The philosophy of Epicurus (341–270 B.C.E.) was a complete andinterdependent system, involving a view of the goal of human life(happiness, resulting from absence of physical pain and mentaldisturbance), an empiricist theory of knowledge (sensations, togetherwith the perception of pleasure and pain, are infallible criteria), adescription of nature based on atomistic materialism, and anaturalistic account of evolution, from the formation of the world tothe emergence of human societies. Epicurus believed that, on the basisof a radical materialism which dispensed with transcendent entitiessuch as the Platonic Ideas or Forms, he could disprove the possibilityof the soul’s survival after death, and hence the prospect ofpunishment in the afterlife. He regarded the unacknowledged fear ofdeath and punishment as the primary cause of anxiety among humanbeings, and anxiety in turn as the source of extreme and irrationaldesires. The elimination of the fears and corresponding desires wouldleave people free to pursue the pleasures, both physical and mental,to which they are naturally drawn, and to enjoy the peace of mind thatis consequent upon their regularly expected and achieved satisfaction.It remained to explain how irrational fears arose in the first place:hence the importance of an account of social evolution. Epicurus wasaware that deeply ingrained habits of thought are not easilycorrected, and thus he proposed various exercises to assist thenovice. His system included advice on the proper attitude towardpolitics (avoid it where possible) and the gods (do not imagine thatthey concern themselves about human beings and their behavior), therole of sex (dubious), marriage (also dubious) and friendship(essential), reflections on the nature of various meteorological andplanetary phenomena, about which it was best to keep an open mind inthe absence of decisive verification, and explanations of suchprocesses as gravity (that is, the tendency of objects to fall to thesurface of the earth) and magnetism, which posed considerablechallenges to the ingenuity of the earlier atomists. Although theoverall structure of Epicureanism was designed to hang together and toserve its principal ethical goals, there was room for a great deal ofintriguing philosophical argument concerning every aspect of thesystem, from the speed of atoms in a void to the origin of opticalillusions.

• 1. Sources
• 2. Life
• 3. Physical Theory
• 4. Psychology and Ethics
• 5. Social Theory
• 6. The Epicurean Life
• Bibliography
  • Editions, translations, commentaries
  • Critical Studies
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Sources

The major source for Epicurean doctrine is Diogenes Laertius’third-century C.E.Lives of Eminent Philosophers, acompilation of information on the lives and doctrines of thephilosophers of classical Greece (see “Doxography of AncientPhilosophy”). In the tenth and final book, devoted toEpicureanism, Diogenes preserves three of Epicurus’ letters tohis disciples, in which he presents his basic views in a concise andhandy form. TheLetter to Herodotus summarizesEpicurus’ physical theory, theLetter to Menoeceusoffers a précis of Epicurean ethics, and theLetter toPythocles treats astronomical and meteorological matters. (Thereis some doubt about whether the last is by Epicurus himself or afollower, but there seems to be sufficient reason to attribute it tothe founder himself.) Diogenes also quotes a collection of briefsayings, called the “Principal Beliefs” or“Principal Doctrines” (Kuriai Doxai), excerptedfrom the writings of Epicurus or, in some cases, of his closeassociates; another such collection, partially overlapping with thefirst, survives in an independent manuscript and is conventionallycalled the Vatican Sayings. The purpose of both sets, like that of theLetters, was to make the core doctrines easy to remember. Diogenesalso fills in topics not covered in the Letters, and provides a listof Epicurus’ writings and other biographical information (forthe text, see Dorandi 2013; for an English translation, Mensch 2018).

Short citations of Epicurus’ works appear in other writers(e.g., Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and the Greek commentators onAristotle), often taken out of context or presented in a polemical anddistorted fashion. (The standard edition of Epicurus’ works inGreek is Arrighetti 1973; the fullest collection of fragments andtestimonies is still Usener 1887, repr. with Italian translation,Ramelli 2002; for translations, see Bibliography: Editions,Translations, Commentaries). In addition, several works of Epicurus,including parts of his major treatise,On Nature (Periphuseôs) — a series of lectures running to 37 papyrusrolls — have been recovered in damaged condition from thelibrary of a villa in the town of Herculaneum, which was buried in theeruption of Mt. Vesuvius in 79 C.E. The library almost certainlycontained the working collection of Philodemus, an Epicureanphilosopher from Syria who studied in Athens and moved to Italy in thefirst century B.C.E. Many of the rolls consist of Philodemus’own writings, and provide valuable information about later issues inthe history of Epicureanism. One must be cautious about ascribingthese views to the founder himself, although the school tended to beconservative and later thinkers embellished rather than alteredEpicurus’ own teachings. New editions and translations are nowmaking these difficult texts available to a wider readership.

More or less contemporary with Philodemus is Lucretius (first centuryB.C.E.), who composed in LatinDe rerum natura (“On theNature of Things”; the title, if it is Lucretius’ own, isan adaptation of “On Nature”) in six books of hexameterverse, the meter characteristic of epic and didactic poetry. As adedicated Epicurean, passionate to promulgate the message of thefounder, Lucretius reproduced Epicurean doctrine faithfully (Sedley1998; Clay 1983 allows Lucretius more originality). His poemconcentrates principally on the physical and psychological orepistemological aspects of Epicureanism, and to a great extent omitsthe ethical. From a hostile point of view, Cicero rehearsed andcriticized Epicurus’ ideas, especially concerning ethics, inseveral of his philosophical works, includingOn Moral Ends(De finibus) and theTusculan Disputations. Stilllater, in the second century C.E., another Diogenes erected a largeinscription, to this day only partially excavated, in the city ofOenoanda (in southwestern Turkey), which contained the basic tenets ofEpicureanism (authoritative edition by Smith 1993, but new fragmentshave been published subsequently; see also Gordon 1996, Hammerstaedtet alii, 2017).

2. Life

“Epicurus, the son of Neocles and Chaerestrata, was an Athenianfrom the deme of Gargettus and the lineage of the Philaïdes, asMetrodorus says in hisOn Noble Families. Heraclides, amongothers, in his epitome of Sotion, says that he was raised in Samos,since the Athenians were given parcels of land there, but came toAthens when he was eighteen, when Xenocrates was head of the Academyand Aristotle was still in Chalcis” (where he died in 322). Sobegins the account by Diogenes Laertius (10.1). The dates forEpicurus’ birth and first move to Athens are thus 341 B.C.E. and323 respectively. Diogenes adds that after the death of Alexander(323), when the Athenians were expelled from Samos, Epicurus leftAthens and joined his father in Colophon (in 321), on the coast ofwhat is now Turkey. Here he studied philosophy under the tutelage ofNausiphanes, a Democritean philosopher with skeptical leanings, andauthor of a work called theTripod, on which Epicurusreportedly drew for hisCanon, his principal work onepistemology; in ethics, Nausiphanes substituted the termakataplêxia (“undauntability”) forDemocritus’athambiê, “fearlessness,”as crucial to the good life, which invites comparison withEpicurus’ataraxia or “imperturbability,”though Epicurus is said to have denied having been influenced by him(On Nausiphanes’ role in transmitting elements of Democriteandoctrine to Epicurus, see Warren 2002: 160–92.)

Ten years later, Epicurus moved to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos,and soon proceeded to Lampsacus on the nearby mainland; in both citieshe taught and gathered followers before returning again to Athens in307/06, where he remained until his death in 270, at the age ofseventy or seventy-one. In Athens, he purchased the property thatbecame known as the “Garden” (later used as a name for hisschool itself) and began to develop his own school in earnest.Diogenes reports a number of slanderous stories that were circulatedby Epicurus’ opponents, despite which he affirms that Epicuruswas of an extraordinarily humane disposition; this was the prevailingview, shared even by hostile witnesses to Epicureanism. Diogenes alsorecords Epicurus’ will (10.16–21), in which, among otherthings, he made provisions for the children of his friends andappointed a successor.

3. Physical Theory

Epicurus held that the elementary constituents of nature areundifferentiated matter, in the form of discrete, solid andindivisible particles (“atoms”) below the threshold ofperception, plus empty space, that is, the complement of matter orwhere matter is not (Inwood 1981, Konstan 2014; contra Sedley 1982,who argues that space, for Epicurus, is a continuous matrix extendinguniformly throughout the universe, and is either occupied by matter orempty). In its broad outline, Epicurus inherited this scheme from theearlier atomists, above all Democritus. But Democritus’ versionhad been the object of critiques by later thinkers, especiallyAristotle, in part for incoherencies in the notion of an infinitevoid, in part for problems attaching to his idea of minima, orentities of the smallest conceivable size (see especiallyPhysics Book 6). First, freestanding entities of minimal sizecould have no edges, and so no shapes, or rather would be all edge:thus, if two minima touched, they would wholly overlap. (The sameargument applies to points in a line, which is why a line containspoints but is not composed of them, according to Aristotle.) Further,if atoms really are conceptually indivisible, and not just physicallyunsplittable, then when two atoms pass by each other it is impossiblethat they should at any time be only partway past, for this wouldimply a point partway along the length of the atom, which contradictsthe premise that it is a minimum. Although Aristotle does not statethe argument precisely in this form, it is apparent that a strictconception of minimal-sized atoms entails that motion too must consistof discontinuous quanta; and if motion, then time. Atoms must, then,Aristotle inferred, move in discrete hops (kinêmata),each one occupying a single temporal minimum — and hence, allatoms must move at a uniform speed. An infinite void, with atomsdistributed throughout it, led to problems of its own, for it permitsno intrinsic spatial orientation and hence no account of why thingsfall, as they are observed to do.

The problem for Epicurus was to find a way of explaining the naturalphenomena of bodily movement while responding to the challenges posedby Aristotle’s criticisms of Democritus’ theory. Epicurusrose to the challenge, although one cannot be certain that he wasresponding directly to Aristotle’s critique. (It is unclearwhether or how much philosophers of Epicurus’ generation whowere not members of Aristotle’s own school had access toAristotle’s treatises.)

First, he distinguished between the atom, which by its nature cannotbe broken apart, and the minimum conceivable expanse of matter: atomshave such minima as parts, but are not minima themselves — therecan be no free-standing entity one minimum expanse in size. Thisresolves the problem of atomic edges, and also that of how atoms cancome in different shapes and sizes (though never large enough to beseen): to have the hooks and crevices needed to form compounds, theycan scarcely be theoretically partless. Second, Epicurus agreed thattime too is discontinuous, as is motion: Simplicius (p.934.23–30 Diels; translation in Konstan 1989) quotes him asaffirming that it is untrue to say that an atom is moving over aminimum interval, but only that it has moved (some scholars maintainthat this is a later innovation in the school; see especially Verde2013). What is more, as Aristotle had argued must be the case, atomsall move at the same velocity (the principle ofisotakheia).This last claim entailed difficulties of its own, such as how atomsever overtake each other, if they are moving in the same direction.(Lucretius invoked the idea of a random swerve to solve this one; seebelow.) But it also provided a solution to another problem, that ofentropy: for since atoms can never slow down, the universe can nevercome to a halt (in modern terms, there is no loss of energy). As forgravity, Epicurus may have had a solution to this too, and in a novelform. If an atom just on its own cannot slow down or alter itsdirection of motion, then an atom that is rising or moving in anoblique direction cannot at some point begin to tilt or fall, unlesssomething blocks its progress and forces it to do so. If, however,after a collision atoms tended to emerge in a statistically favoreddirection — that is, if the motions of all atoms aftercollisions did not cancel each other out but on average produced avector, however small, in a given direction, then that direction wouldby definition be down. The absence of a global orientation in theuniverse was thus immaterial. Due to this vector, any given worldwill, like our own, be similarly oriented in respect to the direction“down.” (Given the infinite expanse of the universe onEpicurean theory — see below — we must expect there to bea plurality of worlds, some like ours, some — within limits— different.)

Macroscopic objects, of course, do not move at a uniform and verygreat speed; the atoms within them do, but their motions arerestricted and deflected by neighboring atoms, and so they vibrate. Inthe case of compound objects that are completely at rest, theresultant of internal atomic motions is zero, relative, at least, tothe earth, which may have an average motion of its own. If so, and iffor some reason the earth’s motion is slower in a downwarddirection than that of objects on or near its surface — because,say, the earth is disk-shaped, as Epicurus held, and hence sinks moreslowly in the surrounding atomic medium, like a falling leaf —then Epicurus could explain as well why things like stones tend tofall to the earth’s surface when let go.

Epicurus operated with a highly limited number of elementaryprinciples in nature — he did not know the concept of force, forexample, or the associated ideas of attraction and repulsion amongatoms, not to mention more arcane properties — and for all hisefforts to account for all the physical features of the world on thebasis of this theory, paradoxes remained. An excellent one is posed bySextus Empiricus (Against the Physicists =M10.144–48), which at the same time gives an idea of howEpicurean atoms were understood to behave (at least in Sextus’time, late 2^nd century C.E.). Sextus imagined two atomsseparated by a distance of nine minima, traveling at the same speed(as atoms must) toward each other; after four temporal minima, theatoms would be one spatial minimum apart. Then what? They cannot meetin the middle of the remaining distance, by the very concept of aminimum. Nor can one cross the interval before the other, withoutviolating the rule of equal velocity. But how, then, can they meet atall? We do not know an Epicurean reply to this conundrum. Perhapsatoms are always an even number of minimal spaces apart from oneanother. Or else, minima are always bundled in such large quantitiesthat it is meaningless to speak of an odd or even number of minimabetween atoms; the Stoics, at all events, held that whether the numberof stars, for example, is odd or even is absolutely or naturallynon-evident (kathapax adela, Sextus EmpiricusOutline ofPyrrhonism =PH 2.97,M 8.147;physeiadela,M 8.317–18). But Epicurus believed thatmotion at the atomic level obeyed different laws from those thatappear to operate at the level of macroscopic objects (that atomicmotion is discontinuous is an example). Perhaps, then, motions oversmall numbers of minima were in some sense indiscernible. Finally, itis possible that he discounted such a puzzle as a purely mathematicalparadox, since it is recorded that he had little interest inmathematics as a separate science from physics and believed it to beirrelevant to the proper study of physics.

Fascinating as these questions are in their own right, Epicurushimself does not proceed by creating an abstract model, exploring itsinternal coherence, and determining its applicability to phenomena, inthe ideal manner of modern science. Rather, he begins with thetestimony of the senses, which he thinks are always reliable. Theseprovide a basis on which to draw conclusions either with respect tothings that still await confirmation or those that are by natureimperceptible (Letter to Herodotus =LH 38). Thus,in beginning his account of the physical world in this Letter, heargues that things cannot arise out of nothing, since otherwise therewould be no need of specific seeds for specific plants and animals,and anything whatsoever could be generated out of just any types ofmaterial elements. Since this is not seen to happen, but reproductionin things we can observe with our senses is in fact orderly anddeterminate, spontaneous generation at any level is ruled out. Thelogic is what Epicurus calls counterwitnessing: a hypothetical premise(here, that things sometimes arise out of nothing) is eliminatedbecause experience tells against its conclusion (here, that the cominginto being of visible objects does not require determinate seeds ormaterials). More simply, ifA thenB; but notB, hence notA. One might, of course, challenge theimplication: something might arise from nothing, even if there are nocases of chickens giving birth to horses. The important point,however, is that Epicurus invokes the data of perception to testifyfor or against the nature of elementary phenomena; he assumes acertain uniformity of nature at all levels. So too with his nextpostulate: things are not destroyed into what is not, since in thatcase everything would cease to exist (and would have ceased to existbefore now, given infinite past time — recall that nothing iscreated out of nothing); but things do exist, hence the premise isfalse.

As for bodies (note the plural: Epicurus does not typically speak ofmatter per se) and void as the basic physical principles, the senses,Epicurus affirms, testify to the existence of bodies, and bycalculation on the basis of the senses we infer the nature of what isinvisible, for example the atoms (LH 39). Here the reasoningis based on analogy: what is evident to our senses must be true on themicroscopic level as well, at least in some respects. Void must exist,in turn, if bodies are to be able to move, as they are seen to do.Thus motion is the counterwitness to the non-existence of void —an indirect argument is required since one cannot perceive emptyspace. What is more, since bodies, being “full,” offerresistance and void, being empty, offers no resistance, theycomplement each other and exhaust the possibilities; hence it isimpossible to conceive of anything besides these two principles, apartfrom things that are accidents of them — accidents that arisefrom unions of elementary bodies in the void. (Inconceivability isanother tool in Epicurus’ method of demonstration.) Theseelementary bodies, then, are the atoms, which are indivisible andinalterable, if things are not to dissolve into nothingness. TheLetter to Herodotus is an epitome of Epicurean doctrine, andthe arguments are crisp and abbreviated, but the reasoning is clear,and is confirmed by the more detailed treatment in Lucretius, whichalmost certainly follows Epicurus’On Nature (see Leone2012). Epicurus appeals to some elementary intuitions concerningbodies and their movement through space in order to establish thestructure of imperceptibly small things; he concludes that these mustbe inalterable if nature is not to dissolve into nothing (creationback out of nothing having already been eliminated by the argumentcited above from regularity in generation); and the basic features ofthe atomic system are then in place. A similar appeal to the sensesestablishes the infinity of the universe, since what is finite musthave an edge, and an edge is conceived in reference to somethingbeyond it. But the universe — in Greek, the “all”— contains everything, and so there is nothing outside it bywhich to conceive an edge. Hence, it is infinite. And if the all isinfinite, so is the void and the number of atoms as well, forotherwise atoms would be too widely dispersed ever to meet(LH 41–42).

Epicurus now has in place the fundamental constituents of his naturalworld, and he might have stopped here, with atoms and void and thedenial, on the grounds of inconceivability, of any other kind of basicphysical principle. All secondary properties, such as color and taste,will be explained as epiphenomena of atomic combinations, andperception of things at a distance by the continual emission ofinfinitesimally thin laminas from objects, which maintain the relevantfeatures of the source (in the case of vision, for example, thelaminas will preserve the atomic patterns specific to the color andshape of the object) and directly stimulate the relevant sense organ.This is a tricky thesis, and again posed puzzles: how do the lamina orsimulacra, as Lucretius called them, of a mountain enter the eye, forexample? In fragments? By somehow shrinking? We do not know the answerto this one, but there are some plausible hypotheses (see Leone 2012;Konstan 2020). A few more concepts fill in the picture of the naturalworld: thus, Epicurus denies that there can be infinitely many kindsof atoms, for then all shapes (which define the kinds) at any givenmagnitude would be exhausted and atoms would have to reach visibleproportions, which we know that they do not (this argument depends onthe idea of minima, discussed further below); instead, the number ofkinds (i.e., shapes of various microscopic sizes) is inconceivablylarge but “not strictly infinite,” whereas the number ofeach kind of atom is simply infinite (LH 55–56). Thiscondition is also invoked to explain why there is a limit on possibletypes of combinations of atoms, and hence on the number of viablespecies of things in the perceptible world: if there were infinitelymany kinds of atoms, Epicurus believed, they could combine to generateabsolutely anything — an infinity of different sorts ofthing.

But an infinite number of solid and therefore indivisible atoms offinitely many kinds, such as Epicurus’ theory provides, areenough to avoid the possibility of the universe crumbling intonothing. Why did Epicurus complicate matters still further with thedoctrine that atoms themselves consist of still smaller parts in theform of mathematically minimal expanses, as we saw above that he does?Finite bodies, according to Epicurus, had to be composed of smallerexpanses, and if there were no lower limit in size to such expanses,one would have to imagine traversing such a body in an infinite numberof moves — but then, however small these infinitesimals mightbe, the object that contained them, Epicurus reasoned, would have tobe infinitely large (LH 56–57). What are such minimalike? Epicurus asks us to think of the smallest perceptible thing. Itdiffers from larger visible entities in that it has no sub-parts to betraversed with the eye: if you do attempt to visualize such sub-parts,they simply coincide with the original perceptible minimum. Since suchminimal visible entities have no parts, they do not touch edge to edge(edges are parts), and yet they measure out the body that containsthem, larger bodies having more such minima. By analogy with thevisible, then, we conceive of the smallest part of an atom(LH 58–59). This conception resembles the way pointsexist in a line, according to Aristotle, since they too do not touch,nor can they exist independently. But Epicurean minima differ frompoints in that they are physical expanses and so have extension. Thislooks like a contradictory state of affairs: can we imagine, forexample, an atom consisting of just two minima? Or ten? It would belike counting up the least visible bits of a perceptible object.Geometrical problems arise as well, since it was known that the sideand diagonal of a cube, for example, were incommensurable, yet bothmust, it would appear, be composed of finite and hence commensurablenumbers of minima. On the assumption that Epicurus was aware of andcared about such puzzles, it has been suggested that he thought anyatom consists of a not strictly infinite, but inconceivably large— and so “not strictly finite” — number ofminima (see Konstan 1989a): thus, the minimum may be imagined as theinverse of the number of kinds of atoms postulated by Epicurus, aquantity that takes on a quasi-technical status as a special order ofmagnitude. But sufficient evidence for this hypothesis is lacking.

4. Psychology and Ethics

Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceedsto explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order inwhich Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists ofatoms: first, there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void(secondary qualities are simply accidents of the arrangement ofatoms), and second, an incorporeal entity could neither act on nor bemoved by bodies, as the soul is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious ofwhat happens to the body, and it initiates physical movement).Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are particularly fine and aredistributed throughout the body (LH 64), and it is by meansof them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and theexperience of pain and pleasure, which Epicurus callspathê (a term used by Aristotle and others to signifyemotions instead). Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert,and when the atoms of the body are disarranged so that it can nolonger support conscious life, the soul atoms are scattered and nolonger retain the capacity for sensation (LH 65). There isalso a part of the human soul that is concentrated in the chest, andis the seat of the higher intellectual functions. The distinction isimportant, because it is in the rational part that error of judgmententers in. Sensation, like pain and pleasure, is incorrigible justbecause it is a function of the non-rational part, which does notmodify a perception — that is, the reception of lamina emittedfrom macroscopic bodies — by the addition of opinion orbelief.

The corporeal nature of the soul has two crucial consequences forEpicureanism. First, it is the basis of Epicurus’ demonstrationthat the soul does not survive the death of the body (other argumentsto this effect are presented in Lucretius 3.417–614). Thesoul’s texture is too delicate to exist independently of thebody that contains it, and in any case the connection with the body isnecessary for sensation to occur. From this it follows that there canbe no punishment after death, nor any regrets for the life that hasbeen lost. Second, the soul is responsive to physical impressions,whether those that arrive from without in the form of laminas orsimulacra, or those that arise from internal motions of the body. Nophenomena are purely mental, in the sense of being disembodied statesor objects of pure consciousness conceived as separate fromembodiment. The elementary sensations of pleasure and pain,accordingly, rather than abstract moral principles or abstractconcepts of goodness or badness, are the fundamental guides to what isgood and bad, since all sentient creatures are naturally attracted tothe one and repelled by the other. The function of the human mind— that part of the soul that is located in our chest — isnot to seek higher things, but to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.That is its entire objective; the risk (a substantial one) is that itmay miscalculate, since it is subject to false beliefs and errors incognitive processes.

Unlike other Hellenistic schools, such as those of Aristotle and theStoics, the Epicureans were not greatly interested in formal logic,but they certainly needed a theory of the formation of beliefs. As faras the ideational content of thinking — that is, the thought ofsomething — is concerned, Epicurus proposed a radicallyreductive hypothesis: just as sensations occur as a result of thinfilms emitted by objects that enter the appropriate sense organ, sotoo some of these simulacra are fine enough to penetrate directly tothe mind (located in the chest), and that is how we imagine suchobjects (e.g., gods). This process is invoked to explain not onlydream images, but many kinds of mental impression, includingimpressions constituting voluntary thought: the latter occurs when weattend to one or another of the exiguous physical films that arecontinuously floating through the air. (How we manage to attendvoluntarily to whichever of these films we choose is not explained inthe surviving sources.) Imagining a thing is thus nothing more thanpicking out the simulacra that have been emitted by it, and which mayendure beyond the life of the thing itself (hence we can imagine thedead). These mental images have no privileged status, such as Platogave to his noetic Ideas or Forms; they are always true, but in thisdo not differ from the information provided by the senses. Mistakesoccur here too when the wrong beliefs are associated with suchimpressions, for example, that because we have a mental image of adead person it follows that he or she still exists in a ghostly form.Epicurean physics proves that this is impossible.

A great barrier to correct thinking is language itself, which, becauseit has a name for death, may suggest that death (being dead) issomething a person can experience and hence deserves to be feared.Words must be understood in their basic sense, Epicurus says, asopposed to what he calls “empty sounds” (LH 37).The culprit in misunderstanding is always an illegitimate inferencefrom sensation (the latter including thoughts produced by film-likeimages). An example is the belief that centaurs exist. Epicurus doesnot deny that the thought of a centaur corresponds to some realstimulus in the form of simulacra: his theory of knowledge commits himto the view that it must. But the flimsy laminas as they float throughthe air can become distorted or interfere with one another, and thusthe upper part of a human figure may get loosely attached to the lowerpart of a horse’s. We know that this is unreal because such acombination is physically impossible: horses and human beings matureat different rates, for example, and eat different foods (seeLucretius 5.878–91; cf. PalaephatusOn Incredible Tales20). Beliefs about whether sensations correspond to an actuallyexisting thing must be tested against knowledge of the world, asinformed by Epicurean theory.

The ability to reason or calculate (logismos) cannot be afunction of images. It is the faculty that lets us infer by analogyfrom the visible world to the invisible, and also that with which wemay recognize that not all pleasures are to be chosen at all times,since some immediate pleasures may lead to long-term pain or harm(Letter to Menoeceus =LM 129). What is more, onemust know something about the nature of pleasure in order to pursue itrationally, and likewise for pain. Epicurus, it appears, uses theterms pleasure and pain (hêdonê,algêdôn) strictly in reference to physicalpathê or sensations, that is, those that areexperienced via the non-rational soul that is distributed throughoutthe body. As for the rational part or mind, we have positive andnegative experiences through it too. Most prominent among the negativemental states is fear, above all the fear of unreal dangers, such asdeath. Death, Epicurus insists, is nothing to us, since while weexist, our death is not, and when our death occurs, we do not exist(LM 124–25); but if one is frightened by the empty nameof death, the fear will persist since we must all eventually die. Thisfear is one source of perturbation (tarakhê), and is aworse curse than physical pain itself; the absence of such fear isataraxy, lack of perturbation, and ataraxy, together with freedom fromphysical pain, is one way of specifying the goal of life, forEpicurus.

There are also positive states of mind, which Epicurus identifies bythe special termkhara (joy), as opposed tohêdonê (pleasure, i.e., physical pleasure). Thesestates too depend on belief, whether true or false. But Epicurus doesnot treatkhara as an end, or part of the end for living:rather, he tends to describe the goal by negation, as freedom frombodily pain and mental disturbance (LM 128). However,happiness (eudaimonia), according to Epicurus, is not simplya neutral or privative condition but rather a form of pleasure in itsown right — what Epicurus called catastematic or (followingCicero’s Latin translation) “static” as opposed to“kinetic” pleasure. Although the precise nature of thisdistinction is debated, kinetic pleasures seem to be of thenon-necessary kind (see below), such as those resulting from agreeableodors or sounds, rather than deriving from replenishment, as in thecase of hunger or thirst. The philosophical school known as theCyrenaics advocated increasing desires and seeking ever new ways ofgratifying them.

Epicurus objected that such pleasures are necessarily accompanied bydistress, for they depend upon a lack that is painful (Plato haddemonstrated the problematic nature of this kind of pleasure; seeGorgias 496C–497A,Philebus 31E–32D,46A–50C). In addition, augmenting desires tends to intensifyrather than reduce the mental agitation (a distressful state of mind)that Epicurean philosophy sought to eliminate. Catastematic pleasure,on the contrary, is (or is taken in) a state rather than a process: itis the pleasure that accompanies well-being as such. The Cyrenaics andothers, such as Cicero, maintained, in turn, that this condition isnot pleasurable but rather neutral — neither pleasurable norpainful.

For Epicurus, there are some fears that are perfectly legitimate; sotoo are some desires. Epicurus offers a classification of desires intothree types: some are natural, others are empty; and natural desiresare of two sorts, those that are necessary and those that are merelynatural (see Cooper 1999). Natural and necessary are those that lookto happiness, physical well-being, or life itself (LM 127).Unnecessary but natural desires are for pleasant things like sweetodors and good-tasting food and drink (and for various pleasurableactivities of sorts other than simple smelling, touching and tasting).Empty desires are those that have as their objects things designatedby empty sounds, such as immortality, which cannot exist for humanbeings and do not correspond to any genuine need. The same holds forthe desire for great wealth or for marks of fame, such as statues:they cannot provide the security that is the genuine object of thedesire. Such desires, accordingly, can never be satisfied, any morethan the corresponding fears — e.g., the fear of death —can ever be alleviated, since neither has a genuine referent, i.e.,death as something harmful (when it is present, we do not exist) orwealth and power as salves for anxiety. Such empty fears and desires,based on what Epicurus callskenodoxia or empty belief, arethemselves the main source of perturbation and pain in civilized life,where more elementary dangers have been brought under control, sincethey are the reason why people are driven to strive for limitlesswealth and power, subjecting themselves to the very dangers theyimagine they are avoiding.

Although human beings, like everything else, are composed of atomsthat move according to their fixed laws, our actions are not whollypredetermined — rather than entertain such a paralyzingdoctrine, Epicurus says, it would be better to believe in the oldmyths, for all their perversities (LM 134). What enables usto wrest liberty from a mechanistic universe is the existence of acertain randomness in the motion of atoms, that takes the form of aminute swerve in their forward course (evidence for this doctrinederives chiefly from later sources, including Lucretius and Cicero).It is not entirely clear how the swerve operates: it may involve asmall angle of deviation from the original path, or else a slightshift sideways, perhaps by a single minimum, with no change indirection. The idea of such a minute veering, said to occur at nodeterminate time or place, is less strange in the modern age ofquantum physics than it was in Epicurus’ time, and it gave riseto mocking critiques. More problematic today is how the swerve mightexplain freedom of will — if indeed Epicurus’ idea of thewill was like our own. It did, at all events, introduce anindeterminacy into the universe, and if soul atoms, thanks to theirfineness, were more susceptible to the effects of such deviations thancoarser matter, the swerve could at least represent a breach in anystrict predestination of human behavior. And this might have beenenough for Epicurus’ purposes: he may not have invoked theswerve in order to explain voluntary action (claiming that it isaction deriving, immediately or ultimately, from a swerve or someswerves of the soul’s atoms). He may have wished merely toestablish the possibility of action not deriving from the positions ofthe soul’s constituent atoms at any time plus the effects ofcollisions among them resulting from their given movements at thattime. According to Lucretius (2.225–50), the swerve was also putto use to solve a cosmological problem: if at some (as it were)initial moment all atoms were moving uniformly in a single direction(downward) at the same speed, it is impossible to conceive how theprocess of atomic collisions could have begun, save by some suchdevice. This seems a curious idea: given that time, like space, wasinfinite according to Epicurus, he need not have imagined a time priorto collisions. Just possibly the tendency of atoms to emerge fromcollisions in a preferred direction (by definition “down”)might lead over time to local regions of parallel motion, and theswerve could serve to reintroduce contact among them. In any event,Epicurus may have thought of atoms moving in some uniform directionrather than in diverse ones as a default position for physical theory(because of the simplicity of that hypothesis); thus he may have feltthe need to explain how the diversity of the atoms’ motionscould have arisen.

5. Social Theory

Although our main witness for Epicurus’ views on the evolutionof human society is Lucretius’ poem (5.925–1457), there isno doubt that Lucretius was following, in the main, the ideas of thefounder himself, as recorded in Epicurus’On Nature andother treatises. In the beginning, human beings were solitary; theyreproduced haphazardly, could not communicate verbally, had no socialinstitutions, and survived because they were physically hardier thantheir modern descendants. With time, the race softened, thanks in partto the discovery of fire, in part too to the emergence of the familyand the gentler sentiments toward spouses and offspring to which thefamily gave rise. At this stage, human beings were in a position tounite in order to fend off natural dangers, such as wild beasts, andthey developed various kinds of technical skills, such as agricultureand the building of houses, as well as language. Epicurus explains(LH 75–76) that names at first arose naturally, in thesense that as human beings experienced different affects(pathê) or received various images(phantasmata) they emitted air corresponding to thesestimuli; since human physical characteristics vary somewhat from placeto place, however, the sounds people produced in response to any givenstimulus similarly differed, which explains why there are manytongues. Upon this basis, people later, nation by nation, establishedcertain terms by convention for the purpose of improving clarity andbrevity in communication. Finally, certain individual experts furtheraugmented the vocabulary by the introduction of new and specializedwords, to explain the results of their theoretical investigations.Once language reached a developed state, people began to establishalliances and friendships, which contributed further to collectivesecurity.

This early form of social life had various advantages: among others,the relative scarcity of goods prevented excessive competition(sharing was obligatory for survival) and thereby set limits on thoseunnatural desires that at a later, richer phase of society would leadto wars and other disturbances. It would appear too that, beforelanguage had developed fully, words more or less conformed to theiroriginal or primitive objects, and were not yet a source of mentalconfusion. But thanks to a gradual accumulation of wealth, thestruggle over goods came to infect social relations, and there emergedkings or tyrants who ruled over others not by virtue of their physicalstrength but by dint of gold. These autocrats in turn were overthrown,and after a subsequent period of violent anarchy people finally sawthe wisdom of living under the rule of law. This might seem torepresent the highest attainment in political organization, but thatis not so for the Epicureans. For with law came the generalized fearof punishment that has contaminated the blessings of life (Lucretius5.1151; cf. [Philodemus]On Choices and Avoidances col. XII).Lucretius at this point gives an account of the origin of religioussuperstition and dread of the gods, and although he does not relatethis anxiety directly to the fear of punishment under human law, hedoes state that thunder and lightning are interpreted as signs thatthe gods are angry at human sins (5.1218–25). While primitivepeople in the presocial or early communal stages might have been awedby such manifestations of natural power and ascribed them to theaction of the gods, they would not necessarily have explained them aschastisement for human crimes before the concept of punishment becamefamiliar under the regime of law. People at an early time knew thatgods exist thanks to the simulacra that they give off, although theprecise nature of the gods according to Epicurus remains obscure (forcontrasting intepretations, see Konstan 2011 and Sedley 2011); but thegods, for him, do not interest themselves in human affairs, since thiswould compromise their beatitude (see Obbink 1996: 321–23).

If one does not fear the gods, what motive is there for living justly?Where law obtains, Epicurus indicates, it is preferable not to commitcrimes, even secret ones, since there will always be anxiety over thepossibility of detection, and this will disrupt the tranquillity orataraxy that is the chief basis of happiness in life (seePrincipal Beliefs =KD 34–35). Justice, forEpicurus, depends on the capacity to make compacts neither to harmothers nor be harmed by them, and consists precisely in thesecompacts; justice is nothing in itself, independent of sucharrangements (KD 31–33). According to Epicurus(LM 132,KD 5), someone who is incapable of livingprudently, honorably, and justly cannot live pleasurably, and viceversa. Moreover, prudence or wisdom (phronêsis) is thechief of the virtues: on it depend all the rest. This again soundscalculating, as though justice were purely a pragmatic and selfishmatter of remaining unperturbed. Epicurus does not entertain thethought experiment proposed by Plato in theRepublic(359C–360D), in which Plato asks whether a person who isabsolutely secure from punishment would have reason to be just. DidEpicurus have an answer to such a challenge? He may simply have deniedthat anyone can be perfectly confident in this way. Perhaps, however,he did have a reply, but it was derived from the domain of psychologyrather than of ethics. A person who understands what is desirable andwhat is to be feared would not be motivated to acquire inordinatewealth or power, but would lead a peaceful life to the extentpossible, avoiding politics and the general fray. An Epicurean sage,accordingly, would have no motive to violate the rights of others.Whether the sage would be virtuous is perhaps moot; what Epicurus saysis that he would live virtuously, that is prudently, honorably, andjustly (the adverbial construction may be significant). He would do sonot because of an acquired disposition orhexis, as Aristotlehad it, but because he knows how to reason correctly about his needs.Hence his desires would be limited to those that are natural (notempty), and so easily satisfied, or at least not a source ofdisturbance if sometimes unsatisfied.

6. The Epicurean Life

Epicurus placed an extremely high value on friendship (or love:philia). A saying with rather a more poetic flair than isEpicurus’ custom runs: “Friendship goes dancing round theworld, announcing to all of us to wake up to happiness”(Vatican Saying =VS 52). Epicurus held that a wiseman would feel the torture of a friend no less than his own, and woulddie for a friend rather than betray him, for otherwise his own lifewould be confounded (VS 56–57). These are powerfullyaltruistic sentiments for a philosopher who posits as the unique goalin life happiness based on freedom from physical pain and mentalanxiety. Epicurus could justify such an attitude by the sameprudential calculus that he uses to argue in favor of living justly:only by living in such a way that loyalty to friends is perceived tobe a consummate value will one be able to feel secure in one’sfriends, and thus maximize one’s felicity. Yet this does notseem quite what Epicurus means when he says that “friendship [orlove] had its beginning as a result of utility, but is to be chosen[or is a virtue, if we follow the manuscript reading] for its ownsake” (VS 23). The question is further complicated bythe report in Cicero’sOn Moral Ends (1.66–70)that there was a difference of opinion concerning friendship amonglater Epicureans. Since human beings were originally asocial and onlylater learned to form alliances and compacts, it is possible thatEpicurus means to say that this capacity for friendship arose out ofneed, but that once the capacity for such feelings was acquired,feeling them came to be valued in itself. The argument would besimilar to the modern idea that altruism could have developed as aresult of natural selection. But the evidence does not permit a firmconclusion on this matter.

When Epicurus spoke of friendship, he may have had at least partly inmind specifically the relationship among his followers, who seem tohave thought of themselves as friends. Epicureans were encouraged toform communities and to observe certain rituals, although most ofthese practices, such as the celebration each month of the day (the20^th) on which Epicurus was born or wearing rings bearingan image of Epicurus, may have originated after the founder’sdeath. The Epicureans paid attention to problems of pedagogy as well,laying out the best way to correct the ideas of people new to theschool and its community without cajoling or discouraging them. Itmust be remembered that Epicurus understood the task of philosophyfirst and foremost as a form of therapy for life, since philosophythat does not heal the soul is no better than medicine that cannotcure the body (Usener 1887, frag. 221). A life free of mental anxietyand open to the enjoyment of other pleasures was deemed equal to thatof the gods. Indeed, it is from the gods themselves, via the simulacrathat reach us from their abode, that we derive our image of blessedhappiness, and prayer for the Epicureans consisted not in petitioningfavors but rather in a receptivity to this vision. (Epicurusencouraged the practice of the conventional cults.) Although they heldthe gods to be immortal and indestructible (how this might work in amaterialist universe remains unclear), human pleasure mightnevertheless equal divine, since pleasure, Epicurus maintained(KD 19), is not augmented by duration (compare the idea ofperfect health, which is not more perfect for lasting longer); thecatastematic pleasure experienced by a human being completely free ofmental distress and with no bodily pain to disturb him or her is atthe absolute top of the scale. Nor is such pleasure difficult toachieve: it is a mark precisely of those desires that are neithernatural nor necessary that they are hard to satisfy. Epicurus wasfamously content with little, since on such a diet a small delicacy isas good as a feast, in addition to which it is easier to achieveself-sufficiency, and “the greatest benefit of self-sufficiencyis freedom” (VS 77).

Bibliography

Editions, translations, commentaries

• Annas, Julia (ed.), and Raphael Woolf (trans.), 2001.Cicero:On Moral Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Arrighetti, Graziano, 1973.Epicuro Opere, 2^ndedition, Turin: Einaudi. (Best edition available, with Italiantranslation.)
• Arrighetti, Graziano and Marcello Gigante, 1977. “Frammentidel libro undidesimo ‘Della natura’ di Epicuro (PHerc.1042),”Cronache Ercolenesi, 7: 5–8.
• Bailey, Cyril B., 1926.Epicurus: The Extant Remains,Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Best edition in English.)
• Bollack, Jean (ed.), 1985.Il pensiero del piacere: Epicuro,testi morali, commentari, Genoa: La Quercia.
• De Lacy, Phillip Howard and Estelle Allen De Lacy, 1978.Philodemus On Methods of Inference, 2nd edition, Naples:Bibliopolis.
• Delattre, Daniel and Jackie Pigeaud (eds.), 2010.Lesepicuriens, Paris: Gallimard. (Very rich collection of texts intranslation.)
• Dorandi, Tiziano (ed.), 2013.Diogenes Laertius, Lives ofEminent Philosophers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hammerstaedt, Jürgen, Pierre-Marie Morel, Refik Güremen(eds.), 2017.Diogenes of Oinoanda: Epicureanism and PhilosophicalDebates / Diogène d’Œnoanda: Épicurisme etControverses, Leuven: Leuven University Press.
• Hessler, Jan Erik, 2014.Epikur: Brief an Menoikeus,Basil. (Best commentary on this epistle.)
• Indelli, Giovanni and Voula Tsouna-McKirahan (eds.), 1995.[Philodemus]: [On Choices and Avoidances], Naples:Bibliopolis.
• Inwood, Brad and L.P. Gerson, 1997.Hellenistic Philosophy:Introductory Readings, 2nd edition, Indianapolis: Hackett.(Translation of principal sources. The Epicurean part is alsopublished separately.)
• Konstan, David (trans.), 1989.Simplicius on Aristotle’sPhysics 6, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press andDuckworth.
• Konstan, David, Diskin Clay, Clarence Glad, Johan Thom, and JamesWare, 1998.Philodemus On Frank Criticism: Introduction,Translation and Notes, Atlanta: Society of Biblical LiteratureTexts and Translations (Greco-Roman Religion).
• Laursen, Simon, 1995. “The Early Parts of Epicurus, OnNature, 25th Book,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 25:5–109.
• –––, 1997. “The Later Parts of Epicurus,On Nature, 25th Book,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 27:5–83.
• Leone, Giuliana, 1984. “Epicuro, ‘Della natura,’libro XIV,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 14: 17–107.
• –––, 2012.Epicuro Sulla naturalibro II, Naples: Bibliopolis. (Splendid edition with majorintroduction on simulacra and related questions.)
• Long, A.A. and David Sedley, 1987.The HellenisticPhilosophers, 2 volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(Excellent collection of sources, with Greek text in volume 2,arranged by topic.)
• Mensch, Pamela (trans.), 2018.DiogenesLaertius: Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. (Best and most accessible English version, based on Dorandi’stext.)
• Millot, C., 1977. “Epicure ‘De la nature’ livreXV,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 7: 9–39.
• Obbink, Dirk, 1996.Philodemus De pietate, Oxford:Clarendon Press.
• Sedley, David, 1973. “Epicurus, ‘On Nature’ BookXXVIII,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 3: 5–83.
• Smith, Martin Ferguson (ed.), 1993.Diogenes of Oenoanda: TheEpicurean Inscription, Naples: Bibliopolis.
• Stern, Jacob (trans.), 1996.Palaephatus: On UnbelievableTales, Wauconda, IL : Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers.
• Taylor, C.C.W. (ed.), 1999.The Atomists: Leucippus andDemocritus: A Text and Translation with a Commentary (The PhoenixPresocratics 5 = Phoenix Supplementary Volume 36), Toronto: TheUniversity of Toronto Press.
• Usener, Hermann, 1887.Epicurea. Leipzig: Teubner.Italian translation by Ilaria Ramelli,Epicurea: Testi di Epicuroe testimonianze epicuree nell’edizione di Hermann Usener,Milan: Bompiani, 2002. (Most complete collection of fragments.)
• Verde, Francesco, 2010.Epicuro Epistola a Erodoto. Rome:Carocci. (The best edition of this fundamental work.)
• Verde, Francesco (ed.), 2022.Epicuro, Epistola aPitocle, in collaboration with M. Tulli, D. De Sanctis,F. G. Masi, Academia Verlag, Baden-Baden.

Critical Studies

General

• Algra, Keimpe, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and MalcolmSchofield (eds.), 1999.The Cambridge History of HellenisticPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Good chapterson Epicurean epistemology, physics, psychology, and ethics.)
• Bailey, Cyril B., 1928.The Greek Atomists and Epicurus,Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Dated but still useful.)
• Clay, Diskin, 1983.Lucretius and Epicurus, Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
• Gigandet, Alain and Pierre-Marie Morel (eds.), 2007.LireÉpicure et les épicuriens, Paris: PressesUniversitaires de France.
• Giovacchini, J. 2008.Épicure, Paris: Les BellesLettres.
• Gordon, Pamela, 1996.Epicurus in Lycia: The Second-CenturyWorld of Diogenes of Oenoanda, Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress.
• Hossenfelder, Malte, 1991.Epikur, Munich: Beck.
• Jones, Howard, 1989.The Epicurean Tradition, London:Routledge.
• Mitsis, Phillip (ed.), 2020.Oxford Handbook of Epicurus andEpicureanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Excellent collectionon every aspect of Epicureanism.)
• Németh, Attila, 2017.Epicurus on the Self,London: Routledge,
• O’Keefe, Tim, 2010.Epicureanism. Durham: Acumen.(Highly readable and philosophically engaging introduction.)
• Pesce, Domenico, 1974.Saggio su Epicuro, Bari:Laterza.
• Rist, John, 1972.Epicurus: An Introduction, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. (A good survey.)
• Sedley, David, 1998.Lucretius and the Transformation of GreekWisdom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Verde, Francesco, 2013.Epicuro, Rome: Carocci. (Up todate survey of all aspects of Epicurus’ thought.)
• Warren, James (ed.), 2009.The Cambridge Companion toEpicureanism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wilson, Catherine, 2015.Epicureanism: A Very ShortIntroduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Physics

• Cambiano, Giuseppe, 1997. “L’atomismo antico,”Quaderni di Storia, 23: 5–17.
• Furley, David, 1967.Two Studies in the Greek Atomists,Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Still fundamental.)
• Furley, David, 1996. “The Earth in Epicurean andContemporary Astronomy,” in Gabriele Giannantoni and MarcelloGigante (eds.),Epicureismo greco e romano: Atti del congressointernazionale Napoli, 19–26 maggio 1993, Naples:Bibliopolis, 1996, Volume 1, pp. 119–25.
• Giannantoni, Gabriele, 1989. “L’infinito nella fisicaepicurea,” inL’infinito dei greci e dei romani,Genoa: Facoltà di Lettere dell’ Università diGenova, pp. 9–26.
• Inwood, Brad, 1981. “The Origin of Epicurus’ Conceptof Void,”Classical Philology, 76: 273–85.
• Konstan, David, 1972. “Epicurus on Up and Down (Letter toHerodotus sec. 60),”Phronesis, 17: 269–78.
• –––, 1979. “Problems in EpicureanPhysics,”Isis, 70: 394–418.
• –––, 2000. “Democritus thePhysicist” (Review of Taylor 1999),Apeiron, 33:125–44.
• –––, 2014. “Epicurus on the Void,”in Christoph Helmig, Christoph Horn, and Graziano Ranocchia (eds.),Space in Hellenistic Philosophy, Berlin: de Gruyter.
• –––, 2020. “Epicurean phantasia,” in ErmannoMalaspina and Jula Wildberger (eds.),Axiological Confusion and itsCauses, Πηγη/Fons: Revista de Estudios sobre la Civilización Clásica ysu Recepción 5: 1–18.
• Laks, André, 1991. “Épicure et la doctrinearistotélicienne du continu,” in F. de Gandt and P.Souffrin (eds.),La Physique d’Aristote et les conditionsd’une science de la nature: Actes du colloque organisépar le Séminaire d’Épistémologie etd’Histoire des Sciences de Nice, Paris: J. Vrin, pp.181–194.
• Laursen, Simon, 1992. “The Summary of Epicurus ‘OnNature’ Book 25,” in Mario Capasso (ed.),Papiriletterari greci e latini, Galatina: Congedo, pp.141–154.
• Masi, Francesca Guadalupe and Stefano Maso (eds.), 2015.Epicurus on Eidola. Peri Phuseos Book II: Update, Proposals andDiscussions, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.
• Morel, Pierre-Marie, 2000.Atome et nécessité:Démocrite, Épicure, Lucrèce, Paris: Pr.Universitaires de France.
• Sedley, David, 1982. “Two Conceptions of Vacuum,”Phronesis, 27: 175–93.
• Verde, Francesco, 2013. Elachista:La dottrina dei miniminell’epicureismo, Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Psychology

• Armstrong, David, 2003. “Philodemus, the Herculaneum Papyri,and the Therapy of Fear,” in Dane R. Gordon and David B. Suits(eds.),Epicurus: His Continuing Influence and ContemporaryRelevance, Rochester, NY: RIT Cary Graphic Arts Press, pp.17–43.
• Armstrong, David, 2008. “‘Be Angry and Sin Not’:Philodemus versus the Stoics on Natural Bites and NaturalEmotions,” in John T. Fitzgerald (ed.),Passions and MoralProgress in Greco-Roman Thought, London: Routledge, pp.79–121.
• Diano, Carlo, 1974 [1939–42].Scritti Epicurei,Florence: Leo S. Olschki.
• Konstan, David, 2008.“A Life Worthy of the Gods”:The Materialist Pyschology of Epicurus, Las Vegas: ParmenidesPublishing. (This is an updated version of D. Konstan,SomeAspects of Epicurean Psychology, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973.)

Ethics

• Annas, Julia, 1993.The Morality of Happiness, Oxford:Oxford University Press. (Excellent overview.)
• Alberti, Antonina, 1994. “Ragione e virtùnell’etica epicurea,” in A. Alberti,Realtà eragione: studi di filosofia antica, Florence: Accademia Toscanadi Scienze e Lettere La Colombaria [Studi 140], pp.185–216.
• Barigazzi, A., 1983. “Sul concetto epicureo della sicurezzaesterna,” inSUZHTHSIS: Studi sull’epicureismo greco eromano offerti a Marcello Gigante, Naples: Biblioteca dellaParola del Passato, pp. 73–92.
• Cooper, J.M., 2012.Pursuits of Wisdom, Princeton:Princeton University Press, Chapter 5 (Sections 5.1–5.6), pp.226–290.
• Müller, Reimar, 1991.Die epikureische Ethik,Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
• Purinton, Jeffrey S., 1993. “Epicurus on the Telos,”Phronesis, 38: 281–320.

Pleasure

• Annas, Julia, 1987. “Epicurus on Pleasure andHappiness,”Philosophical Topics, 15: 5–21.
• Cooper, John M., 1999. “Pleasure and Desire inEpicurus,” in J. Cooper,Reason and Emotion, Princeton:Princeton University Press, pp. 485–514.
• Gosling, J.C.B. and C.C.W. Taylor, 1982.The Greeks onPleasure, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Nikolsky, Boris, 2001. “Epicurus on Pleasure,”Phronesis, 46: 440–465.
• Wolfsdorf, David, 2013.Pleasure in Ancient GreekPhilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Death

• Alberti, Antonina, 1990. “Paura della morte eidentità personale nell’epicureismo,” in AntoninaAlberti (ed.),Logica, mente e persona: studi sulla filosofiaantica, Florence: Olschki, pp. 151–206.
• Lesses, Glenn, 2002. “Happiness, Completeness, andIndifference to Death in Epicurean Ethical Theory,”Apeiron, 35: 57–68.
• Mitsis, Phillip, 2002. “Happiness and Death in EpicureanEthics,”Apeiron, 35: 41–55.
• Rosenbaum, S., 1986. “How to be Dead and not Care: A Defenseof Epicurus,”American Philosophical Quarterly, 23:217–25.
• Warren, James, 2000. “Epicurean Immortality,”Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 18: 231–261.
• –––, 2004.Facing Death: Epicurus and hisCritics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Epistemology

• Asmis, Elizabeth, 1984.Epicurus’ ScientificMethod, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
• Everson, Stephen, 1990. “Epicurus on the Truth of theSenses,” in Stephen Everson (ed.),Epistemology,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 161–183.
• Jürss, Fritz, 1991.Die epikureischeErkenntnistheorie, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
• Konstan, David, 1989a.“Περίληψις inEpicurean Epistemology,”Ancient Philosophy, 13:125–37.
• Konstan, David, 2007. “Response to Morel 2007,”Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in AncientPhilosophy, 23: 49–54.
• Lee, Edward N., 1978. “The Sense of an Object: Epicurus onSeeing and Hearing,” in P.K. Machamer and R.G. Turnbull (eds.),Studies in Perception: Interrelations in the History of Philosophyand Science, Columbus OH: Ohio State University Press, pp.27–59.
• Long, A.A., 1971. “Aesthesis, Prolepsis and LinguisticTheory in Epicurus,”Bulletin of the Institute of ClassicalStudies, 18: 114–33.
• Manuwald, A., 1972.Die Prolepsislehre Epikurs, Bonn:Habelt.
• Morel, Pierre-Marie, 2002. “Les ambiguïtés de laconception épicurienne du temps,”Revue dePhilosophie, 192: 195–211.
• Morel, Pierre-Marie, 2007. “Method and Evidence (enargeia):Epicurean prolêpsis,”Proceedings of the Boston AreaColloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 23: 25–48.
• Sedley, David, 1976. “Epicurus and the Mathematicians ofCyzicus,”Cronache Ercolanesi, 6: 23–54.
• –––, 1989. “Epicurus on the CommonSensibles,” in Pamela Huby and Gordon Neal (eds.),TheCriterion of Truth: Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd,together with a Text and Translation (with Annotations) ofPtolemy’s On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon, Liverpool:Liverpool University Press, pp. 123–136.
• Taylor, C.C.W., 1980. “‘All Perceptions areTrue’,” in M. Schofield, J. Barnes and M. Burnyeat (eds.),Doubt and Dogmatism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.105–24.
• Tsouna, Voula, 2016. “Epicurean Preconceptions,”Phronesis, 61: 160–221.
• vander Waerdt, Paul, 1989. “Colotes and the EpicureanRefutation of Skepticism,”Greek, Roman and ByzantineStudies, 30: 225–267.

Language

• Atherton, Catherine, 2005. “Lucretius on what Language isNot,” in Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood (eds.),Language andLearning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–38.
• Brunschwig, Jacques, 1977. “Epicure et le problème du‘langage privé’,”Revue des SciencesHumaines, 163: 157–77.
• Everson, Stephen, 1994. “Epicurus on Mind andLanguage,” in Stephen Everson (ed.),Language (Series:Companions to Ancient Thought, Volume 3), Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, pp. 74–108.
• Giannantoni, Gabriele, 1994. “Epicurei e stoici sullinguaggio,” inStoria poesia e pensiero nel mondo antico:Studi in onore di Marcello Gigante, Naples: Bibliopolis.
• Verlinsky, Alexander, 2005. “Epicurus and his Predecessorson the Origin of Language,” in Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood(eds.),Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in theHellenistic Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.56–100.

Free Will and the Atomic Swerve

• Asmis, Elizabeth, 1990. “Free Action and the Swerve”(Review of Walter G. Englert, Epicurus on the swerve and voluntaryaction),Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 8:275–291.
• Bignone, Ettore, 1940. “La dottrina epicurea delclinamen,”Atene e Roma, 42: 159–68.
• Bobzien, Susanne, 2000. “Did Epicurus Discover the Free-WillProblem?”Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 19:287–337.
• Englert, Walter G., 1987.Epicurus on the Swerve and VoluntaryAction, Atlanta: Scholars Press.
• Furley, David, 1967.Two Studies in the Greek Atomists,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Greenblatt, Stephen, 2011.The Swerve: How the World BecameModern, New York: W. W. Norton. (This is more a book about thereception of Lucretius than about Epicurean physics as such.)
• O’Keefe, Tim, 1996. “Does Epicurus Need the Swerve asan Archê of Collisions?”Phronesis, 41:305–317.
• Purinton, Jeffrey S., 1999. “Epicurus on ‘FreeVolition’ and the Atomic Swerve,”Phronesis, 44:253–299.
• Russell, Daniel Charles, 2000. “Epicurus and Lucretius onSaving Agency,”Phoenix, 54: 226–243.
• Sedley, David, 1983. “Epicurus’ Refutation ofDeterminism,” inSUZHTHSIS: Studi sull’epicureismogreco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante, Naples: Bibliotecadella Parola del Passato, pp. 11–51.

Justice

• Armstrong, John M., 1997. “Epicurean Justice,”Phronesis, 42: 324–334.
• Denyer, Nick, 1983. “The Origins of Justice,” inSUZHTHSIS: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti aMarcello Gigante, Naples: Biblioteca della Parola del Passato,pp. 133–52.
• Goldschmidt, Victor, 1977.La doctrine d’Epicure et ledroit, Paris: J. Vrin; reprinted 2002.
• Minutoli, Giuseppe, 1997. “Il problema del diritto inEpicuro,”Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto, 74:436–460.
• Mitsis, Phillip, 1988.Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: ThePleasures of Invulnerability, Ithaca NY: Cornell UniversityPress.
• Morel, Pierre-Marie, 2000. “Épicure, l’histoireet le droit,”Revue des Études Anciennes, 102:393–411.
• vander Waerdt, Paul, 1987. “The Justice of the EpicureanWise Man,”Classical Quarterly, n.s. 37:402–22.

Theology and the Gods

• Erler, Michael, 2001, “Epicurus as deus mortalis: homoiosistheôi and Epicurean Self-Cultivation,” in Dorothea Fredeand André Laks (eds.),Traditions of Theology: Studies inHellenistic Theology; Its Background and Aftermath, Leiden: E.J.Brill, pp. 159–81.
• Festugière, A.-J., 1985 [1946].Epicure et sesdieux, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
• Freymuth, G., 1953.Zur Lehre von den Götterbildern inder epikureischen Philosophie, Berlin: Deutsche Akademie derWissenschaften.
• Kleve, Knut, 1963.Gnosis Theon: Die Lehre von denatürlichen Götteserkenntnis in der epikureischenTheologie, Oslo: Symbolae Osloenses, Supplement Volume 19.
• Konstan, David, 2011. “Epicurus on the Gods,” inJeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.),Epicurus and the EpicureanTradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.53–71.
• Lemke, D., 1973.Die Theologie Epikurs: Versuch einerRekonstruktion, Munich: Zetemata 57.
• Obbink, Dirk, 1989. “The Atheism of Epicurus,”Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 30: 187–223.
• Purinton, Jeffrey S., 2001. “Epicurus on the Nature of theGods,”Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 21:181–231.
• Sedley, David, 2011. “Epicurus’ TheologicalInnatism,” in Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders (eds.),Epicurusand the Epicurean Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, pp. 29–52.

Evolution of Society.

• Cole, Thomas, 1967.Democritus and the Sources of GreekAnthropology, Cleveland: American Philological Association.
• Grilli, Alberto, 1995. “Lucrezio ed Epicuro: la storiadell’uomo,”Parola del Pasato, 50:16–45.

Politics

• Ruijgh, Cornelis J., 2000. “À propos de lathe biosas:la valeur de l’impératif aoriste,”Hyperboreus, 6: 325–348.
• Silvestre, Maria Luisa, 1995. “Epicuro e la politica,”in Salvatore Cerasuolo (ed.),Mathesis e philia: studi in onore diMarcello Gigante, Naples: Universita degli Studi di NapoliFederico II, pp. 131–142.

Sex and Marriage

• Brennan, Tad, 1996. “Epicurus on Sex, Marriage andChildren,”Classical Philology, 91: 346–352.
• Chilton, C.W., 1960. “Did Epicurus Approve of Marriage? AStudy of Diogenes Laertius X 119,”Phronesis, 5:71–74.
• Morana, Cyril, 1996. “L’atomisme antique face al’amour,”Revue philosophique de la France et del’Étranger, 186: 119–132.

Friendship

• Arrighetti, Graziano, 1978. “Philia e physiologia: Ifondamenti dell’amicizia epicurea,”Materiali eDiscussioni per l’Analisi dei Testi Classici, 1:49–63.
• Brescia, C., 1955. “La philia in Epicuro,”Giornale Italiano di Filologia, 8: 314–32.
• Brown, E., 2002. “Epicurus on the Value of Friendship(Sententia Vaticana XXIII),”Classical Philology, 97:68–80.
• Gemelli, B., 1978. “L’amicizia in Epicuro,”Sandalion, 1: 59–72.
• Giesz, Ludwig, 1990. “Epikur: das Glück derFreundschaft,” inPhilosophische Spaziergänge:zwölf vorsichtige Antworten auf die Frage, wei man sich im Lebendenn einzurichten hätte, Stuttgart: Metzler, pp.3–19.
• Konstan, David, 1994. “Friendship From Epicurus toPhilodemus,” in M. Giannantoni and M. Gigante (eds.),L’Epicureismo greco e romano, Naples: Bibliopolis, pp.387–96.
• Mitsis, Phillip, 1988.Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: ThePleasures of Invulnerability, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress.
• O’Connor, D.K., 1989. “The Invulnerable Pleasures ofEpicurean Friendship,”Greek, Roman and ByzantineStudies, 30: 165–86.
• O’Keefe, Tim, 2001. “Is Epicurean FriendshipAltruistic?”Apeiron, 34: 269–305.

The Epicurean Community

• Clay, Diskin, 1983. “Individual and Community in the FirstGeneration of the Epicurean School,” inSUZHTHSIS: Studisull’ epicureismo greco e romano offerti a MarcelloGigante, Naples: Biblioteca della Parola del Passato, pp.255–79.
• Frischer, Bernard, 1982.The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism andPhilosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece, Berkeley: Universityof California Press.
• Warren, James, 2001. “Epicurus’ Dying Wishes,”Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 47:23–46.

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