Envy is a complex and puzzling emotion. It is, notoriously, one of theseven deadly sins in the Catholic tradition. It is very commonlycharged with being (either typically or universally) unreasonable,irrational, imprudent, vicious, or wrong to feel. With very fewexceptions, the ample philosophical literature defending therationality and evaluative importance of emotions explicitly excludesenvy and a few other nasty emotions as irredeemable. Indeed, someauthors who are prepared to defend even jealousy insist that envy isbeyond the pale. Yet there is considerable controversy over whatprecisely envy is, and the cogency of various specific criticisms ofenvy depends on what view of that subject is adopted.

In addition to its centrality to discussions in the philosophy ofemotions, envy has sparked controversies in political philosophy.Perhaps best known among these is the claim that egalitarian views ofjustice are motivated by envy. It also receives substantial treatmentfrom John Rawls, who takes pains to argue that envy does not pose athreat to his theory of justice. Each of these topics receives sometreatment below.

• 1. The Nature of Envy
  • 1.1 Defining Envy
  • 1.2 Envy vs. Jealousy
  • 1.3 ‘Benign’ and ‘Invidious’ Envy
  • 1.4 Envy vs. Resentment
• 2. The Rationality of Envy
• 3. Envy and Justice
  • 3.1 Egalitarianism and Envy
  • 3.2 Envy-free allocations
  • 3.3 Rawls’ Problem of Envy
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. The Nature of Envy

1.1 Defining Envy

This entry follows the widespread assumption that envy is an emotion.^[1] That is not to say that it is a mere feeling. Emotions are generallyagreed to be more than feelings. Most emotion theorists could agree onthis vague characterization: emotions are syndromes of thoughts,feelings, motivations, and bodily movements, loosely enough boundtogether that a given emotional episode may not require the occurrenceof every element in the syndrome. Most theories of emotion privilegeone of these elements as central, or even essential, to emotion.Cognitive theories identify a defining thought or judgment. Feelingtheories and Motivational theories respectively take a particularaffective experience or a distinctive motivational role as central oressential to a given emotion type.

The specific contours of the emotional syndrome of envy arecontroversial. It is agreed that envy involves an envier(“Subject”), a party who is envied(“Rival”)—this may be a person or group ofpersons—and some possession, capacity or trait that the subjectsupposes the rival to have (the “good”). The good might besomething that only one party could possibly possess (the crownjewels, or being the world’s best go player), or it might be somethingeasily duplicated. It is sometimes held that the good may even beutility, happiness, or some psychological state that Subject couldattribute to Rival even if there were no material difference in theirpossessions or capacities. Most philosophers who have sought to defineenvy agree in treating it as a form of distress experienced by thesubject because he does not possess the good and the rival does, andin attributing a desire for the good to Subject. Many, but not all, goon to add that envy involves a desire that the rival not have thegood. This disagreement is explored below, [see benign and invidiousenvy]. Envy is widely but not universally agreed to be a symptom orinstance of the human tendency to evaluate one’s well-beingcomparatively, by assessing how well one is doing in comparison withothers. Influential definitions of envy include:

Envy is pain at the good fortune of others. (Aristotle,Rhetoric, Bk II, Chapter 10)

Envy is a propensity to view the well-being of others with distress,even though it does not detract from one’s own. [It is] a reluctanceto see our own well-being overshadowed by another’s because thestandard we use to see how well off we are is not the intrinsic worthof our own well-being but how it compares with that of others. [Envy]aims, at least in terms of one’s wishes, at destroying others’ goodfortune. (Kant,The Metaphysics of Morals 6:459)

Envy is that passion which views with malignant dislike thesuperiority of those who are really entitled to all the superioritythey possess. (Adam Smith,The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.244)

1.2 Envy vs. Jealousy

Ordinary language tends to conflate envy and jealousy. Thephilosophical consensus is that these are distinct emotions.While itis linguistically acceptable to say that one is jealous upon hearingabout another’s vacation, say, it has been plausibly argued that oneis feeling envy, if either, in such a case. According to Farrell(1980) and Neu (1980), both envy and jealousy are three-placerelations; but this superficial similarity conceals an importantdifference. Jealousy involves three parties, the subject, the rival,and the beloved; and the jealous person’s real locus of concern is thebeloved, a person (or being) whose affection he is losing or fearslosing. The locus of concern in jealousy is not the rival. Whereasenvy is a two party relation, with a third relatum that is a good(albeit a good that could be a particular person’s affections); andthe envious person’s locus of concern is the rival.

On this way of distinguishing envy from jealousy there is a differencebetween them even when the good that the rival has is the affection ofanother person.^[2] Roughly, for the jealous person the rival is fungible and the belovedis not fungible. So he would be equally bothered if the beloved wereconsorting with someone else, and would not be bothered if the rivalwere. Whereas in envy it is the other way around. Because envy iscentrally focused on competition with the rival, the subject mightwell be equally bothered if the rival were consorting with a different(appealing) person, but would not be bothered if the‘good’ had gone to someone else (with whom the subject wasnot in competition). Whatever the ordinary meaning of the terms‘envy’ and ‘jealousy,’ these considerationsdemonstrate that these two distinct syndromes need to bedistinguished.

1.3 ‘Benign’ and ‘Invidious’ Envy

Many authors posit a distinction between two kinds of envy: amalicious or invidious form, and a benign, emulative, or admiringvariety of envy.^[3] Typically, the point of the distinction is to identify a class ofcases in which envy is somehow permissible or justifiable and separatethem from cases in which it is not. While details differ, the generalidea is that invidious envy involves a desire that the rival lose thegood, whereas benign envy does not.^[4] But other philosophers claim that benign envy is not envy at all.^[5] Like many disagreements over the nature of emotions, this onethreatens to become a merely verbal dispute, but it can be understoodas a substantive question about the character of an empirical phenomenon.^[6]

Some of the examples advanced on behalf of the suggested bifurcationthreaten to obscure the issue. It will not do, for instance, simply topoint out that people commonly say that they envy someone’s skill incases where it is quite implausible to suppose that they have anydesire that the person loses the skill. There is undoubtedly a commontendency to use the term ‘envy’ for any desire forsomething that is possessed by another. But, given the looseness ofnatural language noted above, we must not simply assume that these arereally cases of the emotional syndrome of envy. Although somediscussions of envy seem to treat any desire for [an instance of] whatanother person has as envy, this threatens to assimilate some cases ofenvy to admiration.^[7]

Most parties to the debate would grant that not every case in whichsomeone would like something that someone else possesses is a case ofgenuine envy. First, envy is typically agreed to be a form of pain ordistress—an unpleasant emotion. To fancy someone else’s linensis not yet to envy them. So not every such desire should be counted asa case of benign envy. Furthermore, even a painful desire for whatsomeone else possesses might be better described as longing than envy.If you badly (painfully) want the new Mercedes convertible, then youlong for it. If you then discover that your neighbor has bought one,does your longing become envy? To avoid turning this into a matter ofstipulation or a verbal dispute, it should be a substantivepsychological question whether you envy her for it. Envy should not beheld to follow as a logical consequence of the conjunction of yourpainful desire with the belief that she has (an instance of) itsobject. But then there must be something more to envy than painfullywanting something that (you know) someone else has.

Robert Young suggests that what differentiates envy from mere longingis that, in (even benign) envy, the subject is pained because therival has the good. But it is questionable whether this proposalsucceeds as a defense of benign envy. If the “because” in question iscausal-explanatory, this seems insufficient to mark the relevantdistinction. After all, ordinary longing may be occasioned by seeingthe good in someone else’s possession. Perhaps if your neighbor hadn’tacquired the convertible, it would never have come to your attention.It would then be true that you want it because she has it, yet itseems possible that this is longing, not envy. Suppose that you wouldhave been equally pained by not having it regardless of how youdiscovered its existence. Then the fact that, as it happens, your longingwas caused by seeing it in the neighbor’s driveway does notsuffice to make this a case of envy.

But perhaps Young’s “because” offers something likethe agent’s reason for being pained, or the content of a thought atwhich she is pained. In other words, perhaps the point is to emphasizethe idea that the subject really is bothered specifically by thedifference in possession, not just by his own lack of the good. But ifso, more would need to be said to explain how how the envy can bebenign. If what pains the subject, or what he evaluates as bad, isreally the disparity between the subject and the rival (not just thesubject’s lack), it is hard to see how the subject could lack anydesire for the rival to lose the comparative advantage. After all, byhypothesis the situation in which the rival loses the good without thesubject getting it would be better than the status quo, as far as thesubject’s envy is concerned – inasmuch as there would then be nodisparity to be bothered by. Of course the subject may not prefer allthings considered that the rival lose the good. But if he is onlymotivated to improve his position, and lacks any desire for the rivalto lose the good, then why think that what bothers him is really thedisparity, rather than just his own lack?

Sara Protasi (2016) offers a more complex taxonomy of envy whichincludes a version of benign envy that she calls “emulativeenvy.” She draws two cross-cutting distinctions: whether thesubject is focused upon the good or upon the rival, and whether sheperceives the good as obtainable or unobtainable. Focus is understoodnot in terms of salience or conscious attention, but as a matter ofevaluative concern: “what the envier focuses on is whatever shecares about, from a prudential point of view.” (2016, p. 4) Inemulative envy, the envier is focused on the good and believes himselfcapable of obtaining it. She is motivated to improve her standing, notto bring down the rival. But emulative envy is supposed to be distinctfrom admiration or even longing. It is meant to be a species of envyin general, which Protasi defines as “an aversive reaction to aperceived inferiority to a similar other, with regard to a good thatis relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.” (2016, p.2)A question for this account is what role the perceived inferiority tothe rival can be playing in emulative envy, if the envier is held tocare only about the good, and not the inferiority as such. If it isplaying no role, then why think this is a species of envy in general,rather than a (no doubt common and important) emotion of some othersort? But if it is allowed that emulative envy does also include aconcern about inferiority as such, distinct from the desire for thegood, then the question is how to make that concern compatible with aninsistence that there is no desire that the rival lose the good.

Even those who deny that “benign envy” is a kind of envy(hereafter, “deniers”) will grant the existence of casesin which people want to have skills or other traits that are possessedby another person, and are pained by their lack, but in which theyhave no desire at all for the other person to lose those traits. Callsuch a state “emulative desire.” Apparently someother languages have a word for that state.^[8] What deniers deny is that emulative desire is an instance of envy (orof “envy proper”, as Rawls puts it). But what is at stakein such a claim? We have already noted that ordinary usage surelypermits application of “envy” in such cases, and in othersbesides, so linguistic propriety is not the issue. One way ofunderstanding the debate concerns which taxonomy of mental statescarves emotions at their joints—that is, carves them in waysthat reflect psychological kinds that support predictions andexplanatory generalizations.

One way to develop the deniers’ position is as follows.^[9] Envy is a distinctive kind of psychological state that is essentiallycompetitive. It is concerned specifically with unfavorable comparisonsto others with whom the subject in some ways sees himself as incompetition. On this view, the characteristic dissatisfaction of envysupplies or embodies some level of motivation toward whatever wouldameliorate the situation: in other words, toward either outdoing orundoing the rival’s advantage Which of those motivations will emergein action depends on many factors. It depends on what the situationaffords, including the probabilities and expected costs and benefitsof success at either option. And it depends on other attitudes anddesires of the subject, including how much he likes the rival, whetherhe thinks it would be wrong to deprive him of the good, and how muchthat wrongness matters to him.

On this view, there can still be cases of genuine envy in which thesubject would not take steps to undermine the rival. He would not evenpush a button to deprive the rival in secret—because he likesthe rival, or because that would be a rotten thing to do to anyone.Call such a person a “decent envier.” A decent envier maysincerely believe that he has no desire whatever that the rival losethe good. He will be wrong about this, but it can still be true thathe would not act on that desire. The attribution of genuine envy insuch a case nonetheless explains some things. It explains why even adecent envier’s pain is prone to go away, along with some of hisambition to achieve the good, if the rival should lose it. Why shouldenvy go away in such cases, if all the envier wanted was to secure thegood himself? It also explains why even decent enviers may be morelikely to be amused by a story that shows the rival in a negativelight, and why they become drawn to other goods that the rivalacquires within the scope of the rivalry. And it explains why somepreviously decent enviers become indecent enviers, or at least becomeaware of some ambivalence about the rival’s possession of thegood, when their efforts to secure the good for themselves provehopeless.

In cases of emulative desire, on the other hand, presumably none ofthese things should be expected. So what deniers want to say aboutbenign envy is that either it is not really envy (it’s justemulative desire, or something else in the neighborhood) or it is notreally benign. Whether the deniers’ view should be preferred may hingeon what explanatory advantages defenders of benign envy can offer fora taxonomy that includes emulative desire as a species of envy.

1.4 Envy vs. Resentment

Although much of the psychological literature on envy supposes thatenvy is concerned with matters of perceived injustice, mostphilosophers reject this suggestion.^[10] The received view is that envy is to be distinguished fromresentment. The latter is held to be a moral emotion, whereas theformer is not. What makes a given emotion a moral emotion has beenglossed in various ways. Roughly, the idea is that moral emotions areones that somehow embody moral principles or appraisals. Resentment isa moral emotion because a given emotional episode does not qualify asa state of resentment unless the subject holds some moral complaintagainst the object of the state. The claim that envy is not a moralemotion should be understood as a denial that any moral complaint ispart of the nature of envy as such. It is compatible with thepossibility of any number of cases in which envious people also holdmoral complaints against those they envy. And it is also compatiblewith the possibility of envying someone for some moral feature.

It seems clear that in many (perhaps even most) cases of envy, thesubject is liable to find some moral complaint with which to justifynegative feelings toward his rival. This would explain variousexperimental findings that correlate feelings of envy with complaintsof injustice. But, of course, such complaints may be defensiverationalizations of rancorous feelings, rather than elements in envy.Claims about which of the various thoughts that commonly attend agiven type of emotion belong in a characterization of that emotiontype are best defended within the context of a general theory of howto individuate emotion types, which is beyond the scope of this entry.In any case, some version of the thesis that envy is not a moralemotion seems both plausible and necessary to make sense of the debateover whether egalitarianism is motivated by envy (see section 3.1below).

2. The Rationality of Envy

Assessments of the rationality of emotions take various forms. It isuseful to distinguish the prudential advisability of emotions (whether they are good for the person who has them) fromtheir fittingness (roughly, whether the appraisal of circumstancesinvolved in the emotion is accurate or not). Both of these assessments are to be distinguished from various ethical appraisals ofemotions. Most authors who address the issue seem to agree that envyis seldom advisable: insofar as one is able to control or influenceone’s emotions, it is best not to be envious, because envy harms thosewho feel it. This is sometimes urged simply on the grounds that envyis a form of pain, but more often because, in envy, a person’ssubjective sense of well-being, self-worth or self-respect isdiminished. But if envy involves certain characteristic patterns ofmotivation, such as a motive to outdo or undo the rival’s advantages,then the advisability of envy may be strongly dependent on theadvisability of the actions it motivates. And whether these actionsare advisable, in turn, depends upon whether they are efficient meansto the ends at which they aim, and whether those ends are themselvesin the subject’s interests. Thus an adequate assessment of theprudential advisability of envy may well depend on whether the envioussubject’s sense that he is worse off because of his rival’s possessionof the good that he lacks is accurate. If it is accurate, thenmotivation to change the situation may well be beneficial for theSubject. We turn now to issues of accuracy.

It is commonly supposed that emotions, envy included, involve a way oftaking the circumstances—a thought, construal, appraisal, orperception of the circumstances—which can then be assessed forfittingness (objective rationality) and/or warrant (subjective rationality).^[11] Thus fear can be unfittingly directed at something that isn’t reallydangerous, or fittingly directed at something that is. And it can beunwarrantedly directed at something the subject has good reason tobelieve poses no danger, or warrantedly directed at what she has goodreason to think dangerous—even if that good reason is suppliedby misleading evidence, so that the object of the emotion is not, infact, dangerous. Similarly, in light of the discussion above, we mightsay that envy involves thinking that the rival has something good thatthe subject lacks, and negatively evaluating this difference inpossession, per se. Each of the various strands in this way of takingthe circumstances, then, can be appraised for fittingness and warrant.We will focus on fittingness here, but analogous points can be made interms of warrant. Envy will be unfitting, for instance, if the rivaldoes not really have the good, or if the ‘good’ isn’treally good—for instance if the envy is directed at somepossession that the subject would not really value if he knew its truenature. These suggestions are uncontroversial. A more interestingquestion concerns the last element in envy’s characteristic appraisal:the negative evaluation of the difference in possession. This toomight be thought to be amenable of broadly rational appraisal.

Some philosophers suggest that envy is always or typically irrational,and they seem to have in mind the charge that it is unfitting.^[12] Theirs is a restricted version of the Stoic critique of emotions,according to which (roughly) all emotions are unfitting because theyinvolve taking various worldly things to matter that don’t reallymatter. Not many contemporary philosophers are attracted to the Stoicview of value, which is embedded in an idiosyncratic ancientcosmology. But perhaps specific emotions can be convicted of theputative mistake, and envy appears to be a likely suspect. If envyinvolves taking the difference in possession between subject and rivalto be bad in itself, then, if such differences are not bad inthemselves, envy is systematically unfitting. Developing this chargedemands getting clearer about the sense in which envy can be said toinvolve taking the difference in possession to be bad in itself.

Suppose that envy includes some desire that the rival not have thegood. Then envy may be interpreted so as to involve a preference forthe situation in which neither subject nor rival have the good to theone in which rival has it and subject does not.^[13] Call this the “envious preference.” The enviouspreference is invoked as a basis for the claim that envy appraises theformer situation as better than the latter. But better in whatrespect? There are a number of possibilities, and we will considerjust two. First, it might be held to be better, from the point of viewof the universe (“impersonally better” for short).Secondly, it might be held to be better for the subject.

If envy holds that the situation in which neither has the good isbetter, impersonally, than the one in which Rival has it, this can becriticized as an axiological mistake.^[14] Surely the world is a better place,ceteris paribus, ifsomeone possesses a given good than if no one does. But this is tooquick. First, consider cases in which rival has acquired the good bywrongdoing. Arguably the world is not a better place when the fortunesof some are wrongfully improved. Secondly, an extreme egalitarian mayhold that inequalities themselves are prima facie bad, because theyare unjust. On that view, it may sometimes be better that neitherpossesses a given good than that one does. Either of theseconsiderations might then be invoked as a defense of fittingness ofenvy. Thus, if envy is interpreted as making a claim about impersonalvalue, it will be difficult to prevent moral considerations fromguiding verdicts about its fittingness.^[15] While this does not completely collapse the distinction between envyand resentment, it renders it considerably murkier.

Alternatively, envy can be held to present the difference inpossession between subject and rival as bad specifically for Subject.This interpretation of envy’s characteristic appraisal is moreplausible, and it jibes better with the doctrine that envy is not amoral feeling. Envy can nonetheless be criticized as irrational, onthis interpretation, for taking something to be bad for Subject thatis not in fact bad for him. What matters to how well things are goingfor Subject is a function of what goods Subject has, not what goodshis rival has, the critic will suggest. Hence, while the present stateof affairs is worse for Subject than a situation in which he has thegood and Rival lacks it, it is not worse than a situation in whichneither has the good. So there is no self-interested reason forSubject to have the envious preference. Envy is thereforesystematically unfitting because it takes something to be bad for thesubject that is not in fact bad for him.

The cogency of this argument for the irrationality of envy depends, ofcourse, on the plausibility of its claims about well-being. If peopledo in fact systematically care about the possessions of others, andregard themselves as worse or better off accordingly as they stack upagainst their selected comparison class, some subjectivist accountswill license taking this concern as itself a part of these subjects’well-being—in which case, some envy will be fitting. Whereasmost objective accounts of well-being either treat it as a measure ofprimary goods, or supply content restrictions on the desires whosesatisfaction contributes to well-being which would exclude desireslike the envious preference. One recent defense of the claim that envyis sometimes fitting relies on the idea that being excellent invarious domains of human achievement contributes to well-being and yetis essentially a comparative matter (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2005). Ifsuch excellences, or other positional goods, are granted to contributein themselves to well-being, then it appears that envy will be fittingwhenever a rival’s diminution with respect to the relevant positionalgood improves the Subject’s position.

3. Envy and Justice

3.1 Egalitarianism and Envy

A recurring suggestion in the history of philosophical and politicalthought has been that envy supplies the psychological foundations ofthe concern for justice, and, especially, of egalitarian conceptionsof justice.^[16] Both the proponents of this charge and those who contest it havecommonly taken it to be a damaging suggestion for egalitarianism.^[17] It is worth distinguishing genetic versions of the charge fromoccurrent ones. Genetic versions concern the historical ordevelopmental sources of a concern for equality. Freud, for instance,held that concern with justice is the product of childhood envy ofother children leading to concern for equal treatment, and thereby to‘group spirit’: “If one cannot be the favoriteoneself, at all events nobody else shall be the favorite.” (p.120). Nietzsche can be read as tendering an account of the origins ofegalitarian values or ideals in envy in his account of the“slave revolt in morality.”^[18] Whatever their merits, these claims should be distinguished from theclaim that those who defend egalitarian views of justice are motivatedby occurrent bouts of envy or propensities to them.^[19]

Defense of the charge that egalitarianism is occurrently motivated byenvy hinges both on the commitments of egalitarianism and on thenature of envy. The common motif is that egalitarians wish to do awaywith the advantages of the better off, and that they wish to do thisbecause they are bothered by the very fact that the better off arebetter off. This is supposed to show that egalitarians are motivatedby envy. Whether this is a fair characterization of any prominentegalitarian position is certainly open to question.^[20] But in any case, in light of the distinction between envy andresentment, it is clear that there can be no direct move from theclaim that egalitarians are ‘bothered’ by the advantagesof the better off to the claim that they are envious. For anotherpossibility is that what they feel is resentment, occasioned by thethought that the present distribution is unjust.^[21] Note that the claim that what is felt is resentment does not dependupon showing that the resentment is fitting—that thedistribution really is unjust. It would suffice to show that theresponse really is a moral evaluation, justified or not.

It seems clear that the occurrent version of the charge is onlydamaging to egalitarianism if the basic distinction between envy andresentment is accepted. Otherwise, envy could be granted to motivateegalitarianism, but this would not impute any concern aside fromconcerns with justice to the position. With the distinction in hand,however, the charge is difficult to defend. Envy does not arise incases where inequalities favor the subject. So defenders of the chargeappear to be committed to the falsifiable thesis that egalitarians areinconsistent in their commitment to inequality.^[22] If the charge were true, egalitarians should oppose only theinequalities that are unfavorable to their own interests. To theextent that egalitarians are sincere and consistent in the embrace oftheir principles, this counts against the charge that their occurrentmotivation is envy.^[23]

3.2 Envy-free allocations

A different way in which envy might be thought to motivate broadlyegalitarian thought is by appeal to the idea of envy-free allocations.A distribution of goods is said to be “envy-free” when noone prefers anyone else’s bundle of resources to her own.^[24] The suggestion here is not that envy is the psychological motivationfor the concern with equality, but rather that, where a distributionin fact produces envy, this is grounds to doubt the fairness of thedistribution. But ‘envy’ in these contexts is a technicalterm for any situation in which someone prefers another’s bundles ofgoods, and does not refer to the emotional syndrome with which thisentry is concerned.^[25]

3.3 Rawls’ Problem of Envy

In constructing the “original position” from whichdeliberators select principles of justice in A Theory of Justice,Rawls assumes that the imagined deliberators are not motivated byvarious psychological propensities. One of these is the propensity toenvy. One justification Rawls offers for this stipulation is that whatprinciples of justice are chosen should not be affected by individualinclinations, which are mere accidents. This rationale is lesspersuasive if envious concerns are universal in human nature. Anotherjustification is that parties in the original position should beconcerned with their absolute level of primary social goods, not withtheir standing relative to others as such.^[26] He then proceeds in the second part of the argument for theprinciples of justice to consider whether, in fact, human propensitiesbeing what they are, the tendency to envy will undermine thearrangements of a well-ordered society (in which case the principlesof justice would have to be reconsidered). The ‘Problem ofEnvy’ is the possibility that widespread envy might do justthis. The reason that Rawls takes this to be a live possibility isthat “the inequalities sanctioned by the difference principlemay be so great as to arouse envy to a socially dangerous extent.”^[27]

The primary way in which Rawls thinks envy could pose such a threat isif it comes to undermine the self-respect of those who are less welloff. It might do this, he thinks, if the differences between the havesand the have-nots are so great that, under existing social conditions,the differences cannot help but cause loss of self-esteem. “Forthose suffering this hurt,” he continues, “enviousfeelings are not irrational; the satisfaction of their rancor wouldmake them better off.” (534) He calls this “excusablegeneral envy,” and offers two reasons for doubting that it willbe prevalent in a well-ordered society. First, he argues that theliberties and political status of equal citizens encourageself-respect even when one is less well off than others. Second, hesuggests that background institutions (including a competitiveeconomy) make it likely that excessive inequalities will not be therule.

Rawls’ discussion is in some tension with the received view of envy.He supposes that “the main psychological root of our liabilityto envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth combined with asense of impotence.” This leads him to expect that envy will bemore severe the greater the differences between subjects and thosethey envy.^[28] However most observers of envy, from Aristotle on, have urged that itis most often felt toward those with whom the subject perceiveshimself as in competition, so that typically very great disparities inwell-being are not envied. And there is some empirical evidence tosupport this claim.^[29] This is usually explained by the hypothesis that the benchmarksagainst which people measure their comparative well-being are, in some(possibly metaphorical) sense, local. If true, this calls intoquestion whether preventing excessive inequalities is likely to reducethe frequency or intensity of envy. But it also suggests that thephenomenon of general, or class, envy toward which Rawls’ discussionis directed may not pose a substantial threat to the well-orderedsociety.

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