Aquinas explainsthat to create is to bring something from nothing, and this ispossible only for deity. This is the famous doctrine ofcreatioex nihilo, or creation from no pre-existingmaterial. Thisex nihilo creation is logically distinct fromthe claim that the universe is temporally finite. Aquinas, forexample, treats the questions whether God is the creator and whetherthe universe had a beginning under separate headings. Aquinas is clearthat he accepts the temporal finitude of the universe as a matter offaith, from revelation, and not because of rational argument. On theother hand, like other traditional theists (Gottfried Leibniz forexample), Aquinas holds that God could have created a temporallyinfinite universe, but it too would have been createdexnihilo.

Process theists generally, though not unanimously, deny that theuniverse had a first temporal moment. Those wishing to demonstrate thecompatibility between process theism and Jewish and ChristianScripture commonly follow David Griffin’s arguments that theBible neither requires nor implies an absolute beginning of theuniverse (Griffin 2001b, 109–114). There is still the objection,however, that by conceiving both God and the creatures as creative,process theists seem to destroy one of the most meaningful contrastsbetween God and the world: God as creator and the world as created.Indeed, Whitehead says, “It is as true to say that God createsthe World, as that the World creates God” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 348]).One must, however, separate Whitehead’s poetic expression fromhis philosophical meaning. In process theism, as in traditionaltheism, theexistence of God is in no way precarious, in noway dependent upon the activity of other entities; likewise, processtheism and traditional theism are in agreement that non-divineindividuals are contingent (they can fail to exist)—in the caseof non-angelic beings, they are born and they die. InWhitehead’s and Hartshorne’s form of theism, God’sexistence is everlasting, but the existence of any particular creatureis not. Nevertheless, the creatures, being lesser creators, createsomething in God, if only the knowledge of their own activity. Forprocess theism, the activity of the creatures makes no difference toGod’s existence, only to God’s experience of them.

Implicit in traditional theism’s doctrine of creation are theideas that God’s creative act and God’s knowledge of theworld are non-temporal. Augustine, for example, in theConfessions (book XI, chapters 13 and 14), considers itnonsensical to ask what God was doing before the creation of theworld; God, in creating the universe, brings time—and with it,relations of before and after—into existence; thus, it is nomore meaningful to ask what camebefore the first moment oftime than it is to ask on a spinning sphere what is north of the northpole. In traditional theism, the temporal world is spread out beforeGod who can see it in its entirety from an eternal vantage point. AsBoethius says inThe Consolation of Philosophy (book 5, prose6), eternity is the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession ofeverlasting life. Process theism takes a contrary view thattimeis the process of creation. In other words, the order of beingsin time is the process whereby beings are created. For processmetaphysics, there is no eternal act of divine creation that fixes theworld in existence and there is no eternal perspective from which theuniverse can be considered a finished product. Furthermore, the“creative advance,” as Whitehead calls the universe, isinherently open-ended and growing, like a line to which tiny segmentsare continually being added. Where Aquinas could liken God’sprescience to a man viewing a caravan of travelers from a high tower,Hartshorne says, “There is not (either now or eternally) a fixedtotality of travelers for God to survey, but a new totality eachmoment” (Hartshorne 1970, 135).

Whitehead remarks that, “In all philosophic theory there is anultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents” (Whitehead1929 [1978, 7]). In process thought, this ultimate is creativity. It would bemisleading, however, to speak as though creativity were “theultimate reality” according to process theism (Hick 1990, 49).Creativity is not a metaphysical agency that produces anything;rather, it is the character of every concrete fact, from the humblestflicker of existence in non-divine actual entities to God.Whitehead’s pithy summary of process philosophy is, “Themany become one, and are increased by one” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 21]).Creativity, then, is the ultimate metaphysical principle. A principle,however, is not a real being. Whitehead explained to his student A. H.Johnson that God is not a principle but an actuality (Johnson 1983,5). That which is best described, in process theism, as the ultimatereality, is God. For Whitehead and Hartshorne, God should not betreated as the exception to metaphysical principles; otherwise, apartfrom an appeal to putative revelations from God, there could be noreasoned discourse about the divine. Whitehead and Hartshorne striveto conceive God as the chief exemplification of metaphysicalprinciples. In process theism, the divine or eminent form ofcreativity provides the basis for cosmic order and achieved value. InWhitehead’s words, God is “the poet of the world,”leading it with tender patience by the divine vision of truth, beauty,and goodness (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 346]).

Process theism is critical of the traditional metaphysical question,“Why is there something rather than nothing?” In processthought, the proposition, “Something exists,” is anecessary truth (Hartshorne 1971). Insofar as traditional theismmaintains the doctrine of the necessary existence of God, it tooaccepts the necessity of something existing. Therefore, the differencebetween process theism and traditional theism is not in whethersomething necessarily exists, but in thenature of thenecessarily existent. According to traditional theism, thetotality of non-divine entities is a multiplicity in need ofgrounding in a primordial unifying activity—the “pureact” (actuspurus) of existing that is God.Process theism refuses to give a privileged metaphysical status to theone over the many. In Whitehead’s words, “The term‘many’ presupposes the term ‘one,’ and theterm ‘one’ presupposes the term ‘many’”(Whitehead 1929 [1978, 21]). Taking creativity as the category of theultimate is an attempt to keep the one and the many on equalmetaphysical footing by taking reality itself as necessarily social.God, considered as the ultimate reality in any version of processmetaphysics, necessarily exists as a social being in dynamicinteraction with all non-divine entities.

Clearly, treating creativity as the ultimate metaphysical principlehas far-reaching consequences for the concept of God and ofGod’s relations to others. It is not possible, in processmetaphysics, to conceive divine activity as a“supernatural” intervention into the “natural”order of events. Process theists usually regard the distinctionbetween the supernatural and the natural as a by-product of thedoctrine of creationex nihilo. In process thought, there isno such thing as a realm of the natural in contrast to that which issupernatural. On the other hand, if “the natural” isdefined more neutrally as “what is in the nature ofthings,” then process metaphysics characterizes the natural asthe creative activity of actual entities. In Whitehead’s words,“It lies in the nature of things that the many enter intocomplex unity” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 21]). It is tempting to emphasizeprocess theism’s denial of the supernatural and therebyhighlight what the process God cannot do in comparison to what thetraditional God can do (that is, to bring something from nothing). Infairness, however, equal stress should be placed on processtheism’s denial of the natural (as traditionally conceived) sothat one may highlight what the creatures cannot do, in traditionaltheism, in comparison to what they can do in process metaphysics (thatis, to be part creators of the world with God).

3. Real Relations in God

Process theists generally regard the notion of creationexnihilo, as explained above, as going hand-in-hand with the ideathat the relations between God and the world are one-way relations.God creates, but the creatures lack all creative power, the one whollyuncreated, the other wholly uncreative (Hartshorne 1970, 9). It is notwithin the ability of any creature, according to this view, to make adifference to God. Aquinas’s way of expressing this asymmetry isto say that the relation from God to the creatures is real (for itmakes a difference, all the difference, to them) whereas the relationfrom the creatures to God is rational, or in the mind only (for theexistence of the creatures makes no difference to the being of God)(Summa Theologica I, Q 13, a. 7). Aquinas borrows, and placesin a Christian context, Aristotle’s terms of “pureact” and “unmoved mover” to apply to God. To saythat God is pure act is to say that anything God could be, God alreadyis—there is no potentiality in God for any type of change. Tosay that God is the unmoved mover is to say that the divine movesothers but is unmoved by another—this includes the idea that Godis impassible, literally, without feeling or emotion.

In the view of process theism, the denial of real relations in Godrenders classical theism paradoxical to the point of incoherence.According to classical theism, God has perfect knowledge of acontingent and changing world, yet nothing in God could be other thanit is. The one condition, however, contradicts the other (cf.Hartshorne 1948, 13–14; Viney and Shields 2020, 147-150). If anyevent is contingent then it could be otherwise—for example, thisbird at this place and time is singing rather than sleeping; but ifthe event could be otherwise, then God’s knowledge of the eventcould be otherwise—knowing this bird at this place and time assinging rather than as sleeping. The contingency implied forGod’s knowing is not that God might have been ignorant ofsomething but that the thing that God knows might have been different.An infallible knower necessarily knows whatever exists; it does notfollow, however, that what exists is necessaryunless oneadds the premise, taken from classical theism, that nothing in Godcould be other than it is. Process theism jettisons the premise thatthere is nothing contingent in God. The only other non-atheisticalternatives, say process theists, are to follow Aristotle and denythat God knows the world or to follow Spinoza and deny that nothing inGod or in the world could be other than it is (Hartshorne 1976, 12).What is impossible is a God with no contingent aspects knowing acontingent world.

The denial of real relations in God also has paradoxical consequencesfor the concept of divine goodness. If God is unaffected by thecreatures, then God is impassible, not moved by their suffering.Anselm, inProslogion chapter VIII, asks how God can becompassionate towards the creatures without feeling sympathy for them.His answer—in effect a kind of theological behaviorism(Dombrowski 2006, 140)—is that the creatures feel the effects ofdivine compassion but that God feels nothing. This leaves unansweredhow non-sympathetic compassion is possible. Aquinas provides a lessobviously question begging reply. He says that to love another is towill the good of the other; God necessarily wills the good of theother, so God is love (Summa Theologica I, Q 20, a. 2).Process theists do not deny that love requires willing the good of theother, but they maintain that it requires something more, or at veryleast that there are greater forms of love of which willing the goodof the other is a necessary aspect. Divine love is more thanbeneficence; it includes sensitivity to the joys and sorrows of thebeloved. This idea is expressed in Whitehead’s depiction of Godas “the great companion—the fellow-sufferer whounderstands” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 351]). Hartshorne points out thatAnselm’s God can give us “everything except the right tobelieve that there is one who, with infinitely subtle and appropriatesensitivity, rejoices in all our joys and sorrows in all oursorrows” (Hartshorne 1948, 54).

Closely related to the problem of passionless love, for classicaltheism, is the question of the world’s value. The denial of realrelations in God, coupled with the concept that the world and itscreatures have no value except as it is borrowed from God, impliesthat that total reality described byGod-and-the-worldcontains no more value than that described byGod-without-the-world. This view has two unhappyconsequences. First, it implies that there is no value in God’screating the world—nothing is gained, or lost, in God’sdecision to create. Second, it implies that there is no value inGod’s interaction with the creatures. Process theists point outthat these ideas do not square with analogies drawn from humanexperience. There is value in giving one’s love to another, asfor instance, bringing children into the world and loving them; thereis also value in one’s love being received and returned, as whenthe children mature and cherish relations with their parents. Yet, onecannot love another unless the other exists, or once existed. Thus, ifthere is a value in love, it requiresthe existence of theother, not merelythe idea of the existence of theother. Process theism rejects the counter-intuitive claim thatthe world as actually existing has no more value than the world aspossibly existing. By parity of reasoning, process theism rejects theview that it is no better for God to create the world than tocontemplate the possibility of creating it.

Perhaps the most disastrous consequences of the denial of realrelations in God, as far as process theists are concerned, are theproblems that it poses for free will and creaturely suffering. Forclassical theism, the creative or causal relation flows one way only,from Godto the world. The world and its creaturesare products of a unilateral divine decision that things should be oneway rather than another. Hartshorne poses a dilemma for this view.Either biological parents are part creators of their children or theyare not. If they are then God alone is not the creator. On the otherhand, if parents are not genuine creators of their children then thecreatures never create anything and we don’t know what“create” means, for parents having children would seem tobe a paradigm of creation—note the word“procreative” (cf. Hartshorne 1987, 88–89).Classical theists accept precisely the implication that Hartshornefinds absurd, namely, that the creatures never create anything. TheThomist, for example, holds that one’s parents are not creative;they are the vehicles whereby matter-energy is rearranged so as toform (not to create) a new human being. Strictly speaking, forAquinas, what God creates isyour-parents-having-you. Yourparents had no part in your creation.

Aquinas’s theory poses complications for human freedom. Thereality described byyour-parents-having-you includes thedecisions they make in having you. God, in creating that reality, alsocreates those decisions. Aquinas says that God’s will isperfectly efficacious—that is, what God wills comes to pass.Therefore, your parents’ decisions inyour-parents-having-you must occur. Would this view ofdecision making jeopardize human freedom? Aquinas, representingclassical theism, says no, but Hartshorne, representing processtheism, says yes. In Aquinas’s view, one’s free decisionshavetwo sufficient explanations, one’s own will andGod’s will. In other words, God brings it about not onlythat one freely decides something, butwhat onefreely decides (Summa Theologica I, Q 19, a. 8). Processtheists counter that multiple freedom (whether between God and thecreatures or among the creatures) implies the possibility of willscoming into conflict or being in harmony. Hartshorne says, “Riskand opportunity go together, not because God chooses to have it so,but because opportunity without risk is meaningless orcontradictory” (Hartshorne 1970, 238). If this is true, then itmust be possible for the will of the creatures to be at cross purposeswith the divine will. We have already seen that classical theists andprocess theists agree that God wills the good of the creatures. Humanbeings, however, do not always will their own good, or the good ofother people. In those cases, on the classical view, God brings itabout that people freely decide not to will the good of others.Process theists argue that this makes God responsible for evil andsuffering in a way that contradicts divine goodness. On the classicalview, for example, the crimes that disfigure human history are thefault of human beings, but they are also God’s doing.

Classical theists are not without responses to these criticisms. Onewell-known reply, used by Augustine and Aquinas, is to invoke thedistinction between divine permission and divine causation of humanwickedness and suffering. On this view, the evil in the world ispermitted by God in order to bring about a greater good. For example,the Exultet of the Easter Vigil, sometimes ascribed to Ambrose ofMilan, speaks of the sin of Adam and Eve as a blessed fault (Ofelix culpa!) that made possible the sacrificial death of Christ.Process theists argue that there can be no distinction betweenpermitting and causing in a being that creates the universeexnihilo. On the principles of classical theism, whatever isdivinely “permitted” is also divinely created to be as itis (cf. Griffin 1976, 63–64 and 82–83)—this is oneof the few points on which process theism agrees with John Calvin(Case-Winters, 1990, 71). On the process view, creaturely decisionsare themselves acts of creation, which means that the universe is ajoint product of God and the creatures. Process theists do not seehow, in creationex nihilo, creaturely decisions that Godpermits are not orchestrated by God so as to fulfill the purposes Godhas for them. Albert Einstein is reported to have said that God doesnot play dice with the universe. Although he was not a classicaltheist, his view on this issue is in accord with that philosophy. Godmay, as it were, allow or permit the dice to fall where they may, butonly if they fall as God desires them to fall; this seems different inname only from playing with loaded dice. Hartshorne replies,“Einstein’s rejection of a ‘dice-throwing God’was a great man’s error. And human individuals are some of thedice …” (Hartshorne 1967a, 113).

4. Dual Transcendence in Whitehead and Hartshorne

The dominant theological position in the West, which we have beenreferring to as classical theism, denies all relativity to God. Onemight suppose that the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and theIncarnation of God in Christ would temper disbelief in divinerelativity. The trend, however, was to argue that these doctrines donot conflict with the denial of real relations in God. Claims ofrevealed truth aside, the core doctrine has been that God, to be God,must be in all respects absolute and in no respects relative. As goesthe contrast between absolute and relative, so go other metaphysicalcontrasts. Theists traditionally held that God isin allrespects creator, active, infinite, eternal, necessary,independent, immutable, and impassible andin no respectscreated, passive, finite, temporal, contingent, dependent, mutable, orpassible. This view can be interpreted either as a doctrine about thenature of God or as a thesis about the parameters of responsiblediscourse about God (in the latter case it is called thevianegativa, or negative path). Hartshorne complains that, oneither interpretation, traditional theology is guilty of a“monopolar prejudice,” placing God (or talk about God) onone side of polar contrasts and the world on the other. It ismonopolar insofar as deity is characterized by only one sideof each pair of contrasts; it isprejudicial insofar as itholds to the invidious nature of the contrasts. As Hartshorne notes,“One pole of each contrary is regarded as more excellent thanthe other, so that the supremely excellent being cannot be describedby the other and inferior pole” (Hartshorne and Reese 1953 [2000,2]).

Classical theists certainly made provisions for speaking of God inways that suggested divine passion and even mutability. As PaulGavrilyuk argues, for the Church Fathers, divine impassibility wasless a denial of God’s emotional life than it was a qualifierthat ruled out “passions and experiences that were unbecoming ofthe divine nature” (Gavrilyuk 2004, 16). In a similar vein,Michael Dodds emphasizes that Aquinas did not construe divineimmutability as an attribute of God nor did he think that it impliesinertness or stagnation. Nevertheless, Dodds, interpreting Aquinas,maintains that immutability “seems to signify divine being(esse) more appropriately [than mutability] since it moreclearly indicates its distinction from all other things and itstranscendence of all human thought and language” (Dodds 2008,157–158).

Process theists also emphasize our limitations in knowing the realityof God, but they are not persuaded that it is best signified by onlyone pair of the metaphysical contraries. If one is willing to concedethat God should not be conceived as immutable in the bad ways thatcreatures are unchanging, why may not God be conceived as changeablein the good ways that creatures are, with the proviso that God’sexcellence necessarily surpasses all else? Hartshorne notes thatordinary language provides scanty support for and abundant evidenceagainst the superiority of one pole over the other. We have alreadyseen that process theism finds positive value in God’s lovebeing active as well as passive; it is as important that God wills thegood of the creatures as that God is affected by their joy andsuffering. Here is another of Hartshorne’s many examples,expressed with some humor:

The venerable dogma, ‘agent is superior to patient’, isnot derived from the study of knowledge. Indeed, it is not derivedfrom any careful examination of ordinary cases. To speak is to beagent, to listen is to be patient, and those who want to show theirsuperiority by speaking without listening are not trustworthyauthorities in the theory of value. (Hartshorne 1970, 231–32)

Hartshorne’s larger point is that the pairs of metaphysicalcontraries arenot related as superior to inferior, but thatthere are admirable and deficient manifestations of both sides. Hesums this up in the principle ofthe non-invidiousness of themetaphysical contraries (Hartshorne 1970, 268). If this principleis correct, and if God is conceived as the eminent embodiment of valueand supremely worshipful being, then God must be conceived not inmonopolar terms but as dipolar, exemplifying the admirable forms ofboth pairs of metaphysical contrasts. For example, rather than sayingthat God is in all respects active and in no respects passive, thealternative is to say that God is active in some respects and passivein other respects, each in uniquely excellent ways. This is onemeaning of the expression “dipolar theism”; in light ofother meanings to be given to “dipolar” in discussions ofprocess theism, it is perhaps clearer to use Hartshorne’sexpression for this idea:dual transcendence, that is to say,God as the supreme embodiment of each pair of metaphysicalcontraries.

The most elegant statement of dual transcendence is in the closingpages ofProcess and Reality, a line of which we have alreadyquoted. The complete quotation reads like a litany:

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the world fluent, asthat the World is permanent and God is fluent.

It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that theWorld is one and God many.

It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actualeminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actualeminently.

It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God isimmanent in the World.

It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the Worldtranscends God.

It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the Worldcreates God.

(Whitehead 1929 [1978, 348])

We saw above in the discussion of divine creativity that Whiteheadindulges in poetic expression and that understanding his meaningrequires looking more closely at his metaphysical categories. Aboveall, however, what is required is a way of making principleddistinctions between different aspects of God so that the doctrine ofdual transcendence does not collapse into contradiction. Let usexamine the different ways in which Whitehead and Hartshorne attemptto save the doctrine of dual transcendence from incoherence.

4.1 Whitehead on the two natures of God

In Whitehead’s philosophy, every actual entity has a physicaland a mental pole. For this reason, Whitehead speaks of actualentities as “dipolar” (thus, a second meaning of theword). The physical and mental poles are aspects of every real being(actual entities) but they are not real beings themselves. In otherwords, Whitehead is not a mind-body dualist. It is also important tonote that, for Whitehead, human consciousness is a higher form ofmentality but not the only form. Thus, Whitehead does not claim thatevery real being is a conscious entity. As with Leibniz, Whiteheadrecognizes a continuum of mind-like qualities ranging from veryprimitive feelings to the most advanced form of self-awareness.Whereas Leibniz speaks of every real being—he calls themmonads—as having apperception and appetition, Whitehead speaksof every actual entity asprehending, or grasping or takingaccount of, its environment and as striving to realize thesubjective aim of coordinating its prehensions in somedeterminate fashion. InProcess and Reality, Whitehead usesthe word “feeling” as a synonym for prehension to indicatethe vector character of feelings—a feeling is always a feelingof something. Whitehead’s belief in a continuum ofmental qualities fits neatly with evolutionary theory where it iscommonplace to conceive differing forms of organic complexity asassociated with differing levels of mental capacity. For example, thefrontal cortex of a human brain allows for more advanced mentalitythan one finds in a chimpanzee, whose brain is not as complex.

Whitehead is fully aware that there is an imaginative leap in applyingthese categories to God, but he believes the application can be donein a disciplined and systematic fashion. Whitehead conceives God as anactual entity. In God, the physical and mental poles are called theconsequent nature and theprimordial naturerespectively. As with the physical and mental poles of actualentities, so the two “natures” are distinguishable butinseparable aspects of deity. That is to say, neither can exist apartfrom the other and each requires the other. The primordial nature isGod’s envisagement of all possibilities; in the idiom ofLeibniz, it is God’s knowledge of all possible worlds. It iscalled “primordial” because it representswhat couldbe in a sense not tethered to the actual course of events. It islogical space, deficient in actuality apart from the consequent naturesays Whitehead. The consequent nature is God’s prehensions ofthe actual processes of the world. Conversely, it is the world’sinfluence on God. It is called “consequent” because it isconsequent upon, or dependent upon, the decisions of non-divine actualentities (Whitehead calls them actual occasions). The consequentnature is the record of all achieved fact, a perfect memory of whathas been—Whitehead speaks of the “objectiveimmortality” of the world in God. The two natures work inconcert in the process of God’s interaction with the creatures.The deity receives the world of actual occasions into its experience;then, comparing what has actually occurred with the realm of purepossibility, God informs the world with new ideals (new aims),customized for each actual entity, for what realistically could beachieved. Whitehead sometimes refers to this aspect of the process asthesuperjectivenature of God. It is God’srelevance for the world as a “lure for feeling,” urgingthe creatures to strive for whatever perfection of which they arecapable.

Each of the statements in Whitehead’s “litany” canbe interpreted in terms of the interaction between the two natures andGod’s interaction with the world. God is permanent in the senseof everlastingly envisioning the realm of possibility; the world ispermanent as objectively immortal in God’s memory. God is fluentin constantly acquiring new experiences of the world and the world isfluent in the rhythm of the birth and death of actual occasions. Godis one in being a single actual entity; but God is many in the gradedrelevance of possibilities provided for each emergent occasion. Theworld is one in virtue of God’s experience of it; the world ismany because of the plurality of occasions that make it up. God iseminently actual in comparison to the world by achieving a unificationof worldly occasions in the consequent nature that is beyond any ofthem taken singly; but the world is eminently actual in comparison toGod’s primordial nature, which is not concrete, although it isas infinite as the entire range of possibility. God and the world areimmanent in each other in that each experiences the other; yet God andthe world transcend each other by being realities whose experiencesare not entirely determined by the other. Finally, as we have seen,God creates the world by informing it with possibilities (technicallyspeaking, God provides “initial aims” for every nascentoccasion). The world creates God, not by bringing God into existence,but by creating something in God, namely the material for what shallbecome objectively immortal.

4.2 Hartshorne on existence and actuality

Hartshorne develops the concept of dual transcendence by drawing adistinction of logical type between, on the one hand, anindividual’s existence and enduring characteristics and, on theother hand, the actual states of the individual. Using an example dearto his ornithological interests, Hartshorne says, “That I shall(at least probably) exist tomorrow is one thing; that I shall existhearing a blue jay call at noon is another” (Hartshorne 1962,63). The logical relationship between the two sentences “I shallexist tomorrow” and “I shall exist tomorrow as hearing ablue jay call at noon” is that the second cannot be inferredfrom the first, but the first can be inferred from the second. Therelation of entailment between the sentences is a function of theinformation provided in them. Both sentences speak of theindividual’s existence, but only the second sentence speaks ofthe experience that the individual is having. Hartshorne argues thatthis logical relation between the sentences reflects an ontologicaldifference between the bare fact of one’s existence and theactual states in which one exists. Existence, says Hartshorne, isabstract compared to actuality, which is the concrete. What is true ofexistence is also true of one’s defining or enduringcharacteristics. The state of affairs described by “Hartshorneexisting as an ornithologist” is abstract compared to the stateof affairs described by “Hartshorne existing as an ornithologisthearing a blue jay call at noon.” The more abstract statementleaves more details concerning the individual’s actuality to bedefined. Unless strict determinism is the case—which wouldrequire that there is only one future that is genuinelypossible—the ornithologist can exist tomorrow without hearing ablue jay call at noon (perhaps he will hear another bird, or none atall).

In effect, Hartshorne lays out a three-fold distinction betweenwhat a thing is (its essence or defining characteristics),that a thing is (its existence), andthe particularmanner in which it exists (its actual states or actuality).Hartshorne maintains that this distinction, familiar enough inordinary experience, is applicable to God and is the basis forspeaking of dual transcendence in deity. Between the cases of God andthe creatures, however, there are important differences. Humanexistence and character are fragile and subject to variation.God’s existence and character, on the other hand, are notinsecure, unstable, or transient; in a word, they are not contingent.Hartshorne agrees with traditional theism that God exists without thepossibility of not existing (sometimes called necessary existence orexistencea se) and that God is necessarily supreme in love,knowledge, and power. A closely related point is that, in the divinecase, existence and essence are identical, whereas they are not thesame thing in the creatures. Aquinas speaks of the “existentialcomposition” of the creatures to indicate that no creaturenecessarily exists. Hartshorne agrees with Aquinas about this. Since,in God, existence and essence are the same, Hartshorne customarilyabbreviates the distinction among existence, essence, and actuality tothat between existence and actuality.

The importance of the distinction between existence and actuality isto demonstrate that the necessary aspects of deity do not preclude Godhaving contingent aspects, provided they do not conflict with thenecessary ones. We saw previously, in the discussion of realrelations, that there must be contingent aspects of the divine beingif it is to have perfect knowledge of contingent things. Aquinasresists this conclusion, in part, because he sees contingency as akind of metaphysical virus that infects the very existence of the oneof which it is a characteristic. He says that a being whose substancehas any admixture of potency is subject to decay (as in physicalcreatures) or annihilation (as in the case of angels) (SummaContra Gentiles I, ch. 16, para. 2). The logical type distinctionbetween existence and actuality ensures that contingencies in God poseno threat to the deity’s necessary existence. Thus, Hartshornesays, “That God exists is one with his essence and is ananalytic truth … but how, or in what actual state of experienceor knowledge or will, he exists is contingent in the same sense as isour own existence” (Hartshorne 1948, 87). It is also part ofHartshorne’s theory that God’s character or essence issupremely excellent. Thus, the contingencies in the divine actualitydo not include the possibilities of God being selfish, cruel, orwicked as they do in the human case.

The mention of angelic existence in the previous paragraph brings up apoint seldom noticed in discussions of process theism. Aquinasapproximates the Hartshornean distinction between immutable existenceand mutable actuality in what he says about the nature of angels.(Thomists might say that Hartshorne approximates Aquinas.) Aquinasholds that angels are not subject to natural decay or destruction forthey are incorporeal. Like God, their existence is not affected by theflow of time. They are, however, capable of certain kinds of change.While their existence is constant, they have free will and theirknowledge can increase, and in a certain sense, they can move fromplace to place. Aquinas says that between the unqualifiedchangelessness of God’s eternity and the qualifiedchangeableness of corporeal existence, there is the qualifiedimmutability of angelic being. The technical expression for this isæviternity, which is the mean between the extremes ofeternity and time (Summa Theologica I, Q 19, a. 5). One isalmost tempted to say that God, as conceived by Hartshorne, isæviternital, except for three important differences:(1) angelic existence is unaffected by time, but it is stillcontingent, unlike the existence of Hartshorne’s God; (2)angelic freedom includes the freedom to be wicked and Hartshorne doesnot view that as an option for God; (3) angels are entirelynonphysical, but Hartshorne argues, as we shall see, that God has abody of sorts in the universe itself.

Hartshorne often refers to his theism as “neoclassical” toindicate both its affinities with and its departures from classicaltheism—it retains much of what is “classical” inclassical theism, but adds something that is new (neo).Classical theism holds to the necessity, eternity, infinity,independence, immutability, and impassibility of God. Hartshorneagrees that God can be so characterized, but only with respect to thedivineexistence and essence. Hartshorne adds thatGod’sactuality is contingent, temporal, finite,dependent, mutable, and passible. Indeed, Hartshorne agrees withWhitehead that allachieved value is necessarily finite inthe sense of not exhausting all that can be. Whitehead makes the pointthat the limitation of God is a necessary condition of God’sgoodness.

[God] gains his depth of actuality by his harmony of valuation. It isnot true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would beevil as well as good. Also this unlimited fusion of evil with goodwould mean mere nothingness. He is something decided and is therebylimited. (Whitehead 1926 [1997, 153])

It is noteworthy that Whitehead does not say that God is not infinite,but that God is not infinitein all respects. Thus, dualtranscendence does not entail that God is in no sense infinite.Hartshorne locates the infinity of God primarily in the unlimitedcapacity to influence, know, and care for the creatures in anyconceivable world.

One may rightly demand an answer to the question: If God is finite insome respects, what prevents there being a reality that surpasses God?Hartshorne’s response is that there is indeed a possible realitythat surpasses God in any actual state of the divine existence, butwhat can surpass God is only a subsequent actual state of Godself.Hartshorne calls on Gustav Fechner’s distinction between“surpassable by others, including self” and“surpassable, but only by self.” It is only the latterphrase, according to Hartshorne, that applies to God. This is whatHartshorne calls R-perfection (for relative perfection), a form ofperfection that permits a contingent actuality in God that isunsurpassed by all others,excluding self. This is by way ofcontrast with A-perfection (for absolute perfection)—whichapplies to the divine existence and essence—which is to beunsurpassable by all others,including self. To speak of Godas having dual transcendence is to say that God is both R-perfect andA-perfect, but in different respects. Thus, one of Hartshorne’spreferred definitions of God: “the self-surpassing surpasser ofall” (Hartshorne 1948, 20).

Hartshorne’s version of dual transcendence is quite differentfrom Whitehead’s. To be sure, Whitehead and Hartshorne are infirm agreement, and are at pains to emphasize, that the relationsbetween God and the world are symmetrical. In addition, bothphilosophers regard God as supremely worshipful not only with respectto the divine absoluteness but also with respect to the divinerelativity. Indeed, one of the main objectives of Hartshorne’sbookThe Divine Relativity (1948) is to show that only byhaving an eminent form of relativity can the deity qualify asworshipful. Nevertheless, Hartshorne conceives God as an individualwho endures through various actual states. In the technical languageof Whitehead’s philosophy, this makes God a“society,” that is to say, a collection of actual entitiesextended in time, each member of which shares a definingcharacteristic, passed along from one moment to the next. All enduringobjects are societies of actual entities; moreover, no actual entityendures through various states. Whitehead’s God isnotan enduring object but a single actual entity. To speak ofWhitehead’s God as dipolar is to indicate that God has aphysical and a mental pole. This sense of “dipolar” isdifferent from the meaning that Hartshorne commonly gives theexpression. Hartshorne does not deny that actual entities are dipolar,nor does he deny that there are physical and mental aspects of deity,but his God is dipolar in having an enduring character embodied insuccessive states, the character being abstract compared to theconcrete actual states—this gives us a third meaning of“dipolar” (cf. Griffin’s rather different view onthe meanings of dipolarity in God, Griffin 2001a, 150). Hartshornesays, “Unlike Whitehead, I … define God as an enduringsociety of actualities, not a single actuality. Here I think Whiteheadwas just mistaken” (Hartshorne 1967b, 287).

Whitehead indicated that he considered the possibility of God being anenduring object, and thus a society, but rejected it on the groundsthat God’s consequent nature loses nothing of the past whereassocieties are characterized by partial loss of the past (Johnson 1983,9). This argument is curious, for it would seem to apply to actualentities as well as to societies. No non-divine actual entitypreserves its entire past without distortion and loss; yet Whiteheadattributes to deity—in the doctrine of objective immortality ofthe past in God—what no other actual entity can accomplish. Inreply to a question from Vergilius Ferm, Hartshorne notes that theunique excellence of retaining the past perfectly in memory must be noless true if God is an actual entity than if God is a society (Rome1964, 324). He argues that the consequent nature of God is itselfabstract, for it is the generic property of beingsomehowactual or affected by others (Hartshorne 1972, 75–76).Thus, Hartshorne proposes that Whitehead would be more true to his ownmetaphysics by conceiving God as an enduring object, and thus as asociety, rather than as a single actual entity. Hartshorneacknowledged that his own theory is not without its problems. Notleast of these is how to coordinate the concept of a divine temporalworld-line with the relativistic view of space-time in contemporaryphysics (Hartshorne 1970, 123–125; Sia 1990, 276; cf. Griffin1992). Suffice it to say that the question whether God is bestconceived as a single actual entity or as an enduring object is amajor parting of the ways between process theists. Griffin, forexample, refers to the idea of God as a single everlasting actualentity as Whitehead’s “greatest blunder” (Griffin2001a, 152). Nevertheless, Whitehead’s view has a number of abledefenders, including Jorge Nobo and Palmyre Oomen (Nobo 1989; Oomen1998).

5. Panentheism

The doctrine of prehension, developed by Whitehead but alsoenthusiastically endorsed by Hartshorne, insures that the world is,in some sense, part of God. Actual entities, by virtue oftheir prehensions of one another, are internally related to theirpredecessors and externally related to their successors.Whitehead’s “organic” philosophy can thereby affirmboth that an individual isin the world and the world isin the individual. This generalization applies equally toGod, but with differences that allow for a clear distinction betweenthe divine and the non-divine. Whitehead maintains that events in theworld have a specific locus with reference to God, but God has nolocus with reference to the world (Johnson 1983, 9). Hartshorne saysthat God is the one individual conceivablea priori—Godis individuated by, though not exhausted by, concepts alone(Hartshorne 1948, 31). This is because God’s scope ofinteraction is universal whereas the scope of interaction for anycreature is localized. To be God is to causally affect and be affectedbyevery real being; to be a non-divine entity is to causallyaffect and be affected bysome, but not all, creatures.Whitehead and Hartshorne also say that God and the creatures differ inthe quality of interaction. For example, any non-divineindividual’s knowledge of others is imperfect and partialwhereas God’s knowledge is without defect (Hartshorne 1967,40).

While both philosophers deny that God has location within theuniverse, they consider God to bein some sense a physical ormaterial being. Since process thought affirms the goodness of God, itis clear that it denies the ancient Manichean and Gnostic ideas thatthere is something inherently evil in being material. Even so, inorder to fully appreciate the process view, it is well to keep in mindthat Whitehead and Hartshorne reject the traditional concept of matteras devoid of any activity or feeling—Whitehead refers to thetraditional view of matter as “vacuous actuality.” Becauseactual entities are dipolar, all of them have a physical aspect, butnone are entirely lacking in psychic qualities, although in most casesthese qualities are negligible. Thus, in process thought, beingphysical does not mean having no mind-like qualities. The closestanticipation of process ideas about mind and body are in Leibniz,although process thought denies Leibniz’s view that the monadshave no “windows.” Leibniz maintains that no monad entersinto the internal constitution of another; Whitehead’s doctrineof prehension insures that actual entities are internally related totheir predecessors.

A common criticism of process theism is that it conceives God as“needing” the world. In one sense this is true, but inanother sense it is false. It is true that, in process metaphysics,the structure of reality is social, and necessarily so. Thus, itpromotes a social view of God—God as necessarily related tonon-divine actualities. On the other hand, the process God does notrequire any particular universe in order to exist. Whitehead speaks ofa succession of “cosmic epochs” which are, in effect,different universes where the very laws of nature are different. Godpresides over each universe as its eminent creative power, makingpossible all localized expressions of creativity, but no universesustains God’s existence. Hartshorne makes a similar point bycomparing God’s existence and actuality to a set thatnecessarily has members. “To say that a class could not be emptyis not at all to say that its particular members are necessary”(Hartshorne 1970, 144). From the perspective of process theism, thecriticism that God “needs” the universe is, at best,simply another way of raising the question of how best to conceive thenecessarily existent: Is it, or is it not, social in nature?

Trinitarians sometimes argue that a social concept of ultimate realitycan be formulated if God is necessarily related to the divine self.Process theists, especially those who are Christians, are not averseto this suggestion. Nevertheless, if this is to be taken seriously asa philosophical proposal, then there can be no mere appeal to the“mystery” of the Trinity. Some effort should be made toretain the primary meaning of “social” as multipleentities in a network of relations, some of which are internal andsome external. That is to say, a genuinely social concept of realityis one in which the multiple identities of each of the interrelatedand interacting entities are not absorbed into each other. Whiteheadand Hartshorne claim to do this apart from the Christian doctrine ofthe Trinity, but there is no reasona priori to suppose thatTrinitarian metaphysics cannot be one version of process metaphysics,or that the latter could not be adapted to the former (Boyd 1992;Inbody 1997, ch. 8; Bracken and Suchocki 2005).

Whitehead and Hartshorne part company concerning the proper analogyfor conceiving the God-world relation. Hartshorne modifiesPlato’s world-soul analogy in theTimaeus(30a–34c). In Plato’s myth, the eternal demiurge creates auniverse that is a living creature, animated by a soul. Hartshorneargues that the best philosophical interpretation of the myth is toconsider the demiurge and the world-soul as two aspects of the samedeity (Hartshorne & Reese 1953 [2000, 55]). If this is correct, thenPlato affirms a version of dual transcendence, with one aspect of Godbeing the universe. According to this interpretation, Plato came closeto Hartshorne’s view that, “the world is God’sbody” (Hartshorne 1941, 185; Dombrowski 2005, chapter 1). Thisis not to say that God has a location within the universe, but thatthe location of the universe is in God, for the divinebeing-in-becoming is all-inclusive. Hartshorne borrows a word inventedby Karl Krause (1781–1832) to express this view:panentheism—everything (pan, all) is in(en, in) God (theos, God) (Cooper 2006, 121).Panentheism is a mediating position between pantheism and classicaltheism. For pantheism, the world is identical to God; for classicaltheism, the world is completely external to God; for panentheism, theworld is within God.

Hartshorne makes qualifications to Plato’s analogy. WhereasPlato apparently conceives the soul-body (or mind-body) relationshipas a one-to-one relation, Hartshorne, following modern biology, arguesthat it is more plausible to construe it as a one-to-many relation.The human body is a hierarchical society of thousands of kinds ofcells. Thus, Hartshorne maintains that God is related to the universein a manner similar to the way that a person is related to the cellsof his or her body. In an important respect, Whitehead can make abetter claim than Hartshorne that the relationship of God to the Worldis one-to-many. Whitehead’s God is a single actual entitywhereas Hartshorne’s God is a society. Thus, if it is a questionof the relations of actual entities, then the God-to-World relation inHartshorne’s theism is a many-to-many relation.Hartshorne’s point requires clarification: God, a singleenduring object, is related to every non-divine actual entity andsociety. Clarity on this point brings out another comparison. Byconceiving God as an actual entity, Whitehead weakens the analogybetween God and a person. Donald Sherburne shows that inWhitehead’s metaphysics, persons are enduring objects of aspecific type (Sherburne 1969). Therefore, Hartshorne’s view ofGod as an enduring object apparently provides more of a basis forspeaking of God as a person.

Randall E. Auxier and Gary L. Herstein (2017) maintain, on thecontrary, that a Whiteheadian view is friendlier to conceiving God asa person than Hartshorne’s view. Their argument turns on theidea of negative prehensions, that is, experience which“eliminates [certain data] from feeling” (Whitehead 1929 [1978,23]). According to Auxier and Herstein, one cannot be a person orexperience temporal passage apart from negative prehensions, which,they say, allow distinctions both between whatwas and whatmight-have-been and between whatwill-be and whatmight-be (Auxier and Herstein 2017, 243 and 265). Hartshorneconsistently rejected the idea of negative prehensions in God whereasWhitehead, at least in some of his statements, seemed to allow forthem. The metaphysical issues run deep; suffice it to say thatHartshorne distinguished the actual and the possible in ways thatdiverged significantly from Whitehead (see Ramal 2010,139–157).

To speak of God as a person is, of course, an analogy. Aperson’s feelings cannot be entirely separated from the feelingsof cells in the body—damage to the cells hurts the person. In asimilar fashion, God is affected by what affects the creatures. On theother hand, God knows—in Whiteheadian language, Godprehends—each “cell” of the divine body in aperfectly distinct fashion whereas others experience their cellsen masse, much as one sees the green of the grass but noteach blade. Another difference, as we have seen, is that God is notlocated within the universe as are non-divine individuals. Hartshorneturns this difference to his advantage by following a suggestion inPlato. He says that Plato’s argument concerning the sphericalnature of the universe adequately explains why the divine body hasneither internal organs nor sense organs. Bodily organs in thecreatures, including a central nervous system, are needed to mediatewith an external environment, but there is nothing external to theuniverse (Hartshorne 1984, 134). God’s only“environment” is internal to God. Thus, the world-soulanalogy does not entail that God has a brain or any other bodily organthat one finds in the creatures. In addition, the lack of an externalenvironment for God means that there can be no threat to the divineexistence from such a source. The “harm” done to God bycreaturely suffering can never be fatal.

Whitehead’s view of God as a single actual entity is arguablyone factor that prevented him from taking the Platonic analogy as aserious proposal. His remarks on the topic are entirely negative. Hecalled theTimaeus Plato’s “most unfortunate essayin mythology,” and he referred to the idea of the World-Soul,considered as an emanation, as “the parent of puerilemetaphysics” (Whitehead 1933, 166; ch. VIII, sec. VI). Whiteheadread the dialogue through the lens of neo-Platonism, conceiving theworld-soul as an emanation from a wholly transcendent demiurge.Hartshorne agrees that this is not the solution to the problem ofpermanence and flux. However, Hartshorne sees in Plato’s myththe elements of a solution, provided the demiurge and the world-soulare not separate deities, but aspects of the same deity. For thisreason, Hartshorne says that Whitehead rejected the analogy for“weak reasons” (Hahn 1991, 642).

Late in his career, Hartshorne saw other advantages to the world-soulanalogy that touch on the problem of God and gender. He wassympathetic to feminist complaints about the male bias in traditionaltheology and he made a concerted effort in the closing decades of hislife to use inclusive language (Hartshorne 1987 [2001, 258]). For example, inthe 1980s he began using “He-She” when referring to Godand he remarked in 1996 that he would title his third bookOurVision of God rather thanMan’s Vision of God(Auxier and Davies 2001, 159). Hartshorne goes further than simplyworrying about pronouns. If the world-soul analogy is combined withthe parent-to-child analogy, then he argues that, “it is themother, not the father, who furnishes by far the best symbol of deity.The fetus-mother relationship is decidedly more intimate than thefetus-father relationship” (Hartshorne 1984, 60). Hartshornenever expressed his thoughts on feminism systematically, but it isinstructive that Carol P. Christ explicitly develops her feministphilosophy of religion in light of Hartshorne’s metaphysics inher bookShe Who Changes. Generally speaking, feministtheologians have been friendly to process thought, seeing Whiteheadand Hartshorne as articulating ideas about the divine that speak tofeminist concerns (Christ 2003, 4–5).

One objection to the concept of a deity whose “body” isthe universe is that it implies that all values, both the good and theevil, are within God. Hartshorne counters that this is true, but notin a sense that compromises divine goodness. As a point of logic,wholes do not necessarily share the characteristics of their parts. OnHartshorne’s model, the relation of God to any non-divinecreature is a relation of whole to part. Indeed, this is the basis ofHartshorne’s view of religion as the acceptance of ourfragmentariness—we are fragments of the cosmos, not the whole ofit. Thus, Hartshorne can say that God’s goodness is notdiminished if a fragmentary being is heedless of the good of others,by indifference or harmful intent. Nevertheless,precisely becauseof God’s goodness, the suffering and wickedness of thecreatures enter God’s experience. God sympathizes with thesufferer and grieves for the criminal in losing an opportunity forcreating the good. God can feel the contrast between what could havebeen and what is. The “what is,” moreover, is notunilaterally determined by God but is left, in part, to the creatures;we have seen that God and the creatures are co-creators in processtheism. For this reason, Hartshorne, following Berdyaev, speaks oftragic and sublime aspects of divine love (cf. Hartshorne 1953,chapter 8). Whitehead agrees that, “there is a tragedy whicheven God does not escape” (Johnson 1983, 7).

6. Divine Power and the Problem of Evil

Process theism provides unique, if controversial, thoughts on thetraditional problem of evil. Simply stated, the problem of evil comesto this: if God is all-powerful then God has the ability to preventunjustified suffering; if God is perfectly good then God has themotive to prevent unjustified suffering; but unjustified sufferingapparently exists; therefore, there is reason to believe that God isnot all-powerful or not perfectly good. The argument can be taken inat least two ways. According to one interpretation, the problem ofevil poses a challenge to belief in God. In other words, it is astepping stone towards atheism. Another interpretation is that it is achallenge to rethink the attributes of God. In this case, if oneconsiders the argument sound, it is not belief in God that one shouldabandon, but belief in certain concepts of God. Process theistsgenerally approach the problem of evil in the spirit of the secondinterpretation. Moreover, they point out that to assume the firstinterpretation—that the problem of evil is an argument againstthe existence of God—is an invitation to beg the questionagainst alternative proposals about the nature of God such as processtheism offers.

A central contention of process theism is that the problem of evil isaggravated by flawed accounts of omnipotence commonly assumed bytheists and their critics. Most theists agree with Aquinas that Godcannot bring about logically impossible states of affairs, likecreating a circle with unequal radii (Summa Contra GentilesII, ch. 25, para. 14). This is not, Aquinas argues, a limitation onGod but a condition of responsible theological discourse. To say, asDescartes does, that God could have made such irregularly shapedcircles, is to utter nonsense according to Aquinas (Cottingham 1991,25). Whitehead remarks that some medieval and modern philosophers gotinto the unfortunate habit of paying God “metaphysicalcompliments”—that is to say, attributing properties to Godthat seem to make the divine more worthy of devotion but that arecontrary to sound metaphysical reasoning (Whitehead 1925, 258).Whitehead’s observation is more applicable to Descartes than toAquinas. Indeed, process theism has no quarrel with Aquinas on thispoint. It is rather, the stronger claim that God can bring about anystate of affairs the description of which is not contradictory, withwhich process theism takes issue. It is a fair question whetherAquinas held this view (seeSumma Theologica I, Q. 25, a. 3).Nevertheless, it is a widely accepted view of omnipotence as Griffinmakes clear (Griffin 1976, chapter 17). In a deliberate play on J. B.Phillips’ classic,Your God is Too Small, Tyron Inbodysums up the criticism of traditional accounts of divine power bysaying, “Your God is too big” (Inbody 1997, 139).

Griffin warns against what he calls “the omnipotencefallacy.” This is the fallacy of assuming that if a state ofaffairs is logically possible—that is, its description involvesno contradiction—then an omnipotent being could single-handedlybring it about (Griffin 1976, 263f). Griffin represents all processtheists in considering it a fallacy, for it is their contention thatthere are logically possible states of affairs that no being,including God, could bring about by itself. For example, a contractualagreement between two individuals or parties is impossible unless eachagrees to keep the conditions of the contract. This is expressedcolloquially in English by saying, “It takes two totango.” The example of making contracts is especially relevantsince it is a theme in Jewish Scripture that God enters into numerouscovenants with the creatures. The emphasis is invariably on the divineinitiative in making the covenants and on God’s reliability inkeeping a promise; nevertheless, when “covenant” is notsimply shorthand for God’s promises, the agreements aretwo-sided affairs, including God’s blessings and demands andhuman obligations. Arguably, the logic of contracts, agreements, andcovenants, does not change when one of the parties is divine. Theseexamples are evidence that there are logically possible states ofaffairs that require something more than the decisions of God.

Hartshorne argues the case as follows. SupposeX andY are agents who make decisionsA andB,respectively. The conjunction,AB, is something that neitherX norY, individually, decided,even if one ofthe agents is God. Suppose, however, for the sake of argument,that this reasoning does not apply in the divine case. According tothis view, ifX is God, then it is possible forX todecide not onlyA, but alsoAB. We can imagine thatA represents God loving an individual andBrepresents the individual freely accepting God’s love. If GoddecidesAB then God must also bring it about thatB,that the individual freely accepts God’s love, for this is partofAB. Hartshorne responds that this view divorces theconcept of decision making from any meaningful connection with livedexperience. Numerous analogies have been discussed in the literaturefor how free creatures might be related to a deity that makes theirdecisions—the creatures as God’s marionettes; as androidsprogrammed by God; as subjects hypnotized by God; as objects ofGod’s dreaming; as characters in God’s novel. Each analogyfaces the dilemma that either the decisions of the person are notfully determined (e.g., the hypnotism case) or the person is not anactual individual (e.g., the fictional character case). In ordinarylanguage, an individual that tries to control a relationship is calledmanipulative, overbearing, or colloquially, “a controlfreak.” Doubtless, it was considering this kind of analogy thatled Hartshorne to speak of “thetyrant ideal ofpower” in classical theism (Hartshorne 1984a, 11). In a similarvein, Whitehead speaks of the idolatry of fashioning God in the imageof imperial rulers: “The Church gave unto God the attributeswhich belonged exclusively to Caesar” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 342]).

James Keller argues that the traditional concept of omnipotence canonly be justified by appealing to metaphysical schemes or intuitionsthat are no better established than omnipotence itself (Keller 2007,131). Hartshorne goes further and says that the traditional concept ofomnipotence was not coherent enough to be false (Hartshorne 1978, 86).The denial that an individual’s free decisions can be totallydetermined by another is what is behind the slogan—often foundin discussions of process theism—thatGod acts by persuasionrather than by coercion. Whitehead attributes this idea toPlato’s later thought, in theSophist and theTimaeus, and calls it, “one of the greatestintellectual discoveries in the history of religion” (Whitehead1933, 213; ch. X, sec. III). Unfortunately, the slogan has often beenmisinterpreted, even by process thinkers. It does not mean that,according to Whitehead and Hartshorne, God acts only as a final causeand never as an efficient cause, as Griffin has shown (Griffin 1991,98–99). “Coercion,” in the sense intended by theslogan, is the ability of one actual being to unilaterally bring aboutthe decision of another actual being. In process metaphysics, noindividual possesses this ability. Thus, in a metaphysical sense, itis not only God that acts persuasively and not coercively, but everyactual being.

Of course, “persuasion” and “coercion” havemeanings in ordinary language. To persuade is to convince others to dosomethingof their own will. To coerce is to forceone’s will upon otherswho are unwilling. Theitalicized phrases are important, for they demonstrate that persuasionand coercion presuppose the ability of the individual who is beingpersuaded or coerced to make decisions. Even in the case of coercion,the person being coerced retains the power to resist, even if onlymentally. This indicates that coercion is an inferior form of power,used either out of ignorance or when persuasion has failed. Cobb says,“In my relations with other people, such as my children, the useof such power is a last resort which expresses my total powerlessnessin all ways that matter” (Cobb 1969, 89). Thus, even if thewords “persuasive” and “coercive” are taken intheir ordinary, non-metaphysical, senses, it makes sense to speak ofthe supreme or eminent form of power as persuasive rather thancoercive.

David Basinger presses the following objection. Coercion in theordinary sense may be an inferior form of power, but there issometimes a moral imperative to use it, otherwise we would never havea police force. Thus, a deity that possesses both coercive andpersuasive power is greater than a deity that possesses onlypersuasive power (Basinger 1988). Hartshorne, who argues againststrict pacifism, agrees that the use of brute force can sometimes bemorally justified. In response to the threat of Naziism he wrote,“Freedom must not be free to destroy freedom” (Hartshorne1941, 173). In process theism, however, coercion in the ordinary senserepresents anindirect form of power that is available onlyfor localized beings within the cosmos (Hartshorne 1948, 155). It isindirect in the sense that it is exerted on aggregates of actualentities and not on actual entities themselves, as when one personprevents another from performing a vicious act by restraining theaggressor’s body. God’s power over aggregates is nothingover and above the direct persuasive power over the actual entitiesthat comprise them. Barry Whitney argues that there is a coerciveaspect of God’s power in process theism insofar as the laws ofnature are the result of a divine decision that no creature is free toabrogate (Whitney 1985, 99–114). That there should be this formof divine power—which is also a form of efficientcausation—providing for an ordered world that no creature hasdecided, is a necessary condition for any creaturely activity,Hartshorne believes. “God decides upon the basic outlines ofcreaturely actions, and guaranteed limits within which freedom is tooperate. That not everything can be guaranteed does not mean thatnothing can be” (Hartshorne 1966, 206).

Griffin maintains that it lies at the heart of process theism’sanswer to the problem of evil that God’s power is exerted onindividuals rather than aggregates (Griffin 1991, 104). Theists of amore traditional bent may view this as an indication of the inadequacyof process metaphysics, for there is no provision for arun-of-the-mill coercive power in its concept of God. The idea thatpersuasion plus coercion is a greater form of power than persuasionalone ignores, however, a significant difference between God and thecreatures. Every person has the power of persuasion and coercion (intheir ordinary senses), but neither of these powers involves aviolation of the laws of nature. In order to attribute both forms ofpower to God seems to require that God have the power to violate thelaws of nature. That may not seem unreasonable since God, astraditionally conceived, acts miraculously in ways that break orsuspend the laws of nature. Nevertheless, to speak, as Basinger does,of a moral imperative to act coercively is tantamount, in the divinecase, to demanding that the deity contravene the very laws that,according to traditional theism and process theism, it imposed in thefirst place. There is an additional irony where the problem of evil isconcerned. Traditional theists fault process theists for, in effect,not attributing to God the power to prevent gratuitous suffering.Traditional theists, on the other hand, attribute this power to Godbut are obliged to argue that God is not at fault for not using it orfor using it in ways that we find utterly baffling.

A hallmark of process theism is to draw attention tothe valueinherent in the twin probabilities of genuine good and evil.Process thought raises the question—and answers it in theaffirmative—whether a world with a probability, not merely apossibility, of genuine good and evil is preferable to a world withoutit. In the closing pages ofPragmatism, James raises thisquestion by means of a thought experiment. If God asked you before thecreation of the universe if you would agree to be part of a world thatwas not certain to be saved—where there was real adventure andreal risk—what would you say? James recognizes that a worldwhere the risk of failure is real does not appeal to everyone; but hesays that the chances for success that it promises brings zest to lifeand makes it rational to, “add ourfiat to thefiat of the creator” (James 1907, 290–291). Infairness, however, the freedom that makes life an adventure must bejudged against the probabilities of debilitating diseases, naturaldisasters, the horrors of history, and cosmic catastrophes. Freedomis, in Hartshorne’s words, a “perilous experiment.”George Shields called this “the hard problem” of aspecifically process theodicy (2014, 33). And Hartshorne admitted thatif he played at questioning God, it was at this point (1984, 126).

Hartshorne says that a universe with multiple freedom or creativity isa universe where the non-identical twins of opportunity and risk areinevitable. As already noted, process theists do not believe in a Godthat plays with loaded dice. What James’s image adds to thispicture is the idea that a world-order with the opportunity forgenuine good and the risk of genuine evilis of greater valuethan a world-order devoid of these opportunities and risks.James’s idea also implies that, in such a world-order, the riskswould be real for deity. We have already seen that process theismaffirms tragedy in God. The silver linings on this cloud are: (1) Godpreserves the universe in the divine memory which means that thecreatures contribute something to God; (2) God, considered assuperject, has an inexhaustible capacity to bring order from chaos andmake fresh beginnings, providing a sense of hope amidst the ruin ofour lives.

The problem of evil is often presented primarily as an ethicalconcern, but there is an aesthetic dimension to the problem that isemphasized by process theism (cf. Whitney 1994). If a perfectly gooddeity would have the motive to overcome discord and wickedness, itwould also have a motive to avoid triviality and boredom. This isespecially the case in the universe as conceived by process theismwhere feeling (prehension) is a metaphysical category. The etymologyof “aesthetic” isaesthesis, which means“feeling,” and process thought emphasizes that aestheticvalues are fundamentally values for an experiencing subject. Moreover,the experiencing subject, in most cases, is not human. This fact isevident not only by looking at the contemporary world with itscountless varieties of species, but also when one considers the nearlyunfathomable stretches of time on this planet when humans did notexist. Process theism takes the non-anthropocentric, andnon-relativist, stance that the experiences of non-human creatures arevaluable whether or not humans value them. This is not to say that allexperience is equally valuable—the experience of a cockroach canhave value without being fully comparable to human experience. Processmetaphysics provides for an aesthetic theory that recognizes objectivecriteria of value such as unity amid contrast and intensity amidcomplexity (see Dombrowksi 2004). The long process of evolution can becharted on a curve of ever increasing varieties and complexities oforganisms with augmented capacity for valuable types of experience. AsCobb and Griffin note, the escape from triviality meant an increasedrisk of discord, but this brings us full circle to James’sthought experiment (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 73).

7. Divine Knowledge and the Problem of Future Contingents

The Preacher in Ecclesiastes gives eloquent expression toworld-weariness by saying that there is nothing new under the sun.Nevertheless, process thought reminds us that there was once a timewhen the sun itself was new. We noted earlier that in processmetaphysics, time is the process of creation. The universe is not atotality, fixed once and for all, but a dynamic vector growing from adeterminate past into an open (partly indeterminate) future. We havealso seen that process theism conceives God as being really related tothe world through prehensions or feelings. If divine knowing isconsidered perfect, then it follows from these premises that God knowsthe past as fully determinate (as created), the present as the processof determination (as being created), and the future as partlyindeterminate (as yet to be created). Some have criticized processtheism for advocating a limited God who is ignorant of the future.Process theists reply that this is incorrect and represents a subtlebegging of the question. The question is not whether God knows a fullydeterminate future but whether there is a fully determinate future toknow. It is the nature of time, not the nature of divine knowing, thatis at issue. If the future exists as partially indeterminate,unsettled, or uncreated, then a perfect knower must know it assuch.

The fact that process theism construes God’s knowledge asprehensive means that it is a mistake to interpret it solely in termsof the information content of declarative sentences. This is not tosay that God does not have this information, but it is well to keep inmind that omniscience, for process theism, is more akin to whatBertrand Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance than it is toknowledge by description (Hartshorne 1941, 241). Divine prehensions ofthe world include not only information but affective tone (Whiteheadcalls it the “subjective form” of prehensions);God’s knowledge is empathetic, feeling the feelings of thecreatures. Again, this contrasts with the traditional account ofomniscience which “attributes to God the informational contentof our perceptions without the hedonistic content” (Kenny 1979,32). E. S. Brightman (Auxier and Davies 2001, 43, 70), HenriSimoni-Wastila (1999), and Auxier and Herstein (2017, 264) argue thatclaiming this kind of knowledge for God is excessive, for it wouldmean, for example, that in knowing a creature’s fear of death,God would also fear death. Hartshorne’s response is that Godfeelshow we feel without feelingas we feel,similar to the way in which persons can vividly remember emotions theyonce experienced without actually having those emotions as their ownin the present experience of memory (Hartshorne 1984b, 199). Thisissue highlights a tension between Whitehead and Hartshorne. Whiteheadspeaks of an actual entity’s subjectivity as“perishing” as it becomes past, but Hartshorne insiststhat the divine memory preserves the immediacy of our experiences,making them objectively immortal (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 351]; Hartshorne1970, 118).

Process theism provides an account of the mechanics ofomniscience—that is, an account of how God knows theworld—that fits well with analogies drawn from experience. Apartfrom complications introduced by quantum physics, events do not occurbecause we know about them; we know about them, in part, because theyoccur. Process theism applies the same logic to God. This accountdiffers from traditional views in two important ways. First, manytheists follow Aquinas in reversing the cognitive relation in God. ForAquinas, God knows events in the world because God is their cause(Summa Theologica I, Q. 14, a. 11). This allows Aquinas toaffirm omniscience while denying real relations in God; however, italso makes an unambiguous affirmation of the contingency of creaturelydecisions difficult if not impossible, as we have already seen in ourdiscussion of God and creativity. Second, the process view contradictsthe Boethian concept of eternity as a non-temporal viewpoint ontemporal events. For Boethius (and for Aquinas) events in time arerelated to God as the points on the circumference of a circle arerelated to its center (Consolation of Philosophy, bk 5, prose6;Summa Contra Gentiles I, ch. 66, para. 7). For processthought, time is more like a line being added to from moment tomoment, but never complete, so there is no vantage from which it canbe taken in all at once (Hartshorne 1945, 284).

There are peculiarities in traditional metaphors for omniscience thatprocess thought rejects. God, it was said, “sees” all oftime in one eternal instant; yet seeing, like knowing, requires realrelations in the perceiver; moreover, one cannot see as fullyactualized that which is still only possibly to be actualized, that isto say, the partially indeterminate future. It is noteworthy, however,that process theism retains one element of the traditional view. Wehave seen that Hartshorne attributes the laws of nature to an act ofGod. For this reason, God knows the extent to which the future isopen—what the laws allow and what they do not allow. The processGod must also be aware of the conditions that creaturely decisions setupon future actualization, opening up some possibilities and closingothers.

Process theists were not the first to notice the problems that theThomistic account poses for human freedom. William of Ockham, forexample, despaired of explaining how God could come to know the futurefree decisions of the creatures (Shields 1993, 298). Luis de Molinadeveloped the chief rival in classical theism to Aquinas’saccount of the mechanics of omniscience. Molinism has been muchdiscussed in recent literature and vigorously defended (Shields &Viney 2004, 241, n. 15). Molina claims that there are true statementsabout what any possible creaturewould freely do in anysituation in which that creature existed. The truth of thesestatements, called “middle knowledge conditionals,” isdecided by neither God nor the creatures; they are simply eternallytrue, a kind of innate divine knowledge. Molina agrees with Aquinasthat the deity knows the product of its own creativeactivity—called “free knowledge” (Kenny 1979, 62).Using free knowledge, in conjunction with middle knowledgeconditionals, God can deduce what any actual creaturewill freelydo. The deduction has the form: “If individualXwere in situationS, thenX would freely decideA” (middle knowledge conditional); and“X is inS” (God’s freeknowledge); therefore, “X will freely decideA.” Molina’s theory is designed to save both thefreedom of the creatures and the divine immutability andimpassibility. Thus, it poses as much of a challenge to process theismas does Thomism which claims for itself the same advantages.

Neither Whitehead nor Hartshorne addresses Molinism, but processmetaphysics provides resources for a number of criticisms (Shields& Viney 2004, 225–233). One objection is that Molinismendows God with an innate knowledge of an elaborate set of contingenttruths which have no explanation. Yet, contingent truths are preciselythe sorts of truths for which we legitimately seekexplanations—indeed, this is one of the marks of contingency(Hartshorne 1962, 74). A related problem is that the distinctionbetween the possible and the actual is finessed. It is common to referto what anactual individual would do in a certaincircumstance, for one can speak of that individual’sdispositions and character as so far formed. To refer to what apossible individual would do is entirely different. Possibleindividuals are either fictional (like Sherlock Holmes) or they aretied to the creative powers of the actual world (like a child yet tobe conceived). The properties of fictional characters are defined bysomeone’s imagination and so there is no fixed truth about whatthey would do. Arguably, persons yet to be conceived can only be saidto have the properties that link them to the reproductivepotentialities of actual persons. Thus, most babies have the capacityto grow up to become parents themselves. What may the first child(call it Chris) of a particular newborn (call it Kim) be like? Themost that can be said with certainty is that half of Chris’schromosomes will be inherited from Kim. To speak informatively aboutwhat Chris would do under any given circumstances presupposesuncountable human decisions and years of development beyondKim’s own childhood.

A third and final criticism of Molinism, from a process perspective,is that it doesn’t really preserve the freedom of the creaturesin the way it claims. Molina verbally accepts the idea that one issignificantly free only if one could have done otherwise in the samecircumstances (in the literature this is called incompatibilistfreedom). For example, if Oswald’s assassination of PresidentKennedy was a genuinely free act then if,per impossibile,the clock could be turned back to the moments before the murder,Oswald could have decided not to pull the trigger. Alternately stated,Oswald’s not pulling the trigger in the exact situation where hein fact did pull the trigger could have become actual. InHartshorne’s view, and as far as incompatibilist freedom isconcerned,to be actually possible is to be (or to have been)possibly actual. On Molinist principles, it is difficult to seehow Oswald’s not pulling the trigger in those circumstancescould have become actual. It is true that, in Molina’s view,there is no contradiction in conceiving Oswald in those circumstancesnot pulling the trigger. But, given the set of middle knowledgeconditionals about Oswald, Oswald’s not pulling the triggerhappens in no world that God can create (this is not to say that if adifferent set of middle knowledge conditionals were true of Oswald Godcould not create those possible worlds). The events, however, that canbecome actual, that are actually possible, are events in universescreated by God. Since, under the assumption of the set of middleknowledge conditionals we know to be true of Oswald, no universe thatcould be created by God—no possible actuality—is one inwhich Oswald freely refrains from pulling the trigger, Oswald’sact cannot be considered a free act. Of course, it may be the casethat the set of middle knowledge conditionals concerning Oswald aresuch that he could have refrained from pulling the trigger had Godcreated a slightly different universe; but it is Oswald’sfreedom in the actual universe that is at issue.

The problems of the mechanics of omniscience aside, the traditionaltheist might argue that the process view of God’s knowledge isproblematic because it either limits God’s knowledge or itviolates elementary principles of logic. The argument is apparentlystraightforward. Every proposition of the form, “p ornot-p” is true because one or the other side of thedisjunction is true. To use Aristotle’s example fromDeInterpretatione IX, either a sea battle will occur tomorrow or itwill not. Letp represent “A sea battle will occurtomorrow” andnot-p, “A sea battle will not occurtomorrow.” In that case, “A sea battle will occur tomorrowor a sea battle will not occur tomorrow” is a tautology andhence true. If God does not know which side of the disjunction is truethen God’s knowledge is limited. If the disjunction itself isnot true then some tautologies are false. Any theory that commits oneto the falsity of some tautologies flaunts the fundamental principlesof logic and thereby faces a steep burden of proof.

Aristotle apparently believed that, where future contingents areconcerned, “p ornot-p” is true but thetwo halves of the disjunction have indeterminate truth values. Thisidea seems logically counter-intuitive. Ifp andnot-p are indeterminate, shouldn’t “p ornot-p” also be indeterminate? For a brief period,Hartshorne defended the Aristotelian idea (Hartshorne 1939), but hediscovered a more parsimonious solution (Hartshorne 2011c, 123).Instead of locating the indeterminacy of the future in truth values,he focused on predicates that reflect the extent to which the futureis open for any given event. Either all causal conditions are suchthat the sea battle will occur, or no causal conditions are such thatit will occur, or it is permitted by some but not all causalconditions (cf. Hartshorne 1970, 145). It “will” occurmeans that all the possibilities for tomorrow which are still leftopen involve the occurrence in question; while it “may”occur means that some of the open possibilities involve theoccurrence; and it “will not” occur means that none of thepossibilities involve it (Hartshorne 1941, 100).

Although Hartshorne rejected Aristotle’s view on futurecontingents, his solution to the problem that Aristotle tried to solveneatly parallels Aristotle’s square. “Z willoccur” and “Z will not occur” arecontraries—they may both be false but they cannot both be true.The contradictory of “Z will occur” is“Z may not occur”; similarly, the contradictoryof “Z will not occur” is “Z mayoccur.” InA Christmas Carol, Scrooge presupposes thisschema when he asks the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, “Arethese the shadows of the things that Will be or the shadows of thingsthat May be, only?” Of this example, Hartshorne said,“There is a master of language [i.e. Dickens]. Will and May arenicely distinguished in ordinary speech” (Hartshorne & Viney2001, 39).

Hartshorne maintains that, “the semantic analysis of truth withreference to future events should not be so formulated as to make‘will’ and ‘will not’ the solepossibilities” (Hartshorne 2011a, 83). FollowingHartshorne’s suggestion, George Shields says that,“Z will occur” and “Z will notoccur” should not be symbolized in the propositional calculus asp andnot-p but asp andq, where“Ifp thennot-q” and “Ifq thennot-p.” The conjunction of thesepropositions, “Ifp thennot-q and ifq thennot-p” mirrors the truth valuesemantics of contrariety, not contradiction, which is mirrored by“It is false that ‘p if and only ifq,’” or exclusive disjunction. Shields arguesthat it is question begging to assume that “Z will orwill not occur” must be an instance of “p ornot-p”. The question at issue is the formalization offuture tense statements; thus, it will not do to assume that verbtense makes no difference in the formalization (Shields & Viney2004, 220).

8. Transforming Traditional Theism and Process Theism

Whitehead says that, “Philosophy never reverts to its oldposition after the shock of a great philosopher” (Whitehead1929 [1978, 11]). Whether or not Whitehead and Hartshorne are consideredgreat philosophers, they seem to have occasioned a seismic shift incontemporary discussions of the philosophy of religion in whichphilosophers take the doctrine of real relations in God moreseriously. For example, some Neo-Thomists have taken the criticisms ofprocess theism to heart and admitted real relations in God, contraryto the teaching of the angelic doctor (Whitney 1985, 75–81). TheJesuit philosopher W. Norris Clarke advises Thomists to “simplydrop” the doctrine of the lack of real relations in God and toadopt the view that, “[God’s] consciousness iscontingently and qualitativelydifferent because of what wedo” (Clarke 1979, 92). At times, Clarke almost sounds like aWhiteheadian or a Hartshornean: “God is thesupremeReceiver, gathering together in His consciousness all thatcreatures do and responding appropriately to it” (Ibid., 93).Another example of a group of theists influenced by process thinking,are those Evangelical Christian philosophers calling themselves“open theists” or “free will theists.” Whilecareful to distance themselves from the more heretical dimensions ofprocess metaphysics, they have stirred controversy in theircommunities of faith by defending aspects of process theism (Pinnocket al. 1994; Enxing 2013, ch. 5; Rice 2020).

The extent to which theists outside the process camp accept theelements of the doctrine of dual transcendence varies greatly.Neo-Thomists like Clarke and some other theists, like William Alston,accept real relations in God but retain the timelessness,immutability, and non-corporeality of God. Clarke and Alston alsoaffirm creationex nihilo. Alston, who was Hartshorne’sstudent at Chicago, refers to his view as a “viamedia” (a middle path) between Hartshorne and Aquinas (Cobb& Gamwell 1984, 78f). Hartshorne responded to both Clarke andAlston (Sia 1990, 269f; Cobb & Gamwell 1984, 98f). In both replieshe emphasizes, among other things, what he takes to be arbitrarydivisions among contingency, potentiality, and change in theirtheories. To admit real relations in God is to admit contingency inGod. To admit this, but to retain the concept of the non-temporalityof deity, requires belief in contingencies eternally fixed in thebeing of God. The ordinary sense of “W iscontingent” is “W could have beenotherwise,” which presupposes that the future was once open withrespect toW. Since there is no future in eternity, to speakof contingency in eternity is to lose one’s anchor in ordinarylanguage which is saturated with temporal reference. Likewise, theconcept of an eternal “now” has lost all moorings withexperience where the present is invariably nested between past andfuture. Hartshorne also maintains that there are forms ofvalue—specifically, aesthetic values—that do not admit ofa maximum. It may be no more meaningful to speak of greatest possibleaesthetic value than it is to speak of a greatest positive integer(Hartshorne 1970, 38 and 310; cf. Whitehead 1929 [1978, 111]). If this is thecase, and if the creatures contribute to the aesthetic value of theworld, then there must be respects in which, as the aesthetic value ofthe world increases, God increases with it. We have already touchedupon this aspect of process theism which Hartshorne refers to asGod’s relative perfection (R-perfection).

Openness or free will theists are closer to process theism than theNeo-Thomists or than Alston. They concur with process theists that Godcannot determine a creature’s decisions without depriving it ofits freedom. They also accept the process view of the nature of time;thus, for God to be influenced by the creatures means that in somerespects the future is yet to be determined and God knows it as such.This provides for a straightforward concept of God responding to thecreatures and for an interpretive scheme for the dominant Scripturalmotif that God is in dynamic interaction with people (in answeringprayer, for example). On the other hand, it is this aspect of processtheism which seems most disturbing to more traditionally mindedEvangelicals, for the lack of knowledge of a detailed futurecompromises or at least complicates the doctrine of divine providence.How, they ask, can history be the working out of a divine plan if thefuture is uncertain for God (cf. Hall and Sanders, 2003). Open theistsbelieve that they can mitigate this criticism by not following processtheism in the denial of creationex nihilo. Open theists likeWilliam Hasker and John Sanders can speak of God as “arisk-taker,” but they insist that God can still perform miraclesand guarantee the ultimate triumph of good over evil (Pinnock, et al.,1994, 151; Sanders 1998).

To speak of open theism as a school of thought distinct from processtheism is ironic since God’s openness to creaturely influence isprecisely the shared content of their views. Hartshorne referred to“the openness of God” in 1963, more than thirty yearsbefore the openness controversy erupted (Hartshorne 1987, 92). In anyevent, these controversies began too late for Hartshorne to respond tothem. It is noteworthy, however, that he was instrumental in bringinga little known forerunner of open theism, Jules Lequyer [or Lequier],to the attention of philosophers (Hartshorne & Reese 1953 [2000,227–230]). Because of the dominance historically of classicaltheism, Hartshorne viewed free will or open theists more as alliesthan foes, although he was fully aware of his differences from themand was not without arguments against those aspects of their viewswith which he disagreed (Viney 1998, 214–230). A vigorousdialogue between process theists and free will theists is on-going(Cobb and Pinnock 2000; Ramal 2010, part II).

The most contentious issue is creationex nihilo. Whiteheadand Hartshorne share a commitment to the idea that God is the supremecreative power among many lesser creators. Hartshorne is adamant thatnothing is gained by endowing God with the ability to createnon-creative actualities or to refrain from creating altogether.Nevertheless, process theists are criticized for failing to considerthe alternative that God, the sole origin of creative power,graciously shares that power with others. Lequyer speaks of“God, who created me creator of myself”—words thatHartshorne often quotes with approval (Lequier 1952, 70; Hartshorne1970, xi). Lequyer’s view is similar to what Nelson Pike calls“over-power,” the power to “completely determinewhich, if any, powers are possessed by agents other thanoneself” (Pike 1983, 19). Pike avers that over-power isprecisely what most classical theists ascribe to deity. Processtheists generally disagree (cf. Griffin 1991, 67–68). Forexample, Aquinas views God as having the ability to determine the freedecisions of others, but this ability isnot entailed byover-power, although Pike sometimes defines over-power in these terms(Pike 1982, 151). If God has over-power in the sense of being able todetermine the extent to which others can make free decisions andexecute them, it does not follow that God can also determine acreature’s free decisions. The latter claim is much stronger,and it is the one that process theists attribute to most classicaltheists.

The process God has what might be called a second cousin toover-power. As we have seen, in process theism, God is responsible forthe laws of nature and these laws determine the limits of non-divinecreativity. Whitehead and Hartshorne deny, however, that God couldcreate actual entities devoid of creative activity. Moreover,developmental and evolutionary categories are central to theirthinking. It is contrary to process philosophy to imagine God with theability to create a fully grown man or woman who did not grow toadulthood from having been a child. One’sbeing actualis inseparable from one’shaving become actual(Hartshorne 1941, 233–234). Hartshorne would say that this isalso true of God’s actual states, though not of God’sexistence. These qualifications notwithstanding, one philosopherworking within the process tradition advocates revisions in processtheism that would move it in the direction that the critics suggest.Rem Edwards speaks of divine self-limitation in creating thecreatures. For Edwards, God could create a universe of uncreativebeings but chooses not to. He thinks that God could “work anoccasional miracle or two.” Edwards acknowledges that, from thestandpoint of “orthodox” process thought, these ideas are“process heresy,” but he prefers revising process theismin these ways in order to avoid the charge, which he regards aslegitimate, that there is a “divine power-deficit” inprocess theism that makes its outlook “religiouslyintolerable” (Edwards 2001, 256).

The claim that deity sharing its creative power is an instance ofself-limitation can perhaps be clarified and placed more in the spiritof process theism by referring to it asdivineself-augmentation. A self-imposed handicap is one that preventsone from achieving a goal or performing a task that one couldaccomplish without the limitation. As Inbody notes, any divineself-limitation can be “self-unlimited” (Inbody 1997,149). For example, a governor on a truck can be designed to inhibitthe velocity it could attain without the governor. In creating othercreators, however, the deity imposes no limits on what it couldachieve without them. To be sure, God could have unerring knowledge ofa determinate future if the creatures had no freedom, but this wouldnot be knowledge of a future with free creatures in it. To imagine alimitation in this case would require that God could know the futuredecisions of free creatures, but chooses instead to put on ablindfold, so to speak. On the other hand, the existence of non-divinecreators opens opportunities for cooperative effort (and conflict)that would be impossible without them. One cannot use persuasion oncompletely unfree beings. Thus, in creating other creators, otherbeings with some degree of freedom, God would be perfecting the divinepower and the uses to which it can be put.

Edwards also affirms a version of the doctrine of creationexnihilo and believes that this is compatible with process theism.Inspired by developments in speculative cosmology amongastrophysicists—which he insists is reallymetaphysics—Edwards asks whether our universe may not be one ofmany actual universes existing within an infinite Superspacetime. Thissuper matrix of co-existing but independent universes could beinterpreted by process theism as the divine body, much as Hartshorneviews our universe as God’s body. Edwards maintains that theseideas allow for a concept of creationex nihilo. Within thedivine Superspacetime, God can create universes from no pre-existingmaterial. Thus, it is not necessary to conceive our own universe ascreated from the dying embers of a previous cosmic epoch. The initialsingularity of our universe could represent an absolute beginning.This does not mean that one must jettison the claims of process theismthat God is necessarily social, embodied, and creative. InEdwards’ words:

Within infinite Divine Superspacetime, God could be infinitely loving,social, embodied, and creative without being tied to a single temporalstrand of spatially finite antecedent-and-successive universes. Withininfinite Superspace and throughout infinite Supertime, God couldcreate many co-existing universes out of nothing …. (Edwards2001, 262)

Edwards notes that his suggestions are not as far removed from themetaphysics of Whitehead and Hartshorne as one might suppose.Whitehead speaks of cosmic epochs and Hartshorne argues that thisinvolves a time beyond what is available to physics that connectsvarious cosmic epochs (Hartshorne 1970, 53–54). Edwards viewshimself as amending Hartshorne’s idea to include super space aswell as super time.

Edwards’ treatment of creationex nihilo retains theessential meaning of the idea—creation from no pre-existingmaterial—but it also suggests both less and more than theconcept as it was expressed in classical theism. It suggests less inthe sense that God’s creative act in traditional theism takesplace in eternity. Superspacetime differs from the Boethian idea ofeternity in at least this much: it is complex whereas eternity has noparts. Edwards also wishes to avoid the deterministic connotations ofthe traditional idea of creation. To create another creator isnot to create that creator’s decisions; this is onereason Aquinas denies that God creates other creators, for he regardsGod as creating, with us, the decisions we make in such a way thatGod’s activity is a sufficient explanation of our decisions(although he denies, contrary to the charge of process theism, thatthis deprives us of our freedom). Finally, Edwards imports more intothe idea of creationex nihilo than was traditionally in thedoctrine. As we noted in the opening section, the idea that theuniverse had a first temporal moment is not to be identified withcreationex nihilo since, according to traditional theism,God could have created a temporally infinite universeexnihilo.

Edwards’ revisions of process theism are made largely, thoughnot exclusively, in light of criticisms from those who do not sharehis commitment to process metaphysics. Lewis Ford revises processtheism in a very different direction, mostly in response todifficulties within process metaphysics that he finds insurmountable.We have already seen that in Whitehead’s metaphysics, the waythat one actual entity influences another is by means of prehensions.According to Ford, an additional mode of influence must be posited,for one must account for an actual entity’sability toprehend. This ability to prehend is precisely its portion ofcreativity. Ford remains within the parameters of process metaphysicsby denying that the entity’s allotment of creativity has itssource outside of time in an eternal being. This leaves only threepossible sources for the entity’s creativity, the past, thepresent, or the future. Ford maintains that past actual entities,because they are past, are devoid of any inner creativity—thus,they cannot be the source of an actual entity’s creativity. Norcan creativity simply “well up” from within the present.It is precisely an actual occasion’spresent creativitythat needs explanation, and it cannot pull itself up by its ownbootstraps, so to speak. Ford argues, by elimination, that a futurecreativity must be the source of an occasion’s ability toprehend.

In process metaphysics, the future is infinite, indeterminate, and itspossibilities for actualization are inexhaustible. Ford identifies Godwith the future so conceived, but with one important departure fromstandard accounts in process thought. According to Ford, God isthe activity of the future. This is contrary to the views ofWhitehead and Hartshorne for whom the future is the arena ofpossibility awaiting decision. Creative activity is confined to thepresent actual entity (called its concrescence) and to its effects onsubsequent actual entities (called transitional creativity) (Whitehead1929 [1978, 211]). In Ford’s view, however, the future is a soundlessdepth of creativity that endlessly “pluralizes itself into themany finite regions of the present” (Ford 2000, 248). This is aprocess whereby divine future activity is “infused” intothe present actual occasion (Ibid., 253). In Ford’s view,present activitymakes the past in the sense that what isdone today adds to what will be the accomplished past of tomorrow. Thepresent is not made by the past but by the divine activity of thefuture.

Because the divine is indeterminate, it cannot be an object of anactual entity’s prehensions. This is dangerously close to sayingthat God cannot be known, except that Ford understands God to fill adefinite role in his metaphysics, to wit, the infusion of creativityinto the present, providing for an immediacy of the divine presence inall actualities. Ford also recognizes the difficulty that his viewposes for God’s knowledge of the past, and hence for divineomniscience. The physical prehensions of actual occasions are not onlythe means whereby the present takes account of the past, but they arealso the means whereby the past persists into the present. AsHartshorne notes, Whitehead’s concept of prehension bringsefficient causation and perception under a single category (Hartshorne1984b, chapter 9). If the past were to persist into the future so asto impart knowledge to God, it would co-opt the present’sfunction of preserving the past. In order to avoid the idea that Godis ignorant of the past, Ford posits a kind of knowledge of the pastthat abstracts from efficient causation. In the interstices separatingthe death of the past moment and the birth of the present moment,“God immediately perceives the recently emergent past andretains that memory forever” (Ford 2000, 284). Since divinememory, on Ford’s account, abstracts from efficient causalrelations, it is clear that it records sequences and correlations ofevents; it is a fair question whether it also contains informationabout causal chains.

Ford recognizes that his revisions of process theism will strike somethinkers as contrary to the metaphysics that first inspired it. Hecorrectly observes, “The notion of an active future may beregarded as oxymoronic, even as bizarre, but it is certainlyunique” (Ford 2000, 316). It is indeed unique; it bears aresemblance to the Thomistic doctrine of participated being, albeittailored to the categories of process philosophy, as modified invarious ways by Ford. In Thomism, the creatures can exist only byparticipating in and channeling the infinite creativity of God. InFord’s revised process theism, non-divine actual entities canexist only by borrowing the influx of future divine activity into thepresent. The parallel with Thomism breaks down insofar as Ford deniesthat God’s activity explains what the actual entities do withtheir portion of creativity. Ford can affirm the freedom of thecreatures vis-a-vis God’s activity since deity does not functionas a deterministic efficient cause as it does in Thomism and otherforms of traditional theism. In Whitehead’s andHartshorne’s theism, there is an efficient causal dimension toGod’s creativity, but it is not deterministic. We have alreadynoted that the process God’s fixing of the laws of nature is aform of efficient causation, but Whitehead and Hartshorne agree withmost current scientific thinking that those laws are stochastic.

9. Arguments for the Existence of God in Process Theism

Our task has been to explain the concept of process theism, not toargue that the God of process theism exists. Nevertheless, a few wordsare in order about the approaches that process theists take tojustifying belief in the existence of God. We noted in opening thatprocess theism does not privilege claims to special insight orrevealed truth (cf. Keller 2007, chapter 6). This is not to say thatsome theologians have not found process thought congenial to theirinterests (e.g., Ogden 1963; Cobb 1965; Griffin 1973). Whitehead andHartshorne did not view themselves as apologists for a particularfaith, but neither did they simply dismiss religious experiences asuninformative. Whitehead warns against narrowness in the selection ofevidence. He says, “Philosophy may not neglect themultifariousness of the world—the fairies dance, and Christ isnailed to the cross” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 338]). They add, however,that the claims that religious people make, individually (as in thecase of mystics) or collectively (as in the case of religiousorganizations), are subject to human fallibility. There may be a Godwho is infallible but human beings are not, and every putativerevelation is sifted through an imperfect human filter (Hartshorne1984a, 41). As far as justifying religious belief is concerned,Whitehead and Hartshorne try to navigate between appeals to blindfaith and knock-down proof. In metaphysics, says Whitehead, “Theproper test is not that of finality, but of progress” (Whitehead1929 [1978, 14]).

If process theism is not based on revelation, neither is it based onnaïve appeals to science, including the social sciences. It is nomore characteristic of process thought to give a“scientific” argument for the existence of God than togive a reductionistic account of religious belief by means of a theoryin sociology, psychology, or more broadly, what F. LeRon Shults calls“the biocultural study of religion” (Shults 2018). As faras Whitehead and Hartshorne are concerned, the working assumptions ofthe sciences are no more or less open to question and clarificationthan the working assumptions of religion. Process thought teaches amodest skepticism about the competencies of science that is arguablyin the spirit of science itself. Indeed, the theory of actual entitiesand their prehensions is Whitehead’s alternative to themetaphysical worldview that developed as a result of the dramaticsuccesses of early modern science—Whitehead calls it“scientific materialism.” The theory of actual entities isa response to the idea that the “stuff” of which the worldis made is devoid of mind-like qualities—Whitehead refers tothis as “vacuous actuality.” The theory of prehensions isa response to the idea that bits of matter can exist at definiteplaces and times without any essential reference to other places andtimes—Whitehead refers to this as “simple location.”The fact is that Whitehead wrote relatively little about God and agreat deal about how his philosophy of organism resolves problems ofmetaphysics and epistemology inherited from a prior age.

Process theism is not based on religious doctrine or theology and itis not a scientific theory; it is a product of metaphysics, or whatWhitehead calls “speculative philosophy.” It is, however,metaphysics “in a new key,” to borrow a phrase fromSusanne Langer. Whitehead says that, “Speculative philosophy isthe endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system ofgeneral ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can beinterpreted” (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 3]). Metaphysics, so defined, is anaudacious enterprise, for experience is open-ended and every claim toknowledge is perspectival and conditioned. If metaphysicians strivefor a comprehensive vision of things, they must continually remindthemselves that there is no standpoint within the world from which tospeak confidently for eternity. Whitehead and Hartshorne reject theidea that metaphysics proceeds best by deducing theorems fromself-evident axioms. To be sure, inferences must be made from thecategories of one’s metaphysics, but it is the categoriesthemselves that are continually on trial. The court in whichmetaphysical proposals are judged is the community of philosophers,stretching through history and into the future. Whitehead andHartshorne, heavily influenced by Plato, practice philosophy as adialogue with great minds, past and present. Hartshorne, taking a pagefrom Karl Popper, says that, “Objectivity is not in theindividual thinker but in the process of mutual correction andinspiration” (Hartshorne 1962, ix).

When it comes to the “God question” Whitehead says that heis not offering proofs. “There is merely the confrontation ofthe theoretic system with a certain rendering of the facts”(Whitehead 1929 [1978, 343]). Having established to his satisfaction analternative to scientific materialism—that is, the philosophy oforganism—he asks whether that philosophy’s categoriesrequire reference to God. Ford suggests that Whitehead was surprisedto find that they do, for he began his reflections on the philosophyof nature as an agnostic (Ford 1977, 27). In keeping with hissensitivity to the history of philosophy, Whitehead characterizes hisdiscussion as adding another speaker to David Hume’sDialogues Concerning Natural Religion. If Whitehead has an“argument” for the existence of God it is implicit in thedual attempt (1) to show the reasonableness of process metaphysics and(2) to show the conceptual necessity of God for its overall coherence.Rudolf Carnap says that it is one thing to ask what one’smetaphysics commit one to and it is something else to ask what commitsone to one’s metaphysics. Whitehead asks both questions.

Ford rightly says that, in Whitehead’s writings, the problem andnature of God is nowhere explored for its own sake (Ford 1970, 393).Moreover, during the period when he was introducing the concept of Godinto his metaphysics, beginning in 1925, the very concept of God wasin flux. For these reasons, there is an inherent flexibility inreconstructing arguments for God’s existence fromWhitehead’s work, and this is reflected in the criticalliterature. Hartshorne identified six arguments implicit inWhitehead’s metaphysics (Hartshorne 1972, 78–88), butothers find fewer (Sherburne 1971) or more (Griffin 2001a, chapter 5).Ford attempted to derive the existence of God analytically, as atheorem from the set of axioms in Whitehead’s categoreal schemeinProcess and Reality; his much abbreviated version ofWhitehead’s reasoning is this: “Actual entities eitherbelong to God or to the World. Given the World, God must exist. GivenGod, the World must exist. Since one or the other must exist, bothmust” (Ford 1970, 393). Interestingly, the God to whichFord’s reconstructed argument concludes is a single non-temporalactual entity, and no mention is made of developments inWhitehead’s idea of God afterProcess and Reality.

More traditional forms of reasoning can also be found in Whitehead.There cannot, to be sure, be a cosmological argument in the classicalsense for Whitehead rejects the traditional idea of divine creativity,but he does see a need to explain the initial phase of each actualentity. In Whitehead’s view, God customizes the generalpotentiality of the universe for each emergent occasion, providing itwith its initial aim. The graded relevance of these potentialitiesanswers to our sense that there are objectively better and worseoptions. A related problem is how the activities of the manyactualities that make up the cosmos happen to obey a common set ofnatural laws. Order implies an ordering power; however, all localizedorder presupposes cosmic order; thus, order on a cosmic scale requiresa cosmic ordering power. The best candidate for the cosmic orderingpower is God, according to Whitehead (Whitehead 1926 [1997, 104])—thisis a type of design argument. Another consideration is that the realmof possibility in terms of which cosmic order is conceived is akin toPlato’s Forms. In Whitehead’s system, these “eternalobjects” require an ontological ground. The primordial nature ofGod serves this function (Whitehead 1929 [1978, 46]). Finally, the consequentnature of God is the explanation of the fixity of accomplished factand achieved value. “The truth itself is nothing else than howthe composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtainadequate representation in the divine nature” (Whitehead 1929 [1978,12]). This sketch of Whitehead’s reasoning may suggest that his“arguments” lose their force when abstracted from hismetaphysics. Bowman L. Clarke, however, produced a formal theisticargument along Whiteheadian lines using the linguistic frameworkdeveloped by Nelson Goodman (Clarke 1966, 162–164). In adifferent vein, Franklin Gamwell argues that the moral law must begrounded in the divine good, wherethe divine good is mostparsimoniously conceived in neoclassical terms (Gamwell 1990). Anotherprocess thinker, Derek Malone-France, argues that the promise ofKant’s transcendental philosophy is best fulfilled in aWhiteheadian inspired theistic metaphysics (Malone-France 2007). Thus,arguing for the existence of Whitehead’s God, or something likeWhitehead’s God, need not be inextricably tied to evaluatingWhitehead’s metaphysics.

The debate among Whiteheadians over the existence of God iscomplicated by the fact that Whitehead’s views rapidly evolvedfrom the time he began teaching at Harvard in 1924. His view of God isless a completed philosophical theism than a work in progress that wasleft to others to try to complete, and many have tried. It is worthyof note, however, that an influential group of scholars maintain thatWhitehead was not true to his finer insights when he included God inhis metaphysical system. Donald Sherburne wrote a pivotal article in1967, revised in 1971, titled “Whitehead without God.”Sherburne holds that God can be “exorcised” fromWhitehead’s metaphysics by showing that the existence of God isinconsistent with its categories and by demonstrating that all of thefunctions ascribed to deity in the system can be met in other ways.Donald Crosby and Frederick Ferré (1933–2013), alsowithin the process fold, hold similar views. Ferré considerstheism “optional” in the sense that the premises oftheistic arguments are subject to competing and equally rational valuecommitments (Ferré 2001, 177f). One of the most careful andpersistent critics of process theism is Robert Neville (Neville 1980).Neville does not argue for “Whitehead without God” so muchas “Whitehead without Whitehead’s God.” He believesthat Whitehead’s critique of scientific materialism and hisphilosophy of organism are basically correct, but that the ultimateexplanation of the universe is in a deity that wholly transcends itand creates itex nihilo (Neville 1968). Griffin forcefullycriticized Neville’s views (Griffin 2007, 186–214) andNeville gave a spirited response (Neville 2008).

Hartshorne was more in the mainstream of philosophical discussionsabout God than was Whitehead. He spoke of proofs for God’sexistence and defended them vigorously, although he ceased callingthem “proofs” when he realized the differences between hisapproach and more traditional ones. Hartshorne is best known for hisvoluminous writings on the ontological argument—he devotes twobooks and numerous articles to the topic (Hartshorne 1962 &1965a). Despite his fondness for his revised ontological argument, henever considered it sufficient unto itself to make the case forGod’s existence. The ontological argument is one strand of amultiple argument strategy—which Basil Mitchell calls a“cumulative case”—in which the various elements aremutually reinforcing.

All of the arguments are phases of one ‘global’ argument,thatthe properly formulated theistically religious view of lifeand reality is the most intelligible, self-consistent, andsatisfactory one that can be conceived. (Hartshorne 1970, 276)

Hartshorne’s versions of the cosmological, teleological (ordesign), moral, epistemic, and aesthetic arguments complete the setthat make up the global argument (Viney 1985).

In Hartshorne’s view, the importance of the ontological argumentis to establish that God could not exist contingently. He calls this“Anselm’s principle.” If Anselm’s principle iscorrect thenif it is possible for God to exist, then Godnecessarily exists. In Hartshorne’s view, Anselm failed to makea convincing case for God’s existence because he failed to showthat his concept of God is coherently conceivable. Indeed, Hartshornebelieves that matters are much worse for Anselm since he considersAnselm’s form of theism to be incoherent, as we have seen.Hartshorne believes that the other arguments in his own globalargument make the case for God’s possible existence. Contingentbeings require a divine necessary being (cosmological); cosmic orderimplies a divine cosmic ordering power (design); reality should beconstrued as the actual content of divine knowledge (epistemic); thesupreme aim in life is to contribute to the divine life (moral); andthere is a beauty of the world as a whole that only God can enjoy(aesthetic). The structure of Hartshorne’s argument isreminiscent of the elaborate case made by John Duns Scotus inDePrimo Principio. Of course, the God whose existence Hartshorneseeks to establish is one that “the subtle doctor” wouldfind unacceptable.

Hartshorne presents each of the sub-arguments within his cumulativecase as a list of options from an exhaustive set, with hisneoclassical theistic option rounding out the set. The reason forpresenting his arguments as lists of options rather than as a seriesof disjunctive syllogisms is to avoid the pretense of offering strictdemonstrations. The conclusion of any valid deductive argument can berejected provided one is willing to reject one or more of thepremises. In this sense, a valid argument provides one with optionsfor belief rather than a proof of its conclusion. Hartshorne deniesthat one can coerce belief in God with arguments. Moreover, heacknowledges that his own choice for neoclassical theism is notwithout its difficulties. He maintains, therefore, that one shouldemploy the “principle of least paradox” in assessing theoptions. Since no metaphysical position is without its problems, itwill not do to argue for one’s own view by finding the problemsin the views of others. “One must decide which paradoxes are thereally fatal ones, in comparison with those of contendingpositions” (Hartshorne 1970, 88).

Hartshorne presents his theistic arguments asa priori, notin the sense that they are conclusive demonstrations, but in the sensethat they aim at a conclusion about what is true in all possiblestates of affairs. In this he is true to Whitehead’smetaphysical project of finding categories that are universal andnecessary. He insists that none of the conclusions of his argumentsare empirical. A proposition is empirical, in Popper’s sense, ifit is falsifiable by some conceivable experience. If Anselm’sprinciple is correct then either God exists without the possibility ofnot existing or God’s existence is impossible. Thus, if Godexists, then no conceivable experience could falsify the statementthat God exists. For this reason, Hartshorne finds all empiricalarguments—and hence, all scientifically basedarguments—for God’s existence to be fatally flawed sincethey must conclude to that which is not God, that is, to that whichexists contingently. Hartshorne also points out that none of hisarguments tell us anything concrete about God. True to his distinctionbetween existence and actuality, Hartshorne maintains that thearguments concern that which is most abstract about deity, itsexistence and character. This is why Hartshorne claimed to know sovery little about God, even though he wrote so many volumes on thesubject (Hartshorne & Viney 2001, 46).

After his ninetieth birthday, Hartshorne emphasized a somewhatdifferent approach in arguing for God’s existence thatincorporates his ideas about dual transcendence (Hartshorne 1993;Hartshorne 2011b). He notes that from a purely formal point of view,any pair of metaphysical contraries may apply to God or to the world.For example, either God is in different respects necessary andcontingent (NC), wholly necessary (N), wholly contingent (C), orneither necessary nor contingent (O). The same is true of the world:necessary and contingent (nc), wholly necessary (n), wholly contingent(c), or neither necessary nor contingent (o). This yields sixteenformal options which Hartshorne arranges in a four by four matrix.Historically significant forms of theism can be found on thematrix—classical theism, for example, is N.c and free willtheism is NC.c. Only one of the sixteen options can be true, soHartshorne develops criteria for judging the various possibilities.For example, if the contrast itself should be preserved, then optionslike N.n, C.c, and O.o are unacceptable. Of course, Hartshorne’sconclusion is that NC.nc is the true option. Arguably, the value ofthese matrices is as much in mapping concepts of God and the world asit is in arguing for a particular option, for they allow a moredetailed idea of the views that contradict one’s own. Hartshornemaintains that one reason classical theism remained unchallenged forso long was because philosophers had not considered all of the options(Hartshorne 1997, ch. 5). If any two matrices are combined, the numberof formal options jumps to 256. If we generalize for any number ofpairsn, then the number of concepts of God and the world is16ⁿ.

We have already mentioned others within the process tradition who havemade the case for process theism: Clarke, Gamwell, and Malone-France.Schubert Ogden (1963) and David Ray Griffin (2001a and 2016) should beadded to the list. Griffin explicitly employs a cumulative caseinvolving eight strands; his argument is indebted to both Whiteheadand Hartshorne but includes his own distinctive contributions. Havingfound the alternatives to process theism unsatisfactory, Griffinmaintains that “process philosophy’s naturalistic theismisoverwhelmingly more probable than the truth ofatheism” (2001a, 203). Also of note is that Griffin is one ofthe few process philosophers to have addressed the arguments in theliterature of the new atheism (although, see Viney and Shields 2020,chapter 6).

With Hartshorne, as with Whitehead, what is at stake in theisticarguments is less a matter of the soundness of a particular piece ofreasoning than the assessment of an entire metaphysical system. Thus,the sketch given here does not begin to do justice to their arguments.Nevertheless, the development and defense of a concept of God that isfully engaged in temporal processes is perhaps the central pillar andthe lasting achievement of their reasoning. After all, one of theselling points of process theism over its rivals has been not only itstheoretical superiority in dealing with theological puzzles but itsadequacy to everyday religious sensibilities. Process theists arguethat the deity of traditional theism is at once too active and toostatic. It is too active in the sense that its control of the universeis absolute, leaving nothing for the creatures to do except tounwittingly speak the lines and play the parts decided for them ineternity. It is too static in the sense that it lacks potentiality tochange, to participate in the evolving universe it created, and to beaffected by the triumphs and tragedies of its creatures. In short, itis a God who acts but is never acted upon and can therefore neverinteract. This is summed up in the non-biblical Aristotelian formulaof God as the unmoved mover. Fritz Rothschild describes the God ofRabbi Abraham Heschel—a God who feels and is felt by thecreatures—as “theMost Moved Mover”(Heschel 1959, 24). Hartshorne, who greatly admired Heschel, amendsthis formula in an attempt to distill the essence of process theism,“God is the mostand best moved mover”(Hartshorne 1997, 6, 39).

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