Consider the following claim: the truck drivers are engaged in a laborstrike in virtue of picketing. What sort of claim is this? Well, itseems clear what sort of claim it isn’t. It isn’t anidentity claim. For example, the property of striking isn’tidentical to the property of picketing, as there are different ways ofstriking, such as carefully following all safety regulations so as toimpede productivity. It isn’t a causal claim either, at least ifbycausation we mean what we normally mean when we use theterm. The causes of the strike concern not the picketing of thetruckers but, instead, antecedent events such as how their employerhas allotted payroll deductions and benefits. Finally, the claimisn’t purely modal in character either—it isn’tmerely the claim that there is a necessary connection betweenpicketing and striking. Perhaps this behavior together with thesatisfaction of other conditions suffices for there to be a laborstrike, but the former suffices for any number of things, such as thefact that \(2+2=4\).

What sort of claim is it, then? Some suggest that this and similarclaims aregrounding claims, where grounding is understood tobe a form of constitutive (as opposed to causal or probabilistic)determination or explanation. The point of departure for theorizingabout grounding is that there are a variety of claims—claims wemake in ordinary life as well as ones we make in the context of doingphilosophy—that are best interpreted as being claims about whatgrounds what. As for metaphysics in particular, some claim thatgrounding plays a central role in the enterprise properly conceived.Schaffer, for example, writes that “metaphysics as I understandit is about what grounds what” rather than what exists (2009:379). And, according to Fine, questions about what grounds what arecentral to what he callsrealist metaphysics, which concernsnot just the nature of things but whether they are real;“Indeed”, Fine writes, “if considerations of groundwere abolished, then very little of the subject would remain”(2012a: 41).

We begin by addressing some preliminary issues, including how best toformulate grounding claims. Then we address the following generalquestions: What is the nature of grounding? Why think that there isgrounding in the first place? And how does grounding interact withother notions of philosophical interest, such as necessity?

• 1. Preliminaries
  • 1.1 Determination and explanation
  • 1.2 Regimentation
  • 1.3 Full and partial grounding
  • 1.4 Illustrative cases
  • 1.5 Historical connections
• 2. The Nature of Grounding
  • 2.1 Objectivity and representation
  • 2.2 Hyperintensionality and non-monotonicity
  • 2.3 Strict ordering
  • 2.4 Well-foundedness
• 3. Why Think There is Grounding?
  • 3.1 Arguments from theoretical utility
  • 3.2 Skeptical responses
• 4. Interaction with Other Notions
  • 4.1 Necessity
  • 4.2 Essence
  • 4.3 Fundamentality
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Preliminaries

In this section we address five preliminary issues: the distinctionbetween determination- and explanation-based conceptions of grounding,the formulation of grounding claims, the distinction between full andpartial grounding, cases that are thought to illustrate the generalconcept of grounding, and historical discussions of grounding.

1.1 Determination and explanation

An important initial choice point in theorizing about groundingconcerns the theses ofunionism andseparatism(Raven 2015: 326). Proponents of unionism work with anexplanation-based conception of grounding, stipulating that groundingis a form of explanation, what we will callexplanation_G (Dasgupta 2017; Fine 2012a;Litland 2015; Rosen 2010). For unionists, to say that the bowl’sbrittleness is grounded in the ionic bonds of its constituent atomsis, in the first instance, to say that the bowl is brittle becausethese bonds are ionic, that it’s brittle in virtue of the ionicbonding, or that the brittleness is accounted for by the bonding.

Separatists, on the other hand, work with a determination-basedconception of grounding. The guiding idea here is an analogy betweencausation and grounding. Causation, while itself a form ofdetermination rather than explanation, nevertheless backsexplanations. So too separatists claim with grounding: grounding,rather than being a form of explanation, is a form ofdetermination—what we will calldetermination_G—that backsexplanations (Audi 2012a; Schaffer 2009, 2012, 2016a; Trogdon 2013a).For separatists, to say that the bowl’s brittleness is groundedin the ionic bonds of its constituent atoms is, in the first instance,to say that these bonds non-causally generate, produce, or bring aboutthe bowl’s brittleness. Just what the intuitive notion ofbacking ultimately comes to in the context of causation and groundingisn’t an entirely settled matter—some understand backingin terms of representation (Trogdon 2018a), while others suggest thatbacking itself is to be given a grounding-theoretic treatment (Kovacs2020; Wirling 2020). (The“explanation_G” and“determination_G” terminology isborrowed from Skiles and Trogdon (2021)).

Unionists, as we understand them, are committed to there beinginstances of a certain form of explanation and to providing an accountof what it’s like; they don’t have a correspondingcommitment regarding any form of determination. For separatists, thereverse is the case. Hence, unionism and separatism are importantlydifferent theses (cf. Dasgupta 2017: fn. 8; Kovacs 2020). And notethat, even if we agree that there is bothexplanation_G anddetermination_G, there still may be substantivereasons to go with one view rather than the other. For example, if,say, explanation_G is conceptually prior todetermination_G, then perhaps we should, all otherthings being equal, interpret grounding claims as targeting in thefirst instance the former rather than the latter. Compare: Strevens(2008: Ch. 6) claims that we ought to interpret causal claims (e.g.,“The stone striking the glass caused the window toshatter”) as targeting in the first instance causal explanationrather than causation understood as a form of determination, as theformer is conceptually prior to the latter.

1.2 Regimentation

To regiment grounding discourse is to adopt a formal language in whichwe can precisely formulate grounding claims. A regimentation includesvarious linguistic policies, including ones specifying which syntacticforms we should use to express grounding relationships. There are twogeneral approaches to regimentation. On the first approach,regimentation is chiefly pragmatic in nature. In this case, we mightregiment in one way rather than another merely because doing so will,say, make a certain complicated argument or idea easier to follow orunderstand. On the second approach, our choices concerningregimentation are guided by the goal of accurately describing thestructure of reality.

As for the regimentations themselves, two general frameworks haveemerged:predicationists formulate grounding claims with arelational predicate, one corresponding to the English predicategrounds (Audi 2012a; Schaffer 2009; Rosen 2010).Connectivists use a non-truth-functional sententialconnective instead, one corresponding to the English operatorbecause (Fine 2012a; Correia 2010; Schneider 2011). Fullblown connective regimentations will include a logic of grounding,which on Fine’s (2012a, 2012b) development includes structuralrules and properties (e.g., transitivity) and logical rules includingintroduction and elimination rules. (See Poggiolesi 2020 for a generaldiscussion of the logic of grounding.) Note that each of theseapproaches to regimentation is compatible with both separatism andunionism (Kovacs 2018: note 28). For further context, note that thereis corresponding discussion regarding the proper formulation oftruthmaking claims (Melia 2005).

Some claim that a potentially relevant consideration here concernsontological commitment (Correia 2010). All other things being equal,if one way of formulating grounding claims has fewer ontologicalcommitments than another, then the former is preferable to the latter.Suppose that the connectivist’s connective is understood to benon-committal, so as not to commit us to a grounding operation. Andsuppose that the predicationist’s predicate is understood tocommit us to a grounding relation between facts. In this case, it maybe that connectivism has an advantage over predicationism—thisdepends on whether there are countervailing considerations (e.g., theconnective treatment may be relatively cumbersome to work with). Butnote that the predicationist, of course, might claim that theirpredicate is non-committal (nominalists, for example, dispute thatrelational terms commit us to properties and relations), and perhapsthere are reasons to think that the connectivist’s connectivecommits us to a grounding operation. The moral is that we need toestablish which terms are committal before any claims of minimizingcommitment can be made. (Also, note that, with respect to thepotential commitments of predicationism, we may have differentattitudes about relations and facts—you might be happy tocountenance facts but not relations or vice versa.)

While we will introduce some symbols for expressing facts below, wewon’t adopt any particular formal language for expressinggrounding relationships, so we needn’t adopt eitherpredicationism or connectivism. For ease of presentation, however, wewill formulate grounding claims with the predicategroundsand speak as if this predicate expresses a relation—thegrounding relation—such that collections of one or more factsground particular facts. (See, however, Dasgupta 2014b and Litland2018a for bicollective conceptions of grounding according to whichcollections of facts can be non-distributivity grounded.) WhereP is an English sentence, let \([P]\) be a function fromP to the fact it corresponds to. So [Gomer is a good dog] isthe fact that Gomer is a good dog. (We will also indicate propositionsin the same manner using angle rather than square brackets.) We assumethat grounding is factive in the following sense: \([P],\) \([P'],\)… grounds \([Q]\) only if \([P],\) \([P'],\) … and\([Q]\) obtain. Much of what we go on to say can be captured withoutrecourse to relations and facts, but we won’t attempt to providesuch translations.

Before proceeding, we should note that some formulate grounding claimsin such a way that all manner of things potentially ground oneanother, not just facts (Cameron 2008; Schaffer 2009; Wilhelm 2020).The theses of separatism and unionism are relevant here (see§1.1). Given unionism (grounding is explanation_G), therestriction to facts seems quite reasonable. While it makes sense tosay, for example, that [The truck exists] explains something,it’s unclear what it might mean to say that the truck itselfdoes so (Raven 2015; Trogdon 2013a). But, given separatism (groundingis determination_G), the alternative view is agenuine option. We can coherently maintain that the truck determinesits particular redness (a mode), and this, in turn, backs anexplanation of the existence of the mode in terms of the existence ofthe truck.

Moreover, some treat grounding as a quaternary rather than binaryrelation. One such view is that the grounding relation includes twoslots for facts and two slots for modes of presentation of those facts(Jenkins 2011). Another such view is that grounding is contrastive innature, so it includes two slots for facts and two slots for contrastsof those facts (Schaffer 2012). Consider, again, the claim that [Thetruckers are picketing] grounds [The truckers are striking]. Dependingon the context, we might read the claim as follows: [The truckers arepicketing] rather than [They’re working as normal] grounds [Thetruckers are striking] rather than [It’s not the case thatthey’re striking]. Schaffer argues that his version of thequaternary view is preferable to the binary view insofar as we canreasonably maintain that grounding is transitive given the former butnot the latter (see§2.3 for further discussion of transitivity). Schaffer also suggests thatthe contrastive treatment of grounding is plausible insofar as itcasts grounding in an apt form to back explanation, which is itselfcontrastive in nature.

1.3 Full and partial grounding

There is a distinction between full and partial grounding. Suppose\([P],\) \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q]\). Speaking in unionistterms, for a preliminary characterization of the distinction we cansay that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … partially grounds \([Q]\) whenthe former facts contribute to explaining the latter; and \([P],\)\([P'],\) … fully grounds \([Q]\) when nothing needs to beadded to the former to get a fully adequate explanation of the latterfact. Separatists might instead initially characterize the distinctionin terms of partial and full determination.

Sticking with unionism for the moment, we can say that, as any groundcontributes to explaining what it grounds, any ground is a partialground. But not all partial grounds provide fully adequateexplanations of what they ground, so not all partial grounds are fullgrounds. A merely partial ground is a partial ground that isn’ta full ground. Bygrounding we henceforth mean partialgrounding. The example of the truckers picketing above illustrates thenotion of merely partial grounding—we would need to add factsabout the trucking company and relations between the picketers and thecompany (e.g., that the picketers work as drivers for the company) toget a fully adequate explanation of the fact that they’restriking. As for full grounding, a common view is that conjunctivefacts are fully grounded by their conjuncts—the collectionconsisting of [The bowl is brittle] and [The truckers are striking],for example, is thought to fully ground [The bowl is brittle and thetruckers are striking].

According to the standard definition of partial grounding, \([P],\)\([P'],\) … partially grounds \([Q]\) just in case \([P],\)\([P'],\) … either on its own or together with other factsfully grounds \([Q]\) (Audi 2012a; Litland 2015; Loss 2017; Raven2013; Rosen 2010; Skiles 2015). You might initially view thisdefinition as being a purely stipulative matter. But it’sactually substantive in nature, as we have a pre-theoretic grip onboth partial and full grounding. In fact, Leuenberger (2020) andTrogdon & Witmer (2021) argue that the standard definition isfalse, proposing cases in which mere partial grounds can’t besupplemented with further facts to yield full grounds. The latterrecommend reversing the direction of the standard definition,proposing a definition of full grounding in terms of partial groundingtogether with other notions.

1.4 Illustrative cases

So far, we have considered four grounding claims, namely:

• [The truckers are picketing] grounds [The truckers arestriking].
• [The truck exists] grounds [Thus-and-so particular rednessexists].
• [The bowl’s constituent atoms are bonded in thus-and-so way]grounds [The bowl is brittle].
• [The bowl is brittle], [The truckers are striking] grounds [Thebowl is brittle and the truckers are striking].

Now, you might think there is something to grounding, yet at the sametime, think that these claims aren’t true. As for the second andfourth examples above, perhaps there are no modes or conjunctivefacts. But these are illustrative cases—these claims, whethertrue or not, help communicate the relevant notion of grounding andthus contribute to fixing the topic of discussion. Let’s try toget a better sense of what the range of illustrative cases lookslike.

While there are perhaps different ways of usefully typing illustrativecases, here we focus on three categories. Importantly, this taxonomyisn’t intended to be exhaustive, and it may be that thesecategories aren’t exclusive either. First, there aremetaphysical cases, cases in which entities that \([P],\)\([P'],\) … concern are metaphysically linked with entities\([Q]\) concerns. Our initial example of the truckers picketing issuch a case. In this case, [The truckers are picketing] concerns theproperty of picketing, and [The truckers are striking] concernsthe property of striking. Plausibly, the property of striking is afunctional property (a property whose nature is exhausted by itscausal role), one functionally realized by the property of picketingon this occasion (as opposed to, say, the property of engaging in awork slowdown). The brittleness and mode examples look likemetaphysical cases as well, where mereological realization and modedetermination yoke the relevant entities in these cases, respectively.For other cases of this type, consider the following sentences, where"{Beijing}" refers to the set whose sole member is Beijing,and <The truck is red> refers to the proposition that the truckis red:

• [Beijing exists] grounds [{Beijing} exists].
• [The grains of sand exist] grounds [The heap of sand exists].
• [The truck is red] grounds [<The truck is red> istrue].

Plausibly, Beijing stands in the set formation relation to {Beijing},the grains of sand compose the heap, and the truck is a truthmaker for<The truck is red> (i.e., the former makes the latter true).

Second, there arelogical cases, grounding claims thatcorrespond to certain logical inference rules, particularlyintroduction rules (cf. McSweeney 2020 and Merlo 2020). Just whichintroduction rules are relevant here will depend, in part, uponwhether grounding is worldly in nature (see§2.1 for discussion). The conjunctive case concerning the bowl beingbrittle and the truckers striking above is such a case, which ofcourse corresponds to conjunction introduction. For other examples,consider the following two cases, which correspond to disjunction andexistential introduction, respectively:

• [The truck is red] grounds [The truck is red or the bowl isbrittle].
• [The truck is red] grounds [Something is red].

Third, there areconceptual cases, grounding claims thatcorrespond to certain conceptually necessary conditionals (cf.Smithson 2020). For example, you might think that it’sconceptually necessary that if the truck is burgundy then the truck isred. The corresponding grounding claim:

• [The truck is burgundy] grounds [The truck is red].

For further examples of this type, consider:

• [Trucks are essentially artifacts] grounds [It’s necessarythat any truck is an artifact].
• [The figure is a rectangle with sides of equal length] grounds[The figure is a square].

The thought is that it’s conceptually necessary that if trucksare essentially artifacts, then it’s necessary that any truck isan artifact; and it’s conceptually necessary that if the figureis a rectangle with sides of equal length, then the figure is asquare.

As mentioned above, these categories are aren’t intended to beexclusive or exhaustive. With respective to exclusivity, the exampleof the burgundy truck above is perhaps both conceptual andmetaphysical, as burgundy and red stand in thedeterminate-determinable relation, a relation that plausiblyunderwrites metaphysical links between properties.

So far, we’ve focused on specific grounding claims (i.e., claimsto the effect that this collection of facts grounds that fact), butvarious generic grounding claims are illustrative cases as well. Thereare illustrative generic grounding claims corresponding to thespecific grounding claims discussed above, such as:

• Facts concerning the instantiation of determinate propertiesground facts concerning the instantiation of determinableproperties.

Here’s another example, one not connected to any specificgrounding claim we have discussed so far:

• Chemical facts ground biological facts.

This last example speaks to the idea that grounding relations betweendifferent kinds of facts are that in virtue of which the world has alayered structure (see§3.2 for related discussion).

1.5 Historical connections

There are interesting and difficult questions about grounding, itshistory, and what its relationship to the history of philosophy is. Onone view, the notion of grounding is old, perhaps as old as philosophyitself, with many of its most important thinkers engaging withquestions related to grounding. On another view, the notion ofgrounding is decidedly new—it’s a recent development incontemporary analytic metaphysics.

Can we reconcile the grounding-is-old and grounding-is-new views? Thedistinction between questionsof grounding and questionsabout grounding is helpful here (Raven 2019). To take but onewell-worn example, when Socrates asks in theEuthyphro ifsomeone is pious because they are loved by the gods, or if they areloved by the gods because they are pious, perhaps Plato is directingour attention to a question of grounding. When in the contemporaryliterature, philosophers are debating about whether grounding is, say,a strict order (see§2.3), this is the result of their asking questions about grounding.Historically, so the thinking goes, philosophers have been interestedin questions of grounding, whereas the contemporary literature hasbeen primarily focused on questions about grounding. There is a sense,then, in which the notion of grounding is as old as the hills, withthe more recent focus in the literature being directed at the notionitself.

Although this characterization is appealing, it has its limitations.Clearly, contemporary philosophers are interested in questions ofgrounding in addition to questions about grounding. What might be lessclear, however, is that, on the face it, the historical literature isby no means short of attempts at engaging with questions aboutgrounding in addition to questions of grounding. Consider, forexample, cosmological arguments. In broad strokes, the thought is thatthe totality of contingent entities, the cosmos, stands in need ofexplanation, and only considerations involving God understood as anecessary existent are up to the task. Central to such arguments is anassumption according to which we can’t explain why there arecontingent entities by appealing to the existence of a contingententity. Debate has raged for centuries over how exactly we ought tounderstand this assumption and whether or not we ought to believe it.Importantly, this assumption is generally understood as a kind of nocircularity assumption. In debating whether the assumption is correct,historical figures are, albeit indirectly, debating whether or not therelation at issue can have reflexive instances. The same goes fordiscussions around God’s nature as a self-causer. If therelation at issue is that of grounding, then the history of philosophyis rich in discussions about grounding.

Ultimately, however, it seems that the “Is grounding old ornew?” question should give way to nuanced and text-baseddiscussions of structural similarities and causal continuities betweenspecific thinkers. As this entry will make clear, contemporary figuresdon’t fully agree on the concept of grounding. Hence, it seemsthat there is little to be gained by asking whether thus-and-sohistorical figures used the same notion as the contemporary figures,as the contemporary figures aren’t using the same notionthemselves! Beyond tracing out similarities and differences in contentof various notions employed by historical figures and paths ofhistorical development, the question of whether grounding is old ornew will apparently always be a crude generalization over thesesimilarities and continuities. And note that there is nothing specialabout grounding in this regard—the same could be said forvirtually any philosophically interesting concept, such as causationor necessity. (For discussions of historical connections to theancient period, see, e.g., Corkum 2016 and 2020, Evans 2012, andMalink 2020; for the early and late modern periods, see, e.g., Amijee2020, Bliss 2019, Casati 2018, Mulligan 2020, Pearce 2017, Roski 2017,2020, and Stang 2019.)

2. The Nature of Grounding

There are a variety of issues to address related to the nature ofgrounding. In this section we focus on objectivity, representation,hyperintensionality, non-monotonicity, whether grounding is a strictorder, and whether grounding is well-founded. There are otherinteresting issues concerning the nature of grounding that wedon’t have the space to discuss here. One such issue is that ofmeta-ground, viz. what if anything grounds the facts aboutwhat grounds what (see Litland 2020 for an overview).

2.1 Objectivity and representation

What are the central features of grounding? Grounding theoristsroutinely claim that grounding is fully objective. But, given thatobjectivity and related notions are used in a variety of ways inphilosophy, it comes as no surprise that there are different ways ofunderstanding precisely what is being claimed here. On one approach,the issue chiefly concerns the regimentation of grounding discourse.If grounding claims are to be formulated with a parameter for factsconcerning human mental activity, then grounding isn’t fullyobjective (Dasgupta 2017). On a more “metaphysical”approach, the issue instead chiefly concerns the essence or nature ofgrounding, specifically whether grounding is essentially connected tosubjects. Suppose, for example, that part of what it is to begrounding is that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q]\) only ifcertain epistemic conditions obtain (e.g., actual subjects are in aposition to understand certain propositions concerning \([P],\)\([P'],\) … and \([Q]\)). In this case, grounding isn’tobjective.

What might speak in favor of objectivism about grounding? Perhaps ourconsidered views about causation should guide our theorizing aboutgrounding (cf. Bernstein 2015). Schaffer (2016a) conceives ofgrounding as being broadly analogous to causation and proposes toextend the familiar structural equation models for causation togrounding. And A. Wilson (2018) argues that grounding is indeed a typeof causation, proposing an interventionist account of grounding. So,provided that it’s a bad idea to outfit causal claims with aparameter for facts concerning human mental activity, this is probablya bad idea for grounding claims as well (cf. Bernstein 2018).Subjectivism (the claim that, while some facts ground other facts,grounding isn’t fully objective), however, isn’t beyondthe pale. One potential route to subjectivism is this: endorseunionism (grounding is explanation_G) and arguethat explanation_G is by its nature subjectinvolving (Maurin 2019; Thompson 2018).

Roughly speaking, therepresentational approach to groundinghas it that grounding is intimately tied to representation (Fine2012a; Rosen 2010), while theworldly approach denies this(Audi 2012b; Schaffer 2012). While the representational/worldlydistinction is somewhat hazy, we understand it to be orthogonal to theobjective/subjective distinction. One way to sharpen the distinctionbetween the representational and worldly approaches is as follows: onthe former, the relata of grounding have concepts among theirconstituents; on the latter, this isn’t the case (Krämer& Roski 2015; Correia 2017). So understood, the representationalapproach comes in two varieties: either facts are composed entirely ofconcepts or they’re a mixture of concepts andnon-representational items like objects and properties. On the formerview, facts are akin to Fregean propositions; on the latter view,they’re instead akin to ordered sets of concepts andnon-representational items. (See Correia 2010 for a discussion of thedistinction between the representational and worldly approaches whereit isn’t assumed that grounding is a relation.)

What hinges on whether grounding is representational or worldly? Thisisn’t entirely clear. You might think that grounding beingworldly ensures that the relata of grounding are relativelycoarse-grained, and grounding being representational ensures that therelata of grounding are relatively fine-grained. Consider thefollowing two facts: [The liquid is H₂O] and [The liquid iswater]. Representationalists, so the thinking goes, might claim thatwe have distinct facts here, as they have different concepts asconstituents. And proponents of the worldly approach might claim thatwe have only one fact here, as there is no difference in constituentsor manner of combination. And this, of course, is potentially relevantto theorizing about grounding—if [The liquid is H₂O]and [The liquid is water] are the same fact, then the claim that theformer grounds the latter or vice versa is false provided thatgrounding is irreflexive (see§2.3). Note, however, that representationalists can coherently maintain thatfacts are relatively coarse-grained—perhaps they think that,while facts are Fregean propositions, concepts are relativelycoarse-grained (Correia 2020). And proponents of the worldly approachcan coherently maintain that facts are relativelyfine-grained—perhaps they think that, while facts are trueRussellian propositions (ordered sets of non-representational itemsincluding properties), properties are relatively fine-grained (Dorsey2015).

You might also think that if grounding is worldly then unionism isfalse. The idea is that, if grounding is worldly, then groundingcan’t be a type of explanation, as explanation itself isrepresentational. There are, however, conceptions of explanationrelative to which explanation is non-representational, and a worldlyunionist is free to appeal to explanation so conceived (Skiles andTrogdon 2021).

2.2 Hyperintensionality and non-monotonicity

Grounding theorists also routinely claim that grounding ishyperintensional (Bader 2013; Leuenberger 2014; Schaffer 2009). Thisissue concerns what linguistic distinctions grounding is sensitive to.It will be helpful to begin by considering the hyperintensionality ofbelief. Consider the following belief attribution:

• Amy believes that Mark Twain was a humorist.

Note that, were we to replace

• Mark Twain was a humorist

as it appears in this belief attribution with a necessarilyco-extensional expression such as

• Samuel Clemens was a humorist

the resulting belief attribution may have a different truth-value thanthe original one. This is the sense in which belief is thought to behyperintensional.

We can understand the claim that grounding is hyperintensional in asimilar way. Consider again the following grounding claim:

• [Beijing exists] grounds [{Beijing} exists].

Were we to replace

• [Beijing exists]

as it appears in this grounding claim with a necessarilyco-extensional expression such as

• [{Beijing} exists]

the resulting grounding claim may have a different truth-value thanthe original one. In this case, it seems that the two grounding claimsdo in fact differ in truth-value—while the original groundingclaim is true, the resulting one is presumably false. (See Duncan,Miller, & Norton 2017 for discussion of the relationship betweengrounding and various senses of hyperintensionality.)

Grounding theorists also normally claim that grounding isnon-monotonic (Audi 2012a; Guigon 2018; Rosen 2010). Logicalentailment is monotonic in the following sense: if one sentencelogically entails another, then the first sentence together with anyother sentence logically entails the second. Returning to grounding,suppose that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q]\). And supposethat \([R],\) \([R'],\) … obtain. Grounding is non-monotonicjust in case these suppositions are compatible with it not being thecase that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … together with \([R],\) \([R'],\)… grounds \([Q]\). To take an example, consider again[Beijing exists] grounds [{Beijing}exists]. Rather than replacing [Beijing exists] inthis sentence with something else as we did above, let’s addsome other nominalized true sentence to it such as [Gomer is agood dog]. The resulting sentence (i.e., [Beijingexists], [Gomer is a good dog] grounds[{Beijing}exists]) is clearly false, while ouroriginal grounding claim (we’re supposing, anyway) is true.

2.3 Strict ordering

Some claim that grounding is a strict order—it’stransitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric (Correia 2010; Fine 2012a;Raven 2013). One way to argue that grounding has some or all of thesefeatures is to embrace separatism (grounding isdetermination_G) and argue thatdetermination_G or determination in general hassome or all of them (Audi 2012a). Another option is to embraceunionism (grounding is explanation_G), focusing onthe features of explanation_G or explanation ingeneral (Raven 2015). Another way, still, is to argue that, giveneither separatism or unionism, grounding plays the theoretical rolesnormally assigned to it only if it has some or all of these features(Kovacs 2018). These strategies can be used to argue that groundinghas further properties as well. For example, Litland (2013) and Raven(2015) claim that explanation in general is non-monotonic, so, givenunionism, grounding is as well; and Audi (2012a) claims thatdetermination in general is non-monotonic, so, given separatism,grounding is as well.

While the view that grounding is a strict-order is the prevailingview, what reasons might there be to think otherwise? (As Bliss &Priest [2018b] note, there are various possible combinations of formalproperties that we may wish to ultimately consider.) Let’s beginwith transitivity. Consider the following case, adapted from one thatSchaffer (2012) proposes. Suppose that the following claims are true,whereg is a metal globe:

(1)

[g is dented in thus-and-so way] grounds [g hasdeterminate shapeS].

(2)

[g has determinate shapeS] grounds [gis more-or-less spherical].

If grounding is transitive, then the following is true as well:

(3)

[g is dented in thus-and-so way] grounds [g ismore-or-less spherical].

You might think, however, that(3) is false—as Schaffer puts the idea, “The thing ismore-or-less sphericaldespite the minor dent, not because ofit” (2012: 127). Note that(1) concerns merely partial grounding, while(2) concerns full grounding. But, as any merely partial ground is apartial ground, and any full ground is a partial ground, we can read(1)–(3) as targeting partial grounding, so there is noequivocation here.

How might proponents of transitivity respond? Litland (2013) proposesthat we can add a fact to the merely partial ground for [ghas determinate shapeS] to get a full ground:

(4)

[g is dented in thus-and-so way], [g elsewherehas determinate shape \(S'\)] fully grounds [g hasdeterminate shapeS].

Given that(2) also concerns full grounding, the transitive inference from(4) and(2) is the following:

(5)

[g is dented in thus-and-so way], [g elsewherehas determinate shape \(S'\)] fully grounds [g ismore-or-less spherical].

Litland claims that(5) is plausible, or at least as plausible as(1) and(2). And, provided that any collection of facts that is a full ground issuch that any fact among that collection is a partial ground,(3) follows from(5). (See Raven 2015 for a similar treatment of this case; see alsoRodriguez-Pereyra 2015 and Tahko 2013 for potential counterexamples totransitivity involving truth.)

Turning to irreflexivity, Bliss (2018) critically assesses the generaltheoretical motivations for thinking that grounding is irreflexive.Lowe (1998: 145) suggests that self-explanatory states of affairs areepistemically possible, so perhaps a characterization of groundingshouldn’t rule this out. Historically, certain influentialthinkers have thought that the fact that God exists, for example, is aself-explanatory state of affairs. Fine (2010) and Krämer (2013)also discuss various cases that seem to involve violations ofirreflexivity. Here is a case along the lines of those theydiscuss—consider the following fact: [Some fact or otherobtains]. Some facts do indeed obtain, so of course [Some fact orother obtains] itself obtains. And it seems that any fact that obtainsis something that grounds this fact. Since [Some fact or otherobtains] is itself a fact that obtains, it follows that this factgrounds itself!

In response to cases like this, Woods (2018) distinguishes betweenwhat he callsvacuous andnon-vacuous grounding.Woods suggests that cases like [Some fact or other obtains] involvevacuous grounding, and, while vacuous grounding isn’tirreflexive, non-vacuous grounding is. Roughly speaking, \([P],\)\([P'],\) … vacuously grounds \([Q]\) when the former groundsthe latter, yet the identity and nature of the constituents of\([P],\) \([P'],\) … aren’t explanatorily relevant to\([Q]\) obtaining. Perhaps [The truck is red] is a vacuous ground for[Some fact or other obtains]—while the former grounds thelatter, it seems that the identity and nature of the truck and theproperty of being red don’t contribute to explaining why [Somefact or other] obtains.

Turning to asymmetry, Bliss (2014) and Thompson (2016, 2018)critically assess the general theoretical motivations for thinkingthat grounding is asymmetric and propose potential counterexamples.Thompson suggests that, given the functional relationship betweenmass, volume, and density (the density of a substance is its massdivided its volume), we should accept that, say, [g has3cm³ volume] grounds [g has 2g/cm³density] and vice versa. It’s worth noting, however, that manyreciprocal functional relationships don’t involve symmetricgrounding. As Alexander Skiles has suggested to us in conversation,there is, for example, a reciprocal functional relationship betweenhow many things are Socrates and how many members Socrates’singleton has, but it’s clear in which direction the groundingruns in this case.

2.4 Well-foundedness

Another issue is whether grounding iswell-founded. Differentauthors mean different things in claiming that grounding iswell-founded. According to Schaffer, grounding is well-founded in thesense that downwardly non-terminating chains of grounds areimpossible. In conceiving of grounding as a relation between entitiesin general and not just facts, Schaffer’s rationale concerns thenotion ofreality inheritance. Schaffer claims that, werethere downwardly non-terminating grounding chains, the being of anyobject in such a chain would be “infinitely deferred, neverachieved” (2010: 62). Something “…cannot be realmerely by having a limitless sequence of ancestors, each claimingreality from its parents”; instead, “There must actuallybe a source of reality somewhere” (2016a: 95). This echoesLeibniz, who claims that in the event that every object is a being ofaggregation, “one never arrives at any real being” (Adams1994: 333).

Others claim that grounding is well-founded in the sense that anygrounded fact is ultimately grounded by ungrounded facts (Dixon 2016;Rabin & Rabern 2016). Note that this conception of thewell-foundedness of grounding, in contrast to the one above, allowsfor infinitely descending grounding chains. How so? Following Bliss(2013) and Rabin and Rabern (2016), consider Euclidean space, which iscomprised of points and regions that include those points. Supposethat regions are gunky in that every region has a region as a properpart. And suppose that the existence facts concerning regions aregrounded by the existence facts concerning their sub-regions, theexistence facts concerning sub-regions are grounded by the existencefacts concerning their sub-sub-regions, and so on,adinfinitum. Hence, the fact that regionR exists is amember of an infinitely descending grounding chain. But suppose thatthe existence facts concerning regions are also grounded by theexistence facts concerning points. Suppose, moreover, that theexistence facts concerning points lack grounds. Hence, while the factthatR exists is a member of an infinitely descendinggrounding chain, this fact nonetheless is grounded in facts thatthemselves lack grounds. The same applies to all the other facts thatare links in the grounding chain in question.

It may be that, if considerations involving reality inheritance arerelevant here, they ultimately support the idea that grounding iswell-founded in the second sense rather than the first. While theremay be something wrong about reality inheritance in the absence of asource of reality, perhaps there is nothing wrong about endlessreality inheritanceper se. (See Puryear 2020 for discussionof the historical context of reality inheritance and Trogdon 2018b forfurther discussion of reality inheritance in the contemporarycontext.)

3. Why Think There is Grounding?

3.1 Arguments from theoretical utility

That grounding figures in ordinary and philosophical thinking (andperhaps other domains as well) and that many grounding claims arefairly easy to evaluate (e.g., [Beijing exists] grounds[{Beijing}exists]) gives us defeasible reason tothink that there is grounding (deRosset 2020). What else can be saidon behalf of grounding? Proponents of grounding tend to think thatit’s a justified posit on the basis of its theoretical utility.In this section we set out three theoretical utility arguments forgrounding that involve unity, explanation, and the direction ofpriority.

Theunity argument says that grounding is a justified positbecause of its unifying role (Audi 2012a; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009).On one way of casting the argument, it has three premises. First,there is substantial unity among the metaphysical relations (relationsfamiliar from metaphysics such as functional realization and setformation that resist analysis in purely modal terms). Second, wherethere is substantial unity, plausibly there is a unifier, somethingthat explains why the relations in question resemble one another inthe manner they do. Third, if there is a unifier for the metaphysicalrelations, the best candidate is grounding.

Theexplanation argument says that grounding is a justifiedposit because of its explanatory role (Audi 2012a; Dasgupta 2014a;Fine 2012a; Litland 2017; Schaffer 2016a). Recalling the distinctionbetween unionism and separatism (see§1.1), the argument proceeds differently depending on which view is in play(Kovacs 2017). Given separatism (grounding isdetermination_G), one way to cast the explanationargument is as follows: there is a form of explanation—what wecan callontic explanation—such that explanations ofthis form are backed by worldly relations; and, among the onticexplanations are ones such that the best candidate for the relationthat plays the backing role is determination_G.Given unionism (grounding is explanation_G), oneway to cast the argument is as follows: there is a form ofexplanation, what we can callmetaphysical explanation, suchthat the connections in metaphysical explanations are best expressedin terms of explanation_G.

Thepriority argument says that grounding is a justifiedposit because of its direction-fixing role—it fixes thedirection of priority between facts, where one fact is prior toanother only if the former is more fundamental than the latter. (See§4.3 for further discussion of fundamentality; J. Wilson (2014) initiallyproposes the priority argument but rejects it—more on thisbelow.) Let apriority case be one in which some fact isprior to another and entities these facts concern are yoked bymetaphysical relations. One way to cast the priority argument is asfollows: there are priority cases in which the direction ofmetaphysical relations doesn’t determine which fact is prior tothe other; and the best candidate for that which fixes the directionof priority in such cases is grounding.

We can cast arguments for grounding in terms of theoretical roles inaddition to those specified by the unity, explanation, and priorityarguments as well. Some, for example, claim that the thesis ofphysicalism (roughly, the view that the world is ultimatelyphysical in nature) is usefully formulated in terms of grounding(Block 2015; Dasgupta 2014a; Schaffer 2017b). With respect tophysicalismabout the mentalin particular (roughly, the viewthat mental phenomena are nothing over and above physical phenomena),a simple grounding-theoretic formulation of the view is this: themental facts are grounded by (non-mental) physical facts (perhapstogether with other non-mental facts such as indexical and totalityfacts). It’s by now a familiar idea that purely modalformulations of physicalism are inadequate, as there are coherentversions of dualism that such formulations don’t rule out(Horgan 1993, 2006). Hence, one point in favor of appealing togrounding in this context is that grounding isn’t a purely modalnotion. And Block (2015) argues that even physicalism formulated interms of a priori entailment faces the same problem, pointing to aparticular grounding formulation of physicalism as the way to resolvethe issue.

As for further potential theoretical applications, some have proposedgrounding-theoretic accounts of:

• the nature of properties (Audi 2016; Carmichael 2016);
• the distinction betweenintrinsic andextrinsicproperties—roughly, properties that something has just in virtueof how that thing is (e.g., being made of tin) vs. propertiessomething has because of how it's related to wholly distinctthings (e.g., being next to a tin cup) (Rosen 2010; Witmer et al2005);
• what it is for an object (e.g., Socrates) in contrast to a word(e.g., ‘Socrates’) to have a definition (Rosen 2015);
• what it is for one claim to reduce to another (Fine 2001)
• what it is for the world to be stratified into levels (Rabin 2018;Schaffer 2012);
• how moral facts (e.g., facts about what we’re morallyobligated to do) are related to natural facts (e.g., facts concerningwhat maximizes utility) (Rosen 2017);
• the special explanatory gap between the experiential and physicaltruths (Rabin 2019; Trogdon forthcoming);
• what it is for the existence of certain entities to depend on theexistence of others (Schnieder 2020);
• what it is for truths to be such that things in the world makethem true (Correia 2014; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005; Schnieder 2006);
• what it is for one theory to be more parsimonious than another(Schaffer 2013);
• the nature of free will and moral responsibility (Sartorio2013);
• what it is for something (e.g., gender) to be a socialconstruction (Griffith 2018; Schaffer 2017a);
• the historically important view that everything has an explanation(Amijee 2020a; Dasgupta 2016; K. McDaniel 2019; Schnieder &Steinberg 2015);
• how multiple objects can exist at the same place and time (Saenz2015);
• the view that only present things exist (Baron 2014);
• the relation between beingF (e.g., being blue)and having the propertyF-ness (e.g., havingblueness) (Dixon 2018);
• how mental events (e.g., pain) can cause physical events (e.g.,wincing) given that such physical events have physical causes (e.g.,C-fiber firing) (Clark & Wildman 2018; Kroedel & Schulz 2016);Stenwall 2021; Tiehen 2015).

This is by no means an exhaustive list—there is something of acottage industry of developing grounding-theoretic accounts of itemsof philosophical interest.

3.2 Skeptical responses

Some are skeptical of grounding. A distinction can be drawn betweenwhat we might callfirst-wave andsecond-wavegrounding skepticism (see Koslicki 2020, though she uses differentterminology). First-wave skepticism is characterized by a generalconcern about the intelligibility of the notion. Daly (2012) arguesthat the notion of grounding doesn’t really make sense. In asimilar spirit, Hofweber (2009) states that grounding theorists areguilty of engaging in a problematic form of metaphysics—whilethey make use of perfectly ordinary terms such aspriority,fundamental andultimately, they use them in adistinctively non-ordinary, metaphysical way. (For non-skepticalrejoinders to first-wave skepticism, see Audi 2012b and Raven 2012.)Second-wave skeptics, by contrast, generally grant that the notion ofgrounding is coherent, but they think that it doesn’t belong inour theoretical toolkit in any case, as the arguments in favor ofpositing grounding aren’t persuasive. What unites second-waveskeptics is a shared sense that grounding theorizing is simultaneouslyundermotivated and overreaching.

With respect to the unity argument, Koslicki (2015) and J. Wilson(2016a) challenge the second premise, arguing that, even if themetaphysical relations (or some sub-collection thereof) aresubstantially unified, this on its own wouldn’t give us a goodreason to posit a generic relation of grounding as a unifier. J.Wilson (2014) challenges the first premise as well, arguing that thereis a class of metaphysical relations, what she calls thesmall-g grounding relations, that are neitherterminologically, formally, nor metaphysically unified. Relatedly,Turner (2016) describes various differences in the way certain kindsof grounding claims behave, ultimately distinguishing between twoforms of grounding,dependence-grounding andrealization-grounding. (For non-skeptical rejoinders to thesechallenges, see Raven 2017, and Schaffer 2016b.)

Roughly speaking,monists claim that there is ultimately justone core type of grounding, whilepluralists claim that thereare different types and no core type. It’s important to notethat being a pluralist about grounding doesn’t necessarily makeyou a grounding skeptic, at least given how we understand the usage ofthe terms. It’s true that some pluralists, as we’ve justseen, are skeptics. But not all of them are. For example, Fine(2012a), a proponent of grounding if anyone is, stresses thedifferences between various forms of grounding, rejecting the ideathat they are unified in a way that might motivate positing a geneticform of grounding. Just what might make it fitting to call onepluralist view a version of skepticism about grounding and anotherpluralist view non-skeptical instead is perhaps worth further thought.(For further discussion of monism and pluralism about grounding, seeBerker 2018, Cohen 2020, Griffith 2014, Litland 2018b, Rettler 2017,and Richardson 2020 and 2021.)

As for the explanation argument, Kovacs (2017) objects to both theseparatist and unionist versions set out above. For example, Kovacsargues that, with respect to the former version of the argument,worldly relations such as necessitation taken together with factsabout their relata, rather than determination_G,back ontic explanations. Relatedly, Miller and Norton (2017) proposean explanation of why you might judge, say, that {Beijing} existsbecause Beijing exists that doesn’t appeal to grounding. AndNorton and Miller (2019) propose an account of the truth conditionsfor statements of such explanations that doesn’t appeal togrounding.

Returning to the priority argument, there are two types of prioritycases to consider: cases in which the prior fact is fundamental, andcases in which neither the prior nor posterior facts are fundamental.J. Wilson (2014, 2016a) develops a proposal according to which aprimitive notion of fundamentality plays the direction-fixing role inpriority cases of the first type. And this primitive notion and othergrounding-free considerations (e.g., modal considerations) play thedirection-fixing role in cases of the second type. (For non-skepticalrejoinders, see Cameron 2016 and Raven 2017.)

What about additional theoretical applications of grounding? Returningto the application to physicalism discussed above, J. Wilson (2014)points out that, as there are importantly different approaches togrounding (ones disagreeing about, e.g., how grounding interacts withreduction, necessitation, and real definition—see§4), the bald grounding claim that the physical grounds the mentaldoesn’t on its own speak to even very basic characteristics ofthe mental-physical interface. A natural response, however, is tosimply work in this context with an approach to grounding that isfleshed out to a degree that such issues aren’t left open(deRosset 2020; cf. J. Wilson 2016a). Still, questions about thetheoretical utility of grounding-theoretic formulations of physicalismremain, including whether the nothing-over-and-above notion central toinitial characterizations of physicalism is best captured in terms ofgrounding (Melnyk 2016; J. Wilson 2016b).

To take another example, Sider (2011: Ch. 8; 2020) questions whethergrounding is apt to play the role of a level connector. Intuitively,the world has an overarching structure where entities occupy differentlevels of reality. One way to formulate the view that grounding is alevel connector is this: different levels of reality are connected toone another by virtue of grounding relations between factscharacterizing occupants of these levels. With this in mind, considerthe fundamental physical level and a higher level, one occupied bycities. The grounding theorist might claim that these levels areconnected partly in virtue of the fact that some quantum-mechanicalfact,Q, grounds the fact,N, that New York is acity. But Sider asks: what is the grounding profile of this groundingfact? On the face of it, [Q groundsN] itself isungrounded. Roughly speaking, the worry is this: provided that anyentity that an ungrounded fact concerns is fundamental in nature, itfollows that New York is a fundamental entity. Hence, it may be thatin using grounding to explain how different levels of reality areconnected, we get unacceptable results about which entities arefundamental. (See§4.3 for more on fundamentality; for an overview of views according towhich facts like [Q groundsN] are grounded, seeLitland 2020.)

For a different skeptical take on grounding related to its theoreticalapplications, Della Rocca (2014) and Tallant (2018: Ch. 5) argue, veryroughly, that various metaphysical claims (e.g., material objectspersist over time and truths have truthmakers) are false, as theseclaims are ultimately about what grounds what but there is nogrounding.

4. Interaction with Other Notions

In this section we focus on how grounding might be related to thenotions of necessity, essence, and fundamentality. There areinteresting issues concerning the relationship between grounding andother phenomena that we don’t have the space to discuss here. Inaddition to the examples listed at the beginning of this entry (e.g.,real definition and truthmaking), one such issue concerns the relationbetween grounding anddegrees of reality. Indeed, K. McDaniel(2017: Ch. 8) sketches an account of the former in terms of thelatter.

4.1 Necessity

How do grounding and necessity interact? Let \([P],\) \([P'],\)… (metaphysically) necessitate \([Q]\) just in case any(metaphysically) possible world in which the former obtains is a worldin which the latter obtains. The broad consensus is that necessityisn’t sufficient for grounding—it’s not the casethat if \([P],\) \([P'],\) … necessitate \([Q]\), then theformer ground the latter. (B. McDaniel 2019, however, argues that arestricted form of necessitation is sufficient—as well asnecessary—for grounding.) Consider a necessary fact such as[\(2+3=5\)]. While this fact might have grounds, facts about, say,German Expressivist art aren’t among them; yet the latternecessitate the former. Also, there are cases in which the directionof necessitation and grounding come apart. Plausibly, [{Beijing}exists] necessitates [Beijing exists], yet presumably the latergrounds the former rather than the other way around.

There are, however, two other issues about the relationship betweengrounding and necessity that are less of a settled matter. The firstis whether it’s necessary that (full) grounds necessitate whatthey ground—according tonecessitarianism,necessitation is necessary for grounding. The second is whethergrounding is an internal relation in the following sense: it’snecessary that if \([P],\) \([P'],\) … (fully) grounds \([Q]\),then any metaphysically possible world in which \([P],\) \([P'],\)… and \([Q]\) obtain is a world in which the former (fully)grounds the latter. According tointernalism, grounding isinternal in this sense. Internalism entails necessarianism but notvice versa. Due to limitations of space, we focus on necessitarianismin what follows. (See Bennett 2011, Litland 2015, Carnino 2017, andLovett 2019 for discussion of internalism.)

Following Skiles 2020, there are at least three ways to go aboutmotivating necessitarianism. One appeals to essences: every instanceof grounding is mediated by essential truths that characterize thegrounds and what they ground or entities these facts concern (see§4.2); these essential truths are themselves necessary; and grounds togetherwith these essential truths suffice for what they ground (Audi 2012a;O’Conaill 2017; Trogdon 2013b). Another appeals to explanation:it’s necessary that grounds explain what they ground in adistinctive way; and, for any explanation of this type, its explananssuffices for its explanandum (deRosset 2010). And another appeals tolaws: every instance of grounding is subsumed by a metaphysical law;the metaphysical laws are themselves necessary; and grounds togetherwith the relevant metaphysical laws suffice for what they ground(Wilsch 2015).

What might a counterexample to necessitarianism look like? FollowingSkiles (2015), suppose that the following accidental generalizationobtains:

(1)

[AllFs areGs].

And suppose that exactlyn things areF; let them be\(a_1\), \(a_2,\) … \(a_n\). While

(2)

\([a_1\) isG, \(a_2\) isG, … \(a_n\) isG]

clearly doesn’t necessitate(1), Skiles proposes that the latter fully grounds the former. Groundingnecessitarians might reply that here we have mere partialgrounding—to get a full ground for(1), to(2) we would need to add

(3)

[The onlyF things are \(a_1\), \(a_2,\ldots\)\(a_n\)].

Skiles considers this reply, noting that(3) is itself an accidental generalization, one that presumably has fullgrounds. Hence, this fact too stands in need a necessitating groundprovided that necessitarianism is true. What then fully grounds(3)? A natural proposal is that

(4)

\(a_1\) isF, \(a_2\) isF, … and \(a_n\)isF.

(5)

\(a_{n+1}\) is notF, \(a_{n+2}\) is notF,… and \(a_{n+m}\) is notF.

(6)

For anyx, \(x = a_1\) or \(x = a_2\), or… \(x = a_{n+m}\).

does so. And note that these facts together necessitate(3). But what is the grounding profile of(6)? Intuitively,

(7)

\(a_1\) exists, \(a_2\) exists, …. and \(a_{n+m}\)exists

grounds(6). You might claim that(7) is a non-necessitating full ground of(6). But one option for necessitarians is to argue that(7) is instead a special sort of merely partial ground, one thatcan’t be augmented with further facts to yield a full ground.This is how Trogdon and Witmer (2021) treat this case and, as aconsequence, reject the standard definition of partial grounding (see§1.3). (See Chudnoff 2016; Ch. 6 and Leuenberger 2014 for discussion ofother potential counterexamples to necessitarianism).

4.2 Essence

How do grounding and essence interact? On the relevant notion ofessence, essence isn’t a purely modal matter—while allessential truths about some item (truths that characterize what it isto be that item) are necessary, not all necessary truths about someitem are essential truths about it (Fine 1994). For example, anythingthat is identical to Beijing is a city, and this is a candidateessential truth about Beijing. But, while it’s necessary thatBeijing exists only if {Beijing} exists, this isn’t a candidateessential truth about the city (though it’s a candidateessential truth about {Beijing}). Intuitively, you can know everythingthere is to know about what it is to be Beijing and not thereby knowanything about sets.

We begin with an essence-to-grounding principle, one specifying apotential entailment from truths about essence to truths about whatgrounds what. According to Rosen (2010), for anyx, ifit’s essential tox thatP, then [It’sessential tox thatP] grounds \([P]\) (see alsoDasgupta 2016 and Kment 2014: Ch. 6). Rosen points out that thisprinciple, if true, may clarify the grounding profile of certainuniversal facts. For example, perhaps [It’s essential totriangularity that all triangles have three sides] grounds [Alltriangles have three sides]. (See Glazier 2017 and Zylstra 2019b forcritical discussion.)

Turning to grounding-to-essence principles, some, such as Correia(2013), O’Conaill (2018), and Trogdon (2013b), focus in thiscontext on putative essential truths that themselves don’tdirectly concern grounding (e.g., part of what it is to be theproperty of being maroon is that, for anyx, ifx ismaroon, thenx is red). Others, such as Audi (2012a), focuson corresponding essential truths that encode information about whatgrounds what (e.g., part of what it is to be the property of beingmaroon is that, for anyx, ifx is maroon, then[x is maroon] grounds [x is red]). Let’s focuson putative essential truths of the former, grounding-free variety,where these truths are understood to characterize facts rather thanentities they concern.

You might think that, if \([P]\), \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q],\)then part of what it is to \([Q]\) is that if \([P],\) \([P'],\)… obtains then \([Q]\) obtains. As Fine (2012a) notes, however,there are potential counterexamples. While [Socrates is a philosopher]grounds [Someone is a philosopher], on the face of it no essentialtruth about the latter encodes information about Socrates inparticular. One possibility is to weaken the proposal so that theessential truths may characterize either \([P],\) \([P'],\) …or \([Q]\). (A further consideration is whether we should understandthis principle as allowing for the relevant essential truths to beirreducibly collective.) Fine (2012a) takes a different route,claiming that, whenever some facts ground another fact, there will besome true generalization of this grounding connection that

1. doesn’t mention the grounds;
2. suffices, together with the grounds, for the grounded; and
3. is an essential truth about the grounded.

With respect to the case just mentioned, Fine proposes that this isthe relevant generalization: for anyx, ifx is aphilosopher, then [x is a philosopher] grounds [Someone is aphilosopher]. Fine notes that this principle, if true, suggests atop-down approach to establishing what grounds what, one where webegin with those facts we take to be grounded and then work our waydown to their grounds.

As Rosen notes (2010), however, these principles rule out so-calledMoorean connections, grounding connections that aren’t mediatedby essential truths. If, say, non-reductive physicalism about themental is best formulated in terms of Moorean connections as Rosensuggests, then the above grounding-to-essence principle has theundesirable result of ruling out what is arguably the dominant viewconcerning the metaphysics of mind.

While we don’t have the space to explore these proposals here,some have proposed not just essence-to-grounding orgrounding-to-essence principles but full-blown accounts of essence interms of grounding or vice versa. deRosset (2013) and Gorman (2014)propose accounts of essence in terms of grounding. (See Zylstra 2018for critical discussion.) Correia (2013) and Zylstra (2019a) insteadpropose accounts of grounding in terms of essence. Finally, some haveproposed accounts of both essence and grounding in terms of some thirditem—Fine (2015) does so in terms of constitutively necessaryand sufficient conditions, and Correia and Skiles (2019) in terms ofgeneralized identity. (See Zylstra 2020 for critical discussion ofeach of the above accounts.)

4.3 Fundamentality

How are grounding and fundamentality related? Here we focus onfundamentality with respect to facts, as opposed to, say, entity ortheory fundamentality. There are two general types of fundamentality,relative and absolute. As for relative fundamentality, the generalidea is that some facts are more fundamental than others. A simplegrounding-theoretic account of relative fundamentality is this: foreach fact among \([P],\) \([P'],\) … to be more fundamentalthan \([Q]\) is for \([P],\) \([P'],\) … to ground \([Q]\).Turning to absolute fundamentality, the idea is that some facts arefundamentalfull stop. On one familiar conception of absolutefundamentality, to be absolutely fundamental is to enjoy a distinctiveform ofindependence (Bennett 2017: Ch. 5). One way for afact to be independent is for it not to be grounded by other facts.This suggests a simple grounding-theoretic account of absolutefundamentality: to be absolutely fundamental it to be ungrounded(Schaffer 2009).

You might think that the above account of relative fundamentalityfails to identify a necessary condition, especially if you assumethat, for any two facts, one of them is more fundamental than theother or they’re equally fundamental. For example, perhaps[There are hydrogen atoms in Phoenix] is more fundamental than [Thereare H₂O molecules in Ithaca] even though the formerdoesn’t ground the latter (Bennett 2017: Ch. 6). (For moresophisticated characterizations of relative fundamentality that appealto grounding, see Bennett 2017: Ch. 6 and Werner 2021.)

Returning to absolute fundamentality, you might worry that the aboveaccount leaves out an important dimension, specifically the fact thatthe absolutely fundamental facts arecomplete in the sensethat, since they are the basic building blocks of reality, to describethem is in some sense to provide a description of everything (Tahko2018). Note that absolute fundamentality conceived of as involvingboth independence and completeness seems to capture the notion of anunexplained explainer—the absolutely fundamental facts areindependent and therefore unexplained, and these facts are completeand therefore explain (Bennett 2017: Ch. 5). Looking to the history ofphilosophy, we see that fundamental entities are regularly invoked asa means of meeting certain kinds of explanatory demands, demands thatperhaps only independent entities could meet. This is typicallyevidenced by the arguments from vicious infinite regress that arecommonly wielded in defense of them. It’s because we need toexplain, for example, why there are any contingent things whatsoeverthat God must exist and, importantly, if God weren’t theterminus point of our regress—because independent—then theproblem that God was invoked to solve wouldn’t be solved afterall.

With this in mind, we might revise the simple account of absolutefundamentality above as follows: to be fundamental is to be a memberof some collection of facts,F, such that

1. each fact amongF is both ungrounded and grounds somefact; and
2. facts amongF ground all the grounded facts.

We might wish to add further conditions ensuring thatF isminimal (there is no proper sub-collection ofF thatgrounds all the grounded facts) andF isunique—F is the only collection that satisfiesthese conditions. Another option is to interpret completeness (orunique minimal completeness) as being characteristic but notdefinitional of absolute fundamentality (Bennett 2017: Ch. 5).(Whether definitional or not, the grounding role that absolutelyfundamental facts play potentially makes the cost of positing suchfacts worth paying—see Bliss 2019 for discussion.) Still anotheroption for the grounding theorist is to be a pluralist about notionsof absolute fundamentality, characterizing independence, completeness,and perhaps further notions as well such asineliminability,granting that they might (in special cases) pull apart. (See Raven2016 for discussion of ineliminability in this context.)

Bibliography

• Adams, Robert Merrihew, 1994,Leibniz: Determinist, Theist,Idealist, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Aizawa, Kenneth and Carl Gillett (eds.), 2016,ScientificComposition and Metaphysical Ground, London: Palgrave MacmillanUK. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6
• Amijee, Fatema, 2020, “Principle of SufficientReason”, in Raven 2020: 63–75.
• –––, 2021, “Explaining ContingentFacts”,Philosophical Studies, 178(4): 1163–1181.doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01487-y
• Audi, Paul, 2012a, “Grounding: Toward a Theory of theIn-Virtue-Of Relation”,Journal of Philosophy,109(12): 685–711. doi:10.5840/jphil20121091232
• –––, 2012b, “A Clarification and Defenseof the Notion of Grounding”, in Correia and Schnieder 2012:101–121. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139149136.004
• –––, 2016, “Property Identity”,Philosophy Compass, 11(12): 829–840.doi:10.1111/phc3.12380
• Bader, Ralf M., 2013, “Towards a Hyperintensional Theory ofIntrinsicality”,Journal of Philosophy, 110(10):525–563. doi:10.5840/jphil2013110109
• Baron, Sam, 2015, “The Priority of the Now”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(3): 325–348.doi:10.1111/papq.12030
• Beebee, Helen and Julian Dodd, 2005,Truthmakers: TheContemporary Debate, Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001
• Bennett, Karen, 2011, “By Our Bootstraps”,Philosophical Perspectives, 25: 27–41.doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2011.00207.x
• –––, 2017,Making Things Up, Oxford:Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780199682683.001.0001
• Berker, Selim, 2018, “The Unity of Grounding”,Mind, 127(507): 729–777. doi:10.1093/mind/fzw069
• Bernstein, Sara, 2016, “Grounding Is Not Causation”,Philosophical Perspectives, 30(1): 21–38.doi:10.1111/phpe.12074
• –––, 2018, “Causal Idealism”, inIdealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, Tyron Goldschmidt andKenneth L. Pearce (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,217–230.
• Bliss, Ricki Leigh, 2013, “Viciousness and the Structure ofReality”,Philosophical Studies, 166(2): 399–418.doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0043-0
• –––, 2014, “Viciousness and Circles ofGround”,Metaphilosophy, 45(2): 245–256.doi:10.1111/meta.12072
• –––, 2018, “Grounding andIrreflexivity”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a: 70–90.
• –––, 2019, “What Work theFundamental?”,Erkenntnis, 84(2): 359–379.doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9962-7
• Bliss, Ricki and Graham Priest (eds.), 2018a,Reality and ItsStructure: Essays in Fundamentality, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755630.001.0001
• –––, 2018b, “The Geography ofFundamentality”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a: 1–33.
• Block, Ned, 2015, “The Canberra Plan Neglects Ground”,inQualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes fromthe Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates,and David Sosa (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,105–133. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139939539.006
• Bohn, Einar Duenger, 2019, “Panpsychism, The CombinationProblem, and Plural Collective Properties”,AustralasianJournal of Philosophy, 97(2): 383–394.doi:10.1080/00048402.2018.1483410
• Cameron, Ross P., 2008, “Turtles All the Way down: Regress,Priority and Fundamentality”,The PhilosophicalQuarterly, 54(230): 1–14.doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x
• –––, 2016, “Do We Need Grounding?”,Inquiry, 59(4): 382–397.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2015.1128848
• Carmichael, Chad, 2016, “Deep Platonism”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92(2):307–328. doi:10.1111/phpr.12190
• Carnino, Pablo, 2017, “Grounding Is NotSuperinternal”,Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 6(1):24–32. doi:10.1002/tht3.227
• Casati, Filippo, 2018, “Heidegger’sGrund:(Para-)Foundationalism”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a:291–312.
• Chalmers, David, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds), 2009,Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Chudnoff, Elijah, 2016,Intuition, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Clark, Michael J. and Nathan Wildman, 2018, “Grounding,Mental Causation, and Overdetermination”,Synthese,195(8): 3723–3733. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1402-3
• Cohen, Shlomit Wygoda, 2020, “Not All Partial Grounds PartlyGround: Some Useful Distinctions in the Theory of Grounding”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100(1):75–92. doi:10.1111/phpr.12524
• Corkum, Phil, 2016, “Ontological Dependence and Grounding inAristotle”,Oxford Handbooks Online, June 2016.doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.31
• –––, 2020, “Ancient”, in Raven 2020:20–32.
• Correia, Fabrice, 2010, “Grounding andTruth-Functions”,Logique et Analyse, 53(211):251–279.
• –––, 2013, “Metaphysical Grounds andEssence”, in Hoeltje et al. 2013: 271–296.
• –––, 2014, “From Grounding toTruth-Making: Some Thoughts”, inMind, Values, andMetaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, Volume1, Anne Reboul (ed.), Cham: Springer International Publishing,85–98. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04199-5_6
• –––, 2017, “Real Definitions”,Philosophical Issues, 27: 52–73.doi:10.1111/phis.12091
• –––, 2020, “Granularity”, in Raven2020: 228–243.
• Correia, Fabrice and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), 2012,Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure ofReality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139149136
• Correia, Fabrice and Alexander Skiles, 2019, “Grounding,Essence, and Identity”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 98(3): 642–670. doi:10.1111/phpr.12468
• Daly, Chris, 2012, “Scepticism about Grounding”, inCorreia and Schnieder 2012: 81–100.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139149136.003
• Dasgupta, Shamik, 2014a, “The Possibility ofPhysicalism”,Journal of Philosophy, 111(9):557–592. doi:10.5840/jphil20141119/1037
• –––, 2014b, “On the Plurality ofGrounds”,Philosophers’ Imprint, 14: art. 20. [Dasgupta 2014 available online]
• –––, 2016, “MetaphysicalRationalism”,Noûs, 50(2): 379–418.doi:10.1111/nous.12082
• –––, 2017, “ConstitutiveExplanation”,Philosophical Issues, 27: 74–97.doi:10.1111/phis.12102
• Della Rocca, Michael, 2014, “Razing Structures to theGround”,Analytic Philosophy, 55(3): 276–294.doi:10.1111/phib.12048
• deRosset, Louis, 2010, “Getting Priority Straight”,Philosophical Studies, 149(1): 73–97.doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9538-8
• –––, 2013, “Grounding Explanations”,Philosophers’ Imprint, 13: art. 7. [deRosset 2010 available online]
• –––, 2020, “Anti-SkepticalRejoinders”, in Raven 2020: 180–193.
• Dixon, T. Scott, 2016, “What Is the Well-Foundedness ofGrounding?”,Mind, 125(498): 439–468.doi:10.1093/mind/fzv112
• –––, 2018, “Upward Grounding”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(1): 48–78.doi:10.1111/phpr.12366
• Dorsey, Jonathan Eric, 2015, “On the Grounding-ReductionLink”,American Philosophical Quarterly, 53(4):411–422.
• Duncan, Michael, Kristie Miller, and James Norton, 2017, “IsGrounding a Hyperintensional Phenomenon?”,AnalyticPhilosophy, 58(4): 297–329. doi:10.1111/phib.12105
• Evans, Matthew, 2012, “Lessons fromEuthyphro10A–11B”,Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume42, Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press,1–38. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644384.003.0001
• Fine, Kit, 1994, “Essence and Modality: The SecondPhilosophical Perspectives Lecture”,PhilosophicalPerspectives, 8: 1–16. doi:10.2307/2214160
• –––, 2001, “The Question ofRealism”,Philosophers’ Imprint, 1: art. 2. [Find 2001 available online]
• –––, 2010, “Some Puzzles of Ground”,Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51(1): 97–118.doi:10.1215/00294527-2010-007
• –––, 2012a, “Guide to Ground”, inCorreia and Schnieder 2012: 37–80.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139149136.002
• –––, 2012b, “The Pure Logic ofGround”,The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5(1):1–25. doi:10.1017/S1755020311000086
• –––, 2015, “Unified Foundations forEssence and Ground”,Journal of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, 1(2): 296–311. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.26
• Glazier, Martin, 2017, “Essentialist Explanation”,Philosophical Studies, 174(11): 2871–2889.doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0815-z
• Goff, Philip, 2017,Consciousness and FundamentalReality, New York: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001
• Gorman, Michael 2014, “Essentiality asFoundationality”, inNeo-Aristotelian Perspectives inMetaphysics, Daniel D. Novotny and LukášNovák, New York: Routledge, 119–137.
• Griffith, Aaron M., 2014, “Truthmaking and Grounding”,Inquiry, 57(2): 196–215.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2013.855655
• –––, 2018, “Social Construction andGrounding”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,97(2): 393–409. doi:10.1111/phpr.12376
• Guigon, Ghislain, 2018, “Truthsqua Grounds”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(1):99–125. doi:10.1111/phpr.12372
• Hoeltje, Miguel, Benjamin Schnieder, and Alex Steinberg (eds.),2013,Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding,Supervenience, Response-Dependence, (Basic PhilosophicalConcepts), Munich: Philosophia.
• Hofweber, Thomas, 2009, “Ambitious, Yet Modest,Metaphysics”, in Chalmers et al. 2009: 260–289.
• Horgan, Terence, 1993, “From Supervenience toSuperdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World”,Mind, 102(408): 555–586.doi:10.1093/mind/102.408.555
• –––, 2006, “Materialism: Matters ofDefinition, Defense, and Deconstruction”,PhilosophicalStudies, 131(1): 157–183.doi:10.1007/s11098-005-5987-x
• Horvath, Joachim, 2018, “Philosophical Analysis: The ConceptGrounding View”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 97(3): 724–750. doi:10.1111/phpr.12378
• Jenkins, C.S., 2011, “Is Metaphysical DependenceIrreflexive?”,Monist, 94(2): 267–276.doi:10.5840/monist201194213
• Kment, Boris, 2014,Modality and Explanatory Reasoning,Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604685.001.0001
• Koslicki, Kathrin, 2015, “The Coarse-Grainedness ofGrounding”, inOxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 9,Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 306–344.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198729242.003.0011
• –––, 2020, “Skeptical Doubts”, inRaven 2020: 164–179.
• Kovacs, David Mark, 2017, “Grounding and the Argument fromExplanatoriness”,Philosophical Studies, 174(12):2927–2952. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0818-9
• –––, 2018, “What Is Wrong withSelf-Grounding?”,Erkenntnis, 83(6): 1157–1180.doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9934-y
• –––, 2020, “Four Questions of IteratedGrounding”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,101(2): 341–364. doi:10.1111/phpr.12591
• Krämer, Stephan, 2013, “A Simpler Puzzle ofGround”,Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(2):85–89. doi:10.1002/tht3.77
• Krämer, Stephan and Stefan Roski, 2015, “A Note on theLogic of Worldly Ground”,Thought: A Journal ofPhilosophy, 4(1): 59–68. doi:10.1002/tht3.158
• Kroedel, Thomas and Moritz Schulz, 2016, “Grounding MentalCausation”,Synthese, 193(6): 1909–1923.doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0820-3
• Leuenberger, Stephan, 2014, “Grounding and Necessity”,Inquiry, 57(2): 151–174.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2013.855654
• –––, 2020, “The Fundamental: Ungrounded orAll-Grounding?”,Philosophical Studies, 177(9):2647–2669. doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01332-x
• Liggins, David, 2016, “Grounding and the IndispensabilityArgument”,Synthese, 193(2): 531–548.doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0478-2
• Litland, Jon Erling, 2013, “On Some Counterexamples to theTransitivity of Grounding”,Essays in Philosophy,14(1): 19–32. doi:10.7710/1526-0569.1453
• –––, 2015, “Grounding, Explanation, andthe Limit of Internality”,Philosophical Review,124(4): 481–532. doi:10.1215/00318108-3147011
• –––, 2017, “Grounding Ground”, inOxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 10, Karen Bennett andDean W. Zimmerman (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press,279–316. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198791973.003.0012
• –––, 2018a. “Bicollective Ground: Towardsa (Hyper)graphic Account”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a:140–164.
• –––, 2018b, “In Defense of the (Moderate)Disunity of Grounding”,Thought: A Journal ofPhilosophy, 7(2): 97–108. doi:10.1002/tht3.273
• –––, 2020, “Meta-Ground”, in Raven2020: 133–147.
• Loss, Roberto, 2017, “Grounding, Contingency andTransitivity”,Ratio, 30(1): 1–14.doi:10.1111/rati.12109
• Lovett, Adam, 2019, “A Simple Proof of GroundingInternality”,Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 8(3):154–166. doi:10.1002/tht3.416
• Lowe, E. J., 1998,The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance,Identity, and Time, Oxford: Clarendon Press.doi:10.1093/0199244995.001.0001
• Malink, Marko, 2020, “Aristotelian Demonstration”, inRaven 2020: 33–48.
• Maurin, Anna-Sofia, 2019, “Grounding and MetaphysicalExplanation: It’s Complicated”,PhilosophicalStudies, 176(6): 1573–1594.doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1080-0
• McDaniel, Brannon, 2019, “Grounding as MinimalNecessitation”,Inquiry, first online: 25 August 2019.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658632
• McDaniel, Kris, 2017,The Fragmentation of Being, Oxford:Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198719656.001.0001
• –––, 2019, “The Principle of SufficientReason and Necessitarianism”,Analysis, 79(2):230–236. doi:10.1093/analys/any071
• McSweeney, Michaela M., 2020, “Debunking Logical Ground:Distinguishing Metaphysics from Semantics”,Journal of theAmerican Philosophical Association, 6(2): 156–170.doi:10.1017/apa.2019.40
• Melia, Joseph, 2005, “Truthmaking WithoutTruthmakers”, in Beebee and Dodd 2005: 67–84.
• Melnyk, Andrew, 2016, “Grounding and the Formulation ofPhysicalism”, in Aizawa and Gillett 2016: 249–269.
• Merlo, Giovani, 2020, “Disjunction and the Logic ofGrounding”,Erkenntnis, first online: 14 February 2020.doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00208-0
• Miller, Kristie and James Norton, 2017, “Grounding:It’s (Probably) All in the Head”,PhilosophicalStudies, 174(12): 3059–3081.doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0846-5
• Mulligan, Kevin, 2020, “Austro-GermanPhenomenologists”, in Raven 2020: 90–102.
• Ney, Alyssa, 2016, “Grounding in the Philosophy of Mind: ADefense”, in Aizawa and Gillett 2016: 271–300.
• Norton, James and Kristie Miller, 2019, “A PsychologisticTheory of Metaphysical Explanation”,Synthese, 196(7):2777–2802. doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1566-x
• O’Conaill, Donnchadh, 2018, “Grounding, Physicalismand Necessity”,Inquiry, 61(7): 713–730.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1385524
• Pearce, Kenneth L., 2017, “Foundational Grounding and theArgument from Contingency”,Oxford Studies in Philosophy ofReligion, Volume 8, Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 245–268.
• Poggiolesi, Francesca, 2020, “Logics”, in Raven 2020:213–227.
• Puryear, Stephen, 2020, “The Logic of Leibniz’sBorrowed Reality Argument”,The PhilosophicalQuarterly, 70(279): 350–370. doi:10.1093/pq/pqz056
• Rabin, Gabriel Oak, 2018, “Grounding Orthodoxy and theLayered Conception”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a:37–49.
• –––, 2019, “Grounding the Gaps or Bumpingthe Rug?”,Journal of Consciousness Studies,26(5–6): 191–203.
• Rabin, Gabriel Oak and Brian Rabern, 2016, “Well FoundingGrounding Grounding”,Journal of Philosophical Logic,45(4): 349–379. doi:10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4
• Raven, Michael J., 2012, “In Defence of Ground”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90(4): 687–701.doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.616900
• –––, 2013, “Is Ground a Strict PartialOrder?”,American Philosophical Quarterly, 50(2):191–199.
• –––, 2015, “Ground”,PhilosophyCompass, 10(5): 322–333. doi:10.1111/phc3.12220
• –––, 2016, “Fundamentality withoutFoundations”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,93(3): 607–626. doi:10.1111/phpr.12200
• –––, 2017, “New Work for a Theory ofGround”,Inquiry, 60(6): 625–655.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251333
• –––, 2019, “(Re)Discovering Ground”,inThe Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015,Kelly Becker and Iain D. Thomson (eds.), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 147–159. doi:10.1017/9781316779651.014
• ––– (ed.), 2020,The Routledge Handbook ofMetaphysical Grounding, New York: Routledge.doi:10.4324/9781351258845
• Rettler, Bradley, 2017, “Grounds and‘Grounds’”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy,47(5): 631–655. doi:10.1080/00455091.2017.1282306
• Richardson, Kevin, 2020, “Grounding Pluralism: Why andHow”,Erkenntnis, 85(6): 1399–1415.doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0083-8
• –––, 2021, “Grounding Is Necessary andContingent”,Inquiry, 64(4): 453–480.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2019.1612777
• Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo, 2005, “Why Truthmakers?”,in Beebee and Dodd 2005: 17–31.
• –––, 2015, “Grounding Is Not a StrictOrder”,Journal of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, 1(3): 517–534. doi:10.1017/apa.2014.22
• Rosen, Gideon, 2010, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding andReduction”, inModality: Metaphysics, Logic, andEpistemology, Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds), Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 109–136.
• –––, 2015, “Real Definition”,Analytic Philosophy, 56(3): 189–209.doi:10.1111/phib.12067
• –––, 2017, “Metaphysical Relations inMetaethics”, inThe Routledge Handbook of Metaethics,Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett (eds), New York: Routledge, pp.151–169.
• Roski, Stefan, 2017,Bolzano’s Conception ofGrounding. Frankfurt: Klostermann Verlag.
• –––, 2020, “Bolzano”, in Raven 2020:76–89.
• Saenz, Noël B., 2015, “A Grounding Solution to theGrounding Problem”,Philosophical Studies, 172(8):2193–2214. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0405-x
• Sartorio, Carolina, 2013, “Making a Difference in aDeterministic World”,Philosophical Review, 122(2):189–214. doi:10.1215/00318108-1963707
• Schaffer, Jonathan, 2009, “On What Grounds What”, inChalmers et al. 2009: 347–383.
• –––, 2010, “Monism: The Priority of theWhole”,Philosophical Review, 119(1): 31–76.doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025
• –––, 2012, “Grounding, Transitivity, andContrastivity”, in Correia and Schnieder 2012: 122–138.doi:10.1017/CBO9781139149136.005
• –––, 2015, “What Not to Multiply WithoutNecessity”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4):644–664. doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.992447
• –––, 2016a, “Grounding in the Image ofCausation”,Philosophical Studies, 173(1):49–100. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1
• –––, 2016b, “Ground Rules: Lessons fromWilson”, in Aizawa and Gillett 2016: 143–170.
• –––, 2017a, “Social Construction asGrounding; or: Fundamentality for Feminists, a Reply to Barnes andMikkola”,Philosophical Studies, 174(10):2449–2465. doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0738-8
• –––, 2017b, “The Ground Between theGaps”,Philosophers’ Imprint, 17: art. 11. [Schaffer 2017b available online]
• Schnieder, Benjamin, 2006, “Truth-Making withoutTruth-Makers”,Synthese, 152(1): 21–46.doi:10.1007/s11229-004-7905-8
• –––, 2011, “A Logic for‘Because’”,The Review of Symbolic Logic,4(3): 445–465. doi:10.1017/S1755020311000104
• –––, 2020, “Grounding andDependence”,Synthese, 197(1): 95–124.doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1378-z
• Schnieder, Benjamin and Alex Steinberg, 2016, “WithoutReason?”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(4):523–541. doi:10.1111/papq.12065
• Sider, Theodore, 2011,Writing the Book of the World,Oxford: Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001
• –––, 2020, “Ground Grounded”,Philosophical Studies, 177(3): 747–767.doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1204-6
• Skiles, Alexander, 2015, “Against GroundingNecessitarianism”,Erkenntnis, 80(4): 717–751.doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9669-y
• –––, 2020, “Necessity”, in Raven2020: 148–163.
• Skiles, Alexander and Kelly Trogdon, 2021, “ShouldExplanation Be a Guide to Ground?”,PhilosophicalStudies, 178: 4083–4098.doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01637-w
• Smithson, Robert, 2020, “Metaphysical and ConceptualGrounding”,Erkenntnis, 85(6): 1501–1525.doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0088-3
• Stang, Nicholas F., 2019, “A Guide to Ground in Kant’sLectures on Metaphysics”, inKant’s “Lectures onMetaphysics”: A Critical Guide, Courtney D. Fugate (ed.),Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 74–101.doi:10.1017/9781316819142.005
• Stenwall, Robin, 2021, “A Grounding Physicalist Solution tothe Causal Exclusion Problem”,Synthese, 198:11775–11795. First online: 14 August 2020.doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02829-3
• Strevens, Michael, 2008,Depth: An Account of ScientificExplanation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Tahko, Tuomas E., 2013, “Truth-Grounding andTransitivity”,Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4):332–340. doi:10.1002/tht3.94
• –––, 2018, “Fundamentality and OntologicalMinimality”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a: 237–253.
• Tallant, Jonathan, 2018,Truth and World: An ExplanationistTheory, New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315143491
• Thompson, Naomi, 2016, “Metaphysical Interdependence”,inReality Making, Mark Jago (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 38–56. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755722.003.0003
• –––, 2018, “Irrealism aboutGrounding”,Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement,82: 23–44. doi:10.1017/S1358246118000206
• Tiehen, Justin, 2015, “Explaining Causal Closure”,Philosophical Studies, 172(9): 2405–2425.doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0418-5
• Trogdon, Kelly, 2013a, “An Introduction to Grounding”,in Hoeltje et al. 2013: 97–122.
• –––, 2013b, “Grounding: Necessary orContingent?”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94(4):465–485. doi:10.1111/papq.12009
• –––, 2018a, “Grounding-MechanicalExplanation”,Philosophical Studies, 175(6):1289–1309. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0911-8
• –––, 2018b, “Inheritance Arguments forFundamentality”, in Bliss and Priest 2018a: 182–198.
• –––, forthcoming, “The Abductive Dimensionto Explanatory Transparency”, inGrounding andConsciousness, Gabriel Oak Rabin (ed.), Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Trogdon, Kelly and D. Gene Witmer, 2021, “Full and PartialGrounding”,Journal of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, 7(2): 252–271. doi:10.1017/apa.2020.26
• Turner, Jason, 2016, “Curbing Enthusiasm AboutGrounding”,Philosophical Perspectives, 30:366–396. doi:10.1111/phpe.12087
• Werner, Jonas, 2021, “A Grounding-Based Measure of RelativeFundamentality”,Synthese, 198: 9721–9737. Firstonline: 27 May 2020. doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02676-2
• Wilhelm, Isaac, 2020, “An Argument for EntityGrounding”,Analysis, 80(3): 500–507.doi:10.1093/analys/anz065
• Wilsch, Tobias, 2015, “The Nomological Account ofGround”,Philosophical Studies, 172(12):3293–3312. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0470-9
• Wilson, Alastair, 2018, “Metaphysical Causation”,Noûs, 52(4): 723–751. doi:10.1111/nous.12190
• Wilson, Jessica M., 2014, “No Work for a Theory ofGrounding”,Inquiry, 57(5–6): 535–579.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2014.907542
• –––, 2016a, “The Unity and PriorityArguments for Grounding”, in Aizawa and Gillett 2016:171–204.
• –––, 2018, “Grounding-Based Formulationsof Physicalism”,Topoi, 37(3): 495–512.doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9435-7
• Wirling, Ylwa Sjölin, 2020, “Is BackingGrounding?”,Ratio, 33(3): 129–137.doi:10.1111/rati.12279
• Witmer, D. Gene, William Butchard, and Kelly Trogdon, 2005,“Intrinsicality without Naturalness”,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 70(2): 326–350.doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00530.x
• Woods, Jack, 2018, “Emptying a Paradox of Ground”,Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(4): 631–648.doi:10.1007/s10992-017-9442-1
• Zylstra, Justin, 2018, “Essence with Ground”,Analytic Philosophy, 59(2): 193–207.doi:10.1111/phib.12130
• –––, 2019a, “The Essence ofGrounding”,Synthese, 196(12): 5137–5152.doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1701-3
• –––, 2019b, “Making Semantics forEssence”,Inquiry, 62(8): 859–876.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2019.1570865
• –––, 2020, “Essence”, in Raven 2020:324–335.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

[Please contact the authors with suggestions.]

Related Entries

causation: the metaphysics of |cosmological argument |dependence, ontological |essential vs. accidental properties |facts |infinite regress arguments |metaphysics |monism |physicalism |principle of sufficient reason |propositions |states of affairs |substance |supervenience |truthmakers

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for detailed andhelpful comments.