Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, oraboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, thesubjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. Thephenomenal intentionality theory is a theory ofintentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality,and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it.In recent years, the phenomenal intentionality theory has increasingly been seen as one of the mainapproaches to intentionality.

• 1. Introduction
• 2. The phenomenal intentionality theory
  • 2.1 The general view
  • 2.2 Weak, Moderate, and Strong PIT
  • 2.3 Grounding, Identity, and Reductive PIT
  • 2.4 Other dimensions of variation
• 3. The place of PIT in logical space
  • 3.1 Alternative theories of intentionality
  • 3.2 Other views of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality
• 4. Arguments for PIT
  • 4.1 The phenomenological case
  • 4.2 Assessability for accuracy
  • 4.3 Internalism and brains in a vat
  • 4.4 Aspectual shape
  • 4.5 Content determinacy
  • 4.6 Intentional states about non-existents
  • 4.7 The argument from predictive accuracy
  • 4.8 Other arguments for PIT
• 5. Cognitive phenomenology
  • 5.1 Phenomenal contrast cases
  • 5.2 Spontaneous thoughts
  • 5.3 The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon
  • 5.4 Epistemic markers of consciousness
  • 5.5 Self-knowledge
• 6. Challenges for PIT
  • 6.1 Thoughts
  • 6.2 Standing propositional attitudes
  • 6.3 Wide intentional states
  • 6.4 Unconscious occurrent states
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction

The phenomenal intentionality theory is a theory ofintentionality, the “aboutness” of mental states, on which phenomenal consciousness plays a central role in accounting for intentional states. Unlike many other contemporary theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of causal relations, information, functional roles, or other “naturalistic” ingredients, the phenomenal intentionality theory’s main ingredient is phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974) aspectof mental life. Accordingly, Pautz (2013) describes the general approach as taking a“consciousness first” approach to intentionality, since it claims that consciousness either grounds or is explanatorily prior to intentionality, and Kriegel (2011a, 2013a) describes the approach as oneon which consciousness is the “source” of intentionality. (These ways of characterizing the phenomenal intentionality theory suggest a reductive picture, on which intentionality is reduced to or explained in terms of consciousness,but insection 2.3 we will see that some versions of the phenomenal intentionality theory are not reductive.)

By explaining intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory challenges the received view of the past few decades that the mind divides into twomutually exclusive and independent types of states: intentional statesand phenomenal states (see Kim 1998 for a clear articulation of thereceived view). According to the phenomenal intentionality theory, intentional states and phenomenalstates are intimately related. Some intentional states are constituted by phenomenal states, and the rest are in some way importantly related to phenomenal states.

Phenomenal intentionality has been discussed under that label onlyrecently (see, e.g., Horgan and Tienson 2002 and Loar 2003, and relatedinfluential work by Searle, Siewert, and others), but many modernphilosophers have suggested a close relation between thought, which ischaracteristically intentional, and perception, which ischaracteristically phenomenal, or consciousness itself. For example, rationalistssuch as Descartes held that all cognition is conscious, while empiricists such as Hume and Locke held that all cognition is grounded in perceptual experience. Later, Brentano, Husserl and the phenomenologists that they influenced conceived of intentionalityprimarily as a conscious phenomenon. Like the phenomenal intentionality theory, the views of these figures canbe understood as taking a “consciousness first” approach. For more on the history of the phenomenal intentionality theory, see Kriegel (2013a) and the entryConsciousness and Intentionality.

In this article we describe various versions of the phenomenal intentionality theory, theirmotivations, the challenges they face, and their relations to other views.

2. The phenomenal intentionality theory

2.1 The general view

Intentionality is the “aboutness” or “directedness”of mentalstates. For example, a thought that snow is white “says” or represents that snow is white. Similarly, yourcurrent visual experience might represent a blue cup or that there isa blue cup in front of you. When a state exhibits intentionality, it involves the instantiation of anintentionalproperty, a property of representing something. What the staterepresents is its(intentional) content. In this article, weuse the term “state” for instantantiations of properties,which are sometimes calledtoken states. (See the entriesIntentionality andMental Representation.)

Phenomenal consciousness is the felt, subjective, or“what it’s like” aspect of mental states (see Nagel1974). Paradigmatic examples of phenomenal states include perceptualexperiences, pains, emotional feelings, episodes of mental imagery,and cognitive experiences such as the experience of déjàvu. Each of these states has a characteristic phenomenal character—there is something that it’s like to be in it. When there issomething that it is like for a subject, we can say that sheinstantiates aphenomenal property, or that she has aphenomenal state. (See the entryConsciousness.)

Phenomenal intentionality is intentionality that isconstituted by phenomenal consciousness. Aphenomenal intentionalstate is an intentional state that is constituted by a subject’s phenomenal states. For example, someone who accepts phenomenal intentionality might say that a perceptual intentional state representing a red cube is constituted by a reddish-cube-ish phenomenal state—the reddish-cube-ish phenomenal experience automatically and necessarily results in the representation of a red cube. We will call intentional states that are not phenomenal intentional statesnon-phenomenal intentional state.

PIT takes phenomenal intentionality to play a central role in accounting for intentional phenomena. The next subsections discuss ways that this initial gloss on PIT can be precisified.

A central idea common to phenomenal intentionality theories is that phenomenal intentionality plays an important role in the mind. The next subsections discuss ways that this idea can be precisified.

2.2 Weak, Moderate, and Strong PIT

The following three theses about the relationship between phenomenalintentional states and intentional states are ways of precisifying the idea that phenomenal intentionality plays an important role in the mind:

The “all” in the above theses should beunderstood as quantifying over all actual intentional states, not allmetaphysically possible intentional states. In the same way that somephysicalist theories of intentionality allow that there are merelypossible forms of intentionality that are independent of physicalproperties, PIT can allow that there are non-actual intentional statesthat have nothing to do with phenomenal consciousness. Of course, morespecific versions of PIT might make stronger claims.

Of the three views mentioned above, Strong PIT asserts the strongestpossible relationship between phenomenal intentionality andintentionality: it claims that phenomenal intentionality is the onlykind of intentionality there is. Relatively few hold this view, butversions of it have been defended by Pitt (2004), Farkas (2008a), andMendelovici (2010, 2018). The difficulty with this view, as we will seebelow, is that it is not clear that there are enough phenomenal statesor phenomenal states of the right kind to constitute all intentionalstates. For example, it is not easy to see how standing beliefs likeyour belief that grass is green could be constituted by phenomenalstates.

Moderate PIT is significantly weaker than Strong PIT. It is compatible with theexistence of non-phenomenal intentional states but claims that anysuch non-phenomenal intentional states are at least partly grounded inphenomenal intentional states.

There are different ways of explicating the intuitive notion ofgrounding used in the definition of Moderate PIT. For our purposeshere, we can say thatA groundsB whenB obtainsin virtue ofA. This gloss is itself in need of furtheranalysis, but for now it is enough to know that grounding is anasymmetric relation of metaphysical determination (see Trogdon 2013for an introduction to grounding). An example of grounding that issimilar to the grounding relation posited by some proponents ofModerate PIT is the (alleged) grounding of linguistic meaning inspeaker intentions: on many views of language, words have theirmeanings in virtue of speakers’ intentions toward them. To saythatA ispartly grounded inB is to that saythatA is grounded in the combination ofB and otherfactors.

There are different views of how phenomenal intentionality mightpartly ground non-phenomenal intentionality:

One view is that non-phenomenal intentional states are simplydispositions to have phenomenal intentional states and that thesedispositions get their contents from the phenomenal intentional statesthat they are dispositions to bring about (Searle 1983, 1990, 1991,1992). On this view, standing beliefs about grass that are notphenomenal intentional states are dispositions to have phenomenal intentional states with the same or related contents.

Another view is that non-phenomenal intentional states get theirintentionality from functional relations they bear to phenomenalintentional states (Loar 2003a, Horgan & Tienson 2002, Graham,Horgan, & Tienson 2007). On this view, a standing belief thatgrass is green might have its content in virtue of being suitablyconnected to a host of phenomenal intentional states.

A third view is that non-phenomenal intentionality is a matter ofideal rational interpretation (Kriegel 2011a,b, Pautz 2013). On Kriegel’s view, for example, the relevant phenomenal intentional states are in the mind of a possible idealrational interpreter.

More versions of Moderate PIT will be discussed below. Proponents ofModerate PIT (or something close to it) include Loar (1987, 1988,1995, 2003a, 2003b), Searle (1983, 1990, 1991, 1992), Goldman(1993a,b), Siewert (1998), McGinn (1988), Kriegel (2003, 2011a,b),Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2003, 2004, 2006, 2007), Georgalis(2006), Pitt (2004, 2009, 2011), Farkas (2008a,b, 2013), Mendola(2008), Chalmers (2010: xxiv), Bourget (2010), Pautz (2010, 2013),Smithies (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2014), and Montague (2016).

Weak PIT merely claims that there is phenomenal intentionality. Itallows that there are non-phenomenal intentional states that havenothing to do with phenomenal consciousness. The proponents of WeakPIT are too many to list. As we will see below, Weak PIT is entailedby some widely accepted views in philosophy of mind, including manyforms of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness, the viewthat phenomenal states are identical to intentional states (perhaps that meet certain further conditions).

Since Moderate PIT is the strongest view that is endorsed by mostproponents of the general approach, it is the view thathas the best claim to beingthe phenomenal intentionalitytheory. For this reason, this article will focus mainly on ModeratePIT. Unless otherwise indicated, we will use “PIT” torefer to Moderate PIT. (Note that Strong PIT is a version of Moderate PIT, while Weak PIT is not a version of PIT at all, but rather a weakening of the view.)

2.3 Grounding, Identity, and Reductive PIT

Our definition of phenomenal intentional states is neutral between twotypes of views regarding how phenomenal states constitute intentionalstates. Ongrounding views, phenomenal intentional states aregrounded in phenomenal states (either in individual states or in setsof such states). Since grounding is asymmetric, this view implies thatphenomenal intentional states are distinct from the phenomenal statesthat ground them. In contrast,identity views take therelation that obtains between phenomenal intentional states andphenomenal states (in virtue of which the former are constituted bythe latter) to be that of identity: certain instantiations ofintentional properties are identical to instantiations of phenomenalproperties. On this view, phenomenal intentional states are identicalto individual phenomenal states or sets of phenomenal states.

Farkas (2008a,b), Pitt (2004) (though not in Pitt 2009), and Woodward (2016, forthcoming-a) defend agrounding version of PIT. It is also possible to read Horgan andTienson (2002) as holding a grounding version of PIT, since they takethe relevant relation between phenomenal intentionality and phenomenalconsciousness to be that of “constitutive determination”,which might be understood as a kind of grounding relation. Otherproponents of PIT, such as Mendelovici (2018), favor an identity view.

We can also distinguish between versions of PIT that are reductive andversions that are not. To a first approximation, a theory ofintentionality is reductive if it specifies the nature ofintentionality in terms that are supposed to be more basic orfundamental. A theory that is not reductivemight either be neutral on the question of reduction or incompatible withreduction.

All grounding versions of (Moderate or Strong) PIT are reductive. Suchviews entail that all intentionality is ultimately grounded inphenomenal states. Since grounding is asymmetric, the groundingphenomenal states cannot themselves be intentional and are morefundamental than intentional states.

An identity version of (Moderateor Strong) PIT will be reductive if it holds or entails thatphenomenal intentional states are identical to phenomenal states andthat phenomenal descriptions are more fundamental than intentionaldescriptions (just as “H₂O” descriptions aremore fundamental than “water” descriptions). If such viewsare correct, it should be possible to understand phenomenal statesindependently of intentionality.

Versions of (Moderate or Strong) PIT that identify phenomenal intentionalstates with phenomenal states can also be nonreductive. On suchnonreductive views, phenomenal descriptions of intentional states arenot more fundamental then intentional descriptions. Exactly whichversions of PIT that identify phenomenal intentional states withphenomenal states are reductive or nonreductive is an openquestion.

Regardless of whether PIT provides a reductive account ofintentionality in general, versions of Moderate PIT that allow fornon-phenomenal intentional states aim to reduce such states tophenomenal intentionality and other ingredients, so they provide areductive account of at least some intentional states. We will discusssome of these views below.

2.4 Other dimensions of variation

An important dimension of variation between versions of PITconcerns the extent of phenomenal intentionality. The disagreement herecuts across the disagreement between Moderate and Strong PIT.For example, Loar (2003a), who falls in the Moderate PIT camp, mostlylimits phenomenal intentionality to perceptual and other sensorystates. In contrast, other advocates of Moderate PIT (for example,Strawson (1994) and Pitt (2004)) claim that many thoughts have phenomenalintentionality. Most theorists maintain that unconscious subpersonalstates, such as states in early visual processing or unconsciouslinguistic processing, lack phenomenal intentionality, though Bourget(2010, forthcoming-b), Pitt (2009,Other Internet Resources), and Mendelovici (2018) claim that some such states might have phenomenal intentionality thatwe are unaware of.

Phenomenal intentionality theorists also disagree on which mentalstates, if any, have non-phenomenal intentionality. Horgan &Tienson (2002) and Kriegel (2011a) claim that at least someunconscious subpersonal states have non-phenomenal intentionality,while Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) and Mendelovici (2018) deny this.Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) takes at least some standing states, such asnon-occurrent beliefs and desires, to have non-phenomenalintentionality, which Strawson (2008) and Mendelovici (2018) deny.

Another important question concerns the structure of phenomenal intentionality. Some proponents of phenomenal intentionality hold that it has a relational structure (Pautz 2010, 2013; Speaks 2015; Bourget forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c), while others (Farkas 2008a,b; Kriegel 2011a,b, 2013; Mendelovici 2018; Pitt 2009) deny this. We briefly discuss this question inSection 4.6.

3. The place of PIT in logical space

This section outlines some important relations between PIT and otherviews.

3.1 Alternative theories of intentionality

Reductive PIT stands in contrast with two well-known classes ofreductive theories of intentionality:tracking theories(Stampe 1977, Dretske 1988, 1995, Millikan 1984, Fodor 1987), whichtake the content of mental states to be a matter ofcausal-informational-historical links between them and things in theenvironment (see the entries oncausal theories of mental content andteleological theories of mental content), andconceptual role theories, which take the content ofmental states to be a matter of their relations to other mental statesand sometimes to the external world (Block 1986, Harman 1987,Greenberg & Harman 2007). (See the sectionConceptual role in the entry onnarrow mental content.) Reductive PIT also contrasts with primitivism, the view thatintentionality cannot be reduced.

Reductive PIT is a competitor totracking, conceptual role, and primitivist theories in that it is analternative account of the grounds of intentionality.Versions of PIT that are not reductive are also competitors to thesetheories, but to a more limited extent: they only offer an alternativeexplanation of the grounds of non-phenomenal intentional states. Suchviews are compatible with reducing phenomenal intentional states totracking states and similar states.

While PIT offers a different account of the grounds of intentionalitythan conceptual role and tracking theories, it is noteworthy that allversions of PIT are, strictly speaking, compatible with these theories.It could turn out that PIT is true but phenomenal consciousnessreduces to conceptual role or tracking, making both PIT and the trackingor conceptual role theory true.

3.2 Other views of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality

Representationalism (orintentionalism) is the viewthat phenomenal states are intentional states that meet certainfurther conditions (Harman 1990, Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 2000,Byrne 2001, Chalmers 2004; see also the entryRepresentational Theories of Consciousness). As in the case of PIT, some versions of representationalism arereductive while others are not. When one says that phenomenal statesare intentional states that meet certain conditions, one might intendthis as a reduction of phenomenal consciousness or one might merelyintend to point out a true identity. As in the case of PIT, manyproponents of representationalism take the view to be reductive.

The reductive versions of representationalism and PIT areincompatible: if consciousness reduces to intentionality, thenintentionality does not reduce to consciousness, and vice-versa.However, versions of PIT and representationalism that are notreductive are compatible. It is common for the two views to becombined: many advocates of PIT also endorse a version ofrepresentationalism, claiming that all phenomenal states are alsorepresentational states (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Graham, Horgan, andTienson 2007, Pautz 2010, Mendelovici 2013, 2018, Bourget 2010). In theother direction, representationalism, as we are understanding theview, is committed to Weak PIT, because it entails that someintentional states are phenomenal states.

Another view of the relationship between intentionality andconsciousness is what Horgan & Tienson dub“separatism”, the view that consciousness andintentionality are wholly distinct mental phenomena (see e.g., Kim1998). On this view, consciousness and intentionality do not bearinteresting metaphysical relations to each other. For example, thereis no identity or grounding relation between them (separatists rejectboth PIT and representationalism). Separatism is typically associatedwith the view that consciousness is limited to perceptual and sensorystates, and intentionality is limited to beliefs, desires, and otherpropositional attitudes.

4. Arguments for PIT

This section overviews the main arguments and motivations for PIT.

4.1 The phenomenological case

Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue for the claim that “[t]here is akind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that isconstitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (2002: 520).This is a (fairly strong) version of Weak PIT. They do so by arguingfor the following two principles:

We take IOP to say that each paradigmatic phenomenal property has anassociated intentional content such that, necessarily, all instancesof the property have this associated content. We take POI to say that eachparadigmatic intentional property has some associated phenomenal character suchthat, necessarily, all instances of the property have this associated phenomenalcharacter.

Horgan and Tienson defend IOP by appealing to broadly phenomenologicalconsiderations:

You might see, say, a red pen on a nearby table, and a chair with redarms and back a bit behind the table. There is certainly somethingthat the red you see is like to you. But the red that you see is seen,first, as a property of objects. These objects are seen as located inspace relative to your center of visual awareness. And they areexperienced as part of a complete three-dimensional scene—notjust a pen with table and chair, but a pen, table, and chair in a roomwith floor, walls, ceiling, and windows. This spatial character isbuilt into the phenomenology of the experience. (Horgan & Tienson2002: 521, footnote suppressed)

The basic idea is that introspective consideration of paradigmatic phenomenal states suggests that they are intentional. This argument echoes the transparencyconsiderations for representationalism (see the entryRepresentational Theories of Consciousness).

Horgan and Tienson’s case for POI (the phenomenology ofintentionality) rests primarily on detailed phenomenologicalobservations purporting to show that there are phenomenologicalfeatures corresponding to most contents of propositional attitudes aswell as the attitudes of belief and desires. We discuss these argumentsinsection 5.

With IOP and POI in hand, Horgan and Tienson proceed to argue for thewidespread existence of phenomenal intentionality. The following is a reconstruction of the key steps of their argument:

1. The perceptual phenomenal states of a pair ofphenomenal duplicates (creatures that have the same phenomenal experiences throughout their existence) necessarily share some contents, including manyperceptual contents (from IOP).
2. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily havethe same perceptual beliefs.
3. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily sharemany of their non-perceptual beliefs.
4. Therefore, the phenomenal duplicates necessarily sharemany of their intentional contents at the level of perception,perceptual beliefs, and non-perceptual beliefs.

The general idea is that phenomenal states, with their phenomenallydetermined intentionality, bring in their train much of the rest ofthe “web of belief”.

Horgan and Tienson argue for the transition from(1) to(2) by articulating in some detail how the contents of perceptualexperiences, either individually or in groups, bring in their trainperceptual beliefs. A key idea, supported by POI, is that perceptualbeliefs and other attitudes towards perceptible contents havephenomenal characters closely associated with them. For example, thereis a phenomenology of accepting various contents as true. Thesuggestion is that once one has a vast number of perceptualexperiences with their associated perceptual contents and feelings ofaccepting and rejecting some of these, one qualifies as having a number of perceptual beliefs.

Regarding the transition from(2) to(3), a key idea, again derived from POI, is that non-perceptual beliefshave extensive phenomenology. For example, according to Horgan andTienson, there is something that it’s like to wonder whether tocook meatloaf for dinner. The phenomenology of such non-perceptualthoughts, together with one’s vast collection of perceptualbeliefs and perceptual experiences, fixes a large number ofnon-perceptual beliefs and other non-perceptual propositionalattitudes.(4) combines conclusions(1)–(3).

The following considerations, while not exactly Horgan andTienson’s, seem to go in the same direction as their line ofargument: If all beliefs and desires have phenomenal characters uniqueto them, as Horgan and Tienson take themselves to have established,then phenomenal duplicates will share these phenomenal characters. ByIOP, these phenomenal characters must determine contents. Plausibly,they determine the contents of the beliefs and desires that theycharacterize. So if an individual has a given belief with contentC,then his or her phenomenal duplicate has this content as the contentof a phenomenal experience. Moreover, the duplicate has a feeling of acceptingC. It is then quite plausible that the duplicate believesC.

Horgan and Tienson’s argument establishes Weak PIT, but it doesnot yet establish any version of Moderate PIT. It could be that manyintentional states are phenomenal intentional states but someintentional states are neither phenomenal intentional states norgrounded in phenomenal intentionality (Bailey and Richards (2014)point out related limitations of the argument). However, when combinedwith Horgan and Tienson’s arguments for the claim that manynon-phenomenal intentional states are grounded in phenomenalintentionality (more on this view below), we have some support forModerate PIT.

Mendelovici (2018) also argues for Moderate PIT on the grounds of metaphysical sufficiency: The ingredients invoked by alternative theories of intentionality, such as tracking and functional role theories, are not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality. For instance, it is unclear why having internal statesplaying certain functional roles should result in those internal states representing a particular content, or any content at all. Likewise, while tracking relations relate us to items that may seem to be well-suited to playing the role of content, such as objects, properties, and states of affairs, it is mysterious how tracking such items could make them psychologically relevant to us. For instance, it is unclear how merely tracking such items can make them introspectively accessible, available to reason with, or in any sense “entertained”. (See also BonJour 1998 for similar worries with tracking and functional role theories.) In contrast, PIT’s central ingredient, phenomenal consciousness, is arguably metaphysically sufficient for intentionality. For instance, it is arguably inconceivable for there to be someone with a reddish phenomenal experience who does not thereby represent redness. If all this is right, then there is reason to think that phenomenal consciousness alone is metaphysically sufficient for intentionality, which supports Moderate PIT.

4.2 Assessability for accuracy

Siewert (1998) argues for Weak PIT by arguing that phenomenal states areautomatically assessable for accuracy. A key element ofSiewert’s argument is his assumption that phenomenal characterscan be identified with “how it seems for it to look some way tosomeone”. We take this to mean that phenomenal states are statesof things seeming a certain way, where the relevant kind of seeming isthe kind we are familiar with from cases where things look a certainway in perception (perhaps there are other kinds of seemings that arenot phenomenal states). Siewert’s argument is contained in thefollowing passage, in which we have added numbers corresponding to thepremises:

First, consider some instance of its seeming to you as it does for itto look as if something is shaped and situated in a certain way, suchas its seeming to you just as it does on a given occasion for it tolook as if there is something X-shaped in a certain position. (1) Ifit seems this way to you, then it appears to follow that it does lookto you as if there is something X-shaped in a certain position. (3) Ifthis is right, then its seeming this way to you is a feature in virtueof which you are assessable for accuracy—(5) that is to say, itis an intentional feature. For, from what we have said, (2) if itseems to you as it does for it to look this way, then, if it is alsothe case that there is something X-shaped in a certain position, itfollows that the way it looks to you is accurate. (Siewert 1998: 221)

Siewert suggests that this argument straightforwardly generalizes to alarge number of perceptual experiences.

LetS be the phenomenal state in which it seems to you just asit does on a given occasion for it to look as if there is somethingX-shaped in a certain position. The argument in the above quotation can bebroken down as follows:

1. Necessarily, if you are inS, it looks toyou as if things are a certain wayW, in virtue of being inS.
2. Necessarily, if it looks to you as if things are inwayW, things being (or not being)W would make youaccurate (or inaccurate).
3. Therefore, if you are inS, you areassessable for accuracy with respect to things beingW, invirtue of being inS.
4. If you are assessable for accuracy in virtue ofbeing in a certain state, this state has intentional content.
5. Necessarily,S has intentional content.

Siewert does not explicitly defend premises(1) and(2).(4) is defended in section 6.2 of the book.

One might object that(3) does not follow from(1) and(2). PerhapsS is such that, necessarily, things being a certainway (or not) would make the bearer ofS accurate (or not), butit is notin virtue of being inS that its bearer isassessable for accuracy. The assessability might come from theinevitable addition of an interpretation toS in allcircumstances. Siewert argues against this possibility extensivelybetween pages 222 and 245, ruling out various sources ofinterpretation.

Gertler (2001) objects that there is an alternative explanation ofSiewert’s observations about the co-occurrence of phenomenal andintentional properties: intentional properties automatically give riseto phenomenal properties. Gertler argues that Siewert has not ruledout this alternative, and so fails to establish PIT. See Siewert 2004 for a response.

4.3 Internalism and brains in a vat

It is possible to argue for PIT on the basis ofinternalismabout mental content, the view that what a subject’s mentalstates represent is fully determined by her intrinsic properties. (Thealternative to internalism isexternalism. Intentionalcontent that is determined by a subject’s intrinsic propertiesis said to benarrow as opposed towide. See theentries onnarrow mental content andexternalism about mental content.)

Loar (2003a) argues from internalism to PIT.First, Loar proposes the following two desiderata for a theory ofintentionality: (1) The theory should be a non-referential theory,where a non-referential theory is a theory that does not takeintentionality to be a matter of reference to external entities, forexample, concrete or abstract objects. This desideratum is motivatedby internalism. (Note that, for Loar, intentionality is not the samething as reference, and so a non-referential theory of intentionalitydoes not commit one to denying that there is such a thing asreference.) (2) The theory should accommodate externalism aboutreference and truth-conditions (see, e.g., Putnam 1975, Burge 1979,Kripke 1980).

Loar then argues that internalist views that do not appeal to phenomenal consciousness fail to meetdesiderata (1) and (2). The first view he considers is short-armfunctionalism, the view that causal interactions between brain statesgive rise to intentionality. The second view is a version ofthe descriptivist theory of reference combined with short-arm functionalism about its primitiverepresentations. Having excluded these views, he argues that a versionof PIT can meet his two desiderata. Phenomenal properties areinherently intentional in that they exhibit directedness, or purportto refer. Since purporting to refer is not the same thing asreferring, the result is non-referential mental content. Thissatisfies the first desideratum.

Loar argues that his view satisfies the second desideratum by arguingthat phenomenal properties do not by themselves secure reference ortruth-conditions. Instead, reference and truth-conditions are a matterof externally-determined relations, as externalists such as Putnam(1975), Burge (1979), and Kripke (1980) claim. However, whichexternally-determined relations matter for reference depends on asubject’s non-referential internalist content. Horgan, Tienson,& Graham (2004) also suggest that PIT is the best available theoryof narrow content and suggest that phenomenal intentionality can provide a basis for externalist content.

Another argument for PIT involves appeal to brain in a vat scenarios (see Loar 2003a and Horgan, Tienson & Graham 2004). Abrain in avat duplicate is an exact physical duplicate of a normallyembodied human brain that is kept in a vat of life-sustaining liquidsand is hooked up to a computer that delivers to it the same kinds ofstimulation its embodied twin receives. It intuitively seems that abrain in a vat would have a mental life “matching” that ofits embodied twin. The brain in a vat and its twin would have matchingperceptual experiences, perceptual judgments, and beliefs. Forexample, when the embodied twin believes that she is lying on thebeach sipping a frappé, the brain in a vat twin believes thatthey are lying on the beach sipping a frappé. However, whilethe normal subject’s belief might be true, the envattedsubject’s beliefs, and many other of their mental states, wouldbe false or non-veridical.

Farkas (2008a) agrees with Loar and Horgan et al. (2004) that PIT isthe best available theory of narrow content but criticizes Loar(2003a) and Horgan et al. (2004) for making a concession toexternalism by allowing for externally-determinedreference, truth-conditions, or broad content. Instead,Farkas argues that internalist, phenomenally-constitutedintentionality is all that a theory of intentionality needs.

Wilson (2003) objects to Loar’s appeal to brains in vats,claiming that intuitions concerning them are theoretical intuitionsand are likely to be rejected by many of PIT’s opponents.

4.4 Aspectual shape

In an early defense of PIT, Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) puts forth anargument based on the “aspectual shapes” of intentionalstates. The argument is rather complex and open to severalinterpretations, but here is one simplified way of understanding it:Searle begins by noting that all intentional states have an aspectualshape, where anaspectual shape is a matter of how somethingis represented. For example, there is a difference betweenrepresenting Hesperus and representing Phosphorus, or representingSuperman and representing Clark Kent. The differences lie not inwhich objects are represented, but inhow they arerepresented—these are differences in their aspectual shapes.

Searle then argues that no internal or external unconscious physicalor functional facts can determine aspectual shapes. The only thingthat can determine aspectual shape is consciousness. If that is so,then it looks like unconscious states can only have their aspectualshapes in virtue of their connections to conscious states. Searleconcludes, more specifically, that unconscious intentional statesinvolve dispositions to have conscious states, a thesis that he callsthe connection principle. (Sometimes he says that unconsciousstates arepotentially accessible to consciousness,apparently meaning that they can beintrospected consciously(1992, p. 156), but other times he says what we say here: thatunconscious states involve dispositions to have conscious states(1992, p. 159, 161–162). The latter is what Searle says as partof his argument for the connection principle, and this interpretationis more in line with the argument he deploys.)

In sum, the argument seems to go as follows:

According to the argument’s conclusion, all intentional statesare either phenomenal intentional states or involve dispositions tohave such states. This is a version of Moderate PIT.

Searle’s arguments have elicited a large number of responses.Fodor and Lepore (1994) argue that there is no suitable way of cashingout what it would take for a state to bepotentiallyconscious such that Searle’s claims are both plausible andtendentious (i.e., that they entail, as Searle claims, that much ofcognitive science’s appeal to non-conscious intentional statesis misguided). For a response, see Searle 1994. Davies(1995) argues that Searle might be right about a kind ofintentionality but that there are other kinds of intentionalityinvoked in cognitive science that are not dependent on consciousness.Van Gulick (1995) argues that Searle’s notion of aspectual shapesmuggles in the notion of consciousness, and that on a lesscontentious understanding of aspectual shape, his argument thatconsciousness is the only way of accounting for aspectual shape doesnot succeed. Baaren (1999) also takes issue with the notion ofaspectual shape. See also the commentaries accompanying Searle 1990.

4.5 Arguments from content determinacy

Another line of argument for PIT similar to Searle’s aspectual shape argument is an argument from content determinacy. Graham, Horgan & Tienson (2007) andHorgan & Graham (2012) argue that it is difficult to see howunconscious neural activity, functional role, dispositions tobehavior, and other possible physical bases of intentionality canyield the sorts of determinate contents we manifestly represent (seealso Dennett 1987, Quine 1960: ch. 2, and Kripke 1982). For example,no causal, functional, or purely physical features of one’sbrain or environment seem to make it the case that one is thinkingaboutrabbits rather thanundetached-rabbit-parts. AMartian looking down on Earth with complete knowledge of allEarthly physical facts could not tell whether we are representingrabbits or undetached rabbit parts. Thus, it appears that aphysical-functional theory of intentionality will predict thatone’s concept RABBIT is indeterminate between the two contents.

Similarly, nothing about our brains, their finite dispositions, ortheir environments indicates that our word “plus” meanstheplus operator rather than a Kripkeanquusoperator, an operator that works just like plus when the operands areless than 57 and returns 5 when either operand is 57 or greater (seeKripke 1982). If we do determinately representplus andrabbits, something other than tracking relations,dispositions towards behaviors, internal functional roles, or brainstates has to determine this. Along similar lines, Strawson (2008)argues that phenomenal intentional facts about what we take anintentional state to refer to play a key role in determining what anintentional state refers to.

Some argue that phenomenal consciousness is capable of explainingcontent determinacy. According to Graham, Horgan and Tienson, there isa phenomenal difference between representing rabbits and representingundetached-rabbit-parts. Since PIT claims that phenomenal intentionalcontent is determined by phenomenal character, it allows that the twostates have distinct contents. The supposition that there ishigh-levelcognitive phenomenology corresponding to suchabstract contents asrabbits andundetached-rabbit-parts is key to this argument. This is acontroversial claim, but one that is quite central to many versions ofPIT. We discuss this claim insection 5.

Arguments for PIT from content determinacy rely on the strong claimthat the totality of physical facts do not fix content determinatelyand that content is fixed determinately. While PIT does not entaildualism about consciousness, PIT combined with this claim does (see Pautz 2013, who objects to arguments for PIT from content determinacy for related reasons). This claim will be resisted by anyone who thinks that physicalism about the mind iswell-motivated. One might say that the intuition that physical factscannot fix determinate contents arises from the fact that we do nothave a suitably good understanding of how intentionality arises fromphysical facts; had we such an understanding, the intuition woulddisappear.

4.6 Intentional states about non-existents

Relationalism about intentionality is the view thatintentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities thatserve as contents.Non-relationalism about intentionalityis the view thatintentionality is not a relation to distinctly existing entities thatserve as contents.

Kriegel (2007, 2011a) argues that a non-relational view of intentionalityprovides the best explanation of how we can represent things thatdon’t exist, such as Bigfoot, and that PIT is the best candidatenon-relational view of intentionality. Kriegel first argues that thefollowing three intuitively appealing claims are inconsistent:

• (a)Onecan represent non-existents.
• (b)Onecannot bear a relation to non-existents.
• (c)Representingsomething involves (constitutively) bearing arelation to it. (Kriegel 2007: 308)

One of these claims needs to be rejected. Kriegel argues that it is(c), the claim that asserts relationalism. His’s argumentproceeds by a process of elimination.

Kriegel considers rejecting(a). On this proposal, when we seem to represent dragons, Bigfoot, orSanta Claus, we either fail to have an intentional state or werepresent something else. One reason Kriegel rejects the first optionis that it implies that there is a gap between trying to represent andrepresenting, which he takes to be implausible. On the second option,when we seem to represent non-existent concrete entities, we arereally just representing something else, such as existent abstractentities (e.g., universals or propositions), existent mental entities(e.g., sense data or ideas), or existent possible but non-actualentities. But Kriegel takes this option to be highly counterintuitive.When we seem to be thinking about concrete flesh-and-blood Bigfoot, weare in fact thinking about an abstract or mental entity. (See, however, Mendelovici 2018, section 9.3.1 for a response to this line of argument.)Another worryis that accounting for the representation of non-existents seems likethe wrong kind of reason to accept the existence of these abstract,mental, or merely possible entities.

Another option is to reject(b). Kriegel argues that just as a monadic property cannot be instantiatedwithout an existing particular that instantiates it, so too a relationcannot be instantiated without existing particulars that instantiateit. In short, it is a general rule that relations require relata.Rejecting(b) is tantamount to claiming that the intentionality relation is anexception to this general rule, which is implausible.

Kriegel concludes that we should reject(c). He calls his non-relational view “adverbialism”, since itdraws its inspiration from the adverbialist views of perception ofDucasse (1942) and Chisholm (1957). According to Kriegel’sadverbialism, representing Bigfoot is not standing in a relation to anentity, but rather instantiating a non-relational intentionalproperty, which we might describe as the property of representingBigfoot-wise.

So far, this only motivates adverbialism. The final step of theargument motivates PIT: One objection to adverbialism is that it ismysterious what non-relational intentional properties are. What is itto represent Bigfoot-wise? Kriegel suggests that a plausible accountof these properties is that they are phenomenal properties. Phenomenalproperties are usually taken to be non-relational and there isindependent reason to think they give rise to intentionality (see theother arguments in this section). The resulting picture is one onwhich phenomenal intentionality is non-relational. Kriegel suggeststhat this view can be combined with the view that non-phenomenalintentionality is derived from phenomenal intentionality and isrelational.

In short, Kriegel’s argument attempts to show that PIT is thebest way to account for the representation of non-existents.

This argument motivates non-relational versions of PIT. However, itdoes not motivate relational versions of PIT, on which intentionalityis relational. Loar (2003a), Pitt (2009), Kriegel (2007, 2011a), andMendelovici (2010, 2018) hold non-relational versions of PIT, while Pautz(2013) and Bourget (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c) defend a relational version of PIT, on which both phenomenal properties and intentional properties are relational. Speaks (2015) also defends a relational view of phenomenal representation (without endorsing PIT).

Arguing in the direction opposite the preceding considerations, some have challenged PIT on the grounds that intentionality is relational. Ott (2016) raises worries for PIT along such lines, arguing that most versions of PIT fail to adequately explain how phenomenal consciousness can give rise to intentionality, which he takes to necessarily involve a relation to extra-mental reality.

There are two lines of response open to phenomenal intentionalists: One is to maintain that phenomenal consciousness is itself relational in the relevant way. Pautz (2010) and Bourget (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-c) argue that consciousness is a relation to items in extra-mental reality, such as clusters of abstract properties or abstract propositions. Of course, this response gives up on the benefits of non-relational PIT alleged by Kriegel. (Bourget (forthcoming-c) responds to some of Kriegel’s arguments against relationalism.)

Another response is to deny that intentionality secures the required relation to extra-mental reality. Along such lines, Mendelovici (2018, sections 1.3.4 and 9.3.4) argues that it is a substantive question whether intentionality on its own or with the help of additional ingredients secures such a relation. Of course, whether this is so depends on what exactly we mean by “intentionality”. If intentionality involves such a relation by definition, then there is no further substantive question to be asked. But if, as Mendelovici (2010, 2018) and Kriegel (2010) suggest, the core notion of intentionality leaves open this aspect of its nature, it might very well turn out that intentionality does not involve such relations.

Even if intentionality does not involve a relation to extra-mental reality, one might worry that it should at least play a role in facilitating such a relation and that PIT cannot allow for this. But Ott (2016) suggests that PIT can in fact connect us to extra-mental reality through relations of resemblance. Similarly, Mendelovici (2018, chapter 9) argues that intentionality does not involve a connection to extra-mental reality but that truth and reference do and that truth and reference are a matter of a special kind of superficial resemblance called “matching”. Woodward (forthcoming-b) and Bourget (forthcoming-b) challenge Mendelovici’s account of truth and reference for non-relational versions of PIT.

4.7 The argument from predictive accuracy

Another line of argument for PIT begins by noting that theories of intentionality, combined with certain facts about the world, often make predictions as to what particular intentional states represent. For example, a causal theory of intentionality combined with the fact that cows often cause tokens of the concept COW might predict that COW represents the contentcow, which might be the property of being a cow.

One line of argument for PIT is based on the claim that PIT makes correct predictions in certain paradigm cases of intentionality that other theories fail to accommodate. One such case is that of color experience: It is plausible (though not undisputed) that color experiences represent what Chalmers (2006) calls “Edenic colors”—primitive, non-physical, qualitative properties (see also Pautz 2006a, 2009). This might be supported by introspection, epistemic considerations, and considerations of psychological role. But since Edenic colors are arguably not instantiated, it is difficult for causal, informational, teleological, and other “tracking” theories of intentionality to allow us to represent them. Instead, such theories predict that perceptual color representations represent the likes of particular dispositions to reflect, emit, or transfer light of particular wavelengths. In contrast, since Edenic colors “match” the phenomenal characters of color experience, PIT has the resources to make the correct predictions in the case of color experiences. Mendelovici (2018) refers to this as theargument from matching for PIT. Pautz (2006b) makes a related argument against tracking representationalism and for primitivist representationalism based on a structural mismatch between the contents represented by color experience and the properties color experiences track. See alsoCausal Theories of Mental Content.

The argument from predictive accuracy purports to show that PIT is the only theory of intentionality that stands a chance of being empirically adequate (whether it can indeed handle all the cases depends on whether it can deal with challenging cases, such as those discussed insection 6). It does not make a complete case for PIT, but it is an important consideration as part of the overall case for PIT.

4.8 Other arguments for PIT

We will briefly mention a few other lines of argument for PIT.

One revolves around the idea that norms of rationality areconstitutive of (non-phenomenal) intentional states. Pautz writes:

Consciousness grounds rationality because it is implicated in basicepistemic norms. … In turn, the facts about rationality help toconstitutively determine belief and desire (Davidson, Lewis). Soconsciousness also ultimately grounds belief and desire. (Pautz 2014:176)

This line of argument combines two claims that have been defendedindependently. The first is a view of non-phenomenal states (chiefly,propositional attitudes) on which they derive their contents fromnorms of rationality (Davidson 2001, Lewis 1983, Chalmers 2012). Thesecond is the view that consciousness plays a role in determiningrational norms (Siewert 1998, Campbell 2002, Smithies 2012, 2014). Inaddition to the above passage from Pautz, this argument for PIT isalso made in Chalmers 2012: 467 and Pautz 2013: 226.

Another line of argument for PIT is that there is nothing to determinewho a given non-conscious state of mind belongs to unless that stateconsists in a disposition to produce a conscious mental state of theright sort (Ludwig 1996). Kriegel (2003) similarly argues that onlyPIT can account for the fact that intentional states have a subjectiveor “for-me” character.

5. Cognitive phenomenology

Many defenses and elaborations of PIT maintain that occurrent thoughtshave a rich and varied phenomenology. Such a view of thought isrequired by versions of PIT that claim that the contents we normallyattribute to thoughts are phenomenal contents (seesection 6.2). Cognitive phenomenology is also a widely debated topic independentlyof any connection to PIT (see, e.g.,Cognitive Phenomenology,edited by Bayne and Montague 2011).

Advocates of PIT that take thought content to be phenomenal contentmainly focus on arguing for the following two claims:

The term “proprietary” is due to David Pitt (2004).Thought has aproprietary phenomenal character just in casethe phenomenal characters of thoughts are special or unique tothought, i.e., they are not perceptual, verbal, bodily, or affectivephenomenal characters, or other phenomenal characters that are presentin mental states other than thoughts. Following current usage, we callall of the aforementioned kinds of phenomenologysensoryphenomenology and the putative proprietary phenomenology ofthoughtcognitive phenomenology. The claim that thought has aproprietary phenomenology is then just the claim that it has anon-sensory phenomenology.

Thoughts haveindividuative phenomenal characters just incase thoughts with different intentional contents have differentphenomenal characters and thoughts with different phenomenalcharacters have different intentional contents. (We use“individuative” in the way Bayne and Montague (2011: ch.1) use it. Pitt (2004) uses the term “distinctive” for asimilar notion and the term “individuative” to meansomething else.)

While most advocates of PIT take thoughts to have individuativephenomenal characters, this isn’t required by PIT. Grounding PIT can allowthat there is a one-many grounding relation between contents andphenomenal characters. For example, phenomenal propertiesr1andr2 might both ground the intentional property ofrepresentingred₄₂₁. If all intentional propertieswere grounded in this way, PIT would be true, but (Individuative)might not be.

It is possible for thoughts to have proprietary but not individuativephenomenal characters. For example, suppose every thought came witheither a generic feeling of understanding or a generic feeling ofconfusion. These phenomenal characters might be proprietary in thatthey do not occur outside of thoughts, but they are not individuative,since thoughts with different intentional contents might have the samephenomenal characters.

It is also possible for thoughts to have individuative but notproprietary phenomenal characters. For example, suppose every thoughtcame with a different kind of perceptual imagery. Then thoughts withdifferent contents would have different phenomenal characters, butthese phenomenal characters would not be special to thoughts, sinceperceptual states could have them too.

In addition to the claims that there is a proprietary and anindividuative phenomenology of thought, advocates of PIT usually aimto establish that thought’s content is phenomenal intentionalcontent and thus that thought’s intentional properties areobtained in the requisite way from phenomenal properties.

While much of the discussion of the phenomenology of thought involvescareful argumentation and consideration of cases, it is worthmentioning that many advocates of a proprietary phenomenology ofthought find the view obvious and the negation of the view clearlyfalse or even absurd. Strawson writes:

To deny this [cognitive phenomenology], one must hold that the totallifelong character of our lived experience—everything that lifeis to us experientially—consists entirely of bare or puresensation or feeling of one kind or another. It must, for example, befalse to say that anguish at someone’s death includesconscious comprehending believing entertaining of theproposition that he is dead. (Strawson 2011a: 295, italics inoriginal)

In a similar vein, Kriegel writes:

For my part, I am persuaded of the existence of cognitive experience[…] most vividly by something like everyday experientialoverwhelm: it simply seems that my inner life is much more interestingto me than it would be if my conscious experience consisted merely inperceptual experiences. (Kriegel 2011a: 50)

In what follows we discuss the main arguments that have been offeredto supplement such appeals to the alleged obviousness of cognitivephenomenology.

5.1 Phenomenal contrast cases

Phenomenal contrast cases are cases of two thoughts that arealike in sensory phenomenal character but differ in thought content.

Siewert (1998) asks his readers to compare an experience of hearing orreading a sentencewithout understanding, as when one reads adifficult passage without paying attention to it, and an experience ofhearing or reading a sentencewith understanding. There isclearly a phenomenal difference between these cases. Siewert arguesthat the difference is not a difference in verbal or perceptualimagery, since the verbal and perceptual imagery might be the same inboth cases. The best explanation of the phenomenal contrast is thatthought involves proprietary cognitive phenomenology.

Strawson (1994) argues for a kind of “understandingexperience” by contrasting the cases of a monolingual Englishspeaker and a monolingual French speaker listening to the news inFrench. The experiences of the two subjects differ in a way that isnot fully explained by a difference in sensory phenomenology. The bestexplanation involves a difference in cognitive phenomenology. Siewert(1998) also employs examples involving the comparison of hearingsentences in familiar versus unfamiliar languages.

As it stands, Strawson’s argument can only establish thatthought has a proprietary phenomenology, but Kriegel (2011a: 49)extends it to argue that thought has an individuative phenomenology.He asks us to imagine a case of two languages involving graphicallyand phonetically identical words such that the same report can beinterpreted in one language as describing a faraway war and in theother language a children’s bedtime story. Monolingual speakersof each language will experience different phenomenal characters uponreading or hearing this report. The best explanation of this involvesa difference in cognitive phenomenology. This supports the claim thatcognitive phenomenology is individuative.

Other arguments from phenomenal contrast cases aim to create thecontrasting experiences in the reader herself. Horgan and Tienson(2002) present the reader with sentences that are likely to give riseto two different interpretations, such as the following:

On one reading, the sentence is about the act of visiting relatives.On another reading, the sentence is about relatives that visit. Bothreadings are likely to generate the same verbal imagery, but theydiffer in content. Horgan and Tienson encourage the reader to noticethat they also differ in phenomenal character. If this is right, thenthis suggests that thought has a proprietary and individuativephenomenology.

The following sentences are also used to generate phenomenal contrastcases:

(Dogs) might at first be read without understanding, but mightsubsequently be read with understanding, giving rise to a phenomenalcontrast case.(Time) can be read as a cliché or as a command at the insect races.(Bar) can be read as being about an aborted legal career or a trip aroundtown. Again, the claim is that these different readings of thesentences give rise to different phenomenal experiences and that thebest explanation of this is that thought has a proprietary andindividuative phenomenology.

Though instances of pairs of thoughts differing in intentional contentand differing in phenomenal character provide some evidence for theexistence of individuative cognitive phenomenology, in order for thethesis that thought has a individuative phenomenology to be true,there have to be no cases of thoughts that are alike in content butthat differ in phenomenal character. This latter kind of case would be a counterexample to (Individuative). Wilson (2003) responds to Horganand Tienson by accepting their observations in their phenomenalcontrast cases but attempting to provide such a counterexample:

In the spirit of Horgan and Tienson’s appeal for a reader to“pay attention to your own experience” ([2002] p. 521), Ihave just done the decisive experiment: I thought first that GeorgeBush is President of the United States, and had CNN-mediated auditoryand visual phenomenology that focussed on one of his speeches. I thentook a short break, doodled a little, wandered around the room, andthen had a thought with that very same content and … nothing.Or at least nothing distinctly Bush-like, as in the first case.(Wilson 2003: 417)

If Wilson is right, this not only shows that arguments based onphenomenal contrast ultimately fail, but also provides positiveconsiderations against (Individuative), since it shows that there canbe thoughts with the same contents that fail to have the samephenomenal character.

Versions of PIT thatrequire only a one-many relation between phenomenal intentional content and phenomenal character, andhence that do not need to endorse (Individuative), can accommodateobservations such as Wilson’s putative observation, since theyallow that multiple phenomenal characters can ground or constitute thesame phenomenal intentional content.

Another kind of objection to arguments from phenomenal contrast involves agreeingthat there is a phenomenal difference between the relevant cases butclaiming that this difference is exhausted by sensory phenomenology,where this might include the phenomenology of perceptual imagery,affective experience, or verbal imagery (see, e.g., Lormand 1996, Tyeand Wright 2011, Levine 2011, Robinson 2011, Carruthers and Veillet2011). What makes the phenomenal contrast cases described abovevulnerable to this kind of objection is that they do not control forall potential accompanying perceptual imagery. This leaves open thepossibility that the observed phenomenal differences are fullyaccounted for by such imagery.

Chudnoff (2013) provides a phenomenal contrast case that he claimsavoids this reply. He asks his readers to compare the experience of anarray of dots to an experience of the same array of dots experiencedas part of a proof for a mathematical theorem. In the secondexperience, but not in the first, the perceptual experience involvescognitive phenomenology. The array of dots is in some senseexperienced as part of a larger whole, representative of something, orin some sense meaningful. (Chudnoff 2015a,b also contain extensivecritical discussions of phenomenal contrast cases.)

One might worry that, like the original phenomenal contrast cases,Chudnoff’s case does not control for certain forms ofaccompanying imagery, in this case, verbal imagery. The adamantopponent of cognitive phenomenology might insist that just as thephenomenal differences in the phenomenal contrast cases involvingsentences might be explained by perceptual imagery, the differences inChudnoff’s cases can be accounted for by differences in verbalphenomenology.

It might seem that what is needed is a phenomenal contrast case thatplausibly controls for both verbal and perceptual phenomenology, aswell other kinds of sensory phenomenology. Mendelovici (2010: 107)argues that thoughts about chiliagons (one-thousand sided figures) andmegagons (one-million sided figures) might involve the same mentalimagery (both shapes effectively look like circles) and so mightprovide the basis for such cases. Imagine a person who mistakenly usesthe word “megagon” to meanchilliagon. Compareher experience of viewing a chilliagon and thinking that it is achilliagon with your experience of viewing a megagon and thinking thatit is a megagon. Since you both use the word “megagon” todescribe the shape you are thinking about, and since the twoshapes are perceptually similar, you will likely have the sameperceptual and verbal imagery. If there is a phenomenal differencebetween the two cases, it is plausibly attributed to a difference inthought content.

5.2 Spontaneous thoughts

Siewert (1998, 2011) claims that sudden realizations are cases inwhich cognitive phenomenology is particularly noticeable.

[Y]ou are standing at the door to your house, reaching in your pantspocket for the door key, and find it empty. You feel a sudden panic;you think perhaps you have locked yourself out; you try to rememberwhere you put the keys, then recall switching them to your coat pocketearlier; you reach and find them there—relief. (Siewert 1998:277)

I meet a friend, and she asks me, “Did you bring thebook?” For a moment I am at a loss as to what book she’stalking about—and then I realize in an instant what book it is.(Siewert 2011: 258)

Siewert claims that such realizations needn’t involve any verbalor perceptual imagery. In the case of the first example, youdon’t think the words “I have locked myself out” orvisualize your keys. Siewert takes these and other similar examples toshow that thought has a proprietary phenomenology.

Similarly, in order to argue that the phenomenal properties of thoughtare not merely associated with verbal imagery, Horgan and Tienson(2002) point to examples of spontaneous thoughts we have when engagingin activities such as cooking or working in a garage or woodshop:

There is something that it is like to think that a certain tool isjust there—in that cabinet, say—but such beliefs aretypically not verbalized either vocally or subvocally or by way ofverbal imagery. (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 523)

Like Siewert’s examples, this example helps motivate the claimthat thought has a proprietary phenomenology.

This line of argument relies heavily on introspection. Unfortunately, detractors ofcognitive phenomenology (for example, Robinson 2011 and Tye &Wright 2011) claim that their own observations of sudden realizationreveal less phenomenology, resulting in an apparent stalemate.

5.3 The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon

Some experiences with a cognitive character seem to make a fairly goodcase for a minimal amount of proprietary phenomenology of thought. Forexample, Goldman (1993a) invokes the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon toargue that thought has a proprietary phenomenology, an argument heattributes to Jackendoff (1987).

When one tries to say something but can’t think of the word, oneis phenomenologically aware of having requisite conceptual structure,that is, of having a determinate thought-content one seeks toarticulate. What is missing is the phonological form: the sound of thesought-for word. The absence of this sensory quality, however, doesnot imply that nothing (relevant) is in awareness. Entertaining theconceptual unit has a phenomenology, just not a sensory phenomenology.(Goldman 1993a: 24)

The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon occurs when one cannot think of aword, so it involves theabsence of verbal phenomenologycorresponding to that word. But instances of this phenomenon doinvolvesome phenomenology. Goldman proposes that thisphenomenology is non-sensory.

Lormand (1996) responds to this suggestion by providing an alternativeaccount of the relevant phenomenology on which it is sensory, which healso takes to be supported by Jackendoff 1987. According to Lormand,the relevant phenomenology involves a sensory phenomenal experience ofa void, which is akin to hearing silence, along with an experience ofeffort, whose phenomenology is also sensory.

5.4 Epistemic markers of consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness has various epistemic markers: It gives riseto (at least the appearance of) an explanatory gap (see Levine 1983and the entry onconsciousness), it is susceptible to zombie thought experiments (see Chalmers 1996and the entry onzombies), and it is susceptible to the knowledge argument (see Jackson 1982 andthe entryQualia: The Knowledge Argument). These arguments usually focus on sensory phenomenal consciousness.For example, Levine’s central example is that of pain andJackson’s is that of experiencing red.

The initial plausibility of these kinds of arguments might be taken toserve as an indicator of phenomenal consciousness: plausibly, if thesearguments have some traction with some mental state, then that mentalstate is likely to have phenomenal properties. Some have used thepresence or absence of such markers to argue for or against cognitivephenomenology.

Goldman (1993b) argues that a version of Jackson’s (1982)thought experiment can be run with propositional attitudes, such asdoubt and disappointment:

Jackson’s example is intended to dramatize the claim that thereare subjective aspects of sensations that resist capture infunctionalist terms. I suggest a parallel style of argument forattitude types. Just as someone deprived of any experience of colorswould learn new things upon being exposed to them, viz., what it feelslike to see red, green, and so forth, so (I submit) someone who hadnever experienced certain propositional attitudes, e.g., doubt ordisappointment, would learn new things on first undergoing theseexperiences. There is “something it is like” to have theseattitudes, just as much as there is “something it is like”to see red. (Goldman 1993b: 365)

In other words, Goldman argues that Jackson’s thought experimentis compelling in the case of propositional attitudes and that thissupports the claim that propositional attitudes have proprietaryphenomenal properties above and beyond functional properties.(Presumably, Goldman intends his argument to apply only to occurrentpropositional attitudes, since he takes standing states to be purelydispositional (1993b: 366).) Goff (2012) makes similar observations.

Horgan (2011a) also uses epistemic indicators of phenomenalconsciousness to argue for cognitive phenomenology. He argues thatsince partial zombies lacking cognitive phenomenology are conceivableand phenomenally different from us, we have cognitive phenomenology.

Interestingly, Carruthers and Veillet (2011) use epistemic indicatorsto argue against cognitive phenomenology. They claim that thought isnot susceptible to the explanatory gap, and thus that there is nocognitive phenomenology.

5.5 Self-knowledge

Pitt (2004) argues that there is a kind of self-knowledge that canonly be explained by cognitive phenomenology. Pitt’s argumentnot only aims to establish that there is a proprietary andindividuative cognitive phenomenology but also that thisphenomenology isconstitutive of thought’s content,i.e., that thought’s content is phenomenal intentional content.

Pitt’s argument runs as follows: Normally, we can consciously,introspectively, and non-inferentially (1) distinguish an occurrentthought from other mental states, (2) distinguish an occurrent thoughtfrom other occurrent thoughts, and (3) identify which occurrentthoughts we are thinking. Pitt considers various explanations of theseabilities, and argues that the only plausible explanation is thatthought has a proprietary, individuative, and constitutivephenomenology. Thought’s proprietary phenomenology explains howwe can tell the difference between thoughts and other kinds of mentalstates, thought’s individuative phenomenology explains how wecan tell the difference between one thought and another, andthought’s phenomenology being constitutive of its contentexplains how we can identify which thoughts we are thinking.

Levine (2011) argues that Pitt (2004) fails to rule out an alternativeexplanation of the relevant kind of self-knowledge: immediateself-knowledge is a matter of non-inferentially coming to have anintentional state that represents that one is thinking what one is infact thinking. In having such a state, one is automatically aware ofits content. Pitt (2011) responds that, when properly understood,Levine’s proposal can’t work unless there is the contestedkind of cognitive phenomenology.

Goldman (1993a,b) also uses considerations from self-knowledge toargue for a phenomenology of thought. He argues that the way we cantell what mental states we are in is not through their functionalroles or neural properties, but through their phenomenal properties.In the case of cognitive states, the best explanation for how we candiscriminate between different strengths of desires or degrees ofbelief is that thoughts have an accompanying phenomenology.

6. Challenges for PIT

PIT faces both in-principle challenges and empirical challenges. Wehave already discussed the in-principle worry that phenomenalconsciousness is not metaphysically sufficient for intentionality(seesection 4.1). Here, wefocus on the empirical challenges PIT faces in accommodating specifickinds of mental states.

The problematic mental states are those that might reasonably be taken to have intentionality without havingphenomenal intentionality. Here we will discuss four types of mentalstate that give rise to challenges of this kind: thoughts, standingpropositional attitudes, wide intentional states, and occurrentunconscious states. These states don’t seem to be phenomenalintentional states, so it is not immediately clear how PIT can accommodatethem.

There are three general strategies for handling a problematic state:eliminativism, inflationism, and derivativism.Eliminativismconsists in denying the existence of the putative intentional state(or denying that it is anintentional state).Inflationism consists in claiming that the state in questionis a phenomenal intentional state. In the case of thought, thisstrategy often involves arguing for rich cognitive phenomenology (seesection 5).Derivativism agrees that the problematic state is not aphenomenal intentional state, but maintains that it nonethelessderives its content in part from phenomenal intentional states and so is at least partly grounded in such states. We will now discuss thesestrategies in more detail in relation to the four problematic kinds ofstates.

6.1 Thoughts

Thoughts are occurrent conceptual states, the kinds of states we have when we think, reflect, or muse over something. Examples of thoughts includejudgments, occurrent beliefs, and occurrent desires. Thoughts, especially thoughtsabout abstract ideas such as democracy and the square root function,might seem to lack phenomenal properties. Even if thoughts havephenomenal properties, it does not seem that these phenomenalproperties are rich or determinate enough to fully account for theirintentional properties. For example, these phenomenal properties might seem to belimited to verbal and visual imagery.

Inflationism is the most widely endorsed strategy for dealing withoccurrent thoughts, at least in cases of thoughts that do not seem tohave wide contents (see6.3 below for the latter). Strawson (1994, 2008), Siewert (1998), Horgan &Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009)all hold that occurrent thought has a phenomenology that is rich anddeterminate enough to fix its intentional contents. Horgan &Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson & Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009)also argue that the difference between beliefs, desires, and otherkinds of attitudes is phenomenally constituted. The case for thisapproach rests on thearguments for cognitive phenomenology we discuss above.

In contrast, Loar (2003a,b), Bourget (2010, 2015), and Mendelovici (2010, 2018) maintainthat thoughts have a fairly impoverished phenomenology that cannotfully constitute all the contents we might want to attribute to them.Loar (2003a,b) endorses a derived content strategy on which much ofthought’s content is determined by the “lateralconnections” between thoughts and other mental states. Thenetwork of interconnected states eventually derives its content fromphenomenal intentional states. Bourget (2010) adopts a derived contentstrategy on which thoughts derive their contents from phenomenalintentional states through a variety of derivation mechanisms.

Mendelovici (2010, 2018) has a largely eliminativist take on theintentionality of thought. Like Pitt (2004, 2009), she holds that allintentional states are phenomenal intentional states, but unlike Pitt, shemaintains that the phenomenology of thought is too impoverished tocapture all the contents we might pre-theoretically want to attributeto thoughts. However, she recognizes the existence of derivedrepresentational contents, which capture the rich contents we tend toattribute to thoughts. Derived representational states are not strictlyspeaking intentional states, but they fill the role that intentionalstates with rich contents have been thought to play.

6.2 Standing propositional attitudes

Standing propositional attitudes are states one is in independently ofwhat one is thinking about or experiencing at the time (i.e., independentlyof one’s occurrent states). For example, five minutes ago youhad the standing belief that monkeys like bananas even though youweren’t occurrently thinking that content. Standingpropositional attitudes do not seem to have phenomenal properties, andso, it seems their intentionality is not phenomenalintentionality.

As far as we can tell, no one has applied the inflationist strategy tostanding propositional attitudes—no one claims that they arephenomenal intentional states.

Strawson (2008) and Mendelovici (2010, 2018) adopt the eliminativiststrategy as part of their defenses of PIT: they deny that standingbeliefs and other standing propositional attitudes are intentionalstates. As Strawson puts it, “To have a belief is not to be inany contentful mental state.” (p. 271) Rather, it is to bedisposed to be in such a state. Horgan & Tienson (2002)are not eliminativists about the intentionality of standing states,but they do not consider them part of the scope of their version ofPIT.

Searle (1990, 1991, 1992), Bourget (2010), and Kriegel (2011a,b) favorderivativism about standing states. Searle holds that non-phenomenalintentional states have their intentionality in virtue ofsubjects’ dispositions to have conscious states. This accountapplies most naturally to standing propositional attitudes. Bourget(2010) holds a similar but more nuanced view according to whichstanding propositional attitudes derive from connections to occurrentthoughts, which themselves either are phenomenal intentional states orderive their contents from distinct phenomenal intentional states (seethe next section on the derivativist strategy for thoughts).

The simple derived content approach defended by Searle and Bourget isopen to well-known objections. One of these objections, discussed byPeacocke (1998), is that a state that causes occurrent thoughts to theeffect thatP is not a belief thatP unless it isaccompanied by the right behavior. Imagine someone who claims not tobe sexist and tends to form occurrent non-sexist thoughts but whobehaves in demonstrably sexist ways. Such an individual is naturallysaid to have unconscious sexist beliefs.

Kriegel’s (2011a,b) account aims to explain standing states andunconscious occurrent states in a unified way. On his account, whichhe callsinterpretivism, a non-phenomenal states hasa certain derived intentional contentC just in case an idealinterpreter is disposed to ascribeC tos. An idealinterpreter is a being that is perfectly rational and knows all thephenomenal and non-phenomenal (but not derivatively intentional) factsabout the world. On the resulting derivativist view, non-phenomenalintentional states derive from an ideal interpreter’s phenomenalintentional states.

The disagreement between eliminativism and derivativism about standingstates might be partly terminological. Most of the above-mentionedtheorists agree that standing states are a matter of a certain kind ofdisposition to have phenomenal states. What they disagree on iswhether the potentially conscious or dispositional states count asintentional states.

6.3 Wide intentional states

Wide intentional states are intentional states that depend onrelations to items in our environments. They are states for which externalism is true(seesection 4.3). Prime candidates of wideintentional states are thoughts about natural kinds (e.g.,H₂O) and thoughts about individual objects (e.g., Bill Gates).Arguably, subjects that are phenomenally alike and have all thesame phenomenal intentional states can nonetheless differ in theirwide intentional states. So, it seems that wide intentional states arenot phenomenal intentional states.

A Twin Earth case helps illustrate the options available in the caseof wide intentional states (see Putnam 1975). Consider twoindividuals, Alice and Twin Alice. Alice lives on Earth, while TwinAlice lives on a copy of Earth located far away from us in this world.Let us suppose that Alice and Twin Alice are phenomenalduplicates: they instantiate all the same phenomenal properties throughout their existences.

Alice and Twin Alice each have a brother called “Bob”. WhenAlice thinks a thought that she would express by making the sounds“Bob is happy”, it seems that her thought is true at justthe worlds where Bob is happy. By contrast, it seems that the thoughtthat Twin Alice expresses with “Bob is happy” in heridiolect is one that is true at just the worlds whereTwinBob is happy. So it looks like the Alices’ thoughts havedifferent truth conditions. This suggests that the Alices’thoughts have different contents. Alice’s thought representsthat Bob is happy, while Twin Alice’s thought represents thatTwin Bob is happy. The Alices’ “Bob”-thoughts areparadigmatic examples of putatively broad intentional states.

Few advocates of PIT seem to endorse an inflationist strategy forbroad intentional states. Even advocates of PIT who take consciousnessto be relational seem to agree that what a subject getsrelated to in consciousness depends solely on her intrinsic properties(Pautz 2010). However, Campbell (2002) holds that perceptualexperience is broad and intentional, and his view might be counted asa type of phenomenal intentionality theory.

Siewert (1998), Kriegel (2007), and Farkas (2008a) adopt aneliminativist strategy with respect to broad intentional states. Theirviews are the same in broad outline. On their views, the twoAlices’ thoughts have the same content, and that content isnarrow. We can account for the fact that the two Alices’thoughts are made true by different Bobs by adding contextualparameters to their shared content: their shared content is not afunction from possible worlds to truth values but a function frompossible worlds and relevant elements of context to truth values. Theintroduction of contexts enables us to account for the fact that theAlices’ thoughts are true at different worlds. For example, one(over-simplistic) view along these lines could state that the sharedcontent of the two Alices’ thoughts can be modeled as a functionfrom worldsW and contexts of useC that returns truejust in case the person that bears the name “Bob” inC is happy inW. Given that different contexts arerelevant to Alice and Twin Alice, different worlds can satisfy thecommon thought they express as “Bob is happy”. If this isthe right way to think about content, the Bobs’ case and othercases motivating broad content do not force us to recognize broadcontents.

Pitt (1999, 2011) also endorses an eliminativist strategy, arguingagainst externalist intuitions. Mendelovici (2010, 2018) also endorseseliminativism but claims that she can capture many externalistintuitions through the notion of derived mental representation (seethe previous section).

Derivativist strategies have also been applied to broadcontents (Loar 2003a,b, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Horgan, Tienson &Graham 2004, Bourget 2010, Chalmers 2010). The idea here is that broadintentional states have two contents: a phenomenally constitutednarrow content, and a broad content that is determined by the narrowcontent together with relevant factors in the environment. SoAlice’s thought has two contents: one narrow and one broad. Thebroad content of her thought is true at just the worlds where Bob ishappy. The narrow content is true at the worlds where a person bearingcertain Bob-like characteristics is happy. The relevant Bob-likecharacteristics might, for example, centrally involve being called“Bob” by people of a certain community.

Of course, such a derivativist approach is compatible with other accounts of the narrow content of Alice’sthought. The options available to proponents of PIT are thesame as for theories of narrow content in general. For instance, thisderivativist approach can draw on all the resources oftwo-dimensional theories of narrow content (see Chalmers 2002a and theentries ontwo-dimensional semantics andnarrow mental content).

Pautz (2008, 2013, 2017) offers a related derivativist approach that he dubsconsciousness-based best systems theory. On this view, facts about (sensory)phenomenal states and their internal causal roles fix the facts aboutwhat is rational for an agent to believe. These facts aboutrationality in turn fix the narrow contents of an individual’sbeliefs. Wide contents are fixed by causal relations between beliefsand the environment.

6.4 Unconscious occurrent states

Cognitive science posits various kinds of occurrent unconsciousrepresentation, e.g., dorsal stream states and internalrepresentations of syntactic structures. It seems that such stateshave intentional properties but lack phenomenal properties, so theirintentionality cannot be phenomenal intentionality.

Some supporters of PIT adopt an eliminativist strategy towards suchunconscious states. Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) argues, roughly, for theclaim that only conscious or potentially conscious states exhibitintentionality. Since most unconscious states posited by cognitivescience are not potentially conscious, they are not intentional.Searle presents this view of unconscious states as being in conflictwith cognitive science. In contrast, Graham, Horgan, and Tienson(2007) and Mendelovici (2018) highlight the agreement between theassumptions of cognitive science and eliminativism about unconsciousstates: everyone agrees that unconscious states play functional roles,bear tracking relations to things in the environment, and have nophenomenal properties. Everyone also agrees that it can be fruitful totreat unconscious states as if they represented certain contents. Themain disagreement is over whether unconscious states really do qualifyas intentional.

Bourget (2010, 2015) and Pitt (2009,Other Internet Resources) suggest that an inflationist strategy may be acceptable in case of atleast some unconscious occurrent states. On their views, we can havephenomenal states that we are not aware of. Unconscious occurrentstates could be such states.

A derived content strategy is also an option in the case of someunconscious occurrent states. Bourget (2010) argues for this strategyby arguing for the claim that the low-level systems that allegedly supportunconscious occurrent intentional states don’t seem intentionalwhen they are taken out of the organisms in which they belong.Kriegel’s interpretivism (2011a,b) is also meant to apply tounconscious occurrent states (seesection 6.2).

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Acknowledgments

Many thanks to David Chalmers, Daniel Stoljar, and SEP’sanonymous referees for extensive comments and discussion. Thanks alsoto Kati Farkas, Adam Pautz, and David Pitt for very helpful commentson previous drafts of this entry.