We have some of our properties purely in virtue of the way we are.(Our mass is an example.) We have other properties in virtue of theway we interact with the world. (Our weight is an example.) The formerare the intrinsic properties, the latter are the extrinsic properties.This seems to be an intuitive enough distinction to grasp, and hencethe intuitive distinction has made its way into many discussions inphilosophy, including discussions in ethics, philosophy of mind,metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of physics. Unfortunately,when we look more closely at the intuitive distinction, we find reasonto suspect that it conflates a few related distinctions, and that eachof these distinctions is somewhat resistant to analysis.

• 1. Introduction
  • 1.1 Philosophical Importance
  • 1.2 Global and Local
  • 1.3 Relations
• 2. Notions of Intrinsicality
  • 2.1 Relational vs. Non-Relational Properties
  • 2.2 Local vs. Non-Local Properties
  • 2.3 Interior vs. Exterior Properties
  • 2.4 Duplication Preserving vs. Duplication Non-Preserving Properties
  • 2.5 Which is the real distinction?
• 3. Attempts at Analysis
  • 3.1 Broadly Logical Theories
  • 3.2 Perfect Naturalness Theories
  • 3.3 Non-Disjunctivity Theories
  • 3.4 Contractionist Theories
  • 3.5 Grounding Theories
• Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Introduction

The standard way to introduce the distinction between intrinsic andextrinsic properties is by the use of a few orientatingcharacterisations. David Lewis provides the following list:

A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsicproperties to something is entirely about that thing; whereas anascription of extrinsic properties to something is not entirely aboutthat thing, though it may well be about some larger whole whichincludes that thing as part. (Lewis 1983a: 197)

A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thingitself, and nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic properties, thougha thing may well have these in virtue of the way some larger whole is… (Lewis 1983a: 197)

If something has an intrinsic property, then so does any perfectduplicate of that thing; whereas duplicates situated in differentsurroundings will differ in their extrinsic properties. (Lewis 1983a:197)

The other way to introduce the subject matter is by providing examplesof paradigmatic intrinsic and extrinsic properties. One half of thistask is easy: everyone agrees that being an uncle is extrinsic, as isbeing six metres from a rhododendron. The other half is morechallenging, since there is much less agreement about which propertiesare intrinsic. Lewis (1983a, 1986a, 1988), for example, has insistedthat shape properties are intrinsic, but one could hold that anobject’s shape depends on the curvature of the space in which itis located at, and this might not even be intrinsic to that space(Nerlich 1979), let alone the object (Bricker 1993, McDaniel 2007, andSkow 2007). Lewis also mentions charge and internal structure as beingexamples of intrinsic properties. (For ease of exposition, we willassume below that shape properties are intrinsic. We will also assumethat properties like being made of tin, and having a mass of 500kg areintrinsic.)

1.1 Philosophical Importance

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties plays anessential role in stating several interesting philosophical problems.Historically, the most prominent of these has to do with notions ofintrinsic value. G. E. Moore (1903: §18) noted that we can make adistinction between things that are good in themselves, or possessintrinsic value, and those that are good as a means to other things.To this day there is still much debate over whether this distinctioncan be sustained (Feldman 1998, Kagan 1998), and, if it can, whichkinds of things possess intrinsic value (Krebs 1999). In particular,one of the central topics in contemporary environmental ethics is thequestion of which kinds of things (intelligent beings, consciousbeings, living things, species, etc) might have intrinsic value. Whilethis is the oldest (and still most common) use of theintrinsic/extrinsic distinction in philosophy, it has not played muchrole in the discussions of the distinction in metaphysics, to which wenow turn.

As P. T. Geach (1969) noted, the fact that some object \(a\) is not\(F\) before an event occurs but is \(F\) after that event occurs doesnot mean that the event constitutes, in any deep sense, a change in\(a\). To use a well-worn example, at the time of Socrates’sdeath Xanthippe became a widow; that is, she was not a widow beforethe event of her husband’s death, but she was a widow when itended. Still, though that event constituted (or perhaps wasconstituted by) a change in Socrates, it did not in itself constitutea change in Xanthippe. Geach noted that we can distinguish betweenreal changes, such as what occurs in Socrates when he dies, from merechanges in which predicates one satisfies, such as what occurs inXanthippe when Socrates dies. The latter he termed ‘mereCambridge’ change. There is something of a consensus that anobject undergoes real change in an event iff there is someintrinsic property it instantiated before the eventbut not afterwards.

David Lewis (1986a, 1988) built on this point of Geach’s tomount an attack onendurantism, the theory thatobjects persist by being wholly located at different times, and thatthere can be strict identity between an object existing at one timeand one existing at another time. Lewis argues that this isinconsistent with the idea that objects undergo real change. If thevery same object can be both \(F\) (at one time) and not \(F\) (atanother), this means that \(F\)-ness must be a relation to a time, butthis means that it is not an intrinsic property. So any property thatan object can change must be extrinsic, so nothing undergoes realchange. Lewis says that this argument supports the rival theory ofperdurantism, which says that objects persist byhaving different temporal parts at different times. While thisargument is controversial (see Haslanger (1989), Johnston (1987) andLowe (1988) for some responses), it does show how considerations aboutintrinsicality can resonate within quite different areas ofmetaphysics.

A third major area where the concept of intrinsicality has been put towork is in stating various supervenience theses. Frank Jackson (1998)defines physicalism in terms of duplication and physical duplication,which are in turn defined in terms of intrinsic properties. Similarly,Jaegwon Kim (1982) defines a mind/body supervenience thesis in termsof intrinsic properties. As Theodore Sider (1993) notes, the simplestway to define theindividualist theory of mentalcontent that Tyler Burge (1979) attacks is as the claim that thecontent of a thinker’s propositional attitudes supervenes on theintrinsic properties of the thinker. And manyinternalist theories in epistemology are based aroundthe intuition that whether a thinker is justified in believing someproposition supervenes on the intrinsic properties of the thinker.

A fourth area where the concept of intrinsically has been employed isto state recombination principles intended to describe what possiblestates of the world there are. (See Lewis 1986a.) An initial attemptto state such a principle might be (R1), where \(x\) is whollydistinct from \(y\) iff \(x\) and \(y\) have no parts in common. (Asis standard in philosophical usage, each thing is counted as a part ofitself. Hence, things are not wholly distinct from themselves.)

(R1)

For any properties \(p\) and \(q\) , it is possible that there aretwo wholly distinct things, \(x\) and \(y\), such that \(x\) has \(p\)and \(y\) has \(q\).

Given an abundant theory of properties according to which each(non-defective) predicate expresses a property, however, (R1) clearlyfails, since it isn’t possible for there to be an \(x\) and a\(y\) such that \(x\) has the property of being made of gold, and\(y\) has the property of being such that nothing is made of gold.This defect with (R1) can be fixed by replacing (R1) with (R2).

(R2)

For anyintrinsic properties \(p\) and \(q\), it ispossible that there are two wholly distinct things, \(x\) and \(y\),such that \(x\) has \(p\) and \(y\) has \(q\).

While being made of gold and being such that nothing is made of goldrefute (R1), they don’t refute (R2), since being such thatnothing is made of gold is clearly non-intrinsic.

In addition to the above four applications of the distinction betweenintrinsic and extrinsic properties, the distinction has also beenemployed for many other purposes. For example, it has been used toformulate principles of universalizability for moral principles andmoral laws (Rabinowicz 1979), formulate a requirement on anexplanation being a good explanation, namely that it be an intrinsicexplanation (Field 1980, Maya 2014), and formulate a non-trivialversion of Mill’s principle of the uniformity of nature(Schlesinger 1990). The distinction (or distinctions definable interms of it) has also been used to argue against the magical ersatztheory of possible worlds (Lewis 1986a, Sect. 3.4), defend thetransitivity of causation (Hall 2000, Hall 2004), defend the modaltheory of essence (Denby 2014), argue for the immanent theory ofproperties (Audi 2019), and argue against the thesis that determinablefacts are always soley grounded by determinate facts (Shumener2022).

Most of the philosophical applications of intrinsicality areindependent of its precise analysis. Work on its analysis, however,has helped clarify these applications by allowing us to distinguishbetween different notions of intrinsicality and different notions inthe vicinity of intrinsicality, and by giving us a greaterunderstanding of these various notions and of what properties satisfythem. A good example of the latter kind of advance is TheodoreSider’s (2003) observation that most of the properties in folktheory are ‘maximal’ and hence not intrinsic properties.This observation provides a strong argument against various theoriesthat appeal to the intuitive intrinsicality of some everydayproperty.

1.2 Global and Local

In addition to the “global” concept of a property beingintrinsic, there is a “local” concept of something havinga property in an intrinsic fashion (see Humberstone 1996, p. 206). Foreach of Lewis’s characterisations concerning the concept of anintrinsic property quoted in section1.1, there is a corresponding characterisation for the concept of a thinghaving a property in an intrinsic fashion. These are:

1. \(x\) has \(F\) in an intrinsic fashion iff a sentence ascribing\(F\) to \(x\) is entirely about that thing.
2. \(x\) has \(F\) in an intrinsic fashion iff \(x\) has \(F\) invirtue of how \(x\) itself, and nothing else, is.
3. \(x\) has \(F\) in an intrinsic fashion iff every duplicate of\(x\) has \(F\).

It follows from at least the third of these characterisations thatsomething can have an extrinsic property in an intrinsic fashion. Forexample, since every duplicate of a piece of tin has the property ofbeing made of tin, every duplicate of a piece of tin also has theextrinsic property of being either made of tin or married. As aresult, it follows from the third characterisation that each piece oftin has the property of being either made of tin or married in anintrinsic fashion, despite this property being extrinsic.

Two plausible principles linking the local and global concepts ofintrinsicality are (GTL) and (LTG) (see Humberstone 1996, p. 228).

(GTL)

If \(F\) is an intrinsic property, then it is necessary thatevery \(x\) that has \(F\) has \(F\) in an intrinsic fashion

(LTG)

If it is necessary that every \(x\) that has \(F\) has \(F\) inan intrinsic fashion, then \(F\) is an intrinsic property

In addition to the two-place predicate ‘has … in anintrinsic fashion’, we can introduce a modifier‘intrinsically’, where, adapting one of thecharacterisations above, \(x\) is intrinsically \(F\) iff \(x\) is\(F\) in virtue of how \(x\) itself, and nothing else, is. (cf.Humberstone 1996, p. 228). This modifier takes predicates as argumentsrather than names of properties or variables ranging over properties.Nominalists, who don’t believe in properties, might attempt touse this modifier to capture the intuitive distinctions associatedwith intrinsicality without committing themselves to properties. Forexample, a nominalist might claim that a table is intrinsicallyrectangular, while claiming to consistently hold that there is noproperty of being rectangular. (For simplicity, we will assume in thefollowing that nominalism is false and that there are abundantly manyproperties and relations, some of which are intrinsic and some ofwhich are extrinsic.)

There might be further reasons to employ either the two placepredicate ‘has … in an intrinsic fashion’, or themodifier ‘intrinsically’, rather than the one-placepredicate ‘is intrinsic’. For example, one might thinkthat at least one of the former two notions is more fundamental thanthe latter notion, or that the latter notion is misguided in some waythat at least one of the former notions isn’t. (See, forexample, Figdor 2008.)

1.3 Relations

While this article focuses on the distinction between intrinsic andextrinsic one-place properties, it is important to recognize that thedistinction between intrinsic and extrinsic also applies to multipleplace relations. As in the case of one-place properties, thedistinction between intrinsic and extrinsic multiple place relationscan be introduced by characterisations and examples. Onecharacterisation is the following:

An \(n\)-place intrinsic relation is an \(n\)-place relation that\(n\) things stand in in virtue of how they are and how they arerelated to each other, and not in virtue of anything else; whereas,this is not the case for extrinsic \(n\)-place relations.

Examples of extrinsic two-place relations includebeing as popularas, andhaving the same cousin as. Possible examples ofintrinsic two-place relations includebeing 1 m away from andbeing made of the same type of metal as. (The claim thatdistance relations likebeing 1 m away from are intrinsicwill be denied by philosophers who deny that shape properties areintrinsic.)

As well as the global notion of an \(n\)-place relation beingintrinsic, there is the local notion of \(n\) things standing in arelation in an intrinsic fashion. A characterisation of this localnotion is:

\(n\) things stand in a relation \(R\) in an intrinsic fashion iff the\(n\) things stand in \(R\) in virtue of how they are and how they arerelated to each other, and not in virtue of anything else.

2. Notions of Intrinsicality

A number of different distinctions have been called theintrinsic/extrinsic distinction. As J. Michael Dunn (1990) notes, someauthors have used ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’to mean ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’. Dunn issurely right in saying that this is a misuse of the terms. A moreinteresting distinction is noted by Brian Ellis (1991; discussed inHumberstone 1996: 206). (See also Figdor 2008 and Figdor 2014 for adiscussion of a related notion of intrinsicality.) Ellis suggests weshould distinguish between properties that objects have independentlyof any outside forces acting on them (what we will call theEllis-intrinsic properties), and those that they have in virtue ofthose outside forces (the Ellis-extrinsic properties). For manyobjects (such as, say, a stretched rubber band) their shape will bedependent on the outside forces acting on them, so their shape will beEllis-extrinsic. If one is committed to the idea that shapes areintrinsic, one should think this means that the distinction betweenthe Ellis-intrinsic and Ellis-extrinsic properties is not the same asthe intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. Such a judgement may seem alittle hasty, but in any case we will turn now to distinctions thathave received more attention in the philosophical literature.

2.1 Relational vs. Non-Relational Properties

Many writers, especially in the literature on intrinsic value, use‘relational’ for the opposite of intrinsic. This seems tobe a mistake since many properties seem to be both be relational andintrinsic. For example, most people have the propertyhavinglonger legs than arms, and indeed seem to have this property inan intrinsic fashion, even though the property consists in a certainrelation being satisfied. Maybe the property is not intrinsic ifwhether or not something is an arm or a leg is extrinsic, so perhapsthis isn’t a conclusive example, but it seems troubling. And, inany case, there are other examples that can’t be responded to inthis way. For example, the property of having a proper part is surelyintrinsic, but it also appears to be a relational property.

As Humberstone 1996 notes, some might respond by suggesting that arelational property is one such that if an object has it, then itbears some relation to a non-part of it. But this won’t doeither.Not being within a mile of a rhododendron is clearlyrelational, but does not consist in bearing a relation to anynon-part, as we can see by the fact that a non-rhododendron all alonein a world can satisfy it.

A further response might be to say that a relational property shouldbe a property that involves a relation that can only relate whollydistinct things, and that, given this construal of a relationalproperty, non-intrinsic properties are relational properties. However,this response faces difficulties also. For example, this account wouldpresumably classify the property of being such that there is a cube asbeing intrinsic. This property, however, is not intrinsic.

While the notion of a relational property should be distinguished fromthe notion of a non-intrinsic property, it might be that the notion ofintrinsic properties can be given an account in terms ofrelationality. One such account due to Francesscotti is discussed inthe supplement:

The Relational Account of Intrinsicality.

2.2 Local vs. Non-Local Properties

We now turn to the notion of intrinsicality characterised by thecharacterisations listed in section1. Or perhaps better, we now turn to thenotions ofintrinsicality characterised by these characterisations, since, whileLewis thought that each of these characterisations characterise asingle notion of intrinsically, it is plausible that they characterisedifferent notions. In this subsection, we will discuss the notioncharacterised by the first characterisation which involves aboutness.In the next two subsections, we will discuss the notions characterisedby the other two characterisations.

Lewis’s first characterisation is:

A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes intrinsicproperties to something is entirely about that thing; whereas anascription of extrinsic properties to something is not entirely aboutthat thing, though it may well be about some larger whole whichincludes that thing as part. (Lewis 1983a: 111–2)

The notion of aboutness employed in this characterisation is plausiblythat ofintrinsic aboutness, where intrinsic aboutness can beintuitively characterised by (1).

(1)

A state of affairs\(s\) is intrinsically about a thing \(x\) iff \(s\) (either truly orfalsely) describes how \(x\) and its parts are and how they arerelated to each other, as opposed to how \(x\) and its parts arerelated to other things and how other things are.

Using the notion of intrinsic aboutness, Lewis’s firstcharacterisation can be more precisely stated by the schema (2).

(2)

The property of being \(F\) is intrinsic iff, necessarily, forany \(x\), the state of affairs of \(x\) being \(F\) is intrinsicallyabout \(x\).

For any predicate \(F\) expressing a property \(p\), and any name\(n\) referring to an \(x\), define the ascription of \(p\) to \(x\)to be the state of affairs expressed by \(\ulcorner Fn\urcorner\).Using this definition, we can replace the schema (2) with the sentence(3).

(3)

For any property\(p, p\) is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), the ascriptionof \(p\) to \(x\) is intrinsically about \(x\).

(3) plausibly classifiesbeing a cube as intrinsic, since,for any \(x\), the state of affairs of \(x\) being a cube plausiblydescribes how \(x\) and its parts are and how they are related to eachother, as opposed to how they are related to other things and howother things are. In contrast, (3) plausibly classifiesbeing anuncle as non-intrinsic, since its ascription to a thing is notonly about how it and its parts are and how they are related to eachother, but also about how it is related to things outside of it. (3)also plausibly classifies being Obama as non-intrinsic since theascription of being Obama to Clinton, namely the state of affairs ofObama being identical to Clinton, is not wholly about Clinton, but isalso about Obama. Finally, (3) also appears to classify being suchthat there is a number as non-intrinsic, even if it is necessary thatthere are numbers. This is because the ascription of this property toClinton, namely the state of affairs that Clinton is such that thereis a number, appears to be not wholly about how Clinton is, but isalso about how things wholly distinct from Clinton are. (We willassume that the intuition underlying this judgement is correct.However, this is not uncontroversial. See Sider 1996 for a rejectionof a closely related intuition and Eddon 2011 for a reply to thisrejection.)

In the following, we will call the properties classified as intrinsicby (3)local properties, and call the properties classifiedby (3) as not intrinsicnon-local properties. (This notion ofa local property needs to be distinguished from the local conceptionof something having a property in an intrinsic fashion discussed insection1.2.)

2.3 Interior vs. Exterior Properties

The second characterisation listed in the quote by Lewis in section1 was “A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the waythat thing itself, and nothing else, is”.

(4)

Being \(F\) isintrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), if \(x\) is \(F\) then\(x\) is \(F\) in virtue of how \(x\) is intrinsically.

Call the properties that are classified as intrinsic by (4)interior properties, and call the properties that areclassified as non-intrinsic by (4)exterior properties. Animportant question is what meaning ‘in virtue’ is meant tohave in (4). One possible answer is that it is meant to have a readingcorresponding to metaphysical grounding, where metaphysical groundingis the relation that stands to metaphysical explanation as causationstands to causal explanation. Under such a reading of ‘invirtue’, (5) is necessarily true.

(5)

‘\(\varphi\)in virtue of it being the case that \(\phi\)’ is true iff thestate of affairs expressed by \(\phi\) metaphysically grounds thestate of affairs expressed by \(\varphi\).

While it might be initially appealing to think that ‘invirtue’ in (4) expresses metaphysical grounding, Marshall 2015has given an argument that (4) fails to characterise a notion ofintrinsicality when ‘in virtue’ has this reading. Theargument relies on (6) being necessarily true and (7) being true onany notion of intrinsicality.

(6)

‘\(\varphi\)in virtue of how \(x\) is intrinsically’ is true iff there is asentence \(\phi\) that expresses an obtaining state of affairs that isintrinsically about \(x\) such that ‘\(\varphi\) in virtue of itbeing the case that \(\phi\)’ is true.

(7)

It is possible forthere to be a sentence ‘\(a\) is \(F\)’, where \(F\)expresses an intrinsic property and ‘\(a\) is \(F\)’expresses a foundational fact in the sense of being a fact that is notmetaphysically grounded by any other fact.

The argument is the following. Suppose, for reductio, that (4)characterises a notion of intrinsicality when ‘in virtue’expresses metaphysical grounding. It follows from this, and thenecessity of (5) and (6), that (8) is necessarily true.

(8)

Being \(F\) isintrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), if \(x\) is \(F\) thenthere is an obtaining state of affairs \(s\) that is intrinsicallyabout \(x\) such that \(s\) metaphysically grounds \(x\) being \(F\).

By (7), it is possible for a sentence \(\ulcorner a\) is\(F\urcorner\) to express a foundational fact, where \(F\) expressesan intrinsic property. Hence, it follows from (7) and the necessity of(8) that (9) is possibly true.

(9)

\(a\) being \(F\)is a foundational fact and there is an obtaining state of affairs\(s\) that is intrinsically about \(a\) such that \(s\) metaphysicallygrounds \(a\) being \(F\).

However, (9) is necessarily false, since foundational facts cannot bemetaphysically grounded by any facts. Hence, the assumption that (4)characterises a notion of intrinsicality when ‘in virtue’expresses metaphysical grounding is false.

Given ‘in virtue’ doesn’t express metaphysicalgrounding in (4) on its intended use, what does it express? Oneattractive option is to think that ‘in virtue’ in (4) ismeant to be understood as having the same effect as ‘is a matterof’ and that, on this reading, it expresses the identityrelation. On this reading, ‘\(\varphi\) in virtue of it beingthe case that \(\psi\)’ is true iff the state of affairsexpressed by \(\phi\) is identical to the state of affairs expressedby \(\varphi\). Since it follows from (6) that, on this reading‘\(\varphi\) in virtue of how \(x\) is intrinsically’ istrue iff there is a sentence \(\phi\) that expresses an obtainingstate of affairs that is intrinsically about \(x\), (10) follows from(4) on this reading of ‘in virtue’.

(10)

Being \(F\) isintrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), if \(x\) is \(F\) then thestate of affairs of \(x\) being \(F\) is intrinsically about \(x\).

An alternative option, which is investigated in Marshall 2016a, is tohold that ‘in virtue’ may express a number of differentreflexive determination, or entailment, relations in (4), and thateach of these relations determines a different notion ofintrinsicality. In addition to identity, such entailment relationsmight include metaphysical necessitation, nomic necessitation, andweak metaphysical grounding, where \(p\) weakly metaphysically grounds\(q\) iff either \(p=q\) or \(p\) metaphysically grounds \(q\). Giventhese relations determine different notions of intrinsicality for eachrelation \(R\), we may call the notion of interiority corresponding to\(R\) ‘\(R\) interiority’. So, for example, the notion ofintrinsicality obtained from (4) by interpreting ‘invirtue’ as expressing the identity relation might be calledidentity interiority, while the notion of interiority obtained frommetaphysical necessitation might be called metaphysical necessitationinteriority, and the notion of interiority obtained from nomicnecessitation might be called nomic necessitation interiority.

If ‘in virtue’ expresses the relation \(R\), then‘\(\varphi\) in virtue of it being the case that \(\phi\)’is true iff the state of affairs of it being the case that \(\phi\)stands in \(R\) to the state of affairs of it being the case the\(\varphi\). It follows from this, (4) and (6) that the \(R\) interiorproperties satisfy (11).

(11)

Being \(F\) is\(R\) interior iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), if \(x\) is \(F\) thenthere is an obtaining state of affairs \(s\) that is intrinsicallyabout \(x\) such that \(s\) stands in \(R\) to the state of affairs ofit being the case that \(x\) is \(F\).

Just as being cubical is intuitively a local property, while being anuncle and being such that there is a number are intuitively non-localproperties, the former property is intuitively an identity interiorityproperty, while the latter properties are both intuitively notidentity interior. (Those that claim that being such that there is anumber is a local property, however, are likely to also claim thatthis property is identity interior. See, for example, Sider (1993a),Eddon (2011), Vallentyne (1997), Hoffman-Kolls (2014) and Francescotti(2014) for the relevant debate.) The identity interior properties,however, plausibly do not coincide with the local properties, since,while being identical to Obama is not a local property, it isplausibly an identity interior property. This is because, necessarily,for any \(x\) that is identical to Obama, the state of affairs of\(x\) being identical to Obama is plausibly about how \(x\) and itsparts are and how they are related to each other, as opposed to howthey are related to other things and how other things are.

Since each identity interior property is also an \(R\) interiorproperty, for each reflexive relation \(R\), the \(R\) interiorproperties also do not coincide with the local properties for each\(R\). The \(R\) interior properties also differ from the identityinterior properties for at least some \(R\). For example, themetaphysical necessitation interior properties plausibly differ fromthe identity interior properties since, while being such that there isa number is plausibly not identity interior, it is metaphysicalnecessitation interior. This is because, given the assumption thatnumbers necessarily exist, any \(x\) is such that how it isintrinsically necessitates that \(x\) is such that there is anumber.

2.4 Duplication Preserving vs. Duplication Non-Preserving Properties

The third characterisation Lewis lists when isolating the concept ofintrinsicality is that duplicates never differ with respect to theirintrinsic properties. Lewis holds a further principle that may not beobvious from the above quote: that any property with respect to whichduplicates never differ is intrinsic. Adding this further principle tothe characterisation gives us (12).

(12)

\(F\) isintrinsic iff \(F\) never differs between duplicates.

(12), however, has the following problem. Assume that no man has amass of 500 kg (although it is possible for a man to have a mass of500 kg). Since nothing has the property of being a popular man who is500 kg, given this assumption, no two duplicates differ in whetherthey have this property. (12) therefore falsely classifiesbeing apopular man who is 500 kg as intrinsic.

David Lewis doesn’t face this problem due to his concretisttheory of possible worlds. Lewis holds that, in addition to the worldwe live in, there are many other concrete worlds of the same kind asthe world we live in. Moreover, he holds that contained in some ofthese worlds are 500 kg duplicate men, some of whom are popular, andsome of whom are not. Given Lewis’s concretist theory ofpossible worlds, then, being a popular man who is 500 kg is classifiedas extrinsic by (12).

Philosophers who instead endorse standard abstractionist theories ofpossible worlds, however, can’t accept (12). According tostandard abstractionist theories of possible worlds, possible worldsdo not contain concrete entities such as 500 kg men as parts.According to standard abstractionists, then, there are no 500 kg men,there are only possible worlds that represent that there are 500 kgmen. Philosophers who endorse standard abstractionist theories ofpossible worlds, however, can replace (12) with (13) (see Moore 1922and Francescotti 1999). (Or at least, they can replace (12) with (13)given they hold that there are things that exist according tonon-actual possible worlds that don’t exist according to theactual world. Abstractionists who deny this will have to furthermodify (13).)

(13)

\(F\) isintrinsic iff, for any \(x\) and \(y\), and for any possible worlds\(u\) and \(v\) such that \(x\) at \(u\) is a duplicate of \(y\) at\(v, x\) has \(F\) at \(u\) iff \(y\) has \(F\) at \(v\)

Given a standard abstractionist theory of possible worlds, there is apossible world \(u\) that represents there being a popular 500 kg man\(x\), and there is another possible world \(v\) that represents therebeing an unpopular 500 kg man \(y\), where \(x\) at \(u\) has the sameintrinsic properties as \(y\) at \(v\), and hence \(x\) at \(u\) is aduplicate of \(y\) at \(v\). Given this, (13) classifiesbeing apopular man who is 500 kg as extrinsic.

Putting aside for the moment the question of whether (13) correctlycharacterises a genuine notion of intrinsicality, let us call thenotion it does characterise duplication preservation. (13), understoodas a characterisation of duplication preservation has two importantconsequences. First, it has the consequence that identity properties,such as being Obama, aren’t duplication preserving. The reasonfor this is that, since Obama could have had a duplicate distinct fromhimself, there is a possible world at which Obama has a duplicate whois not Obama, and hence there is a possible world at which somethinghaving the property of being Obama has a duplicate which lacks thisproperty.

A more general consequence can be stated using the distinction betweenqualitative and non-qualitative properties, where a qualitativeproperty is intuitively a property that doesn’t concern anyparticular entities, while a non-qualitative property is a propertythat does concern one or more particular entities. Examples ofqualitative properties include the property of being cubical and theproperty of being next to a tin, while examples of non-qualitativeproperties include the property of being Obama and the property ofbeing next to Clinton. It plausibly follows from (13), understood as acharacterisation of duplication preservation, that any non-qualitativeproperty that is possibly instantiated is not a duplication preservingproperty.

Say that a property is indiscriminately necessary iff it isnecessarily had by everything. The second consequence of (13),understood as a characterisation of duplication preservation, is thatany two properties that are indiscriminately necessary are duplicationpreserving. Consider, for example, the indiscriminately necessaryproperty of being such that there is a number (where we are assumingthat numbers necessarily exist). Since all things at all possibleworlds have this property, it is a duplication preservingproperty.

Since being such that there is a number is neither a local property oran identity interior property, but is a duplication preservingproperty (given numbers necessarily exist), the duplication preservingproperties do not coincide with either the local properties or theidentity interior properties. Since being Obama is a metaphysicalnecessitation interior property, but is not a duplication preservingproperty, the duplication preserving properties don’t coincidewith the metaphysical necessitation interior properties either. (Moore(1922) and Dunn (1990), in effect, both distinguish duplicationpreservation from interiority on these grounds.) Hence, we have atleast four distinct kinds of properties that are characterised byLewis’s three characterisations: local properties, identityinterior properties, metaphysical necessitation interior properties,and duplication preserving properties.

If Lewis’s three characterisations concerning intrinsicalitycharacterise different notions, the three characterisations describedin section1.2 concerning having a property in an intrinsic fashion alsocharacterise different notions. In order to distinguish these notions,we may employ these characterisations to define having a property in aduplication preserving fashion, having a property in an interiorfashion (relative to different entailment relations), and having aproperty in a local fashion.

2.5 Which is the real distinction?

In the last three subsections, we distinguished a number of distinctnotions that are characterised by Lewis’s threecharacterisation: locality, duplication preservation, and severaldifferent kinds of interiority. We now need to address the question ofwhether there is a single notion of intrinsicality, and, if there is,which of these notions is it? More precisely, we need to determinewhether there is a single notion that philosophers typically use‘intrinsic’ to express, and, if so, which notion isit.

One might attempt to answer this question by first noting that it ismuch more common for philosophers to use Lewis’s second“in virtue” characterisation (or some variant of it), thaneither of the other two characterisations when explaining what theymean by ‘intrinsic’. (For example, as far as we know,Lewis uses the “in virtue” characterisation whenever heexplains what he means by ‘intrinsic’, but only uses theother characterisations once.) This suggests that philosopherstypically use ‘intrinsic’ to express a notion ofinteriority rather than either of the notions of locality orduplication preservation.

Given philosophers typically use ‘intrinsic’ to expresssome notion of interiority, there are several reasons to think thatthe notion of interiority they typically express is that of identityinteriority. First, identity interiority is more fundamental, orsimpler, than the other notions of interiority, and philosophers areoften interested in employing more fundamental notions than lessfundamental notions. Second, the intrinsic properties of a thingshould be the properties that thing has “in itself”,rather than merely the properties that are metaphysicallynecessitated, or nomically necessitated, or metaphysically explained,by the properties the thing has “in itself”. But thissuggests that the intrinsic properties should be the identity interiorproperties, rather than the metaphysical necessitation interiorproperties, or the nomic necessitation interior properties, or theweak grounding interior properties. Finally, while the identityinteriority of necessarily coextensive properties can intuitivelydiffer, this is not true for at least some of the other notions ofinteriority, such as metaphysical necessitation interiority and nomicnecessitation interiority. (Properties \(p\) and \(q\) are necessarilycoextensive iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), \(x\) has \(p\) iff \(x\)has \(q\).) Since it is a widespread intuition that necessarilycoextensive properties can differ in whether they are intrinsic, thissuggests these other notions of interiority aren’t whatphilosophers typically express by ‘intrinsic’. (This lastreason also provides a further reason to think that duplicationpreservation isn’t the notion of intrinsicality philosopherstypically employ, since it also does not differ among necessarilyequivalent properties.)

There are therefore reasons to think that the notion philosopherstypically use ‘intrinsic’ to express is identityinteriority. These reasons, however, are not decisive. First,philosophers often take intrinsic properties to be qualitative, anduse ‘intrinsic’ to distinguish only among qualitativeproperties. (See Sider 1996.) Since each local property and eachduplication preserving property is qualitative, but this is not truefor interior properties, this possibly suggests that at least somephilosophers at least some of the time use ‘intrinsic’ toexpress either locality or duplication preservation. Secondly, whileidentity interiority can do much of the theoretical workintrinsicality is meant to do, it arguably cannot do all of it, withsome of this work being better done by some of the other notions ofintrinsicality described above. For example, Sider (1996) has arguedthat duplication preservation is better able to be used to defineindividualism about mental states than identity interiority. Finally,the failure of many philosophers to clearly distinguish which notionof intrinsicality they are employing provides at least some reason tosuspect that those philosophers have often used‘intrinsic’ indeterminately to express a multiplicity ofnotions of intrinsicality.

An alternative view has been put forward by Plate 2018, who has arguedthat there is a single notion of intrinsicality and that none of thenotions discussed above correspond to it. Plate points out that, oneach of the alleged notions of intrinsicality discussed above, eitherthe property of having Paris as a part is classified as non-intrinsicor the uninstantiable property of being such that Socrates isnon-self-identical is classified as intrinsic. Plate then argues that,since having Paris as a part is intrinsic while being such thatSocrates is non-self-identical is non-intrinsic, it follows that noneof the above notions is intrinsicality. A response to Plate’sargument is given by Marshall 2021, who argues that there is no notionof intrinsicality on which these properties are respectively intrinsicand non-intrinsic. Instead, according to this response, there are onlynotions of intrinsicality on which either both are intrinsic or bothare non-intrinsic.

In the next section, we will consider a number of attempts to analyse‘intrinsic’. Unless otherwise made clear, we will use‘intrinsic’ to express identity interiority, and we willassume that identity interiority is the most dominant notion ofintrinsicality employed by philosophers. As we will see, however, anumber of these attempts are most charitably seen as attempts toanalyse notions of intrinsicality other than identity interiority.

3. Attempts at Analysis

One reason to attempt an analysis of intrinsicality is that theorientating characterisations of intrinsicality discussed in section1 and sections2.2 –2.4 are all to some degree circular. (Cf Lewis 1983a and Yablo 1999.) Forexample, a property \(p\) whose ascription to a thing \(x\) is about\(x\) is intrinsic only if it is about how \(x\) isintrinsically; \(p\) is not intrinsic if the ascription of\(p\) to \(x\) is about how \(x\) isextrinsically.Similarly, a property \(p\) that is had by \(x\) in virtue of how\(x\) is is intrinsic only if \(x\) has \(p\) in virtue of how \(x\)isintrinsically; \(p\) need not beintrinsic if\(x\) has \(p\) in virtue of how \(x\) isextrinsically.

Some of the following attempts to analyse intrinsicality are best seenas attempts to analyse the distinction between duplication preservingproperties and properties that aren’t duplication preserving,while other attempts are best seen as attempts to analyse thedistinction between interior and exterior properties, or between localand non-local properties. For a discussion of whether we can give, orneed to give, a reductive analysis of intrinsicality, see Skiles 2014and Hoffman-Kolss 2018.)

In addition to the metaphysical project of determining what it is fora property to be intrinsic, there is an epistemological project ofdetermining how we can come to know with respect to particularproperties whether they are intrinsic, and whether such knowledge ispossible. To some extent, the metaphysical project of determining whatit is to be intrinsic can help with this epistemological project. Forexample, if it can be shown that being intrinsic can be analysed asthe possession of such and such features, and we have knowledge ofwhich properties have such and such features, then we can use thisanalysis to explain how we can know of particular properties that theyare intrinsic. In addition to employing such analyses ofintrinsicality, however, we might hope to develop and describe furthermethods for obtaining justified beliefs regarding what properties areintrinsic. For further discussion that bears on this issue, seeMcQueen and van Woudenberg 2016.

3.1 Broadly Logical Theories

It would be good if we could analyse intrinsicality using only broadlylogical notions, where broadly logical notions are exhausted by thenarrowly logical notions of conjunction, negation and existentialquantification, the modal notion of metaphysical possibility, themereological notion of parthood, and the basic notions associated withproperty theory and set theory, such as the notions expressed by‘state of affairs’, ‘property’,‘relation’, ‘possible world’,‘instantiates’, ‘is a member of’ and‘set’. (The locution ‘state of affairs’ isused differently by different philosophers. Here it is being used torefer to the zero-place analogues of one-place properties and multipleplace relations. Just as a property is a way of a thing is or fails tobe, a state of affairs, under our usage, is a way things are or failto be.)

It is at least initially appealing to think that, if an object has aproperty in an intrinsic fashion, then it has it independently of theway the rest of the world is. The rest of the world could disappear,and the object might still have that property. Hence alonelyobject, an object that doesn’t coexist with any contingentobjects wholly distinct from it, could have the property. Manyextrinsic properties, on the other hand, cannot be possessed by lonelyobjects – no lonely object has the property of being six metresfrom a rhododendron, for example. This suggests an analysis ofintrinsicality: \(F\) is an intrinsic property iff it is possible fora lonely object to be \(F\). This analysis is usually attributed toKim (1982) (e.g. in Lewis 1983a and Sider 1993), though Humberstone(1996) dissents from this interpretation. If this analysis issuccessful then it would constitute a broadly logical analysis, sincethe expressions on the right hand side of the account can each bedefined using only broadly logical vocabulary.

The major problem with this analysis is that the ‘if’direction of the biconditional is clearly false. As Lewis (1983)pointed out, it is possible for a lonely object to have the propertyof being lonely, but the property of being lonely is notintrinsic.

One might try to deal with this problem by adding extra modalconditions to the above account. Say that a property \(F\) isindependent of accompaniment iff the following fourconditions (taken from Langton and Lewis 1998) are met:

1. Possibly, there exists a lonely \(F\)
2. Possibly, there exists a lonely non-\(F\)
3. Possibly, there exists an accompanied (i.e. not lonely) \(F\)
4. Possibly, there exists an accompanied non-\(F\)

At first glance, if \(F\) is intrinsic, then whether or not an objecthas \(F\) should not depend on whether it is lonely. If this is right,then all four of these conditions should be satisfied. We mighttherefore try to give the following broadly logical analysis: \(F\) isintrinsic iff \(F\) is independent of accompaniment.

As Langton and Lewis (1998) point out, however, this strengthenedanalysis still fails (see also Lewis 1983a). Given intrinsicproperties, such as being a cube, are independent of accompaniment,the extrinsic property of being either a lonely cube or an accompaniednon-cube is also independent of accompaniment. Hence, provided thestrengthened analysis correctly classifiesbeing a cube asintrinsic, it will falsely classifybeing either a lonely cube oran accompanied non-cube as intrinsic.

In the face of this failure, we might still hope that a yet moresophisticated broadly logical analysis might succeed. An argument dueto Marshall 2009 and Parsons 2001, however, shows that, given standardviews about what is possible, and given the absence of specialassumptions about the abundance and structure of properties, no suchanalysis can be given. This argument considers the intrinsic propertyof being an electron and the extrinsic property of being either anaccompanied electron or a lonely positron. It then shows that, givencertain common views about properties and possibility, theseproperties have the same pattern of instantiation through logical,mereological and set-theoretic space. Since formulas containing onlybroadly logical expressions cannot distinguish between propertieshaving the same such pattern, it then follows that no broadly logicalanalysis of intrinsically is possible.

To give more of an idea of how this argument works, suppose forsimplicity that there are only three possible worlds, \(w_1\), \(w_2\)and \(w_3\), and only four possible individuals \(x_1\), \(x_2\),\(x_3\) and \(x_4\). Suppose further that:

At \(w_1\), \(x_1\) and \(x_2\) are the only things that exist,\(x_1\) is an electron and \(x_2\) is a positron

At \(w_2\), \(x_3\) is the only thing that exists and \(x_3\) is anelectron

At \(w_3\), \(x_4\) is the only thing that exists and \(x_4\) is apositron.

Now assume a possible worlds theory of properties, according to whichthe property of being \(F = \{\langle x, w\rangle \mid x \text{ is } F\text{ at } w\}\). Given this theory of properties:

\(q_1\) = Being an electron = \(\{\langle x_1, w_1 \rangle, \langlex_3, w_2\rangle\}.\)

\(q_2\) = Being either an accompanied electron or a lonely positron =\(\{\langle x_1, w_1\rangle, \langle x_4, w_3\rangle\}.\)

Suppose, for reductio, that the notion of an intrinsic property can beanalysed in terms of broadly logical notions. Then, since analysesmust be necessary, there is a formula \(\varphi(p)\) such that (A) isnecessarily true, where \(\varphi\) contains only broadly logicalvocabulary, such as variables, brackets, ‘&’,‘\(\vee\)’, ‘\(\exists\)’, ‘is apossible world’, ‘at’ and ‘\(\in\)’.

(A)

\(p\) is intrinsic iff \(\varphi(p)\).

Since \(q_1\) is necessarily intrinsic, while \(q_2\) is necessarilynot intrinsic, it follows from the necessity of (A) that\(\varphi(q_1)\) is necessarily true, while \(\varphi(q_2)\) isnecessarily false. In other words, if there is a broadly logicalanalysis of intrinsicality, then there is a formula \(\varphi\)containing only broadly logical vocabulary that necessarily applies to\(q_1\), and necessarily does not apply to \(q_2\). However, it can beproved that there is no such formula. For example, while

applies to \(q_1\), it also applies to \(q_2\). Hence, the reductioassumption is false, and there is no broadly logical analysis ofintrinsicality. This argument can easily be adapted to show that thereis no broadly logical analysis of intrinsicality given more realisticassumptions about what possible worlds there are.

It is important to note that, despite the existence of the aboveargument, one might still be able to analyse intrinsicality in termsof broadly logical notions if one is prepared to make special (andcontroversial) assumptions about properties. As an illustration ofthis, suppose one assumes that all intrinsic properties have no properparts while all extrinsic properties do have proper parts. Then onemight give a broadly logical analysis of intrinsicality by givingaccount (14).

(14)

\(p\) is an intrinsic property iff \(p\) is a property that hasno proper parts.

Even if an analysis like this one is true, however, its utility willbe limited. For example, unless we already know somehow whichproperties have proper parts and which properties do not have properparts, (14) will be useless in helping us to determine whichproperties are intrinsic and which properties are non-intrinsic.

Two more sophisticated attempts to give a broadly logical analysis ofintrinsicality are Yablo’s contractionist account discussed insection3.4, and Francescotti’s relational account, which is discussed inthe supplementary document:

The Relational Account of Intrinsicality.

Both these accounts rely on controversial assumptions about propertiesor related entities such as possible worlds. The most sophisticatedattempt to give a purely broadly logical analysis of intrinsicalitythat has yet been proposed is that of Plate 2018. A response toPlate’s account is given in Marshall forthcoming.

Given that we cannot give a satisfactory account of intrinsicalityusing only broadly logical notions, it is natural to investigatewhether we can give a satisfactory account using a larger set ofnotions. In the next four subsections, we will consider whetherintrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the notions of perfectnaturalness, non-disjunctivity, possible world contractions, ormetaphysical grounding.

3.2 Perfect Naturalness Theories

The most influential attempt to analyse intrinsicality over the last30 years has arguably been Lewis’s 1986a account ofintrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness.

The perfectly natural properties and relations are the fundamentalproperties and relations. Lewis wrote:

Sharing of [the perfectly natural properties] makes for qualitativesimilarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they arehighly specific, the set of their instances are ipso facto notentirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them tocharacterise things completely and without redundancy. Physics has itsshort list of ‘fundamental physical properties’: thecharges and masses of particles, also their is so-called‘spins’ and ‘colours’ and‘flavours’, and maybe a few more that have yet to bediscovered. (Lewis 1986b, p. 60, author’s emphasis)]

The notion of a perfectly natural, or fundamental, property orrelation suggests an appealing approach to analysing intrinsicality.Consider the non-intrinsic property of being an uncle. It is appealingto think that the reason this property fails to be intrinsic is thatit can be analysed in terms of more fundamental relations, such asbeing a sibling of and being a child of, in a manner that reveals howsomething being an uncle is at least partially a matter of how it isrelated to things that aren’t part of it. In particular, it isplausible to think that the reason being an uncle is non-intrinsic isthat for \(x\) to be an uncle is for \(x\) to have a sibling that hasa child, where this child fails to be part of \(x\). More generally,it is plausible that, if being \(F\) is a non-intrinsic property, thenthe fact that it is non-intrinsic can be revealed by analysing being\(F\) in terms of more fundamental properties and relations in amanner that reveals how something being \(F\) may partly be a matterof being related to a non-part or may be partly a matter of hownon-parts are. If this is true, then it has the following twoconsequences. First, it follows that every fundamental property isintrinsic, since it being non-intrinsic cannot be revealed by analysisin terms of more fundamental properties and relations. Secondly, andeven more importantly, it follows that whether a property is intrinsicshould be analysable in terms of how that property can be analysed interms of the fundamental properties and relations.

Lewis in effect adopts the above approach to analysing intrinsicalityby analysing intrinsicality in terms of a particular kind ofsupervenience on the fundamental properties and relations.Lewis’s 1986 account (formulated so as to be compatible withstandard abstractionist theories of possible worlds) consists of (15)and (16).

(15)

\(p\) is anintrinsic property iff (i) \(p\) is a property, and (ii) for any \(x\)and \(y\), and for any worlds \(w_1\) and \(w_2\) such that \(x\) at\(w_1\) is a duplicate of \(y\) at \(w_2\), \(x\) has \(p\) at \(w_1\)iff \(y\) has \(p\) at \(w_2\).

(16)

\(x\) at \(w_1\)is a duplicate of \(y\) at \(w_2\) iff there is a one-to-onecorrespondence \(f\) between \(x\)’s parts at \(w_1\) and\(y\)’s parts at \(w_2\) such that, for any perfectly naturalproperty or relation \(R\), for any \(x_1, x_2,\ldots\) that are partof \(x\) at \(w_1\): \(x_1, x_2\ldots\) stand in \(R\) at \(w_1\) iff\(f(x_1), f(x_2)\ldots\) stand in \(R\) at \(w_2\).

Lewis’s account, which I will call perfect naturalness account1, is best seen as an attempt at analysing duplication preservation,rather than as analysing identity interiority which we argued insection2.5 is the dominant notion of intrinsicality in philosophy. This accountrests heavily on the claim that all perfectly natural properties areintrinsic, and, implicitly, that the perfectly natural properties andrelations are sufficient to characterise the world completely. Thelast assumption is needed because the theory rules out the possibilitythat there are two things that share all their perfectly naturalproperties and lack proper parts, but differ with respect to some oftheir intrinsic properties.

The first assumption that all perfectly natural properties areintrinsic has been rejected by Weatherson (2006). (See also Yablo 1999who holds that, even if every perfectly natural property is intrinsic,this fact is at best a lucky accident and that this rendersLewis’s account unsuccessful as a philosophical account ofintrinsicality.) Weatherson claims that it is metaphysically possiblefor the instantiated perfectly natural properties to be vectorproperties. He then argues that, since vector properties must beextrinsic, it follows that at least some perfectly natural propertiesfail to be intrinsic, namely the perfectly natural propertiesinstantiated at such worlds. The claim that vector properties need tobe extrinsic, however, is highly contentious. It is natural tounderstand a vector property to be a property that is usefullyrepresented for theoretical purposes by a certain kind of mathematicalobject, namely a vector. Given this construal, however, there is noreason to think that vector properties cannot be intrinsic. Forexample, due to the similarity relationships between coloursrepresented by the colour solid it might be useful to representcolours by vectors. However, doing this is compatible withmetaphysical theories of colour on which colours are intrinsic. Theremight be other conceptions of being a vector property on which vectorproperties cannot be intrinsic. However, it is unclear whether therean conception of vector properties on which they cannot be intrinsicbut can be fundamental. (See Busse (2009) and Marshall (2016b) formore discussion.)

The second assumption, that the perfectly natural properties andrelations are sufficient to characterise each possible world, has beenrejected by Sider (1995) and Schaffer (2004). Both claim that it ismetaphysically possible for there to be endless sequences of more andmore natural properties, without any set of perfectly naturalproperties out of which all the other properties can be defined. Inresponse to this problem, Sider (1993b) has proposed a modification ofLewis’s account which he claims is consistent with there beingsuch endless sequences of more and more natural properties. Sider(2011) and Marshall (2016b) have recently argued in favour of thesecond assumption, with Sider’s argument appealing to his Humeantheory of metaphysical possibility.

As noted above, Lewis’s account fails to provide an account ofidentity interiority, which is the most standard notion ofintrinsicality, and at best provides an analysis of duplicationpreservation. Marshall 2016b has recently provided an account in termsof perfect naturalness that, if successful, does provide an analysisof identity interiority. If this account works, it can also bemodified to provide analyses of the other notions of intrinsicalitydescribed in section2.4.

The basic idea behind this alternative account of intrinsicality,which I will call perfect naturalness account 2, is that theascription of a property to a thing is intrinsically about that thingiff the ascription can be expressed in fundamental terms while onlyreferring to, and quantifying over, the parts of \(x\). (A similaraccount is briefly sketched in Skow 2007, p. 112.) In more detail,perfect naturalness account 2 first analyses intrinsicality in termsof intrinsic aboutness by (3).

(3)

\(p\) is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any \(x\), theascription of \(p\) to \(x\) is intrinsically about \(x\).

It then provides an account of intrinsic aboutness in terms of perfectnaturalness and qualitivity by (17), where qualitivity is analysed by(Q). (In (17) and (Q), perfectly natural operators and quantifiers arefundamental operators and quantifiers.)

(17)

\(s\) is intrinsically about \(x\) iff \(s\) is a non-qualitativestate of affairs that can be expressed by a sentence \(\phi\)containing at most brackets, commas, lambda abstractors, namesreferring to parts of \(x\), predicates expressing perfectly naturalproperties and relations, operator expressions expressing perfectlynatural operators, and quantifier expressions that express perfectlynatural quantifiers and whose occurrences in \(\phi\) quantify onlyover parts of \(x\).

(Q)

\(p\) is aqualitative property iff \(p\) is a property, and \(p\) can beexpressed by a predicate containing at most brackets, commas,variables, lambda abstractors, predicates expressing perfectly naturalrelations, quantifier expressions expressing perfectly naturalquantifiers, and operator expressions expressing perfectly naturaloperators.

(17) entails that any state of affairs that is intrinsically aboutsomething is non-qualitative. This consequence of (17) can bejustified by noting that, if \(s\) is intrinsically about \(x\), thenthere must be at least one particular thing that it is about, andhence it cannot be a qualitative state of affairs.

(17), as it stands, fails to provide a completely specified account ofintrinsic aboutness, since it contains the locution ‘quantifiesonly over parts of \(x\)’ which needs to be defined, and givingthe needed definition is not straightforward. The account of‘quantifying over parts of \(x\)’ given by perfectnaturalness account 2 can be simplified if we assume that‘some’ expresses the only perfectly natural quantifier.Say that a property \(p\) necessitates a property \(q\) iff,necessarily, for any \(x\), if \(x\) has \(p\) then \(x\) has \(q\).If \(\Phi\) is a set of formulas, let \(\bigvee\Phi\) be thedisjunction of the formulas in \(\Phi\). (So \(\bigvee\{\phi_1 ,\phi_2,\ldots\}\) = \(\ulcorner\phi_1 \vee \phi_2\vee\ldots\urcorner\).) Given these definitions and the abovesimplifying assumption, perfect naturalness account 2 endorses (18),where \(F\) and \(G\) are predicates expressing properties and‘\(\leq\)’ symbolises ‘is part of’.

(18)

The initial occurrence of ‘Some’ in \(\ulcorner[\text{Some } v|Fv]Gv\urcorner\) quantifies only over parts of \(x\)iff, for any set \(\Pi \) of names of all the parts of \(x\), theproperty expressed by \(F\) necessitates the property expressed by\(\ulcorner\lambda v\bigvee\{\ulcorner v\leq a\urcorner \mida\in\Pi\}\urcorner\).

For example, according to this account, if \(d\) has exactly threeproper parts (which are \(a\), \(b\) and \(c\)), then‘some’ in ‘[Some \(v \mid Fv](Gv)\)’quantifies only over parts of \(d\) iff the property of being \(F\)necessitates the property of being part of either \(a\), \(b\), \(c\)or \(d\) (that is, iff, necessarily, any thing that is \(F\) is partof either \(a\), \(b\), \(c\) or \(d\)). More generally, this accountendorses (19).

(19)

For any formulas\(\phi\) and \(\psi\), the initial occurrence of ‘Some’ in\(\ulcorner [\text{Some }v\mid \phi]\psi\urcorner\) quantifies onlyover parts of \(x\) iff, for any set \(\Pi\) of names of all the partsof \(x\), under any assignment \(g\) to the free variables in \(\phi\)that are not \(v\), the property expressed by \(\ulcorner\lambdav\phi\urcorner\) necessitates the property expressed by\[\begin{align}\ulcorner\lambda v\big( \bigvee\{\ulcorner v\leq u \urcorner \mid u&\text{ is a free variable in } \phi \text{ that is not } v\} \\ &\vee \bigvee\{\ulcorner v\leq a\urcorner \mid a\in\Pi\}\urcorner.\end{align}\]

Given the simplifying assumption that ‘some’ is the onlyperfectly natural quantifier expression, (3), (17), (Q) and (19)provide the complete account of what it is for a property to beintrinsic according to perfect naturalness account 2.

As with perfect naturalness account 1, perfect naturalness account 2assumes that each perfectly natural property is intrinsic and that theperfectly natural properties, relations, operators and quantifiers areable to completely describe every possible world. If someone rejectsthese assumptions, they will therefore be unable to endorse thisaccount.

3.3 Non-Disjunctivity Theories

Instead of analysing intrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness,one might try to analyse it in terms of non-disjunctivity, wherenon-disjunctivity is regarded as an objective metaphysical feature ofproperties rather than merely a syntactical feature of predicates. Themost prominent attempt to do this is the account of Langton and Lewis1998. (A similar theory is in an appendix to Zimmerman 1997.)

Langton and Lewis’s account involves the following three steps.First, they analyse the non-disjunctive properties as follows:

[T]hedisjunctive properties [are] those properties that canbe expressed by a disjunction of (conjunctions of) natural properties;but that are not themselves natural properties. (Or, if naturalnessadmits of degrees, they are much less natural than the disjuncts interms of which they can be expressed.) (Langton and Lewis 1998: 61,author’s emphasis)

Secondly, they say a property isbasic intrinsic iff it isnon-disjunctive, is not the negation of a disjunctive property, and isindependent of accompaniment. Finally, they say that (i) two objectsare duplicates iff they share the same basic intrinsic properties, and(ii) \(F\) is an intrinsic property iff two duplicates never differwith respect to it.

The last step of their account is in a form that requiresLewis’s concretist theory of possible worlds. The last step in aform suitable for a typical abstractionist theory of possible worldsis instead:

1. \(x\) at \(u\) is a duplicate of \(y\) at \(v\) iff, for any basicintrinsic property \(P, x\) has \(P\) at \(u\) iff \(y\) has \(P\) at\(v\); and
2. \(F\) is intrinsic iff, for any \(x\) and \(y\), and for anypossible worlds \(u\) and \(v\) such that \(x\) at \(u\) is aduplicate of \(y\) at \(v, x\) has \(F\) at \(u\) iff \(y\) has \(F\)at \(v\).

Note that (ii) is just the abstractionist version of the duplicationcharacterisation for intrinsicality given by (13) in section2.4.

Langton and Lewis claim their account works given a variety of ways ofunderstanding ‘natural’ and ‘more naturalthan’ in their analysis of ‘non-disjunctive’. Inparticular, they hold that the account will work if‘natural’ is understood to express the notion of perfectnaturalness, or fundamentality, in the Lewis (1986a) account, and‘more natural than’ is understood to mean ‘is morefundamental than’. They also claim that the account will work ifthe natural properties are those taken to correspond to Armstrongianuniversals, or the properties expressed by the predicates in canonicalformulations of physics, or the properties expressed by the predicatesin canonical formulations of common-sense. Langton and Lewis say thatit should not matter how we draw the distinction between natural andnon-natural properties for present purposes, as long as we have it,and properties likebeing lonely and round or accompanied andcubical are not natural. As a result of this, Langton and Lewisthink that their account is more neutral than Lewis’s earlieraccount and should therefore should appeal to a larger range ofphilosophers than the earlier account.

Langton and Lewis put forward their account as only an analysis ofqualitative intrinsic properties, rather than intrinsic properties ingeneral. Their account, however, arguably fails as an account ofqualitative identity interior properties since, given numbersnecessarily exist, it classifies being such that there is a number asintrinsic. Therefore, like the Lewis 1986a account, the Langton andLewis account is arguably most charitably interpreted as an account ofduplication preservation, or perhaps of qualitative metaphysicalnecessitation interiority.

In addition to failing to give an account of the standard account ofintrinsicality, there are reasons to think that Langton and Lewiscannot be as neutral as they claim to be regarding what account ofnaturalness is combined with their account. As noted above, Langtonand Lewis claim that their account of intrinsicality is compatiblewith any construal of naturalness on which the natural properties arethose that play a special role in our thinking. On one such conceptionof naturalness, the natural properties include those properties forwhich we have simple words or concepts, which do not strike us asstrange or odd, and on which we have relied in past inductions (Sider2001: 362). Given this conception of naturalness, the property ofbeing a rock is a natural property, and hence is classified asintrinsic on the Langton and Lewis account. However, as Sider 2001argues, being a rock is plausibly not an intrinsic property. Just asan object that is qualitatively intrinsically the same as a house andis a large part of a house is not itself a house, an object that isqualitatively intrinsically the same as a rock and is a large part ofa rock is not itself a rock. Hence, whether something is a rock ispartly a matter of what is the case outside of it. Hence, contra thecombination of the Langton and Lewis account with the above conceptionof naturalness, being a rock is not intrinsic.

Another objection to the Langton and Lewis account is that thereappear to be counterexamples to the account, even given Lewis’sfavoured conception of naturalness. On this conception, the perfectlynatural properties and relations are the fundamental properties andrelations, and a property \(p\) is more natural than a property \(q\)iff the shortest definition of \(p\) in terms of the perfectly naturalproperties and relations is shorter than the shortest definition of\(q\) in terms of the perfectly natural properties and relations. (See(Lewis 1986: 61).) As Marshall and Parsons 2001 argue, given thisconstrual of naturalness, the property of being such that there is acube appears to be neither a disjunctive property nor the negation of adisjunctive property according to Langton and Lewis’s account ofdisjunctivity. If this is the case, however, then, since being suchthat there is a cube is independent of accompaniment, the Langton andLewis account classifies this property as a basic intrinsic property,and hence classifies it as an intrinsic property. This property,however, is clearly not intrinsic.

Langton and Lewis 2001 have responded to this objection by claimingthat being such that there is a cube is less natural than both being acube and being accompanied by a cube, since (I) being such that thereis a cube can be expressed as the disjunction ‘being either acube or accompanied by a cube’, (II) disjoining unrelatedproperties always reduces naturalness, and (III) being a cube andbeing accompanied by a cube are unrelated properties. One problem withthis response is that it is not obvious why (II) is meant to be truegiven Lewis’s favoured conception of naturalness above, or whatother notion of naturalness it might be true of. A second problem withthe response is that, even granting (II) is true, it is not clear whatit is for two properties to be unrelated in the sense that is at issuein (II), and hence it is not clear why being a cube and beingaccompanied by a cube are meant to be unrelated. For furtherdiscussion of attempts to analyse intrinsicality in terms ofnon-disjunctivity, see the supplementary document:

More on Non-Disjunctive Theories.

3.4 Contractionist Theories

One attractive idea is that a thing’s intrinsic properties arethose properties it would have if it were alone in the world. Anelegant theory of intrinsicality that develops this idea is that ofPeter Vallentyne (1997).

Vallentyne defines acontraction of a world as “a world‘obtainable’ from the original one solely by‘removing’ objects from it.” (211) As a special caseof this, an \(x-t\) contraction, where \(x\) is an object and \(t\) atime, is “a world ‘obtainable’ from the original oneby, to the greatest extent possible, ‘removing’ allobjects wholly distinct from \(x\), all spatial locations not occupiedby \(x\), and all times (temporal states of the world) except \(t\),from the world”, as well as all laws of nature from the world.(211) Vallentyne claims that \(F\) is intrinsic iff, for any thing\(x\), for any time \(t\), and for any worlds \(u\) and \(w\) suchthat \(u\) is an \(x-t\) contraction of \(w, x\) has \(F\) at \(t\) at\(u\) iff \(x\) has \(F\) at \(t\) at \(w\). In short, a property isintrinsic to an object iff removing the rest of the worlddoesn’t change whether the object has the property.Vallentyne’s account classifies identity properties, like beingObama, as intrinsic. It is therefore best seen as an account ofinteriority. The account also classifies all indiscriminatelynecessary properties as intrinsic. It is therefore arguably mostcharitably interpreted as an account of metaphysical necessitationinteriority

As Vallentyne notes, this definition will not be very enlighteningunless we understand the idea of a contraction. This seems related tothe objection Langton and Lewis (1998) urge against Vallentyne. Theysay that Vallentyne’s account reduces to the claim that aproperty is intrinsic iff possession of it never differs between anobject and its lonely duplicates, a claim they think is true but tootrivial to count as an analysis. Their position is that we cannotunderstand contractions without understanding duplication, but if weunderstand duplication then intrinsicality can be easily defined, soVallentyne’s theory is no advance.

This criticism might be too quick. Stephen Yablo (1999) has arguedthat Vallentyne should best be understood as working within a verydifferent metaphysical framework than Lewis. For Lewis, no (ordinary)object exists at more than one world, so Vallentyne’scontractions, being separate worlds, must contain separate objects.Hence \(x-t\) contractions can be nothing other than lonelyduplicates, and the theory is trivial. Yablo suggests that the theorybecomes substantive relative to a metaphysical background in which thevery same object can appear in different worlds. If this is the casethen we can get a grip on contractions without thinking aboutduplications — the \(x-t\) contraction of a world is the worldthat contains \(x\) itself, and as few other things as possible.

There are, however, problems with Yablo’s defense ofVallentyne’s contractionist approach to intrinsicality. Oneproblem, discussed in Parsons 2007 and Marshall 2014, is that, onYablo’s version of contractionism, we need to be able to makesense of sentences like ‘In \(w\), Prince Philip is not ahusband’, where \(w\) is the world consisting of just PrincePhilip. Making sense of such sentences, however, is difficult withoutappealing to the distinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsicproperties. Appealing to this distinction when interpretingYablo’s account, however, would render it circular.

3.5 Grounding Theories

Over the last few years, there have been a number of attempts toanalyse intrinsicality in terms of metaphysical grounding, a prominentinstance of which is that of Rosen (2010). Other accounts ofintrinsicality in terms of grounding include those of Witmer, Butchardand Trogdon (2005), Trogdon (2009), Bader (2013), and Witmer (2014).For a discussion of the first two of these accounts, see thesupplementary document:

More on Grounding Theories of Intrinsicality.

The state of affairs of it being the case that \(A\) is grounded bythe state of affairs of it being the case that \(B\) iff \(A\) invirtue of it being the case that \(B\), where the relevant notion of“in virtue” is meant to be a metaphysically explanatoryone. Grounding is supposed to be a metaphysical analogue of causation:just as causation is what connects the explanans of an explanationwith its explanandum in causal explanation, grounding is meant to bewhat connects the explanans of an explanation with its explanandum inmetaphysical explanation. An example of a metaphysical explanationwould be an explanation of why a certain type of act is wrong in termsof more fundamental moral facts.

Rosen’s account presupposes Russellianism about facts, accordingto which facts are structured out of things, properties and operatorsin the same kind of way sentences are built up out of names,predicates and operator expressions. Given this background,Rosen’s analysis can be stated as follows:

\(F\) is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, for any \(x\): (i) ifthe ascription of \(F\) to \(x\) is grounded by a fact withconstituent \(y\), then \(y\) is part of \(x\); and (ii) if thenegation of the ascription of \(F\) to \(x\) is grounded by a factwith constituent \(y\), then \(y\) is part of \(x\)

Given the negation of the ascription of being Obama to Clinton isgrounded by the negation of the ascription of identity to Obama andClinton (a claim plausibly required by Rosen’s account) theaccount classifies being Obama as non-intrinsic since Obama is notpart of Clinton. The analysis also classifies intuitivelynon-intrinsic indiscriminately necessary properties, such as theproperty of being such that there is a number, as non-intrinsic. Beingsuch that there is a number is classified as non-intrinsic by theaccount since, for example, its ascription to Obama is grounded by thefact that 2 is a number, which has a constituent, namely the number 2,that is not part of Obama. These consequences of the account suggestthat it is best thought of as an account of the distinction betweenlocal and non-local properties.

Marshall (2015) has given the following objection to Rosen’saccount. (The objection is meant to generalise to all attempts toanalyse intrinsically in terms of grounding, including the attempts ofWitmer, Butchard and Trogdon (2005), Trogdon (2009), Bader (2013) andWitmer (2014). For an objection that is meant to apply toRosen’s account, but not Bader’s account, see Bader2013:fn. 53.) According to the objection: a) there is nothingincoherent in supposing that a state of affairs that is intrinsicallyabout \(x\) might ground a state of affairs that is intrinsicallyabout something that is wholly distinct from \(x\), and b) on a numberof popular metaphysical theories, there are such groundingrelationships. If there are such grounding relationships, however,Rosen’s account fails.

To consider an example of such a grounding relationship, let us assumethat standard set theory is necessarily true, and that existence is alocal property. (If one thinks that existence is not a local property,perhaps because one thinks that existence is the non-localquantificational property of being such that, among all the thingsthere are, there is something that is identical to one, replaceexistence with the property of being such that, among all the parts ofone, there is something identical to one, which is intuitively local.)Let us also assume the common (though not universal) view that membersof sets are not literally parts of those sets. (See Lewis (1986a) foran example of a prominent theory of sets that denies members of setsare parts of those sets.) Given these assumptions, it is plausiblethat the fact that \(\{Obama\}\) exists is grounded by the fact thatObama exists. However, if this is correct, then, since the fact thatObama exists has a constituent that is not part of \(\{Obama\}\), itfollows that Rosen’s account falsely classifies existence as anon-local property.

Borrowing from the recent account of Witmer (2014) (which is similarto Rosen’s account), we might attempt to fix Rosen’saccount by replacing parthood in the account with ontologicaldependence, where the relation of ontological dependence is defined by(20).

(20)

\(x\) ontologically depends on \(y\) iff the fact that \(y\)exists at least partly grounds the fact that \(x\) exists.

Applying this modification to Rosen’s account results in(21).

(21)

\(F\) is an intrinsic property iff, necessarily, for any \(x\):(i) if the ascription of \(F\) to \(x\) is grounded by a fact withconstituent \(y\), then \(x\) ontologically depends on \(y\); and (ii)if the negation of the ascription of \(F\) to \(x\) is grounded by afact with constituent \(y\), then \(x\) ontologically depends on\(y\).

This modified version of Rosen’s account appears to correctlyclassify existence as a local property given the above metaphysicaltheses. Given these metaphysical theses, however, it arguably ends upclassifying too many properties as local. For example, given the abovetheses, it appears to classify the property of having a member as alocal property. It does this, since, given the above metaphysicaltheses, necessarily, if \(x\) has a member, then the fact that \(x\)has a member is plausibly grounded by the fact that \(y\) is a memberof \(x\), where \(y\) is some member of \(x\), and where \(x\) isontologically dependent on \(y\). Provided members of setsaren’t parts of those sets, however, the property of having amember appears to be just as non-local as the property of havingsomething be two meters away from one.

Bibliography

• Audi, Paul, 2019, “Partial Resemblance and PropertyImmanence”,Noûs 53 (4): 884–903.
• Bader, Ralf, 2013, “Towards a Hyperintensional Theory ofIntrinsicality”,Journal of Philosophy, 110:525–563.
• Barwise, Jon and John Perry, 1983,Situations andAttitudes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Bricker, Phillip, 1993, “The Fabric of Space: Intrinsic Vs.Extrinsic Distance Relations”, in P. French, T. Euhling, and H.Wettstein (eds.),Philosophy of Science, Vol 18,MidwestStudies in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.
• Burge, Tyler, 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, inP. French, T. Euhling, and H. Wettstein (eds.),Studies inEpistemology, Vol 4,Midwest Studies in Philosophy,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Busse, Ralf, 2009, “Humean Supervenience, Vectorial Fields,and the Spinning Sphere”,Dialectica, 63:449–489.
• Cameron, P. Ross, 2008, “Recombination andIntrinsicality”,Ratio, 21: 1–12.
• –––, 2009, “Intrinsic and ExtrinsicProperties”, in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, AndrewMcGonigal, and Ross Cameron (eds.),The Routledge Companion toMetaphysics, London: Routledge.
• Denby, A. David, 2006, “The Distinction Between Intrinsicand Extrinsic Properties”,Mind, 115: 1–17.
• –––, 2010, “Intrinsic and ExtrinsicProperties: A reply to Hoffmann-Kolss”,Mind, 119:773–782.
• –––, 2014, “Essence andIntrinsicality”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companionto Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Dunn, J. Michael, 1990, “Relevant Predication 2: IntrinsicProperties and Internal Relations”,PhilosophicalStudies, 60: 177–206.
• Eddon, Maya, 2011, “Intrinsicality andHyperintensionality”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 82: 314–336.
• –––, 2014, “Intrinsic Explanations andNumerical Representations”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companion to Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Ellis, Brian, 1991, “Scientific Essentialism”, Paperpresented to the 1991 conference of the Australasian Association forthe History and Philosophy of Science.
• –––, 2001,Scientific Essentialism,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Feldman, Fred, 1998, “Hyperventilating about IntrinsicValue”,Journal of Ethics, 2: 339–354.
• Field, Hartry, 1980,Science Without Numbers: A Defence ofNominalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Figdor, Carrie, 2008, “Intrinsically/Extrinsically”,Journal of Philosophy, 105: 691–718.
• –––, 2014, “What’s the Use of anIntrinsic Property?”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companion to Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Francescotti, Robert, 1999, “How to Define IntrinsicProperties”,Noûs, 33: 590–609.
• –––, 2014, “Intrinsic/Extrinsic: ARelational Account Defended”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companion to Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Geach, P. T., 1969,God and the Soul, London:Routledge.
• Hall, Ned, 2000, “Causation and the Price ofTransitivity”,Journal of Philosophy, 97 (4): 198.
• –––, 2004, “Two concepts ofcausation”, in John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.),Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Harris, Roger, 2010, “How to Define ExtrinsicProperties”,Axiomathes, 20: 461–478.
• Haslanger, Sally, 1989, “Endurance and TemporaryIntrinsics”,Analysis, 49: 119–125.
• Hawthorne, John, 2001, “Intrinsic Properties and NaturalRelations”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,63: 399–403.
• Humberstone, I. L., 1996, “Intrinsic/Extrinsic”,Synthese, 108: 205–67.
• Hoffmann-Kolss, Vera, 2010a,The Metaphysics of ExtrinsicProperties, Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag.
• –––, 2010b, “Denby on the DistinctionBetween Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties”,Mind, 119:763–772.
• –––, 2014, “Is the Intrinsic/ExtrinsicDistinction Hyperintensional?”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companion to Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• –––, 2018, “Why Intrinsicness Should BeDefined in a Non-reductive Way”,Grazer PhilosophischeStudien, 95: 1–14.
• Jackson, Frank, 1998,From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence ofConceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Johnston, Mark, 1987, “Is There a Problem AboutPersistence?”,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society(Supplement), 61: 107–35.
• Kagan, Shelly, 1998, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value”,Journal of Ethics, 2: 277–297.
• Kim, Jaegwon, 1982, “Psychophysical Supervenience”,Philosophical Studies, 41: 51–70.
• Khamara, E. J., 1988, “Indiscernables and the AbsoluteTheory of Space and Time”,Studia Leibnitiana, 20:140–59.
• Krebs, Angelika, 1999,Ethics of Nature: A Map,Hawthorne: de Gruyter.
• Langton, Rae and David Lewis, 1998, “Defining‘Intrinsic’”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 58: 333–45.
• –––, 2001, “Marshall and Parsons on‘Intrinsic’”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 63: 353–5.
• Lewis, David, 1983a, “Extrinsic Properties”,Philosophical Studies, 44: 197–200.
• –––, 1983b, “New Work for a Theory ofUniversals”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61:343–77.
• –––, 1986a,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 1986b,Philosophical Papers: Volume2, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1988, “Rearrangement of Particles:Reply to Lowe”,Analysis, 48: 65–72.
• –––, 2001, “Redefining‘Intrinsic’”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 63: 381–398.
• Lowe, E. J., 1988, “The Problems of Intrinsic Change:Rejoinder to Lewis”,Analysis, 48: 72–77.
• Marshall, Dan, 2009, “Can ‘Intrinsic’be Defined using only Broadly Logical Notions?”,Philosophyand Phenomenological Research, 78: 647–672.
• –––, 2012, “Analyses of Intrinsicality interms of Naturalness”,Philosophy Compass, 7 (8):531–542.
• –––, 2013, “Analyses of Intrinsicalitywithout Naturalness”,Philosophy Compass, 8 (2):186–542.
• –––, 2015, “Intrinsicality andGrounding”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,90: 1–19.
• –––, 2016a, “Varieties ofIntrinsicality”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 92: 237–263.
• –––, 2016b, “An Analysis ofIntrinsicality”,Noûs, 50: 704–739.
• –––, 2021, “Intrinsicality and theclassification of uninstantiable properties”,PhilosophicalStudies, 178 (3): 731–753.
• –––, forthcoming, “Plate’s accountof intrinsicality”,Inquiry, first online 10 Mar 2021.doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1884130
• Marshall, Dan and Josh Parsons, 2001, “Langton and Lewis on‘Intrinsic’”,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 63: 347–51.
• McDaniel, Kris, 2007, “Extended simples”,Philosophical Studies, 133 (1): 131–141.
• McQueen, Kelvin J. & van Woudenberg, René, 2016,“Tests for intrinsicness tested”,PhilosophicalStudies, 173 (11): 2935–2950.
• Moore, G. E., 1903,Principia Ethica, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1922,Philosophical Studies,London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
• Nerlich, Graham, 1979, “Is Curvature Intrinsic to PhysicalSpace”,Philosophy of Science, 46: 439–58.
• Nolan, Daniel, 1998, “Impossible Worlds: A ModestApproach”,Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38:535–73.
• Parsons, Josh, 2001, “Theories of Persistence”, Ph.D.thesis, Canberra: Australian National University.
• –––, 2007, “Is Everything a World?”,Philosophical Studies, 134: 165–181.
• Plate, Jan, 2018, “Intrinsic properties andrelations”,Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal ofPhilosophy, 61 (8): 783–853.
• Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz, 1979,Universalizability,Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
• Rosen, Gideon, 2010, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding andReduction”, in Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffmann (eds.),Modality:Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology., Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• Schaffer, Jonathan, 2004, “Two Conceptions of SparseProperties”,Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85:92–102.
• –––, 2007, “From Nihilism toMonism”,Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85:175–191.
• –––, 2009, “On What Grounds What”,in David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman (eds.),Metametaphysics., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schlesinger, George, 1990, “Qualitative Identity andUniformity”,Noûs, 24: 529–41.
• Shoemaker, Sydney, 1984,Identity, Cause and Mind,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Shumener, Erica, 2022, “Intrinsicality anddeterminacy”,Philosophical Studies, 179:3349–3364.
• Sider, Theodore, 1993a, “Intrinsic Properties”,Philosophical Studies, 83: 1–27.
• –––, 1993b, “Naturalness, Intrinsicality,and Duplication”. Ph.D. thesis, Philosophy Department,University of Massachusetts/Amherst.
• –––, 1995, “Sparseness, Immanence, andNaturalness”,Noûs, 29: 360–377.
• –––, 2001, “Maximality and IntrinsicProperties”,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,63: 357–64.
• –––, 2003, “Maximality and MicrophysicalSupervenience”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 66: 139–149.
• –––, 2011,Writing the Book of theWorld, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Skiles, Alexander, 2009, “Trogdon on Monism andIntrinsicality”,Australian Journal of Philosophy, 87:149–154.
• –––, 2014, “Primitivism AboutIntrinsicality”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companionto Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Skow, Bradford, 2007, “Are Shapes Intrinsic?”,Philosophical Studies, 133: 111–130.
• Trogdon, Kelly, 2009, “Monism and Intrinsicality”,Australian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 127–148.
• –––, 2010, “Intrinsicality for Monists(and Pluralists)”,Australian Journal of Philosophy,88: 555–558.
• Vallentyne, Peter, 1997, “Intrinsic PropertiesDefined”,Philosophical Studies, 88: 209–19.
• Weatherson, Brian, 2001, “Intrinsic Properties andCombinatorial Principles”,Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, 63: 365–80.
• –––, 2006, “The Asymmetric MagnetsProblem”,Philosophical Perspectives, 20:479–492.
• Wilhelm, Isaac, 2022, “Intrinsicality andEntanglement”,Mind, 131 (521): 35–58.
• Witmer, Gene D., 2014, “A Simple Theory ofIntrinsicality”, in Robert M. Francescotti (ed.),Companionto Intrinsic Properties, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Witner, Gene D., William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon, 2005,“Intrinsicality without Naturalness”,Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, 70: 326–50.
• Yablo, Stephen, 1999, “Intrinsicness”,Philosophical Topics, 26: 479–505.
• Zimmerman, Dean, 1997, “Immanent Causation”,Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 433–71.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entryatPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Naturalness, Intrinsicality, and Duplication (Theodore Sider, Ph.D. thesis)

Related Entries

aboutness |abstract objects |Davidson, Donald |descriptions |disjunctive properties |events |fundamentality |grounding, metaphysical |identity: of indiscernibles |justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of |mereology |perfect naturalness |properties |propositions |qualitative properties |states of affairsstructured propositions

Acknowledgments

As of the 2012 revision, Dan Marshall has taken over responsibilityfor maintaining and keeping this entry current. We would like to thankthe referees of this entry for their very helpful comments.