Experimental philosophy is an interdisciplinary approach that bringstogether ideas from what had previously been regarded as distinctfields. Specifically, research in experimental philosophy bringstogether two key elements:

1. the kinds of questions and theoretical frameworks traditionallyassociated with philosophy;
2. the kinds of experimental methods traditionally associated withpsychology and cognitive science.

Though experimental philosophy is united by this broad approach, thereis a diverse range of projects in experimental philosophy. Some useexperimental evidence to support a “negative program”that challenges more traditional methods in analytic philosophy,others use experimental data to support positive claims abouttraditional questions, and still others explore questions about howpeople ordinarily think and feel insofar as these questions areimportant in themselves.

This entry provides a brief introduction to the core aims ofcontemporary experimental philosophy. It then reviews recentexperimental work on the negative program, free will, moral judgmentand epistemology. We conclude with a discussion of major objections tothe field of experimental philosophy as a whole.

• 1. Overview
• 2. Research in Experimental Philosophy
  • 2.1 The Negative Program
    • 2.1.1 The argument from diversity
    • 2.1.2 The argument from sensitivity
  • 2.2 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
  • 2.3 Impact of Moral Judgment
  • 2.4 Epistemology
  • 2.5 Other Topics
• 3. Challenges to Experimental Philosophy
  • 3.1 Disputing the Role of Intuitions in Philosophy
    • 3.1.1 Philosophers don’t rely on intuitions
    • 3.1.2 Philosophers shouldn’t rely on intuitions
  • 3.2 Defending Privileged Intuitions Rather Than Those of Ordinary Experimental Participants
  • 3.3 But is it Philosophy?
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Overview

Experimental philosophy is a relatively new approach, usuallyunderstood as beginning only in the early years of the 21st century.At the heart of this new approach is the idea of pursuingphilosophical questions using methods more typically associated withthe social sciences.

Within the broad banner of experimental philosophy research, one findswork using an enormous variety of methods and aims (see, e.g.,Schwitzgebel & Rust 2014; Meskin et al. 2013; Bartels &Urminsky 2011). Nonetheless, most research in experimental philosophymakes use of a collection of closely connected methods that in someway involve the study of intuitions. The remainder of this sectionaims to characterize the different projects experimental philosophershave pursued using these methods and their relevance for broaderquestions in philosophy.

The practice of exploring intuitions has its origins in a moretraditional philosophical approach that long predates the birth ofexperimental philosophy (see the entry onintuition). Research within this more traditional approach often relies on theidea that we can make progress on one or another topic by looking atintuitions about that topic. For example, within epistemology, it hasbeen suggested that we can make progress on questions about the natureof knowledge by looking at intuitions about whether certain statescount as knowledge. Similarly, within moral philosophy, it has beensuggested that we can make progress on questions about moralobligation by looking at intuitions about what actions certain agentsare obligated to perform. Similar approaches have been advocated innumerous other areas of philosophy.

There is a complex literature within the analytic tradition about howto understand this traditional method. Some argue that the study ofintuitions gives us insight into concepts (Jackson 1998), others arguethat the study of intuitions gives us a more direct sort of insightinto the actual properties or relations those concepts pick out (Sosa2007), and still others argue that this whole way of conceiving of theproject is a mistaken one (e.g., Cappelen 2012).

It is commonplace to divide existing research in experimentalphilosophy into distinct projects in accordance with their differentrelationships to this prior tradition. Dividing things up in this way,one arrives at three basic kinds of research in experimentalphilosophy.

First, some experimental philosophy research has a purely‘negative’ relationship to this more traditional use ofintuitions. Such research aims to provide evidence that the methodused in the more traditional work is in some way flawed or unreliable.For example, it has been argued that intuitions differ acrossdemographic factors such as gender or ethnicity, or that they aresubject to order effects, or that they can be influenced by incidentalemotion (e.g., Weinberg et al. 2001; Buckwalter & Stich 2014; Swain etal. 2008; Cameron et al. 2013). To the extent that intuitions showthese effects, it is argued, we should not be relying uncritically onintuition as a method for addressing substantive philosophicalquestions. This first project is called ‘negative’ in thatit is not intended to make progress on the original philosophicalquestion (e.g., about the nature of knowledge) but only to argueagainst a specific method for addressing that question (appeal tointuition).

This project has triggered a large and multi-faceted literature amongphilosophers interested in its metaphilosophical implications (Brown2013b; Cappelen 2012; Deutsch 2015; Weinberg 2007; Weinberg et al.2010; Williamson 2007). This literature has explored the question asto whether empirical facts about the patterns in people’sintuitions could give us reason to change our philosophical practices.Much of this work is quite closely tied to prior philosophical workabout the role of intuition in philosophy more generally.

Second, some research in experimental philosophy aims to make furtherprogress on precisely the sorts of questions that motivated prior workwithin analytic philosophy. Thus, this research looks at epistemicintuitions as a way of making progress in epistemology, moralintuitions as a way of making progress in moral philosophy, and soforth. Experimental philosophers pursuing this second project haveoffered various different accounts of the way in which facts aboutintuitions could yield progress on these philosophical issues, but themost common approach proceeds by advancing some specific hypothesisabout the underlying cognitive processes that generate intuitions in aparticular domain. The suggestion is then that this hypothesis canhelp us assess which intuitions in this domain are worthy of our trustand which should simply be dismissed or ignored (Gerken 2017; Leslie2013; Greene 2008; Nagel 2010).

Work within this second project has inspired a certain amount ofmetaphilosophical debate, but its main impact on the philosophicalliterature has been not at the level of metaphilosophy but rather indiscussions of individual philosophical questions. Thus, philosophersinterested in epistemic contextualism discuss experiments onpeople’s intuitions about knowledge (DeRose 2011), philosophersinterested in incompatibilism discuss experiments on people’sintuitions about free will (Björnsson & Pereboom 2014; Vargas2013), and philosophers interested in interventionist accounts ofcausation discuss experiments on people’s intuitions aboutcausation (Woodward 2014). Work in this vein typically does not focusprimarily on more abstract theories about the role of intuitions inphilosophy. Instead, it draws more on theories about the particulartopic under study (theories of knowledge, free will, causation).

The third type of research being conducted in experimental philosophyis not concerned either way with the kind of project pursued in moretraditional analytic philosophy; it is just doing something elseentirely. Specifically, in many cases, experimental philosophers arenot looking at people’s thoughts and feelings about some topicas a way of making progress on questions about that topic; they areinstead trying to make progress on questions that aredirectlyabout people’s thoughts and feelings themselves. Forexample, much of the experimental philosophy research in moralpsychology is concerned with questions that truly are about moralpsychology itself.

Research in this third vein tends to be highly interdisciplinary.Thus, work on any particular topic within this third vein tends to beat least relatively continuous with work on that same topic in otherdisciplines (psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, etc.), and theimpact of such work is often felt just as much in those otherdisciplines as in philosophy specifically.

The distinction between these projects has proven helpful withinmetaphilosophical work on the significance of experimental philosophy,but it should be noted that the metaphilosophical distinction betweenthese three projects does not correspond in any straightforward way tothe distinctions between the different concrete research programsexperimental philosophers pursue (on free will intuitions, on moralintuitions, on epistemic intuitions, etc.). Each of these concreteresearch programs can be relevant to a number of different projects,and indeed, it often happens that a single paper reports a result thatseems relevant to more than one of these projects. Thus, as we reviewthe actual experimental research coming out of experimentalphilosophy, we will need to turn away from the metaphilosophicaldistinction between projects and turn instead to distinctions betweenconcrete research topics.

2. Research in Experimental Philosophy

The best way to get a sense of what experimental philosophy is allabout is not just to consider it in the abstract but to look in detailat a few ongoing research programs in the field. Accordingly, weproceed in this section by reviewing existing research in fourspecific areas: the negative program, free will, the impact of moraljudgment, and epistemology.

We focus on these four areas because they have received an especiallylarge amount of attention within the existing experimental philosophyof literature. We should note, however, that experimental philosophershave explored an enormous range of different questions, and work inthese four specific areas comprises only a relatively small percentageof the experimental philosophy literature as a whole.

2.1 The Negative Program

In theTheaetetus, Socrates asks, “Herein lies thedifficulty which I can never solve to my satisfaction—What isknowledge?” (146a). The subsequent philosophical discussion oftenproceeds by setting out various hypotheses, e.g., that knowledge istrue belief, and considering possible counterexamples to thehypothesis. So, for instance, Socrates argues that knowledgeisn’t simply true belief because a skilled lawyer can persuade aperson to have a belief that is true, but that belief wouldn’tactually be knowledge [see the entry on theTheaetetus]. Socrates typically expects, and receives, agreement from hisinterlocutor. Nor does Socrates ask his interlocutor, “What isyour conception of knowledge” or “What counts asknowledge for Athenians?” Rather, he seems to expect a globalanswer about what knowledge is. In addition, he seems to expect thatknowledge has a single nature, as suggested by his telling Theaetetus,“I want you… to give one single account of the manybranches of knowledge” (148d).

Work in thenegative program of experimental philosophy usesempirical work to challenge this traditional philosophical project.Two somewhat different challenges have been developed.

2.1.1 The argument from diversity

One challenge arises from the prospect of systematic diversity in howdifferent populations of people think about philosophical questions.The possibility of such diversity had been raised before (e.g., Stich1990), but experimental philosophers have sought to provide evidenceof such diversity. For instance, an early study reported differencesbetween East Asian students and Western students on famous cases fromepistemology (Weinberg et al. 2001). Another early study providedevidence for cultural differences in judgments about reference. EastAsians were more likely than Westerners to have descriptivistjudgments about the reference of proper names (Machery et al. 2004).Some studies have also found gender differences in intuitions aboutphilosophical cases (see, e.g., Buckwalter & Stich 2014; Friesdorfet al. 2015). In addition, there are systematic individual differencesin philosophical intuition; for example, people who are moreextraverted are more inclined to compatibilism about responsibility(Feltz & Cokely 2009).

This apparent diversity in intuitions about philosophical matters hasbeen used to challenge the use of intuitions in philosophy to tell usabout the nature of things like knowledge and reference. If intuitionsabout knowledge turn out to exhibit diversity between populations,then this looks to put pressure on a traditional philosophicalproject. In rough form, the worry arises from the followingclaims:

• D1. The philosophicaltradition uses intuitions regarding philosophically importantcategories or kinds likeknowledge in an effort to determinethe nature of those categories
• D2.Knowledge(like many other philosophical categories) has a single nature.It’s not the case that knowledge is one thing in Athens andanother thing in Sparta.
• D3. Intuitions aboutphilosophical categories systematically vary between populations (byculture, for instance)
• D4. The diversity inintuition cannot be dismissed by privileging the intuitions of onepopulation.

Each of these claims has been challenged. Some argue that philosophersdo not—or should not—rely on intuitions (thus rejectingD1) (seesection 3.1); others hold, contra D4, that certain populations (e.g., professionalphilosophers) are specially positioned to have reliable intuitions(seesection 3.2).

Another way to defuse the challenge is to argue (contra D2) that weneedn’t suppose thatknowledge has a single nature, butinstead allow for a kind of pluralism. For instance,“knowledge” might pick out different epistemic notions indifferent communities. A pluralist might allow, or even celebrate,this diversity. Even if other communities have different epistemicvalues than we do, this need not undermine our valuing knowledge, asit is construed in our community (e.g., Sosa 2009: 109; also Lycan2006). For a pluralist, empirical demonstrations of diversityneedn’t undermine traditional philosophical methods, but mightinstead reveal important epistemic features that we have missed.

A more conservative response to the challenge, which leavestraditional philosophy largely untouched, is to question whether therereally is diversity between populations in intuitions aboutphilosophical categories. One way to develop this response is to claimthat participants in different populations might simply interpret thescenarios in different ways; in that case, we could explain theirdifferent answers by saying that they are responding to differentquestions (e.g., Sosa 2009).

More importantly, a growing body of empirical evidence has called intoquestion the claim that there really are large differences inphilosophical intuitions across populations. Some of the originalfindings of culture differences have not replicated (e.g., Nagel etal. 2013; Kim & Yuan 2015); similarly, many of the originalfindings of gender differences haven’t replicated (e.g.,Seyedsayamdost 2015; Adleberg et al. 2015). These findings providestrong reason to believe that some of the effects suggested by earlyexperimental philosophy studies do not, in fact, exist at all.Moreover, experimental philosophers have also uncovered robustcross-cultural uniformity. For instance, one recent cross-culturalstudy examined intuitions about Gettier cases across four verydifferent cultures (Brazil, India, Japan, and the USA), withparticipants in all groups tending to deny knowledge to theprotagonist in Gettier cases (Machery et al. 2015). This suggests thatthere might be a universal “core folk epistemology”(Machery et al. 2015). In any case, these kinds of results suggestthat there is less diversity than had been suggested.

2.1.2 The argument from sensitivity

The foregoing argument is based on diversity between populations. Butexperimental philosophers in the negative program have also usedintra-individual diversity to undermine traditional philosophicalmethods (Swain et al. 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Weinberg2016).Experimental philosophers have found that people’s judgmentsabout philosophical cases are sensitive to various kinds of contextualfactors that seem to be philosophically irrelevant. The same personwill give different responses depending on apparently irrelevantfactors of presentation. People’s judgments about cases areaffected by the induction of irrelevant emotions (Cameron et al.2013), the order in which cases are presented (Petrinovich andO’Neill 1996; Swain et al. 2008; Wright 2010), and the way anoutcome is described (e.g., Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996;Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2015).

Sensitivity to contextual factors has been used to challenge thephilosophical use of intuition in a way that is somewhat distinct fromthe diversity argument. The challenge begins with the same assumptionabout the role of intuitions in philosophy, but then draws on somewhatdifferent considerations:

• S1. The philosophicaltradition uses intuitions regarding philosophically importantcategories or kinds likeknowledge in an effort to determinethe nature of those categories
• S2. A person’sjudgments about philosophical cases are sensitive to contextualfactors like the order of presentation.
• S3. Sensitivity tothese factors is epistemically inappropriate
• S4. This inappropriatesensitivity cannot be dismissed by privileging the intuitions of onepopulation (e.g., philosophers)
• S5. We can’ttell, from the armchair, which of our judgments are inappropriatelysensitive in this way.

This set of claims presents a challenge because it seems that evenphilosophers are susceptible to these epistemically inapt influences,and we can’t tell which of our intuitions are to be trusted.Thus, philosophers are on shaky epistemic ground when they rely ontheir intuitions to try to glean philosophical truths.

Obviously, the argument from sensitivity is developed in differentways depending on the category in question and the evidence ofsensitivity, but it’s useful to see how the general claims(S1–S5) might be questioned. (Seesection 3.1 for the rejection of intuition in philosophy (S1) andsection 3.2 for a defense of privileged populations [contra S4]).

Although there are replicable effects on the influence of contextualfactors,pace S2 many of these effects seem too small tothreaten the practice of relying on intuitions (see, e.g.,Demaree-Cotton 2016; May 2014). The effect might amount to thedifference between 2.2 and 2.5 on a 7 point scale. It’s hard tosee how such a difference threatens the practice of relying on theoperative intuitions.

In some cases, contextual factors have more pronounced effects, and dolead to changes in participants’ verdict about a case. Forinstance, judgments about certain moral dilemmas and judgments aboutcertain epistemic cases are changed depending on previously seen cases(e.g., Petrinovich & O’Neill 1996; Swain et al. 2008).However, it’s possible that participants respond differently toa case because the contextual differences actually provide anepistemically appropriate basis for changing one’s judgment. Forinstance, in the order effect studies, seeing one case can provideevidence about the appropriate response on another case(Horne & Livengood 2016). On this view, we can grant thatparticipants change their judgment, but deny that they are doing so ina way that is epistemically inappropriate.

Finally, even if people’s judgments do change in epistemicallyinappropriate ways, people might be able to recognize which judgmentsare especially trustworthy. For instance, only some thoughtexperiments are susceptible to order effects, and it turns out thatfor these thought experiments, people have lower confidence in theirresponses (e.g., Wright 2010; Zamzow & Nichols 2009). Thissuggests (contra D5) that there might be an internalresource—confidence—that can be used to discern whichjudgments are epistemically unstable.

2.2 Free Will and Moral Responsibility

Research in experimental philosophy has explored many aspects of laybeliefs regarding free will. Experimental philosophers have designedimproved scales for measuring belief in free will (Nadelhoffer et al.2014; Deery et al. 2015), they have investigated the role of thedesire to punish in attributing free will (Clark et al. 2014), andthey have examined the impact of the belief in free will on moralbehavior (Baumeister et al. 2009). But the most intensively studiedissue concerns intuitions about whether free will is compatible withdeterminism.

Experimental philosophers have argued that the philosophical defenseof incompatibilism depends on intuitions (e.g., Nahmias et al., 2006).The question about whether incompatibilism is true depends on a widevariety of factors, but experimental philosophers have argued that onefactor that plausibly matters is the alleged intuitiveness of thethought that determinism is incompatible with free will (Murray &Nahmias 2014, but see Sommers 2010). This then generates a questionthat invites an empirical inquiry:is incompatibilismintuitive? (Nahmias et al. 2006).

One of the first experimental studies on free will found that peopleseemed to have compatibilist intuitions. Participants were presentedwith a scenario describing a deterministic universe, and then askedwhether a person in the scenario was free and morally responsible(Nahmias et al. 2006). In one case, participants were asked to imaginea future scenario in which there is a supercomputer that is capable ofpredicting all future human behavior when provided with a completedescription of the universe along with the laws of nature. In thisscenario, a man robs a bank, and participants are asked whether theman is morally responsible for his action. Somewhat surprisingly, mostparticipants gave compatibilist answers, saying that the person wasmorally blameworthy. This basic finding held across a number ofscenarios.

In these early studies on intuitions about free will and moralresponsibility, the description of determinism focused on the factthat in a deterministic universe, every event is in principlepredictable from the past and the laws. In addition, the scenariosinvolved particular agents in our world doing bad things. Laterstudies emphasized thecausal nature ofdeterminism—that what happens at a given point iscompletelycaused by what happened previously—and stressed that whathappens in a deterministic universe isinevitable given thepast. Even with this description of determinism, participants stilltend to say that a specific concrete individual in such a universe whocommits a heinous crime is free and responsible (Nichols & Knobe2007; Roskies & Nichols 2008). However, when asked a more abstractquestion about whether it is possible in general for people in such adeterministic universe to be free and responsible, participants tendto say that morally responsibility is not possible in a deterministicuniverse. This incompatibilist response was also found in a crosscultural sample with participants from India, Hong Kong, Colombia, andthe United States (Sarkissian et al. 2010). In addition to theabstract nature of the question, another important element seems to bewhether one is considering an alternate deterministic universe orcontemplating the possibility that our own universe is deterministic.When led to consider our own universe as deterministic, participantswere more likely to say that people would still be morally responsible(Roskies & Nichols 2008).

Thus, it seems like people give compatibilist responses under someconditions and incompatibilist responses under others. One reaction tothis apparent inconsistency is to treat one set of responses asdefective. Some experimental philosophers maintain that it’s theincompatibilist responses that don’t reflect people’s truejudgments. The best developed version of this view maintains peoplearen’t affirming incompatibilist responses at all (Nahmias &Murray 2011; Murray & Nahmias 2014). Instead, when people denyfree will and responsibility it’s because they misunderstand thedescription of determinism. In particular, people mistakenly interpretthe description of determinism to mean that our mental states lackcausal efficacy, that the production of our behavior“bypasses” our mental states. That is, on this view,people wrongly think that determinism means that a person will behaveas she does regardless of what she thinks, wants, or intends (Murray& Nahmias 2014).

Of course, if people’s mental states have no impact on theirbehavior, that is an excellent reason to think that peoplearen’t morally responsible for their behaviors. So, if peopleinterpret determinism to meanbypassing, it is perfectlyrational for them to infer the lack of free will and responsibilityfrom bypassing. However, it seems to be a flat-out confusion tointerpret determinism as bypassing. Even if determinism is true, ourbehavior might be caused (not bypassed) by our mental states. Thus, ifpeople give incompatibilist responses because they confuse determinismwith bypassing, then people’s responses don’t reflect areal commitment to incompatibilism.

Surprisingly, peopledo make bypassing judgments when given adescription of causal determinism. For instance, when presented with adescription of a determinist universe, many participants agreed thatin that universe, “what a person wants has no effect on whatthey end up doing” (Murray & Nahmias 2014). This suggeststhat people go through the following confused process: determinismmeans bypassing, and bypassing means no free will. If that’sright, then the incompatibilist response really is a confusion.However, another explanation is that people think that determinismmeans no free will, and it’s the denial of free will that leadsto the bypassing judgments. The idea would be roughly that if wedon’t have free will, then in some way our mental statesdon’t lead to our behavior in the way we had thought. Someexperimental philosophers have used statistical causal modeling to tryto tease these two possibilities apart, arguing that it’s thelatter explanation that is the right one (Björnsson 2014; Rose& Nichols 2013). That is, people take determinism to entail thatthere is no free will, and it is this judgment that there is no freewill that leads to the bypassing judgment.

Thus, there is some reason to think that incompatibilist responses doreflect many people’s intuitions. What about the compatibilistresponses? Some experimental philosophers maintain that it is thesejudgments that are distorted. On one view, the distortion is caused byemotional reactions (e.g., Nichols & Knobe 2007). However, ameta-analysis indicates that there is very little evidence thatemotions play a critical role in generating compatibilist judgments(Feltz & Cova 2014). A different argument for demotingcompatibilist judgments holds that many people who affirm freewill in deterministic scenarios lack any sensitivity to compatibilistconsiderations, but instead will affirm free will even underfatalistic conditions in which it is explicitly stipulated thatJohn’s behavior is inevitable “regardless of the pastevents in John’s life and the laws of nature”. (This viewis dubbed “free will no matter what”; Feltz & Millan2015.) One line of argument based on these results is that ifpeople’s attributions of free will are so insensitive, it canhardly be said that people appreciate the consistency of free will anddeterminism. However, subsequent studies found that in thesefatalistic scenarios, subjects who affirmed free will still tended tothink that the source of the action was in the agent, in harmony with“source compatibilism” (Andow & Cova 2016).

Thus, the state of the evidence currently suggests that people do haveboth incompatibilist and compatibilist intuitions. Future empiricalwork might uncover more clearly what factors and processes drawspeople in one direction or the other. There are also open questionsabout whether the role of different psychological mechanisms inintuitions about free will has implications for philosophicalquestions for whether we are truly free and responsible.

2.3 Impact of Moral Judgment

It is common to distinguish between two kinds of judgments that peoplemake about morally significant situations. On one hand, people canmake straightforwardlymoral judgments (e.g., judgments aboutmoral wrongness, about obligation, about blameworthiness). On theother, they can make judgments that might be morally relevant but thatstill appear to be in some important sensenon-moraljudgments (about whether the agent acted intentionally, whethershe caused certain outcomes, whether she knew what she was doing). Aquestion now arises as to how to understand the relationship betweenthese two different kinds of judgments.

One possible view would be that the relationship is entirelyunidirectional. Thus, it might be thought that (a) people’smoral judgments depend on prior non-moral judgments, but (b)people’s non-moral judgmentsdo not depend on priormoral judgments. We can illustrate this view with the example of therelationship between people’s moral judgments and theirintentional action judgments. It seems clear that people’s moraljudgments about whether an agent is deserving of blame might depend onprior non-moral judgments about whether this agent actedintentionally. However, one might think that things do not go in theopposite direction. It is not as though your non-moral judgment thatthe agent acted intentionally could depend on a prior moral judgmentthat her action was wrong.

Although this view might seem intuitively compelling, a series ofstudies in experimental philosophy have called it into question. Thesestudies suggest that people’s moral judgments can impact theirjudgments even about what might appear to be entirely non-moralquestions. Such results have been obtained for a wide variety ofdifferent apparently non-moral judgments.

• When an agent knows that she will bring about an outcome but isnot specifically trying to bring it about, people are more inclined tosay that she brought it aboutintentionally when it ismorally bad than when it is morally good (Knobe 2003).
• When an agent correctly believes that an outcome will arise butis only correct in this belief as the result of a coincidence, peopleare more inclined to say that she hasknowledge when theoutcome is morally bad than when it is morally good (Beebe & Shea2013; Buckwalter 2014).
• When an agent has a lot of positive emotion and a high opinion ofher life, people are less inclined to say that she is trulyhappy when her life is morally bad than when it is morallygood (Phillips, Nyholm & Liao 2014).
• When a number of different factors are each individuallynecessary for an outcome to arise, people are more inclined to regardone of the factors as acause when it is morally bad thanwhen it is morally good (Alicke 1992; Hitchcock & Knobe2009).

Effects of moral judgment have also been observed on numerous otherjudgments, including everything from action individuation (Ulatowski,2012) to attributions of weakness of will (May & Holton 2012) tothe semantics of gradable adjectives (Egré & Cova2015).

These findings might be philosophically relevant at two differentlevels. On one hand, each individual effect might be relevant tophilosophical work that aims to understand the corresponding conceptor property. Thus, the findings about intentional action judgmentsmight be relevant to philosophical work about intentional action,those about happiness judgments might be relevant to philosophicalwork about happiness, and so forth. At the same time, the generalfinding that moral judgment has this pervasive influence might berelevant to philosophical work that focuses on the human mind and theway people make sense of the world. For example, these findings couldhelp us to understand the nature of folk psychology or therelationship between our ordinary folk theories and more systematicscientific theories.

To make progress on these two issues, research has focused on tryingto understand why these effects arise. That is, researchers have aimedto provide hypotheses about the precise cognitive processes that giverise to the patterns observed in people’s judgments. Thesehypotheses then, in turn, have implications for philosophicalquestions both about specific concepts and properties and about thehuman mind.

Existing research has led to a proliferation of hypotheses, drawing ontheoretical frameworks from a variety of fields (see Cova 2016 for areview of seventeen hypotheses about the intentional action effect).Still, although there are numerous distinct specific hypotheses, itseems that the basic approaches can be grouped into four broadfamilies.

First, it might be that the effect isnot truly driven by moraljudgment. Existing studies show that people make differentjudgments depending on whether the agent is doing something helpful orharmful, but of course, there are many differences between helpful andharmful actions other than their moral status. For example, a numberof researchers have argued that the effect is in fact driven bypeople’s beliefs about the mental states of the agents in thevignettes (Sloman, Fernbach & Ewing 2012; Sripada & Konrath2011). Agents will tend to have different sorts of mental states whenthey are doing something helpful than when they are doing somethingharmful, and it might be that this difference in mental states isdriving all of the observed effects.

Second, it might be that the effect is indeed driven by moral judgmentbut that it is the result of anerror. On this view, moralconsiderations do not play any real role in the concepts at work here(people’s concepts of intentional action, of happiness, etc.).Rather, people’s judgments are being biased or distorted by somefurther process which gets in the way of their ability to correctlyapply their own concepts. For example, some researchers have arguedthat the effect is due to a process of motivated cognition (Alicke,Rose & Bloom 2011). People believe the agent to be blameworthy andwant to justify that belief. This desire to justify blame thendistorts their judgments about what might seem to be purely factualmatters.

Third, it might be that the effect is driven by moral judgment anddoesn’t involve an error but nonethelesssimply reflects afact about how people use words, rather than a fact about theirapplication of the corresponding concepts. Researchers often makeinferences from facts about how people use certain words(‘intentionally,’ ‘happy,’‘knows’) about how people apply the corresponding concepts(the concept of intentional action, of happiness, of knowledge).However, it is also possible for factors to influence the use of ourwords without influencing the use of these concepts, and someresearchers have suggested that this is the process at work in thepresent effects. For example, it has been suggested that these effectsarise as a result of conversational pragmatics, with people trying toavoid the pragmatic implicatures that would be generated by makingcertain claims that are in fact literally true (Adams & Steadman2004). Alternatively, it has been suggested that the relevant words(e.g., ‘intentionally’) are actually associated with morethan one different concept and that the impact of morality arises notbecause morality plays a role in any of these concepts but ratherbecause it plays a role in the way people resolve the ambiguity of theword itself (Nichols & Ulatowski 2007). On these sorts of views,people are not necessarily making a mistake when their use of languageis impacted by moral judgment, but all the same, moral judgment is notplaying a role in their more basic capacities to make sense of theworld.

Fourth, it might be thatmoral judgment actually plays a role inpeople’s basic capacities to apply the relevant concepts.For example, it has been argued that the concept of happiness isitself a value-laden concept (Phillips et al. 2014). Similarly, it hasbeen suggested the concepts of intentional action and causation makeuse of a form of counterfactual thinking in which moral judgments playa key role (Icard, Kominsky & Knobe 2017; Phillips, Luguri &Knobe 2015). On this last view, the effects observed in theseexperiments point to a genuine role for moral judgment in the mostbasic capacities underlying people’s application of the relevantconcepts.

Debates between these rival views remain ongoing. Within the morerecent literature, discussion of these questions has becomeincreasingly interdisciplinary, with many of the key contributionsturning to methods from cognitive neuroscience, developmentalpsychology, or computational cognitive science.

2.4 Epistemology

Within experimental work in epistemology, the primary focus ofresearch has been on the patterns of people’s ordinaryattributions ofknowledge. As we’ve seen (section 2.1), evidence on epistemic intuitions plays a prominent role in thenegative program. But work in experimental epistemology has not beendominated by any one single issue or question. Rather, it has beendivided among a number of different strands of research, which haveeach been pursued separately.

One important topic has been the role ofstakes inpeople’s knowledge attributions. Suppose that Keith considerssome available evidence and then concludes (correctly) that the bankwill be open on Saturday. Now consider two cases. In thelow-stakescase, it is not especially important whether thebank actually is open. By contrast, in the high-stakescase,Keith’s whole financial future depends on whether the bank isopen or not. The key question now is whether this difference in stakeshas any impact on whether it is correct to say: “Keith knowsthat the bank will be open”.

Within the non-experimental literature, philosophers have appealed toa wide variety of arguments to help resolve this question. Althoughmany of these arguments do not directly involve people’sintuitions about cases (Brown 2013a; see also Fantl & McGrath2009; Hawthorne 2004), some specifically rely on the empirical claimthat people would be more willing to attribute knowledge when thestakes are low than when the stakes are high (DeRose 1992). Amongphilosophers who accept this empirical claim, there has beenconsiderable debate about precisely how to explain the purportedimpact of stakes (DeRose 1992; Hawthorne 2004; Rysiew 2001; Stanley2005).

Surprisingly, a number of early findings from the experimentalepistemology literature suggested that people’s ordinaryknowledge attributions actuallydon’t depend on stakes.For example, people seem to say that Keith knows the bank will be openon Saturday not only in the low-stakes case but also in thehigh-stakes case (Buckwalter 2010; Feltz & Zarpentine 2010; May etal. 2010). This experimental finding threatens to undermine the entiredebate within the non-experimental epistemology literature. After all,if there is no effect of stakes, then there is no question as to howto understand this effect.

Subsequent experimental work in this area has therefore focused on thequestion as to whether the stakes effect even exists at all. Some havecriticized the early experiments that did not find an effect (DeRose2011). Others have shown that although the effect does not emerge inthe experimental paradigms used by those early experiments, it doesemerge in other paradigms (Pinillos 2012; Sripada & Stanley 2012;but see Buckwalter & Schaffer 2015, for a critique). Regardless ofhow these debates are resolved, recent experimental work seems to haveestablished, at a very minimum, that the pattern of people’sepistemic intuitions is not quite the way it was assumed to be withinthe previous non-experimental literature.

A second question concerns the relationship between knowledge andbelief. Clearly, a mental state can only count as knowledge if itsatisfies certain conditions that go beyond anything that would berequired for the state to count as belief. Thus, there can be cases inwhich a person believes thatp but does not know thatp. A question arises, however, as to whether the conversealso holds. That is, a question arises as to whether a mental statemust satisfy certain conditions to count as a belief that go beyondwhat would be required for it to count as knowledge. Can there becases in which a person knows thatp but does not believethatp?

Strikingly, a series of studies suggest that people do attributeknowledge in certain cases in which they would not be willing toattribute belief (Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013; see alsoMurray et al. 2013; Rose & Schaffer 2013; Buckwalter et al. 2015;Shields 2016). In one study, participants were given a vignette abouta student taking a history test who faces the question: “Whatyear did Queen Elizabeth die?” She has reviewed this date manytimes, but at that one moment, she is flustered by the pressure andcan’t recall the answer. She therefore decides just to guess,and she writes down ‘1603.’ In fact, this is the correctanswer. When given this vignette, experimental participants tended tosay that (a) the studentknows that Queen Elizabeth died in1603 but to deny that (b) shebelieves that Queen Elizabethdied in 1603 (Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013, drawing on avignette from Radford). Similar effects have been obtained fornumerous other cases (Murray et al. 2013; Rose & Schaffer 2013;Buckwalter et al. 2015; Shields 2016).

Research in this area aims to understand why this effect arises andwhat implications it has for epistemology. One view is thatpeople’s concept of belief truly does involve certain conditionsthat are not required by their concept of knowledge (Myers-Schulz& Schwitzgebel 2013). An alternative view is that there is morethan one sense of ‘belief,’ such that knowledge requiresthe mental state picked out by one of the senses but not the other.Within work that adopts this latter approach, there have been a numberof more specific suggestions about how to spell out the differencebetween the two senses and what relation each has to the ordinaryconcept of knowledge (Rose & Schaffer 2013; Buckwalter et al.2015).

Experimental epistemology has also explored numerous other issues. Aseries of studies indicate that people actually do attribute knowledgein ‘fake barn’ cases (Colaço et al. 2014; Turri2017). Others show that judgments about whether a person’smental state counts as knowledge depend on whether that person’sevidence comes from facts about an object itself or from statisticalbase rates (Friedman & Turri 2015). Still others have exploredissues at the intersection of formal semantics and epistemology,exploring the impact of specific linguistic factors on knowledgeattributions (Schaffer & Szabó 2014).

2.5 Other Topics

We have been focusing in on four specific areas in which there havebeen especially prominent contributions from experimental philosophy,but we should emphasize that it is not as though the majority ofexperimental philosophy research falls into one or another of theseareas. On the contrary, research in experimental philosophy is highlydiverse, and it has actually been getting steadily more heterogeneousin recent years.

First, experimental philosophers have been pursuing an ever morediverse array of topics. On one hand, there has been a surge ofexperimental research using more formal, mathematical tools, includingwork on causation using Bayes nets (e.g., Livengood & Rose 2016).and work in formal semantics on everything from gradable adjectives toconditionals to epistemic modals (Liao & Meskin 2017; Cariani& Rips 2017; Khoo 2015). On the other, there has been aproliferation of work addressing core topics in the humanities,including art, religion and even questions at the intersection ofexperimental philosophy and the history of philosophy (De Cruz &De Smedt 2016; Liao et al. 2014; Nichols 2015).

Secondly one finds an ever-growing diversity of experimental methods.There are still plenty of studies that proceed by giving participantsvignettes and asking for their intuitions, but in contemporaryexperimental philosophy, one also finds studies using corpora (Reuter2011), reaction times (Philips & Cushman 2017), neuroimaging(Greene et al. 2001), evenstudies that look at whether ethics professors actually behaveethically (Schwitzgebel & Rust 2014).

Finally, and perhaps most noticeably, there is an increasingly closeconnection between research in experimental philosophy and research inpsychology. For example, the experimental research program onintuitions about trolley problems has been dominated by contributionsfrom psychology (e.g., Cushman et al. 2006; Wiegmann et al. 2012), butthere have also been important contributions from philosophers (e.g.,Mikhail 2011; Kahane & Shackel 2008). Conversely, there have beennumerous recent papers in psychology that aim to contribute toresearch programs that originated in experimental philosophy (Samland& Waldmann 2016; Feldman & Chandrashekar forthcoming; Starmans& Friedman 2012).

3. Challenges to Experimental Philosophy

As is the case with any healthy research area, there is lots ofdispute about issues within experimental philosophy. There aredisagreements about particular studies, the implications of differentkinds of results, and so on. But there are also broad challenges tothe very idea that experimental philosophy research could provehelpful in addressing the philosophical questions. We focus here onthree of the most prominent of these challenges.

3.1 Disputing the Role of Intuitions in Philosophy

As we’ve seen, much work in experimental philosophy presupposesthat intuitions play an important role in philosophical inquiry. Workin the negative program characteristically starts with the assumptionthat intuitions play a central role in the philosophical tradition.Outside of the negative program, experimental philosophers want tounderstand what people’s intuitions are about philosophicalmatters and why they have these intuitions. Several philosophers,however, challenge the role of intuitions in philosophy in ways thatalso pose a challenge to the philosophical significance of muchexperimental philosophy.

3.1.1 Philosophers don’t rely on intuitions

One way to reject the role of intuitions is simply to deny thatphilosophers use intuitions as justification for their views(Williamson 2007; Cappelen 2012; Deutsch 2009, 2010, 2015). Accordingto such “intuition deniers”, the experimentalinvestigation of intuitions is thoroughly irrelevant to philosophy(e.g., Cappelen 2012: 1; for discussion, Nado 2016). Obviously if this is right, thenthe negative program is arguing against a thoroughly mistakenconception of philosophy.

Although work in metaphilosophy often assumes that philosophers useintuitions as evidence, this is exactly what is challenged byintuition deniers. It is granted on all sides that philosopherssometimes mention intuitions, but according to the intuition deniers,intuitions are not integral to the philosophical work. In particular,intuition deniers maintain that a careful inspection of philosophicalpractice reveals that philosophers don’t rely on intuitions tojustify philosophical views; rather, philosophers rely onarguments (see, e.g., Cappelen 2012: 170; Deutsch 2009:451).

There have been several responses to the intuition deniers, butperhaps the most prominent response to is that the arguments ofintuition deniers depend on an implausibly strong conception of thenotion ofintuition (e.g., Chalmers 2014; Devitt 2015;Weinberg 2014). Once we focus on a less demanding notion of intuition,it’s plausible that philosophers often rely on intuitions asevidence for philosophical theses (Devitt 2015). Indeed, some haveargued that for classic examples like Gettier cases, it’s hardto see how the argument works if it doesn’t rely on intuitions(see, e.g., Brown 2017; Sytsma & Livengood 2015: 92–93)Experimental philosophers have also argued against intuition denierson experimental grounds, noting that a recent study found that over50% of philosophers agree with the statement “intuitions areuseful for justifying philosophical claims” (Kuntz & Kuntz2011; see Sytsma & Livengood 2015: 91).

3.1.2 Philosophers shouldn’t rely on intuitions

A rather different way to challenge the study of intuitions inexperimental philosophy is to deny that the study of intuitions is anapt subject matter for philosophical inquiry. On this view, we cangrant that it’s a fact that philosophers rely on intuitions, butit’s a lamentable fact. The use of intuitions in philosophy ismisguided for reasons that have nothing in particular to do withexperimental philosophy—the appeal to intuitions is a relic,which should be rejected because it doesn’t actually answer thephilosophical questions. This conclusion threatens positiveapplications of experimental philosophy (see, e.g.,sections 2.2–2.4), but is of course, perfectly consistent with the conclusion urged bythe negative program in experimental philosophy (section 2.1).

One influential argument against the use of intuitions builds on therejection of descriptivist theories of reference, according to whichconcepts refer to kinds via a set of associated descriptions. In placeof descriptivism, some maintain that concepts refer in virtue of thefunction of the concept (e.g., Millikan 2000). Other views maintainthat concepts refer in virtue of a causal chain connecting the conceptto the kind (Putnam 1973). On these anti-descriptivist views, peoplecan have wildly mistaken intuitions regarding the application of theirconcepts. As a result, probing lay intuitions might be an ineffectiveway to investigate the kinds of things to which our concepts refer(e.g., Fischer 2015; Kornblith 2002).

Anti-descriptivism itself doesn’t entail that appeal tointuitions is philosophically irrelevant. Indeed, some of the mostinfluential arguments against descriptivist theories of reference seemto depend on intuitions (Devitt 2015). However, some argue that ratherthan relying on intuitions about kinds, we should investigate thekinds themselves. So, if the conceptknowledge picks out anatural kind, we can consult the distribution and characteristics ofknowledge as it is instantiated in the world. Using intuitions tounderstand knowledge would be like using intuitions tounderstand gold. The way we come to understand the nature ofgold is to examine samples of gold rather than people’sintuitions about gold. Similarly, the way to understandknowledge is to examine samples of knowledge as it presentsin animals, rather than people’s intuitions about knowledge(Kornblith 2002). To examine knowledge by intuitions is at bestinefficient, and at worst a complete distraction from the task ofunderstanding what knowledge is. This objection is primarily directedat traditional forms of conceptual analysis, but insofar asexperimental philosophy focuses on intuitions, it is in the same leakyboat (Kornblith 2013: 197).

The claim that philosophers shouldn’t rely on intuitionsconstitutes a broad attack on conceptual analysis, in both itstraditional and experimental guises. Not surprisingly, there have beenseveral defenses of the importance of intuitions for doing philosophy.For instance, some philosophers argue that in order even to pick outthe kind of interest, we need to rely on our intuitive sense of whatbelongs in the category (e.g., Goldman 2015). To determine thecharacteristics of knowledge, we need to have a way of picking outwhich items are genuine members of the kind, and for this we must relyon our intuitive understanding of knowledge. In addition, if we rejectoutright the appeal to what intuitively belongs to a category,it’s hard to make sense of the intelligibility of eliminativism(e.g., Bermúdez 2006: 305), since eliminativists typicallyargue that there is a mismatch between intuitive notions of, e.g.,free will, and the kinds of things in the world. To give up on thesignificance of characterizing our intuitive commitments is topreemptively exclude eliminativist views, which have long beenregarded as of central philosophical interest.

3.2 Defending Privileged Intuitions Rather Than Those of Ordinary Experimental Participants

A second objection would be that even if intuitions do matter, weshould not be concerned with just any old kind of intuition. Rather,our concern should be with a distinctive class of intuitions.For example, research in philosophy has traditionally been conductedby trained philosophers who spent years thinking about difficultproblems. There is good reason to suspect that the intuitionsgenerated by this type of process will have a special sort ofepistemic status, and perhaps these sorts of intuitions can play alegitimate role in philosophy. By contrast, the intuitions exploredwithin experimental philosophy research tend to be those of ordinaryfolks, with no prior background in philosophy, and one might thinkthat intuitions of this latter type have no real philosophicalsignificance.

One way of spelling out this concern is in terms of what has come tobe known as theexpertise objection. The key contention hereis that trained philosophers have a distinctive type of expertise.Thus, if we want to understand the process at the core of traditionalphilosophical practice, we need to study people who have this type ofexpertise. It is no good just looking at the judgments of people whohave never taken a single philosophy course. A number of philosophershave developed objections along more or less these lines though withimportant differences (Williamson 2007; Ludwig 2007).

This is an important objection, and to address it, experimentalphilosophers launched a major effort to study the intuitions oftrained philosophers. The results show that trained philosophers stillshow order effects (Schwitzgebel & Cushman 2012), actor/observereffects (Tobia et al. 2013), and effects of temperament (Schulz,Cokely, & Feltz 2011). Thus, existing work provides at least someevidence against the claim that trained philosophers have adistinctive expertise that allows them to escape the sorts of biasesthat plague the judgments of ordinary folks.

Of course, there are numerous ways of defending the objection againstthis type of response. It could be argued that although philosophersdo not have an ability to avoid biases of the type studied withinexperimental philosophy, their judgments do differ from those ofordinary folks in some other important respect. Similarly, it could beargued that what gives certain intuitions their privileged epistemicstate is not the fact that they come from a particular type of person(trained philosophers) but rather the fact that they are the productof a particular way of approaching the question (sustained reflection)(see, e.g., Kauppinen 2007).

3.3 But is it Philosophy?

Finally, it might be objected that experimental philosophy simplyisn’t philosophy at all. On this view, there are certainproperties that differentiate work in philosophy from work in otherdisciplines. Research in experimental philosophy lacks theseproperties and is therefore best understood as falling outside thephilosophical tradition entirely. Note that this last objection is notconcerned with the question as to whether experimental philosophy hasany value but rather with the question as to whether it should beconsidered part of a particular discipline. As one recent paper putsit,

… what is at issue is not whether there is room for suchempirical study, but whether there is room for it now as a branch ofphilosophy. (Sorell forthcoming: 6)

In actual practice, debate over this objection has tended to focus onquestions in the history of philosophy. Clearly, numerous philosophersfrom Aristotle through Nietzsche were deeply concerned with empiricalquestions about human nature, so it might seem that the default view,at least in the absence of any counterarguments, should be that workon these issues can indeed count as philosophy. The key question,then, is whether there are any legitimate counterarguments.

One possible argument would be that although the people we now regardas philosophers did work on these issues, this aspect of their workshould not be regarded as falling within the discipline of philosophy.Anthony Appiah questions this gambit:

You would have a difficult time explaining to most of the canonicalphilosophers thatthis part of the work wasechtphilosophy andthat part of their work was not. Trying toseparate out the “metaphysical” from the“psychological” elements in this corpus is like trying topeel a raspberry. (Appiah 2008: 13)

According to this response, there is a well-established practicewithin the history of philosophy of exploring empirical andpsychological questions, and it is actually the idea of carefullyseparating the psychological from the philosophical that should beregarded as a departure from philosophical tradition.

More recent work on these issues has been concerned especially withthe early modern period. It has been noted that some of the mostprominent philosophers in this period actually conducted experimentalstudies (Sytsma & Livengood 2015), and some explicitly referred tothemselves as ‘experimental philosophers’ (Anstey &Vanzo 2016). Though contemporary experimental philosophy obviouslydiffers in certain respects from these historical antecedents, onemight argue that the work of contemporary experimental philosophers isbest understood as a continuation of this broad historicaltradition.

On the other side, it has been argued that this historical continuitypicture fails to take account of a change in the use of the word‘philosophy’ (Sorell forthcoming). In the Renaissance,physics was referred to as ‘philosophy,’ but we would notsay that all research in contemporary physics belongs in thediscipline of philosophy. Similarly, even if work on the psychology ofmoral judgment was historically classified as philosophy, one mightthink that it should not be regarded today as falling into thediscipline of philosophy but rather into a distinct discipline.

Certainly, partisans on both sides of this debate should agree thatthe boundaries of a discipline can change over time, but this pointcuts both ways. Just as the boundaries of a discipline may havechanged in the past, they can change in the future. It will thereforebe interesting to see how the boundaries of the discipline ofphilosophy evolve over the course of the next few decades and how thisevolution impacts the status of experimental philosophy.

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experimental moral philosophy |intuition |Plato: on knowledge in theTheaetetus

Acknowledgments

We’d like to thank Jonathan Weinberg, the editors, and ananonymous referee for helpful comments on some of this material.