Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703) was an eclectic Germanphilosopher, professor at the University of Altdorf, one of the firstexperimental physicists, a mathematician, astronomer,calendariographer, and Lutheran priest. He was a correspondent ofRobert Boyle (1627–1691) and Gottfried Leibniz(1646–1716), among others. Sturm’s thought mirrors thecomplex interplay between debates in metaphysics, natural philosophy,and theology that characterize the second half of the seventeenthcentury. The three pillars of Sturm’s theoretical system aremechanism, occasionalism, and final causes.

In his numerous academic works, Sturm forcefully defends the use ofthe experimental method in natural philosophy. He advocates aninclusive and open-minded examination of old and new philosophicaltheories in order to find the best explanations for observedphenomena. In metaphysics, Sturm is one of the most outspokensupporters of occasionalism, the theory according to which finitebeings lack genuine causal powers and work only as occasions forGod’s causal intervention in nature. While occasionalism wasdeveloped before Sturm by a number of other authors, Sturm gives hisown original twist to it by making it the foundation of his system ofnatural philosophy.

• 1. Life and works
  • 1.1 Sources of Sturm’s thought
  • 1.2 Reception of Sturm in Leibniz and Wolff
• 2. The scientific method: experimental, hypothetical, eclectic
• 3. Occasionalism
• Bibliography
  • Selection of Sturm’s works
  • Early Modern & Post-Kantian Reception
  • Secondary literature
  • Other works cited
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and works

Sturm was born in Hilpoltstein close to Nuremberg on November 3, 1635in the midst of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) whichdevastated mainly those areas that were to later constitute theterritory of Germany. Sturm’s father, Johann Eucharius Sturm,was a tailor, valet, treasurer, and custodian of the silverware at thecourt of Count Palatine Johann-Friedrich of Pfalz-Hilpoltstein.Sturm’s mother was Gertraud Bock, daughter of Konrad Bock,country parson of Liebenstadt. During his infancy, Sturm learned Latinand other (fine) arts from the court chaplain (concionator),Johann Jakob Beurer.

When the Count Palatine Johann-Friedrich (himself a Protestant) diedin 1644, leaving no heir to the throne, his territory devolved untohis older brother Wolfgang Wilhelm, who had converted to Catholicismin 1613. Although Johann-Friedrich had reached an agreement with hisbrother that (unlike all other subjects) the courtiers and servants toJohann-Friedrich’s court could remain Protestant, this promiseceased upon his death. As a consequence of the Counter-Reformation,all subjects had to become Catholic. Sturm and his family, beingLutherans and resisting this call, fled the county in 1645. Theysettled close by in Weißenburg. From 1646 onwards, Sturmattended the Latin School in Weißenburg living in the house ofthe rector, Johannes Hupfer, who took care of him. In 1653, upon theadvocacy of Sturm’s father, Daniel Wülfer, priest and deanof St. Lorenz, employed Johann Christoph as amanuensis. He supportedSturm financially and furthered his academic career. Initially, Sturmmight have thought about studying at the University of Altdorf, sincehe enrolled on October 4, 1653. However, he did not take up hisstudies.

Instead of studying at the University of Altdorf, Sturm decided toread at the University of Jena, enrolling on February 2, 1656. Sturmstudied mathematics and physics with both Erhard Weigel(1625–1699) and Johann Zeisold (1599–1667). He studiedtheology with Henning Spoercke. Sturm was awarded the degree ofmagister philosophiae magna cum laude on January 27, 1658. OnOctober 10, 1660 Sturm enrolled at the University of Leiden, where hestudied philosophy with Johannes De Raey (1622–1702) andarchitectureprivatim with Nicolai Goldmann(1611–1665). It was in Leiden that Sturm most likely came intocontact with the concept of and the driving force behind the idea ofeclecticism (seesect. 2) as Henricus Bornius (1617–1665), professor of ethics at theUniversity of Leiden, had formulated it in his (1653) inaugurallectureDe vera philosophandi libertate. During his one-yearstay in Leiden, Sturm also visited Baruch de Spinoza(1632–1677). In 1661, Sturm returned to Jena via Amsterdam,Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Magdeburg, and Leipzig. In Jena, he spent onemore year on the study of theology.

In 1662, Sturm returned to his former benefactor, Daniel Wülfer,instructing his sons, but also conducting his own philosophicalstudies. Only in 1664 was Sturm able to find a decent employment aspriest of Deiningen and (from 1667 onwards) Klosterzimmern, allowinghim to settle and start a family.

On August 15, 1669 Sturm was offered a position as professor ofmathematics and physics at the University of Altdorf, which he tookover from Abdias Trew (1597–1669). Sturm held this positionuntil his death in 1703. His most famous students were the Swisspolyhistor Johann Jakob Scheuchzer (1672–1733); Johann GabrielDoppelmayr (1671–1750), a German mathematician, naturalphilosopher and encyclopedist; Johann Heinrich Müller(1671–1731), one of Sturm’s successors to the chair ofmathematics and physics at the University of Altdorf; Martin Knorre(1657–1699); and Georg Albrecht Hamberger (1662–1716), ateacher of Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Besides hisprofessorship, Sturm was twice the rector of the University ofAltdorf, and nine times the dean of the faculty of philosophy.

Sturm was married three times: his first wife was Barbara JohannaKesler. They married in 1664. She died in 1679. His second wife wasMaria Salome Höchstetter. They married in 1680. She died in 1691.His third wife was Dorothea Elisabeth Göring. They married in1692 and she outlived Sturm. Sturm had 13 children, Leonhard ChristophSturm being the most famous one.

Sturm died in Altdorf on December 25, 1703 from the consequences of astroke he had suffered two months earlier. He was said to be

a pious, honest, kind, upright man, of clear speech, very eager in[the search for] justice and truth, and the successful renovator ofmathematical studies. (Brucker 1766: 770)

In his eulogy on Sturm, Georg Paul Rötenbeck, who was ordinaryprofessor of political science and logic at the University of Altdorfand whose daughter was married to Sturm’s son LeonhardChristoph, portrays Sturm as humble, decent, impartial, duteous,patient, and godly. Furthermore, Sturm is venerated as a brilliantphilosopher and mathematician as well as a good family father (Hermann& Platz 2003: 10–27).

Throughout his life as professor of mathematics and physics at theUniversity of Altdorf, Sturm produced a variety of works, includingmathematical textbooks, a colorful set of disputations, works onastronomy (aimed at discrediting astrology), and calendars. However,Sturm’s core interest concerned natural philosophy. He publishedthree systematic treatises on physics, thePhysicaConciliatrix (PC, 1684), thePhysica Electiva siveHypothetica (PE, 1697/1722) and the posthumously publishedCompendium Physicae Modernae Sanioris (CPMS, 1704).

ThePhysica Electiva is Sturm’s masterpiece. It isdivided into three parts: aphysica generalis (generalphysics) that lays down the foundations of Sturm’s system andincludes his discussion of key metaphysical themes such as the natureof matter, form, and causation; aphysica specialis (specialphysics) that covers the main phenomena of the supralunary and thesublunary world; and aphysica specialissima (very specialphysics) that is devoted to the study of life and human beings. Duringhis life, Sturm managed to published only thephysicageneralis. Thephysica specialis was publishedposthumously by Christian Wolff in 1722. The third part has never beenpublished. It has been alleged that it were held in manuscript form bythe city library of Nuremberg (Gaab, in Gaab et al. 2004). Based onarchival research conducted by one of the authors (C. Henkel) in thecity library of Nuremberg in October 2019, he thinks no suchmanuscript exists there. However, the city library of Nuremberg holdswhat he takes to be study notes of Sturm’s students on coursesin natural philosophy.^[1]

1.1 Sources of Sturm’s thought

In line with his eclectic approach to philosophy (seesect. 2), Sturm surveys and builds upon a wide range of sources. They includepre-Socratic authors, such as Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus,Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus as well as philosophers of theclassical period, such as Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus,Euclid, and Archimedes. Due to the Aristotelian curriculum dominatingthe life of early modern academic philosophers, Sturm draws uponAristotle (in particular his Physics) more often than upon any otherauthor. Furthermore, Sturm avails himself of Roman philosophers bothStoic, such as Cicero, Seneca, Pliny the Elder, and Plutarch, andSceptic, such as Sextus Empiricus and Aulus Gellius. Other authors ofthe era include Potamon of Alexandria, whom Sturm takes to be thefirst eclectic philosopher; Galen, as well as Diogenes Laërtius,an important source for early modern philosophers to study thephilosophers of antiquity.

Furthermore, Sturm knows the Church Fathers, that is, he mentionsClemens of Alexandria, Origen of Alexandria, and Lucius CaeciliusFirmianus Lactantius. He takes the Church Fathers to be eclectics.

Sturm is well-versed in the Aristotelian commentary traditionincluding the Greek commentators rediscovered in the Renaissance(Schmitt 1983), such as Iamblichus, Alexander of Aphrodisias,Themistius, Ammonius Hermeae, Simplicius of Cilicia, Philoponus (Johnthe Grammarian), and Olympiodorus the Younger; the Arab commentators,such as Avicenna and Averroës; as well as the Latin commentators,such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Durandus of St.Pourçain, and William of Ockham. Following a general line ofthought manifesting itself in the Renaissance among both Aristotelianand Humanist thinkers (Schmitt 1983), Sturm takes the Greekcommentators to be more reliable and true to the views of Aristotlehimself than the Latin commentators (PE I: preface).

Sturm draws extensively on Aristotelian thinkers ranging from medievalscholastic authors, such as Gabriel Biel, to Renaissance and lateearly modern scholastic authors. The latter include Italianphilosophers, for instance, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Andrea Caesalpino,Jacopo Zabarella, Giulio Pace, and Francisco Lana de Terzi; Dutchphilosophers, such as Gijsbert Voet (Voetius); Spanish and Portuguesephilosophers such as Gómez de Pereira, Pedro da Fonseca,Francisco de Toledo, Antonio Rubio, Francisco Suárez, GabrielVásquez, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, and Rodrigo de Arriaga;French philosophers, such as Samuel Maresius, Honoré Fabri,Jean Baptiste Du Hamel, and Pierre Daniel Huet; English philosophers,such as John Case and Gilbert Jack (Jacchaeus); and GermanPhilosophers, such as Daniel Sennert, Christoph Scheibler, JohannesZeisold, Johann Sperling, Jakob Thomasius, and Erhard Weigel. Sturmknows the German academic philosophical landscape very well, sincethese philosophers were influential in their respective fields (seeWundt 1938), or since they were either Sturm’s colleagues orteachers. The latter is true of Zeisold and Weigel.

In addition, Sturm is acquainted with humanist thinkers, such asLorenzo Valla, Juan Louis Vives, Philip Melanchthon, and Pierre de laRamée. Furthermore, his sources include early modern naturalphilosophers: microscopists, such as Marcello Malpighi, AntoniePhilips van Leeuwenhoek, and Nehemiah Grew, but also astronomers suchas Nicolaus Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Galileo Galilei. Sturm is alsofamiliar with Renaissance and early modern physicians and anatomistssuch as Jean Fernel, William Harvey, Claude Perrault, and JeanPecquet.

Sturm is acquainted with alchemist sources, such as theCorpusHermeticum, Paracelsus, Jan Baptista van Helmont, and AthanasiusKircher, as well as atomists such as Lucretius and Pierre Gassendi,none of whom he looks upon very favorably.

Concerning seventeenth-century philosophers, Sturm builds upon FrancisBacon and Gerrit Janszoon Vos (Vossius) regarding his eclecticphilosophy and scientific method. He argues against Spinoza’sand Leibniz’s conception of nature, and mentions Thomas Hobbes,Kenelm Digby, Blaise Pascal, and Isaac Newton in passing. Sturm alsoargues against the Cambridge Platonists, such as Henry More and RalphCudworth. In contrast, he builds upon Cartesian thought, usingRené Descartes, Johann Clauberg, Géraud de Cordemoy,Louis de la Forge, Antoine le Grand, and Nicolas Malebranche assources. Cordemoy, La Forge Malebranche, and the Christian mysticPierre Poiret inspire Sturm’s case in favor ofoccasionalism.

Finally, Sturm corresponded extensively with members of the RoyalSociety, such as John Wallis, Robert Boyle, and Robert Hooke. It is inBoyle that he finds backup for his own position of the passivity ofnature in the controversy with Leibniz and Schelhammer (seebelow).

1.2 Reception of Sturm in Leibniz and Wolff

Today, Sturm is most commonly remembered as the polemical target ofLeibniz’s essayDe Ipsa Natura (1698), which is part ofan articulated controversy between Sturm and Leibniz on whether naturecan be considered endowed with active principles (a claim denied bySturm and defended by Leibniz). In fact, Leibniz and Sturm knew of oneanother, since they were both students of Erhard Weigel (Lemanski2018). Presumably, they met in the 1660s, maybe when Leibniz was atAltdorf University in 1666 or when he was the secretary of thealchemical society in Nuremberg in 1667 (for Leibniz’s life, seeArthur 2014: x–xvi). The controversy between Leibniz and Sturmcommenced in 1694–95 through correspondence (Palaia 1990) andcontinued later in the 1690s through academic dissertations andjournal articles published in theActa eruditorum (Henkel2024, ch.2).

In hisDe Ipsa Natura, Leibniz presents Sturm as a supporterof Malebranche’s occasionalism. This charge is partially correctinsofar as Sturm does claim, like Malebranche, that God is the onlyactive efficient cause operating in nature. However, Leibnizoversimplifies Sturm’s position. Sturm’s account ofpassive forms is in fact different from Malebranche’soccasionalism for the role that it attributes to finite forms in theexplanation of natural phenomena and for the relatively minor rolethat the notion of the laws of nature plays in Sturm’s account(seesect. 3).

More generally, Sturm’s project is diametrically opposed toLeibniz’s. At the core of Leibniz’s criticisms is hiscommitment to the traditional scholastic view that the notions ofsubstance and action are deeply interconnected (e.g. Leibniz 1989,160). The commitment to the notion of action as the fundamental groundto think about the very nature of substances underpins Leibniz’smain objections to Sturm’s account of the passivity of forms.Leibniz objects to the idea that any natural being could ever beadequately conceived, or taken to have any ontological consistency,without referring to some kind of activity. However, Sturm, in turn,rejects precisely Leibniz’s fundamental commitment to activityas the ontological ground of substances. As a result, Sturm hardlyoffers Leibniz any answer that would be satisfying from thelatter’s point of view.

The clash of fundamental philosophical intuitions that surfaces in theexchange between Leibniz and Sturm is particularly interesting withregard to the complex evolution of early modern philosophy across theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Henkel 2021 and 2024, especiallych. 2; Sangiacomo 2020a and 2020b). In a sense, Leibniz voices themain objection that can be raised against Sturm; namely, without someactive principle “mechanical forms” are just idleconstructions that cannot perform any genuine explanatory role.However, Sturm’s consistent way of maintaining that explanationdoesnot require any reference to intrinsic causal powerspoints, in fact, to an alternative account of causation and causalexplanations altogether, which was emerging at the time (Carraud 2002;Sangiacomo 2019, 2020c).

Despite Leibniz opposing Sturm’s metaphysics and naturalphilosophy, he was appreciative of and influenced by Sturm’s(and Weigel’s) developments in logic (Lemanski 2018).Furthermore, Leibniz’s major philosophical ally in Germany,Christian Wolff, was very much fond of Sturm himself. So much so thatit was Wolff who supported the publication of theparsspecialis of Sturm’s PE and provided a preface to it. Wolffwas probably familiar with Sturm due to Wolff’s former teacher,Georg Albrecht Hamberger (1662–1716), who in turn had studiedwith Sturm (Gaab, in Gaab et al. 2004: 48f).

In his preface, Wolff is full of praise for Sturm, especially becausehe believes to find in Sturm’s method an anticipation of his owntripartite division of knowledge into historical knowledge orknowledge of facts, philosophical knowledge or knowledge of causes,and mathematical knowledge or knowledge of the quantities of thingsput down in the first chapter of thePhilosophia Rationalis(seeSEP entry on Christian Wolff, sects. 3 and 7). However, Wolff is aware that mathematicalquantification does not figure in Sturm’s method as prominentlyas the other two types of knowledge. Besides, Wolff compliments Sturmfor establishing experimental teaching (collegia) — anacademic novelty. Moreover, he looks very favorably on Sturm’sthree physics, praising Sturm’s scientific method (sect. 2), and pointing out the very positive reception of the first part of thePE. He laments the absence of a third part (theparsspecialissima) of the PE, which was supposed to deal with livingbeings. Sturm’s death prevented its termination and successivepublication. However, in order to close this gap, Wolff directs thereader to the lecture of Honoré Fabri’s works on plants,animals and human beings. Indeed, Sturm himself had allegedlyrecommended to the editor to join Fabri’s writings on thesematters with the two completed parts of the PE to provide a completephysics. Besides Fabri, in the preliminaries, Wolff directs the readerto the works of Gassendi, Clauberg, Du Hamel, La Forge, Cordemoy,Harvey, Perrault, Malpighi, Grew, and Ray to obtain knowledge aboutplants, animals, and especially the connection of the mind and thebody in the human case.

2. The scientific method: experimental, hypothetical, eclectic

Sturm’s scientific method aims at providing a complete system ofnatural philosophy in which (potentially) all natural phenomena canreceive satisfying causal explanations based on available observationsand by taking into account the most perspicuous hypotheses advanced.Sturm’s method consists of three main steps, which also providethe recurrent pattern used to discuss all topics covered in thePhysica Electiva.^[2]

The first step consists in collecting phenomena, either reported byother natural philosophers or encountered by means of observation orexperimentation itself. They need to be reported faithfully(fideliter), by accurately presenting the circumstances underwhich the phenomena obtained (PE I: preface, art. 3.4).

Sturm was committed to the new emerging experimental naturalphilosophy and he was among the first university professors in Germanyto introduce an experimental approach on an academic level. Inspiredby the experimental method advanced by Bacon and Boyle, he offeredregular yet private experimentalcollegia (teaching). HisCollegium experimentale sive curiosum (1676/1685) revealsthat Sturm was familiar with the state of the art of experimentalnatural science, putting to good use the new instruments available atthe time; namely, the telescope, microscope, air pump, diver’sbell, etc. Furthermore, hypotheses (the basis of theory-building) aremeasured both against their congruence with phenomena and the resultsof experiments. Paradigmatic experimenters for Sturm are Otto vonGuericke, Caspar Schott, and Robert Boyle.

However, Sturm does not content himself with putting forth a merenatural history, a mere listing of things found in nature, or curiousexperimental results. Natural philosophy must provide deeper causalexplanations for why the phenomena are such as they are and why theyoccur. To achieve this goal, the natural philosopher should take stockof experimental findings and available observations and investigatesuitable hypotheses to explain them.

The second step, hence, consists in collecting and presenting with thesame faithfulness old and new hypotheses that have been suggested toaccount for the phenomena. Sturm meticulously presents hypotheses oldand new, from Pre-Socratic to seventeenth-century authors (seesect. 1.2). Sturm shows himself to be an assiduous, diligent reader of thenatural philosophy available at his time. His knowledge of more andeven less prominent authors is impressive and precise.

Sturm’s last physics, theCompendium Physicae ModernaeSanioris (CPMS), makes particularly clear that hypotheses have aplace in between observations by the senses and certainties revealedby the demonstrative method. He points out that some things areobvious, in that they are observed by the senses or by means ofexperiments including the use of newly invented instruments (CPMS:2f). Some things are merely conjectured rather than infalliblydemonstrated (supponuntur verius & conjiciuntur, quaminfallibiliter demonstratur) (CPMS: 3). Some are certain, in thesense that phenomena and hypotheses align, that is, they are

deduced (deducuntur) from phenomena and hypotheses in such away by means of the demonstrative method that due to the ubiquitousharmonizing correspondence itself of the phenomena with thehypotheses, by means of a certain demonstrative regress, the thingsthat had been assumed in a way seemingly true(verosimiliter), ascend to (evadent) truth andcertainty. (CPMS: 3f)

The third step of Sturm’s method aims at selection andreconciliation of different hypotheses and at the final concocting ofa satisfying account of the phenomena at stake. Sturm’s goal isto distil what is good and reasonable while discardingpseudo-explanations, prejudices and preconceived notions. This step isapproached mainly through critical investigation, rational discussionand logical inference. In this sense, it is the more philosophical orspeculative part of Sturm’s method. The goal of this third stepis thus to critically assess and integrate the hypothesescollected.

At the beginning of his preface to the PE (PE I: art. 3.1), Sturm(possibly inspired by Boyle and Mariotte) extensively investigatescriteria good hypotheses have to meet. They have to have a reasonabledegree of possibility and show the connection among phenomena. Theyhave to satisfy the circumstances that obtain. A hypothesis is betterin case it can accommodate more phenomena and notable circumstances.Simpler hypotheses should be preferred. Hence, Sturm avails himself ofOckham’s razor in choosing among hypotheses. The reasoningbehind this is that simple hypotheses mirror God’s ways whichare simple (PE I: preface, art. 3.1). God as the wisest creator ofnature (Opificem naturae Sapientissimum) designed the worldby simple means which have to be taken into consideration whenstudying nature and its design. Furthermore, good hypotheses shouldneither conflict with phenomena, other established hypotheses norevident principles (PE I: preface, art. 3.2). Finally, Sturm pointsout that hypotheses have to satisfy not only the intellect but alsothe imagination and the senses (PE I: preface, art. 3.3).Sturm’s reasoning here is that all natural phenomena arephenomena pertaining the world of extension and its modifications likeshape and motion. The senses and the imagination are first andforemost concerned with the realm of extended beings, and therefore toassess the aptness of hypotheses about natural phenomena, one needs toconsult both of these faculties. Mere abstract conceptual reflectionabout nature as is characteristic of the scholastics (Sturm thinks) isnot sufficient, since worldly phenomena are most proximate to andpalpable by the senses and the imagination (PE I: preface, art3.3).

In this three-step method, the presentation of phenomena establishestheexplanandum, the hypotheses cover some ground towardsapproximating a solution. But since these different hypotheses eithercontradict or run parallel to one another, a true explanation has toselect from existing theories what is true, reject what is false, andadd what needs be added. This brings us to Sturm’s eclecticism.^[3]

The eclectic approach consists in nothing other than

to select and adopt (sibi sumere) from all sects ofPhilosophers that which is true, having left behind what is false anderroneous. (PE I: preface, art. 2.1)

Sturm encountered the eclectic method during his one-year stay inLeiden in 1660 probably inspired by Henricus Bornius. Both the prefaceof Sturm’sPhysica Electiva and his disputationDePhilosophia Sectaria & Electiva (DSE; in his 1686Philosophia Eclectica) held in 1679 are pleas foreclecticism, which contrasts sharply with sectarian philosophy.According to Sturm, the whole of philosophers — bracketingsceptics and doubters (sceptios ac dubitatores) — canbe subsumed under two classes: sectarians and eclectics (DSE: 3).

Sectarian thinkers are led by an authority on whom they slavishlydepend. They do not follow their own reasoning, but spend their timeabsorbing, reproducing and fiercely defending what they have learnedex cathedra. Sectarian philosophers do not follow the truthof what is being said, but the authority of the person who saidsomething. The most notable sects in Sturm’s days are theAristotelians (secta Aristotelica) with its two mainbranches, namely, the Greek interpreters and the scholasticcommentators; the Cartesians (secta Cartesiana); theGassendists (secta Gassendica) reviving Epicurean andDemocritean thought; and the Neoplatonists (sectaNeo-Platonica) (DSE: 13). In hisPhysica Electiva, Sturmmentions the alchemical school (theSpagyric school or thatof the chemists [Chemicorum]) as the fourth main one omittingNeo-Platonism (PE I: preface, art. 3.5).

The case for eclecticism is madeex negativo by challengingsectarianism and positively by bringing to light the strengths of theeclectic method. Concerning the repudiation of sectarian philosophy,Sturm argues that adopting a sectarian approach is first of all not anecessity (Sectariae quippe Philosophiae primo nulla estnecessitas). It is not the only option (see DSE: 28f). Second,following one authority is not only not useful, it is even dangerousand damaging to the advancement and augmentation of the sciences.

In contrast to this, eclectic philosophers are defined as:

[T]hose who did not want to hang on to every word of someone, norswear by the words of one master; they knew and collected for theirstorehouse everything that is true and good from the words andwritings of whatever teachers (Doctorum) not convinced by theauthority of the person teaching but by the weight of the argumentsand demonstrations; even more they added from themselves as much asthey could; they make it their business (sustineant) to seewith their own rather than with someone else’s eyes. (DSE: 3f;see also DSE: 6, 28)

The eclectic method acknowledges the feebleness of the human mind, itsproclivity to err (DSE: 23). In this it is humbler than sectarianphilosophy which assumes to find all the truths in one author. Sincehumans on their own tend to misjudge things or make mistakes, theydepend on one another as correctives. The scientific study of natureif it is to succeed, hence, becomes a collective endeavor:

By the name of the eclectic philosophers we understand in this wholetreatise no others than those, who do not reject without a differenceall the things that are found (inventa) and left(tradita) by the heads of different sects, and who are not somoved by the authority of one leader that they do accept all of hisutterances andbons mots (dicteria), but whoacknowledge the feebleness (imbecillitatem) of the human mind(humani ingenii), which makes it apparent that all depths ofnature and reason cannot be exhausted by one or a few men; theypersuade themselves that the truth can be only viewed in part, andthat the sciences are to be advanced and stabilized by means of unitedpowers (junctis viribus) and communicated advice(communicato consilio). (DSE: 7f)

It should be stressed that although eclecticism means collecting whatis good in other authors, it does not just aim at a mere collection oftrue or probable hypotheses, but instead at the formulation of acoherent system of natural philosophy (PE I: preface, art. 3.2).Eclecticism, in Sturm’s eyes, explicitly invites the correction,emendation and augmentation of existing theories (DSE: 48, 69). It isa philosophical approach more useful and appropriate for theadvancement of the sciences than thinking in line with one author asthe sectarians do (DSE: 14).

Finally, Sturm’s method conceives of natural philosophy as adynamic project in a state of constant transformation. To illustratethis point, Sturm compares philosophy as a whole to a ship: it issomewhat complete, though undergoing constant changes and mending.Both philosophy and a ship in use need to be fixed from time to time.Old, used-up parts (hypotheses in the case of philosophy, planks inthe case of the ship) have to go to be replaced by new parts fit toallow both to advance (CPMS: 79). Philosophy is a never endingproject. It can only approximate truth, getting closer and closer. Nosingle natural philosopher has or could have exhausted andsufficiently explained the phenomena obtaining in nature. Hence, whatneeds to be done is to diligently assess and select what is good andtrue in other philosophers, adding what needs to be added. Newphenomena are being discovered, new competing hypotheses are beingdeveloped to explain them. They too need to be assessed. What isreasonable remains. What is not able to stand up to the demands of agood hypothesis will have to go. The experimental study of natureproceeds, too. New instruments are being developed raising newchallenges to old hypotheses. The vastness of nature, the manifold ofits phenomena and the fact that causes cannot be observed but onlyconjectured add to the difficulty of the natural philosopher’stask. It would indeed be temerity and arrogance to think that one hasexplained all there needs to be explained in nature (CPMS: 67).Therefore, Sturm is making a case for the open-endedness of naturalphilosophy. Its goal is to know oneself, to know the world, andultimately to know God (PE I: preface, art. 4.5; CPMS: 8). A goal thatis not reachable within the life span of a human being, but a goalworth striving for.

3. Occasionalism

In the theoretical part (physica generalis) of hisPhysica Electiva, Sturm sets down the metaphysicalfoundations of his system. In a nutshell, Sturm argues that the wholeof nature (human and angelic minds set aside) can be explained by twoprinciples: matter and its modes, which are material forms. Both theseprinciples are causally passive and shaped by local motion. Forms, inparticular, provide the specific reasons why certain phenomena areproduced in a certain way, but they do not include the causal powersthat bring these phenomena about. That power comes only from God, whois the universal and omnipresent cause acting in nature. In order tosupport this picture, Sturm gives a number of original twists to anargumentative strategy already exploited by other occasionalistauthors, while providing at the same time a more eclectic and broaderrationale for endorsing an occasionalist metaphysics. To deepenSturm’s account, three main points deserve special attention:(1) the justification forpassive forms as modes of matter;(2) why God’s causal power is directly needed to bring aboutnatural phenomena; and (3) the role that passive forms play inscientific explanations.

(1) Early modern natural philosophers agree with their Scholasticopponents in granting that matter is utterly passive and devoid ofefficacious causal powers. Sturm takes stock of this point, joiningDescartes and other Cartesians in defining matter in terms of pureextension (res extensa) and motion as local motion. However,early modern natural philosophers disagreed with Scholastics and amongthemselves about the notion of ‘form’, whether there couldbe any ‘substantial form’ and if rejecting substantialforms would lead to discard all causal powers in finite beings.

Sturm’s position in this debate is clear-cut. Sturm argues thatforms are nothing butmodes of matter (i.e., modifications ofan extended substance), and since matter is causally passive, formsare causally passive, too. Sturm agrees with many other early modernanti-Scholastic philosophers in dismissing scholastic substantialforms.

Sturm’s argument for rejecting substantial forms is based on atrilemma, according to which forms are either (i) purely materialbeings, (ii) purely spiritual beings distinct from matter, or (iii) akind of being that is in between purely material and purely immaterialsubstances.

The first option leads directly to Sturm’s own view. Ifsubstantial forms are purely material beings, they cannot besubstances in themselves because the form of a material body cannot beanother separate material body, given that forms operate in virtue oftheir intimate union with the matter of the substance of which theyare the form. It follows that if substantial forms are purelymaterial, then they have to be conceived as modes of matter.

The second option is relevant because later scholastic authors (suchas Suárez) tended to use the rational soul as the prototype tounderstand natural substantial forms as well. However, the rationalsoul is a self-standing spiritual substance that can exist and beconceived independently from the body with which it is united. Thisentails that the rational soul is not theform of the body,but simply a different, independent substance that is united with thebody itself. Hence (pace scholastics), the case of the humanrational soulcannot be used as a model to conceptualize‘substantial forms’ in other (non-human) natural beings(PE I: 94).

Sturm’s argument against the third option of the trilemma runsas follows. If one defines (as scholastics usually do) a substantialform in terms of the role that the form plays in explaining andaccounting for the nature of composite beings, then what is called a‘substantial form’ cannot belong to the ontologicalcategory of a substance, but only to the category of‘relatives’ or relational things. Sturm stresses that“the entire nature of a form generally and essentially consistsof a relation” (PE I: 94). Forms are not beings in themselves,butways in which certain beings operate and undergo changes.Against the third option of the trilemma, Sturm maintains that formsare not the kind of being that can be conceived of or existindependently from the being that they inform. Natural formscannot be understood as a kind of substance or beingintermediate between material and spiritual substances because formsarenot substances in the first place. Since natural formsarerelational beings they cannot besubstances, andthus the very idea of a ‘substantial form’ is a chimera, acategory mistake. The only viable option left is thus the one defendedby Sturm himself: forms are modes of matter, and since matter iscausally passive, forms are causally passive as well.

(2) This conclusion requires an account of how natural phenomena cantake place if nothing in nature is endowed with active causal powers.According to Sturm, the origin of natural causality lies in Godhimself. God is the substance defined by pure activity, and He is theonly truly efficient cause of all motion in the world:

Only God’s most efficacious volition is that truly acting power(virtutem), which moves while not being moved, whichrigorously speaking moves, which moves one body by means of(per) another, which moves the whole corporeal world, itsparts, some by means of (per) others, and in this way Hebrings about (efficiat) every one of the natural effects thathappens in even the most remote corners of the Universe by means ofhis sole immediate power. (PE I: 164)

God is the “requiring cause” (causam exigentem,PE I: 161) of natural phenomena. This means that when Godwants something to happen then the effect obtains. However,Sturm also maintains that God’s will does not operate in naturethrough its “absolute power” (potentia absoluta)but rather by following what Sturm calls “respective orhypothetical power” (potentia respectiva &hypothetica):

Here I established that God acts and operates in the whole of nature,not on the basis of his absolute power (which obtains whatever hewants without hindrances and in the most perfect way), but on thebasis of a respective and hypothetical power, whose exercise Godhimself has (in the most free way) subordinated to certain conditionsof matter or of the human mind. (PE I: 178)

God did not establish to elicit effects absolutely by his mere act offree will. Rather, God freely subordinated his own actions to theobtainment of certain specific conditions, namely, certain states ofnatural beings or of human minds. Sturm does not extensively use theMalebranchian terminology of occasional causes, but he does explicitlyequate occasional causes withsine quibus non causes (PE I:117). Asine qua non cause is a (counterfactually) necessarycondition for the production of a certain effect, although thesine qua non cause does not truly contribute to itsproduction in virtue of any active power it possesses (see Sangiacomo2019). Sturm’s account of God’s hypothetical power entailsthat all natural forms aresine quibus non conditions for theproduction of natural effects, in the sense that they do notcontribute in virtue of any active power they might have (since theyhave none), but rather because God (freely) established to bring aboutcertain effects as consequences of certain modifications (i.e., forms)of matter. Since (what Malebranche calls) ‘occasionalcauses’ can be understood in terms ofsine qua noncausation, and since Sturm maintains that all natural forms work assine quibus non causes of natural effects, it seems safe toconclude that Sturm supports a version of occasionalism.

Hence, Sturm’s strategy achieves its goal: matter is causallypassive, and material forms are passive as well. In order to accountfor the changes observed in nature, it is necessary to locate a sourcefor causal activity. However, this source cannot be found anywhere inthe natural world itself. God is thus the only candidate left toaccount for the causal active power needed to bring about naturalphenomena. God’s power, however, is only responsible for thefactthat natural phenomena are brought about. The specificreasonwhy they are such and such is to be located in thespecific features of passive forms themselves. In this respect,God’s involvement in nature plays only a metaphysical groundingfunction and it is not supposed to replace, but rather to justify, theneed to carefully investigate the mechanical structures of passiveforms.

Sturm’s occasionalism, however, is quite peculiar, especially ascompared to Malebranche’s more familiar version ofoccasionalism. A crucial feature of Malebranche’s occasionalismis the role that the laws of nature play in accounting for naturalphenomena. According to him, natural beings do not have any causalpowers and can be occasions of their effects only in virtue of thelaws of nature established by God. In contrast, Sturm takes God toestablish the whole set of counterfactually necessary conditionalsthat determine which effects will obtain when certain conditions arein place in nature. These conditions are passive forms themselves,which then play the role ofexplanantia of naturalphenomena.

(3) Sturm’s account of passive forms breaks with the idea thatexplanatory principles in natural philosophy must also account for theactive power that brings phenomena about. In this sense, Sturmdismisses the idea that causal explanations must be based on activepowers intrinsic to the natural agents themselves. According to Sturm,all phenomena are brought about by God himself. But God’s powerbeing indifferent, differences among phenomena depend on passiveforms, which operate assine quibus non conditions for theirproduction. This means that theexplanandum in naturalphenomena is not the fact that something is brought about, but ratherthe specific characteristics of what is brought about. God’spower explains that something (in general) is brought about, but onlypassive forms explain what is brought about in particular and how. Theexplanandum in natural phenomena is thus the specificity ofthe phenomenon at stake, and theexplanans of this phenomenonare passive forms, which are a matter of empirical investigation.

Sturm’s approach combines the strengths of both the scholasticand seventeenth-century mechanist approach in order to remedy theirreciprocal shortcomings. Passive mechanical forms (asAristotelian-scholastic forms) areparticular principles ofexplanation that can be used to account for different specificphenomena. At the same time, passive mechanical forms (as mechanicalprinciples) are ontologically nothing but modes of matter shaped bymotion. Passive forms aredifferent among themselves but theyare all ontologically shaped by the same universal principles, whichmake explanations based on passive mechanical formshomogenous anduniform (from a conceptual point of view) without making them toogeneral and abstract.

Sturm’s approach has at least two important implications: (i)the integration of teleology and final causation in a mechanistnatural philosophy; and (ii) the marginalization of the laws of naturetherein.

Sturm is a strenuous defender of natural teleology and final causes.In the chapter dedicated to final causes in the PE, Sturm presents tothe reader numerous phenomena which are supposed to back up or atleast make her inclined to accept the existence of teleology in natureas well as the necessity to study it. Sturm mentionsinteralia bodily organs performing certain functions (the eyes arethere to see; the heart pumps blood through the body) and thewell-adaptedness of certain animals; for instance, in the case ofbirds (geese, ducks, storks) their wings, the lightness of theirbones, and the possession of a certain type of beak. According toSturm, ends and uses are an inextricable part of the world as a wholeand of its parts (PE I: 226). Sturm’s passive forms thus retainthe teleological connotation that Aristotelian forms already had,fitting it into a mechanist picture of the universe. Forms arestructures of matter aimed at producing certain effects rather thanothers. They are not only the efficient (passive) conditions for theseeffects to obtain, but also the final (passive) principles thatexplain them. Properly speaking, God himself, once again, is the solefinal cause in nature, since God is the one who designed,planned and carried out the whole of nature as a gigantic and mostperfect clockwork.

Sturm’s emphasis on forms has its counterpart in hismarginalization of the role that the laws of nature play in hisnatural philosophy and in scientific explanations. Sturm puts forwardonly two very general laws, one concerning the communication of motion(PE I: 164) and the other concerning the mind-body union (PE I:858–859). Focusing on the conservation of motion, it isimportant to stress that this law is not supposed to explain whatspecific features different specific bodies can have, nor does Sturmever suggest that the variety of finite things could follow from aconsideration of this (or any other) law alone. Rather, the law of theconservation of the quantity of motion simply constrains the effectsof every natural phenomenon (namely, the fact that motion cannot bedissipated during impacts but must be always conserved in the whole ofthe universe). Remarkably, Sturm also mentions that this law is notdeduceda priori from purely metaphysical considerations (asis the case in Descartes’ deduction of conservation from thenature of God’s immutability), but rather onlyaposteriori on the basis of empirical observations. As anempirical regularity derived from experience, Sturm’sconservation law does not have the same strong metaphysicalconnotations of Malebranche’s laws of nature (which are groundedin a consideration of God’s attributes of simplicity andwisdom), nor does it play any significant role in the explanation ofparticular phenomena.

Bibliography

Selection of Sturm’s works

• 1661,Universalia Euclidea, The Hague: Adrian Ulac.
• 1670,Mathesis compendiaria, Altdorf: HeinrichMeyer.
• 1676,Collegium experimentale sive curiosum, part one,Nuremberg: Wolfgang Mauritius & Johannes Andreas Endter.
• 1684 [PC],Physica Conciliatrix, Nuremberg: WolfgangMauritius Endter.
• 1685,Collegium experimentale sive curiosum, part two,Nuremberg: Wolfgang Mauritius Endter.
• 1686,Philosophia eclectica, h.e. ExercitationesAcademicae, Vol. 1 (a collection of thirteen academicdisputations), Altdorf?: Johann Heinrich Schönnerstädt.
• 1689,Mathesis enucleata, Nuremberg: Wolfgang MauritiusEndter.
• 1692,IdolumNaturae, Altdorf: HeinrichMeyer.
• 1697 [PE I],Physica Electiva sive Hypothetica, Vol. 1,Nuremberg: Wolfgang Mauritius Endter; reprint in Christian Wolff(2006): Gesammelte Werke, III Abt., Band 97.1.1 and 97.1.2,Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
• 1698,Philosophia eclectica, h.e. ExercitationesAcademicae, Vol. 2 (a collection of another fourteendisputations) (Frankfurt; Leipzig);De Natura sibi incassumvindicata, Altdorf: Heinrich Meyer.
• 1699,Mathesis juvenilis, Vol. 1, Nuremberg: Joh. Hofmann& Engelbert Streck.
• 1701,Mathesis juvenilis, Vol. 2, Nuremberg: Joh. Hofmann& Engelbert Streck.
• 1704 [CPMS],Physicae modernae et sanioris compendiumerotematicum, Nuremberg: Joh. Hofmann & EngelbertStreck.
• 1713,Kurtzer Begriff der Physic oder Natur-Lehre,anonymous translation of 1704 CPMS, Hamburg: Samuel Heyl.
• 1722 [PE II],Physica electiva sive hypothetica,tomus secundus, introduced and published by Christian Wolff,Wolfgang Mauritius Endter (Nuremberg); reprint in: Christian Wolff(2006): Gesammelte Werke, III Abt., Band 97.2.1 and 97.122,Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.

Early Modern & Post-Kantian Reception

• Brucker, Johann Jakob, 1766,Historia critica philosophiae atempore resuscitatarum in occidente literarum ad nostra tempora,Bernh. Christoph. Breitkopf (Leipzig), Vol. IV, part 1, book 3, ch. 4,pp. 769–772.
• Doppelmayr, Johann Gabriel, 1730,Historische Nachricht vonden Nürnbergischen Mathematicis und Künstlern, welche vondreyen Seculis her durch ihre Schriften und Kunst-Bemühungen dieMathematic und mehrere Künste in Nürnberg vor anderentrefflich befördert/ und sich um solche sehr wohl verdientgemacht/ zu einem guten Exempel, und zur weiteren rühmlichenNachahmung in zweyen Theilen an das Licht gestellet, auch mit vielennützlichen Anmerkungen und verschiedenen Kupffern versehen,Johann Ernst Adelbuinern (Nuremberg), pp. 114–122, entry:“Johann Christoph Sturm”.
• Gumposch, Victor Philipp, 1851,Die philosophische Literaturder Deutschen von 1400 bis auf unsere Tage, Verlag von G. JosephManz (Regensburg), reprinted as part of Lutz Geldsetzer’sInstrumenta Philosophica,Series Indices LibrorumII, Stern Verlag Janssen & Co. (Düsseldorf), pp.99f.
• von Haller, Albert, 1774–1777,Bibliotheca Anatomica quascripta ad Anatomen et Physiologiam facientia a rerum initiisrecensentur, Orell, Gessner, Fuessli et socc. (Zurich), Vol. 1(1774), Book VI (Animalium Incisiones), §570(Johannes Christophorus Sturm), pp. 632–633.
• König, Georg Matthias, 1678,Bibliotheca vetus et nova inqua Hebraeorum, Chaldaeorum, Syrorum, Arabum, Persarum, Aegyptiorum,Graecorum, et Latinorum per universum terrarum orbem Scriptorum,Theologorum, Jctorum, Medicorum, Philosophorum, Historicorum,Geographorum, Philologorum, Oratorum, Poetarum &c Patria,Ætas, Nomina, Libri, saepius etiam Eruditorum de iis Elogia,Testimonia & Judicia summa fide atque diligentia ex quotidianaAutorum Lectione depromta a prima Munid origine ad Annum usqueMDCLXXIIXX ordine Alphabetico digesta gratissima brevitate recensentur& exhibentur, Wolfgang Mauritius & Johannes AndreasEndter (Altdorf), p. 783.
• Jöcher, Christian Gottlieb, 1750, AllgemeinesGelehrten-Lexicon, darinne die Gelehrten aller Stände sowohlmänn- als weiblichen Geschlechts, welche vom Anfange der Welt bisauf die ietzige Zeit gelebt, und sich der gelehrten Welt bekanntgemacht, nach ihrer Geburt, Leben, merckwürdigen Geschichten,Absterben und Schrifften aus den glaubwürdigsten Scribenten inalphabetischer Ordnung beschrieben werden, Vierter Theil S-Z, JohannFriedrich Gleditschens Buchhandlung (Leipzig), entry: Sturm, Joh.Christoph, pp. 912–913.
• Morhof, Daniel Georg, 1747,Polyhistor Literarius,Philosophicus et Practicus, Lübeck: Peter Boeckmann; reprintAalen: Scientia Verlag 1970.
• Saxe, Christopher, 1785,Onomasticon Literarum siveNomenclator historico-criticus praestantissimorum omnis AetatisPopuli, Artiumque, Formulae Sciptorum item Monumentorum maximeillustrium, ab Orbe condito usque ad Saeculi, quod vivimus, Temporadigestus, et verisimilibus, quantum fieri potuit Annorum notisaccomodatus, Paddenburg, Paddenburg, Wild & Schoonhoven(Utrecht), part V, p. 612.
• Stolle, Gottlieb, 1738,Anmerkungen über D. HeumannsConspectum Reipublicae Litterariae, allen Liebhabern der Historie derGelahrtheit zu Liebe an den Tag gegeben, Johann Meyer (Jena), p.384.
• Will, Georg Andreas, 1757,NürnbergischesGelehrten-Lexicon oder Beschreibung aller NürnbergischenGelehrten beyderley Geschlechtes nach Ihrem Leben/ Verdiensten undSchriften zur Erweiterung der gelehrten Geschichtskunde undVerbesserung vieler darinnen vorgefallenen Fehler aus den bestenQuellen in alphabetischer Ordnung, part 3 (N-S), LorenzSchüpfel (Nuremberg & Altdorf), pp. 800–809, entry:“Sturm (Johann Christoph)”.
• Windelband, W., 1878,Die Geschichte der Neueren Philosophiein ihrem Zusammenhange mit der allgemeinen Cultur und den besonderenWissenschaften dargestellt, Verlag Breitkopf und Härtel(Leipzig), Vol. 1:Von der Renaissance bis Kant, §47.Deutschland im XVII. Jahrhundert, pp. 432 – 433.
• Zedler, Johann Heinrich, 1731–1754,Grossesvollständiges Universallexikon aller Wiessnschaften undKünste, welche bishero durch menschlichen Verstand und Witzerfunden und verbessert worden, Johann Heinrich Zedler(publisher) (Halle & Leipzig), 64 vol. + 4 supplementary vol.,vol. 40, pp. 722–725 (columns 1417–1424): “Sturm(Johann Christoph)”.

Secondary literature

In German

• Ahnert, Thomas, 2003, “‘Nullius in verba’:Autorität und Experiment in der Frühen Neuzeit. Das BeispielJohann Christoph Sturms (1635–1703)”,Zeitsprünge, 7(4): 604–618.
• Albrecht, Michael, 1994,Eklektik. Eine Begriffsgeschichte mitHinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte,Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (GüntherHolzboog), ch. 5, §§28–30, pp. 309–357.
• –––, 2001, “Johann Christoph Sturm”,in Friedrich Ueberweg, Helmut Holzhey, and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann(eds),Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophiedes 17. Jahrhunderts, Band 4 [Vol. 4],Das HeiligeRömische Reich Deutscher Nation, Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa,Basel: Schwabe & Co AG Verlag, ch. 8, §24, pp.942–947.
• Bosl, Erika, 1983, “Sturm, Johann Christoph, Philosoph,Physiker und Mathematiker”, inBosls bayerischeBiographie, Karl Bosl (ed.), Regensburg: Pustet, p. 766.
• Gaab, Hans, Pierre Leich, and Günter Löffladt, 2004,Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703), Frankfurt am Main:Verlag Harri Deutsch.
• Herrmann, Volker and Kai Thomas Platz, 2003,Der Wahrheit aufder Spur. Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703,Büchenbach, Germany: Verlag Dr. Faustus.
• Herrmann, Volker, 2013, “Sturm, Johann Christoph (PseudonymAlethophilus von Uranien)”, inNeue DeutscheBiographie, 25: 652 [available online].
• Krafft, Fritz, 1978, “Der Weg von den Physiken zur Physik anden deutschen Universitäten”,Berichte zurWissenschaftsgeschichte, 1(3–4): 123–162.doi:10.1002/bewi.19780010302
• Leinsle, Ulrich Gottfried, 1988,Reformversucheprotestantischer Metaphysik im Zeitalter des Rationalismus,Augsburg: Maro Verlag, §3.2 “Universalmathematik alsMetaphysik: Johann Christoph Sturm”, pp. 105–113.
• Nobis, Heribert M., 1966, “Die Bedeutung Der Leibnizschrift‚De Ipsa Natura’ Im Lichte Ihrer BegriffsgeschichtlichenVoraussetzungen. Herrn Dr. Ludwig von Pigenot zur Vollendung Seines75. Lebensjahres”,Zeitschrift Für PhilosophischeForschung, 20(3/4): 525–538.
• Pallaia, Roberto, 1990, “Naturbegriff und Kraftbegriff imBriefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Sturm”,Studia LeibnitianaSupplementa, 27: 157–172 (contains the original Latincorrespondence between Leibniz and Sturm).
• Petersen, Peter, 1921,Geschichte der aristotelischenPhilosophie im protestantischen Deutschland, Hamburg: Verlag vonFelix Meiner. [facsimile reprint 1964, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Holzboog)], pp.156–161.
• Recknagel, Hans, 1998,Die nürnbergische UniversitätAltdorf und ihre großen Gelehrten, Eigenverlag.
• Recktenwald, Hans Claus (ed.), 1966,Gelehrte derUniversität Altdorf, Nuremberg: Lorenz Spindler Verlag.
• Schimank, Hans, 1969, “Die Wandlung des Begriffs‚Physik‘ während der ersten Hälfte des 18.Jahrhunderts”, inWissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Technik.Studien zur Geschichte, Karl-Heinz Manegold (ed.), Munich:Verlag F. Bruckmann, part VI, pp. 454–468.
• Ueberweg, Friedrich, 1924,Grundriss der Geschichte derPhilosophie, part 3:Die Philosophie der Neuzeit bis zum Endedes XVIII. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: S. Mittler & Sohn, p.328.

In English

• Blackwell, Constance W. T., 1995, “The Case of HonoréFabri and the Historiography of Sixteenth and Seventeenth CenturyJesuit Aristotelianism in Protestant History of Philosophy: Sturm,Morhof and Brucker”,Nouvelles de la Republique desLettres, 1995(1): 49–78.
• –––, 1997, “Sturm, Morhof and Brucker vs.Aristotle: Three eclectic natural Philosophers view the AristotelianMethod”, inMethod and Order in Renaissance Philosophy ofNature. The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, Daniel A. Di Liscia,Eckhard Kessler, and Charlotte Methuen (eds.), Aldershot: AshgatePublishing Limited, pp. 381–407.
• Dennehy, Myriam, 2009, “Leibniz et Sturm, Lecteurs deBoyle,” in M. Dennehy and C. Raimond (eds.),La philosophienaturelle de Robert Boyle, Paris: Vrin, 331–359.
• Henkel, Christian, 2021, “Mechanism, Occasionalism, and FinalCauses in Johann Christoph Sturm’s Physics”,EarlyScience and Medicine, 26(4): 314–340.
• –––, 2022,Grounding the World. TheDissemniation of Occasionalism in Early Modern Germany, Ph.D.dissertation, University of Groningen.
• –––, 2024,Occasionalism and the Debateabout Causation in Early Modern Germany, New York and London:Routledge.
• Lemanski, Jens, 2018, “Logic Diagrams in the Weigel andWeise Circles”,History and Philosophy of Logic, 39(1):3–28. doi:10.1080/01445340.2017.1341074
• Sangiacomo, Andrea, 2019, “Sine Qua Non Causation:The Legacy of Malebranche’s Occasionalism in Kant’sNew Elucidation”, inOxford Studies in Early ModernPhilosophy, volume 9, Donald Rutherford (ed.), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, pp. 251–257.
• –––, 2020a, “Johann ChristophSturm‘s natural philosophy: passive forms, occasionalism andscientific explanations”,Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 58(3): 493–520.
• –––, 2020b, “Teleology and the evolutionof natural philosophy: the case of Johann Christoph Sturm and Petrusvan Musschenbroek”,Studia Leibnitiana, 50(1):41–56.
• –––, 2020c, “The Normalisation of NaturalPhilosophy: Occasional Causality and Coarse Grained Reality”,History of Universities, XXXIII(2): 201–236.

Other works cited

• Arthur, Richard T. W., 2014,Leibniz, Cambridge: PolityPress.
• Carraud, Vincent, 2002,Causa sive Ratio. La raison de lacause, de Suárez à Leibniz, Paris: Pressesuniversitaires de France.
• Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von, 1989,PhilosophicalEssays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber,Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.
• Schmitt, Charles B., 1983,Aristotle and the Renaissance,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Wundt, Max, 1938,Die deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17.Jahrhunderts, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

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