Panentheism

First published Thu Dec 4, 2008; substantive revision Mon Apr 24, 2023

“Panentheism” is a constructed word composed of theEnglish equivalents of the Greek terms “pan”, meaning all,“en”, meaning in, and “theism”, derived fromthe Greek ‘theos’ meaning God. Panentheismconsiders God and the world to be inter-related with the world beingin God and God being in the world. While panentheism offers anincreasingly popular alternative to classical theism, both panentheismand classical theistic systems affirm divine transcendence andimmanence. But, classical theistic systems by prioritizing thedifference between God and the world reject any influence by the worldupon God while panentheism affirms the world’s influence uponGod. On the other hand, while pantheism emphasizes God’sidentity with the world, panentheism maintains the identity andsignificance of the non-divine. Anticipations of panentheisticunderstandings of God have occurred in both philosophical andtheological writings throughout history (Hartshorne and Reese 1953; J.Cooper, 2006). However, a rich diversity of panentheisticunderstandings has developed in the past two centuries primarily inChristian traditions responding to scientific thought (Clayton andPeacocke 2004). Although panentheism affirms God’s presence inthe world without losing the distinct identity of either God or theworld, specific forms of panentheism, drawing from different sources,explain the nature of the relationship of God to the world in avariety of ways and come to different conclusions about the nature ofthe significance of the world for the identity of God. Panentheistshave responded to two primary criticisms: (1) the panentheistic God isa limited God, and (2) panentheism cannot be distinguished from otherforms of theism such as classical theism or pantheism.

1. Terminology

Because modern “panentheism” developed under the influenceof German Idealism, Whiteheadian process philosophy, and currentscientific thought, panentheists employ a variety of terms withmeanings that have specialized content.

Theological terms as understood by panentheists:

1. Classical Theism: Classical theism as a specific form of theism understands God astranscendent, immutable, impassible, timeless (Mullins 2020, 393).Ultimate reality is a reality which is distinct from the world (J.Cooper, 2008, 11; Stenmark, 2019, 30). This distinction at timesdevelops into an ontological separation between God and the world thatmakes any interaction between God and the world problematic. ClassicalChristian theism bases God’s immanence and presence in the worldon God’s transcendence. This priority of transcendence impliesthat God’s presence is always partial. God’s differencefrom the world is crucial. Even if God’s relationship to theworld is dynamic rather than static, developing rather than fixed,divine transcendence does not allow the world to affect God.
2. Pantheism: A type of theism that stresses the identity of God and the worldontologically. This identity is expressed in different manifestationsso distinctions can be made, but the distinctions are temporary. Thereis often a strong sense of necessity in God’s creation of theworld so that God as God must express deity in creation.
3. Transcendence: Generally, God’s externality to the world so that God isunlimited by any other being or reality. Hegel and then Hartshorne,however, understand transcendence as including all the parts that makeup the world in order to avoid any reality external to God that limitsGod (Whittemore 1960, 141; Davis 2019, 8 [Other InternetResources]).
4. Immanence: God’s presence and activity within the world. Panentheistsassert that classical theism limits its affirmation of God’simmanence by deriving God’s immanence from God’stranscendence. God is present in every situation because God isunlimited by any reality external to God.
5. Kenosis: Divine self-emptying, or withdrawal, of divine attributes.Traditionally, the limitation of the exercise of the divine attributesresulted from the divine will whether in the case of Jesus’human life or in God’s relation to the creation.
6. Essential Kenosis: God’s nature is self-giving and other-empowering. Thomas J.Oord’s concept of essential kenosis bases the emptying of divineattributes on the divine nature rather than the divine will (Oord2015, 158–166).

Terms influenced by the German Idealism of Hegel and Schelling:

1. Dialectic: The presence of contradictory realities where the contradiction isovercome by including elements from each of the contradictory elementsin a synthesis that is more than the combination of each member of thecontradiction. Whitehead’s understanding of God’sredemption of evil by placing an evil event in a contrast to a goodevent expresses a similar understanding although he is not as explicitas Hegel in understanding all of reality as a dialecticaldevelopment.
2. Infinite: The obvious understanding of the infinite is as a negation of anylimits such as a bounded space or time. However, many panentheists,and other thinkers (Williams 2010, 143), understand the infinite in apositive sense as the inclusion of all that is and that might be(Clayton 2008a, 152). Panentheists influenced by process philosophyemphasize that divine infinity deals with possibility not actuality(Dombrowski 2013, 253; Keller 2014, 80). In process thought, Godcontains all possibilities and presents every possible response thatan actual event might make to any events from the past that influencewhat that event becomes.
3. Perichoresis: The ontological intermingling of Christ’s divine and humannatures and the ontological intermingling of the members of theTrinity (Otto 2001). This concept of intermingling has also beenutilized to describe the Incarnation and the relationship between Godand individuals/creation. Moltmann generalizes perichoresis to thecosmic realm by affirming the presence of God in the world and theworld in God (J. Cooper 2006, 252 citing Moltmann 1985, 17).

Terms influenced by Whiteheadian process philosophy:

1. Internal and External Relations: Internal relations are relations that affect the being of therelated beings. External relations do not change the basic nature oressence of a being. For panentheism, the relationship between God andthe world is an internal relationship in that God affects the worldand the world affects God.
2. Dipolar: Refers especially to God as having two basic aspects. Schellingidentified these aspects as necessary and contingent. Whiteheadreferred to God’s primordial and consequent natures meaning thatGod has an eternal nature and a responsive nature. Whiteheadunderstood all reality to be dipolar in that each event includes bothphysical and mental aspects in opposition to a mind-body dualism.Hartshorne identified these aspects as abstract and concrete.
3. Panpsychism: In the most general description, panpsychism assumes thatfundamental entities possess mental and physical properties(Göcke 2018, 208). Process panentheism and panpsychism arefrequently connected although neither entails the other. The basis forthe connection between panentheism and panpsychism isWhitehead’s concept that every actual occasion consists of amental and physical pole. Whitehead understood this mental pole asalways present, but Philip Clayton understands mentality as emergent(Clayton 2020b).

Terms related to current scientific thought:

1. Research Program: Drawing on scientific practice, a research program in philosophyinvolves central affirmations and auxiliary hypotheses which areconsistent with available data. Consistency with data, rather thanbeing either true or false, characterizes research programs (Clayton2019).
2. Dualism: While dualism may refer to a variety of pairs of opposites, inscientific thought and process philosophy dualism refers to theposition that consciousness and matter are fundamentally differentsubstances, or types of reality. Panentheists generally reject thedualism of consciousness and matter (Clayton 2004c, 3). As analternative, panentheists tend to affirm that consciousness and matterare different manifestations of a basic ontological unity. This basicontological unity may take the form of panpsychism, in which allactualities include an element of mentality. Griffin prefers the term“panexperientialism” because all actualities have anexperiential component (2004, 44–45). Clayton takes analternative approach to overcome the consciousness-material dualism byadvocating strong emergence in which ontologically different types ofexistence develop out of the basic ontological unity (2004c,3–6). J. Leidenhag identifies difficulties with each of theseapproaches (2016).
3. Reductionism: The properties of one scientific domain consists of properties ofa more elementary scientific domain (Kim 2005, 164). Modernreductionism primarily holds that all of reality can be explained byusing only physical, sub-atomic, entities and denies the existence ofmental realities as a separate kind of existence. Any reference to ahigher type of existence results from a lack of information about thephysical entities that are involved. Causation always moves from thebottom-up, from the basic physical entities to higher forms oforganization. For example, thought is caused by the physicalcomponents of the brain. Reductionism allows for weak emergence butnot strong emergence and top-down causation (Davies 2006, 37).Panentheism critiques reductionism as an oversimplification of realityand the experience of reality.
4. Supervenience: Generally refers to a relation between properties. Popular usagerefers to one property depending on another property such as mindbeing a quality that supervenes on physical structures. Analyticphilosophy instead emphasizes a logical relation between classes ofproperties with a variety of understandings of the nature of therelationship (Leuenberger 2008; McLaughlin and Bennett 2014).
5. Emergence: A. Meaning:; Emergence is a process that occurs when a new property arises outof a combination of elements. The traditional example is that wateremerges out of the combination of oxygen and hydrogen atoms in certainproportions. The concept of emergence arose in a scientific responseto reductionistic explanations of reality that failed to recognize theimportance of a system as a whole as well as the parts of that whole(Clayton 2004a, 85). Four characteristics are involved in emergence:1) ontological monism but not physicalism, 2) emergence of propertiesthat are potential in complex objects, but absent from any of theobject’s parts, and distinct from any structural property of theobject, 3) recognizing distinct levels of causal relations, and 4)downward causation that cannot be reduced to the structuralmacro-properties (Clayton 2006a, 2–4). Emergence may be eitherstrong or weak. Strong emergence understands evolution to produce newand distinct levels characterized by their own laws, regularities, orcausal forces. Weak emergence holds that the new level follows thefundamental causal process of physics (Clayton 2004c, 9). Strongemergence is also known as ontological emergence and weak asepistemological emergence (Clayton 2006b, 67). Strong emergence holdsthat genuinely new causal agents or processes come into existence overthe course of evolutionary history. Weak emergence insists that as newpatterns emerge, the fundamental processes remain ultimatelyphysical.; B. Role in panentheism:; Emergence as a scientific concept helps explain the“in” of panentheism (Clayton 2004a, 84). The scientificrecognition of the limitations of reductionistic understandings ofreality led to an interest in emergence as recognition of theimportance of the system as a whole as well as the parts of the whole(Clayton 2004a, 85). Further, the scientific understanding of matteras having a propensity to self-organization leading to a more and morecomplex system makes possible an internalist understanding ofGod’s action and creativity (Clayton 2001, 209). Emergenceprovides the best current way to understand the immanence of God inthe world (Clayton 2004a, 87) by exemplifying the radically differentsorts of inclusion relations found in the natural world (Clayton2008a, 132).
6. Top-Down Causation: More complex levels of objects or events affect less complexelements. A common example of top-down causation is the effect ofthought upon a person’s body. This contrasts with bottom-upcausation where the simple is the cause of the more complex. Inbottom-up causation, physical elements cause other, more complex,objects or events. Scientists debate the possibility of top-downcausation (Davies 2006).
7. Entanglement: In quantum theory, the correlation of two particles that originatein a single event even though separated from each other by significantdistance. Entangled objects behave in ways that cannot be predicted onthe basis of their individual properties. The impossibility ofprediction can be understood epistemically if behavior is consideredthe result of an average of many similar measurements or ontologicallyif behavior results from the existence of the world in an indefinitestate prior to measurement. Both Bohr’s indeterministic andBohm’s deterministic understandings of quantum theory acceptthis relational understanding of physical processes. Understanding theworld as composed of persistent relationships among particles that arephysically separated provides a model based in science forunderstanding God’s relation to the world. God’s influencecan be present at the level of individual events although thisentanglement would remain hidden from a local perspective. However,the implications of entanglement for concepts of causality become evenmore complex when considering the relation between God and the world.Polkinghorne suggests that causality may be active information,“pattern-forming operations” of what might be called“the causal principle”, rather than an exchange of energy(2010, 9).

Although numerous meanings have been attributed to the“in” in panentheism (Clayton 2004b, 253), the moresignificant meanings are:

1. Locative: Location that is included in a broader location. For example,something may be located in a certain part of a room. Such a meaningis problematic in reference to God because of the common understandingthat God is not limited by spatial categories. If spatial categoriesdo not apply to God in ordinary usage, to say something is located inGod becomes problematic. “In” then takes on metaphysicalmeanings.
2. Metaphysical basis for being: Beings come into existence and continue to exist due to thepresence of divine Being. The concept of participation in bothclassical theism and panentheism often includes the understanding thatthe world comes into being and continues to exist through taking partin God’s Being (Clayton 2008a, 118–119).
3. Metaphysical-Epistemological basis for being: Presence in God provides both identity and being. KarlKrause’s panentheism asserted a metaphysical structure thatinvolved both how an entity differs from other entities(epistemological identity) and what it is in itself (ontologicalstatus) (Göcke 2013a).
4. Metaphysical interactive potential: Neither God’s actions nor the world is completelydetermined. This lack of complete determination leads to anunpredictable self-organizing relation of both God and the world basedon prior actualizations of each. “The ‘en’designates an active indeterminacy, a commingling of unpredictable,and yet recapitulatory, self-organizing relations” (Keller 2003,219).
5. Emergence metaphor: A more complex entity comes from at least a partial source.
6. Mind/Body analogy: The mind provides structure and direction to the organization ofthe organism of the body. The world is God’s body in the sensethat the world actualizes God as specifically who God is and manifestsGod while different from God.
7. Part/Whole analogy: A particular exists in relation to something that is greater anddifferent from any of its parts and the total sum of the parts. Theworld is in God because the world shares in the greater unity ofGod’s being and action.

2. History

In 1821, Karl Krause (1781–1832) used the explicit label of“panentheism” for apparently the first time. (See Pfeifer2020, 123, especially n. 1 for a brief discussion about the firstexplicit use of the term “panentheism”.) However, variousadvocates and critics of panentheism find evidence of incipient orimplicit forms of panentheism present in religious thought as early as1300 BCE. Hartshorne discovers the first indication of panentheisticthemes in Ikhnaton (1375–1358 BCE), the Egyptian pharaoh oftenconsidered the first monotheist. In his poetic description of the sungod, Ikhnaton avoids both the separation of God from the world thatwill characterize theism and the identification of God with the worldthat will characterize pantheism (Hartshorne 1953, 29–30). EarlyVedantic thought implies panentheism in non-Advaita forms thatunderstand non-dualism as inclusive of differences. Although there aretexts referring to Brahman as contracted and identical to Brahman,other texts speak of Brahman as expanded. In these texts, the perfectincludes and surpasses the total of imperfect things as anappropriation of the imperfect. Although not the dominantinterpretation of theUpanishads, multiple intimations ofpanentheism are present in theUpanishads (Whittemore 1988,33, 41–44). Hartshorne finds additional religious concepts ofGod that hold the unchanging and the changing together in a way thatallows for the development and significance of the non-divine inLao-Tse (fourth century BCE) and in the Judeo-Christian scriptures(1953, 32–38).

In philosophical reflection, Plato (427/428–348/347 BCE) plays arole in the development of implicit panentheism although there isdisagreement about the nature of that role. Hartshorne drew a dipolarunderstanding of God that includes both immutability and mutabilityfrom Plato. Hartshorne understood Plato’s concept of the divineto include the Forms as pure and unchanging being and the World soulas changing and in motion. Although he concluded that Plato neverreconciled these two elements in his understanding of the divine, bothaspects were present (1953, 54). J. Cooper maintains that Platoretained an essential distinction between the Good and the otherbeings that Plato called gods. According to J. Cooper, Plotinus(204–270 CE) rather than Plato provided the basis forpanentheism with his description of the physical world as an emanationof being from the One making the world part of the Ultimate (2006,35–39). However, Baltzly finds evidence in theTimaeusof a polytheistic view that can be identified as panentheistic(2010).

From Plato to Schelling (1775–1854 CE), various theologians andphilosophers developed ideas that are similar to themes incontemporary panentheism. These ideas developed as expressions oftheism. Proclus (412–485 CE) and Pseudo-Dionysus (late Fifth toearly Sixth century) drawing upon Plotinus developed perspectives inwhich the world came from God and understood the relationship betweenGod and the world as a dialectical relationship in which the worldcame from God and returned to God (J. Cooper 2006, 42–46). Inthe Middle Ages, the influence of Neoplatonism continued in thethought of Eriugena (815–877 CE), Eckhart (1260–1328 CE),Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464 CE), and Boehme (1575–1624CE). Although accused of pantheism by their contemporaries, theirsystems can be identified as panentheistic because they understood Godin various ways as including the world rather than being the world andbecause they used a dialectical method. The dialectical methodinvolved the generation of opposites and then the reconciliation ofthe opposition in God. This retained the distinct identity of God inGod’s influence of the world (J. Cooper 2006, 47–62).During the early modern period, Bruno (1548–1600 CE) and Spinoza(1631–1677 CE) responded to the dualism of classical theism byemphasizing the relationship between God and the world to the pointthat the nature of any ontological distinction between God and theworld became problematic. Later thinkers such as the CambridgePlatonists (Seventeenth century), Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758CE) (Crisp 2009), and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834 CE)thought of the world as in some way in God or a development from God.Although they did not stress the ontological distinction between Godand the world, they did emphasize the responsive relationship thathumans have to God. Human responsiveness assumed some degree of humaninitiative if not freedom, which indicates some distinction betweenGod and humans. The assumption of some degree of human initiative wasa reaction against the loss of freedom due to Spinoza’s closeidentification between God and the world (J. Cooper 2006,64–90).

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the development ofpanentheism as a specific position regarding God’s relationshipto the world. The awareness of panentheism as an alternative toclassical theism and pantheism developed out of a complex ofapproaches. Philosophical idealism and philosophical adaptation of thescientific concept of evolution provided the basic sources of theexplicit position of panentheism. Philosophical approaches applyingthe concept of development to God reached their most completeexpression in process philosophy’s understanding of God beingaffected by the events of the world.

Hegel (1770–1831) and Schelling (1775–1854) sought toretain the close relationship between God and the world that Spinozaproposed without identifying God with the world. Their concept of Godas developing in and through the world provided the means foraccomplishing this. Prior to this time, God had been understood asunchanging and the world as changing while existing in God (J. Cooper2006, 90). Schelling’s understanding of God as personal providedthe basis for the unity of the diversity in the world in a manner thatwas more open than Hegel’s understanding. Schelling emphasizedthe freedom of the creatures in relation to the necessity ofGod’s nature as love. For Schelling, God’s free unfoldingof God’s internal subjective necessity did not result in anexternal empirical necessity determining the world (Clayton 2000,474). This relationship resulted in vitality and on-going development.Hartshorne classified this as a dipolar understanding of God in thatGod is both necessary and developing (1953, 234). J. Cooper describesSchelling’s thought as dynamic cooperative panentheism (2006,95). Hegel found Schelling inadequate and sought a greater unity forthe diversity. He united Fichte’s subjective idealism andSchelling’s objective idealism to provide a metaphysics ofsubjectivity rather than substance (Clayton 2008a, 125). Hegel’sunification of Fichte and Schelling resulted in a more comprehensiveand consistent system still based upon change in God. God as well asnature is characterized by dialectical development. In his rejectionof pantheism, Hegel understood the infinite as including the finite byabsorbing the finite into its own fuller nature. This retained divinetranscendence in the sense of the divine surpassing its parts althoughnot separate from the parts (Whittemore 1960, 141–142). Thedivine transcendence provided unity through the development of theAbsolute through history. Karl Krause (1781–1832) in 1828labeled Schelling’s and Hegel’s positions as“panentheism” in order to emphasize their differences fromSpinoza’s identification of God with the world (Atmanspacher andvon Sas 2017, 1032). J. Cooper describes Hegel’s panentheism asdialectical historical panentheism (2006, 107).

As Darwin’s theory of evolution introduced history into theconceptualization of biology, Samuel Alexander (1859–1938),Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936)introduced development into the ways in which all of physical realitywas conceptualized. They then worked out positions that in a varietyof ways understood God and the world as growing in relationship toeach other. Although Hartshorne’s classification of“panentheism” did not include Alexander in the category of“panentheism,” only occasionally mentioned Bergson, andmade no reference to Morgan, Whitehead referred to all three of thesethinkers positively. It may be too strong to claim that theyinfluenced Whitehead (Emmett 1992), but they did provide thebackground for Whitehead’s and then Hartshorne’ssystematic development of process philosophy as an expression ofpanentheism. Hartshorne popularized the modern use of the term“panentheism” and considered Whitehead to be theoutstanding panentheist (Hartshorne 1953, 273). Although Hartshornemade several modifications to Whitehead’s understanding of God,the basic structures of Whitehead’s thought were continued inHartshorne’s further development of Whitehead’s philosophy(Ford 1973, Cobb 1965). God, for process philosophy, is necessary forany actual world. Without God, the world would be nothing more than anunchanging existence radically different from the actual world ofexperience. God as both eternal and temporal provides possibilitiesthat call the world to change and develop. God as eternal provides anactual source of those possibilities. However, if God is only eternal,the possibilities would be unrelated to the actual world as itpresently exists. Thus, Whitehead and Hartshorne understand the worldto be present in God in order for the possibilities that lead todevelopment to be related to the world (Hartshorne 1953, 273). Theimplication of God’s inclusion of the world is that God ispresent to the world and the world influences God. Although thepresence of the world in God could be understood as a form ofpantheism, process philosophy avoids collapsing the world into God orGod into the world by maintaining a distinction between God and theworld. This distinction is manifest in the eternality of God and thetemporality of the world. It is also apparent in the freedom of theevents in the world. Although God presents possibilities to the eventsin the world, each event “decides” how it will actualizethose possibilities. The freedom of each event, the absence of divinedetermination, provides a way for process thought to avoid God beingthe cause of evil. Since God includes the events of the world, Godwill include the evil as well as the good that occurs in the world andthis evil will affect God since the world affects God’sactualization. But, because God does not determine the response ofeach event to the possibilities that God presents, any event mayreject God’s purpose of good through the intensification ofexperience and actualize a less intense experience. God does take thisless intense, evil, experience into God’s self, but redeems thatevil by means of relating it to the ways in which good has beenactualized. Thus, God saves what can be saved from the world ratherthan simply including each event in isolation from other events (J.Cooper 2006, 174, 180).

3. Contemporary Expressions

Although recent developments of panentheism tend to continue theGerman Idealist tradition or the tradition of process philosophy,contemporary panentheism demonstrates great diversity (see MichaelBrierley 2004, 3). Many of these contemporary expressions ofpanentheism involve scientists and protestant theologians orphilosophers. But, articulations of forms of panentheism have alsodeveloped among feminists, in the Roman Catholic tradition, in theOrthodox tradition, and in religions other than Christianity.

Utilizing resources from the tradition of German Idealism, JürgenMoltmann developed a form of panentheism in his early work,TheCrucified God in 1974 (1972 for the German original), where hesaid that the suffering and renewal of all humanity are taken into thelife of the Triune God. He explicated his understanding of panentheismmore fully inThe Trinity and the Kingdom in 1981.Theological concerns motivate Moltmann’s concept of panentheism.Panentheism avoids the arbitrary concept of creation held by classicaltheism and the loss of creaturely freedom that occurs in Christianpantheism (J. Cooper 2006, 248). The relationship between God and theworld is like the relationship among the members of the Trinity inthat it involves relationships and communities (Molnar 1990, 674).Moltmann uses the concept of perichoresis to describe thisrelationship of mutual interpenetration. By using the concept ofperichoresis, Moltmann moves away from a Hegelian understanding of thetrinity as a dialectical development in history (J. Cooper 2006, 251).The relationship between God and the world develops because ofGod’s nature as love that seeks the other and the free responseof the other (Molnar 1990, 677). Moltmann does not consider creationnecessary for God nor the result of any inner divine compulsion.Instead, creation is the result of God’s essential activity aslove rather than the result of God’s self-determination (Molnar1990, 679). This creation occurs in a process of interaction betweennothingness and creativity, contraction and expansion, in God. Becausethere is no “outside” of God due to God’s infinity,God must withdraw in order for creation to exist. Kenosis, orGod’s self-emptying, occurs in creation as well as in theincarnation. The nothing in the doctrine of “creation fromnothing” is the primordial result of God’s contraction ofGod’s essential infinity (J. Cooper 2006, 247). Moltmann findsthat panentheism as mutual interpenetration preserves unity anddifference in a variety of differences in kind such as God and humanbeing, person and nature, and the spiritual and the sensuous (Moltmann1996, 307).

In his process panentheism, David Ray Griffin assumes that scientificunderstandings of the world are crucial and recognizes theimplications of scientific understanding for theology. However, hisconcept of panentheism builds on the principles of process philosophyrather than scientific concepts directly. Griffin traces modernatheism to the combination of understanding perception as exclusivelybased on physical sensations, accepting a naturalistic explanation ofreality, and identifying matter as the only reality. But, theemergence of mind challenges the adequacy of this contemporaryworldview (2004, 40–41). He claims that the supernaturalisticform of theism with its emphasis upon the divine will does not providean adequate alternative to the atheism of the late modern worldviewbecause God becomes the source of evil. Griffin argues thatsupernaturalistic theism makes God the source of evil becauseGod’s will establishes the general principles of the universe(2004, 37). Process panentheism provides a way to avoid the problemsof both materialistic naturalism and classical theism (2004, 42).Griffin’s panexperientialism bases sensory perception on anon-sensory mode of perception in order to explain both the mind-bodyinteraction and the God-world interaction. God and the world aredifferent entities but both are actual. They are numerically distinctbut ontologically the same, in Griffin’s terms, avoiding dualismand supernaturalism. God and events in the world interact throughnon-sensory perception (2004, 44–45). Through this interaction,God can influence but not determine the world, and the world caninfluence God’s concrete states without changing God’sessence. Process panentheism recognizes two aspects of the divine, anabstract and unchanging essence and a concrete state that involveschange. Through this dipolar concept, God both influences and isinfluenced by the world (2004, 43–44). Griffin understands Godas essentially the soul of the universe although distinct from theworld. The idea of God as the soul of the world stresses the intimacyand direct nature of God’s relationship to the world, not theemergence of the soul from the world (2004, 44). Relationality is partof the divine essence, but this does not mean that this specific worldis necessary to God. This world came into existence from relativenothingness. This relative nothingness was a chaos that lacked anyindividual that sustained specific characteristics over time. However,even in the chaos prior to the creation of this world, events had somedegree of self-determination and causal influence upon subsequentevents. These fundamental causal principles along with God existnaturally since these causal principles are inherent in things thatexist including the nature of God. The principles cannot be brokenbecause such an interruption would be a violation of God’snature. An important implication of the two basic causal principles, adegree of self-determination and causal influence, is that Godinfluences but does not determine other events (2004, 43).Griffin’s understanding of naturalism allows for divine actionthat is formally the same in all events. But this divine action canoccur in a variable manner so that some acts are especially revelatoryof the divine character and purpose (2004, 45).

The context of the science and religion discussion responds to theearly modern concept of an unchanging natural order which posed achallenge to understandings of divine action in the world. The currentdiscussion draws on the development of scientific information aboutthe natural world that can contribute to religious efforts to explainhow God acts in the world. Arthur Peacocke and Paul Davies have madeimportant contributions as scientists. Peacocke developed hisunderstanding of panentheism beginning in 1979 and continuing throughworks in 2001, 2004, and 2006. Peacocke starts with the shift in thescientific understanding of the world from a mechanism to the currentunderstandings of the world as a unity composed of complex systems ina hierarchy of different levels. These emergent levels do not becomedifferent types of reality but instead compose a unity that can beunderstood naturally as an emergentist monism. At the same time, thedifferent levels of complexity cannot be reduced to an explanation ofone type or level of complexity. The creative dynamic of the emergenceof complexity in hierarchies is immanent in the world rather thanexternal to the world (Peacocke 2004, 137–142). Similarly, PaulDavies describes the universe by talking about complexity and higherlevels of organization in which participant observers bring about amore precise order (2007). An important scientific aspect of thisconcept of complexity and organization is the notion of entanglementespecially conceptual level entanglement (Davies 2006, 45–48).Again, the organization, which makes life possible, is an internal, ornatural, order rather than an order imposed from outside of theuniverse (Davies 2004). Peacocke draws upon this contemporaryscientific understanding of the universe to think about therelationship between God and the natural world. He rejects anyunderstanding of God as external to nature whether it is a theisticunderstanding where God intervenes in the natural world or a deisticunderstanding where God initiates the natural world but does notcontinue to be active in the world. For Peacocke, God continuouslycreates through the processes of the natural order. God’s activeinvolvement is not an additional, external influence upon events.However, God is not identified with the natural processes, which arethe action of God as Creator (Peacocke 2004, 143–144). Peacockeidentifies his understanding of God’s relation to the world aspanentheism because of its rejection of external interactions by Godin favor of God always working from inside the universe. At the sametime, God transcends the universe because God is more than theuniverse in the sense of God being unlimited by the world. Thispanentheistic model combines a stronger emphasis upon God’simmanence with God’s ultimate transcendence over the universe byusing a model of personal agency (Peacocke 2004, 147–151).Davies also refers to his understanding of the role of laws in natureas panentheism rather than deism because God chose laws that give aco-creative role to nature (2004, 104).

Philip Clayton begins with contemporary scientific understandings ofthe world and combines them with theological concepts drawn from avariety of sources including process theology. He describesGod’s relationship with the world as an internal rather than anexternal relationship. Understanding God’s relationship asinternal to the world recognizes the validity of modern scientificunderstandings that do not require any external source in order toaccount for the order in the world. At the same time, God’sinternal presence provides the order and regularity that the worldmanifests (2001, 208–210). Clayton agrees that the world is inGod and God is in the world. Panentheism, according to him, affirmsthe interdependence of God and the world (2004a, 83). This affirmationbecame possible as a result of the rejection of substantialisticlanguage in favor of personal language in thinking of God.Substantialistic language excludes all other actualities from any oneactuality. Rejection of substantialistic language thus allows for theinteraction of beings. Clayton cites Hegel’s recognition thatthe logic of the infinite requires the inclusion of the finite in theinfinite and points towards the presence of the world in God (Clayton2004a, 78–79). Clayton, along with Joseph Bracken (1995),identifies panentheism as Trinitarian and kenotic (Clayton 2005, 255).It is Trinitarian because the world participates in God in a manneranalogous to the way that members of the Trinity participate in eachother although the world is not and does not become God. God freelydecides to limit God’s infinite power in an act of kenosis inorder to allow for the existence of non-divine reality. The divinekenotic decision results in the actuality of the world that is takeninto God. But, for Clayton, God’s inclusion of finite being asactual is contingent upon God’s decision rather than necessaryto God’s essence (2003, 214). Clayton affirms creation fromnothing as a description of creaturely existence prior to God’sdecision. The involvement of the world in an internal relationshipwith God does not completely constitute the divine being for Clayton.Instead, God is both primordial, or eternal, and responsive to theworld. The world does constitute God’s relational aspect but notthe totality of God (2005, 250–254). The best way to describethe interdependence between God and the world for Clayton is throughthe concept of emergence. Emergence may be explanatory,epistemological, or ontological. Ontological understandings ofemergence, which Clayton supports, hold (1) monism but notphysicalism, (2) properties emerge in objects from the potentiality ofan object that cannot be previously identified in the object’sparts or structure, (3) the emergence of new properties giving rise todistinct levels of causal relations, and (4) downward causation of theemergent level upon prior levels (2006a, 2–4). Emergencerecognizes that change is important to the nature of the world andchallenges views of God as unchanging (Clayton 2006b, 320).

A number of feminists advocate panentheism by critiquing traditionalunderstandings of transcendence for continuing dualistic ways ofthinking. Feminist panentheists conceive of the divine as continuouswith the world rather than being ontologically transcendent over theworld (Frankenberry 2011). Sallie McFague’s use of metaphors inboth theology and science led her to describe the world as God’sbody. McFague bases the metaphorical nature of all statements aboutGod upon panentheism (2001, 30). Furthermore, for McFague, panentheismsees the world as in God which gives priority to God’s name butincludes each person’s name and preserves their distinctivenessin the divine reality (2001, 5). God’s glory becomes manifest inGod’s total self-giving to the world so that transcendencebecomes immanence rather than being understood as God’s powermanifest in distant control of the world. Grace Jantzen also uses themetaphor of the world as God’s body. Additionally, Jantzen(1998) and Gloria Schaab (2007) have proposed metaphors about the womband midwifery to describe God’s relation to the world. AnnaCase-Winters challenges McFague’s metaphor of the world asGod’s body. Case-Winters acknowledges that this metaphormaintains God’s personal nature, offers a coherent way to talkabout God’s knowledge of and action in the world, recognizesGod’s vulnerable suffering love, and revalues nature andembodiment. But at least McFague’s early use of theworld-as-God’s-body metaphor tended towards pantheism and evenher later introduction of an agential role for the divine stillretains the possibility of the loss of the identity of the world.Case-Winters uses Jay McDaniel’s (1989) distinction betweenemanational, arising out of the being of the One, and relational,present through relationship, understandings of God’s immanencein the world to establish a form of panentheism with a clearerdistinction between God and the world. The world is an“other” in relation to God rather than being a directexpression of God’s own being through emanation for Case-Winters(30–32). Nancy Frankenberry contrasts McFague’s andCase-Winter’s two concepts of transcendence to the traditionalhierarchical concept of transcendence. McFague’s concept is oneof total immanence while Case-Winters holds a dialectic betweenindividual transcendence and immanence (2011).

Although much of the development of panentheism takes place in thecontext of the Christian tradition, connections between other worldreligions and panentheism have been identified. These connectionsrange from explicitly panentheistic traditions, to similarities tospecific beliefs and practices of a tradition, to beliefs andpractices that could be developed into panentheistic positions.Hartshorne in his discussion of panentheism included a section onHinduism (1953). Lorilai Biernacki considers Hinduism to be one of themost panentheistic traditions (Biernacki 2014b). The concept of theworld as the body of the divine offers a strong similarity to Westernpanentheism. TheGita identifies the whole world, includingall the gods and living creatures, as the Divine body. But the DivineBeing has its own body that contains the world while being more thanthe world. While the Upanishads acknowledge the body of the Divine attimes, the body of the divine is never identified as the cosmos. Mostof the Tantrics hold a pantheistic view in which the practitioner is amanifestation of the divine. Abhinavagupta, in the tenth century,provided the first panentheistic understanding of the world asGod’s body. For him, differentiation is Shiva concealing hiswholeness. Abhinavagupta also insisted that Shiva transcends thecosmos (Bilimoria and Stansell 2010, 244–258; Clayton 2010,187–189; and Barua 2010, 1–30. See also Hardy 2016;Silberstein 2017; and Stavig 2017). Other traditions where connectionsto panentheism have been found include Judaism (Artson 2014 andLangton 2016), Jainism (Chapple 2014), Confucianism (Lee 2014),Buddhism (Samuel 2014), and Sufism (Sharify-Funk and Dickson 2014).While these connections might imply a universalistic theology,panentheism affirms the importance of all religions and supportsinter-religions dialogue (Biernacki 2014a, 6, 10).

4. The Nature of the God/world Relation

The God/world relation plays a crucial role in the variety ofexpressions of panentheism. Using metaphors to describe therelationship between God and the world has been controversial. McFagueargues that any attempt to do theology requires the use of metaphor(2001, 30) and for Peacocke the limitation of language requires theuse of models and metaphors in describing both God and the cosmos(Schaab 2008, 13). The primary objection to the dominant metaphor inpanentheism of the world as God’s body is the substantialisticimplications of the term “body” that lead either to anontological separation between the world and God or to a loss ofidentity for God or the world. Bracken finds that the soul–bodymetaphor lacks clarity about the freedom and self-identity of thecreatures in relations to God (1992, 211). Case-Winters faults thesoul–body metaphor for tending to see the soul as dominating thebody and failing to recognize the world as a unified organism (1995,251, 254). Clayton proposes different levels of metaphor as the mostadequate way to reconcile the conflict between divine action and theintegrity of the created realm (2003, 208).

Describing the God–world relation by use of the term“in” lacks precision in understanding the ontologicalnature of the relation due to the variety of meanings of“in”. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling used the phrase“Pan+en+theism” in his “Essay on Freedom” in1809 where the “en” meant inherence as strong ontologicaldependence and referred to participation as a relation to the divine(Clayton 2008a, 169). Karl Krause (1781–1832) created the Germanterm translated as “panentheism” seeking to overcome thesplit between humanity and nature that was expressed both in thesupernaturalist theism epitomized by Leibniz and the naturalism ofSpinoza’s pantheism (Gregersen 2004, 28). Metaphysicalunderstandings of God’s relation to the world have been proposedthat are more precise than metaphors or “in”.Schelling’s German idealism understood God as freely unfoldingemanation by introducing subjectivity. Emanation avoids ontologicalseparation between God and the world because the world participates inthe infinite as its source (Clayton 2000, 477–481). Krauseunderstood the world’s participation in God both ontologicallyand epistemically. The particularity of each existent being dependsupon the Absolute for its existence as what it is (Göcke 2013a,372). Keller offers another metaphysical understanding by arguing forcreation out of chaos. She rejects substance metaphysics and describesthe relation between God and the world as a complex relationalityinvolving an active indeterminacy and past realities (2003, 219).Finally, the science and religion discussion provides anothermetaphysical understanding by drawing upon scientific concepts ofsupervenience, emergence, downward causation, and entanglement toprovide a ground for theological concepts of God’s relation tothe world.

The nature of this mutual relationship between the infinite and thefinite basically depends upon the understanding of the ontology ofeach member of the relationship. The issue is the nature of being forGod and for the world as the basis for mutual influence between Godand the world. A variety of attempts have sought to describe thenature of God’s being and the world’s being in theirrelationship. Thomistic thought utilizes a concept of analogy as itwrestles with the nature of the being of God and the being of theworld (Malloy 2014). Others in considering God’s action in theworld posit the necessity of ontological difference between God andfinite reality (M. Leidenhag 2014, 219). Process thought directlyaddresses the issue of ontology by calling for an ontology that doesnot consider substance as the basic type of existence becausesubstance does not allow for internal relations (Bracken 2014, 10).According to Wesley Wildman the relations between entities areontologically more fundamental than the entities themselves forrelational ontology in contrast to substantivist ontology whereentities are ontologically primary and relations derivative (2010,55).

Historically, participation, Hegelian dynamic ontology, and processdynamic ontology have been utilized to describe the ontological basisfor the relations between God and the world. Participation hasphilosophical antecedents in Plato and Aristotle and was utilized inAugustinian and Orthodox Christian traditions. In participation, theexistence of the world somehow takes part in God’s being. Earlymodern usage of the concept of participation appears in the thought ofKrause (1781–1832) and Sergei Bulgakov (1871–1944). Krauseidentifies the character of each thing as the result of itsparticipation in the original unity of the Absolute. But the Absoluteis still different from its parts in its internal constitution(Göcke 2013a, 372). Bulgakov describes participation as theinclusion of the finite by the Absolute (Gavrilyuk 2015, 453).Hegelian dynamic ontology describes an Infinite which gives rise tothe finite through a dialectical process of negation. The finitethrough a second reciprocal negation of its finitude brings aboutunion and return in transformation to both the Infinite and the finite(Williams 2010, 143). Process dynamic ontology understands God asdipolar with a primordial nature that is eternal and a consequentnature that includes the actualizations achieved by the world. Godpresents possibilities to the events of the world which then makedecisions bringing about actualities that are then included inGod.

Bracken and Cazalis seek to make the ontological nature of therelation more precise. Bracken proposes a Trinitarian field theory toexplain the world’s presence in God. The world is a large butfinite field of activity within the all-comprehensive field ofactivity constituted by the three divine persons in ongoing relationswith each other and with all the creation (2009, 159). Bracken’sTrinitarian field theory draws on systems theory from science,Whitehead’s concept of society, and Christian Trinitariandoctrine. A society as a type of system is a group of entities with anorganizing principle. Basically, reality is an all-encompassingsociety in which subsocieties operate in their own ways as distinct.God functions as the regnant subsociety and receives the richness ofthe information from the world of creation (Bracken 2014, 80). Brackensummarizes this system understanding of panentheism in threeconclusions: (1) systems are social rather than individual, can becombined horizontally and vertically, change over time due to changesin constituents, and do not make decisions; (2) the three divinepersons and all their creatures are together constituent members of anexpanded divine life-system; and (3) the relationships of the variouslevels of societies involve both bottom-up causation and an objectiveformal top-down causation of the constraints of higher order systemson lower order systems (2015a, 223). Although not as fully developedas Bracken’s society explanation, Cazalis uses category theoryand the concept of adjunction in order to offer an internal law thatgives specificity to panentheism. In this approach relations go bothways between two categories and the link carries the universalproperty from one element of a given category to another category(Cazalis 2016, 210).

5. Criticisms and Responses

Panentheism continues to develop. This growth has led to diverse formsof panentheism such as soteriological, revelational or expressivist,and dipolar (Gregersen 2004, 21). The variety of forms of panentheismhas also resulted in different degrees of panentheism ranging fromexplicit fully developed panentheism to vague and underdeveloped formsof panentheism and to expressions of theism that share certainconcepts with fully developed forms of panentheism. Michael Brierleylists three premises as distinctive to panentheism: God is notseparate from the cosmos, God is affected by the cosmos, and God ismore than the cosmos (2006, 639–640). Fully developedpanentheism includes thinkers such as Charles Hartshorne, PhillipClayton, Leonardo Boff, Peter Hodgson, John Macquarrie, SallieMcFague, Jürgen Moltmann, and Arthur Peacocke who have identifiedthemselves as panentheists. Other thinkers such as Paul Tillich haverarely self-identified as panentheists but share concepts withpanentheism (Burch 1998, 251). And finally, especially through worldreligions and early theologies various forms of theism offer diversitysharing certain concepts with panentheism.

Another impetus for development has been criticisms of panentheism.These criticisms have taken two forms. One form, by major alternativesto panentheistic understandings of the God-world relation, hascriticized the adequacy of panentheism. Panentheism faces challengesboth from those who resist any lessening of the emphasis upon divinetranscendence and from those who find pantheism more adequate than anysystem distinguishing between God and the world. Recently, animportant criticism, especially from Analytic theology, has been thatpanentheism lacks the distinctiveness needed to identify it preciselyenough to distinguish it from other forms of theism, critique it, andfurther its development. Finally, the variety of the versions ofpanentheism has led to an active internal discussion among the variousversions.

Criticisms of panentheism from major alternatives such as pantheistsand scientists working with naturalist assumptions criticizepanentheism for its metaphysical claim that there is a being above orother than the natural world. At times, this criticism has been madeby claiming that a thorough-going naturalism does not need atranscendent, individualized reality. Robert Corrington describes thedevelopment of his thought as a growing awareness that panentheismunnecessarily introduces a being above nature as well as in nature(2002, 49). William Drees expresses a similar criticism by arguingthat all contemporary explanations of human agency, includingnon-reductionist explanations, are naturalistic and do not require anyreference to a higher being. For panentheists to claim that divineagency is analogous to human agency fails both to recognize that humanagency requires no additional source or cause and to explain how adivine source of being could act in the realm of physical and mentalprocesses (1999). Frankenberry makes this objection more specific.Panentheism offers a more complex relationship between God and theworld than is necessary. This unnecessary complexity is revealed bythe problems that panentheism has with the logic of the freedom ofparts in wholistic relations, the possibility of the body-soul analogyrelapsing into gender inflected ideas of the soul as the maleprinciple, the problem with simultaneity of events in the divineexperience in relation to the principle of the relativity of time, thenecessity of the everlasting nature of value, and finally the use ofthe ontological argument to establish the necessity of the abstractpole of the divine nature (1993, 36–39). Carl Gillett points outthat panentheism lacks an explanation for a causal efficacy higherthan the causal efficacy realized by microphysical causation (2003,19). Generally, panentheists respond to these criticisms by claimingthe inadequacy both scientifically and metaphysically of any type ofreductionistic naturalism. Such a naturalism whether articulated inscientific categories or religious categories fails to recognize theemergence of levels of complexity in nature. The emergence of higherlevels of organization that cannot be completely explained in terms oflower levels renders non-differentiated accounts of being inadequate.Panentheists often argue that the emergence of higher levels of ordermakes possible downward causation. Davies describes the difficultiesin coming to a clear description of downward causation and concludesthat the complexity of systems open to the environment makes room fordownward causation but has not yet provided an explanation of howdownward causation works (2006, 48). The concepts of entanglement anddivine entanglement may offer a new perspective on causation andespecially the role of the divine in natural causation (Wegter-McNelly2011).

The basic theological criticism of panentheism is that its concept ofGod is inadequate. J. Cooper concludes that panentheists reduce thescope and power of God’s immanence (J. Cooper, 2006, 330). M.Leidenhag criticizes the panentheist rejection of ontologicaldifference between divine influence and natural causes for making thenotion of divine influence ontologically superfluous (M. Leidenhag2014, 209–210). Similarly, Mariusz Tabaczek requires that thedifference between God and the world hold that God is distinct andutterly different from all created entities (Tabaczek 2022, 631). Thepanentheistic God changes because God needs the world and thus ischanged by changes in the world (Tabaczek 2022, 633). Because Godchanges, God is not essentially identical to God, God’s aseityis compromised by including potential rather than being fully actual(Tabaczek 2022, 634). God loses metaphysical independence fromcreatures, and has only a relative transcendence, transcendence ofdifference rather than transcendence of being (Tabaczek 2022, 634).Efforts to justify a mutual relation fail to recognize that relationis posterior to substance, things need to be what they are in order torelate (Tabaczek 2022, 638). If God is not ontologically differentfrom the world, God lacks the omni characteristics and an adequatetype of transcendence. According to J. Cooper, if God’stranscendence does not infinitely exceed God’s immanence,God’s presence, knowledge, and power are limited rather thancomplete, immediate, and unconditioned (J. Cooper 2006,322–328). Whitehead’s understanding of God’stranscendence is limited because God only influences events before orafter the decisions of the events. Likewise, Hegel’s denial ofdivine simplicity makes ontological difference between God and theworld impossible thus limiting God’s transcendence (Tabaczek2013, 151, 154).

The panentheistic response to the foundational issue of theontological distance between God and world is that the essentialdifferences between God and the world adequately distinguish God fromthe world. Clayton argues that the differences in essence and functionbetween God and creation preserve the divinity of God (Clayton 2001,10). Humans are constituted by free and finite relatedness but God hasa primordial and essential nature (Clayton 2005, 254). Real changedoes occur in the divine experience, but not in the divine nature(Clayton 2019, 9). God is prior to the evolution of the natural worldbecause creation is contingent (Macallan, 376). The divine act ofcreation exceeds the individual identities and their transcendenceover other created beings. Divine transcendence is not mereself-transcendence of created beings because the actions of all finiteagents participate in the divine act (Clayton 2008a, 216). God’stranscendence is found in God’s awareness of all that occurswithin the world but this transcendence is much more intimate than anexternalist or substantialist model can account for (Clayton 2008a,148).

Top-down causation indicating God’s vertical transcendence is afurther response that Clayton and others have made to critiques aboutthe absence ontological difference. But Jensen finds this inadequatebecause they are unable to verify clearly God’s presence in thecausal nexus of the world (2014, 131). However, Bracken rejects thenecessity of a causal joint when both top-down and bottom-up causationtakes place (2014, 10). Also, Clayton counters that few processpanentheists accept a full equality between finite actual occasionsand the divine actual occasion or occasions. While God and finiterealities are equal in having existence, God being the chiefexemplification of creativity indicates a difference between God andactual occasions and thus a vertical transcendence (Clayton 2015b,27). Finally, Bracken’s field understanding of panentheism givespriority to God as the regent subsociety that communicates a unifyingpatter of operation just as mind does in human existence (2014,79–80).

Several challenges to panentheism claim that the absence of anontological difference between God and the world means thatpanentheism cannot account for God’s causal influence on theworld. J. Leidenhag concludes that salvation through emergence as themeans of divine action cannot explain how an individual can accelerateevolutionary development to significant change rather than gradualdevelopment (J. Leidenhag 2016, 872). M. Leidenhag thinks that theabsence of ontological difference runs the risk of making the notionof divine influence ontologically superfluous (M. Leidenhag 2014,209–210). Panentheistic explanations of divine causation arguethat the differences between God and the world allow for divinecausation without control of creation. Clayton argues that differencesin essence and function between God and the world preserve thedivinity of God so that it is not necessary to locate creation outsideof God (2001, 210). Bringing emergence together with transcendencerecognizes that the physical is not closed and in downward causationcan be influenced by the non-physical. Science is coming to understandmatter as having a propensity to self-organization leading to more andmore complex systems that display new qualities that are not presentat simpler stages (Clayton 2001, 209). “Just as theneurophysiological structure of the higher primates is ‘upwardlyopen’ to the emergence and causal power of the mental, so themental or cultural world is upwardly open to the influence of theCreator Spirit.” (Clayton 2003, 211). This makes possible aninternalist understanding of God’s action and creativity.Concepts of emergence and system levels avoid the dilemma betweenupward and downward causation by understanding causation as circular,involving interacting effects between different levels of organization(Clayton 2008a, 68). Bringing emergence together with transcendencerecognizes that a divine source entails divine involvement with theworld (Clayton 2004c, 185). Divine causality is best understood as aform of causal influence that prepares and persuades. History in thissense is the result of divine persuasion and is open (Clayton 2008a,198).

However, a concept of divine causation risks raising the problem ofevil if divine causation is the sole source of reality. J. Leidenhagpoints out that if God generates the world with all its inequality andinjustice God becomes responsible for evil with all the issues oftheodicy (J. Leidenhag 2016, 879). Thomas J. Oord illustrates atypical panentheist response to the critique that a panentheistconcept of God makes God responsible for evil. For Oord, God’slove is inherently uncontrolling (Oord 2019, 30). God’s loveempowers others giving them the possibility of choosing to do evil.God does not create or cause evil. Clayton describes all the actionsof finite agents as participating in the divine act in a way thattheir partial autonomy of action is preserved (Clayton 2008a, 216).The autonomy of finite actions makes possible the existence ofevil.

But if God does not control all that happens, the question of if Godcan guarantee the defeat of evil arises. If God cannot finallyovercome evil, God is not worthy of worship. A closely relatedcritique is that the panentheistic God is unable to guarantee a futuregood. While panentheists agree that human freedom logically precludesGod’s prevention of future evil that results from human choice,many affirm that God’s response to unpreventable evil is thatGod suffers with the person suffering evil. However, God’ssuffering with a person does not offer any guarantee that evil will beovercome. But the support of a relationship with God does offer abasis for the hope of overcoming evil. Clayton and Bracken maintainthat the world does influence God but God’s will, expressedthrough the decisions that God makes, protects God’s ability tosave (Clayton 2005). Moltmann’s description of God’sessence as directing God’s activity in order to maintain thereliability of God as love acting on behalf of creation provides anexplanation of how God acts to overcome evil. Moltmann does not findit necessary to protect divine freedom by giving it priority overdivine love but rather understands freedom as acting according to thedivine nature of love (Moltmann 1981, 98, 99). Even more specifically,Griffin’s discussion of divine variable action allows forspecific and distinctive manifestations of divine love (2004, 45).But, Alexander Jensen criticizes the ability of the panentheistconcept to save by distinguishing between salvation by God andsalvation through agents of their own salvation (2014, 12–13).For him a process panentheist’s God can only draw and persuaderather than save (Jensen 2014, 128). Kenneth Pak concludes that anopen future makes any ultimate victory over evil impossible (2014,223–224). In response, B. Cooper lists five ways in which aprocess theology supports God’s power over other realities andevil: 1) ontological priority in providing definition, God’sexistence establishes the nature of all that exists, 2) universalityto all actuality, actual existence occurs due to divine actuality, 3)as the ground of novelty, God makes possible new realities, 4) as theground and preserver of all value, God preserves all value, and 5) asthe unconditioned character of God’s integrity seeking toincrease value in the world and love towards the world, God’sincrease of value and love depends only upon God (1974, 102). PalmyreOomen finds three similar elements in Whitehead’s thought thatrelate to God’s governing and sustaining the world: 1) Godoriginates all occasions by presenting the initial aim which providessome direction against evil, 2) God preserves all that can bepreserved, and 3) God as everlasting means that no occasion canovercome God forever (2015, 287–288).

Analytic theology (Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher, eds. 2013; Andrei A.Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa, eds. 2016) offers a different type ofcritique of panentheism. Analytical approaches to panentheism critiquepanentheism as lacking a distinctive identity making carefulidentification, research, and development of a distinctive positionimpossible. Two responses to this challenge to identify thedistinctiveness of panentheism have developed. One response seeks toidentify a defining characteristic. The second response affirms therichness of diversity and suggests certain commonalities distinguishpanentheism from other forms of theism.

Benedikt Göcke’s effort to identify a specificcharacteristic of panentheism notes the similarities of classicaltheism and panentheism and concludes that the crucial difference is amodal difference in that the world is not necessary for God inclassical theism while the world is necessary for God in panentheism(2013b). Raphael Lataster challenges Göcke’s limitation ofthe distinction between classical theism and panentheism by claimingthat panentheism’s rejection of divine immutabilitydistinguishes panentheism from classical theism (2014). Göckerejects this distinction as failing to recognize that spatialreferences are not adequate in dealing with metaphysical rather thanphysical or logical necessity (2014). Göcke makes therequirements for the distinction between classical theism andpanentheism more specific by calling for a consistent definition of“in” by panentheists and by noting the presence oflogically contradictory but self-consistent interpretations of keynotions by various panentheists (2015). Yujin Nagasawa develops theconcept of modal panentheism by describing modal panentheism asholding that God is the totality of all possible worlds and that allpossible worlds exist to the same extent that the actual world exists.Thus, God includes all possible worlds and any actual worlds. ButNagasawa also notes that modal panentheism has some similarities toclassical theism which limits any modal distinction between classicaltheism and panentheism (2016). R. T. Mullins provides further evidenceand refinement in identifying the distinctiveness of panentheism bypointing out similarities among panentheism, open theism, andneo-classical theism and by critiquing Göcke’s modaldistinction as failing to say anything unique about God. Both modaldistinctions and considering the world as God’s body failbecause they do not say anything unique about the nature of God(2016). Mullins offers an analytic response to the challenge regardingthe distinctiveness of panentheism by suggesting that panentheism candistinguish itself from classical theism by making absolute space andtime attributes of God and by recognizing the distinction betweenabsolute time and space and physical and temporal realities containedwithin absolute time and space. Such a distinction offers a literalunderstanding of “in” in contrast to classical theism(2016). Oliver Crisp critiques Mullins’s identification ofabsolute space and time as attributes of God because that appears tomake God spatial and temporal (2019, 30–31). Pfeifer finds thatMullins’s identification of absolute time and space is helpfulbut lacks clarity as to whether absolute time and space are attributesof God or the substance of God (2020, 130).

A different response to the challenge that panentheism lacks adistinctive characteristic suggests a symmetrical, mutual relationbetween God and the universe as the crucial characteristic ofpanentheism (Griffin 2004, 43–44; Keller 2008, 73; Clayton 215a,189; Gregersen 2004, 20, 22, 23; J. Cooper 2006, 29; Olson 2013, 330;Meister 2017, 5; Henriksen 2017, 1084; Stenmark 2019, 27; Gasser 2019,50).

A variety of terms have been used to describe a mutual relationbetween God and the universe. Daniel Dombrowski (2013a, 32) describedGod’s relation to the universe as an organic relation in thatGod and the universe influence each other. Niels Gregersen (2004, 20),cited by Stenmark (2019, 29), uses the phrase “bilateralrelations”. Stenmark calls God’s relation to the world an“ontological symmetrical” relation in comparison toclassical theism’s “asymmetrical” ontologicaldependence. The basic nature of a mutual relation between God and theuniverse involves an influence of each member of the relationship onthe other member and assumes some degree of independence or freedom ofeach member.

A mutual relation differs from the understanding of the God/worldrelation in classical Christian theism. Panentheism and classicalChristian theism both distinguish between God and the world. Classicaltheism identifies this as an ontological difference. God’s beingdiffers from the being of the world. Göcke calls this a modeldifference in which God’s existence is necessary while theworld’s existence is contingent (2013b). Stenmark describes thisas God being ontologically distinct from the world in classical theismand contrasts that with panentheism as holding that God ontologicallyincludes the world (2019, 19, 27; Göcke 2017, 5–6). Attimes, classical Christian theism maintains the ontological differencebetween God and the world while allowing for the influence of theworld upon God by distinguishing between God’s ontologicalnature and God’s conceptual knowledge of the world orGod’s compassion for the world (Göcke 2017, 3). God’sknowledge may change as the world changes and God’s care mayrespond to different events in the world, but God’s existence oressence is not changed (Stenmark 2019, 30). While God is immanent andactive in the world as well as transcendent for classical Christiantheism, the relationship between God and the universe is asymmetricalin that God influences the universe, but the universe does not affectGod (J. Cooper, 2006, 18, 22 and Stenmark 2019, 30). The world changesbecause of God’s presence in the world, but this dynamicrelationship does not indicate any change in God’s nature orwill.

The balance between God’s transcendence and God’simmanence further refines the distinctiveness of panentheism’smutual relation between God and the universe in distinction from bothclassical Christian theism and pantheism. By deriving divine immanencefrom divine transcendence, classical Christian theism prioritizesGod’s transcendence (J. Cooper 2006, 328; Coman 2016, 82). Incontrast, Gregersen (2004, 19) balances transcendence and immanence.Thus, panentheism affirms the basic role of divine immanence.Likewise, in contrast to pantheism’s derivation of divinetranscendence from divine immanence, panentheism affirms God’stranscendence from the world. David Nikkel recognizes the importanceof this balance even within panentheism. He warns against anoveremphasis upon transcendence leading to the loss of theindeterminacy needed for growth that occurs in panentheism overlyinfluenced by German idealism and an overemphasis on immanence leadingto the loss of God as the source of existence that occurs inpanentheism overly influenced by process thought (2016). The classicalChristian tradition due to a variety of influences such as Platonicinfluence that stressed the reality of the forms in contrast to mattershaped by the forms (see Straus 2010) has tended to understand God asan unrelated Other to ordinary existence. Prioritizing divinetranscendence by calling for a deity unlimited by events in the worldas seen in the doctrine of creation from nothing limitscreation’s freedom to impact divine actions. While divineimmanence is not denied by the classical Christian tradition,transcendence over all specific relations enables the immanence of thedivine relation to all of reality. God is present to all of realitybecause God exists independently from all other reality and isuninfluenced by other reality. This separation of divine reality fromordinary, created reality makes the relationship of the divine to allof created reality an external relationship. The external nature ofthis relationship becomes apparent in deviations from the classicalChristian tradition such as deism. Because of the assumed externalnature of God’s relation to creation, God cannot logically beconceived of as being affected by created reality. God then does notrespond in any way to the created order but acts without considerationof the events of the world. Understanding God’s transcendence inbalance with God’s immanence enables a positive relation betweenscience and theology (Clayton 2020a) and provides a basis for moralityand ethics (Ciocan 2016, 175).

The panentheistic mutual relation also differs from pantheism whichprioritizes divine immanence by identifying the infinite with thefinite. The emphasis upon divine immanence seeks to affirm thepresence of God in the world. In contrast to pantheism’sderivation of divine transcendence from divine immanence, panentheismaffirms God’s transcendence from the world. If divine immanencerather than transcendence is stressed, even when that includes theinfluence of other realities, it fails to retain a robust concept ofdivine transcendence. While some forms of this interest lead topantheism and the identity of God with the creation, the emphasis uponimmanence can acknowledge the need for a source of newness and noveltythat is not limited by, or to, the past. For panentheism the basis forthis novelty is internal to created reality rather than an externalreality providing novelty. However, the question about the adequacy ofthe novelty for the present situation must be considered. Thetranscendence involved in the emphasis upon immanence is a horizontalrather than a vertical transcendence. A horizontal transcendenceinvolves beings of the same ontological status. For example, a persondiffers from other persons and thus in a sense transcends thelimitation of other peoples’ experiences just as they are notlimited to the first person’s experiences. Newness and noveltythen arise from the unrealized potentials in the original situation.However, this limitation risks making radical novelty impossiblebecause the context always limits the possibilities.

Another response to the challenge that panentheism lacks a distinctivecharacteristic recognizes the diversity of types of panentheism andsimilarities between some other forms of theism and panentheism (Olson2020 [Other Internet Resources]; Burch 1998; Gustafson 2011). Thisdiversity of panentheism and the similarities to other forms of theismrequires identifying panentheism by means of more than singlecharacteristic (Lataster and Bilimoria 2018, 57–58). Severalsuggestions about ways to identify the commonality among the diverseexpressions of panentheism and similar forms of theism have been made.Michael Brierley finds eight common themes in panentheism although alleight themes may not be present in each expression of panentheism(2004, 6–8). Gregersen identifies a core common to all forms ofpanentheism, God contains the world so that the world belongs to Godand there is a feeding back from the world into divine life (2017,582). This common core then is expressed in a variety of forms ofpanentheism as particular theologies (Gregersen 2017, 583). Stenmarkdescribes panentheism as having core doctrines and extension claims(2019, 23). Panentheism and classical theism share extension claimsthat God is the creator of the world and that continued existence ofthe world depends upon God’s ongoing creative activity. Bothpanentheism and classical theism maintain the immanence of God, butthey differ in that panentheism holds that God ontologically includesthe world while classical theism maintains an ontological distinctionbetween God and creation. For Stenmark, the core claims of panentheismare that God ontologically includes the world and that God depends onthe world for God’s own existence (2019, 25–26). Claytonsuggests that panentheism be considered a philosophical researchprogram which may include sub-research programs. The panentheisticresearch program affirms the pervasiveness of change with real changetaking place in the divine experience but not in the divine nature.Since panentheists differ on whether creation is from nothing or isnecessary this is a sub-research program within panentheism (Clayton2019, 9–10).

While the idea of panentheism may not be a philosophically stableconcept in itself, that instability makes possible respecification inlight of particular theologies (Gregersen 2017, 583). Thus the term“panentheism” pointed to a balance between classicaltheism and pantheism in the early twentieth century with its use of“in”. The growth of the influence of scientific thoughtupon theology leads to a more specific understanding of the balance inthe relation between God and the world that emphasizes the mutualinteraction of God and the world and moves on from the usefulness of“in”.

The varieties of panentheism participate in internal criticism.Clayton (2008a, 127) and Steven Crain (2006) emphasize the dependenceof the world upon God rather than the dependence of God upon the worldalthough they maintain that God is influenced, and changed, by theworld. They criticize understandings of God that limit God by makingGod subject to metaphysical principles. Griffin emphasizes theregularity provided by metaphysical principles. This regularityrecognizes the order in reality that the reliability of God’slove provides. Panentheists also caution that the emphasis upon theontological nature of the relation between God and the world can leadto a loss of the integrity of the world. Richardson warns againstlosing the discrete identity of finite beings in God (2010, 345).Case-Winters calls for maintaining a balance between the distinctionbetween God and the world and God’s involvement with the world.Over-emphasis upon either side of the balance leads to positions thatare philosophically and theologically inadequate (Case-Winters 2007,125).

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Davis, Andrew M., 2019, “Ambiguities in Panentheism: Definitions, Distinctions, and Demarcations”, unpublished manuscript.
Olson, Roger, 2012, “What’s wrong with panentheism”, blog post (August 7, 2012), at pantheos.com.
–––, 2020, “Can God Change Without Changing?”, blog post (13 November 2020), at pantheos.com.
Paul Davies’s web pages at Arizona State University
Center for Process Studies
Emergence, by Joseph Bracken, with a response from Philip Clayton.

Acknowledgments

R.T. Mullins suggested several sources that increased the coverage ofthis article and through careful reading provided helpful challengesto increase the clarity of this article without being responsible forany remaining lack of clarity.

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