Movatterモバイル変換

1. Although this has beendisputed. See section3 below.

2. This need not follow ifnonconceptual content is understood along the lines of the“state” view of the nonconcepual debate. For more on the“state” view, see section3.

3. See, e.g., Stalnaker(1984). It has been argued that possible worlds semantics is toocoarse-grained an account of content to be sensitive totheway that the thinker apprehends the world. (More on this insection5. See also the entries onbelief,propositional attitude reports, andstructured propositions.)

4. This assumption isexplicitly rejected by some psychologists and philosophers who takeconcepts to be mental particulars thathave content (see,e.g., Fodor 1975, 1987, 1998, 2008. For more on various accounts ofconcepts, see the entry onconcepts). In the following we will leave this alternative account of conceptsto the side while noting those occasions in which it is particularlyrelevant to the discussion.

5. For further discussion ofthis distinction see Heck 2007, Byrne 2003, 2005. Other authors usedifferent terminology. Speaks (2005) distinguishes betweenabsolute nonconceptualism, whereby the mental state has adifferent type of content from that involved in belief, andrelative nonconceptualism, whereby the content of the stateinvolves contents not grasped by the subject undergoing thestate. Crowther (2006) makes a distinction betweencompositional nonconceptualism, whereby the content of thestate is not composed of concepts, andpossessionalnonconceptualism, whereby undergoing the state in question does notrequire possession of concepts characterizing the content of thestate. See also Laurier (2004) for yet another set of similardistinctions.

6. This claim is true ofthose holding to a “content” view of the nonconceptualdebate. However, if one is persuaded by the “state” viewof the nonconceptual debate, then it is possible to hold that thecontent of perceptionis exhausted by the propositionalcontents of the perceptual beliefs perception would give rise to,though having the perception does not depend on the organism’sconceptual capacities (i.e., perception is a concept-independentstate). See section3 for discussion of the state/content distinction.

7. Chuard (2007) warnsagainst the inference from analog representation to nonconceptualcontent, suggesting that the analog/digital distinction might mark adistinction between two types ofconceptual content or adistinction betweenvehicles, rather than between differenttypes of content.

8. Following severalobjections (Peacocke 1998) regarding the general concepts involved indemonstrative concepts expressible by such phrases as ‘that shade’,McDowell revised his account of the demonstrative concepts involved inthe contents of perception to be of the form …is shapedthus, or …is colored thus (McDowell1998). Similar, and further, misgivings about the possibility ofdemonstrative concepts with such general terms are found in, forexample, Kelly 2001a, Peacocke 2001a, Tye 2006, and Wright 2003.