The economic, political, and social frameworks that each society has—its laws, institutions, policies, etc.—result indifferent distributions of benefits and burdens across members of thesociety. These frameworks are the result of human political processesand they constantly change both across societies and within societiesover time. The structure of these frameworks is important because thedistributions of benefits and burdens resulting from themfundamentally affect people’s lives. Arguments about whichframeworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferableconstitute the topic of distributive justice. Principles ofdistributive justice are therefore best thought of as providing moralguidance for the political processes and structures that affect thedistribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principleswhich do offer this kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardlessof the terminology they employ, should be considered principles ofdistributive justice.

This entry is structured in the following way. After outlining thescope of the entry and the role of distributive principles, the firstrelatively simple principle of distributive justice examined is StrictEgalitarianism, which calls for the allocation of equal material goodsto all members of society. John Rawls’ alternative distributiveprinciple, which he calls the Difference Principle, is examined next.The Difference Principle permits diverging from strict equality solong as the inequalities in question would make the least advantagedin society materially better off than they would be under strictequality. Some have thought that neither strict equality norRawls’ Difference Principle capture the important moral roles ofluck and responsibility. The “Luck Egalitarianism”literature comprises varying attempts to design distributiveprinciples that are appropriately sensitive to considerations ofresponsibility and luck. Desert-based principles similarly emphasizethe moral roles of responsibility and luck but are distinct becausethey approach these factors through claims about what people deservebecause of their work.

Advocates of welfare-based principles (of which utilitarianism is themost famous) do not believe the primary distributive concern should bematerial goods and services. They argue that material goods andservices have no intrinsic value but are valuable only in so far asthey increase welfare. Hence, they argue, distributive principlesshould be designed and assessed according to how they affect welfare,either its maximization or distribution. Advocates of libertarianprinciples, by contrast to each of the principles so far mentioned,generally criticize any distributive ideal that requires the pursuitof specific ‘patterns’, such as maximization or equalityof welfare or of material goods. They argue that the pursuit of suchpatterns conflicts with the more important moral demands of liberty orself-ownership. Finally, feminist critiques of existing distributiveprinciples note that they tend to ignore the particular circumstancesof women, so feminists tend to argue for principles which are moresensitive to facts such as that women often have primaryresponsibility for child-rearing and on average, spend less of theirlifetimes than men in the market economy.

• 1. Scope and Role of Distributive Principles
• 2. Strict Egalitarianism
• 3. The Difference Principle
• 4. Equality of Opportunity and Luck Egalitarianism
• 5. Welfare-Based Principles
• 6. Desert-Based Principles
• 7. Libertarian Principles
• 8. Feminist Principles
• 9. Methodology and Empirical Beliefs about Distributive Justice
• Bibliography
  • Strict Egalitarianism
  • The Difference Principle
  • Equality of Opportunity and Luck Egalitarianism
  • Welfare-Based Principles
  • Desert-Based Principles
  • Libertarian Principles
  • Feminist Principles
  • Methodology and Empirical Beliefs about Distributive Justice
  • Further Theories and General Reference
  • Extended Bibliography [Supplementary Document]
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Scope and Role of Distributive Principles

Distributive principles vary in numerous dimensions. They vary in whatis considered relevant to distributive justice (income, wealth,opportunities, jobs, welfare, utility, etc.); in the nature of therecipients of the distribution (individual persons, groups of persons,reference classes, etc.); and on what basis the distribution should bemade (equality, maximization, according to individual characteristics,according to free transactions, etc.). In this entry, the focus isprimarily on principles designed to cover the distribution of benefitsand burdens of economic activity among individuals in a society.Although principles of this kind have been the dominant source ofAnglo-American debate about distributive justice over the last sixdecades, there are other important distributive justice questions,some of which are covered by other entries in the encyclopedia. Theseinclude questions of distributive justice at the global level ratherthan just at the national level (seejustice: international), distributive justice across generations (seejustice: intergenerational) and how the topic of distributive justice can be approached, not as aset of principles but as a virtue (seejustice: as a virtue).

Although the numerous distributive principles vary along differentdimensions, for simplicity, they are presented here in broadcategories. Even though these are common classifications in theliterature, it is important to keep in mind they necessarily involveover-simplification, particularly with respect to the criticisms ofeach of the groups of principles. Some criticisms may not applyequally to every principle in the group. The issue of how we are tounderstand and respond to criticisms of distributive principles isdiscussed briefly in the final section on methodology (seeMethodology).

Throughout most of history, people were born into, and largely stayedin, a fairly rigid economic position. The distribution of economicbenefits and burdens was normally seen as fixed, either by nature orby a deity. Only when there was a widespread realization that thedistribution of economic benefits and burdens could be affected bygovernment did distributive justice become a live topic. Now the topicis unavoidable. Governments continuously make and change laws andpolicies affecting the distribution of economic benefits and burdensin their societies. Almost all changes, whether they regard tax,industry, education, health, etc. have distributive effects. As aresult, every society has a different distribution at any point intime and we are becoming increasingly more adept at measuring thatdistribution. More importantly, at every point in time now, eachsociety is faced with a choice about whether to stay with currentlaws, policies, etc. or to modify them. The practical contribution ofdistributive justice theory is to provide moral guidance for theseconstant choices.

Many writers on distributive justice have tended to advocate anddefend their particular principles by describing or considering idealsocieties operating under them. They have been motivated to do this asan aid to understanding what their principles mean. Unfortunatelythough, as a result of this practice, some readers and the generalpublic have been misled into believing that discussions ofdistributive justice are merely exercises in ideal theory—tobe dismissed as a past-time of the academic elite rather than assomething that is crucially relevant to current political discussion.This misunderstanding is unfortunate because, in the end, the mainpurpose of distributive justice theory is not to inform decisionsabout ideal societies but about our societies. To help correct thismisunderstanding it is important to acknowledge that there has neverbeen, and never will be, a purely libertarian society or Rawlsiansociety, or any society whose distribution conforms to one of theproposed principles. Rather than guiding choices between idealsocieties, distributive principles are most usefully thought of asproviding moral guidance for the choices that each society faces rightnow. So, for instance, advocates of Rawls’ Difference Principleare most constructively understood as arguing for changes to our basicinstitutional structures which would improve the lifetime prospects ofthe least advantaged in society. Other theorists are arguing forchanges to bring economic benefits and burdens more in accordance withwhat people really deserve. Libertarians are arguing that reductionsin government intervention in the economy will better respect libertyand/or self-ownership of its citizens. Sometimes a number of thetheories may recommend the same changes to our current practices;other times they will diverge. It is best to understand the differenttheorists, despite the theoretical devices they sometimes employ, tobe speaking to what should be done in our society—not aboutwhat should be done in some hypothetical society. Of course, ensuringthat philosophical principles be effective for the purpose of guidingpolicy and change in real societies involves important and complexmethodological questions. For a review of work specifically addressingthis issue, in ideal and nonideal theory, see Zofia Stemplowska andAdam Swift (2012), and Valentini (2012).

Distributive justice theorists (perhaps like all theorists) tend toemphasize the differences between their theories. This emphasis alsoprovides an avenue for those who have an interest in ignoringdistributive justice to dismiss the relevance of the distributivejustice literature—‘we cannot get any guidance fromthese theorists—they completely disagree with eachother’. Such dismissals misunderstand that it is impossible notto take a stand on distributive justice at every moment of asociety’s existence. This misunderstanding is, perhaps, bestillustrated by the most common type of dismissal. Often governmentstry to justify inaction, in the face of calls to change somegovernment policy in light of some distributive justice concern, onthe grounds that there are ‘disagreements/lack ofconsensus’ about the issue. Of course, there always aredisagreements, on any topic, whether moral or empirical, which willhave a differential effect on people’s material interests. Butto think that this points to the desired conclusion—that inlight of this we should retain the status quo for the time being—reveals a confusion about the nature of the choices alwaysfacing each society. So, in this instance, to claim that we should notpursue any changes to our economic structures in light of adistributive justice argument calling for change is, by its verynature, to take a stand on the distributive justice of (or, if oneprefers, the morality of) the current distribution and structures inthe society compared to any of the possible alternative distributionsand structures practically available. At any particular moment theexisting economic and institutional framework is influencing thecurrent distribution of economic and life prospects for all members ofthe society. To assert that we should not change the current system istherefore, despite implications to the contrary, to take a substantiveposition on distributive justice debates. It is to argue that keepingthe existing distribution is morally preferable to changing to anypractical alternative proposed—to take a substantive positionin just the area that it was claimed was too controversial toconsider. Societies cannot avoid taking positions about distributivejustice all the time and any suggestion that they can should beresisted as incoherent.

A related point can be made when people assert that economicstructures and policy should be left to economists, or when peopleassert that economic policy can be pursued without reference todistributive justice. These assertions reveal misconceptions aboutwhat distributive justice and economics are, and how they are related.Positive economics, at its best, can tell us about economic causes andeffects. Positive economics is very important for distributive justicebecause it can give us guidance about which changes to pursue in orderto better instantiate our moral principles. What it cannot do, in theabsence of the principles, is tell us what we should do. This point iseasily lost in everyday political discussion. When an economist says‘The Central Bank should raise interest rates’, thegeneral population often, mistakenly, believes the recommendation ispurely coming from the science of economics. Moreover the‘should’ is almost always a moral ‘should’.When economists make such a recommendation they, sometimesunconsciously, have taken off their social scientific hat. They areemploying alongside their positive economic theory, a moral principle.Suppressing, either consciously or unconsciously, that there arealways moral arguments being employed in arguments about what economicpolicies a government should pursue has had the effect of creatingmisconceptions about the respective roles of positive economics anddistributive justice in government decision-making.

For instance, the raising of interest rates is typically thought byeconomists to have the dual effects of suppressing inflation andsuppressing employment. To get to a recommendation that the CentralBank should reduce interest rates involves not only empirical viewsabout the relative sizes of the inflation and unemployment effects andtheir long-term impact on growth, etc. but also normative views aboutthe relative moral importance of inflation, employment and growth. Foreconomists, these normative views on economic policies come under therubric of ‘normative’ economics, while philosophers wouldtypically categorize them under ‘distributive justice’.But the rubrics are not important as basically the same area iscovered under different names—the normative evaluation ofeconomic policies, structures, or institutions. (To avoid confusion itshould be noted that the distributive justice tradition includesprinciples which do not use ‘justice’ per se, such asutilitarianism, but which are moral principles relating todistribution just the same.) The evaluations often look differentbecause economists most commonly use utility as their fundamentalmoral concept while philosophers use a wider variety of moralconcepts, but the task in which they are both engaged is very similar.What is most important to understand here is that positive economicsalone cannot, without the guidance of normative principles, recommendwhich policies, structures, or institutions to pursue. Distributivejustice theories, such as those discussed in this entry, aim to supplythis kind of normative guidance.

2. Strict Egalitarianism

One of the simplest principles of distributive justice is that ofstrict, or radical, equality. The principle says that every personshould have the same level of material goods (including burdens) andservices. The principle is most commonly justified on the grounds thatpeople are morally equal and that equality in material goods andservices is the best way to give effect to this moral ideal.

Even with this ostensibly simple principle, some of the difficultspecification problems of distributive principles can be seen. The twomain problems are the construction of appropriate indices formeasurement (the index problem), and the specification of time frames.Because there are numerous proposed solutions to these problems, the‘principle of strict equality’ is not a single principlebut a name for a group of closely related principles. This range ofpossible specifications occurs with all the common principles ofdistributive justice.

The index problem arises primarily because the goods and services tobe distributed need to be measured if they are going to be distributedaccording to some pattern (such as equality). The strict equalityprinciple stated above says that there should be ‘the samelevel of material goods and services’. The problem ishow to specify and measure levels. The simplest way of solving theindex problem in the strict equality case is to specify that everyoneshould have the samebundle of material goods and servicesrather than the samelevel (so everyone would have 4 oranges,6 apples, 1 bike, etc.). The problem with adopting this simplesolution is that there will be many other allocations of materialgoods and services which will make some people better off withoutmaking anybody else worse off. Such allocations are what are called‘Pareto superior’ allocations (seeequality for a more detailed discussion of Pareto efficiency). For instance,someone who prefers apples to oranges will be better off if she swapssome of her oranges for some of the apples belonging to a person whoprefers oranges. That way, they are both better off and no one isworse off. Indeed, since most everyone will wish to trade something,requiring identical equal bundles will make virtually everybody worseoff than they would be under an alternative allocation. So specifyingthat everybody must have the samebundle of goods does notseem to be a satisfactory way of solving the index problem. Some indexfor measuring the value of goods and services is required.

Money is an index for the value of material goods and services. It isan imperfect index whose pitfalls are documented in most economicstextbooks. Moreover, once the goods to be allocated are extendedbeyond material ones to include goods such as opportunities, moneymust be combined with other indices. (For instance, John Rawls’index of primary goods—see Rawls 1971.) Nevertheless, usingmoney, either in the form of income or wealth or both, as an index forthe value of material goods and services is the most common responseto the index problem. In terms of public, rather than academicdiscourse, GDP (gross domestic product) or per capita GDP is mostcommonly touted as the way to measure the effect of governments’policies on the population’s well-being. The deficiencies insuch indices has now been well-documented and has lead to theproposing of better alternative indices such as the Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI) and Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI).Unfortunately, the general population is generally unaware of thesemore accurate indices and so are disadvantaged in their ability tojudge the distributive justice effects of their governments’policies.

The second main specification problem involves time frames. Manydistributive principles identify and require that a particular patternof distribution be achieved or at least be pursued as the objective ofdistributive justice. But they also need to specifywhen thepattern is required. One version of the principle of strict equalityrequires that all people should have the same wealth at some initialpoint, after which people are free to use their wealth in whatever waythey choose, with the consequence that future outcomes are bound to beunequal. Principles specifying initial distributions after which thepattern need not be preserved are commonly called‘starting-gate’ principles. (See Ackerman 1980,53–59,168–170,180–186; Alstott and Ackerman1999.)

Because ‘starting-gate’ principles may eventually lead tolarge inequalities, strict egalitarians do not usually favor them. Themost common form of strict equality principle specifies thatincome (measured in terms of money) should be equal ineach time-frame, though even this may lead to significantdisparities in wealth if variations in savings are permitted. Hence,strict equality principles are commonly conjoined with somesociety-wide specification of just saving behavior (seejustice: intergenerational). In practice, however, this principle and the starting-gate versionmight require more similar distributions than it first appears. Thisis because the structure of the family means the requirement to givepeople equal starts will often necessitate redistribution to parents,who due to bad luck, bad management, or simply their own choices, havebeen unsuccessful in accruing or holding on to material goods.

There are a number of direct moral criticisms made of strict equalityprinciples: that they unduly restrict freedom, that they do not givebest effect to the moral equality of persons, that they conflict withwhat people deserve, etc. (see the sections onLibertarian Principles, andDesert-Based Principles, and the entry onequality). But the most common criticism is a welfare-based one related to thePareto efficiency requirement: that everyone can be materially betteroff if incomes are not strictly equal (Carens 1981). It is thiscriticism which partly inspired the Difference Principle.

3. The Difference Principle

The wealth of an economy is not a fixed amount from one period to thenext, but can be influenced by many factors relevant to economicgrowth. These include, for example, technological advancement orchanges in policy that affect how much people are able to produce withtheir labour and resources. More wealth can be produced and indeedthis has been the overwhelming feature of industrialized countriesover the last couple of centuries. The dominant economic view is thatwealth is most readily increased in systems where those who are moreproductive earn greater incomes. This economic view partly inspiredthe formulation of the Difference Principle.

The most widely discussed theory of distributive justice in the pastfour decades has been that proposed by John Rawls inA Theory ofJustice, (Rawls 1971), andPolitical Liberalism, (Rawls1993). Rawls proposes the following two principles of justice:

1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equalbasic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the samescheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, andonly those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a)They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all underconditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be tothe greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.(Rawls 1993, pp. 5–6. The principles are numbered as they werein Rawls’ originalA Theory of Justice.)

Where the rules may conflict in practice, Rawls says that Principle(1) has lexical priority over Principle (2), and Principle (2a) haslexical priority over (2b). As a consequence of the priority rules,Rawls’ principles do not permit sacrifices to basic liberties inorder to generate greater equality of opportunity or a higher level ofmaterial goods, even for the worst off. While it is possible to thinkof Principle (1) as governing the distribution of liberties, it is notcommonly considered a principle of distributive justice given that itis not governing the distribution of economic goodsper se.Equality of opportunity is discussed in the next section. In thissection, the primary focus will be on (2b), known as the DifferencePrinciple.

The main moral motivation for the Difference Principle is similar tothat for strict equality: equal respect for persons. Indeed, since theonly material inequalities the Difference Principle permits are thosethat raise the level of the least advantaged in the society, itmaterially collapses to a form of strict equality under empiricalconditions where differences in income have no effect on the workincentive of people (and hence, no tendency to increase growth). Theoverwhelming economic opinion though is that in the foreseeable futurethe possibility of earning greater income will bring forth greaterproductive effort. This will increase the total wealth of the economyand, under the Difference Principle, the wealth of the leastadvantaged. Opinion divides on the size of the inequalities whichwould, as a matter of empirical fact, be allowed by the DifferencePrinciple, and on how much better off the least advantaged would beunder the Difference Principle than under a strict equality principle.Rawls’ principle, however, gives fairly clear guidance on whattype of arguments will count as justifications for inequality. Rawlsis not opposed in principle to a system of strict equalityperse; his concern is about theabsolute position of theleast advantaged group rather than theirrelative position.If a system of strict equality maximizes the absolute position of theleast advantaged in society, then the Difference Principle advocatesstrict equality. If it is possible to raise the absolute position ofthe least advantaged further by having some inequalities of income andwealth, then the Difference Principle prescribes inequality up to thatpoint where the absolute position of the least advantaged can nolonger be raised.

Because there has been such extensive discussion of the DifferencePrinciple in the last 40 years, there have been numerous criticisms ofit from the perspectives of all the other theories of distributivejustice outlined here. Briefly, the main criticisms are asfollows.

Advocates of strict equality argue that inequalities permitted by theDifference Principle are unacceptable even if they do benefit theabsolute position of the least advantaged. The problem for theseadvocates has been to explain convincingly why society should beprevented from materially benefiting the least advantaged when thisbenefit requires a deviation from strict equality.

For the strict egalitarian therelative position of people isall important and theabsolute position is either notimportant at all or lexically inferior. For Rawls, at least withrespect to the social and economic inequalities, the opposite is true.But there have been various plausible explanations given in reply toRawls’ proposed Difference Principle why relative position is avalue that should beweighed against the value of theabsolute position of the least advantaged rather than subordinatedlexically to it. In an early reply to Rawls, Crocker explains thevalue of paying attention to the relative position as a way ofunderstanding the value of solidarity. His approach fits into a set ofviews in which being materially equal, or striving towards it, is animportant expression of the equality of persons.

Another set of views, in opposition to Rawls’ DifferencePrinciple, emphasizes the importance of relative position not as avalue in itself but because of its effect on other relations. Inparticular, if some people are significantly better off materiallythan others then that can result in them having significant power overothers. Rawls’ response to this criticism appeals to the lexicalpriority of his first principle: The inequalities consistent with theDifference Principle are only permitted so long as they do notcompromise the fair value of the political liberties. So, forinstance, very large wealth differentials may make it practicallyimpossible for poor people to be elected to political office or tohave their political views represented. These inequalities of wealth,even if they increase the material position of the least advantagedgroup, may need to be reduced in order for the first principle to beimplemented. However, while this provides a partial reply toRawls’ critics, it does not seem to recognize that it is notjust differential political power that can come from significantdifferences in economic position but also economic power and henceeconomic freedom. Virtual monopoly employers in regions of developingeconomies give a stark illustration of this phenomenon. Of course,Rawls can appeal in such cases to the empirical claim that suchdifferentials do not maximize the long-term position of the leastadvantaged. The empirical question will be whether all such largedifferentials which result in large differences in economic power alsodemonstrably have the result of worsening the absolute position of theleast advantaged.

The utilitarian objection to the Difference Principle is that it doesnot maximize utility. InA Theory of Justice, Rawls usesutilitarianism as the main theory for comparison with his own, andhence he offers a number of arguments in response to this utilitarianobjection, some of which are outlined in the section onWelfare-Based Principles.

Libertarians object that the Difference Principle involvesunacceptable infringements on liberty, property rights, orself-ownership. For instance, the Difference Principle may requireredistributive taxation for the benefit of the poor, and libertarianscommonly object that such taxation involves the immoral taking of justholdings (seeLibertarian Principles).

The Difference Principle is also criticized as a primary distributiveprinciple on the grounds that it mostly ignores claims that peopledeserve certain economic benefits in light of their actions.Advocates of desert-based principles argue that some may deserve ahigher level of material goods because of their hard work orcontributions even if their unequal rewards do not also function toimprove the position of the least advantaged. Desert theorists as wellas libertarians also argue that the explanation ofhow peoplecome to be in more or less advantaged positions is morally relevant totheir fairness, yet the Difference Principle ignores theseexplanations.

Like desert theorists, advocates of Luck Egalitarian principles arguethat the Difference Principle does not fully capture the moral rolesthey believe luck and responsibility should play in principles ofdistributive justice. Indeed, ‘luck egalitarianism’ as adistinct approach in the distributive justice literature reallydeveloped in critical response to Rawls’ theory of distributivejustice. The reasons for that response are outlined in the nextsection.

4. Equality of Opportunity and Luck Egalitarianism

The distribution of material goods and services is not the onlyeconomic distribution which is important to people. The distributionof opportunities is also important. As noted in the previous section,John Rawls conjoined his Difference Principle with a principle ofequality of opportunity. Endorsement of some form of equality ofopportunity is very prevalent among distributive justice theoristsand, indeed, among the general population, especially when combinedwith some form of market distributive mechanism. Equality ofopportunity is often contrasted favorably with ‘equality ofoutcome’ or strict egalitarianism, by those who believe that wecan show equal concern, respect, or treatment of people without themhaving the same material goods and services, so long as they haveequal economic opportunities. An equality of opportunity principlethen, is combined with other principles to ensure that theinequalities permitted by the overall theory (whether utilitarian,desert, or a Rawlsian difference principle) are only justified ifpeople have the relevant kind of equal opportunity to achieve greateror lesser amounts of goods. So an equality of opportunity principleallows those theorists who depart from strict equality to capture someof what nonetheless has motivated egalitarians. What is the morallybest interpretation of this equality of opportunity principle has beena significant focus of research (seeEquality of Opportunity), particularly among luck egalitarians. In fact, the luck egalitarianideal (also sometimes known as the ‘level playing field’ideal) elevates the role of equal opportunity to the centraldistributive ideal, so that distributive inequalities are only justwhen they flow from one’s choices or from factors for which onecan reasonably be held responsible.

In 1988, Brian Barry gave an interesting reconstruction of thereasoning which led John Rawls to his Equal Opportunity and DifferencePrinciples. Barry’s reconstruction and Ronald Dworkin’searlier discussion (which we will come to later), have been seminal inthe rise of the luck egalitarian literature; hence, a version of thisargument is probably the best introduction to some of the relevantmoral issues.

‘Formal’ equality of opportunity rules out formaldiscrimination on grounds such as a person’s race, ethnicity,age or gender. What is the underlying concern, shared by mosttheorists and the general population, with a society lacking formalequality of opportunity? The concern seems to be rooted in the beliefthat traits such as a persons’ gender or race are elements overwhich people have no control and, hence, a society in whichpeople’s race or gender have fundamental effects on theirlifetime economic prospects treats people unfairly. In such societies,whether people were born as the favored gender or race, and hence werefavored economically, would simply be a matter of luck. Rawls’claim is that structuring a society so that this ‘naturallottery’ has such fundamental effects on people’s lives isimmoral, when we have the option to structure it another way, with asystem of formal equality of opportunity.

The foregoing is relatively uncontroversial, but what madeRawls’ (and Barry’s) arguments so interesting was theirclaim that this line of reasoning actually leads to much stronger (andmore contentious) requirements for social justice. They note that evenwith formal equality of opportunity, there will remain many factorsover which people have no control but which will affect their lifetimeeconomic prospects, such as whether a person’s family can affordto purchase good quality educational opportunities or health care. Asociety therefore will have reasons to adopt a more substantialequality of opportunity principle, with equal opportunities foreducation, health care, etc.—the same reasons it had foradopting a merely formal equality of opportunity principle.

Following this line of reasoning further (and it certainly hasappeared to many that we have no principled reason to stop here) seemsto lead to more radical conclusions than those who agreed with formalequality of opportunity would have imagined. A society with a moresubstantial equality of opportunity principle in place will still notbe providing equality of opportunity for all. People are born intomore or less nurturing families and social circumstances. People areborn into families and neighborhoods which are more or lessencouraging of education and the development of economicallyadvantageous talents. There are a whole range of social influenceswhich have fundamental and unequal effects on children’seconomic prospects and for which they are in no way responsible—the influences children are exposed to are a matter of theirluck in the ‘social lottery’. Moreover, the luck of thenatural lottery is not just restricted to such characteristics asgender and race. Children are more or less fortunate in thedistribution of natural talents as well.

A race where the starting line is arbitrarily staggered, wherepeople’s prospects for winning are not largely determined byfactors for which they are responsible but rather largely by luck, isnot considered a fair race. Similarly, if society is structured sothat people’s prospects for gaining more economic goods are notlargely determined by factors for which they are responsible butrather largely by luck, then the society is open to the charge ofbeing unfair. This is the challenging conclusion with which Barry,following Rawls, presents us.

In response to this challenge, Barry himself explores a number ofavenues, including questioning whether economic distribution is reallyanalogous to a race. Rawls, of course, responded to his own challengeby arguing that there is not a lot that can be done (morally) to makethe social and natural opportunities more equal, so the fair responseis to adopt the Difference Principle. Others, however, have taken thischallenge in different directions.

Ronald Dworkin, (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b, 2000) provided one of the mostdetailed early responses to Rawls’ challenge. In retrospect,Dworkin’s theory is often identified as one of the earliest inthe luck egalitarian literature, though Dworkin himself called histheory Resource Egalitarianism. Dworkin presented his key insight(i.e., what distinguishes him from Rawls) in terms of a distinctionbetween ‘ambitions’ and ‘endowments’. Dworkinuses the term ‘ambitions’ to cover the realm of ourchoices and what results from our choices, such as the choice to workhard, or to spend money on expensive luxuries. His term‘endowments’ refers to the results of brute luck, or thosethings over which we have no control, such as one’s geneticinheritance, or unforeseeable bad luck. Dworkin agrees with Rawls thatnatural inequalities are not distributed according to people’schoices, nor are they justified by reference to some other morallyrelevant fact about people, so people should not end up worse off as aresult of bad luck in the natural lottery. However, Dworkin argues theDifference Principle fails to deliver on this ideal, since itsformulation in terms of primary goods fails to recognize that thosewho are very unlucky, such as the severely ill or disabled, may needconsiderably greater shares of primary goods than others in order toachieve a reasonable life. Dworkin also argued that just economicdistributions should be more responsive than the Difference Principleto the consequences of people’s choices.

Dworkin proposed that people begin with equal resources but be allowedto end up with unequal economic benefits as a result of their ownchoices. What constitutes a just material distribution is to bedetermined by the result of a thought experiment designed to modelfair distribution. Suppose that everyone is given the same purchasingpower and each uses that purchasing power to bid, in a fair auction,for resources best suited to their life plans. They are then permittedto use those resources as they see fit. Although people may end upwith different economic benefits, none of them is given lessconsideration than another in the sense that if they wanted somebodyelse’s resource bundle they could have bid for it instead.

In Dworkin’s proposal we see his attitudes to‘ambitions’ and ‘endowments’ which have becomea central feature of luck egalitarianism (though under a wide varietyof alternative names and further subset-distinctions). In terms ofsensitivity to ‘ambitions’, Dworkin and many other luckegalitarians argue that provided people have an ‘equal’starting point (in Dworkin’s case, resources) they should livewith the consequences of their choices. They argue, for instance, thatpeople who choose to work hard to earn more income should not berequired to subsidize those choosing more leisure and hence lessincome.

With respect to ‘endowments’, Dworkin proposes ahypothetical compensation scheme in which he supposes that, before thehypothetical auction described above, people do not know their ownnatural endowments. However, they are able to buy insurance againstbeing disadvantaged in the natural distribution of talents and theyknow that their payments will provide an insurance pool to compensatethose people who are unlucky in the ‘natural lottery’.

Dworkin’s early proposals were very hypothetical and it wassomewhat difficult to see what they meant in practice. Later luckegalitarians have tried to tease out the practical implications oftheir theories in more detail, though much of the debate still remainsat the theoretical level. They agree with Dworkin’srecommendation, against Rawls’ Difference Principle approach,that those with unequal natural endowments should receivecompensation. For instance, people born with disabilities, orill-health, who have not brought these circumstances upon themselves,can be explicitly compensated so that they are not disadvantaged intheir economic prospects. Under Rawls’ Difference Principle,though, no such explicit compensation is forthcoming—as Rawlssays, the Difference Principle is not the principle of redress (Rawls1971, 101). Of course, for the subset of people with long-termdisabilities or ill-health who are also in the least advantaged group(variously defined by Rawls, but most commonly defined as the lowestsocio-economic grouping) the Difference Principle will help. But thehelp will not be proportionate to their needs arising from theirdisabilities or ill-health.

Luck egalitarians continue to refine such aspects of their theories as(a) what they believe is the relevant conception of equality ofopportunity, (b) how much of a role luck should play in thedistribution of economic benefits and (c) what is the best conceptionof ‘luck’ (Arneson 1990 and 2001, Fleurbaey 2001, Hurley2001 and 2003, Swift 2008, Sher 2010). Relatedly, they continue toexplore what role responsibility should play in the distribution ofeconomic goods (Sen 1985, Cohen 1997, Valentyne 1997, Knight2011).

Because the luck egalitarian proposals have a similar motivation tothe Difference Principle the moral criticisms of them tend to bevariations on those leveled against the Difference Principle. However,as noted above, what is practically required of a society operatingunder the Difference Principle is relatively straightforward. How thetheoretical concerns of luck egalitarians are to be practicallyimplemented is often not so clear. For instance, it has seemedimpossible to measure differences in people’s natural talents—unfortunately, people’s talents do not neatly divideinto the natural and those for which people can be held responsible. Asystem of special assistance to the physically and mentally disabledand to the ill would be a partial implementation of the compensationsystem, but most natural inequalities would be left untouched by suchassistance while the theories commonly require compensation for suchinequalities. Exploring how in practical ways the economic systems canbe refined to track responsibility while mitigating certain types ofpure luck will be an ongoing challenge for luck egalitarians.

5. Welfare-Based Principles

Welfare-based principles are motivated by the idea that what is ofprimary moral importance is the level of welfare of people. Advocatesof welfare-based principles view the concerns of other theories—material equality, the level of primary goods of the leastadvantaged, resources, desert-claims, or liberty—as derivativeconcerns. They are valuable only in so far as they affect welfare andso all distributive questions should be settled entirely by how thedistribution affects welfare.

Choosing welfare as the relevant value is only the first step towardsanswering the distributive questions. Welfare-theorists must alsospecify the welfare function. The welfare functions proposed varyaccording to what will count as welfare and the weighting system forthat welfare. Economists defending some form of welfarism normallystate the explicit functional form, while philosophers often omit thisformality, concentrating on developing their theories in answer to twoquestions: 1) the question of what has intrinsic value (‘whatcounts as welfare’), and 2) the question of what actions orpolicies would maximize the intrinsic value. Moreover, philosophershave tended to focus on an extremely small subset of the availablewelfare functions. Although there are a number of advocates ofalternative welfare functions (such as ‘equality ofwell-being’), most philosophical activity has concentrated on avariant known as utilitarianism. This theory can be used to illustratemost of the main characteristics of welfare-based principles.

Historically, utilitarians have used the term ‘utility’rather than ‘welfare’ and utility has been definedvariously as pleasure, happiness, or preference-satisfaction, etc.Jeremy Bentham, the historical father of utilitarianism, argued thatthe experience of pleasure was the only thing with intrinsic value,and all other things had instrumental value insofar as they contributeto the experience of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Hisintellectual successor, John Stuart Mill, broadened this theory ofintrinsic value to include happiness, or fulfillment. Modernphilosophers since Kenneth Arrow, though, tend to argue that intrinsicvalue consists in preference-satisfaction, i.e. in individuals’having what they want. So, for instance, the principle fordistributing economic benefits for preference utilitarians is todistribute them so as to maximize preference-satisfaction. The welfarefunction for such a principle has a relatively simple theoretical formrequiring the distribution maximizing the arithmetic sum of allsatisfied preferences (unsatisfied preferences being negative),weighted for the intensity of those preferences. To accommodateuncertainty with respect to outcomes the function is modified so thatexpected utility, rather than utility, is maximized (seeconsequentialism).

The basic theory of utilitarianism is one of the simplest to state andunderstand. Much of the work on the theory therefore has been directedtowards defending it against moral criticisms, particularly from thepoint of view of ‘commonsense’ morality. The criticismsand responses have been widely discussed in the literature onutilitarianism as a general moral theory (seeconsequentialism). Two of the most widely discussed criticisms will be mentionedhere.

The first, which was famously articulated by John Rawls (1971), isthat utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinctness ofpersons. Maximization of preference-satisfaction is often taken asprudent in the case of individuals—people may take on greaterburdens, suffering or sacrifice at certain periods of their lives sothat their lives are overall better. The complaint againstutilitarianism is that it takes this principle, commonly described asprudent for individuals, and uses it on an entity, society, unlikeindividuals in important ways. While it may be acceptable for a personto choose to suffer at some period in her life (be it a day, or anumber of years) so that her overall life is better, it is oftenargued against utilitarianism that it is immoral to make some peoplesuffer so that there is a net gain for other people. In the individualcase, there is a single entity experiencing both the sacrifice and thegain. Also, the individuals, who suffer or make the sacrifices, chooseto do so in order to gain some benefit they deem worth theirsacrifice. In the case of society as a whole, there is no singleexperiential entity—some people suffer or are sacrificed sothat others may gain. Furthermore, under utilitarianism, unlike theindividual prudence case, there is no requirement for people toconsent to the suffering or sacrifice, nor is there necessarily aunified belief in the society that the outcome is worth the cost.

A related criticism of utilitarianism involves the way it treatsindividual preferences about other peoples’ welfare or holdings.For instance, some people may have a preference that the members ofsome minority racial group have less material benefits. Underutilitarian theories, in their classical form, this preference orinterest counts like any other in determining the best distribution.Hence, if racial preferences are widespread and are not outweighed bythe minority’s contrary preferences (perhaps because theminority is relatively few in number compared to the majority),utilitarianism will recommend an inegalitarian distribution based onrace if there is not some other utility-maximizing alternative onoffer.

Utilitarians have responded to these criticisms in a number of ways.Often they just deny the empirical claim upon which the criticismrests. So they assert that the empirical conditions are such thatutility maximizing will rarely require racial minorities to sacrificeor suffer for the benefit of others, or to satisfy the prejudices ofothers. Relatedly, utilitarians often emphasize the long runperspective required by their theory. They may concede that short-termmaximization may point to distribution on a racial basis but that thiswould not be welfare-maximizing in the long run and that even greaterwelfare can be achieved by re-educating the majority so that racistpreferences weaken or disappear over time, leading to a moreharmonious and happier world. In reply, it is pointed out that theutilitarian must supply an account of why racist or sexist preferencesshould be discouraged if the same level of total long term utilitycould be achieved by encouraging the less powerful to be content witha lower position.

Critics of utilitarianism have responded that this reliance on theempirical conditions turning out a particular way undermines theplausibility of utilitarianism as a moral theory. They argue that wedo not have to wait until we find out how strong the racist feelingsare, how many are in the adversely affected racial minority, how manyracists there are, etc. to know that racist policies are wrong. It isargued that given utilitarianism says that we do need to know thesenumbers in order to know when, if ever, racist policies are wrong,utilitarianism fails to adequately capture our moral judgments.Utilitarians respond that if their theory on rare occasions doesrequire people to sacrifice or suffer in these or other ways, theunintuitiveness of this consequence is a result of our contrary moraljudgments about right and wrong, which are fallible. For manyutilitarians, commonsense moral judgments are best understood asproviding us with ‘rules of thumb’ which are useful at thelevel of commonsense morality but can ultimately be mistaken at thelevel of ‘critical theory’.

Most recently, some utilitarians have drawn on institutional theory orgame theory in defence, or in modification, of utilitarianism (seeHardin 1988, Goodin 1995, Bailey 1997). Noting that the consequencesof individual actions are rarely determined in isolation, but ratherin conjunction with the actions of many others, these‘institutional’ or ‘indirect’ utilitariansargue that morally intuitive institutions such as constitutionalrights, human rights and various property rights would be endorsed bythis modified utilitarianism, and would forbid the morally horribleoutcomes critics have feared utilitarianism could sanction.

Utilitarian distribution principles, like the other principlesdescribed here, have problems with specification and implementation.Most formulations of utilitarianism require interpersonal comparisonsof utility. This means, for instance, that we must be able to comparethe utility one person gains from eating an apple with that anothergains from eating an apple. Furthermore, utilitarianism requires thatdifferences in utility be measured and summed for widely disparategoods (so, for instance, the amount of utility a particular persongains from playing football is measured and compared with the amountof utility another gains from eating a gourmet meal). Some criticshave argued that such interpersonal utility comparisons areimpossible, even in theory, because even if all the diverse goods canbe combined into a single index of ‘utility’ for anindividual, there is no conceptually adequate way of calibrating sucha measure among individuals (see Elster 1991).

Utilitarians face a greater problem than this theoretical one indetermining what material distribution, or institutional structure, isprescribed by their theory. Those who share similar utilitariantheoretical principles frequently recommend very differentdistributions or structures to implement the principles. This problemoccurs for other theories, with recommendations for distributions oreconomic structures to implement commonly varying among advocates withsimilar theoretical principles. But the advocates for otherdistributive principles tend to cluster significantly with respect towhat they recommend. This is much less the case with respect toadvocates for utilitarian and welfare-based distribution principleswith advocates dispersed in their recommendations across the fullrange of possible distributions and economic structures. For instance,many preference utilitarians believe their principle prescribesstrongly egalitarian structures with lots of state intervention whileother preference utilitarians believe it prescribes alaissezfaire style of capitalism.

There is an explanation for why utilitarianism seems so much lessdeterminate in its policy (including structural) recommendations andit points to what is the greatest challenge to utilitarianism as aguiding distributive principle. Other distributive principles can ruleout, relatively quickly, various policies on the grounds that theyclearly violate the guiding principle, but utilitarians must examine,in great detail, all the policies on offer. For each policy, they mustdetermine the distribution of goods and services yielded by the policyand at least three other factors: the identity of each person in thedistribution (if individuals’ utility functions differ); theutility of each person from the goods and services distributed tothem; the utility of each person from the policy itself. They mustthen aggregate these utilities across all individuals. The size of theinformation requirements make this task impossible. Hence, broadassumptions must be made and each different set of assumptions willyield a different answer, and so the answers range across the full setof policies on offer. Moreover, there is no obvious way to arbitratebetween the different sets of assumptions. For instance, suppose threeutilitarians agree on the same utilitarian distributive principle.Utilitarian 1, for example, may assert that the population’sutility function conforms to function A (e.g. people’s marginalutility is diminishing at rate R) and is maximized by Policy 1;Utilitarian 2, however, asserts that half the population’sutility function conforms to function A and half to function B (e.g.people’s marginal utility is diminishing at rate 2R) and ismaximized by Policy 2; Utilitarian 3 asserts Utilitarian 2 is correctabout the utility functions of the population but claims that Policy 3is the one that will maximize utility. The challenge for contemporaryutilitarians is to explain, given the massive informationalrequirements of utilitarianism and our apparent human inability tomeet those requirements, how the population, and its experts, canplausibly arbitrate between conflicting policy and institutionalrecommendations coming from utilitarian theorists who share the sameunderlying normative principle.

6. Desert-Based Principles

Another complaint against welfarism is that it ignores, and in factcannot even make sense of, claims that peopledeserve certaineconomic benefits in light of their actions (Feinberg, Lamont 1997).The complaint is often motivated by the concern that various forms ofwelfarism treat people as mere containers for well-being, rather thanpurposeful beings, responsible for their actions and creative in theirenvironments.

The various proposeddesert-based principles of distribution differ primarily according to what theyidentify as the basis for deserving. While Aristotle proposed virtue,or moral character, to be the best desert-basis for economicdistribution, contemporary desert theorists have proposed desert-basesthat are more practically implemented in complex modern societies.Most contemporary desert theorists have pursued John Locke’slead in this respect. Locke argued people deserve to have those itemsproduced by their toil and industry, the products (or the valuethereof) being a fitting reward for their effort (see Miller 1989).Locke’s underlying idea was to guarantee to individuals thefruits of their own labor and abstinence. Most contemporary proposalsfor desert-bases fit into one of three broad categories:

1. Contribution: People should be rewarded for their work activityaccording to the value of their contribution to the social product.(Miller 1976, Miller 1989, Riley 1989)
2. Effort: People should be rewarded according to the effort theyexpend in their work activity (Sadurski 1985a,b, Milne 1986).
3. Compensation: People should be rewarded according to the coststhey incur in their work activity (Dick 1975, Lamont 1997).

According to the contemporary desert theorist, people freely applytheir abilities and talents, in varying degrees, to sociallyproductive work. People come to deserve varying levels of income byproviding goods and services desired by others (Feinberg 1970).Distributive systems are just insofar as they distribute incomesaccording to the different levels earned or deserved by theindividuals in the society for their productive labors, efforts, orcontributions.

Contemporary desert-principles all share the value of raising thestandard of living—collectively, ‘the socialproduct’. Under each principle, only activity directed atraising the social product will serve as a basis for deserving income.The concept of desert itself does not yield this value of raising thesocial product; it is a value societies hold independently. Hence,desert principles identifying desert-bases tied to socially productiveactivity (productivity, compensation, and effort all being examples ofsuch bases) do not do so because the concept of desert requires this.They do so because societies value higher standards of living, andtherefore choose the raising of living standards as the primary valuerelevant to desert-based distribution. This means that the fulldevelopment of desert-based principles requires specification (anddefense) of those activities which will or will not count as sociallyproductive, and hence as deserving of remuneration (Lamont 1994).

It is important to distinguish desert-payments from entitlements. Fordesert theorists a well-designed institutional structure will make itso that many of the entitlements people have are deserved. Butentitlements and just deserts are not conceptually the same andregularly come apart. For instance, as Feinberg notes, a person can beentitled to assume the presidential office without deserving it(Feinberg 1970, 86) and a person who accidentally apprehends acriminal may be entitled to a reward but not deserve it. Conversely, ateam may deserve to win the championship prize but not be entitled toit or a person may deserve an economic benefit but not be entitled toit. Indeed, these and many other instances of desert and entitlementscoming apart provide the bases for desert theorists to argue forinstitutional reform. For desert theorists, the institutionalstructure should facilitate people’s economic entitlements(including one’s property holdings) tracking their justdeserts.

Payments designed to give people incentives are a form of entitlementparticularly worth distinguishing from desert-payments as they arecommonly confused (Barry 1965, 111–112). Incentive-payments are‘forward-looking’ in that they are set up to create asituation in the future, while desert-payments are‘backwards-looking’in that they are justified withreference to work in the present or past. Even though it is possiblefor the same payment to be both deserved and an incentive, incentivesand desert provide distinct rationales for income and should not beconflated (Lamont 1997).

While some have sought to justify current capitalist distributions viadesert-based distributive principles, John Stuart Mill and many sincehave forcefully argued the contrary claim—that theimplementation of a productivity principle would involve dramaticchanges in modern market economies and would greatly reduce theinequalities characteristic of them. It is important to note, though,that contemporary desert-based principles are rarely completedistributive principles. They usually are only designed to coverdistribution among working adults, leaving basic welfare needs to bemet by other principles.

The specification and implementation problems for desert-baseddistribution principles revolve mainly around the desert-bases: it isdifficult to identify what is to count as a contribution, an effort ora cost, and it is even more difficult to measure these in a complexmodern economy.

The main moral objection to desert-based principles is that they makeeconomic benefits depend on factors over which people have littlecontrol. John Rawls has made one of the most widely discussedarguments to this effect (Rawls 1971), and while a strong form of thisargument has been clearly refuted (Zaitchik, Sher), it remains aproblem for desert-based principles. The problem is most pronounced inthe case of productivity-based principles—people’sproductivity seems clearly to be influenced by many factors over whichthey have little control.

It is interesting to note that under most welfare-based principles, itis also the case that people’s level of economic benefitsdepends on factors beyond their control. But welfarists view this as avirtue of their theory, since they think the only morally relevantcharacteristic of any distribution is the welfare resulting from it.Whether the distribution ties economic benefits to matters beyond ourcontrol is morally irrelevant from the welfarist point of view. (As ithappens, welfarists often hold the empirical claim that people havelittle control over their contributions to society anyway.) However,for people’s benefits to depend on factors beyond their controlis a more awkward result for desert theorists who, with luckegalitarians, emphasize the responsibility of people in choosing toengage in more or less productive activities.

7. Libertarian Principles

Most contemporary versions of the principles discussed so far allowsome role for the market as a means of achieving the desireddistributive pattern—the Difference Principle uses it as ameans of helping the least advantaged; utilitarian principles commonlyuse it as a means of achieving the distributive pattern maximizingutility; desert-based principles rely on it to distribute goodsaccording to desert, etc. In contrast, advocates of libertariandistributive principles rarely see the market as a means to somedesired pattern, since the principle(s) they advocate do notostensibly propose a ‘pattern’ at all, but insteaddescribe the sorts of acquisitions or exchanges which are just intheir own right. The market will be just, not as a means to somepattern, but insofar as the exchanges permitted in the market satisfythe conditions of just acquisition and exchange described by theprinciples. For libertarians, just outcomes are those arrived at bythe separate just actions of individuals; a particular distributivepattern is not required for justice. Robert Nozick advanced thisversion of libertarianism (Nozick 1974), and is its best knowncontemporary advocate.

Nozick proposes a 3-part “Entitlement Theory”.

If the world were wholly just, the following definition wouldexhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings:

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principleof justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principleof justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, isentitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applicationsof (a) and (b).

The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that adistribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings theypossess under the distribution (Nozick, p.151).

The statement of the Entitlement Theory includes reference to theprinciples of justice in acquisition and transfer. (For details ofthese principles see Nozick, pp.149–182.) The principle ofjustice in transfer is the least controversial and is designed tospecify fair contracts while ruling out stealing, fraud, etc. Theprinciple of justice in acquisition is more complicated and morecontroversial. The principle is meant to govern the gaining ofexclusive property rights over the material world. For thejustification of these rights, Nozick takes his inspiration from JohnLocke’s idea that everyone ‘owns’ themselves and, bymixing one’s labors with the world, self-ownership can generateownership of some part of the material world. However, ofLocke’s mixing metaphor, Nozick legitimately asks:‘…why isn’t mixing what I own with what Idon’t own a way of losing what I own rather than a way ofgaining what I don’t? If I own a can of tomato juice and spillit in the sea so its molecules... mingle evenly throughout the sea, doI thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated mytomato juice?’ (Nozick 1974, p.174) Nozick concludes that whatis significant about mixing our labor with the material world is thatin doing so, we tend to increase the value of it, so thatself-ownership can lead to ownership of the external world in suchcases (Nozick 1974, pp. 149–182).

The obvious objection to this claim is that it is not clear why thefirst people to acquire some part of the material world should be ableto exclude others from it (and, for instance, be the land owners whilethe later ones become the wage laborers). In response to thisobjection, Nozick follows Locke in recognizing the need for aqualification on just acquisition. According to theLockeanProviso, an exclusive acquisition of the external world is just,if, after the acquisition, there is ‘enough and as good left incommon for others’. One of the main challenges for libertarianshas been to formulate a morally plausible interpretation of thisproviso. According to Nozick’s weaker version of Locke’sProviso, “a process normally giving rise to a permanentbequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not doso if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing isthereby worsened” (Nozick, 1974, p. 178). For Nozick’scritics, his proviso is unacceptably weak. This is partly because itfails to consider the position others may have achieved underalternative distributions and thereby instantiates the morally dubiouscriterion of whoever is first gets the exclusive spoils. For example,one can satisfy Nozick’s proviso by ‘acquiring’ abeach and charging $1 admission to those who previously were able touse the beach for free, so long as one compensates them with a benefitthey deem equally valuable, such as a clean-up or life-guardingservice on the beach. However, the beach-goers would have been evenbetter off had the more efficient organizer among them acquired thebeach, charging only 50 cents for the same service, but thisalternative is never considered under Nozick’s proviso (Cohen,1995).

Will Kymlicka has given a summary of the steps in Nozick’sself-ownership argument:

1. People own themselves.
2. The world is initially unowned.
3. You can acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share ofthe world, if you do not worsen the condition of others.
4. It is relatively easy, without worsening the condition of others,to acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world.Therefore:
5. Once private property has been appropriated, a free market incapital and labor is morally required (Kymlicka 1990, p. 112).

The assessment of this argument is quite complex, but the difficultiesmentioned above with the proviso call into question claims (3) and(4). The challenge for libertarians then is to find a plausiblereading of (3) which will yield (4). Moreover, Nozick extends theoperation of the proviso to apply both to acquisitions and transfers,compounding the problem (Nozick, 1974, p. 174).

Egalitarian leaning theorists generally have opposed Nozick’sform of libertarianism on the grounds that its implementation wouldlead to potentially vast material inequalities. However, a subset ofegalitarians have nevertheless been attracted to the normativestrength and implications of self-ownership, concerned that anunconstrained pursuit of equality could pose a danger topeople’s rights over themselves and their labor. G.A. Coheneloquently expresses this concern:

In my experience, leftists who disparage Nozick’s essentiallyunargued affirmation of each person’s rights over himself loseconfidence in their unqualified denial of the thesis of self-ownershipwhen they are asked to consider who has the right to decide whatshould happen, for example, to their own eyes. They do not immediatelyagree that, were eye transplants easy to achieve, it would then beacceptable for the state to conscript potential eye donors into alottery whose losers must yield an eye to beneficiaries who wouldotherwise not be one-eyed but blind. (Cohen, 1995, p.70)

Of course, many existing holdings are the result of acquisitions ortransfers which at some point did not satisfy the principles ofjustice for acquisitions or transfers, however these are understood.Hence, libertarians who rely on historical principles to underpinproperty rights must supplement these with a principle ofrectification for past injustice, or at least some strategy fordealing with unjust holdings. Although Nozick does not specify thisprinciple he does describe its purpose:

This principle uses historical information about previous situationsand injustices done in them... and information about the actual courseof events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and ityields a description (or descriptions) of holdings in the society. Theprinciple of rectification presumably will make use of its bestestimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred...if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description ofholdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by theprinciple, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized.(Nozick 1974, pp. 152–153)

Nozick does not make an attempt to provide a principle ofrectification. The absence of such a principle is much worse for ahistorical theory than for a patterned theory. Past injusticessystematically undermine the justice of every subsequent distributionin historical theories. Nozick is clear that his historical theorycannot be used to evaluate the justice of actual societies until sucha theory of rectification is given or no considerations ofrectification of injustice could apply to justify the distribution inthe actual society:

In the absence of [a full treatment of the principle of rectification]applied to a particular society, onecannot use the analysisand theory presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transferpayments, unless it is clear that no considerations of rectificationof injustice could apply to justify it. (Nozick 1974, p.231)

Unfortunately for the theory, it would seem that no such treatmentwill ever be forthcoming because the task is, for all practicalpurposes, impossible. The numbers of injustices perpetrated throughouthistory, both within nations and between them, are enormous and thenecessary details of the vast majority of injustices are unavailable.Even if the details of the injustices were available, thecounterfactual causal chains could not be reliably determined. AsDerek Parfit has pointed out, in a different context, even the peoplewho would have been born would have been different (Parfit 1986). As aconsequence, it is difficult to see how Nozick’s entitlementtheory could provide guidance as to what the current distribution ofmaterial holdings should be or what distributions or redistributionsare legitimate or illegitimate. (Indeed Nozick suggests, for instance,the Difference Principle may be the best implementation of theprinciple of rectification.) Although Nozick is fairly candid aboutthis consequence, many of his supporters and critics have ignored itand have carried on a vigorous debate as though, contrary toNozick’s own statement, his theory can be used to evaluate thejustice of current economic distributions.

Classical libertarians such as Nozick usually advocate a system inwhich there are exclusive property rights, with the role of thegovernment restricted to the protection of these property rights. Theproperty rights commonly rule out taxation for purposes other thanraising the funds necessary to protect property rights. One of thestrongest critiques of any attempt to institute such a system oflegally protected strong property rights comes, as we have seen, fromNozick’s theory itself—there seems no obvious reason togive strong legal protection to property rights which have arisenthrough violations of the just principles of acquisition and transfer.But putting this critique to one side for a moment, what otherarguments are made in favor of exclusionary property rights?

As already noted, Nozick argues that because people own themselves andhence their talents, they own whatever they can produce with thesetalents. Moreover, it is possible in a free market to sell theproducts of exercising one’s talents. Any taxation of the incomefrom such selling, according to Nozick, ‘institute[s] (partial)ownership by others of people and their actions and labor’(Nozick, p. 172). People, according to this argument, have theseexclusive rights of ownership. Taxation then, simply involvesviolating these rights and allowing some people to own (partially)other people. Moreover, it is argued, any system not legallyrecognizing these rights violates Immanuel Kant’s maxim to treatpeople always as ends in themselves and never merely as a means. Thetwo main difficulties with this argument have been: (1) to show thatself-ownership is only compatible with having such strong exclusiveproperty rights; and (2) that a system of exclusive property rights isthe best system for treating people with respect, as ends inthemselves.

Nozick candidly accepts that he does not himself give a systematicmoral justification of the exclusionary property rights he advocates:‘This book does not present a precise theory of the moral basisof individual rights.’ (Nozick, p.xiv) But others have tried toprovide more systematic justifications of similar rights (Lomasky,Steiner) or to develop, more fully, justifications to which Nozickalludes.

In addition to the arguments from self-ownership, and the requirementto treat people as ends in themselves, the most common other route fortrying to justify exclusive property rights has been to argue thatthey are required for the maximization of freedom and/or liberty orthe minimization of violations of these (Hayek 1960). As an empiricalclaim though, this appears to be false. If we compare countries withless exclusionary property rights (e.g. more taxation) with countrieswith more exclusionary property regimes, we see no systematicadvantage in freedoms or liberties enjoyed by people in the lattercountries. (Of course, we do see adifference in distributionof such freedoms or liberties. In the latter countries, the richerhave more and the poorer less, while in the former they are moreevenly distributed.) Now if libertarians restrict what counts as avaluable freedom/liberty (and discount other freedoms/liberties peoplevalue), it will follow that exclusionary property rights are requiredto maximize freedom and/or liberty or to minimize violations of these.But the challenge for these libertarians is to show why only theirfavored liberties and freedoms are valuable, and not those which areweakened by a system of exclusive property rights.

8. Feminist Principles

There is no one feminist conception of distributive justice; feministsdefend positions across the political spectrum. Hence, feminists offerdistinctive versions of all the theories considered so far as well asothers. One way of thinking about what unifies many feminist theoristsis an interest in what difference, if any, the practical experience ofgender makes to the subject matter or study of justice; how differentfeminists answer this question distinguishes them from each other andfrom those alternative distributive principles that most inspire theirthinking.

The distributive principles so far outlined, with the exception ofstrict egalitarianism, are often described as falling under the broadclassification of liberalism—they both inform, and are theproduct of, the liberal democracies which have emerged over the lasttwo centuries. Lumping them together this way, though somewhat clumsy,makes the task of understanding the emergence of feminist critiques(and the subsequent positive theories) much easier.

John Stuart Mill inThe Subjection of Women (1869) gives oneof the clearest early feminist critiques of the political anddistributive structures of the emerging liberal democracies. Hiswritings provided the starting point for many contemporary liberalfeminists. Mill argued that the principles associated with thedeveloping liberalism of his time required equal political status forwomen. The principles Mill explicitly mentions include a rejection ofthe aristocracy of birth, equal opportunity in education and in themarketplace, equal rights to hold property, a rejection of the man asthe legal head of the household, and equal rights to politicalparticipation. Feminists inspired by Mill believe that a properrecognition of the position of women in society requires that women begiven equal and the same rights as men have, and that these primarilyprotect their liberty and their status as equal persons under the law.Thus, government regulation should not prevent women from competing onequal terms with men in educational, professional, marketplace andpolitical institutions. The problem for women, on the liberal feministview, is not liberalism but the failure of society and the State toproperly instantiate liberal principles.

From the point of view of other feminisms, the liberal feministposition is a conservative one, in the sense that it requires theproper inclusion for women of the rights, protections, andopportunities previously secured for men, rather than a fundamentalchange from the traditional liberal position. One phrase or mottoaround which a whole range of feminists have rallied marks asignificant break with Mill’s liberalism: ‘the personal ispolitical.’ Feminists have offered a variety of interpretationsof this motto, many of which take the form of a critique of liberaltheories. Mill was crucial in developing the liberal doctrine oflimiting the state’s intervention in the private lives ofcitizens. Many contemporary feminists have argued that the resultingliberal theories of justice have fundamentally been unable toaccommodate the injustices that have their origins in this‘protected’ private sphere. This particular feministcritique has also been a primary source of inspiration for the broadermulticultural critique of liberalism. The liberal commitments togovernment neutrality and to a protected personal sphere of liberty,where the government must not interfere, have been primary criticaltargets.

While issues about neutrality and personal liberty go beyond debatesabout distributive justice they also have application within thesedebates. The feminist critics recognize that liberalism correctlyidentifies the government as one potential source of oppressionagainst individuals, and therefore recommends powerful politicalprotections of individual liberty. They argue, however, that liberaltheories of distributive justice are unable to address the oppressionwhich surfaces in the so-called private sphere of governmentnon-interference. Susan Moller Okin, for example, documents theeffects of the institution of the nuclear family, arguing that theconsequence of this institution is a position of systematic materialand political inequality for women. Standard liberal theories,committed to neutrality in the private sphere, seem powerless toaddress (or sometimes even recognize) striking and lastinginequalities for women, minorities, or historically oppressed racialgroups, when these are merely the cumulative effect ofindividuals’ free behavior. Okin and others demonstrate, forexample, that women have substantial disadvantages in competing in themarket because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equallyshared with men. As a consequence, any theory relying on marketmechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems whichresult in women systematically having less income and wealth than men.Thus, feminists have challenged contemporary political theorists torethink the boundaries of political authority in the name of securinga just outcome for women and other historically oppressed groups.

While the political effects of personal freedom pose a seriouschallenge to contemporary liberal theories of distributive justice,the feminist critiques are somewhat puzzling because, as Jean Hamptonputs it, many feminists appear to complain in the name of liberalvalues. In other words, their claims about the fundamental flaws ofliberalism at the same time leave intact the various ideals of libertyand equality which inspire the liberal theories of justice. Moreover,the task of defining feasible pathways for modifying the structure ofliberal democracies without undermining their virtues and protectionshas proved more difficult than setting out the criticisms ofliberalism. Indeed, despite a legitimate feminist worry about theeffects of so-called government neutrality on women’s materialstatus, the relative neutrality of liberal democracies compared tonon-liberal societies has been one of the significant contributingfactors both to the flourishing of feminist theory and to the manysignificant practical gains women in liberal democracies have maderelative to women in other parts of the world. The challenge, beingtaken up by many, is to navigate both a coherent theoretical andpractical path in response to the best feminist critiques available(see the entry onfeminist ethics).

9. Methodology and Empirical Beliefs about Distributive Justice

How are we to go about choosing between the different distributiveprinciples on offer, and respond to criticisms of the principles?Unfortunately, few philosophers explicitly discuss the methodologythey are using. The most notable exception is John Rawls (1971, 1974)who explicitly brought the method of wide reflective equilibrium topolitical philosophy. This method has been brilliantly discussed byNorman Daniels over the years and the reader is strongly encouraged torefer to his entry (seereflective equilibrium) to understand how to evaluate, revise and choose between normativeprinciples. While there is no point in reiterating the method herethere are some supplementary issues worth noting.

Empirical data on the beliefs of the population about distributivejustice was not available when Rawls publishedA Theory ofJustice (Rawls 1971) but much empirical work has since beencompleted. Swift (1995, 1999) and Miller (1999, chaps. 3–4) haveprovided surveys of this literature and arguments for why thosecommitted to the method of reflective equilibrium in distributivejustice should take the beliefs of the population seriously, thoughnot uncritically. Indeed, some go even further, arguing that thedistributive decisions arising through the legitimate application ofparticular democratic processes might even, at least in part,constitute distributive justice (Walzer 1984). Data on people’sbeliefs about distributive justice is also useful for addressing thenecessary intersection between philosophical and political processes.Such beliefs put constraints on what institutional and policy reformsare practically achievable in any generation—especially whenthe society is committed to democratic processes.

Two final methodological issues need to be noted. The first concernsthe distinctive role counterexamples play in debates aboutdistributive justice. As noted above, the overarching methodologicalconcern of the distributive justice literature must be, in the firstinstance, the pressing choice of how the benefits and burdens ofeconomic activity should be distributed, rather than the mereuncovering of abstract truth. Principles are to be implemented in realsocieties with the problems and constraints inherent in suchapplication. Given this, pointing out that the application of anyparticular principle will have some, perhaps many, immoral resultswill not by itself constitute a fatal counterexample to anydistributive theory. Such counter-evidence to a theory would only befatal if there were an alternative, or improved, version of thetheory, which, if fully implemented, would yield a morally preferablesociety overall. So, it is at least possible that the bestdistributive theory, when implemented, might yield a system whichstill has many injustices and/or negative consequences. This practicalaspect partly distinguishes the role of counterexamples indistributive justice theory from many other philosophical areas. Giventhat distributive justice is about what to do now, not just what tothink, alternate distributive theories must, in part, compete ascomprehensive systems which take into account the practicalconstraints we face.

The second and related methodological point is that the evaluation ofalternate distributive principles requires us (and their advocates) toconsider the application of the distributive principle in society. Ifit is uncertain or indeterminate how a particular distributiveprinciple might in practice apply to the ordering of real societies,then this principle is not yet a serious candidate for ourconsideration. This is also true of principles whose implementation ispractically impossible given the institutional, psychological,informational, administrative, or technical constraints of a society.Distributive justice is not an area where we can say an idea is goodin theory but not in practice. If it is not good in practice, then itis not good in theory either.

Bibliography

Strict Egalitarianism

• Carens, Joseph, 1981,Equality, Moral Incentives and theMarket, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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The Difference Principle

• Cohen, G.A., 1992, “Incentives, Inequality, andCommunity,” in Grethe B. Peterson (ed.),The Tanner Lectureson Human Values, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
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Equality of Opportunity and Luck Egalitarianism

• Anderson, Elizabeth, 1999, “What is the Point ofEquality?”,Ethics, 109: 287–337.
• –––, 2010, “The Fundamental Disagreementbetween Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians,”Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 36:1–23.
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• Dworkin, Ronald, 1981, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equalityof Resources,”Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10:185–246.
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• Knight, C. (ed.) 2011,Responsibility and DistributiveJustice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kronman, Anthony T., 1981, “Talent Pooling,” in J.Roland Pennock and John W.Chapman (eds.),Human Rights: Nomos23, New York: New York University Press, 58–79.
• Sen, Amartya, 1982, “Equality of What?,” in A. Sen,Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• –––, 1985,Commodities and Capabilities,Amsterdam: North Holland.
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• Steiner, H. 1997, “Choice and Circumstance,”Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 10:296–312.
• Swift, A. 2008, “The Value of Philosophy in NonidealCircumstances,”Social Theory and Practice: An Internationaland Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, 34:363–387.
• Vallentyne, Peter, 1997, “Self-Ownership and Equality: BruteLuck, Gifts, Universal Dominance, and Leximin,”Ethics,107: 321–343.
• Wolff, Jonathan, 1998, “Fairness, Respect and theEgalitarian Ethos,”Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27:97–122.
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Welfare-Based Principles

• Bailey, James Wood, 1997,Utilitarianism, Institutions, andJustice, New York: Oxford University Press.
• Elster, Jon, and John E. Roemer (eds.), 1991,InterpersonalComparisons of Well-Being, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
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• Hardin, Russell, 1988,Morality within the Limits ofReason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Rescher, Nicholas, 1966,Distributive Justice: A ConstructiveCritique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution, Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.
• Schmidtz, David and Robert E. Goodin, 1998,Social Welfare andIndividual Responsibility, For and Against, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.
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• Schroth, J. 2008, “Distributive Justice and Welfarism inUtilitarianism,”Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal ofPhilosophy, 51: 123–146.

Desert-Based Principles

• Dick, James, 1975, “How to Justify a Distribution ofEarnings,”Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4:248–72.
• Feinberg, Joel, 1970, “Justice and Personal Desert,”Doing and Deserving, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 55–94.
• Lamont, Julian, 1997, “Incentive Income, Deserved Income,and Economic Rents,”Journal of Political Philosophy,5: 26–46.
• –––, 1995, “Problems For Effort-BasedDistribution Principles,”Journal of AppliedPhilosophy, 12: 215–229.
• –––, 1994, “The Concept of Desert in DistributiveJustice,”The Philosophical Quarterly, 44:45–64.
• Mill, John Stuart, 1848,Principles of Political Economy,W.J. Ashley (ed.), New York: Kelly, 1965. Reprint of the 1909edition.
• Miller, David, 1989,Market, State, and Community,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1976,Social Justice, Oxford: ClarendonPress.
• Milne, Heather, 1986, “Desert, effort and equality,”Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3: 235–243. .
• Pojman, L. and McLeod, O. (eds), 1999,What Do WeDeserve?, New York: Oxford University Press.
• Riley, Jonathan, 1989, “Justice Under Capitalism,”Markets and Justice, John W. Chapman (ed.), New York: NewYork University Press, 122–162.
• Sadurski, Wojciech, 1985a,Giving Desert Its Due,Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
• –––, 1985b,Giving desert its due : socialjustice and legal theory (Law and Philosophy Library, Volume 2),Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel.
• Sher, George,Desert, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1987.
• Zaitchik, Alan, 1977, “On Deserving to Deserve,”Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 370–388.

Libertarian Principles

• Bogart, J. H., 1985, “Lockean Provisos and State of NatureTheories,”Ethics, 95: 828–836.
• Christman, John, 1991, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and theStructure of Property Rights,”Political Theory, 19:28–46.
• Cohen, G. A., 1995,Self-Ownership, Freedom, andEquality, New York: Cambridge University Press.
• George, Henry, 1879,Progress and Poverty, 5th ed., NewYork, NY: Appleton and Company.
• Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960,The Constitution of Liberty,London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
• Hospers, J. 1971,Libertarianism: a Political Philosophy forTomorrow, Los Angeles: Nash.
• Kymlicka, Will, 1990,Contemporary Political Philosophy,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Lomasky, Loren E., 1987,Persons, Rights, and the MoralCommunity, New York: Oxford University Press.
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• Narveson, J., 1988,The Libertarian Idea, Philadelphia:Temple University Press.
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• –––, 1994,An Essay on Rights, Cambridge, MA:Blackwell Publishers.
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• Van Parijs, Philippe, 1995,Real Freedom for All, What (ifanything) Can Justify Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Feminist Principles

• Okin, Susan Moller, 1991,Justice, Gender and the Family,New York: Basic Books.
• Hampton, Jean, 1997,Political Philosophy, Boulder:Westview Press.
• Held, Virginia, 1994,Rights and Goods: justifying socialaction, New York: Free Press.
• Gatens, Moira, 1991,Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives onDifference and Equality, Indianapolis: Indiana UniversityPress.
• MacKinnon, Catherine A., 2001,Sex Equality, New York:Foundation Press.
• –––, 1987,Feminism Unmodified: Discoursesof Life and Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Pateman, Carol, 1988,The Sexual Contract, Stanford:Stanford University Press.
• Tong, Rosemary, 1993,Feminine and Feminist Ethics,Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Methodology and Empirical Beliefs about Distributive Justice

• Daniels, Norman, 1996,Justice and Justification: ReflectiveEquilibrium in Theory and Practice, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.
• Elster, Jon, 1995, “The Empirical Study of Justice,”inPluralism, Justice, and Equality, David Miller and MichaelWalzer (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 81–98. .
• Miller, David, 1999,Principles of Social Justice,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Stemplowska, Zofia and Swift, Adam, 2012, “Ideal andNonideal Theory,” in David Estlund (ed.),The OxfordHandbook of Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Swift, Adam, 1999, “Public Opinion and Political Philosophy:The relation between social-scientific and philosophical analyses ofdistributive justice,”Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: AnInternational Forum, 2: 337–363 .
• Swift, Adam, and Gordon Marshall, Carole Burgoyne, and DavidRouth, 1995, “Distributive justice: Does it matter what thepeople think?,” inSocial Justice and PoliticalChange., D. Mason, J. Kluegel and B. Wegener (eds.), New York:Aldine De Gruyter, 15–47 .
• Valentini, Laura 2012, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: AConceptual Map,” inPhilosophical Compass, 7(9):654–664.

For extensive further references on reflective equilibrium see theentry onreflective equilibrium.

Further Theories and General Reference

• Ackerman, Bruce A., 1980,Social Justice and the LiberalState, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Alstott, Anne and Bruce A. Ackerman, 1999,The StakeholderSociety, New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Arthur, John and William Shaw (eds.), 1991,Justice andEconomic Distribution 2nd Ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.
• Barry, Brian, 1965,Political Argument, London: Routledgeand Keagan Paul.
• –––, 1989,Theories of Justice (Volume 1),Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Cohen, G.A., 1997, “Where the Action Is: On the Site ofDistributive Justice,” inPhilosophy and PublicAffairs, 26: 3–30.
• –––, 2000,If You’re an Egalitarian,How Come You’re so Rich?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.
• Gauthier, David, 1987,Morals by Agreement, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Kymlicka, Will, 1990,Contemporary Political Philosophy,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Parfit, Derek, 1986,Reasons and Persons, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Roemer, John E., 1996,Theories of Distributive Justice,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Scheffler, Samuel, 2001,Boundaries and Allegiances,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schmidtz, D. 2006,Elements of Justice, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• Stemplowska, Zofia and Swift, Adam, 2012, “Ideal andNonideal Theory,” in David Estlund (ed.),The OxfordHandbook of Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Valentini, Laura 2012, “Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: AConceptual Map,” inPhilosophical Compass, 7(9):654–664.
• Walzer Michael, 1984,Spheres of Justice, New York: BasicBooks.

Extended Bibliography

Extended Bibliography on Distributive Justice [Supplement]

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• Center For Economic And Social Justice This site promotes a new paradigm of economics and development, the“just third way”. Provides links to numerousorganisations, reports, articles and statistical data which supportits paradigm.
• Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) The CIS offers an Australian perspective on libertarian distributivejustice, with its purpose to promote a market economy with highgrowth, an open society, individual freedom and small government inAustralia.
• Communist Party of Australia (CPA) Official website of CPA Australia. An alternative approach to currentsocial policy issues within Australia promoting Communist Theory.
• Crossroads Community Fund Crossroads was established in 1979 as a response to increasing socialproblems regarding the distribution of wealth, power and resources inChicago, USA. This organisation attempts to address the institutionalbarriers that prevent people from enjoying freedom in their lives andattempts to evaluate the effectiveness of institutional changes toincrease freedom.
• Index to Economic and Social Development Statistics of the United Nations An index linking to relevant statistics associated with social andeconomic justice development both globally and in specificregions.
• Guild Law Centre for Economic and Social Justice A non-profit law centre which provides advocacy, representation,legal education and technical support to empower communities, workerrights groups and individuals seeking systemic change toward economicand social justice.
• Heritage Foundation A research and educational institution in the United States, whosestated purpose is to formulate and promote libertarian public policiesbased on principles of free enterprise, limited government, individualfreedom, and a strong national defence.
• Political Research Associates Home Page A non-profit organisation committed to establishing a democraticsociety based on progressive values and encouraging a pluralisticsociety. The website enables various activists to voice their opinionabout the injustices of American society and supports researchprojects for developing ideas and informing the general public.

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• Marxists Internet Archive A website for Marxist theory, including the history of Marxistthought, writings on Marxism, and a format for questions anddebates.

Further Resources

• Archive for the History of Economic Thought A predominately economics site through McMaster University with alarge collection of papers, containing a good selection on Mill,Bentham and Hume.
• Brown Electronic Article Review Service In Moral And Political Philosophy This site publishes reviews of up to 1000 words on recent articles,papers and reports in moral and political philosophy.
• Utilitarianism Resources Website linked to Carnegie Mellon University which list currentmaterial and critiques of applied ethics theory.

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consequentialism |desert |egalitarianism |feminist philosophy, interventions: ethics |justice: as a virtue |justice: intergenerational |justice: international distributive |liberalism |libertarianism |Locke, John |Marx, Karl |Mill, John Stuart |property and ownership |reflective equilibrium