This article is concerned with social and political equality. In itsprescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contestedconcept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical powersuitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least sincethe French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leadingideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probablythe most controversial of the great social ideals. There iscontroversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation ofjustice and equality (the principles of equality), the materialrequirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?),the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its statuswithin a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value ofequality). This article will discuss each of these issues in turn.

• 1. Defining the Concept
• 2. Principles of Equality and Justice
  • 2.1 Formal Equality
  • 2.2 Proportional Equality
  • 2.3 Moral Equality
  • 2.4 Presumption of Equality
• 3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?
  • 3.1 Simple Equality and Objections to Equality in General
  • 3.2 Libertarianism
  • 3.3 Utilitarianism
  • 3.4 Equality of Welfare
  • 3.5 Equality of Resources
  • 3.6 Responsibility and Luck-Egalitarianism
  • 3.7 Equality of Opportunity for Welfare or Advantage
  • 3.8 Capabilities Approaches
• 4. Relational Equality
• 5. Equality Among Whom?
• 6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?
  • 6.1. Kinds of Egalitarianism
  • 6.2 Equality vs. Priority or Sufficiency
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Defining the Concept

‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People whopraise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising ordisparaging” (Dworkin 2000, p. 2). Our first task is thereforeto provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespreadmisconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms‘equality’ (Greek:isotes; Latin:aequitas,aequalitas; French:égalité; GermanGleichheit),‘equal’, and ‘equally’ signify a qualitativerelationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’)signifies correspondence between a group of different objects,persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in atleast one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specificfeature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’must then be distinguished from ‘identity’, which refersto one and the same object corresponding to itself in all itsfeatures. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximatecorrespondence (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44 ff.; Westen 1990,pp. 39, 120). Thus, to say that men are equal, for example, is not tosay that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than‘sameness’.

Judgements of equality presume a difference between the thingscompared. According to this definition, the notion of‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality may be seenas problematic because it would violate the presumption of adifference. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; theyare different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things donot differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather,more precisely, ‘identical’, such as the morning and theevening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolutequalitative equality admissible as a borderline concept (Tugendhat& Wolf 1983, p. 170).

‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both todescribe and prescribe, as with ‘thin’: “you arethin” and “you are too thin”. The approach taken todefining the standard of comparison for both descriptive andprescriptive assertions of equality is very important (Oppenheim1970). In thedescriptive case, the common standard is itselfdescriptive, for example when two people are said to have the sameweight. In theprescriptive use, the standard prescribes anorm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equalbefore the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions ofequality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is adescriptive component, since the assertions need to containdescriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which therule or norm applies. The question of this identification – whobelongs to which category? – may itself be normative, as when weask to whom the U.S. laws apply. On the other hand, the comparativestandards contain something normative – a moral or legal rule,such as the U.S. laws – specifying how those falling under thenorm are to be treated. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptivecomponent (Westen 1990, chap. 3). Sociological and economic analysesof (in-)equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can bedetermined and measured and what their causes and effects are. Incontrast, social and political philosophy is in general concernedmainly with the following questions:what kind of equality,if any, should obtain, and with respect towhom andwhen? Such is the case in this article as well.

‘Equality’ and ‘equal’ are incompletepredicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in whatrespect? (Rae 1980,p. 132 f.) Equality essentially consists of atripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons andone (or several) qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certainrespect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term.‘Equality’ denotes the relation between the objectscompared. Every comparison presumes atertium comparationis,a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equalityapplies – equality thus referring to a common sharing of thiscomparison-determining attribute. This relevant comparative standardrepresents a ‘variable’ (or ‘index’) of theconcept of equality that needs to be specified in each particular case(Westen 1990, p. 10); differing conceptions of equality here emergefrom one or another descriptive or normative moral standard. There isanother source of diversity as well: As Temkin (1986, 1993, 2009)argues, various different standards might be used to measureinequality, with the respect in which people are compared remainingconstant. The difference between a general concept and differentspecific conceptions (Rawls 1971, p. 21 f.) of equality may explainwhy some people claim ‘equality’ has no unifiedmeaning – or is even devoid of meaning. (Rae 1981, p. 127 f.,132 f.)

For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality orinequality, in the context of social justice, not as a singleprinciple, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic coreof today’s egalitarianism. Different principles yielddifferent answers. Both equality and inequality are complex andmultifaceted concepts (Temkin 1993, chap. 2). In any real historicalcontext, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep thefield (Rae 1981, p. 132). Many egalitarians concede that much of ourdiscussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also acommon underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it(Williams 1973). Above all, it serves to remind us of our commonhumanity, despite various differences (cf. 2.3. below). In this sense,egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normativedoctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following theintroduction of different principles and theories of equality, thediscussion will return in the last section to the question how best todefine egalitarianism and its core value.

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality andjustice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquityequality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. (Onthe history of the concept, cf. Albernethy 1959, Benn 1967, Brown1988, Dann 1975, Thomson 1949.) People and movements throughouthistory have used the language of justice to contest inequalities. Butwhat kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice?Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety ofprinciples and conceptions of equality. This section introduces foursuch principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversialto the more specific and controversial. The next section reviewsvarious conceptions of the ‘currency’ of equality.Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory ofjustice emerge according to which of the four principles and metricshave been adopted. The first three principles of equality holdgenerally and primarily for all actions upon others and affectingothers, and for their resulting circumstances. From the fourthprinciple onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, thefocus will be mainly on distributive justice and the evaluation ofdistribution.

2.1 Formal Equality

When two persons have equal status in at least one normativelyrelevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in thisrespect. This is the generally acceptedformal equalityprinciple that Aristotle articulated in reference to Plato:“treat like cases as like” (Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, V.3. 1131a10–b15;Politics, III.9.1280 a8–15,III. 12. 1282b18–23). The crucial question is which respects arenormatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formalprinciple of equality as a specific application of a rule ofrationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equalcases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955–56). Butothers claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle ofjustice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature ofmoral judgments. On this view, the postulate of formal equalitydemands more than consistency with one’s subjective preferences: theequal or unequal treatment in question must be justifiable to therelevantly affected parties, and this on the sole basis of asituation’s objective features.

2.2 Proportional Equality

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical andproportional (Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, 1130b–1132b; cf.Plato,Laws, VI.757b–c). A way of treating others, or adistribution arising from it, is equalnumerically when ittreats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating themidentically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita.That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or adistribution isproportional or relatively equal when ittreats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Justnumerical equality is a special case of proportionalequality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances,namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that therelevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality furtherspecifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensiveformulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequateequality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods topersons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two ormore persons \((P_1, P_2)\) and two or more allocations of goods topersons \((G)\) and \(X\) and \(Y\) as the quantity in whichindividuals have the relevant normative quality \(E\). This can berepresented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If \(P1\) has\(E\) in the amount of \(X\) and if \(P_2\) has \(E\) in the amount\(Y\), then \(P_1\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(X'\) and \(P_2\) isdue \(G\) in the amount of \(Y'\), so that the ratio \(X/Y = X'/Y'\)is valid. (For the formula to be usable, the potentially large varietyof factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle andcommensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregatevalue.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because thepersons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment ordistribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims totreatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that isthe prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical,inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demandedwith equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats allbelieve that persons should be assessed according to their differingdeserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevantcriterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should beproportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who isdue what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumedfundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth -– this isapparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle’s idea of justice as proportional equality contains afundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rationalargument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, itsfocal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality(Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality.Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that the argument involves thosefeatures that decide whether two persons are to be considered equal orunequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice andequality are linked through these formal and proportional principles.Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, whichthemselves only receive their normative significance in their role asprinciples of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. Itneeds to be made precise – i.e., its open variables need to befilled out. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it isunclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or casesshould be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception ofjustice – over who is due what – can be understood ascontroversies over the question of which cases are equal and whichunequal (Aristotle,Politics, 1282b 22). For this reason,equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim thatpersons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is toldwhatkind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981;Sen 1992, p. 13). Every normative theory implies a certain notion ofequality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thustake account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To doso, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, whichare discussed below.

2.3 Moral Equality

Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings areunequal by nature. This postulate collapsed with the advent of theidea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which allhuman beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classicalformula for justice according to which an action is just when itoffers each individual his or her due took on a substantivelyegalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the samedignity and respect. This is now the widely held conception ofsubstantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics,who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and inearly New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humanswere equal before God, although this principle was not always adheredto in the later history of the church. This important idea was alsotaken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded inboth Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in theseventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in thetradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651)postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equalrights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each otherharm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same naturalright to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declaredsocial inequality to be the result of a decline from the naturalequality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a declinecatalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions(Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequalityand rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individualsubjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. InKant’s moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulatesthe equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendentaland philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead toa recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the soleprinciple of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenmentideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions,and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of humanrights. During the French Revolution, equality, along with freedom andfraternity, became a basis of theDéclaration des droits del’homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle that holds that human beings, despite their differences,are to be regarded as one another’s equals, is often also called‘human equality’ or ‘basic equality’ or‘equal worth’ or ‘human dignity’ (William1962, Vlastos 1962, Kateb 2014, Waldron 2017, Rosen 2018). Whetherthese terms are synonyms is a matter of interpretation, but“they cluster together to form a powerful body ofprinciple” (Waldron 2017, p. 3).

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of theequal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) iswidely accepted (Carter 2011, but see also Steinhoff 2015). In aperiod in which there is not agreement across the members of a complexsociety to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view(Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39–44), it appears impossible topeacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims withoutaccepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moralequality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for allcontemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p. 5).

Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in importantrelevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are allgenerally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). Ina now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p.227), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment ofpersons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not theoften implausible principle of providing all persons with equaltreatment. Recognizing that human beings are all equally individualdoes not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than thosein which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to andhow they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned withthe kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutuallyconsider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moralequality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are toarrive at a clear moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of justequality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, wefind competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving asinterpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed accordingto their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality(Kymlicka 1990, p. 44).

2.4 Presumption of Equality

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involvingapresumption of equality. More materially concrete, ethicalapproaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned withdistributive criteria – the presumption of equality, incontrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located ona higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is thequestion of the principle with which a material conception of justiceshould be constructed, particularly once the approaches describedabove prove inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facieprinciple of equal distribution for all goods politically suited forthe process of public distribution. In the domain of politicaljustice, all members of a given community, taken together as acollective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution ofsocial goods, as well as on the distribution’s fair realization. Anyclaim to a particular distribution, including any existingdistributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., noownership should be recognized without justification. Applied to thispolitical domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyoneshould get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types ofdifferences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptablereasons, unequal shares. (With different terms and arguments, thisprinciple is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959,111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach byWilliams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by Tugendhat (1993, 374;1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2002, chap. 5); forcriticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap.10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equaldistribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equaldistribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justifyimpartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on theside of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. (For ajustification of the presumption in favor of equality s. Gosepath2004, II.8.; Gosepath 2015.)

The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure forconstructing a theory of distributive justice (Gosepath 2004). One hasonly to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequaldistribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the followingpostulates of equality are at present generally considered morallyrequired.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms,since – putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment– there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows fromthe principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal generalrights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply toall. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, thepostulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should havethe same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the mostfar-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate socialorder.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participationshould be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim toparticipation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution,control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate– requiring equal opportunity – of equal political powersharing. To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to bedesigned in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e.g. have astutter or a low income, have an equal chance to make their viewsknown and to participate fully in the democratic process.

In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must haveapproximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions,independent of their economic or social class and native endowments.This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Anyunequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity,i.e., qualifications alone should be the determining factor, notsocial background or influences of milieu.

The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, takingaccount of several positions that – each according to thepresumption of equality – justify a turn away from equality. Asalient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equaldistribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequateconceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The followingfactors are usually considered eligible for justified unequaltreatment: (a) need or differing natural disadvantages (e.g.disabilities); (b) existing rights or claims (e.g. private property);(c) differences in the performance of special services (e.g. desert,efforts, or sacrifices); (d) efficiency; and (e) compensation fordirect and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affirmativeaction).

These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the followingalternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offerdifferent accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere.Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality(whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not); only a few (likestrict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency) are alternatives tothe presumption.

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply theprinciples of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure ofthe parameters of equality. We need to know the dimensions withinwhich the striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is abrief review of the seven most prominent conceptions of distributiveequality, each offering a different answer to one question: in thefield of distributive justice, what should be equalized, or whatshould be the parameter or “currency” of equality?

3.1 Simple Equality and Objections to Equality in General

Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with thesame material level of goods and services, represents a strictposition as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generallyrejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf (1796) and Shaw (1928),no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Sinceegalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand foreconomic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialisticideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism– despite their protest against poverty and exploitation andtheir demand for social security for all citizens – calls forabsolute economic equality. The orthodox Marxist view of economicequality was expounded in theCritique of the Gotha Program(1875). Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on threegrounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number ofmorally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequaleffects. In Marx’s view, the economic structure is the mostfundamental basis for the historical development of society, and isthus the point of reference for explaining its features. Second,theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distributioninstead of the basic questions of production. Third, a futurecommunist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflictswill have vanished.

As an idea,simple equality fails because of problems thatare raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to reviewthese problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approachto equality.

(i) We need adequate indices for the measurement of the equality ofthe goods to be distributed. Through what concepts should equality andinequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of materialgoods can lead to unequal satisfaction. Money constitutes a typical,though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has tobe conceived in other terms.

(ii) The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desiredmodel of equal distribution (McKerlie 1989, Sikora 1989). Should weseek to equalize the goods in question over complete individuallifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments areas equally provisioned as possible?

(iii) Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in theeconomic field, and the administrative costs of redistribution producewasteful inefficiencies (Okun 1975). Equality and efficiency need tobe balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect,usually by economists. A social condition is Pareto-optimal orPareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another conditionjudged better by at least one person and worse by none (Sen 1970,chap. 2, 2*). A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principleis the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise insocial welfare is always present when the benefits accruing throughthe distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs.A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a changecould compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain asubstantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, theKaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule (Kaldor 1939). Forpurposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimalefficiency make a great deal of sense. However, the analysis is alwaysmade relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust andunequal. A society can thus be (close to) Pareto-optimality –i.e., no one can increase his or her material goods or freedomswithout diminishing those of someone else – while alsodisplaying enormous inequalities in the distribution of the same goodsand freedoms. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may benecessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, ifthere is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal.In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should notlead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizingdown does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position.

(iv)Moral objections: A strict and mechanical equaldistribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take intoaccount the differences among individuals and their situations. Inessence, since individuals desire different things, why shouldeveryone receive the same goods? Intuitively, for example, we canrecognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person,and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken. With simpleequality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctiveindividual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they arein fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moralright to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty totake responsibility for their own decisions and the resultingconsequences.

Working against the identification of distributive justice with simpleequality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitariansis as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certaininequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimumaid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities(but cf. relational egalatarians, discussed in Section4).On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that arenot the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world ismorally better whenequality of life conditions prevail. Thisis an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is suchequality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does itinvolve?

By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality ofoutcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to theiremphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals areresponsible for their decisions, and that the only things to beconsidered objects of equality are those which serve the realinterests of individuals. The opportunities to be equalized betweenpeople can be opportunities for well-being (i.e. objective welfare),or for preference satisfaction (i.e., subjective welfare), or forresources. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being orresources themselves that should be equalized, but an equalopportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to. Suchequality depends on their being a realm of options for each individualequal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of thesame prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession ofresources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one canreally take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beingseffectively enjoy equal realms of possibility.

(v) Simple equality is very often associated with equality of results(although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive onlyfor equality of results is problematic. To illustrate the point, letus briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event orstate of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not bejudged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important asthis may be. One must also consider the way in which the events orcircumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, amoral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of theaction in question (the consequentialist aspect) but, first andforemost, the assessment of the intention of the actor (thedeontological aspect). The source and its moral quality influence themoral judgement of the results (Pogge 1999, sect. V). For example, ifyou strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may beconsidered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will alsodepend on whether you were (morally) allowed such a gesture (perhapsthrough parental status, although that is controversial) or evenobliged to execute it (e.g. as a police officer preventing me fromdoing harm to others), or whether it was in fact prohibited but notprevented. What is true of individual actions (or their omission) hasto be truemutatis mutandis of social institutions andcircumstances like distributions resulting from collective socialactions (or their omission). Social institutions should therefore beassessed not only on the basis of information about how they affectindividual quality of life. A society in which people starve on thestreets is certainly marked by inequality; nevertheless, its moralquality, i.e., whether the society is just or unjust with regard tothis problem, also depends on the suffering’s causes. Does the societyallow starvation as an unintended but tolerable side effect of whatits members see as a just distributive scheme? Indeed, does it evendefend the suffering as a necessary means, as with forms of SocialDarwinism? Or has the society taken measures against starvation whichhave turned out to be insufficient? In the latter case, whether thesociety has taken such steps for reasons of political morality orefficiency again makes a moral difference. Hence even foregalitarians, equality of results is too narrow and one-sided afocus.

(vi) Finally, there is a danger of (strict) equality leading touniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy(Cohen 1989; Arneson 1993). In the contemporary debate, this complainthas been mainly articulated in feminist and multiculturalist theory. Acentral tenet of feminist theory is that gender has been and remains ahistorically variable and internally differentiated relation ofdomination. The same holds for so-called racial and ethnicdifferences, which are often still conceived of as marking differentvalues. The different groups involved here rightly object to theirdiscrimination, marginalization, and domination, and an appeal toequality of status thus seems a solution. However, as feminists andmulticulturalists have pointed out, equality, as usually understoodand practiced, is constituted in part by a denial and ranking ofdifferences; as a result it seems less useful as an antidote torelations of domination. “Equality” can often mean theassimilation to a pre-existing and problematic ‘male’ or‘white’ or ‘middle class’ norm. In short,domination and a fortiori inequality often arises out of an inabilityto appreciate and nurture differences, not out of a failure to seeeveryone as the same. To recognize these differences should howevernot lead to an essentialism grounded in sexual or culturalcharacteristics. There is a crucial debate between those who insistthat sexual, racial, and ethnic differences should become irrelevant,on the one hand, and those believing that such differences, eventhough culturally relevant, should not furnish a basis for inequality:that one should rather find mechanisms for securing equality, despitevalued differences. Neither of these strategies involves rejectingequality. The dispute is about how equality is to be attained(McKinnon 1989, Taylor 1992).

Proposing a connection between equality and pluralism, MichaelWalzer’s theory (1983) aims at what he calls “complexequality”. According to Walzer, relevant reasons can only speakin favor of distributing specific types of goods in specific spheres,not in several or all spheres. Against a theory of simple equalitypromoting equal distribution of dominant goods, which underestimatesthe complexity of the criteria at work in each given sphere, thedominance of particular goods needs to be ended. For instance,purchasing power in the political sphere through means derived fromthe economic sphere (i.e., money) must be prevented. Walzer’s theoryof complex equality is not actually aimed at equality per se, but atthe separation of spheres of justice; the theory’s designation ismisleading. Any theory of equality should, however, as per Walzer,avoid monistic conceptions and recognize instead the complexity oflife and the plurality of criteria for justice.

The preceding considerations yield the following desideratum: insteadofsimple equality, a morecomplex equality needs tobe conceptualized. That concept should resolve the problems discussedabove through a distinction of various classes of goods, a separationof spheres, and a differentiation of relevant criteria.

3.2 Libertarianism

Libertarianism andeconomic liberalism representminimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. CitingLocke, they both postulate an original right to freedom and property,thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the freemarket (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1960). They assert an opposition betweenequality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can belimited only for the sake of foreign and domestic peace. For thisreason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state’sonly legitimate duty. They assert a natural right to self-ownership(the philosophical term for “ownership of oneself” –i.e., one’s will, body, work, etc.) that entitles everybody tohitherto unowned bits of the external world by means of mixing theirlabor with it. All individuals can thus claim property if“enough and as good” is left over for others (Locke’sproviso). Correspondingly, they defend market freedoms and oppose theuse of redistributive taxation schemes for the sake of egalitariansocial justice. A principal objection to libertarian theory is thatits interpretation of the Lockean proviso – nobody’s situationshould be worsened through an initial acquisition of property –leads to an excessively weak requirement and is thus unacceptable(Kymlicka 1990, pp.108–117). However, with a broader and more adequateinterpretation of what it means for one a situation to be worse thananother, it is much more difficult to justify private appropriationand,a fortiori, all further ownership rights. If the provisorecognizes the full range of interests and alternatives thatself-owners have, then it will not generate unrestricted rights overunequal amounts of resources. Another objection is that precisely ifone’s own free accomplishment is what is meant to count, as thelibertarians argue, success should not depend strictly on luck,extraordinary natural gifts, inherited property, and status. In otherwords,equal opportunity also needs to at least be present asa counterbalance, ensuring that the fate of human beings is determinedby their decisions and not by unavoidable social circumstances. Equalopportunity thus seems to be the frequently vague minimal formula atwork in every egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Manyegalitarians, however, wish for more – namely, anequalityof (at least basic) life conditions.

In any event, with a shift away from a strictly negative idea offreedom, economic liberalism can indeed itself point the way to moresocial and economic equality. For with such a shift, what is at stakeis not only assuring an equal right to self-defense, but alsofurnishing everyone more or less the same chance to actually make useof the right to freedom (e.g. Van Parijs 1995, Steiner 1994, Otsuka2005). In other words, certain basic goods need to be furnished toassure the equitable or “fair value of the basicliberties” (Rawls 1993, pp. 356–63).

3.3 Utilitarianism

It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretizing moralequality – and this in a way meant to offer the sameconsideration to the interests of all human beings (Kymlicka 1990, pp.31f., Hare 1981, p. 26, Sen 1992, pp. 13f.). From the utilitarianperspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one(Bentham), the interests of all should be treated equally withoutconsideration of contents of interest or an individual’s materialsituation. For utilitarianism, this means that all enlightenedpersonal interests have to be fairly aggregated. The morally properaction is the one that maximizes utility (Hare 1984). This conceptionof equal treatment has been criticized as inadequate by many opponentsof utilitarianism. At least in utilitarianism’s classical form –so the critique reads – the hoped for moral equality is flawed,because all desires are taken up by the utilitarian calculation,including “selfish” and “external” preferences(Dworkin 1977, p. 234) that are meant to all have equal weight, evenwhen they diminish the ‘rights’ and intentions of others.This conflicts with our everyday understanding of equal treatment.What is here at play is an argument involving “offensive”and “expensive” taste: a person cannot expect others tosustain his or her desires at the expense of their own (Kymlicka 1990,p. 40 f.). Rather, according to generally shared conviction, equaltreatment consistently requires a basis of equal rights and resourcesthat cannot be taken away from one person, whatever the desire ofothers. In line with Rawls (1971, pp. 31, 564, cf. 450), many holdthat justice entails according no value to interests insofar as theyconflict with justice. According to this view, unjustified preferenceswill not distort the mutual claims people have on each other. Equaltreatment has to consist of everyone being able to claim a fairportion, and not in all interests having the same weight in disposalover my portion. Utilitarians cannot admit any restrictions oninterests based on morals or justice. As long as utilitarian theorylacks a concept of justice and fair allocation, it must fail in itsgoal of treating everyone as equals. As Rawls (1971, pp. 27) alsofamously argues, utilitarianism that involves neglecting theseparateness of persons does not contain a proper interpretation ofmoral equality as equal respect for each individual.

3.4 Equality of Welfare

The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that whenit comes to political ethics, what is at stake is individualwell-being. The central criterion for justice must consequently beequalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to beequalized leads to difficulties resembling those of utilitarianism. Ifone contentiously identifies subjective welfare with preferencesatisfaction, it seems implausible to count all individual preferencesas equal, some – such as the desire to do others wrong –being inadmissible on grounds of justice (the offensive tasteargument). Any welfare-centered concept of equality grants people withrefined and expensive taste more resources – somethingdistinctly at odds with our moral intuitions (the expensive tasteargument) (Dworkin 1981a). However, satisfaction in the fulfillment ofdesires cannot serve as a standard, since we wish for more than asimple feeling of happiness. A more viable standard for welfarecomparisons would seem to be success in the fulfillment ofpreferences. A fair evaluation of such success cannot be purelysubjective, but requires a standard of what should or could have beenachieved. This itself involves an assumption regarding justdistribution, so it cannot stand as an independent criterion forjustice. Another serious problem with any welfare-centered concept ofequality is that it cannot take account of either desert (Feinberg1970) or personal responsibility for one’s own well-being, to theextent this is possible and reasonable.

3.5 Equality of Resources

Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equalityavoids such problems (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981b). It holds individualsresponsible for their decisions and actions, but not for circumstancesbeyond their control, such as race, sex, skin-color, intelligence, andsocial position, thus excluding these as distributive criteria. Equalopportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequalinnate gifts. What applies for social circumstances should also applyfor such gifts, as both are purely arbitrary from a moral point ofview.

According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initialexpectations of “basic goods,” i.e., all-purpose goods;this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of suchgoods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions andactions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basicfreedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill twoprovisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices andpositions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality ofopportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possibleadvantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, p. 5f.; 1971, § 13). Otherwise, the economic order requires revision.Due to the argument of the moral arbitrariness of talents, thecommonly accepted criteria for merit (like productivity, workinghours, effort) are clearly relativized. The difference principle onlyallows the talented to earn more to the extent this raises the lowestincomes. According to Rawls, with regard to the basic structure ofsociety, the difference principle should be opted for under aself-chosen “veil of ignorance” regarding personal andhistorical circumstances and similar factors: the principle offers ageneral assurance of not totally succumbing to the hazards of a freemarket situation; and everyone does better than with inevitablyinefficient total equal distribution, whose level of well-being isbelow that of those worst off under the difference principle.

Since Rawls’Theory of Justice is the classical focal pointof present-day political philosophy, it is worth noting the differentways his theory claims to be egalitarian. First, Rawls upholds anatural basis for equal human worth: a minimal capacity for having aconception of the good and a sense of justice. Second, through thedevice of the “veil of ignorance,” people are conceived asequals in the “original position.” Third, the idea ofsharing this “original position” presupposes the partieshaving political equality, as equal participants in the process ofchoosing the principles by which they would be governed. Fourth, Rawlsproposes fair equality of opportunity. Fifth, he maintains that alldesert must be institutionally defined, depending on the goals of thesociety. No one deserves his or her talents or circumstances, whichare products of the natural lottery. Finally, the difference principletends toward equalizing holdings. However, it is important to keep inmind, as Scheffler (2003) has pointed out, that the main focus ofRawls’ theory is justice as such; it is only secondarily about anegalitarian conception of justice. In addition, since the primarysubject is the basic structure, pure procedural justice has priorityover distributive or allocative justice Equality is not the only orsingle value for Rawls.

Dworkin’s equality of resources (1981b), on the other hand, isconcerned with equality as such. His theory stakes a claim to beingeven more ‘ambition- and endowment-insensitive’ thanRawls’ theory. Unequal distribution of resources is considered faironly when it results from the decisions and intentional actions ofthose concerned. Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction in whicheveryone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means ofpayment, so that in the end no one is jealous of another’s bundle (theenvy test). The auction-procedure also offers a way to preciselymeasure equality of resources: the measure of resources devoted to aperson’s life is defined by the importance of the resources to others(Dworkin 1981b, p. 290). In the free market, how the distribution thendevelops depends on an individual’s ambitions. The inequalities thatthus emerge are justified, since one has to take responsibility forhow one’s choices turn out (i.e., one’s “option luck”) inthe realm of personal responsibility. In contrast, unjustifiedinequalities based on different innate provisions and gifts, as wellas on brute luck, should be compensated for through a fictivedifferentiated insurance system: its premiums are established behindDworkin’s own “veil of ignorance,” in order to then bedistributed in real life to everyone and collected in taxes. ForDworkin, this is the key to the natural lottery being balanced fairly,preventing a “slavery of the talented” through excessiveredistribution.

3.6 Responsibility and Luck-Egalitarianism

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most oftoday’s egalitarians are pluralistic, recognizing other values besidesequality. So called luck-egalitarians regard the moral significance ofchoice and responsibility as one of the most important values besidesequality (for an overview over the debate see Lippert-Rasmussen 2015).They hold that it is bad – unjust or unfair – for some tobe worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own(Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore strive to eliminate involuntarydisadvantages, for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible(Cohen 1989, 916).

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantagepoint for deciding on which grounds one might justify whichinequality. Thepositive formulation of the responsibilityprinciple requires an assumption of personal responsibility and holdsthat inequalities which are the result of self-chosen options arejust. (See above all Dworkin, 1981b, p. 311; contra: Anderson, 1999.)Unequal portions of social goods are thus fair when they result fromthe decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Individualsmust accept responsibility for the costs of their decisions. Personsare themselves responsible for certain inequalities that result fromtheir voluntary decisions, and they deserve no compensation for suchinequalities, aside from minimal provisions in cases of dire need (seebelow). In itsnegative formulation, the responsibilityprinciple holds that inequalities which are not the result ofself-chosen options are to be rejected as unjust; personsdisadvantaged in this way deserve compensation. That which one can donothing about, or for which one is not responsible, cannot constitutea relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumption remains anascription of responsibility, and each individual case requires closescrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unless there is anadequate reason for being considered otherwise (but cf. Stemplowska2013 for a different interpretation)..

If advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitrary and unearneddifferences are unfair, this holds for social circumstances as well asnatural endowments. The reasons favoring an exclusion of features likeskin-color, size, sex, and place of origin as primarily discriminativeapply equally to other natural human qualities, like intelligence,appearance, physical strength, and so forth. The kind and the extentof one’s natural abilities are due to a lottery of nature; consideredfrom a moral standpoint, their distribution is purely arbitrary(Rawls, 1971, § 48). To sum up: natural and social endowment mustnot count, and personal intentions and voluntary decisions shouldcount. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes as much aspossible, and in a normatively tenable way, all personal disadvantagesfor which an individual is not responsible, and accords individualsthe capacity to bear the consequences of their decisions and actions,as befits their capacity for autonomy.

Objections to all versions of “brute-luck egalitarianism”come from two sides. Some authors criticize its in their viewunjustified or excessively radical rejection of merit: Theluck-egalitarian thesis of desert only being justifiably acknowledgedif it involves desert “all the way down” (Nozick 1974, p.225) not only destroys the classical, everyday principle of desert,since everything has a basis that we ourselves have not created. Inthe eyes of such critics, along with the merit-principle this argumentalso destroys our personal identity, since we can no longer accreditourselves with our own capacities and accomplishments. (Cf. the textsin Pojman & McLeod 1998, Olsaretti 2003.) Other authors considerthe criterion for responsibility to be too strong, indeed inhuman (or“harsh”) in its consequences, since human beingsresponsible for their own misery would (supposedly) be left alone withtheir misery (Anderson 1999, also MacLeod 1998, Scheffler 2003, Wolff1998, Fleurbaey 1995, Voigt 2007, Eyal 2017, Olsaretti 2009,Stemplowska 2009). However, pluralistic egalitarians should be ableto argue that there are special cases, in which people are so badlyoff that they should be helped, even if they got into the miserablesituation through their own fault. But even when people are interrible situations, which did not arise through their own fault(‘bad brute luck’) – for instance, when they aredisabled from birth – and egalitarians therefore have reasons tohelp them, these reasons are supposedly stigmatizing, since in thesecases the principles of distribution would be based on pity. In thesecases, political institutions have to take certain decisions –for example, in which category a particular case of distress should beplaced – and gather relevant information on theircitizens. Against such a procedure, one could object that it subjectsthe citizens to the tutelage of the state and harms their privatesphere (Anderson 1999, also Hayek 1960: 85–102).

3.7 Equality of Opportunity for Welfare or Advantage

Approaches based on equality of opportunity can be read as revisionsof both welfarism and resourcism. Ranged against welfarism anddesigned to avoid its pitfalls, they incorporate the powerful ideas ofchoice and responsibility into various, improved forms ofegalitarianism. Such approaches are meant to equalize outcomesresulting from causes beyond a person’s control (i.e., beyondcircumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes thatresult from autonomous choice or ambition. But the approaches are alsoaimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have tocount, as the sole basis for a necessary linkage back to theindividual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of theperson’s value. In Arneson’s (1989, 1990) concept ofequalopportunity for welfare, the preferences determining the measureof individual well-being are meant to be conceived hypothetically– i.e., a person would decide on them after a process of idealreflection. In order to correspond to the morally central vantage ofpersonal responsibility, what should be equalized are not enlightenedpreferences themselves, but rather real opportunities to achieve orreceive a good, to the extent that it is aspired to. G.A. Cohen’s(1989, p. 916 f.) broader conception ofequality of access toadvantage attempts to integrate the perspectives of welfareequality and resource equality through the overriding concept ofadvantage. For Cohen, there are two grounds for egalitariancompensation. Egalitarians will be moved to furnish a paralyzed personwith a compensatory wheelchair independently of the person’s welfarelevel. This egalitarian response to disability overrides equality of(opportunity to) welfare. Egalitarians also favor compensation forphenomena such as pain, independent of any loss of capacity –for instance by paying for expensive medicine. But, Cohen claims, anyjustification for such compensation has to invoke the idea of equalityof opportunity to welfare. He thus views both aspects, resources andwelfare, as necessary and irreducible. Much of Roemer’s (1998) moretechnical argument is devoted to constructing the scale to calibratethe extent to which something is the result of circumstances. Anincurred adverse consequence is the result of circumstances, notchoice, precisely to the extent that it is a consequence that personsof one or another specific type can be expected to incur.

3.8 Capabilities Approaches

Theories that limit themselves to the equal distribution of basicmeans, in the hope of doing justice to the different goals of allhuman beings, are often criticized as fetishistic, because they focuson means as opposed to what individuals gain with these means (Sen1980). The value that goods have for someone depends on objectivepossibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities.Hence, in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposesorientating distribution around “capabilities to achievefunctionings,” i.e., the various things that a person manages todo orbe in leading a life (Sen 1992). In other words, evaluatingindividual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving andmaintaining various precious conditions and “functionings”constitutive of a person’s being, such as adequate nourishment, goodhealth, the ability to move about freely or to appear in publicwithout shame. The real freedom to acquire well-being is alsoimportant here, a freedom represented in the capability to oneselfchoose forms of achievement and the combination of“functionings.” For Sen, capabilities are thus the measureof anequality of capabilities human beings enjoy to leadtheir lives. A problem consistently raised with capability approachesis the ability to weigh capabilities in order to arrive at a metricfor equality. The problem is intensified by the fact that variousmoral perspectives are blended in the concept of capability (Cohen1993, p. 17–26, Williams 1987). Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) haslinked the capability approach to an Aristotelian, essentialistic,“thick” theory of the good – a theory meant to be,as she puts it, “vague,” incomplete, and open-ended enoughto leave place for individual and cultural variation. On the basis ofsuch a “thick” conception of necessary and universalelements of a good life, certain capabilities and functionings can bedesignated as foundational. In this manner, Nussbaum can endow thecapability approach with a precision that furnishes an index ofinterpersonal comparison, but at the risk of not being neutral enoughregarding the plurality of personal conceptions of the good, aneutrality normally required by most liberals (most importantly Rawls1993; but see Robeyns 2009 for a different take on the comparison withRawls). For further discussion, see the entry on thecapability approach.

4. Relational Equality

Since the late 1990s, social relations egalitarianism has appeared inphilosophical discourse as an increasingly important competitor todistribuitivist accounts of justice, especially its luck egalitarianversions (cf. Lippert-Rassmussen 2018). Proponents of social relationsegalitarianism include Anderson (1999), Miller (1997), Scanlon (1996,2018), Scheffler (2003, 2005, 2015), Wolff (1998, 2010) and Young(1990). Negatively, they are united in a rejection of the view thatjustice is a matter of eliminating differential luck. Positively, theyclaim that society is just if, and only if, individuals within itrelate to one another as equals. Accordingly, the site of justice(i.e. that to which principles of justice apply) is society, notdistributions. Relational Egalitarianism has a certain overlap withmany theories of recognition and non-domination. Certain statusdifferences are at the core of their objections, like thosestigmatizing differences in status, whereby the badly off are causedto experience themselves as inferior, and are treated as inferiors, orwhen inequalities create objectionable relations ofpower(Honneth/Fraser 2003) and domination (Pettit 2001).

What does it mean that (and when do) individuals within a societyrelate to one another as equals? Racial discrimination, for example,is a paradigmatic instance of this condition?s violation. But once wemove beyond a handful of such examples things become much lessclear.

These claims to social and political equality exclude all unequal,hierarchical forms of social relationships, in which some peopledominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence uponothers:

As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived ofas a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys thesame social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claimsthat citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of theirstatus as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of thedetails of their particular circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, p. 22)

However, forms of differentiation that do not violate moral equality(see above) are not per se excluded from social equality, if they arecompatible with the recognition of the equal social status ofconcerned parties, as with differences relating to merit, need, and,if appropriate, race, gender, and social background (as in cases ofaffirmative action or fair punishment).

Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of thecommunity enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overridestheir unequal ratings along particular dimensions. (Miller, 1997, p.232)

Thus the question has to be answered whether – and if so, why– other dimensions, such as a person’s natural talents,creativity, intelligence, innovative skills or entrepreneurialability, can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.

Relational egalitarians need a certain conception of what an equalstanding in society amounts to and implies in terms of rights andgoods. One way to offer such an account would be to rely (likeAnderson 1999) on the capabilities approach (§3.8) andsufficitarianism (§6.2.): In a democratic community thatpreserves the free and equal status of persons, at least three sets ofconditions have to be fulfilled.

First, certain political conditions are necessary to allow citizens toparticipate as equals in democratic deliberation. These include, amongothers, the capabilities to vote, hold office, assemble, petition thegovernment, speak freely, and move about freely (Rawls 1999, p.53).The principle of democratic equality (as asked for by Anderson 1999)requires us to eliminate social hierarchies that prevent ademocratically organized society, a society in which we cooperate anddecide upon state action as equals. Persons morally owe each other thecapabilities and conditions to live as equals in a democraticcommunity (Christiano 2008, Kolodny 2014). Democracy can beinterpreted as realizing public equality in collectivedecision-making.

Second, to participate as an equal in civil society, certain civilconditions must obtain. These include the conditions that make itrobustly likely that injustices such as marginalization,powerlessness, cultural imperialism (Anderson 1999 with reference toYoung 1990), or domination (Pettit 2001) can be to avoided. Third,certain social conditions and personal capabilities have to obtainthat enable people to enjoy equal standing in society. Citizens need,in this regard, adequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, education, andmedical care. This last point leads into the debate over whether arelational egalitarian conception of social justice yields intrinsicand instrumental reasons of justice to care about distributiveinequality in socially produced goods, despite its emphasis on justsocial relationships and not the distribution of goods per se(Schemmel 2011, Elford 2017).

5. Equality Among Whom?

Justice is primarily related to individual actions. Individual personsare the primary bearers of responsibility (the key principle ofethical individualism). This raises two controversial issues in thecontemporary debate.

One could regard the norms of distributive equality as applying togroups rather than individuals. It is often groups that rightfullyraise the issue of an inequality between themselves and the rest ofsociety, as with women and racial and ethnic groups. The questionarises of whether inequality among such groups should be consideredmorally objectionable in itself, or whether even in the case ofgroups, the underlying concern should be how individuals (as membersof such groups) fare in comparative terms. If there is a worry aboutinequalities between groups of individuals, why does this nottranslate into a worry about inequalities between members of thegroup?

A further question concerns whether the norms of distributive equality(whatever they are) apply to all individuals, regardless of where (andwhen) they live. Or rather, do they only hold for members ofcommunities within states and nations? Most theories of equality dealexclusively with distributive equality among people in a singlesociety. There does not, however, seem to be any rationale for thatlimitation. Can the group of the entitled be restricted prior to theexamination of concrete claims? Many theories seem to imply this,especially when they connect distributive justice or the goods to bedistributed with social cooperation or production. For those whocontribute nothing to cooperation, such as the disabled, children, orfuture generations, would have to be denied a claim to a fair share.The circle of persons who are to be the recipients of distributionwould thus be restricted from the outset. Other theories are lessrestrictive, insofar as they do not link distribution to actual socialcollaboration, yet nonetheless do restrict it, insofar as they bind itto the status of citizenship. In this view, distributive justice islimited to the individuals within a society. Those outside thecommunity have no entitlement to social justice. Unequal distributionamong states and the social situations of people outside theparticular society could not, in this view, be a problem of socialdistributive justice (Nagel 2005). Yet here too, the universalmorality of equal respect and the principle of equal distributiondemand that all persons consider one another as prima facie equallyentitled to the goods, unless reasons for an unequal distribution canbe advanced. It may be that in the process of justification, reasonswill emerge for privileging those who were particularly involved inthe production of a good, but there is no prima facie reason toexclude from the outset other persons, such as those from othercountries, from the process of distribution and justification (Pogge2002). That may seem most intuitively plausible in the case of naturalresources (e.g. oil) that someone discovers by chance on or beneaththe surface of his or her property. Why should such resources belongto the person who discovers them, or on whose property they arelocated? Nevertheless, in the eyes of many if not most people, globaljustice, i.e., extending egalitarian distributive justice globally,demands too much from individuals and their states (Miller 1998; butcf. Caney 2005). Alternatively, one might argue that there are other‘special relations’ between members of one society that donot exist between members of different societies. Nationalism is anexample for such a (controversial) thesis that may provide a case fora kind of local equality (Miller 1995). For further discussion,see the entry onglobal justice.

Another issue is the relationship between generations. Does thepresent generation have an egalitarian obligation towards futuregenerations regarding equal living conditions? One argument in favorof this conclusion might be that people should not end up unequallywell off as a result of morally arbitrary factors. However, the issueof justice between generation is notoriously complex (Temkin1992). For further discussion, see the entry onintergenerational justice.

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Does equality play a major role in a theory of justice, and if so,what is this role? A conception of justice isegalitarianwhen it views equality as a fundamental goal of justice. Temkin hasput it as follows:

… an egalitarian is any person who attachessome valueto equalityitself (that is, any person that caresatall about equality, over and above the extent it promotes otherideals). So, equality needn’t be the only value, or even the ideal shevalues most… . Egalitarians have the deep and (for them)compelling view that it is a bad thing – unjust and unfair– for some to be worse off than others through no fault of theirown. (Temkin 1986, p. 100, cf. 1993, p. 7)

In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realizeequality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e., on an equality oflife prospects and life circumstances – interpreted in variousways according to various positions in the “equality ofwhat” debate (see above).

6.1. Kinds of Egalitarianism

It is apparent that there are three sorts of egalitarianism: intrinsic,instrumental and constitutive. (For a twofold distinction cf. Parfit1997, Temkin 1993, p. 11, McKerlie, 1996, p. 275.)

Intrinsic egalitarians view equality as a good in itself. Aspure egalitarians, they are concerned solely with equality, most ofthem with equality of social circumstances, according to which it isintrinsically bad if some people are worse off than others through nofault of their own. But it is in fact the case that people do notalways consider inequality a moral evil. Intrinsic egalitariansregarde quality as desirable even when the equalization would be of nouse to any of the affected parties, such as when equality can only beproduced through depressing the level of well being of everyone’slife. But something can only have an intrinsic value when it is goodfor at least one person, when it makes one life better in some way oranother.

The following “leveling-down” objection indicatesthat doing away within equality in fact ought to produce bettercircumstances; it is otherwise unclear why equality should be desired.(For such an objection, cf. Nozick 1974, p. 229, Raz 1986, chap. 9, p.227, 235, Temkin 1993, pp. 247–8.) Sometimes inequality can only beended by depriving those who are better off of their resources,rendering them as poorly off as everyone else. (For anyone looking fora drastic literary example, Kurt Vonnegut’s 1950 science-fiction storyHarrison Bergeron is recommended.) This would have to be anacceptable approach according to the intrinsic conception. But wouldit be morally good if, in a group consisting of both blind and sightedpersons, those with sight were rendered blind because the blind couldnot be offered sight? That would be morally perverse. Doing away withinequality by bringing everyone down contains – so the objectiongoes – nothing good. Such leveling-down objections would ofcourse only be valid if there were indeed no better and equallyegalitarian alternatives available, but there are nearly always suchalternatives: e.g. those who can see should have to help the blind,financially or otherwise. When there are no alternatives, in order toavoid such objections, intrinsic egalitarianism cannot be strict, butneeds to bepluralistic. Then intrinsic egalitarians couldsay there is something good about the change, namely greater equality,although they would concede that much is bad about it. Pluralisticegalitarians do not have equality as their only goal; they also admitother values and principles, above all the principle of welfare,according to which it is better when people are doing better. Inaddition, pluralistic egalitarianism should bemoderateenough to not always grant equality victory in the case of conflictbetween equality and welfare. Instead, they must accept reductions inequality for the sake of a higher quality of life for all (as withRawls’ difference principle).

At present, many egalitarians are ready to concede that equality inthe sense of equality of life circumstances has no compelling value initself, but that, in a framework of liberal concepts of justice, itsmeaning emerges in pursuit of other ideals, like universal freedom,the full development of human capacities and the human personality,the mitigation of suffering and defeat of domination andstigmatization, the stable coherence of modern and freely constitutedsocieties, and so forth (Scanlon 1996, 2018). For those who are worseoff, unequal circumstances often mean considerable (relative)disadvantages and many (absolute) evils; as a rule, these (relative)disadvantages and (absolute) evils are the source of our moralcondemnation of unequal circumstances. But this does not mean thatinequality as such is an evil. Hence, the argument goes, fundamentalmoral ideals other than equality stand behind our aspiring forequality. To reject inequality on such grounds is to favor equalityeither as a byproduct or as a means, and not as a goal or intrinsicvalue. In its treatment of equality as a derived virtue, the sort ofegalitarianism – if the term is actually suitable – hereat play isinstrumental.

As indicated, there is also a third, more suitable approach to theequality ideal: aconstitutive egalitarianism. According tothis approach, to the aspiration to equality is rooted in other moralgrounds, namely because certain inequalities are unjust. Equality hasvalue, but this is an extrinsic value, since it derives from another,higher moral principle of equal dignity and respect. But it is notinstrumental for this reason, i.e., it is not only valued on accountof moral equality, but also on its own account. (For the distinctionbetween the origin of a value and the kind of value it is, cf.Korsgaard 1996.) Equality stands in relation to justice as does a partto a whole. The requirement of justification is based on moralequality, and in certain contexts, successful justification leads tothe above-named principles of equality, i.e., formal, proportionalequality and the presumption of equality. Thus, according toconstitutive egalitarianism, these principles and the resultingequality are required by justice, and by the same token constitutesocial justice.

It is important to further distinguish two levels of egalitarianismand non-egalitarianism, respectively. On a first level, a constitutiveegalitarian presumes that every explication of the moral standpoint isincomplete without terms such as ‘equal,’‘similarly,’ etc. In contrast, a non-egalitarianismoperating on the same level considers such terms misplaced orredundant. On a second level, when it comes to concretizing andspecifying conceptions of justice, a constitutive egalitarian givesequality substantive weight. On this level, more and less egalitarianpositions can be found, according to the chosen currency of equality(the criteria by which just equality is measured) and according to thereasons for unequal distributions (exemptions of the presumption ofequality) that the respective theories regard as well grounded.Egalitarianism on the second level thus relates to the kind, qualityand quantity of things to be equalized. Because of such variables, aclear-cut definition of second level egalitarianism cannot beformulated. In contrast, non-egalitarians on this second leveladvocate a non-relational entitlement theory of justice.

6.2 Equality vs. Priority or Sufficiency

Alongside the often-raised objections against equality mentioned inthe section on “simple equality” (3.1. above) there is adifferent and more fundamental critique formulated by first levelnon-egalitarians: that equality does not have a foundational role inthe grounding of claims to justice. While the older version of acritique of egalitarianism comes mainly from the conservative end ofthe political spectrum, thus arguing in general against“patterned principles of justice” (Nozick 1974, esp. pp.156–157), the critique’s newer version also often can be heard inprogressive circles (Walzer 1983, Raz 1986, chap. 9, Frankfurt 1987,1997, Parfit 1997, Anderson 1999). This first-level critique ofequality poses the basic question of why justice should in fact beconceived relationally and (what is here the same) comparatively.Referring back to Joel Feinberg’s (1974) distinction betweencomparative and non-comparative justice, non-egalitarians object tothe moral requirement to treat people as equals, and the many demandsfor justice emerging from it. They argue that neither the postulatenor these demands involve comparative principles, let alone anyequality principles. They reproach first-level egalitarians for aconfusion between “equality” and “universals.”As the non-egalitarians see things, within many principles of justice– at least the especially important ones – theequality-terminology is redundant. Equality is thus merely a byproductof the general fulfillment of actually non-comparative standards ofjustice: something obscured through the unnecessary insertion of anexpression of equality (Raz 1986, p. 227f.). At least the centralstandards of dignified human life are not relational but“absolute.” As Harry Frankfurt puts it: “It iswhether people have good lives, and not how their lives compare withthe lives of others” (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). And again:“The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing thatit is morally important whether one person has less than anotherregardless of how much either of them has” (Frankfurt 1987, p.34).

From the non-egalitarian perspective, what is really at stake inhelping those worse off and improving their lot ishumanitarianconcern, a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern is notunderstood as egalitarian, as it is not focused on the differencebetween the better off and the worse off as such (whatever the appliedstandard), but on improving the situation of the latter. Theirdistress constitutes the actual moral foundation. The wealth of thosebetter off only furnishes a means that has to be transferred for thesake of mitigating the distress, as long as other, morally negativeconsequences do not emerge in the process. The strength of the impetusfor more equality lies in the urgency of the claims of those worseoff, not in the extent of the inequality. For this reason, instead ofequality the non-egalitarian critics favor one or anotherentitlement theory of justice, such as Nozick’s (1974)libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt’s (1987)doctrine ofsufficiency, according to which “What is important from themoral point of view is not that everyone should havethe samebut that each should have enough. If everyone hadenough, itwould be of no moral consequence whether some had more thanothers” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Parfit’s (1997)priority view accordingly calls for a focuson improving the situation of society’s weaker and poorer members, andindeed all the more urgently the worse off they are, even if they canbe less helped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishesbetween egalitarianism and prioritarianism. According toprioritarians, benefiting people is more important the worse off thosepeople are. This prioritising will often increase equality, but theyare two distinct values, since in an important respect equality is arelational value while priority is not. However, egalitarians andprioritarians share an important feature, in that both hold that thebest possible distribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. Itis thus a matter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort ofegalitarianism or a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case,entitlement-based non-egalitarian arguments can practically result inan equality of outcome as far-reaching as egalitarian theories. Hencethe fulfillment of an absolute or non-comparative standard foreveryone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequentlyresults in a certain equality of outcome, where such a standardcomprises not only a decent but a good life. Consequently, the debatehere centers on the basis – is it equality or something else?– and not so much on the outcome – are persons or groupsmore or less equal, according to a chosen metric? Possibly, thedifference lies even deeper, in their respective conceptions ofmorality in general.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique by concedingthat it is the nature of some (however certainly far from all)essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily withthe adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals.However, whether a claim can itself be considered suitable can beascertained only by asking whether it can be agreed on by all thoseaffected in hypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. (See,e.g., Casal 2007 for a deeper discussion and critique of the doctrineof sufficiency.) This justificatory procedure is more necessary if itis less evident that what is at stake is actually suffering, distress,or an objective need. In the view of the constitutive egalitarians,all the judgments of distributive justice should be approachedrelationally, by asking which distributive scheme all concernedparties can universally and reciprocally agree to. As described atsome length in the pertinent section above, many egalitarians arguethat a presumption in favor of equality follows from thisjustification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, this isall one needs for the justification and determination of theconstitutive value of equality.

Secondly, even if – for the sake of argument – thequestion is left open as to whether demands for distribution accordingto objective needs (e.g. alleviating hunger) involve non-comparativeentitlement-claims, it is nonetheless always necessary to resolve thequestion of what needy individuals are owed. And this is tied in abasic way to the question of what persons owe one another incomparable or worse situations, and how scarce resources (money,goods, time, energy) must be invested in light of the sum total of ourobligations. While the claim on our aid may well appearnon-relational, determining the kind and extent of the aid must alwaysbe relational, at least in circumstances of scarcity (and resourcesare always scarce). Claims are either “satiable” (Raz1986, p. 235) – i.e., an upper limit or sufficiency level can beindicated, after which each person’s claim to X has been fulfilled– or they are not. For insatiable claims, to stipulate any levelat which one is or ought to be sufficiently satisfied is arbitrary. Ifthe standards of sufficiency are defined as a bare minimum, why shouldpersons be content with that minimum? Why should the manner in whichwelfare and resources are distributed above the poverty level not alsobe a question of justice? If, by contrast, we are concerned solelywith claims that are in principle “satiable,” such claimshaving a reasonable definition of sufficiency, then these standards ofsufficiency will most likely be very high. In Frankfurt’s definition,for example, sufficiency is reached only when persons are satisfiedand no longer actively strive for more. Since people find themselvesourselves operating, in practice, in circumstances far beneath such ahigh sufficiency level, they (of course) live under conditions of(moderate) scarcity. Then the above mentioned argument holds as well– namely, that in order to determine to what extent it is to befulfilled, each claim has to be judged in relation to the claims ofall others and all available resources. In addition, the moral urgencyof lifting people above dire poverty cannot be invoked to demonstratethe moral urgency of everyone having enough. In both forms of scarcity– i.e., with satiable and insatiable claims – the socialright or claim to goods cannot be conceived as something absolute ornon-comparative. Egalitarians may thus conclude that distributivejustice is always comparative. This would suggest that distributiveequality, especially equality of life-conditions, should play afundamental role in any adequate theory of justice in particular, andof morality in general.

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