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1. Peter Geach, one of theforemost commentators of McTaggart, also refrains from commenting onMcTaggart’s works on Hegel. He suggests, however, that scholars ofHegel regard McTaggart’s interpretations of Hegel as perverse (Geach1979, 17). Hiralal Haldar, in his bookNeo-Hegelianism, describes McTaggart’s interpretations ofHegel as “highly original and very unorthodox” (Haldar1927, 415). McTaggart’s views on Hegel are briefly discussed byKreines (2008, 374–376). For a more favorable reception ofMcTaggart’s interpretation of Hegel, see Stern (1994).

2. See Monk (1999, 109) for discussion.

3. Geach (1995, 568). Geach(1979, 10) reports that, after his wife’s death, his fortune wasdonated to Clifton College.

4. The former quote istaken from McTaggart’s article “The Relation of Time toEternity”, the latter is quoted by Paul Levy in (Levy 1981,109).

5.For more onMcTaggart’s influence on Moore, see Baldwin (1996).

6. See (Dickinson 1931, 40)for a quote of the poem and for a discussion of McTaggart’s reactionto it.

7.According toDickinson (1931, 85), McTaggart believed that the sciences wereincapable of throwing real light on the nature of the world.

8.Rochelle(1991, 88) discusses how McTaggart’s lectures on the problemsof philosophy stressed the need to avoid ‘logical and verbalambiguity’.

9. See Section 4 in theSEP entry ontime for furtherdiscussion. D.H. Mellor (1981, 1998) has recast McTaggart’s argumentagainst the reality of time as an argument against the reality oftenses.

10.Such a viewis hinted at in the concluding section of “The Unreality ofTime”.

11.This claimis also defended inSome Dogmas of Religion, sections 180 and192, as well as in his article “Personality”, which isreprinted in hisPhilosophical Studies.

12.See Geach(1979, 15), and Geach (1995, 569). Dickinson (1931, 94–97) andRochelle (1991, 75–76) discuss McTaggart’s mysticalexperiences, which he called his “Saul feeling”, a namewhich he took after Robert Browning’s poem,“Saul.”

13.The moralexhortation is articulated in “Dare to Be Wise”, reprintedin hisPhilosophical Studies, as well as in section 59 ofSome Dogmas of Religion.

14.Chapter 4 ofSome Dogmas of Religion and chapter 63 of the second volume ofThe Nature of Existence contain defenses of pre-existence andpost-existence.

15.See“An Ontological Idealism”, reprinted in hisPhilosophical Studies as well asSome Dogmas ofReligion, chapter 7, section 209.

16.In “AnOntological Idealism”, he defines the view as the claim that theonly substances are selves, parts of selves and groups of selves orgroups of parts of selves.

17.For athorough reconstruction of McTaggart’s argument in theNatureof Existence for ontological idealism, see Nathan (1991).

18.This view isdefended in the second volume ofThe Nature of Existence,chapter 37, section 412.

19.See“Personality”, reprinted inPhilosophicalStudies.

20.McTaggartdefends these claims in the second volume ofThe Nature ofExistence, sections 401–404.

21. This view is defended in “Personality”, reprinted inPhilosophical Studies.

22.See volumetwo ofThe Nature of Existence, section 389.

23.See sections364 and 507 ofThe Nature of Existence.

24.Dickinson(1933, 84) seems to disagree with me. He writes, “Chairs andtables, dishes and plates, everything that the senses perceive are“really” souls presenting themselves to our deceptivesenses under these particular forms”. However, on page 282 of“An Ontological Idealism”, McTaggart explicitly states thatwe never perceive objects as being material. If we see something asbeing, e.g., a chair, do we see something as being a materialobject?

25.McTaggartargues against the existence of sense-data in chapter 35 of volume twoofThe Nature of Existence.

26.See volumetwo ofThe Nature of Existence, chapter XLV and sections723–726 for further discussion.

27.As ananonymous referee pointed out, what I call McTaggart’s secondpoint is the conjunction of two principles accepted by McTaggart andsubjected to individual discussion: the Identity of Indiscernibles,defended in section 99, and a principle of sufficient description,defended in section 104, according to which the qualities of everysubstance are fully determinate.

28.That somerelation be a relation of determining correspondence is central toMcTaggart’s argument; unfortunately, what it is to be a relationof determining correspondence is one of the less clearer bits ofMcTaggart’s metaphysics. See Geach (1979), Nathan (1991), andWisdom (1928) for contrasting takes on determining correspondence.

29.McTaggart’s arguments against the existence of matter andsense-data are located in, respectively, chapters XXXIV and XXXV ofvolume II ofThe Nature of Existence.

30.See section360 of volume II ofThe Nature of Existence.

31.In chapterXXXVII of volume II ofThe Nature of Existence, McTaggartargues that perception can serve as a relation of determiningcorrespondence.

32.See thefirst volume ofThe Nature of Existence, section 81.

33.See“Mysticism”, inPhilosophical Studies, p.61.

34.See chapterXXXIX ofThe Nature of Existence vol. II for furtherdiscussion.

35.See thefirst volume ofThe Nature of Existence, sections 1–4.

36.In“The Relation of Time to Eternity”, McTaggart criticizesHermann Lotze’s view that something exists only if it is intime.

37.SeeStudies in Hegelian Cosmology sections 97–99 fordiscussion.

38.SeeStudies in Hegelian Cosmology, sections 101–136 fordiscussion.

39.An anonymous referee suggested that McTaggart’s discoverythat the absolute is not free from imperfection is what led him toabandon Hegel’s system.