Plato’sTimaeus

First published Tue Oct 25, 2005; substantive revision Fri May 13, 2022

In theTimaeus Plato presents an elaborately wrought accountof the formation of the universe and an explanation of its impressiveorder and beauty. The universe, he proposes, is the product ofrational, purposive, and beneficent agency. It is the handiwork of adivine Craftsman (“Demiurge,”dêmiourgos,28a6) who, imitating an unchanging and eternal model, imposesmathematical order on a preexistent chaos to generate the ordereduniverse (kosmos). The governing explanatory principle of theaccount is teleological: the universe as a whole as well as itsvarious parts are so arranged as to produce a vast array of goodeffects. For Plato this arrangement is not fortuitous, but the outcomeof the deliberate intent of Intellect (nous),anthropomorphically represented by the figure of the Craftsman whoplans and constructs a world that is as excellent as its naturepermits it to be.

The beautiful orderliness of the universe is not only themanifestation of Intellect; it is also the model for rational souls tounderstand and to emulate. Such understanding and emulation restoresthose souls to their original state of excellence, a state that waslost in their embodiment. There is, then, an explicit ethical andreligious dimension to the discourse.

This picture of a divinely created universe, though controversial fromthe start (see below, section 2), has captured the imagination andadmiration of numerous generations of philosophers and theologiansthrough the centuries.^[1] Because of the vast scope of the work, as well as its character as amonologue—by excluding exchanges between interlocutors thediscourse is much more like an authoritative statement than a set ofquestions to be investigated—theTimaeus was generallytaken to be the culmination of its author’s intellectualachievement, particularly by thinkers in sympathy with its portrayalof the universe. This also seems to have been one of the reasons forits early translation into Latin. Calcidius’ Latin translationin the fourth century CE made it the only text of Plato available inthe Middle Ages in the Latin West until the twelfth century. While itstill was an important reference point for Kepler, its influence beganto wane over time. In the latter part of the nineteenth and earlierpart of the twentieth century interest in theTimaeus wasagain stimulated by the refinement of philological methods and exacthistorical scholarship,^[2] but for most of the second half of the twentieth century the dialoguewas frequently dismissed as philosophically insignificant at best andregressive at worst. It played an important role in debates about thedevelopment of Plato’s philosophy, but not much more. Recentdecades, however, have witnessed a strong revival of interest in theTimaeus: philosophers, historians of science and of ideas,and philologists, while not necessarily persuaded by thedialogue’s bold claims, have been fascinated by its majesticaccount and have sympathetically entered into and sought to elucidateits conceptual structure.

1. Overview of the Dialogue

The opening conversation (17a1–27d4) introduces thecharacters—Socrates, Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates—andsuggests that the latter three would contribute to a reply toSocrates’ speech allegedly given on the previous day, whichpresented an ideal political arrangement strongly reminiscent of theRepublic.^[3] This reply would start with an account of the creation of theuniverse down to the creation of human beings and, in a second step,show an ideal society in motion. Critias is meant to provide thesecond step with his account of a war between ancient Athens andAtlantis, the beginning of which we find in Plato’sCritias, while Timaeus is meant to deal with the first stepin our dialogue. Timaeus begins the discourse (27d5–92c9) with aprologue (27d5–29d6) in which he sets out the metaphysicalprinciples on which his account is based, introduces the figure of theCraftsman and his eternal model, and provides a brief comment on thestatus of the account he is about to provide. This prologue isfollowed by the discourse proper, which is uninterrupted to the end ofthe dialogue (29d7–92c9). The discourse unfolds in three mainstages: the first sets out the achievements of Intellect(29d7–47e2), the second gives an account of the effects ofNecessity (47d3–69a5), and the third shows how Intellect andNecessity cooperate in the production of the psychophysicalconstitution of human beings (69a6–92c9).

The first of the main sections of the discourse explains the existenceof the universe and some of its most general features teleologically.The universe exists and manifests goodness because it is the handiworkof a supremely good, ungrudging Craftsman, who brought order to aninitially disorderly state of affairs. It is a living thing(zô[i]on, also translatable as “animal”),because it is better for it to possess intelligence than to lack it,and the acquisition of intelligence requires the acquisition of soul.It is complete, and thus it includes within itself all the species ofliving things as its parts. It is unique, because its model is unique;the uniqueness of the model follows from its completeness. Theworld’s body is composed of fire (for visibility) and earth (fortangibility), but these so-called elements require the mediation ofair and water in a progression of proportion to bind them togetherinto a unified, concordant whole. The shape of the universe’sbody—a sphere—and the characteristics it possesses orlacks are all explained in terms of their various purposes. Thecomposition of the world’s soul out of a harmonicallyproportionate series of portions of a mixture of both divisible andindivisible Sameness, Difference and Being, and the division of theseportions into two intersecting circles (called the circle of the Sameand of the Different) explain the cognitive powers of the soul inrelation to the different types of objects of cognition: those thatare and those that become. When joined with the world’s body,they also explain the cosmological organization of the universe. Theheavenly bodies are divine and move in their various orbits to serveas markers of time: the fixed stars to mark a day/night, the moon tomark the (lunar) month and the sun to mark the year. Time itself cameinto being together with these celestial movements as an “imageof eternity.”^[4] Individual souls are made up of the residue (and an inferior grade)of the soul stuff of the universe, and are eventually embodied inphysical bodies. This embodiment throws the previously regular motionsof the soul into confusion as the soul is subjected to the forcefuldisturbances of internal bodily processes as well as the impact ofexternal bodies upon it, particularly in sense experience. Thesedisturbances gravely impair the soul’s cognitive functioning;only with appropriate nurture and education can its original motionsbe reestablished and proper cognitive functioning be restored. Thebody and its parts were designed to support that functioning, andTimaeus takes the design of the eyes and the mechanics of vision as animportant case in point.

Timaeus prepares for the transition to the second main part of hisdiscourse by pointing out that while a causal story of the sort he hasbeen telling so far is indeed concerned with what is properly thecause (aitia) of the universe’s generation, that storyis not by itself sufficient and must extend to an account of“contributing causes” (sunaitiai orsummetraitiai, 46c7, 46e6, 68e4–5) as well. Thediscourse must provide an account of the various physical structuresthat are necessary for and support the achievement of the purposes ofIntellect. The properties possessed by these various structures aredetermined by their constitutions as a matter of“Necessity,” and it is not open to the Craftsman to changeor eliminate the properties of these structures. The properties allow(or disallow) certain processes desirable to the Craftsman, and to theextent that Intellect achieves its desiderata, it succeeds in“persuading” Necessity (48a2–5). It is the role ofthe second major part of the discourse to set forth these contributingcauses.

The second main section begins with the introduction of thereceptacle, a “third kind” alongside the familiarparadigmatic forms and the generated images of the forms(49a1–4, 52a8, d2–4). The receptacle has been seen asserving either as material substratum or as some form of space or ascombining both roles. Timaeus’ account of the receptaclepresents several interpretive difficulties, some of which will bediscussed below. In the “pre-cosmic” state (the state“prior to” the intervention of the Craftsman) thereceptacle is subject to erratic and disorderly motions, and moves itscontents in turn. Its contents are mere “traces”(ichnê, 53b2) of the subsequently articulated four“kinds” (the so-called “elements”): fire, air, water and earth. Eachof these four kinds is made up of geometrical bodies—fire oftetrahedra, air of octahedra, water of icosahedra, and earth of cubes.The Craftsman begins by constructing these four regular solids as theprimary corpuscles of each of the four kinds. These solids have facesthat are made up (ultimately) of two types of right-angledtriangles—the half-equilateral and the isosceles—and it isthese triangles that are the “simples” of the physics ofthe dialogue. Because their triangles are similar (half-equilateral),only corpuscles of fire, air and water may be transformed into oneanother; while corpuscles of earth are made up of isosceles trianglesand are thus excluded from such transformations. Each of the fourkinds has properties that are determined by the constitution of theirrespective corpuscles, and these properties in turn determine how theparticles act upon and react to one another. These actions andreactions are ongoing and perpetuate a state of non-uniformity whichitself is a necessary condition for motion, i.e., the continuation ofthe interactions. Although each of the four kinds has a tendency tomove toward its own region of space, their being squeezed together ina spherical universe without any gaps leads to the inevitabletransformations that occur when their various corpuscles cut or crushone another. Thus it is assured that these migrations are nevercompleted in the sense that there would be a complete separation ofthe four elements into separate regions. The account proceeds toexplain the various varieties of each of the four kinds, and thesensible properties that they and their compounds manifest. An accountof sensible properties calls for a preliminary account of sensation(including pleasure and pain), and it is with that preliminary accountthat this section of the discourse concludes.

The third main section of the discourse—about the cooperation ofIntellect with Necessity—focuses primarily on the psychophysicalconstruction of the human being. While the Craftsman has created theindividual souls, he delegates the creation of the human bodies to thelesser, created gods. As individual immortal (and rational) souls areembodied in mortal bodies, the embodiment requires the furthercreation of the “mortal” parts of the soul—thespirited and appetitive parts, familiar from theRepublic andthePhaedrus. These parts are assigned their respectivelocations in the body: the immortal and rational soul in the head, andthe two parts of the mortal soul in the trunk: the spirited part inthe chest (nearer to the head) and the appetitive part in the belly.The various organs in the trunk—the lungs and heart in the chestand the liver in the belly—support the functions of theirresident soul parts. The account proceeds to describe the formation ofthe various bodily parts, setting out in each case the purpose of thepart in question and showing how its construction (out of theappropriately selected materials) serves that purpose. The purpose isprescribed by Intellect, and the properties of thematerials—selected because their properties render themcompliant to Intellect’s purposes—are the consequences(and thus contributions) of Necessity. For the most part, Necessityserves the purposes of Intellect well, but this is not always thecase. A notable example of them coming apart is the covering aroundthe brain. That covering needs to be massive to provide maximalprotection, but that very massiveness would impede sensation, and so apreferential choice must be made between the conflicting demands. Suchoccasional cases of resistance by Necessity to the“persuasion” of Intellect limit the degree of excellencethe created world can attain. Timaeus’ discourse moves on withan account of the mechanisms of respiration and digestion, and aclassification and etiological discussion of various diseases of bothbody and soul. This is preparatory to an exhortation to properlyexercise both the soul and the body to recover or maintain physicaland psychic well being. The well being of the soul in particular isemphasized: it is through realigning the motions of our souls withthose of the universe at large that we achieve our goal of livingvirtuously and happily. The discourse concludes with an account of thegeneration of women and non-human animals.

2. An Interpretive Question

Ever since Aristotle rejected the cosmology of theTimaeus onthe ground that it required not just a beginning of the universe intime, but a beginning of time itself (Physics251b14–26), defenders of the dialogue—perhaps wishingto neutralize Aristotle’s critique while conceding that theassumption of a beginning of time is problematic—have claimedthat the creation story is not to be read literally, but metaphorically.^[5] This metaphorical reading of the dialogue became the prevailing(though not exclusive) view among Platonists, from the Old Academy ofPlato’s immediate successors to Plotinus (third cent. CE). Thequestion of how literally the creation story is to be interpretedremains an intriguing one that continues to interest (and divide)scholars to this day: if we follow the metaphorical interpretation, wewill read the account not as a process by which an intelligentCraftsman put the world together at some time in the past, but as astatement of the principles that underlie the universe at all times ofits existence. Key questions raised by this issue include thefollowing: (1) Is Intellect (personified by the Craftsman) literallyan intelligent agent of some sort, an entity that is ontologicallydistinct from both the model and its copy, or can the Craftsman beidentified with some aspect of either the copy or the model—theworld soul, for example, or one or other of the forms—and thusbe reducible to something else? (On this question, see more below,under “Teleology.”) (2) How do we understand the relationof the “pre-cosmic” state of the universe to its finishedstate? The account posits that pre-cosmic state “before”the creative process by which the ordered universe comes into being.But if there is no time apart from the measured celestial motions, howis that “before” to be understood? (3) If the creationstory is read literally, is it consistent with Plato’s views onrelated subjects set forth in other dialogues?^[6]

3. Relation of theTimaeus to other Platonic Dialogues

The question of the place of theTimaeus relative to theother dialogues has given rise to an acrimonious but neverthelessfruitful debate, with far-ranging implications for our assessment ofPlato’s philosophy. In 1953, G. E. L. Owen published aprovocative article that challenged the orthodox view of theTimaeus as a work written during Plato’s so called“late” period, and argued that it should be regarded as amiddle dialogue instead, composed prior to theTheaetetus andtheParmenides. Owen claimed to see in theTimaeus areassertion of several metaphysical views familiar from theRepublic but (on the reading proposed by Owen) subsequentlyexposed for refutation in these two dialogues, both of which on theorthodox view precede theTimaeus. The orthodox view wasbased on long-standing tradition, but had been confirmed by thestylometric studies of Plato’s writings undertaken by latenineteenth- and early twentieth-century philologists. Owen called intoquestion the assumptions and the results of these studies. Four yearslater Owen’s criticism of stylometry, as well as hisinterpretation of the relevant arguments in theTheaetetusand theParmenides, were in turn vigorously if notrancorously disputed by H. F. Cherniss in defense of the traditionalview (Cherniss 1965, 1977). This debate between these two scholars ofrenown whose approaches to the study of Plato’s dialogues wereso markedly different did much to bring a new level of acuity to theanalysis of Platonic texts. Over time the orthodox view appears tohave held its own. Both a more nuanced examination of the texts andmore recent computer-assisted stylometric studies have done much toreinforce it.^[7]

The opening of theTimaeus, depicting it as a sequel to aconversation about the ideal city-state that resembles thekallipolis of theRepublic in important points,connects the project announced in theTimaeus to theRepublic. This opening also presents theCritias asa sequel to theTimaeus. And Socrates’ request in thePhaedo to provide teleological causes for the explanation ofthe world, instead of the material causes employed in the cosmologiesof the Presocratics (97b-99b), is answered byTimaeus’account of the rational cause of the universe (theTimaeus,however, points out that the material causes of thePhaedoalso have to be considered in order to explain the perceptible world).

4. The Status of the Account

In his prefatory remarks Timaeus describes the account he is about togive as a “likely account” (eikôs logos) or“likely story” (eikôs muthos).^[8] The description is a play on words: the subject of the account isitself an “image” (eikôn) and, Timaeusavers, “the accounts we give of things [should] have the samecharacter as the subjects they set forth” (29b3–5).Fashioned after an unchanging and eternal model—a possiblesubject of a definitive and exact account—the universe as athing that becomes is shifting and unstable, and hence any accountgiven of it will be similarly lacking in complete accuracy andconsistency (29c4–7). This may be read as lowering ourexpectations—the account is no more than likely. At the sametime, Timaeus says he will strive to give an account that is “noless likely than anyone else’s” (or “any other[account]”) (29c7–8) and, while the account cannot begrasped by understanding (nous, 29b6—the faculty forapprehending unchanging truths), it nevertheless merits our“belief” (pistis, 29c3) and fulfills certainstandards. As Timaeus’ account proceeds, we are frequentlyreminded of its “likely” character,^[9] and both the negative and positive connotations of thatcharacterization should be kept in mind.

The account, then, is presented as reasonable, thus meriting ourbelief, but neither definitive nor complete (cf. 68b6–8), andthus open to possible revision (cf. 54b1–2, 55d4–6). Adefinitive account of these matters eludes humans (29d1) and isavailable only to a god “and those human beings dear tohim” (53d4–7).^[10] It has sometimes been argued that the qualification of the account as“merely likely” supports a metaphorical reading of thecosmology. This, however, is a mistake; it is not easy to see how thedistinction between an exact and definitive versus a reliable butrevisable account maps on to the distinction between a literal versusa metaphorical account. The contrast should rather be seen as onebetween apodeictic certainty (about intelligible matters) and plausibility^[11] (about empirical matters). To the extent that the subject of theaccount is a thing that becomes rather than a thing that is, as wellas a thing that is perceptible rather than a thing that isintelligible, the account will be no more than likely. To the extentthat it is beautiful and ordered, modeled after a perfect reality andfashioned by a most excellent maker, the account will be no less thanlikely.

5. Being and Becoming

The account Timaeus gives of the generation of the universe is fromthe outset based on metaphysical and epistemological principlesfamiliar from the dialogues of Plato’s middle period,particularly theRepublic. Introducing the subject of hisdiscourse, Timaeus posits a distinction betweenwhat always is andnever becomes andwhat becomes and never is(27d5–28a1). He goes on to connect each with its familiarepistemological correlate (28a1–4): the former is grasped byunderstanding (noêsis) involving a reasoned account(logos), and the latter by opinion (doxa), whichinvolves unreasoning sense perception (aesthêsisalogos). Although Timaeus does not here name the types of entitythat satisfy these descriptions, the reader familiar with theRepublic will call to mind the distinction between forms andsensibles (518c, 534a). The role ofwhat is as the modelafter which the Craftsman designs and constructs the universe (29a)recalls the role of the forms as models for the philosopher-rulers toimitate in exercising their statecraft (Rep.500b–501c). It is not until much later in Timaeus’discourse (51b7–e6) that forms are mentioned for the first time,and their existence is argued for on the basis of the distinction(itself supported by argument) between understanding and (true)opinion. And the identification ofwhat becomes withsensibles (in this case the universe as an object of sense) is readilymade at 28b7–c2 (see 5. in the argument below).

Timaeus’ opening question (“What is that which alwaysis and neverbecomes…?”) can be readextensionally (“What entity or entities are such that theyalwaysare and neverbecome…?”) orintensionally (“What is it for some entity always tobeand never tobecome…?”). If read in the formerway, the answer will be “forms” or “a form.”If read in the latter way, the question is answered immediately in thetext and hence this reading seems preferable : always to be isto be intelligible and unchanging.

The metaphysical being-becoming distinction and its epistemologicalcorrelate are put to work in an argument that establishes theframework for the cosmology to follow. The conclusion of that argumentis that the universe is a work of craft, produced by a supremely goodCraftsman in imitation of an eternal model. The reasoning may berepresented as follows:

Some things always are, without ever becoming (27d6).
Some things become, without ever being (27d6–28a1).
If and only if a thing always is, then it is grasped byunderstanding, involving a rational account (28a1–2).
If and only if a thing becomes, then it is grasped by opinion,involving unreasoning sense perception (28a2–3).^[12]
The universe is a thing that has become (28b7; from 5a–c,and 4).
1. The universe is visible, tangible and possesses a body(28b7–8).
2. If a thing is visible, tangible and possesses a body, then it isperceptible (28b8).
3. If a thing is perceptible, then it has become (28c1–2; alsoentailed by 4).
Anything that becomes is caused to become by something(28a4–6, c2–3).
The universe has been caused to become by something (from 5 and6).
The cause of the universe is a Craftsman, who fashioned theuniverse after a model (28a6 ff., c3 ff.; apparently from 7, but seebelow).
The model of the universe is something that always is(29a4–5; from 9a–9e).
1. Either the model of the universe is something that always is orsomething that has become (28a5–29a2, also implied at28a6–b2).
2. If the universe is beautiful and the Craftsman is good, then themodel of the universe is something that always is (29a2–3).
3. If the universe is not beautiful or the Craftsman is not good,then the model of the universe is something that has become(29a3–5).
4. The universe is supremely beautiful (29a5).
5. The Craftsman is supremely good (29a6).
The universe is a work of craft, fashioned after an eternal model(29a6–b1; from 8 and 9).

Given familiar Platonic doctrines and assumptions, the argument up tothe intermediate conclusion that the universe has a cause of itsbecoming (7) presents no particular difficulties. But 7 by itselfgives only partial support to 8.^[13] Here it helps to anticipate 9d as a fundamental premise inTimaeus’ reasoning; it is not just the generation of any world,but that of a supremely beautiful one that Timaeus’ reasoninghere—and in fact throughout the discourse—attempts toexplain. That a world as beautiful as ours might be the effect of anunintelligent cause is a possibility that Plato does not discuss.

Once the conclusion that the universe is teleologically structured issettled, the explanatory methodology of the discourse proceedsaccordingly. The question that frames the inquiry is not the question:What best explains this or that observed feature of the world? It israther the question: Given that the world as a whole is the bestpossible one within the constraints of becoming and of Necessity, whatsorts of features should we expect the world to have? This questioninvites a priori answers, and Timaeus’ arguments about the mostgeneral features of the universe as a whole (for example, why itexists, why it is alive and intelligent, why it is unique, why it isshaped and composed as it is) are derived wholly a priori. The answersto these questions are not open to empirical confirmation. But clearlythe inquiry is also constrained by features of the universe that areactually observed, and this gives rise, secondly, to questions aboutthe good purposes that are being served by these features (forexample, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the psychophysicalconstitutions of human beings, etc.), and how the features in questionaccomplish those purposes. For the most part there is a happycoincidence between the features that are required (in answer to thefirst question), and the features that are actually observed (inanswer to the second), and it is part of the genius of the discoursethat these are so well woven together. Occasionally, however, themethodology leads to conclusions apparently at odds withobservation—for example, the exemption of earth frominter-elemental transformation (see further under“Physics” below).^[14]

The model that serves the Craftsman is regularly named the“Living Thing (Itself),” and this is either a form, or anappropriately organized constellation of forms. It is the Ideal (orbetter: Real) Universe; the object of what Plato had called“real astronomy” (as opposed to empirical astronomy) intheRepublic (527d–531d, esp. 530a3). The Craftsmandoes not—indeed logically cannot—copy by replicating theLiving Thing; his challenge rather lies in crafting an image of itthat is subject to the constraints of becoming: unlike the model, itmust be visible and tangible (28b7), hence three-dimensional(solid—stereoeidê, 32b1). This constraint in turnrequires the postulation of something three-dimensionalinwhich the created universe may subsist, what Timaeus initiallynames the “receptacle (hupodochê) of allbecoming” (49a5–6) and subsequently calls“space” (chôra, 52a8, d3).

The imitative activity of the Craftsman, who forms the universe as animitation of an eternal model, is unlike that of a builder whoreplicates a larger- or smaller-scale three-dimensional structure asmodel, but like that of a builder who follows a set of instructions orschematics. That set is the intelligible, non-material and non-spatialmodel that prescribes the features of the structure to be built; it isnot a structure itself. It is a matter of debate whether Plato’smiddle-period metaphysics included the view that forms were, orexhibited, some grander, unalloyed version of some of the propertiesexhibited by sensible objects. Arguably such a view (call it“crude paradeigmatism”) was refuted by the “ThirdMan” argument of theParmenides (132a). As invisible,intangible, and non-spatial entities forms are excluded frompossessing properties that only visible, tangible and spatial objectmay possess. Nevertheless, in so far as they are or exhibitintelligible natures forms may, like a set of instructions orschematics, serve as models to be “looked at” (28a7, 29a3)by anyone who understands those natures and is in a position toconstruct a world in accordance with them. (This view of theCraftsman’s imitative activity might by contrast be described as“refined paradeigmatism.”^[15])

6. The Receptacle

Timaeus introduces the receptacle as a “third kind”(triton genos, 48e4) alongside forms and their imitations. Heapologizes for the obscurity of the concept, and attempts to explicateits role by means of a series of analogies: it is variously comparedto a lump of gold (50a4–b5), a mother that together with afather produces offspring (50d2–4, 51a4–5), a plastic,impressionable stuff (50c2–6, e7–51a1), and an ointmentthat serves as a neutral base for various fragrances (50e5–8).These images suggest that it is devoid of any characteristics in itsown right (except those formal characteristics necessary to its role,such as malleability). The receptacle is posited as the solution to aproblem: none of the observable particulars persists as this or that(for example as fire or water) over time. We observe the very thingthat is fire at one time becoming air, and subsequently becomingwater, etc., “transmitting their becoming to one another in acycle, so it seems” (49c6–7). Thus the thing that appearsas fire here and now is not fire in its own right: its fieriness isonly a temporary characterization of it. What, then, is that thing inits own right? In a difficult and controversial passage Timaeusproposes a solution:^[16] In its own right it is (part of) a totally characterless subject thattemporarily in its various parts gets characterized in various ways.This is the receptacle—an enduring substratum, neutral in itselfbut temporarily taking on the various characterizations through tracesof the four elements in it. The observed particulars just are parts ofthat receptacle so characterized (51b4–6).

The above analogies may be seen as suggesting that the receptacle is amaterial substratum: as gold qua gold is the material substratum forthe various geometrical configurations it is shaped into, the ointmentbase for the fragrances, or the impressionable stuff for the variousimpressions, so the receptacle serves as the “stuff” thatgets characterized in various ways. But Timaeus does not use anydescriptive word that can suitably be translated as“matter” or “material”; he does, however, usethe word, “space” (chôra). And its functionof providing a “seat” (hedra, 52b1) reinforcesthe conception that its role is to provide a spatial location for thethings that enter it and disappear from it (49e7–8,50c4–5, 52a4–6).

There has been considerable discussion about whether the receptacle isto be thought of as matter, or as space, and whether it is possible tothink of it coherently as having both of those roles. And there isalso ongoing disagreement about the nature of the entities that aresaid to enter into and disappear from the receptacle. They are clearlynot forms (52a4). Some interpreters have suggested that these arecharacter types (or character tokens) derived from the forms, and thatthese types (or tokens) are properly the form copies(mimêmata) that have a prominent place in the argumentfor the receptacle (49c7–50a4). Whatever the merits of thisreading, the things the receptacle is said to “receive”are “all the bodies (sômata)” (50b6).Bodies are three-dimensional entities, and this makes it likely thatit is the emergence and disappearance of the variously characterizedobservable particulars as such, and not their properties (types ortokens), that are mentioned in these passages (49e7–8,50c4–5, 52a4–6). But the particular bodies have ageometrical underpinning—the four “elements”,which are the building blocks of the physical world, are made up ofthe so-called Platonic solids; and these solids, in turn, are made upof two kinds of triangles (cf. below).

The complete metaphysical scheme of the Timaeus that is summed up at50c7–d4 and again at 52a1–b5 is thus as follows: (i) theeternal and unchanging forms, the “model,” or“father”; (ii) the receptacle, or “mother,”and (iii) the copies of the model or “offspring” of thefather and the mother. These three are the components of Plato’sanalysis; they are not three ontologically distinct ingredients. Thereceptacle is introduced not as a distinct entity newly superadded toparticulars and forms, but as a new and essential component in theanalysis of what it is to be a spatio-temporal particular. What ismissing from that analysis, however, is any mention of character typesor tokens, and while later philosophers might see a use for suchconcepts in elucidating the metaphysical scheme of theTimaeus, it is not clear that Plato himself makes any use ofthem there.

The introduction of the receptacle is an important innovation inPlato’s metaphysics, and clearly a development that takes himbeyond the metaphysics of the middle dialogues.^[17] Little attention was given in those dialogues to the question of whatit is to be a sensible particular (other than being something thatparticipates in forms), or what is required of particulars to be suchthat forms may be exemplified in them. In order to be effective intheir role of exemplifying forms, particulars must possess certaingeneral characteristics qua particulars: they must be spatiallyextended and spatially situated, and they must be constituted of someindeterminate but determinable “stuff” that is subject todetermination by way of participating in forms. Although thereceptacle does not appear by name in any other of the laterdialogues, it clearly has affinities to the concept of theapeiron (indefinite or indeterminate) of the metaphysicalscheme in thePhilebus. It is impossible, however, todetermine the chronological relation between these two dialogues withcertainty (see note 7), and thus impossible to infer which of the twoschemes Plato might have thought to be the more definitive.

7. Teleology

Many commentators on theTimaeus have pointed out that theteleological account set out in theTimaeus is thefulfillment of a quest for teleological explanations related in thePhaedo (see, e.g., Strange 1999). In that dialogue thecharacter Socrates describes his foray into causal questions in therealm of natural science and recounts both his high expectations ofand disappointment with Anaxagoras’ concept of Intellect(nous) as providing the true cause of natural phenomena.Socrates expected the use Anaxagoras made of Intellect to provideteleological explanations; instead, Anaxagoras employed the concept toprovide the same sort of causal explanation—in terms of physicalinteractions—that Socrates had found confusing. Continuing tohope for teleological causal explanations but finding them elusive,Socrates settles for a second best account: offering causalexplanations in terms of participation in Forms (Phaedo 99c6ff.).

It is not entirely clear by what avenue of reasoning Plato found whathis character Socrates failed to find in thePhaedo, but itis reasonable to assume that the role of the form of the Good,introduced in theRepublic, assisted in the discovery.Although the character Socrates in that dialogue declines to offer anaccount of the nature of the Good, it is not unreasonable to connectthat form, as some have done, with rational, mathematical order.^[18] Such order as the expression of goodness is arguably for Plato theultimate metaphysical datum; forms other than the Good are good in sofar as they possess such intelligible order, and they do so perfectly.Sensibles are good in so far as they participate in these forms,though they fail to do so completely. What is left to be explained,then, is how such order is manifested in the visible universe, howeverimperfectly. The explanation offered in theTimaeus is thatorder is not inherent in the spatio-material universe; it is imposedby Intellect, as represented by the Craftsman.

While the figure of the Craftsman seems to be an anthropomorphicrepresentation of Intellect,^[19] it remains to ask what the ontological status of Intellect is, inrelation to the division between being and becoming—adistinction that appears to be exhaustive. Some interpreters, relyingon Timaeus’ claim (at 30b3) that intellect cannot become presentto anything apart from soul, have argued that Intellect is (part of)the world’s soul.^[20] This cannot be correct: like the rest of becoming, the world’ssoul is a product of the Craftsman, and hence neither it nor anythingelse on the side of becoming can be identified with Intellect.Alternatively, either Intellect is a form, or the distinction betweenbeing and becoming is not exhaustive. Some have argued that Intellectis to be identified with the entire realm of forms,^[21] or the form of the Good,^[22] while others, understanding “nous” to name avirtue, have opted for the form of Intelligence (a substance in virtueof its status as a form).^[23] More recently, it has been suggested that the figure of the Craftsmanis a personification of craftsmanship.^[24] None of these accounts seem adequate either: if Intellect were a formof any kind, it would be an intelligible object, not a subject thatpossesses cognition and efficient causal agency.^[25] Intellect, then, cannot be placed either on the side of being or onthat of becoming, and that dichotomy is thus not exhaustive.^[26] It is reasonable to conclude that Intellect is asui generissubstance that transcends the metaphysical dichotomy of being andbecoming—possibly not unlike the Abrahamic conception of God.^[27]

The teleology of theTimaeus may be usefully compared to thatof Aristotle’s philosophy of nature. What is immediatelystriking in that comparison is the absence from Aristotle’snatural philosophy of a purposive, designing causal agent thattranscends nature. Aristotelian final causes in the formation oforganisms and the structures of the natural world are said to beimmanent in nature (i.e., the nature or “form” of theorganism or structure) itself: it is not a divine Craftsman but natureitself that is said to act purposively.^[28] Such an immanent teleology will not be an option for Plato.Aristotle’s teleology is local, with no more than a few hints ata global level : while it makes sense to ask Aristotle for ateleological explanation of this or that feature of the natural world,it makes little sense to ask him for a teleological explanation of theworld as a whole. Moreover, for Aristotle the development of anindividual member of a species is determined by the form it hasinherited from its (male) parent: the goal of the developingindividual is to fully actualize that form. For Plato the primevalchaotic stuff of the universe has no inherent preexisting form thatgoverns some course of natural development toward the achievement ofsome goal, and so the explanatory cause of its orderliness must beexternal to any features that such stuff may possess.

8. Physics

While the receptacle has an obvious metaphysical role in theTimaeus, its primary role after its introduction is in thephysical theory of the dialogue. The argument from 47e3 to 52d4prepares the ground for both the spatial matrix in which to situate,and the material substratum from which to constitute, the universethat he will fashion after its eternal model. The fashioning, however,is the process of bringing order to what was, prior to and apart fromthe Craftsman’s intervention, a thoroughly disorderly state ofaffairs, and so the physical account begins with a description of thatdisorderly, “god-forsaken” (53b3–4) initialstate.

In that state, dramatically described at 52d4–53c3, the filledspace that is the receptacle undergoes constant, erratic motion: it issubject to forces (dunameis, 52e2) that are dissimilar to andout of balance with each other, and thus, as each spastic movementproduces its chain of spastic reactions, it is perpetually unstable(52e1–5). These motions may accidentally produce manifestationsthat to a would-be observer look like fire or any of the so-calledfour elements, or “kinds” (genê). Timaeuscalls these manifestations “traces” (53b2) of the fourkinds, and states that even as inarticulate traces, they tended tobehave in the ways in which the subsequently articulated kinds wouldcome to behave by necessity: each trace type would gather to its ownregion, with the heavier to one region and the lighter to another.These migrations are the effect of the ceaseless agitation of thereceptacle, which acts like a “winnowing sieve” (52e6),separating the heavy from the light. The result is a pre-cosmicinchoate stratification of these traces, which anticipates the(perpetually incomplete, 58a2–c4) stratification of the finisheduniverse.

In accordance with the requirements for the construction of the bodyof the universe previously set out at 31b4–32c4, the Craftsmanbegins by fashioning each of the four kinds “to be as perfectand excellent as possible…” (53b5–6). He selects asthe basic corpuscles (sômata, “bodies”)four of the five regular solids: the tetrahedron for fire, theoctahedron for air, the icosahedron for water, and the cube for earth.(The remaining regular solid, the dodecahedron, is “used for theuniverse as a whole,” [55c4–6], since it approaches mostnearly the shape of a sphere.) The faces of the first three of theseare composed of equilateral triangles, and each face is itselfcomposed of six elemental (scalene) half equilateral right-angledtriangles, whose sides are in a proportion of 1:√3:2. Timaeusdoes not say why each face is composed of six such triangles, when infact two, joined at the longer of the two sides that contain the rightangle, will more simply constitute an equilateral triangle. The facesof the cube are squares composed of four elemental isoscelesright-angled triangles and again, it is not clear why four should bepreferred to two. Given that every right-angled triangle is infinitelydivisible into two triangles of it own type (by dropping aperpendicular from the right-angle vertex to the hypotenuse, theresulting two smaller right triangles are both similar to the originaltriangle) the equilateral or square faces of the solids and thus thestereometric solids themselves have no minimal size. Possibly, then,the choice of six component triangles for the equilateral and four forthe square is intended to prevent the solid particles from becomingvanishingly small.^[29]

Since each of the first three of the regular solids has equilateralfaces, it is possible for any fire, air or water corpuscles to comeapart in their interactions—they cut or crush eachother—and their faces be reconstituted into corpuscles of one ofthe two other sorts, depending on the numbers of faces of the basiccorpuscles involved. For example, two fire corpuscles could betransformed into a single air corpuscle, or one air corpuscle into twofire corpuscles, given that the tetrahedron has four faces and theoctahedron eight (other examples are given at 56d6–e7). In thisway Timaeus explains the intertransformation that can occur amongfire, air and water. On the other hand, while the faces of the cubeparticles may also come apart, they can only be reconstituted as cubessince they are based on isosceles right-angled triangles; and so earthundergoes no intertransformation with the other three.^[30] Having established the construction and interaction of the basicparticles, Timaeus continues the physical account of the discoursewith a series of applications: differences among varieties of each ofthe primary bodies are explained by differences in the sizes of theconstituent particles (some varieties consisting of particles ofdifferent sizes), and compounds are distinguished by theircombinations of both different sorts and different sizes of particles.These various arrangements explain the perceptible propertiespossessed by the varieties of primary bodies and their compounds. Anobject’s particular arrangement of triangles produces aparticular kind of “disturbance” or“experience” (pathos) in the perceiving subject,so that the object is perceived as having this or that perceptibleproperty.

It is a fair question to ask how the physics of the discourse relatesto its metaphysics—for example, how the perceptible propertiesof observable instances of fire (its brightness, lightness and heat,let us say) relate to the form of Fire, an intelligible reality thathas no perceptible properties at all. The form of Fire is thenon-spatial, non-material, non-perceptible intelligible, eternal andunchanging nature of fire that the Craftsman “imitates,”and in so doing produces spatially extended, material, perceptible,transient and variable instances of fire. Although we are not toldwhat it is about the nature of fire that requires observable instancesof it to have just these properties, it is presumably that knowledgethat guides the Craftsman to select and assign the four regular solidsas he does. Given that the nature of fire is such that any“imitations” of it that appear in the Receptacle must beperceptible as bright, light and hot, the type of solid body that bestsupports these properties—the tetrahedron, it turnsout—should be assigned to fire. And so with the other threekinds (see 55d7–56c7).

9. Ethics

Plato inherited from Socrates the conviction that knowledge ofgoodness has a salvific effect upon human life. That knowledgeremained elusive to Socrates. As Plato continues the Socratic quest,he expands the scope of the search beyond ethical matters. In thePhaedo, as we saw earlier, the character Socrates expressesthe conviction that goodness is the true cause (aitia) of thebeneficent arrangement of the natural world, though the nature ofgoodness continues to elude him as well. The causal supremacy ofgoodness is recognized in the metaphysical and epistemological rolesassigned to theRepublic’s form of the Good, and it isthe understanding of that form that constitutes the culmination of theeducation of the philosophical statesman, the paragon of the virtuousand happy person. What remains to be articulated is a conception ofhow cosmic goodness is manifested in the universe so that human beingswill recognize it, understand it, and emulate it in order that theirlives may become truly virtuous and happy.^[31]

We saw above that in its dramatic context, theTimaeus is thesecond of a series of three or possibly four (seeCritias108a–b) speeches exchanged by four or possibly five (seeTimaeus 17a) friends during one of the yearly AthenianPanathenaic festivals. It is sandwiched between Socrates’Republic-like speech, which is briefly summarized at thebeginning of theTimaeus (17c–19b), and Critias’speech, the unfinished sequel to theTimaeus,^[32] which was intended to recount and celebrate the great victory ofancient, prehistoric Athens over the vast military might of Atlantis.^[33] The stated thematic purpose of Timaeus’ discourse is to providean account of human nature in the context of the nature of theuniverse as a whole. Conjoined with Socrates’ previous accountof education (à laRepublic) this account will providethe basis for Critias’ forthcoming account of human virtue inaction, as displayed by the deeds of the ancient Athenians (27a7–b1).^[34] If we take this stated purpose seriously, we will expect the entirecosmological account to culminate in human psychology and ethics. Andthat is indeed what we find.

In the passage that may fairly be taken as the climax ofTimaeus’ discourse (90a2–d7), human beings are urged todevote their utmost attention to the cultivation and preservation ofthe well being of their immortal, rational souls. The well being of arational soul consists in its being well ordered (eukekosmêmenon, 90c5), and so the goal of human life, giventhe fact that the soul’s revolutions were thrown off coursearound the time of birth (43a6–44b1), is to realign(exorthounta, 90d3) those revolutions with those of theuniverse at large. Such realignment is achieved by a study of therevolutions and harmonies of the universe and, once achieved, restoresthe soul to its original condition and thereby brings to fulfillment“that most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, bothnow and forevermore” (90d5–7).

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