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1. Throughout “that”-clauses in relevant positions areitalicized for clarity and ease of reading: the italicization has nogrammatical significance, and could be omitted without solecism.

2. The inclusion of (8) in the definition of the identity theory pushesit in the direction of idealism: this emerges clearly fromHornsby’s discussion (at 1997: 9; cf. Candlish and Damnjanovic2018: 277–8). That might be objectionable to some upholders ofthe theory; so for that reason too it makes sense to keep the twopositions (i.e., (5)/(7) and (8)) definitionally separate.

3. There is a threat of inconsistency in theTractatushereabouts, concerning the status ofthe world: Wittgensteinsays or implies both (i) that the world is everything that is thecase, and (ii) that the world is everything that is the caseaswell as everything that is not the case (Tractatus 1.1,2.04–2.063; see Stenius 1960: 51).

4. Strictly, this phrase is a solecism: it should be either“truth-donors” or “true-makers”, as Künnepoints out (2003: 158 n. 200). But the phrase has acquired currency,and I shall use it here.

5. But this assumption is not essential, and the ensuing discussion caneasily be adapted to accommodate nominalist qualms aboutuniversals.

6. In defense of the possibility of unified false propositionsinre, see Gaskin 2006: 215–20; 2008: 110–14.

7. Notwithstanding this point, the sense of one linguistic expressioncan itself be the referent of another such expression. What is ruledout is that that entity might beboth the senseandreferent of thesame expression. At least, so one mightnaturally assume: but to discuss this issue fully would take us intothe territory of Frege’s views onoratio obliqua.

8. Dodd 1995 and 1999; Suhm, Wagemann, & Wessels 2000; Gaskin 2006:181–4. Dodd withdraws the charge against McDowell at 2008b: 82.See also his 2008a: 174–86, where the charge against Hornsby isnot so much withdrawn as nuanced. It is actually not clear that Doddis right to withdraw the charge against McDowell, given thelatter’s insistence that facts are “perceptible …an aspect of the perceptible world” (McDowell 1996: 26; cf. Dodd2008a: 182).

9. McDowell 2000; 2005: 84–5; Hornsby 1999: 241–2. It isclear from the final paragraph of one of Hornsby’s footnotes(1997: 4, n. 6) that she embraces an intensional conception of facts,and so locates them at the level of sense.

10. This issue has generated some discussion in the literature. Apartfrom the pieces already mentioned (in the last two footnotes), seeEngel 2001, 2005; Fish and Macdonald 2007, 2009; Candlish andDamnjanovic 2018: 274–6.

11. One might wish to identify the world withmore than merelythe true or obtaining reference-level propositions/facts, but alsowith the false or non-obtaining ones. See Gaskin 2006: ch. 6; 2008:ch. 2. And there is also the problem (if it is one) of facts thatcannot be expressed in language(§1) to worry about: see Gaskin 2020: ch. 8.

12. I reformulate Candlish’s statement of the problem at 1999b:203.

13. In response to an objector who presses him with

You have shown that the true propositionthatp isidentical witha fact, butwhich fact is itidentical with?,

Beall in effect gives the answer that we are here considering:“It is identical with the factthatp”(2000: 129). However, since he thinks he has “dissolved”Candlish’s problem by appeal to the indiscernibility ofidenticals, Beall is inclined to regard the question as a spurious oneand the answer as unnecessary.

14. See supplement onthe slingshot argument to the entry onfacts for discussion and references.

15. In defense of a pluralistic approach to propositional individuation,with full discussion and references, see Gaskin 2020: ch. 5.

16. The account has to be slightly complicated to accommodate adistinction between simple and complex propositions: it will applydirectly only to simple propositions, and indirectly to complex ones.See Gaskin 2006: 220–4.