William Crathorn (fl. 1330s), like Adam Wodeham (d. 1358) and RobertHolkot (c. 1290–1349), belonged to the first generation ofOxford philosophers after William of Ockham (c. 1285–1347), whosought to criticize and develop Ockham’s philosophy. Crathorn isremembered for his theories of language and cognition, and for someanti-skeptical arguments strikingly similar to those found inDescartes’Meditations. The radical ontology of hisworks is also noteworthy, though it has not yet been closelystudied.

• 1. Life and Work
• 2. Relation to Other Scholars
• 3. Epistemology
• 4. Philosophy of Language
• 5. Ontology and Categories
• 6. Atomism
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Work

Very little is known about Crathorn’s life. He might have beenborn in the village of Crathorne in north Yorkshire. He became aDominican friar before going to Oxford, where he lectured on the firstbook of Peter the Lombard’sSentences in the years1330–32, a work we can date because of a passage in whichCrathorn mentions an eclipse that we know occurred on July 16, 1330.His Dominican contemporary, Robert Holkot, also tells us that that helectured at the same time (1331–33) as a Dominican namedCrathorn (Courtenay 1978; Schepers 1970 and 1972)

William Crathorn also lectured on the Bible, and Holkot is presumablyresponding to Crathorn’s arguments in hisSex articuli.A manuscript in Vienna contains what could be Crathorn’sforty-two quodlibetal questions (Richter 1972), but most of thesequestions are similar to the ones contained in hisQuestions onthe Sentences (Quaestiones super librumsententiarum).

2. Relation to Other Scholars

Crathorn’sSentences commentary is of greatphilosophical and historical interest for the study of the firstgeneration of Oxford thinkers after Ockham because he develops his ownprovocative positions by discussing the major issues of his day andcriticizing the views of his contemporaries (Courtenay 1978, Gelber2004). His favorite target was Ockham, but he also argued against theviews of Thomas Aquinas (Krauss 1933), John Duns Scotus, RichardFitzralph, and Robert Holkot (Schepers 1970, 1972).

Although Crathorn criticized Ockham, he remained a nominalist (headmits only individuals in his ontology and subscribes to the samekind of theory of predication as Ockham). Above all, he worked outsome of the consequences of Ockham’s views in epistemology, thephilosophy of language, and ontology, to show what problems theycreated. We do not know whether he knew Ockham personally, or onlyindirectly, through his younger disciple, Adam Wodeham. Indeed,Wodeham frequently refers to a Dominicansocius, who couldhave been Crathorn himself or a certain John Grafton, another OxfordDominican of this time.

3. Epistemology

The problem of knowledge is at the very heart of Crathorn’sthought. Going back to Roger Bacon, he held that the only way thehuman mind is able to know the external world is throughspecies that resemble it (ISent. q. 1, concl. 4).Bacon’s theory of the multiplication of species(multiplicatio specierum) was developed to explain causalityusing the model of optics. A thingc has an effect on anotherthinge through the multiplication of speciess fromc towardse, just as light is multiplied through theair when it illuminates an object. According to Bacon, the speciess is a representative ofc but with a lesser mode ofbeing. Thus, the species is multiplied through the medium of air againand again until it arrives ate. The causal power ofc is in this way conserved through the medium until it actsone. The species is therefore both the cause (i.e., the samething as the cause but with a diminished mode of being) and a likenessof that cause. Applying Bacon’s theory to epistemology, Crathornasserts that we have no direct access to things in the external worldand that we immediately perceive only their mental likenesses orrepresentations, i.e., their species. These mental entities, whetherwe call them ‘species“ or ‘concepts” (theterms are equivalent for Crathorn), have the same nature as the thingsthey resemble (ibid. concl. 8). Contrary to Bacon, theDominican considers that the species has the same mode of being— i.e., material being — outside and inside the mind. As aconsequence, all the species we have in the mind belong to thecategory of quality, for no real substance or quantity can existmaterially in the human soul. Since concepts can only belong to thecategory of quality according to Crathorn, they must be mentalqualities having the same nature as non-mental qualities and they mustexist subjectively in the mind, which is to say that they exist insome part of the brain (Pasnau 1997). Crathorn writes, “the word‘cognition’ (cognitio) stands for the idea(verbum) of the thing known, and that idea is the qualityexisting subjectively (subiective existens) in the mind or insome part of the brain” (ISent. q. 1, concl. 1).Therefore, cognition is nothing but the species itself or the part ofthe soul where it is received and stored. From an ontological point ofview, nothing distinguishes sensible cognition, imagination andintellection except the distinct part of the soul where the species isreceived. There is no difference between sensible and intelligiblespecies.

Crathorn goes on to describe the different parts of the brain andtheir functions. As the canonical medieval topology of the brainsuggests, there are three main lobes (cellulae) connected bynerves through which the information conveyed by the species can betransferred from one lobe to another. The first lobe corresponds tosensitive imagination (cellula fantastica), the second toconceptualization and discourse (cellula syllogistica) andthe third to memory (cellula memoriale) (ISent. q.2, concl. 4).

Crathorn thus had to emend Ockham’s theory of evident knowledge,because intuitive cognition is no more the guarantee of any certituderegarding the existence of extramental things. In addition, thecognition of the terms of a proposition — even aper senota proposition — is not sufficient, according toCrathorn, to ensure the causal mechanism that leads to evidence andcertitude. Indeed, as we shall see below, Crathorn refuses to treatthe species or cognitions as linguistic elements of thought. Alllanguages are conventional by nature. Therefore, it is possible tocognize some terms the signification of which remains unknown to thecognizing subject. As a result, although empirical knowledge of thethings signified by the terms is usually needed, it is necessary toargue beyond simple and intuitive cognitions, via syllogisms anddemonstrations, to consolidate one’s certitude that not onlyrepresentations exist. Crathorn thus suggests that we substitute forthe Ockhamist definition of evident cognition his own definition:evident cognition is a manifest, clear, and not obscure cognition (q.1, p. 69–70:notitia evidens est notitia manifesta, clara etnon obscura), be it simple or complex, intuitive orabstractive.

Incredibly, Crathorn affirms that whenever one is thinking of a whitething, the mind of that person actually becomes white. His notion ofsimilarity is strict and uncompromising. Mental concepts cannotresemble substances but only qualities of substances (ISent., q. 1, concl. 7) because the species of substance wouldhave to be a substance itself and our minds would turn into a newsubstance if we thought of it. It also cannot be a pure quantitybecause in thinking of infinite magnitudes, our minds would becomeinfinite, and the same is true for the other categories besidesquality. According to Crathorn, our ability to conceptualize istherefore limited to natural concepts of qualities, which in beingconceived become qualities of the soul.

Crathorn had to face up to the skeptical consequences of this oddepistemology. How can we know what is real if our only access toreality is via representations of its qualitative features? His answerto this question is quite radical: we cannot be naturally and directlycertain that reality exists as we conceive it since it is not possibleto distinguish qualities inside and outside the mind: as qualities,they would have precisely the same nature (ibid. concl.10–13). The only solution to skeptical doubt here is theprinciple, which he claims is knownper se, that God does notproduce an effect supernaturally in order to lie or to lead peopleinto error (ibid. q. 1, concl. 14), a principle more famouslyused in connection with Descartes’ thought experiment of aDieu trompeur several centuries later.

Crathorn endeavored elsewhere to gather at least a few certitudes,since one could doubt whether the a priori principle that God wouldnever deceive us is itself certain. To rebut the skeptic, he turnsback to Augustine’s version of thecogito-argument toprove that we can at least be certain of our own mental activity, forif one were to doubt a proposition such as ‘I am’, itwould follow that he exists, since he who does not exist does notdoubt. Hence, no one can be in doubt concerning the proposition,‘I am’ (ISent., q. 1, concl. 14; translated inTachau 1988, p. 273).

4. Philosophy of Language

One of the most important debates at Oxford around 1320–30concerned the proper object of scientific knowledge. When we knowsomething scientifically, is our knowledge about external things (theearth interposed between the sun and the moon), propositions(‘The moon is eclipsed’), or some other more complex stateof affairs? Crathorn is believed to have participated in thedevelopment of the idea that the proper object of science is neitherthe external thing nor the proposition (as Ockham and Holkot hadargued), but the ‘total significate’ of that proposition(Tachau 1987). Typically, the total significate would include not onlyexternal things but also the premises and other assumptions thatgenerate our assent to the proposition as the conclusion of a piece ofdemonstrative reasoning.

Another debate concerned the nature of mental language, specificallywhether it is conventional or natural (Gelber 1984; Panaccio 1996)Ockham had argued that thinking occurs in a universal language made ofconcepts acquired naturally, i.e. through natural relations ofcausality and similitude. All conventional languages used for humancommunication are subordinated to this mental language, which isshared by everyone. But Crathorn could not accept such a positionbecause of his cognitive theory according to which there are onlyqualities in the mind. So there can be natural signs of extra-mentalqualities. What about substance-terms (the equivalent of proper andcommon names), verbs, and syncategorems, i.e., logical particles andconnectives such as ‘or’, ‘but’,‘all’, and ‘if’? Accordingly, Crathorn arguesthat except for natural signs of qualities, no natural likeness in themind can explain the signification of these terms. Mental language istherefore as conventional as spoken and written languages and is infact derived from conventional languages (ISent., q. 2; Cf.Panaccio 1996, Perler 1997, Robert 2009b and 2010b). Just as thoughtdepends on thespecies or likenesses of external things,mental words are likenesses of conventional words and have exactly thesame semantic properties. Depending upon which language(s) you learnto speak, your mental language will be a likeness of Latin, English,French, etc. This does not mean that we do not have naturalrepresentations of the external world, but these mentalqualia do not form a language. Crathorn was the only thinkerof his time to affirm that conventional words are prior to theirmental counterparts. Meaning is first given by a community ofspeakers; mental language is simply the internalization of thesespoken and written languages. When we think about the world withpropositions and syllogisms, we always think in a conventionallanguage or, more precisely, in its mental reflection.

5. Ontology and Categories

In keeping with his views on knowledge and language, Crathornadvocated radical changes to traditional Aristotelian ontology. Theseare discussed in a sub-treatise on the categories in hisCommentary on the Sentences (ISent. qq.13–18).

Ockham famously reduced the ten Aristotelian categories to two,substance and quality, treating the other eight as modes of signifyingsubstances and qualities. For Crathorn, however, the entireAristotelian system has to be revised. The human mind naturally knowsnothing but qualities, and we cannot be certain that even they existwithout appealing to the principle that God could not deceive us.Thinking and reasoning are of no help because, as we saw above, theyare purely conventional.

Instead, Crathorn treats the Aristotelian categories as philosophicalconventions. Following the chapters of Aristotle’sCategories step by step, he comes to the conclusion that noneof the ten categories are valid because the reasons Aristotle uses todistinguish them are inadequate. For example, the category ofsubstance is distinguished from the other categories by the fact thatit has no contrary and can successively acquire contrary qualities(Aristotle,Categories 5). But Crathorn claims that when weheat a piece of wood or a man, not only the substance but also itsqualities become hot, such that its qualities change from one state totheir contrary exactly like a substance. Therefore, this crucialdistinction between substance and accidents does not apply. Crathornwrites, “not only the substance of the wood can receive thecontraries, but also the accidents of the wood ... but if the wood ishot, not only is the heat attached to the wood hot, but also all thepositive coextensive natures of the wood” (ISent., q.13, concl. 13). He also affirms that “one and the same thingnumerically can truly be said to be substance and accident in relationto different things” (ibid., concl. 5). Indeed, waterand fire can be considered as natural substances, but one is thecontrary of the other. As a general conclusion, Crathorn asserts thatthe very same thing can be called a substance, a quality, a quantity,a relation and so forth (q. 17, p. 462 and q. 18, p. 476).

Crathorn develops his position mostly by attacking the views of otherphilosophers who accepted such distinctions, but unfortunately he isnot always clear about his positive reasons for abandoningAristotelian ontology. But, on one hand it is consistent with hisepistemology, for our only direct and natural certitude is thatqualities exist. On the other hand, it is also consistent with hisfrequent tendency to materialism. Indeed, we can discern hints ofatomism in hisCommentary on the Sentences.

6. Atomism

Crathorn is less well known than other fourteenth-century atomistssuch as the Oxford thinkers Henry of Harclay (d. 1317) and WalterChatton (c. 1285–1344), or the Parisians Gerard of Odo(1290–1349), Nicolas Bonet (d. 1343), and Nicolas of Autrecourt(1299–1369) (Murdoch 1974, 1982; Grellard and Robert 2009), yetwe find several questions on the divisibility of the continuum in hisSentences commentary (particularly ISent., q. 3,but also qq. 4 and 14–16). He affirms that a continuum isdivisible into a finite number of atoms that are not mathematicalpoints but its real, physical parts (ISent., q. 3; fordiscussion, see Wood 1988, Robert 2009a). Atoms are thus real singularentities with discrete magnitude or quantity and a proper nature. Forexample, he says that there are atoms of gold and atoms of lead, andthat these are different kinds of things (ISent., q. 14).Crathorn’s atomism is far from that of Democritus.

The most difficult problem for atomists arises from book VI ofAristotle’sPhysics, where it becomes necessary todefine the contiguity of atoms. Since an atom by definition has noparts, how can we say that they touch each other? If they are actuallyin contact, they should be in one and the same place (if not, thenthere is no continuity since continuity requires contiguity). Crathornreplies by saying that this is a problem only for those who think ofatoms as mathematical points. But since he holds that atoms have aproper magnitude and that they are defined by the fact that theyoccupy a single location (situs orlocus), aquantity that is simply the place occupied by the quantified thing (ISent., qq. 3 and 14–15), the contiguity and continuityof atoms can be explained in terms of the contiguity of places. Atomscan form a continuous magnitude if all of them are contiguous, i.e.,if they all occupy contiguous atomic places.

The implications of Crathorn’s atomism are truly astonishing.First, every movement boils down to local motion of atoms in the void.Thus, Crathorn affirms that a continuous motion has only one possiblespeed, which is the greatest speed it could ever reach (Murdoch 1984).In other words, movement is continuous when an atom changes from oneatomic place to another contiguous atomic place. The proportion oftime and place (i.e., the speed) is always equal to one. So how can heexplain the fact that things appear to move at different speeds? Theanswer is quite simple: to every varying speed there corresponds adiscontinuous motion, with times of rest between some of the atomicplaces occupied by the moving atoms (ISent., q. 16, concl.6). For example, the normal speed of an atoma corresponds toits local motion from a placep1 to another contiguous placep2 in a given atomic time. Variation of speed occurs ifa moves fromp1 top2 but with a time ofrest equivalent to two atoms of time. We may infer that speed can alsovary ifa goes fromp1 to another placep3that is not directly contiguous withp1.

Although Crathorn does not describe himself this way, he seems to beone of the most radical atomists of the fourteenth century (Robert2010a), sharing with his Parisian contemporary Nicholas of Autrecourtmuch of the same anti-Aristotelian bent in his metaphysics and naturalphilosophy. Combined with his epistemology and philosophy of language,his philosophy is certainly one of the most original forms ofreductionism in later medieval philosophy.

Bibliography

Primary Literature

• Quaestiones super librum sententiarum, ed. F. Hoffmann inQuästionen Zum ersten Sentenzenbuch, Beiträge zurGeschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band 29,Aschendorff: Münster, 1988.

Translation

• ISent., q. 1, tr. R. Pasnau in Pasnau (ed.),TheCambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. III:Mind and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Secondary Literature

• Alisade, H. F. X., 2014, “Wilhelm Crathorn OP”, inBiographisch-bibliographisches Kirchenlexicon, Bd. 35,Nordhausen: Bautz, 1537–1543.
• Courtenay, W. J., 1978,Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to HisLife and Writings (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought21), Leiden: E. J. Brill.
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• –––, 2004,It Could Have Been Otherwise:Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology, 1300–1350,Leiden: E. J. Brill.
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• Hoffmann, F., 1971, “Der Satz als Zeichen der TheologischenAussage bei Holcot, Crathorn und Gregor von Rimini,” inDerBergriff der Repraesentatio im Mittelalter,MiscellaneaMedievalia, 8: 296–313.
• –––, 1995, “Der Wandel in derScholastischen Argumentation vom 13 Zum 14 Jahrhundert aufgezeigt anzwei Beispielen: Robert Holcot und William (Johannes?)Crathorn,” in A. Speer (ed.),Die BibliothecaAmploniana,Miscellanea Medievalia, 23:301–322.
• Kirjavainen, H., 2000, “Transcendental Elements in theSemantics of Crathorn,” in G. Holmström-Hintikka (ed.),Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times,Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer, pp. 45–58.
• Krauss, J., 1933, “Die Stellung des OxforderDominikanerlehrers Crathorn zu Thomas von Aquin,”Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, 57:66–68.
• Murdoch, J. E., 1974, “Naissance et développement del’atomisme au bas Moyen Âge latin,” inLascience de la nature: théories et pratiques (Cahiersd’Études Médiévales 2), Montréal:Bellarmin, pp. 11–32.
• –––, 1982, “Infinity andContinuity,” in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (eds.),The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.564–591.
• –––, 1984, “Atomism and Motion in theFourteenth Century,” in E. Mendelsohn (ed.),Transformationand Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in Honor of I. B. Cohen,Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45–66.
• Panaccio, C., 1996, “Le langage mental en discussion:1320–1335,”Les Études Philosophiques, 3:323–39.
• Pasnau, R., 1997,Theories of Cognition in the Later MiddleAges, Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Perler, D., 1997, “Crathorn on Mental Language,” inCostantino Marmo (ed.),Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics andlogic in medieval theological texts (XIIth–XIVth century). Acts of theXIth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. San Marino,24–28 May 1994, Turnhout: Brepols, pp. 337–54.
• Richter, V., 1972, “Handschriftliches zu Crathorn,”Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, 94:445–49.
• Robert, A., 2009a, “William Crathorn’sMereotopological Atomism”, in C. Grellard and A. Robert (eds.),Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology,Leiden-Boston: E.J. Brill, pp. 127–162.
• –––, 2009b, “Les deux langages de lapensée: à propos de quelques réflexionsmédiévales”, in J. Biard (ed.),Le langagemental du Moyen Âge à l’âge classique,Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, pp. 145–168.
• –––, 2010a, “Atomisme etgéométrie à Oxford au XIVe siècle”,in S. Rommevaux (ed.),Mathématiques et connaissance duréel avant Galilée, Omniscience: Paris, pp.15–85.
• –––, 2010b, “William Crathorn onPredication and Mental Language”,Analytica, 14(2):227–258.
• –––, 2016, “Crathorn versus Ockham onCognition, Language, and Ontology,” in Christian Rode (ed.),A Companion to Responses to Ockham, Leiden-New York: E.J.Brill, pp. 47–78.
• Schepers, H., 1970, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn: I.Quellenkritik und Biographische Auswertung der Bakkalareatsschriftenzweier Oxforder Dominikaner des XIV Jahrunderts,”Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 77: 320–54.
• –––, 1972, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn:II. Das significatum per propositionem. Aufbau und Kritik einerNominalistischen Theorie über den Gegenstand des Wissens,”Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 79: 106–136.
• Sprengard, K. A., 1968, “Crathorn. Ein Oxforder modernus desXIV. Jahrhunderts,”Systematische-Historische Untersuchungenzur Philosophie des XIV Jahrhunderts (Band 2), Bonn: MainzerPhilosophische Forschungen.
• Tachau, K. H., 1987, “Wodeham, Crathorn, and Holcot: TheDevelopment of thecomplexe significabile,” in L. M. deRijk and H. Braakhuis (eds.),Logos and Pragma, Nijmegen:Ingenium Publishers, pp. 161–87.
• –––, 1988,Vision and Certitude in the Ageof Ockham, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte desMittelalters, Leiden-New York-København-Köln: E. J.Brill.
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