Movatterモバイル変換

1. This example is borrowed from Howard 2022.

2. Moreover, assuming that different kinds of normative relations are tobe individuated according to the grounds of facts involving thoserelations (Leary 2020), an object-focused view would entail, e.g.,that the fittingness of admiration is a different kind of normativerelation than the fittingness of love, insofar as facts involving eachare ultimately grounded in different kinds of evaluative fact. Thus,object-focused views would need to posit not only a plurality ofdifferent kinds of fundamental evaluative facts, but also a pluralityof different kinds of fittingness (or reasons), each corresponding tothe specific kind of evaluative fact in terms of which they explainfacts involving the relation in question. Object-focused views in thisway disunify the normative relation(s) they purport to explain.

3. Moore’s view may be more complex than this. In particular, heseems to hold that what’s valuable is never a response itself,but rather a whole (an organic unity) consisting of something beingresponded to in a requisite way, e.g., a whole consisting of somethingvaluable being valued. For ease of exposition, I talk of the value ofresponses, as opposed to that of wholes, but the reader may substituteaccordingly if they wish. In any case, it’s possible to be aresponse-focused primitivist without being a Moorean in this regard.Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.

4. Not all competing explanations of the relevant normative-evaluativeconnections are canvassed here; see, e.g., Rowland 2022.

5. The discussion to follow draws from the discussion of the same issuesin Howard 2019.

6. For further criticisms of the alethic view, see esp. Naar 2021.

7. Whether fittingness is a deontic normative relation is controversial;see, e.g., Berker 2022, which argues that fittingness is neitherdeontic nor evaluative but rather belongs to a third, distinctivefamily of normative categories—the fittingness categories.

8. That being said, certain proposed solutions to the problem, e.g.,that in Elliott 2017, may work better for reasons-based FA theoriesthan for fit-based ones (or vice versa). Thanks to Jonathan Way forthis point.

9. For a novel approach to the partiality problem proposed in work thatwas published as the present entry was being finalized, see McHugh andWay 2022a, 2022b.