Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy

First published Thu Dec 2, 2010; substantive revision Tue Jan 12, 2021

Classical Indian Philosophy accepts perception(pratyakṣa), or perceptual experience, as the primarymeans of knowledge (pramāṇa). Perception(pratyakṣa) is etymologically rooted in thesense-faculty or the sense-organ (akṣa) and can betranslated as sensory awareness, whilepramāṇa, onthe other hand, is derived from knowledge (pramā) and,literally means ‘the instrument in the act of knowing’.However, the standard interpretation of perception accepted byclassical Indian philosophers, barring the Buddhists and theVedāntins, is that it is a cognition arising within theself—the knowing subject—from mental operations followinga sense-object contact. It, therefore, is neither an instrument in theact of knowing, nor a mere sensory awareness. Definitions ofperception from various classical Indian philosophy schools are givenin section 2 below.

The same is true of concepts. There is no one agreed notion ordefinition of concept understood as the meaning of a general term inClassical Indian Philosophy. Rather, we have a variety of viewsranging from robust realism about concepts as real properties,essences or universals to extreme nominalism which admits only ofunique particulars with versions of conceptualism in between. Therobust realist position is defended by theNyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsāschools, the nominalist by the Buddhist schools and the conceptualistby the Vedāntins and Jainas. I will not be discussing theconceptualist position or their arguments here because ultimately thisposition ends up collapsing into a version of realism ornominalism.

1. Introduction

The etymology of perception in Sanskrit underlines a major and,perhaps the most controversial, issue in classical Indianepistemology, viz. is the sensory coreall there is to thecontent of a perceptual experience? Put differently, it is askedwhether thecontent of a perceptual experience is restrictedto being unconceptualized (nirvikalpaka), or can any part ofit be conceptualized (savikalpaka) as well? TheNaiyāyikas generally take perception to be a two-staged process:first there arises a non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perceptionof the object and then a conceptual (savikalpaka) perception,both being valid cognitions. For Buddhists, non-conceptual perceptionsalone are valid, while Grammarians (Śābdikas) deny theirvalidity altogether. Sāṃkhya andMīmāṃsā agree with the Nyāya position. Thesetwo realist schools, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā,contest the Grammarian as well as the Buddhist positions. AdvaitaVedānta position on perception seems to agree, in spirit, withthe Buddhists, but their reasons for supporting non-conceptualperceptions alone as ultimately valid (paramārthikasatta) are very different. This debate, on the role of conceptsin perception, is discussed in detail in section 3.

Yet another debate about the nature of universals and concepts loomsin the background of this debate. How do we know universals orconcepts? The Buddhist introduce the doctrine of apoha to provide theresources for constructing concepts from sensory content to furtherthe nominalist project of explaining thought and language in a worldof particulars. In response to Buddhist nominalism, Nyāyaphilosophers present a defense of realism in the course of which theyargue for a theory of real perceivable universals. This debate will bethe focus of secion 4.

A very critical question germane to these epistemological issues israised by the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 4th century CE): howdo we distinguish veridical perceptions from the non-veridical ones?This is taken up in the last section.

Before we start out with the definitions, the following observationmay be noted. It is true that the classical Indian philosophers wereseriously concerned with the notions of enlightenment, the highestgood, freedom from the cycle of rebirth and the attainment of ultimatebliss, etc. Therefore, some even question whether they were concernedwith any epistemological questions at all, much less the ones raisedhere? But they were! For Naiyāyikas, in particular, this was amajor focus: the reason offered in the early Nyāya tradition, inVātsyāyana’s (c. 450–500 CE) commentary on theNyāya-sūtra, is that without knowledge of objectsthere is no success in practical response to them. Not veryenlightening, perhaps. However, a much sharper justification comesfrom Gaṅgeśa (c. 12th century CE), the founder of theNavya-Nyāya school, in the introduction to his great work,Jewel Of Reflection On The Truth(Tattvacintāmaṇi):

In order that discerning persons may have interest in studying thework, Akṣapāda Gautama (c. 2nd century CE) laid down thesūtra: ‘Attainment of the highest good comes fromright knowledge.’.

It should not then be surprising that one of the most sophisticatedclassical Indian treatises dealing with perception,Kumārila’s (c. 7th century CE)Pratyakṣapariccheda (a portion ofŚlokavārttika pertaining to the fourthsūtra ofMīmāṃsā-sūtra), discusses thenature and validity of perception without any consideration of itsrole in the ascertainment of religious and moral truth; in fact, theMīmāṃsā-sūtra itself characterizesperception as not being ameans of knowing righteousness(Dharma). It is true that epistemological debates inclassical Indian philosophy arose in the religio-philosophicalcontext; however, there is plenty of evidence on record to show thatclassical Indian philosophers were haunted by the very sameepistemological concerns that have troubled the minds of Westernphilosophers through the ages. The controversial classical Indianepistemology issue—whether perception is conceptualized ornot?—continues to be debated in the Western and Indianphilosophy journals even today. That said, what makes this historicalinquiry significant is that the epistemological issues in classicalIndian philosophy are introduced against the backdrop of radicallydifferent metaphysical and ethical presuppositions.

2. Perspectives on Perception

Most classical Indian philosophical schools accept perception as theprimary means of knowledge, but differ on the nature, kinds andobjects of perceptual knowledge. Here we first survey Buddhist andorthodox Hindu schools’ definitions of perception (excludingVaiśeṣika and Yoga schools since they simply take on boardNyāya and Sāṃkhya ideas, respectively) and note theissues raised by these definitions. As mentioned above, the orthodoxschools generally accept both non-conceptualized (indeterminate) andconceptualized (determinate) perceptual states in sharp contrast tothe Buddhist view that perception is always non-conceptualized orindeterminate awareness.

2.1 Buddhist nominalism

The oldest preserved definition of perception in the Buddhisttradition is the one by Vasubandhu (c. 4^th century CE),“Perception is a cognition [that arises] from that object [whichis represented therein]” (Frauwallner, 1957, p. 120). However,the more influential and much discussed view is that of later BuddhistYogācāra philosopher Diṅnāga (c. 480–540CE) for whom perception is simply a cognition “devoid ofconceptual construction (kalpanāpodhaṃ)”.Taber (2005, p. 8) notes two important implications of thisdefinition. First, perception is non-conceptual in nature; no seeingis seeing-as, because that necessarily involves intervention ofconceptual constructs, which contaminate the pristine given.Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars without anyidentification or association with words for, according toDiṅnāga, such association always results in falsificationof the object. Referents of the words are universals which, for theBuddhist, are not real features of the world. Second,Diṅnāga’s definition only indicates aphenomenological feature of perception; it says nothing about itsorigin and does not imply that it arises from the contact of a sensefaculty with the object. Therefore, for the Buddhist idealist, theobject that appears in perceptual cognition need not be an externalphysical object, but a form that arises within consciousness itself.Both these ideas led to vigorous debates in classical Indianphilosophy between the Hindus and the Buddhists. The first of theseideas relates to the notion of non-conceptual perception, the secondto idealism. Diṅnāga’s philosophy isidealist-nominalist in spirit and his epistemological position is insync with the Buddhist metaphysical doctrines of no-self, evanescenceof all that exists and emptiness which, expectedly, evoke strongreaction from the realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika andMīmāṃsā schools.

In recent literature, there has been a scholarly debate on whether theIndian Yogācāra philosophy is a form of idealism or not.This debate is murky because there are various versions of idealismdiscussed in the literature in Buddhist philosophy. At least threeversions have been discussed in recent literature in Buddhistphilosophy: subjective idealism (the view that there are nomind-independent objects); metaphysical idealism (the view thatexternal objects do not exist); and, epistemic idealism (the view thatwhat we are immediately aware of is intrinsic to cognition). Lusthaus(2002) and Coseru (2012) have argued, respectively, for a“phenomenological” and “phenomenalistnaturalist” interpretation of Yogācāra in oppositionto the standard idealist interpretation. The main argument for thephenomenological reading is that the epistemic claims made by theYogācāra philosophers do not commit them to ontologicalclaims. This would avoid the charge of metaphysical idealism but isstill open to being interpreted as offering an epistemic or subjectiveidealism. Lusthaus sees Yogācāra philosophers’ denialof solipsism and affirmation of other minds as a fatal blow to thesubjective idealist interpretation of Yogācāra. Idealismdoes not necessitate solipsism as is made clear in Berkeley’sversion of subjective idealism and Hegel’s absolute idealismwhich explicitly requires other minds. Thus, there is reason to thinkthat the epistemic idealist interpretation of Yogācāra isnot threatened by its commitment to other minds.

Kellner and Taber (2014) have argued that Vasubandhu’s arguesfor a standard metaphysical idealist position, which is to deny theexistence of physical objects outside of consciousness.Kellner andTaber (2014) also present a new reason for the revival of the standardidealist reading of Yogācāra. Their argument for thisreading is based on Vasubandhu’s argumentative strategy ratherthan the logical structure of individual proofs. They claim that intheViṃśikā Vasubandhu uses the argument fromignorance, according to which, the absence of external objects isderived from the absence of evidence for their existence. They alsonote that Vasubandhu uses the same strategy to refute the existence ofthe self in theAbhidharmakośabhāṣya IX. Theargument from ignorance seems like a bad strategy. It is often listedas a logical fallacy of the general form: since statementP isnot known or proved to be true,P is false. But because thegeneral form of the argument is bad, it does not necessarily followthat every argument of that form is unsuccessful. It may well succeedbecause of other features, for example the semantic meanings of theterms or when the arguments are arguments to the best explanation.Kellner and Taber emphasise that some arguments from ignorance aresuccessful when they function as arguments to the best explanationespecially in contexts where there are agreed-upon standards ofverification. For example, the medical community agrees that the mostaccurate and sensitive test for typhoid is testing the bone marrow forSalmonella typhi bacteria. If it turns out that it cannot be proventhat one has typhoid (because of the lack of Salmonella typhi bacteriain one’s bone marrow), then it is false that one has typhoid. Nomatter how suggestive the symptoms are, if the specific bacteria donot show up in the bone marrow within a specific time period, then onedoes not have typhoid. So, then, the question is: IsVasubandhu’s argument from ignorance successful for establishingidealism? I fear not. That is because there are no universallyagreed-upon criteria among Classical Indian philosophers (not evenamong fellow-Buddhists) as to what counts as evidence for theexistence of external things.

More recently in a series of papers on Buddhist idealism, Kellner(2017a) revisits Vasubandhu’s argument from ignorance toestablish the non-existence of external objects andDharmakīrti’s objections to it. Dharmakīrti was amongthe first Indian logician’s to pay attention to how we can knowabout non-existence. Dharmakīrti is worried about the validity ofarguments from ignorance in general and was the first to argue thatthese arguments cannot be used to establish the absence of a class ofentities. He posits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as aspecial kind of reason (hetu) to prove non-existence ofobjects, but is careful to qualify again that non-apprehension canonly prove the situationally specific absence of particular objects,it cannot prove the non-existence of an entire class of objects.Arguments from ignorance and non-apprehension cannot prove theontological non-existence of objects. Dharmakīrti thus is onlyinterested in supporting the weaker epistemic idealist position thatexternal objects are imperceptible. As far as his arguments go theynever establish anything beyond this conclusion. Some, for exampleRatié (2014, 361) argue that Dharmakīrti does not need toadd anything to this to establish the stronger metaphysical idealism.The stronger thesis follows because of his ontological principle“to be is to be causally efficacious”(arthakriyā). If external objects are completelyimperceptible in that they cannt even produce the minimal effect ofperceptual awareness, then they are as good as being non-existent.Kellner, however, notes that such a conclusion is excluded byDharmakīrti’s logical theory which highlights theevidential gap between imperceptibility and non-existence. For him,absence of evidence does not equate to evidence of absence.

Dharmakīrti’s target is to show that external objects areimperceptible, any further conclusion about the existence or otherwiseis totally irrelevant, only to be oursued by those interested infutile metaphysical arguments. Following Kellner (2017b) his argmentsfor the imperceptibility of external obejcts can be divided into twogroups. The first group of arguments point to defects in the realisttheory of perception supported by the Hindus and fellow Buddhists. Thesecond group focuses on positive argument against the imperceptibilityof external objects based on the nature of cognition. It is this groupwhich contains Dharmakīrti’s distinctive and novelcontribution to the debate and deserve much more attention than theyhave received in the contemporary philosophical literature. The firstgroup of arguments leads Dharmakīrti to conclude theself-reflexive nature of cognition. Cognition is ‘aware ofitself’ and of nothing else. The second group of arguments thendefends this conclusion by appeal to the nature of cognition.

Dharmakīrti begins by pointing to the well-known fact that thereis incongruence between the external object and our perception of it.Visual perception, for example, is limited to certain aspects orfeatures of the object. The external object as a whole is nevervisually perceived. We do not perceive cups and pots, but only itscolour, shape, size and so on. So, he asks, what reason is there tocup and pots over and above visual perception of shapes, sizes andcolours. This incongruence allows him to conclude that perception doesnot have the form of the external object or it’s form isdeviant. Next he questions whether the realist commitment to causationand resemblance between the form (image, impression) and the externalobject establishes that perception must have external objects.Causation cannot work on its own by virtue of the well-known fact thatour cognitions can and do have internal mental causes. And the notionof resemblance is too weak and vague to do any real work inindexically linking particular forms to objects in front ofone’s eyes. These two negative arguments suggest the conclusionthat there is no external object to be experienced by cognition. Thisconclusion is then supported by two further positive argumentsreferred to assaṃvedana-argument and thesahopalambhaniyama-inference in the literature. Thesaṃvedana-argument appeals to the nature of cognitionas that which appears in a certain way. And this“appearing-to-in-a-certain-way” highlights theintransitive nature of cognition. Cogniton by its nature isself-illuminating, it shines forth itself. This argument is no doubtterse and can do with further explication but Dharmakīrti doesnot elaborate. The second argument,sahopalambhaniyama-inference is also tersely encapsulated ina single sentence in the text: “No object [is observed] withoutawareness, nor is an awareness observed being experienced without anobject; thus they are not different”(Pratyakṣapariccheda, 390). Taber (2010, 292–3)presents a useful reconstruction of the argument. The argument drawson the logical principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: two thingshaving exactly the same properties are identical. However, theargument at issue just points to sharing of one crucial propert: theproperty of being perceived at the same time. This crucial property isregarded as sufficient evidence to establish that the two things are“non-different”. Both these arguments deserve furtherelaboration before we can properly assess whether they are succesfulin establishing the conclusion. This new literature in ceratinly astart in the right direction and opens up new research questions forcontemporary philosophers.

2.2 Nyāya realism

The most comprehensive, and the most influential, definition ofperception in classical Indian philosophy is offered inGautama’sNyāya-sūtra 1.1.4:

Perception is a cognition which arises from the contact of the senseorgan and object and is not impregnated by words, is unerring, andwell-ascertained.

Expectedly, each part of this definition has raised controversy andcriticism. If perception is a cognition (and non-erroneous), then itis a state of knowledge, rather than a means to knowing! How does thatconstitute a primary means of knowledge? Some Naiyāyikacommentators, Vācaspati Miśra (c. 900–980 CE) andJayanta Bhaṭṭa (c. 9th century CE) among them, suggestthat thesūtra is to be understood by adding to it theterm ‘from which (yataḥ),’ since theprecedingsūtra-s indicates that Gautama’sformulation of thissūtra was intended to define aninstrument of knowledge. Another issue has been the interpretation ofthe word ‘contact’. In what sense are the eye and the ear,the sense organs for vision and auditory perception, respectively, incontact with their objects? Here a careful look at the term‘sannikarṣa,’ generally translated ascontact, helps resolve the issue;‘Sannikarṣa’ literally means ‘drawingnear,’ and can be interpreted as being incloseconnection with or in thevicinity of. Thus perception isthat which arises out of a close connection between the sense organand its object.

More substantial debates on the nature of perception focus on theadjectives in the latter part of thesūtra, viz.,non-verbal (avyapadeśyam), non-erroneous ornon-deviating (avyabhichāri), and well-ascertained orfree from doubt (vyavasāyātmaka). There is somedisagreement among the Naiyāyika commentators about theinterpretations of the adjectives non-verbal and well-ascertained.Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on theNyāya-sūtra, argues that the adjectives non-verbaland well-ascertained are really part of the definition; non-verbal topoint out that perceptual knowledge is not associated with words(Bhartṛhari, the famous Grammarian, on the other hand, holdsthat awareness is necessarily constituted by words and apprehendedthrough them) and well-ascertained to affirm that perceptual knowledgeis only of a definite particular and specifically excludes situationsin which the perceiver may be in doubt whether a perceived object‘a’ is anF or aG. VācaspatiMiśra, argues that the adjective well-ascertained need not beused to exclude the so-called perception in the form of doubt, asdoubtful knowledge, being invalid, is already excluded by theadjective non-erroneous. Rather, the termvyavasāyātmaka stands for determinate perceptualjudgment. Thus understood, the adjectivesnon-verbal anddeterminate seem to be complementary; a piece ofnon-verbal perceptual knowledge cannot be said to be, at thesame time,determinate. Vācaspati Miśra posits thatthese two adjectives indicate two different forms of perceptualcognition and are not to be regarded as its defining characteristics.According to him, Gautama included these adjectives to identify twokinds of perceptual knowledge:avyapadeśyamindicates non-conceptual or non-verbal perception andvyavasāyātmaka indicates conceptual or determinateperceptions. He contends that by the term non-verbal, Gautama refutesthe Grammarian view and includes non-conceptual perception and, by theterm well-ascertained, he refutes the Buddhist view and includesconceptual or judgemental perceptions as valid. Pradyot Mondal (1982)traces the history of this controversy among Naiyāyikas. Heoffers overwhelming scholarly evidence in favor of the view thatNaiyāyikas mostly regard the adjectives as part of the definitionof perception and do not agree with Vācaspati’sinterpretation. For most Naiyāyikas “non-verbal” isincluded to deny the causal role of words in origination of perceptualcognition and, therefore, it applies to non-conceptual and conceptualperceptions both, the difference being that the former isinexpressible in language, while the latter is not. Thus Mondal claimsthat the adjective “non-verbal” is sufficient on its ownto reject the Grammarian and the Buddhist views of perception. TheNyāya pphilosophers seek the middle ground between thesepositions to defend their thoroughly realist view. They argue thattheir is some mental shaping in almost all perceptual events, memorydispositions acquired on account of previous experiences are among thecausal factors contributing to the current perception. Perceptualexperience in this sense is laden with or infused by concepts. This,however, does not compromise the realism, since the conceptsthemselves are repeatable features of real objects and areperceptually acquired in past encounters with these features. Forperception to be a source of knowledge it must be concept-laden, suchthat it is verbalizable and determinate (Phillips, 2019). The exactrole of concepts in perception—in dispute in theNyāya/Buddhist debate—will be discussed in the nextsection.

The early Naiyāyikas held that perception is determinate, butunder pressure from the Buddhists opponents VācaspatiMiśra (in about the 10century AD) conceeds that there is alsoconcept-free indeterminate perception. In his commenatry on theNyāyasutra1.1.4, Vācaspati interprets thequalifiers non-verbal (avyapadeśyam) andwell-ascertained or free from doubt(vyavasāyātmaka) as indicating two types ofperception: indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception isthus conceived as the first stage of sensory processing without anymental shaping. The indeterminate sensory percept generated at thisstage is then classified by the mind resulting in a determinateperception of a whole object qualified by its parts (or features).This idea is later taken up by the Navya-NaiyāyikaGaṅgeśa, according to whom, indeterminate perception isindispensable for explaining how our concepts originate in reality.Determinate perception of a thing as qualified by its features, e.g.,That’s a cow, requires a prior grasp of the qualifier‘cowness’. The usual explanation will turn to memorydispositions acquired by previous encounters with cow. Thisexplanation however cannot be extended to a child’s perceptionof a cow for the first time. In the first instance, Gaṅgeśaclaims, the ‘cowness’ is grasped indeterminately in thatcowness is grasped but not as related to a particular cow.

Gaṅgeśa also objects to the notion ‘sensoryconnection’ in the classical Nyāyasutradefinitionof perception, arguing that this makes the definition too wide and toonarrow at the same time: too wide because it implies thatevery awareness is perceptual being produced by virtue of aconnection with the ‘inner’ sense faculty or mind(manas); too narrow because it fails to include divineperception, which involves no sensory connection. Gaṅgeśaoffers a simpler definition of perception as an awareness which has noother awareness as its chief instrumental cause. Being concerned thathis definition may be interpreted as ruling out conceptualized ordeterminate perception that may have non-conceptual or indeterminateperception as one of it causes, he argues that indeterminateperception can never bethe chief instrumental cause ofdeterminate perception, although itis a cause, since itsupplies the qualifier or the concept for determinate perception. Thissimpler definition has other problems. Perception is a source ofknowledge so Gaṅgeśa must explain how this definition rulesout non-veridical perceptions. So, he spends the longest Section inthe Chapter on Perception in hisTattvacintāmaṇi Jewelof Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology on giving a generalaccount of illusion as “appearance of something other than itis”.

2.3 Mīmāṃsā realism

ThePurvaMīmāṃsā-sūtra(MS) were originally composed by Jamini around 200 BCE. The fourth MS1.1.4 says:

The arising of a cognition when there is a connection of the sensefaculties of a person with an existing (sat)object—that (tat) is perception; it is not the basis ofthe knowledge ofDharma, because it is the apprehension ofthat which is present. (Taber, 2005:44)

There is no consensus among Mīmāṃsā commentatorson whether this is intended as a definition of perception, even whilean initial reading of it suggests that it may be. Kumārila, thenoted Mīmāṃsā commentator argues that the firstpart of thesūtra isnot intended as adefinition because of the context in which it figures; thesūtra-s preceding it are concerned with an inquiry intorighteousness (Dharma). Moreover, thesūtraconstrued as a definition of perception, results in too wide, and nottoo accurate, a definition, because it only says that perceptionarises from a connection between the sense faculty and an existingobject and does not exclude perceptual error or inferential cognition.Taber (2005, 16), on the other hand, suggests that it is possible toconstrue MS 1.1.4 as a valid definition, and indeed such a construalwas proposed by an earlier commentator, the so-calledVṛttikāra quoted at length by Śābara inhisŚābarabhāṣyam. This, the mostextensive commentary on theMīmāṃsā-sūtra, suggests that thewords of thesūtra (tat = ‘that’andsat = ‘existing’) be switched around for adifferent reading for the first part of thesūtra, whichwould then state that, “a cognition that results from connectionof the sense faculties of a person with that (tat) [sameobject that appears in the cognition] is true (sat)perception”. This switch rules out perceptual error andinference; both these present objects other than those that are thecause of the perception.

2.4 Sāṃkhya definition

In the oldest Sāṃkhya tradition, perception is thefunctioning of a sense organ. This is clearly inadequate, as theancient skeptic Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (c. 8th centuryCE) is quick to point out. Perception in this sense cannot be a meansof knowledge (pramāṇa) as it does not distinguishbetween proper and improper functioning of sense organs and,therefore, between valid and erroneous perceptions. A moresophisticated definition is later devised wherein perception is“an ascertainment [ofbuddhi or intellect] in regard toa sense faculty (Sāṃkhyakārikā 5 inYuktīdipikā)”. This implies that perceptionis a modification of the intellect in the form of selectiveascertainment of an object, brought about by the activity orfunctioning of a sense faculty. In some respects, thischaracterization of perception as an “ascertainment” ofthe intellect neatly captures the idea that perception, being aninstrument of knowledge, is the primary means of knowledge.Ascertainment residing in the intellect is regarded as the instrumentof perception, while residing in the self it is regarded as the resultof the process of perception. Furthermore, theSāṃkhyakārikā states that the functionof the senses with regard to the objects is “a mereseeing” (Sāṃkhyakārikā, 28b), andthe function of the intellect, referred to as ascertainment, can bethought of as “identification” of the object as in“this is a cow”, etc.(Sāṃkhyakārikā 5ab). This suggests atwo-stage process: first the functioning of the sense faculty resultsin “mere seeing” of the object (non-conceptualizedawareness) and, later this mere seeing is acted upon by the intellector mind and results in a conceptual identification of the object. Thistwo-stage process is very similar to the detailed account ofconceptual (savikalpaka) perception offered by theMīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas.

2.5 Advaita Vedānta: direct knowledge

According to Advaita Vedānta the defining characteristic ofperception is the directness of knowledge acquired through perception(Bilimoria, 1980:35). In highlighting the directness of the perceptualprocess, the Advaitin differs from Nyāya andMīmāṃsā proponents for whom the contact of thesense faculty with its object is central to the perceptual process.Vedānta Paribhāṣā (ed. 1972: 30) cites pleasureand pain as instances of perception that are directly intuited withoutany sense object contact. For the Advaitin perception is simply theimmediacy of consciousness; knowledge not mediated by any instrument(Gupta et. al., 1991, p. 40). It is worth noting that this definitionis very close to that accepted by Navya-Naiyāyikas. Like thelatter, the Advaitins regard the role of the sensory connection asaccidental, rather than essential, to the perceptual process. TheNeo-Advaitins accept the distinction between conceptual or determinateperception (they refer to it asviṣayagatapratyakṣa) and non-conceptual or indeterminate perception(nirvikaplapkapratyakṣa), but do not think ofnon-conceptual perception as simply a prior stage of conceptualizedperception, as other Hindu schools do.

3. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa

The Sanskrit termkalpanā is variously translated asimagination or conceptual construction and is meant to be the sourceof ‘vikalpa’, roughly translated as concepts, butwhich may stand for anything that the mind adds to the‘given’. The time-honored differentiation of perceptioninto conception-free perception (nir-vikalpa pratyakṣa)and conception-loaded perception (sa-vikalpapratyakṣa) is made on the basis of concepts(vikalpa) (Matilal, 1986: 313).

3.1 The basis of Buddhist nominalism

The distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual was first drawnby Diṅnāga who contended that all perception isnon-conceptual because what constitutes seeing things as they reallyare must be free from any conceptual construction. The claimis that a verbal report of proper perception is strictly impossible,for such a report requires conceptualization, which is not perceptualin character; the objects of conceptual awareness are spontaneousconstructions of our mind and are essentially linguistic in character.On the other hand, what is seen, ‘the given’, does notcarry a word or a name as its label and neither is such a labelgrasped along with the object, nor inherent in it, nor even producedby it; objects-as-such, the real particulars(svalakṣaṇas), do not, as Quine would say, weartheir names on their sleeves. Furthermore, the sense faculty cannotgrasp a concept or a name; if I have never smelt garlic before I firstencounter it, I cannot smell itas garlic, though I can smellIT; an olfactory awareness can only grasp asmell present inthe olfactory field. The Buddhists argue that a perceiver apprehendsonly the real particulars,arbitrarily imposes concepts/wordson them and believes, mistakenly, that these arereally therein the objects and integral to them. The conceptual awareness concealsits own imaginative quality and, because it results directly fromexperience, the perceiver takes it to be a perceptual experience. Theperceiver fails to notice that imagination is involved and mistakenlythinks that he really perceives the constructed world. From theBuddhists standpoint, therefore, a perceiver can only perceive realparticulars so that any perceptual experience is always and only atthe non-conceptual level.

3.2 The development of Hindu realism: the Nyāya mission

The Nyāya view evolves in response to Buddhist account ofperception. They regard perception as a cognitive episode triggered bycausal interaction between a sense faculty and an object. Thisinteraction first results in a sensory impression, nothing more thanmere physiological change. This preliminary awareness, non-conceptualperception, is a necessary first step in the process of perception andis invariably followed by a structured awareness leading to conceptualperception. A cognition that is independent of preliminary sensoryawareness cannot result in a perceptual judgment. The first awarenessdoes not destroy the perceptual character of the second; rather, itfacilitates this subsequent awareness. Non-conceptual perception is anindispensable causal factor for generation of conceptual perception,although memory, concepts and collateral information may also berequired. It is important to note that the Nyāya notion ofvikalpa (in their distinction ofnir-vikalpa andsa-vikalpa) is different from that of the Buddhists. Unlikethe latter, the Naiyāyikas do not think ofvikalpa-s asmental creations or imaginative constructions but as objectively realproperties and features of objects.Vikalpa in this senseindicates the operation of judging and synthesizing rather thanimagining or constructing. Thus conceptual perceptionstrulyrepresent the structure of reality. Of the five types of concepts(vikalpa-s) recognized by the Buddhists, viz.nāma (word),jāti (universal),guṇa (quality),kriyā (action) anddravya (substance), the Naiyāyikas, regard all but thefirstvikalpa as categories of reality (Mondal, 1982, p.364). Unlike the Grammarians, the Nyāya schools do not accept theobjective reality of words; words are not inherent to the objectpresented in perception. Rather, the Naiyāyikas hold that therelation between word and object is created by convention in alinguistic community. Although a concept is associated with a word(nāma-vikalpa) by means of a convention, it is notmerely a fabrication. For example, when someone brings garlic clovenear my nose and teaches me by pointing to it that it is calledgarlic, then subsequently confronted with the garlicky odor and asimilar clove, I can see it and smell itas garlic. Thusperceptual awareness includes knowledge of words but, insofar as it isperceptual awareness, it is brought about by sensory contact with theobject and, its properties which exists independently of words.

The Buddhists reject this argument on the basis that the conventionalmeaning of a word relates the word with the concept or the universal.Universals or concepts cannot be objects of our perception; theycannot be sensed. Universals, attributes and concepts are theoreticalconstructs for the Buddhists; what is sensed is the actual object, theexclusive particular, the ultimate existent. The Buddhists offer twoarguments in favor of the claim that only particulars are real. First,knowledge by means of words or verbal testimony is very different fromperceptual knowledge, for what we are aware of when we hear the words“garlic is pungent” is very different from what we arephenomenologically aware of when we smell garlic; words do not denoteor stand-in for actual objects and can be uttered in the absence ofany objects, but perception cannot arise in the absence of objects.Second, the particulars are real or existent because they have causalefficacy (arthakriyāsāmarthya). Only particularreal garlic can flavor one’s food or ruin it, but the universalgarlichood cannot do any of these; in this sense, only the particularsare real for they fulfill the purposes (artha) of humans.

The foregoing discussion shows that the epistemological debate betweenthe Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas regarding the nature ofperception rests on, and brings to the fore, their metaphysicaldisagreement about the nature of universals. The Naiyāyikas arerealists about universals; universals are objective features of theworld that impress themselves upon minds; they are not mere figmentsof our imagination. The Naiyāyikas hold that particulars arequalified propertied wholes and we directly perceive themas theyare, without any kind of manipulation or imposition; we do notimpose universals on property-less real particulars, rather we findstable, durable, relational wholes in reality that do not require anyimposition or manipulation. They argue that there is no evidence of aworld of bare particulars, as claimed by the Buddhists. Thereforeconceptual or determinate perception does not involve distortion ofreality; rather it presents things as they really are. To see a pieceof sandalwood as itreally is, we do not need to see thesandalwood as a colorless, odorless pure particular; indeed, since thepiece of sandalwood isreally brown andreallyfragrant, to see it as a propertied whole is to see it as itreallyis.

The idea that the world consists of propertied particulars seems toput pressure on the notion of non-conceptual perception. If there areno indeterminate particulars, what is the object of indeterminateperception? Indeed some Navya-Nyāya thinkers hold that the rawdata of perception (‘real particulars’ in the Buddhistssense) is too inchoate and elusive to count as objects of knowledge.Recently, Arindam Chakrabarti (2000), a prominent contemporaryNavya-Nyāya thinker offered seven reasons for altogethereliminating non-conceptual, or immaculate perceptions as he callsthem, from Nyāya epistemology in an attempt to understand the“deeper relation between direct realism and concept-enrichedperception”. Chakrabarti’s skepticism about non-conceptualperception as a cognitive state stems from the fact that we cannotassign an intentional role to the object of indeterminate perceptionbecause the object of non-conceptual perception is incapable of beingapperceived or directly intuited in any fashion. Chakrabarti’sgauntlet has been picked by several Nyāya enthusiasts (Phillips,2001 and 2004; Chadha, 2001, 2004 and 2006) and defenders of Buddhistdoctrine (Siderits, 2004). This debate brings to the fore an importantfeature of non-conceptual perception first highlighted byGaṅgeśa, suggesting that while there is no direct,apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is posited asthe best explanation for the availability of the qualifier (property,feature), since the cognizing subject is not immediately aware of theobject of non-conceptual perception. Phillips (2001: 105) presentsGaṅgeśa’s argument for the inclusion ofnon-conceptual perception as an essential part of Nyāyaepistemology:

…it [nirvikalpa pratyakṣa] is posited by the force of thefollowing inference as the first step of a two step argument.“The perceptual cognition ‘A cow’ (for example) isgenerated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition ofan entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing) like aninference”. The second step takes a person’s firstperception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., ashaving some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as theinference’s subject (pakśa) such that thecognizer’s memory not informed by previous cow experience couldnot possibly provide the qualifier cowhood. The qualifier has to beavailable, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in theraw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont tomisinterpret the point) as divorced from itsqualificandum(Bessie) but rather as neither divorced nor joined, and, furthermore,not as qualified by another qualifier (such as being-a-heifer) butrather just the plain, unadorned entity. In the particular example,the entity is the universal, cowhood, or being-a-cow, although, again,it would not be grasped as a universal. Or as anything except itself.

The Navya-Nyāya notion of non-conceptual perception differs fromthat of the Buddhists in many respects, two of which are veryimportant. First, according to Navya-Naiyāyikas, there is noapperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, unlike theBuddhists who contend that conception-free awareness is necessarilyself-aware. The Navya-Naiyāyikas, as is obvious from the quoteabove, emphasize that the evidence for a non-conceptual sensory graspof universals comes in the form of an inference. Second, according toNavya-Nyāya, the object of non-conceptual perception is aqualifier (concept), although not given as that in the first instance,but not a bare particular as the Buddhists hypothesize. It is, as theabove quote explains, posited by the force of an inference; the‘bare object’ of non-conceptual perceptionbecomes the qualifier in a resultant determinate perception.While this does not satisfactorily address Chakrabarti’s concernthat lack of apperceptive evidence implies that the subject cannotassign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception,Chadha (2006) argues that the subject’s not being in a positionto assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptualperception is no hindrance to the intentionality of non-conceptualperception itself. Non-conceptual perception is awarenessofa “non-particular individual” (Chakrabarti, 1995) and canbe assigned the intentional role of a qualifier in virtue of therecognitional abilities acquired by the subject on the basis of theperceptual episode. The subjectsees a non-particularindividual but, since there is no apperceptive or conscious awareness,the subject does not see itas an instance of a universal ora qualifier. Chadha explicates Gaṅgeśa’s insight thata qualifier is given as a non-particular individual, neither divorcedfrom nor joined to thequalificandum and, therefore it iswrong to suggest that lack of apperceptive evidence implies thatnon-conceptual perception is not an intentional perceptual state.

More recently, Chaturvedi (2020) analyses counter-arguments againstGaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perceptionoffered by the sixteenth century Dvāita Vedanta scholarVyāsatīrtha. Chaturvedi argues thatVyāsatīrtha’s objection undermineGaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptualperception to show that it has a necessary role to play in generatingconcept-laden determinate perception. In addition,Vyāsatīrtha’s questions the internal consistency ofGaṅgeśa’s that the contents of indeterminateperception is not available for introspection. Despite all theproblems pointed out by the Vedantin, Chaturvedi argues that there isstill hope to reconstruct Gaṅgeśa’s account ofindeterminate perception with some help from recent empirical sciencecan help to restore the overall plausibility of the view.

3.3 The Mīmāṃsā advance in realism

Kumārila argued against the Buddhist position to show thatperception is not always devoid of concepts. InPratyakṣapariccheda, he principally targetsDiṅnāga’s theory, while simultaneously addressingsome of Dharmakīrti’s ideas and arguments. Kumārila,like Naiyāyikas, holds both the two kinds of perception as valid.For him the initial non-conceptualized perception is borne of theundifferentiated pure object (śuddhavastu) and iscomparable to the perception of an infant and others who lack alanguage. The ‘pure object’ is the substratum for thegeneric and specific features of the object, but the subject is notdistinctly aware of any of these and simply cognizes the object as anindeterminate particular, as “this” or“something”. Although Kumārila agrees with theBuddhists that the object of immediate perception is inexpressible inlanguage, he maintains that it is different, in at least one respect,from the real particular (svalakṣaṇa) of theBuddhists; the latter being a structure-less unitary whole, whereasthe former is non-unitary and grasps both the particular and theuniversal aspects of the object. Otherwise, Kumārila argues, itcould not give rise to conceptual awareness, which explicitlyidentifies such features. Diṅnāga’s counterpoint tothis is that conceptual awareness at second stage cannot be aperception, since it involves application of concepts and words which,in turn, requires memory. If we admit conceptual awareness asperception, we are forced to accept that a sense faculty is capable ofremembering (since perception is a cognition brought about by thefunctioning of the sense faculty) but that cannot be the case becausea sense faculty, being a mere instrument of cognition, is in itselfunconscious and cannot remember anything. Kumārila admits thatconceptual awareness is aided by memory and concepts, but argues thatthat does not rob it of its perceptual character for the sense facultyis still functioning while in contact with the very same object. Hefurther suggests that we should not expect a perceptual cognition toarise as soon as there is contact between a sense faculty and itsobject. He uses the analogy of entering a dimly lit room after walkingin the blazing sun; even though the contents of the room are directlyavailable to the sense faculties of the subject who has just walkedin, he does not immediately apprehend the objects in front of him.However, the subject may become distinctly aware of the objects in theroom and their features in the following moments. The perceptualcharacter of the latter awareness is maintained so long as theconnection between the sense faculty and the object is intact, evenwhen other conceptual awarenesses or memories intervene between theinitial contact with the object and the subsequent awareness. Aconceptual awareness can be referred to as a perception even thoughthe mind,qua memory, is involved because the functioning ofthe sense faculty is the factor responsible for arising of theawareness. Furthermore, he insists that the mind must be involved inall perceptions since it functions as a link between the sense facultyand the self; the sense faculty is turned on or activated by aconnection with the self and, the self as the subject of knowledge isinvolved in all cognitions. He points out that even Buddhists do notdeny this, since they hold that self-reflexive awareness accompaniesevery cognition. He contends that the Buddhists are wrong to insistthat only a cognition arising directly from the functioning of a sensefaculty is perception; they agree that we perceive inner states, e.g.,pleasure and pain, and if the mind is accepted as the operative sensefaculty in the self-reflexive awareness of such cognitions, it followsthat they should admit that the mind is also the sense faculty thatgives rise to conceptualized cognitions. He, however, clarifies thatnot every cognition that follows a contact between a sense faculty andan object is a perception, for if one were to open one’s eyesmomentarily (in the above analogy) and construct a judgment such as“that was table” with eyes closed again, it would not be aperceptual cognition since it solely depends on the memory of afleeting sensory contact.

Later, Dharmakīrti, using a methodology very different (and akinto proof by contradiction) from his predecessor Diṅnāga,raises new problems for the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsāview. Assuming, he says, for the sake of the argument, that universalsare real. Then the judgments “This is a cow,” “It isan animal,” relate two distinct entities, namely a particular(or object) and a universal (or concept) arguably via a non-relationaltie as in being substratum and superstratum, with the proviso that thesubstratum object has the power to let the universal reside in it.This leads to all the universals (such as cowness, animalhood, etc)then being tied to the object by this simple and single power. In sucha scenario, any perceptual judgment involving the universal cowhood asin the case of “This is a cow” makes subsequent judgments“This is an animal,” “This is a substance,”etc., superfluous. For, if one perceives an object along with itspower to let any one universal reside in it, one must be able toperceive its power to attract all other universals that reside in it.Thus, there would be no distinction between “This is acow” and “This is a substance”; clearly anunacceptable thesis. Matilal (1986, 326) notes two points inconnection with this argument. First, Dharmakīrti assumes that anobject, or a unique particular, is perceived in its entirety and nopart of it is left unperceived. Second, the realist has objectifiedall the universals including the relation-universal. If, as therealist believes, the object of perception—theparticular—has the power to accommodate all universals in it,then the onus is on him to show why only a single universal manifestsitself in a perceptual judgment. This concern is pertinent, especiallyagainst the Nyāya philosophers who admit only one singlerelation-universal: inherence, which supposedly unites all nestinguniversals with the object. The Naiyāyikas readily respond tothis argument by pointing out that the redundancy objection rests onDharmakirti’s assumption that an object is grasped in itsentirety in perception. This assumption is false; perception isperspectival, we never see all sides of an ordinary three-dimensionalobject, but we still seeit.

Furthermore, Dharmakīrti’s argues that conceptual orjudgmental awareness is phenomenologically distinct fromnon-conceptual awareness. In the latter we are confronted with theobject of perception which is vivid and immediate, while in the formerno object is present. In the judgment “this is a cow”,even the ‘subject’ of the judgment does not refer to theobject of perception, since words do not refer to perceivedparticulars but to universals which extend across space and time.Dharmakīrti admits that the words we apply to things have someobjective basis in those things; we call something a cow because ithas a certain effect, it gives milk, is gentle, or it calls forth acertain cognition, etc. This effect, in turn, inclines us to associatethe word ‘cow’ with other things that have the same effectand we do that by jointly dissociating them from things that lack thateffect. Universals, according to the Buddhists are arbitrarilyconstructed “exclusions” (apoha); words serve thepurpose of separating things off from other objects. For example, theword ‘cow’ singles out a class of things by excluding themfrom things they are not, all things assembled together under theconcept ‘cow’ are distinct from each other and do notshare a single nature that the word ‘cow’ names. Aconceptual awareness insofar as it imputes a word to a particularobject and, therefore a universal nature it shares with all others ofthe same universal-kind, essentially falsifies the object.Kumārila objects to the Buddhists theory of universals(apoha) on the grounds that it is counterintuitive andcircular. The theory of universals (apoha) contradicts ourintuition that meaning of a positive word is positive; there isnothing negative about the word ‘cow’. A negative entitycan be the meaning of a word only where something is negated.Moreover, if we accept that understandingx requireseliminating non-x, then in turn we presuppose knowledge ofnon-x, which entails an understanding of non-non-x,and so on (Drefyus, 1997, 215). The Mīmāṃsakas alsotake on board the concerns raised by the Naiyāyika philosopherUddyotakara (c. 7th century CE), who questions the theory ofexclusions on the specific grounds that it fails to offer an adequatetheory of reference and relation between concepts and reality. Heargues if the word ‘cow’ primarily designates a negativeentity, either this entity is a cow in disguise or is different from acow. If it is a cow in disguise then the Buddhist view of universalsis no different from the Nyāya common sense realism that wordsare used to single out phenomena in the world. If the negative entityis different from a cow, then the word ‘cow’ does notrefer to real cows, making it difficult to explain how any word canrefer to real objects or classes thereof. This last point begs thequestion because the Buddhist denies that words refer to the objectsin the real world. For him words refer to universals, and that isprecisely what the world doesnot contain. The onus is putback on the realists to show that universals, which serve as meaningsof words, are real properties of objects rather than imagined ormentally constructed features. This challenge is taken up by theNaiyāyikas and their position against the nominalist stand ofboth the Buddhists and the Grammarians is presented later below.

3.4 The Śābdika (Grammarian) nominalism and realist objections

Bhartṛhari, the most notable Grammarian, highlights the intimaterelation between language, thought, and knowledge. Two aspects of histheory have important implications for the nature of perceptualexperience. First, there is no non-linguistic cognition in the world;all knowledge appears permeated by words. ThoughBhartṛhari’s theory may leave room for extraordinary, orother-worldly, cognitions, there is no scope for purenon-conceptualized perception in this world. The essence of his theoryis: words do not designate objects in the external world directly, butthrough the intervention of universals, which are inherent in words.Thus universals constitute the basis of our knowledge of the externalworld, since they are intimately connected with language and mind onthe one hand, and the world on the other. Given this, the Grammariansquestion the very possibility of non-conceptual perception? The secondaspect is underscored by Kumārila who ascribes the so-calledSuperimposition Theory to Bhartṛhari (Taber, 2005, 27),according to which, a word has its “own form” superimposedupon its meaning. This has implications for determinate conceptualperception, which (for the pluralists and direct realists ofMīmāṃsā and Nyāya persuasions) arises purelyout of the object itself and involves discrimination and determinationof its nature.

Bhartṛhari’s argument can be thought of as an attack, onthe adjective ‘non-verbal’ (avyapadeśyam) inthe Nyāya definition of perception, aimed at their belief thatfor cognitive comprehension language is an inessential detail. Forhim, bare sense-impressions cannot count as awarenesses because theyare nor effective enough, nothing is accomplished by them and, they donot result in appreciable mental activity. Bhartṛhari gives anexample: a man walking along a village path to approach his housewould invariably touch some grass on the road, and in some sense thiswould be tactile awareness at a pre-linguistic level(Vākyapadīya, Ch.1, verse 123). But this would notcount as an awareness unless combined with the further ability to sortit out or verbalize it; consciousness cannot reveal an object to usunless we discriminate it, and the process of discrimination requiresverbalization. What about a baby’s awareness, or that of a muteperson, asks Vātsyāyana? Bhartṛhari points out that ababy’s sensations or a mute person’s awarenesses may stillcount as cognitive because they are linguistically potent. Apre-linguistic state of an infant can be cognitive if and only if ithas speech potency, which is the cause of verbal language. So also, inthe non-conceptual perceptual awareness (in adults and even someanimals) speech-potency is latent; it is an essential trait of humanconsciousness and the defining characteristic of cognitive awareness(Vākyapadīya, Ch.1, verse 126). All knowledge ofwhat is to be done in this world depends on speech-potential; even aninfant has such knowledge due to residual traces from previous births(Vākyapadīya, Ch.1, verse 121). The initial sensoryawareness of external objects which does not grasp any specialfeatures of them, nonetheless illuminates them in a non-specificmanner as mere things by such expressions as ‘this’ or‘that’ (Bhartṛhari; 123 and 124). Thus, insofar asthe initial sensation is an awareness, it can be verbalized. Thefollowing analogy is offered as an argument for positing the presenceof speech-seed (verbal disposition, as some modern philosophers callit) in pre-linguistic awareness: think about the experience of trying,but failing, to remember a verse heard before. Bhartṛhari claimsthat the entire verse exists in the cognitive faculty asspeech-potency but because of lack of other contributory factors thereis no verbalization. Similarly, a non-linguistic experience of amute-person is an awareness because of the presence of verbaldisposition or speech-seed even though there is no actualization ofspeech. There are no non-conceptual perceptions, because ordinaryobjects are not given to us without a concept (vikalpa) orsome mode of presentation; verbalization makes the concept explicit.There are infinite concepts associated with an object, none integralto it. However, we always perceive an object ina concept asan instantiation of a universal; it is a cow, white, bovine,four-legged, etc. The point to note is that concepts or universals(vikalpa-s) are word-generated and superimposed on theobjects; there are no ‘thing-universals’ or realuniversals over and above these. Bhartṛhari’s defendslinguistic nominalism, according to which, words are the onlyuniversals that exist; thing-universals are word-generated illusions.As Matilal remarks, for Bhartṛhari there is not much of adistinction between words and concepts, they are two sides of the samecoin (Matilal, 1986, 396).

Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, the common senserealists, raise specific objections to the Grammarian view on thegrounds that it is not borne by experience. We have separateawarenesses of words and universals. While we may not perceivesomething as a cow prior to acquiring the word ‘cow,’ weare surely aware of cowness before we acquire the linguisticexpression, just as we are aware of and can discriminate shades of redeven before we acquire the names of some of those shades. Anon-conceptual awareness of the object is implied by the subsequentoccurrence of a conceptual awareness with determinate content.Kumārila also points to other phenomena which indicate that theawareness of the meaning of a word (the object) is independent anddistinct from the word itself. Furthermore, awareness of the meaningand that of the word are usually different kinds of representations;there is no possibility of confusing or conflating these.Kumārila brings to attention linguistic phenomena that reinforcethe point that words and meanings must be distinct representations,e.g., homonymy, synonymy, categorizing and recognizing grammaticalparts of speech, etc. The ability to distinguish and discriminatetypes is perhaps enhanced by knowledge of language and concepts, butis not completely dependent on it. Those who are not trained in musiccan certainly hear the difference between distinct notes, even thoughthey are unable to identify them by name. Vātsyāyana alsoappeals to the ordinary experience of people who are conversant withwords. Ordinarily, words are apprehended as names of objects. Theknowledge of the word-object association comes after the perceptualknowledge derived through sense-object contact. Such contact resultsin a perceptual awareness which, in turn, provides the occasion forrecalling the appropriate word, if indeed the appropriate word existsin the experiencer’s linguistic repertoire. Perceptual knowledgeis antecedent to verbal knowledge and cannot owe its existence towords. Vācaspati Miśra specifically objects toBhartṛhari’s claim that infants and adults who lack alanguage perceive objects by memory impressions of their names fromprevious births. Objects are vividly and clearly given to us inperception, but the memory-impressions of previous births are at bestvague and indistinct. Vācaspati Miśra asks, “How cansuch a vague and unclear thing be identified with a clear and distinctperception?”(Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā,127). His other argument against Bhartṛhari is the obvious pointthat words do not necessarily refer to their objects, for examplewords in quotation marks do not refer to objects, only to themselves.Moreover, if the word and its denotation were identical, a blind manwould grasp red or redness when he grasps the word ‘red’and a deaf person would grasp the word ‘red’ when hegrasps a red thing(Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā,129).

The Naiyāyikas also have a general response tonominalists—Buddhists as well as Grammarians. They posit monadicuniversals that correspond to natural and metaphysical kinds and onedyadic universal, viz. inherence. The main nominalist objection isthat once we accept real universals in our ontology we riskoverpopulating the world with entities corresponding to everyexpression that designates a property. For example, if we accepthorsehood and cowhood as universals, we also need to acceptuniversalhood as another universal. The Naiyāyikas propose thatnot every expression which designates a property generates anobjective universal (jāti); some property-expressionscorrespond to subjectively constructed categories(upādhi), which though useful for analysis, are notontologically real. Uddyotakara argues that to correspond to a realuniversal a general term must meet two conditions: (i) a general termshould be based on a ground, which accounts for the common awarenessof a number of different objects, that makes the application of theterm possible, and (ii) that ground should be a simple (non-compound),unitary property or entity that cannot be analyzed or explained awayotherwise (Commentary onNyāya-sūtra, 2.2.65).Universalhood is abogus universal; it violates the secondcondition. There is no simple basis or ground for universalhood asopposed to universals such as cowhood and horsehood; the ground ofbeing one-in-many can be analyzed in terms of inherence. The sameapplies to universals like ‘barefooted’,‘cook’, ‘reader’ etc.; the basis for theirapplication is presence of compound features such as bare feet, etc.However, this stratagem forces the Naiyāyikas to admit that manygeneral terms designate bogus universals and, consequently, they startsuccumbing to the nominalist pressure. Matilal (1986, 420–421)notes that there is another way in which it happens toNavya-Nyāya: A real universalmust partake of the natureof ‘one-in-many’. The Navya-Naiyāyika, Udayana (c.10th century CE), lists a third necessary condition for disqualifyinga property from being regarded as a real universal. Under thiscondition, an abstract property that belongs only to one individual isalso a bogus universal even though it is simple and unanalyzable;skyness in the sky is bogus because it is only a nominal attribute.However, since both cowhood and skyness are simple properties, theyare graspedas such in perception without furtherqualification. In this sense, Naiyāyikas maintain that some realuniversals are directly perceptible. When we see a cow, we do notnecessarily see ‘it’ as a ‘cow’, the cow andthe cowness are not given as separate entities in our awareness,rather they appear fused. This leads to the peculiar Nyāya viewthat real universals and basic properties are grasped in our awarenessas ‘epistemic firsts’ or ultimates (Matilal, 1986, 421).Gaṅgeśa calls such perception, in which universals aregrasped as such, non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka)perception.

3.5 The Advaita Vedānta: a compromise on Hindu realism

The Advaita Vedānta theory compromises on the realism of earlierclassical Hindu philosophy. Their early view on perception is akin tothe Buddhists, although arrived at from a different perspective.Maṇḍana Miśra says:

Perception is first, without mental construction, and has for itsobject the bare thing. The constructive cognitions which follow itplunge into particulars. (Brahma-Siddhi, 71.1-2)

He draws a distinction between perceptual cognition and constructivecognition, but is careful to usevikalpa-buddhi, rather thansavikalpaka pratyakṣa, for the latter cognition. Forhim perception is always non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka)perception and it is of a universal, indeed of the highest universal,Being (sat). According to early Vedāntins, the real isbereft of all character since its nature is non-differentiatedconsciousness or Brahman. Therefore, perceptual cognition, whichpresents the real, must be non-conceptual or indeterminate for it isthe knowledge of the existence of a thing without any qualificationsor predications. Maṇḍana Miśra also denies the thesisthat non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception is non-verbal.This surprising claim is clearly owed to Bhartṛhari’sinfluence, as is evidenced by the example used by MaṇḍanaMiśra in the argument. Confronted by an opponent with the claimthat verbal knowledge involves duality and relation, and thereforemust involve concepts, Maṇḍana Miśra replies thatverbal knowledge is not necessarily relational: a baby’snon-verbal knowledge of its mother’s breast, grasps it merely as‘this’ (of course we do not assume that the babyarticulates the word ‘this’; the word, as inBhartṛhari’s account, has a more subtle form in thebaby’s mind) and, therefore, the highest knowledge of theUltimate reality (Brahman) in which there is no duality, norelations, no concepts, may still be verbal.

Neo Advaita-Vedāntins, however, accept a distinction betweennon-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perception and conceptual(nirvikalpaka) perceptions from empirical or practical(vyāvahārika) standpoint; from ultimate(paramārthika) standpoint such distinction is untenable.A brief description of conceptual (viṣayagata,Advaita-Vedānta term forsavikalpaka) perception willhelp put in perspective Applebaum’s (1982) reconstruction oftheir notion of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) perceptionlater. Determinate perception is the result of the activity of mind(manas) orantaḥkaraṇa (literallytranslated as ‘inner vehicle’)—the terms arefrequently used interchangeably. Advaitins maintain that the mind(antaḥkaraṇa) ‘goes out’ through therespective sense organ (the eye, say) and pervades the object ofattention. As a result of this contact, the object presents itself asdata to the receptive mind (antaḥkaraṇa) which,in turn, transforms into mental state (vṛtti)(Bilimoria, 1980, 38). As soon as the data are presented to innerfaculty, there is an identification of consciousness associated withthe mental state (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti) withthe consciousness associated with the object. To say that vṛttiand data are identified is to say that the form of the mental state,if all goes well, corresponds one-to-one with the form of the object;the mental state is a reflection of the object of perception, and assuch is non-different from the object. Thus results a determinatejudgment (vṛttijñāna) of the form“this is a jar”. Furthermore, according to them, we do notperceive our mental states; we directly perceive the objectsthemselves. Bilimora explains,

Thevṛtti in the form of the object impresses itself asit were in the mode of the subject itself, and thereby comes to beapprehended, but as a predicate—and not as the puresubject-content which is the ‘I-notion’—in thesubject’s apperception. (Bilimoria, 1980, 41)

The initial mental state subsides and the subject becomes directlyaware of the object itself; the cognition is self-evident to thesubject, just like the cognition of pleasure and pain. In thisreflective stage, the mind (antaḥkaraṇa)integrates the mental contents corresponding to the object withfamiliar or recognized percepts. Determinate perception of thetotality of the object occurs with the completion of the assimilativeprocess.

David Applebaum (1982) notes that Bilimoria’s discussion of theAdvaitin’s notion of perception focuses on the necessaryconditions or criteria for valid or veridical perceptions. Accordingto him, this approach while justified in the light ofperception’s inclusion among the means of knowledge(pramāṇa-s) is mistaken because it only focuses onsensation as a species of mental state (vṛtti). For theAdvaitin, sensation is not a mode exhausted by the judgmental contentof a mental state (vṛtti), it has epistemic valueindependently of its role in judgmental perception. Applebaum quotesfrom the Upanisadic texts to support this view:

Manas is for men a means of bondage or liberation … ofbondage if it clings to objects of perception (visayasangi),and of liberation if not directed towards these objects(nirviṣayam). (Applebaum, 1982, 203)

Non-conceptual perception furnishes us with knowledge of pureexistence (sanmātra) rather than with protodata toconstruct imagined particulars. Therefore, it is not simply a priorstage of conceptual perception and so also not necessarily a mentalstate produced in cooperation with the object. Applebaum (1982, 204)suggests that non-conceptual perception in this sense focusesattention on sensing, in which consciousness turns its attentioninwards to the activity of the sense-organs resulting in deepening andbroadening their proprioceptive content. Proprioception, he claims,points the way to the soul or self (ātman); mind(antaḥkaraṇa) returns to its presentationalactivity, its function of monitoring and unfolding the sensorymanifold to create conditions for the emergence of self(ātman), which according to the Advaitin, is identicalwith the Ultimate reality (Brahman). In non-conceptual(nirvikalpaka) perception, consciousness is returned toitself and opens up the possibility of manifesting or seeing theSeer (ātman) or knowing the Ultimate reality(Brahman).

4. Constructing Concepts or Knowing Universals?

The problem of universals, as we have seen, is at the epicentre of thedebate between Hindu philosophers and their Buddhist opponents. Thedoctrine of exclusion (apoha) is the Buddhist attempt toaccount for the relation between concepts and sensory content. Thedoctrine of apoha basically claims that the term ‘cow’does not refer to the universal ‘cowness’ or‘cowhood’ because there is no such general entity; rather,the term refers to every individual that is not a non-cow. Theapoha theory of meaning is originally propounded byDignāga and his followers is an attempt to explain thefunctioning of language, conceptual thought and inference withoutappeal to real universals. For these Buddhists, universals are merelyimaginary constructs which lack causal efficacy and the awarenessesthat they produce are faint (asphuṭābha). Theunique particulars alone are ultimately real, but they do not have anycommon properties, and thus cannot be brought under any concept, norcan they be expressed by words. They are inexpressible. Dignāgaexplains that language functions through what is known as“exclusion of the other”(anyāpoha/apoha). This claim needs to beunpacked. Matilal explains,

[A] word expresses a concept, and a concept, being a fiction, cannotPOSITIVELY qualify or characterize the particular … but it canNEGATIVELY disqualify the particular from being claimed by otherfictions or concepts. Thus, construction and verbalization are to beunderstood as “exclusion” of all rival claims. If weassociate the name cow, or the cow, with a particular, it means thatit is not what we cannot call a cow (1971, 44–45).

The idea is that the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is anegation: not non-cow. If you exclude all the things that are notcows, you have the reference of the word ‘cow’. TheHindus, in particular the Nyāya philosopher Uddyotakara and theMīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila raise manyepistemological and metaphysical objections to Dignāga’sapohavada. The basic problem metaphysical problem is how tounderstandapoha as a non-existence. Both the Hindu schoolsregard non-existence as a real property of a thing (absence of a potin a room) and therefore are not convinced that by introducingapohas the Buddhist will be able to ultimately avoid referenceto universals. The epistemological issues concern how it is possibleto knowapohas as they cannot be known by perception and anyappeal to inference would be circular. These philosophers also raiselinguistic concerns that are important because the apoha doctrine doesdouble duty as a Buddhist theory of meaning. First, sinceapohais basically an absence, the meanings of all words would besynonymous. Second, how is it possible to learn whichapoha aword refers to?

More recently, two new annotated translations of primary texts, thefirst by Eltschinger et al. (2018) and the second by Taber and Kataoka(forthcoming) have become available. These translationsoffernew insights into the debates between the Hindus and Buddhists.In the text Kumārila takes up the linguistic concerns raisedabove. He notes that if the relation between a word and a meaning isestablished by not observing that the word is applied to certainthings, and one never observes what the word is applied to, then theword simply would have no meaning at all (Apohavāda, 75).Kumārila developed this concern into what is known as the mutualpresupposition argument. The objection goes: If someone is taught themeaning of the word ‘cow’ by being told, “The word‘cow’ refers to what is not non-cow,” then one mustknow what a non-cow is. But how can one comprehend what a non-cow isif one does not already know what ‘cow’ means. The meaningof ‘cow,’ it seems, presupposes the meaning of‘non-cow,’ while the meaning of ‘non-cow’presupposes the meaning of ‘cow’ (Apohavāda,83–85ab, reprinted in Taber). Theapoha theory, as we can seein the examples, is introduced using general terms like cow, white andso on. The theory may seem to work in the case of general termsbecause there are entities that are cow and others that are not cow,there are entities that are white and others that are not white and soon. But such a dichotomy does not hold in the case of every word. Sen(2011) offers the example of the word ‘all’(sarva). There is no entity called ‘not all’(asarva), which may be obtained by negating the meaning of theword ‘all’. Nor can it be suggested that the expression‘not all’ is applicable to unity, duality, etc., becausethe word ‘all’ stands for a collection, the components orconstituents of which may be things that are one, two, and so on innumber; and once all the constituents of this collection are negated,the word ‘all’ will become an empty expression (Sen, 2011,182). Kumārila also argues that the Apohavāda is unable toaccount for words which designate actions, connectives like‘and’, ‘or’ ‘not’ and‘but’, verbal prefixes and prepositions, adjectives like‘knowable’ and ‘cognizable’ and so on (Taberand Kataokaforthcoming).

The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (a follower of Dignāga)takes up these concerns on behalf of the Buddhist in hisPramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PV(SV) heceforth).Dharmakīrti responds to this concern but rather than addressingall the categories separately; he offers a general argument. He claimsthat all meaningful discourse serves to rule things out: “anutterance is inseparably related to delimitation” (PV(SV)122–123). The point is illustrated by using examples of commands(PVSV61, 20–26). If one desires only water and does not care how it isbrought one says “Bring water”, but if one desires a potof water, one would have to say, ‘Bring water in a pot’.Similarly, one mentions ‘water’ to rule out othersubstances, ‘bringing’ to rule out other actions. Taberand Kataoka (forthcoming) summarise it thus: “a word is onlyuttered when certain things are to be excluded by uttering it, nototherwise, and presumably this would be true of all parts ofspeech”. Dharmakīrti adds two other conditions. First,words are uttered only when there is some doubt. Second, words arealmost always uttered in a sentence and their excluding function isspecified by the context and relation to other words in the context.Dharmakīrti’s also responds to the first concern raisedabove: aren’t all words synonymous on the Buddhist view? No,says Dharmakīrti, becauseapohas are not real properties,rather they are “differences”.Apohas are contraststhat distinct individuals share by differing from the same (moreexactly, qualitatively similar) other things. They are not propertiesthat things in themselves have by virtue of belonging to a class (sayof cows). Rather, they are absences things have in virtue of nothaving certain properties. So, for example, a certain individual–say a spotted cow—has one absence (that of being a notnon-cow) insofar as it is viewed, together with certain otherindividuals as different from non-cows, and has another absence (thatof being not non-spotted) insofar as it is viewed together withcertain other not non-spotted individuals which may include cows,horses, humans. Different words that are applied to the same object– cow and spotted – have different meanings depending onthe corresponding differences or exclusions from other things.Explaining these stanzas in his PV(SV)Dharmakīrtisays,

Therefore, although the nature [of a particular, which might serve asthe subject of an inference] is undivided, the“difference” (viśeṣa) [that is,]distinction that is known through any “property”(dharma) [that is,] name whatsoever cannot be imparted byanother [property or word] (because that other word would excludeother things). Thus, all words do not have the same meaning (25, 24–25).

There is an unusual view of the nature of particulars expressed inthis passage. Dharmakīrti, following Dignāga, holds thatthe nature of a particular is one, unified. Sometimes he expressesthis misleadingly by saying that a thing is “withoutparts” or “without aspects”, when what he probablymeans is that the different aspects of its nature are fused into one;they are inseparable, completely integrated. If one apprehends anypart of the nature of a thing one must apprehend the thing in itsentirety, because its nature is undivided. This is exactly whathappens in perception, a thing is grasped completely. It is onlyinference (and other conceptual cognitions) we ascertainapohaswhich are not intrinsic properties of the thing nor aspects of theirnatures. Perception is always veridical owing to its direct link withreal thing, provided that all of its causes are in place. Conceptualcognition or inference is characteristically erroneous insofar as itmistakes the general features that it abstracts from and superimposeson a particular for the thing in itself. Still, some conceptualcognitions are ‘correct’ in a sense. Kellner clarifies thesense in which they are correct is that they identify things correctlyand can serve as a solid basis for successful action, whereas othersare incorrect because they misidentify things and lead people astray –identifying a mirage as a reflection caused by sun’s rays is inthis sense correct, whereas identifying it as a water body is false(2004, 2). In addition, Kellner clarifies that there is a kind ofperceptual ascertainment, over and above sensory perception, whichenables us to superimpose or ascribe features/properties of theobject. We may superimpose them correctly or incorrectly depending onthe environmental factors (lighting, distance, etc.) as well as thecognisor’s mind being focussed in ascertaining certain aspectsof perceived reality (Kellner, 2004, 42). Concepts, in this Buddhistsense, are well-formed rules for identifying exclusions. Even thoughthe Buddhists talks about the awareness produced by concepts as faintimpressions, it is not meant to be taken in the sense of Hume’sideas which are a blurry expression of the real thing. Rather, thepoint is that the concepts are constructed from abstracting generalfeatures of objects and then superimposing them back on the objects.General features or properties cannot be known in sensory perceptionas the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā opponetsbelieve. Rather, as we see, general features can be correctly orincorrectly superimposed on the particulars in the perceptual orinferential ascertainments. They are correctly ascertained when theylead to successful action, incorrectly ascertained when they lead usastray.

In the secondary literaure discussing the apoha theory, Tillemans(2011) draws a useful distinction between the two versions of theapoha doctrine offerd by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti: thetop-down approach and the bottom-up approach. The former is presentedby Diṅnāga. According to the top-down version, the negationoperator in the exclusion, theapoha somehow manages pick outreal particulars in the world while avoiding any commitment touniversals.Apoha, in this sense functions like a sense ormeaning, a not-non X expressed by the word X, which enables us to pickout real particulars while at the same time avoiding a commitment toreal universals in virtue of the special features of double negation.The latter is presented by Dharmakīrti who uses the causalapproach to link language and the world. According to this version ofthe doctrine,apoha provides a way to bridge the gap betweensensory perception of particulars and expressions of belief andjudgement in thought and language. The top-down version of the apohadoctrine was subjected to various criticisms from the Hindu realists,especially by Kumārila who criticised the doctrine on grounds ofcircularity. The thought is that in order to understand the exclusionclass of non-cows, we have to first have an idea that some particularsare cows. In other words, one must be able to refer to cows before onecan refer to non-cows. The bottom-up approach developed byDharmakīrti was basically a response to this circularity worry.His version of the apoha doctrine is developed as a strategy to bridgethe gap between non-conceptual perceptual content and conceptualcontent. Dreyfus (2011) develops Dharmakīrti’s naturalizedaccount of concept formation by elucidating the mediating role ofrepresentations that link reality to conceptuality. Representations,in this sense, stand for agreed-upon fictional commonalties and areprojected on to discrete individuals (Dreyfus, 2011, 216).

The top-down approach is promising but there is a concern that abottom-up account might not succeed in offering a completely reductivestory about concepts. In response to this concern, Ganeri (2011)develops a hybrid account that combines the resources of the top-downand bottom-up approaches. The idea is that we work up from basicsentience and down from the language of reference and predication tomeet at the middle-ground of feature-placing in the formation ofproto-concepts (Ganeri, 2011, 244). These proto-concepts show thatsense experience can normatively constrain belief and judgement,though it does not give us a full-blown reductive account of conceptsin non-conceptual terms.

The doctrine ofapoha and Ganeri’s hybrid version maywell be ingenious, but it is a far cry from what would satisfy theHindu realist. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,universals exist in this very world of ours. We do not need toconstruct concepts from sensory content, rather universals are partand parcel of this sensory content. Chadha (2014, 289) explains thataccording to Nyāya, for a universal to exist all that is requiredis that it be exemplified; in a Quinean twist – to be is to beexemplified. There is no further requirement that it existindependently as an abstract entity or in Plato’s heaven;universals are given directly in perception insofar as their loci areperceived. Taber (2017) develops the Mīmāṃsa viewsabout how universals are cognised. In the first verse of hisĀkṛtivāda, the Kumarila explains what is at stake forthe Mīmāṃsakas in the debate about universals. Unlikethe Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsa philosophers are notmotivated merely by epistemological requirements, their main aim is todefend the eternality of the Vedas. This requires that the language,and in turn the words and their meanings are eternal. Therefore, themeaning of a word cannot be a particular which is perishable. It mustbe a universal that exists eternally. But like the Naiyāyikas,the Mīmāṃsa philosophers believe that universals arenot merely inferred, but are directly perceived. Kumarila’sargument for the perceptibilty of universals s developed in responseto the Buddhist doctrine of apoha. To the Buddhist who says that wecannot perceive universals distinct from particulars, becauseperception can only cognise particulars. Kumarila replies by offeringexample. When we perceive a man at a distance and wonder whether he isa Brahmin or some other kind of man, we do so because we perceive theuniversal humanity directly. This would be possibble if at least someuniversals were not directly given in perception.

It is useful to think of a universal in this sense as a non-particularindividual (Chakrabarti, 1995). Examples abound: Dusky is what manyparticulars are, though they may be spatiotemporally separated by manymiles and years; rainy is what several days of the year can be at thesame time in different places and at different times in the sameplace. If we are not thinking of universals as abstract entities inPlatonic heaven or in the mind, but as individuals out there in theworld, it is easier to grasp the idea that they can be perceived. TheNyāya equation of universals and properties might tempt one tothink that Nyāya conceives of universals as natural properties inDavid Lewis’ sense of the term (Lewis, 1983), but such is notthe case. Nyāya universals are as robust as Armstrong’suniversals: they capture facts of resemblance and the causal powers ofthings. Naiyāyikas will happily endorse Armstrong’s‘One over Many’ argument as the main reason for includinguniversals in their ontology (Armstrong, 1978). Udayana puts the pointthus: “Causality is regulated by universals, so is effect-hood.It is a natural universal if there is no obstruction [in establishingit]; it is a conditional [nominal] universal when we have to establishit through effort [construction?]”(Kiraṇāvālī, in Praśastapāda1971, 23).

Although Gautama mentions universals in theNyāyasūtras as the meaning of general terms,there isno explanation in these originalsūtras as to how theymight be known. Praśastapāda was the first to argue thatuniversals are sensorily given. He argues that universals, when theyinhere in perceptible loci (e.g., ‘cowness’ in anindividual cow), are perceived by the same sense organs that alsoperceive those loci (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, 99).This thesis is explicated in detail by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa inNyāyamañjarī where he argues against theBuddhist nominalists as well as the holistic monist pan-linguistBhartṛhari and his followers. Jayanta makes an allusion to theview that universals are given in indeterminate perception, a viewlater developed in detail by Gaṅgeśa inTattvacintāmaṇi (the chapter on“Perception,” the section on “IndeterminatePerception”). Most of Jayanta’s arguments against theBuddhist nominalist are discussed in detail in Chakrabarti (2006),however, he does not discuss the issue about universals being given inindeterminate perception. This is, as we have mentioned in the abovesections, because Chakrabarti is sceptical about the coherence of thenotion of indeterminate perception. Chadha (2014) argues thatGaṅgeśa makes a unique contribution to this debate inproposing the idea that universals or qualifiers are given as objectsin indeterminate perception. He spells out his argument in terms ofqualifiers rather than real universals, because the logical andepistemological role of a real universal is the same as that of asimple nominal property. Gaṅgeśa is concerned with basic,unanalyzable properties that can be grasped as such in our awareness.Basic properties in this sense are simple; they can be grasped withoutfurther qualification. They are, according to Nyāya, the‘epistemic firsts’ comparable to non-conceptual perceptionin Buddhist epistemology. Gaṅgeśa’s argument ispresented by Bhattacharya (1993, 10–11) using a specific form ofinference (parārthānumāna) developed inNyāya for convincing others. It has a five-propositionstructure:

Proposition: The determinate perception of the form ‘acow’ (or ‘that’s a cow’) is produced by thecognition of the qualifier.
Reason: Because this is a qualificative cognition.
Pervasion with an example: Every qualificative cognition isproduced by a prior cognition of the qualifier, for example,inference.
Application: The perception of the form ‘a cow’ is aqualificative cognition.
Conclusion: Hence, it is produced by the cognition of thequalifier.

The weight of the argument rests on the third sentence.Gaṅgeśa supports it offering various examples ofqualificative cognition, namely inference, recognition, analogy,verbal testimony, and so on. The point is that unless some awarenessof dung is present in a person, (s)he cannot infer that there is dungon the hill on the basis of seeing some animals grazing on the hill.Universals like fireness and dungness are given directly inindeterminate perception. Gaṅgeśa’s argumentmaintains a causal uniformity among pramāna-generated cognitionsof an entity as qualified (Phillips and Tatacharya 2004, p. 398).However, there is a problem: if anything that is known through aqualifier requires a prior cognition of the qualifier, there will be aregress of cognitions. Gaṅgeśa’s answer is that anindeterminate perception blocks the threat of such a regress, becausethe qualifier is then grasped directly rather than through anotherqualifier. In other words, the object is perceived through theproperty, but the property itself is perceived directly rather thanthrough another property. The indeterminate perception, which precedesthe determinate perception of an object through a mode, that is, aspossessing a certain property, is not itself a perception through amode. Simply put, we need to grasp the universal cowness in order tohave an awareness of a particular as qualified by cowness. Chadha(2014) argues that Gaṅgeśa’s argument thus shows thatthe postulate of indeterminate perception of universals is a necessaryrequirement for realism.

5. Perceptual Illusion

The skeptics challenge strikes at the claim made by theNaiyāyikas that perception should be non-erroneous(avyabhichāri) and well-ascertained or free from doubt(vyavasāyātmaka). They ask: how do we distinguishbetween veridical perceptions and the non-veridical ones? In case of aperceptual doubt, say, seeing something at a distance which looks likea pole or an old tree-trunk, we are uncertain which it is but area priori sure it cannot be both. In case of perceptualillusion, I see a snake but I misperceive as there is only a rope infront of me. Illusoriness of the experience (seeing a snake) isexposed with reference to another veridical experience (seeing arope), but again, we area priori sure that both cannot betrue together. Then, the Buddhist skeptic, Vasubandhu, raises the antewith the question: could they not both be false simultaneously? Theskeptical argument is premised on a denial of the realist thesis thatexperiences refer to a mind-independent reality. Vasubandhu’sargument for idealism appears right at the beginning ofVimśatikā, when he states:

This [the external world] is consciousness only, because there isappearance of non-existent things, just as a person with cataractssees non-existent hairs, moons et cetera. (Feldman, 2005, p. 529).

Vasubandhu offers many other examples of dreams, delusions,hallucinations, etc., where we are aware of non-existent objects thatare products of our imagination and not objects external to the mind.If it is possible for awareness to create its own object and thengrasp it (as in a dream) then, Vasubandhu argues, everything that weseem to be aware of could be a making of awareness.

The standard reply to this view appeals to the intuition that illusoryexperience is parasitic on veridical experience. The Naiyāyika,Vātsyāyana explains that an erroneous cognition depends on aprincipal cognition as its basis. “This is a man” for atree-trunk, which is not a man, has for its basis a principalcognition of a man. If a man has never been perceived in the past, anerroneous cognition of a man, in what is not a man, can never beproduced (Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, 4.2.35). Asimilar argument is put forth by the Advaita-Vedanta founderŚankara. He challenges Vasubandhu’s view on the ground thatit is incoherent; when the Buddhists say “that which is thecontent of an internal awareness appearsas thoughexternal,” they are

assuming the existence of an external thing even while they deny it… For they use the phrase ‘as though’ …because they become aware of a cognition appearing externally …For nobody speaks thus: Viṣnumitra appears like the son of abarren woman. (Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, 2.2.28)

Feldman (2005, p. 534) argues that this does not suffice to defeatVasubandhu’s idealism. The illusory experience ofx, nodoubt requires a memory impression which can be produced by a previouscognition, but there is no further requirement that the previousexperience be veridical, because such impressions can be produced byillusory experiences. Feldman uses the case of someone who has onlyexperienced snakes in dreams. He can mistake a rope for a snake,because the previous dream experience provides the necessary memoryimpression. Feldman’s argument ignores the gravity of theconcern raised by Vātsyāyana and Śankara, however. Theyreject Vasubandhu’s argument on the grounds that we cannotimagine (dream, hallucinate, etc) an absolutely unreal thing, like abarren woman’s son. The Nyāya theory of imagination,working in the background here, says that to imagine something is tosuperimpose or attribute properties belonging to one kind of thing toa thing of different kind, provided that there is some resemblancebetween the two kinds of objects (Uddyotakara’sNyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya, 3.1.1). For example,to imagine a centaur is to attribute a property belonging to thehuman-kind to a thing of the horse-kind. There is some generalresemblance between the two kinds: both are animals and have legs.However, an ‘absolutely unreal’ thing can have noproperties, and hencea fortiori no properties in common withan existing thing. They, therefore, cannot be an object ofimagination.

Uddyotakara presents an even stronger argument against the skeptics.In hisNyāya-Vārttika he turns Vasubandhu’sown argument against him. Uddyotakara asks: how do we know that theobject of a dream experience is non-existent? Vasubandhu accepts thatthe dreamer does not know that he is dreaming; the knowledge that theobject is non-existent occurs only when he awakens and no longerapprehends the object. If non-apprehension of an object in the wakingstate is required to support the claim that the objects of dreamexperience do not really exist out there, then apprehension in thewaking state must be an indicator of their existence, otherwise therewould be no contrast between what is apprehended and what is not(Nyāya-Vārttika, 4.2.33). If there is no suchcontrast, then Vasubandhu’s argument fails because there is nosupport for the claim that objects of dream experiences do not existin the external world. And, if there is such a contrast betweenapprehension and non-apprehension, then at least some external objectsmust exist. Clearly, Vasubandhu’s argument for thesis ofuniversal delusion (or idealism) does not succeed completely, nor arethe realists totally defeated.

We close this entry on the note thatSūtra-s wereprimarily composed in the seven centuries from 5^th BCE to2^nd CE and, thereafter, for the next millennium and more,the philosophical work was carried forward bySūtracommentators (tikākār-s) from respective schools.This latter period saw these epistemological debates rage amongscholars from these schools. Note also that there is no consensus onthe dates given here; most Western scholars accept these, while Indianschools place them further back in antiquity.

Bibliography

Texts in English translation

Aksapada Gautama,Nyāya-Sūtra, withVatsyayana’s Nyayabhasya, Uddyotakara’s Nyayavartikka, andUdayana’a Parisuddhi, A. Thakur (ed. and trans.), vol. 1,Mithila, 1967.
Bhartr̥hari,Vākyapadīya, Abhyankar K.V.and Limaye V.P. (eds.), Poona University, 1965.
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