Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy

First published Mon Jul 28, 2003; substantive revision Fri Aug 22, 2025

Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to referto the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s lifeaccording to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own andnot the product of manipulative or distorting external forces, to bein this way independent. It is a central value in the Kantiantradition of moral philosophy, but it is also given fundamental statusin John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Kant1785/1983, Mill 1859/1975, ch. III). Examination of the concept ofautonomy also figures centrally in debates over education policy,biomedical ethics, various legal freedoms and rights (such as freedomof speech and the right to privacy), as well as moral and politicaltheory more broadly. In the realm of moral theory, seeing autonomy asa central value can be contrasted with alternative frameworks such anethic of care, utilitarianism of some kinds, and an ethic of virtue.Autonomy has traditionally been thought to connote independence andhence to reflect assumptions of individualism in both moral thinkingand designations of political status. For this reason, certainphilosophical movements, such as certain strains of feminism, haveresisted seeing autonomy as a value (Jaggar 1983, chap. 3; for adowngrading of autonomy for different reasons, see Conly 2012).However, in recent decades, theorists have increasingly tried tostructure the concept so as to sever its ties to this brand ofindividualism.

In all such discussions the concept of autonomy is the focus of muchcontroversy and debate, disputes which focus attention on thefundamentals of moral and political philosophy and the Enlightenmentconception of the person more generally.

1. The Concept of Autonomy

In the western tradition, the view that individual autonomy is a basicmoral and political value is very much a modern development. Puttingmoral weight on an individual’s ability to govern herself,independent of her place in a metaphysical order or her role in socialstructures and political institutions is very much the product of themodernist humanism of which much contemporary moral and politicalphilosophy is an offshoot. (For historical discussions of autonomy,see Schneewind 1988, Swain 2016 and Rosich 2019). As such, it bearsthe weight of the controversies that this legacy has attracted. Theidea that moral principles and obligations, as well as the legitimacyof political authority, should be grounded in the self-governingindividual, considered apart from various contingencies of place,culture, and social relations, invites skeptics from several quarters.Autonomy, then, is very much at the vortex of the complex(re)consideration of modernity.

Put most simply, to be autonomous is to govern oneself, to be directedby considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that arenot simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what cansomehow be considered one’s authentic self. Autonomy in thissense seems an irrefutable value, especially since its opposite– being guided by forces external to the self and which onecannot authentically embrace – seems to mark the height ofoppression. But specifying more precisely the conditions of autonomyinevitably sparks controversy and invites skepticism about the claimthat autonomy is an unqualified value for all people.

Autonomy plays various roles in theoretical accounts of persons,conceptions of moral obligation and responsibility, the justificationof social policies and in numerous aspects of political theory. Itforms the core of the Kantian conception of practical reason (see,e.g, Korsgaard 1996, Hill 1989) and, relatedly, connects to questionsof moral responsibility (see Wolff 1970, 12–19). It is also seenas the aspect of persons that prevents or ought to preventpaternalistic interventions in their lives (Dworkin 1988,121–29, Conly 2012). It plays a role in education theory andpolicy, on some views specifying the core goal of liberal educationgenerally (Gutmann 1987, Cuypers and Haji 2008; for discussion, seeBrighouse 2000, 65–111). It is central to many approaches tobioethics (Pugh 2020). Also, despite many feminists’reservations concerning the ideal of autonomy, it is sometimes seen asa valuable conceptual element in some feminist ideals, such as theidentification and elimination of social conditions that victimizewomen and other (potentially) vulnerable people (Friedman 1997, Meyers1987, Christman 1995. Veltman and Piper 2014, Roessler 2021)).

1.1 Basic Distinctions

Several distinctions must be made to zero in on the kind of autonomythat is of greatest interest to moral and political theory.“Moral autonomy” refers to the capacity to impose the(putatively objective) moral law on oneself, and, following Kant, itis claimed as a fundamental organizing principle of all morality (Hill1989). On the other hand, what can be called “personalautonomy” is meant as a trait that individuals can exhibitrelative to any aspects of their lives, not limited to questions ofmoral obligation (Dworkin 1988, 34–47, Swaine 2020).

Personal (or individual) autonomy should also be distinguished fromfreedom, although again, there are many renderings of theseconcepts, and certainly some conceptions of positive freedom will beequivalent to what is often meant by autonomy (Berlin 1969,131–34; Roessler 2021, ch. 1; Christman 2025). Generally, onecan distinguish autonomy from freedom in that the latter concerns theability to act, without external or internal constraints and also (onsome conceptions) with sufficient resources and power to makeone’s desires effective (Berlin 1969, Crocker 1980, MacCallum1967, and the essays in Christman (ed.) 2022). Autonomy concerns theindependence and authenticity of the desires (values, emotions, etc.)that move one to act in the first place. Some distinguish autonomyfrom freedom by insisting that freedom concerns particular acts whileautonomy is a more global notion, referring to states of a person(Dworkin 1988, 13–15, 19–20). But autonomy can be used torefer both to the global condition (autonomous personhood) and as amore local notion (autonomous relative to a particular trait, motive,value, or social condition). Addicted smokers for example areautonomous persons in a general sense but (for some) helplessly unableto control their behavior regarding this one activity (Christman 1989,13–14; cf. Meyers 1987, 66–67).

In addition, we must keep separate the idea of basic autonomy, theminimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak foroneself, from ideal autonomy, an achievement that serves as a goal towhich we might aspire and according to which a person is maximallyauthentic and free of manipulative, self-distorting influences. Anyplausible conceptualization of basic autonomy must, among otherthings, imply that most adults who are not suffering from debilitatingpathologies or are under oppressive and constricting conditions countas autonomous. Autonomy as an ideal, on the other hand, may well beenjoyed by very few if any individuals, for it functions as a goal tobe attained.

The reason to construe basic autonomy broadly enough to include mostadults is that autonomy connects with other status designators whichapply (or, it is claimed, should apply) in this sweeping manner.Autonomy is connected, for example, to moral and legal responsibility,on some views (e.g., Ripstein 1999); autonomous agency is seen asnecessary (and for some sufficient) for the condition of equalpolitical standing; moreover, being autonomous stands as a barrier tounchecked paternalism, both in the personal, informal spheres and inlegal arenas (Feinberg 1986). Lacking autonomy, as young children do,is a condition which allows or invites sympathy, care, paternalism andpossibly pity. Therefore, a guiding consideration in evaluatingparticular conceptions of autonomy (though hardly a hard and fasttest) will be whether it connects properly to these ancillaryjudgments (for discussion of “formal conditions” of aconcept of autonomy, see Dworkin 1988, 7–10).

1.2 Conceptual Variations

The variety of contexts in which the concept of autonomy functions hassuggested to many that there are simply a number of differentconceptions, and that the word simply refers to different elements ineach of those contexts (Arpaly 2004). Others have claimed that whilethere may be a single over-arching concept of autonomy, we shouldthink in terms of separable dimensions of it rather than an all ornothing idea (Mackenzie 2014 and Killmister 2017). Still others objectto the idea thatself-government – the actual controlwe (our selves) exert over what we value and do – should serveas the best model for autonomy or its value (Berofsky 2022, Swain2020, ch. 2, Buss 2022).

Feinberg has claimed that there are at least four different meaningsof “autonomy” in moral and political philosophy: thecapacity to govern oneself, the actual condition of self-government, apersonal ideal, and a set of rights expressive of one’ssovereignty over oneself (Feinberg 1989). One might argue that centralto all of these uses is a conception of the person able to act,reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are somehow her own(authentic in some sense). Nevertheless, it is clear that formulatinga “theory” of the concept will involve more than merelyuncovering the obscure details of the idea’s essence, forautonomy, like many concepts central to contentious moral or politicaldebate is itself essentially contested. So a theory of autonomy issimply a conceptual model aimed at capturing the general sense of“self-rule” or “self-government” (ideas whichobviously admit of their own vagaries) and which can be used tosupport principles or policies the theory attempts to justify.

The idea of self-rule contains two components: the independence ofone’s deliberation and choice from manipulation by others, andthe capacity to rule oneself (see Dworkin 1989, 61f and Arneson 1991).However, the ability to rule oneself will lie at the core of theconcept, since a full account of that capability will surely entailthe freedom from external manipulation characteristic of independence.Indeed, it could be claimed that independenceper se has nofixed meaning or necessary connection with self-government unless weknow what kinds of independence is required for self-rule (cf.,however Raz 1986, 373–78).

Focusing, then, on the requirements of self rule, it can be claimedthat to govern oneself one must be in a position to act competentlybased on desires (values, conditions, etc.) that are in some senseone’s own. This picks out the two families of conditions oftenproffered in conceptions of autonomy: competency conditions andauthenticity conditions. Competency includes various capacities forrational thought, self-control, and freedom from debilitatingpathologies, systematic self-deception, and so on. (Different accountsinclude different conditions: see, for example, Berofsky 1995, R.Young 1991, Haworth 1986, Meyers 1989, Dworkin 1988, Lehrer 1997.)

Authenticity conditions often include the capacity to reflect upon andendorse (or identify with) one’s desires, values, and so on. Themost influential models of authenticity in this vein claim thatautonomy requires second-order identification with first orderdesires. For Frankfurt, for instance, such second-order desires mustactually have the structure of a volition: wanting that the firstorder desires issue in action, that they comprise one’s will.Moreover, such identification, on his view, must be“wholehearted” for the resulting action to count as free (autonomous).^[1]

This overall approach to autonomy has been very influential, andseveral writers have developed variations of it and defended itagainst objections. The most prominent objections concern, on the onehand, the fatal ambiguities of the concept of“identification” and, on the other, the threat of aninfinite regress of conditions. The first problem surrounds thedifferent ways that one can be said to “identify” with adesire, each of which render the view conceptually suspect. Either oneidentifies with an aspect of oneself in the sense of simplyacknowledging it (without judgment) or one identifies with a desire inan aspirational, approving sense of that term. In the first case,however, identification would clearly not be a consistent mark ofautonomy, for one could easily identify as part of oneself any mannerof addictive, constricting, or imposed aspects of one’s make-up.But approving of a trait is also problematic as a requirement ofautonomy, for there are many perfectly authentic aspects of myself(ones for which I can and should be held fully responsible forexample) which I do not fully approve of. I’m not perfect, butdoes that mean that I am thereby not autonomous? (Cf. Watson 1989,Berofsky 1995, 99–102).^[2]

This model stresses internal self-reflection and proceduralindependence. However, the view includes no stipulations about thecontent of the desires, values, and so on, in virtue of which one isconsidered autonomous, specifically there is no requirement that oneact from desires independently of others. Were there to be such arequirement, it would involve what is called “substantiveindependence”. Some writers have insisted that the autonomousperson must enjoy substantive independence as well as proceduralindependence, meaning that they must be free of external constraint(from others especially) in the formulation of their desires and plansmeaning that they must be free of external constraint (from othersespecially) in the formulation of their desires and plans (e.g.,Stoljar 2000, Benson 1987, 2005, Oshana 2006). The motivation for sucha position is the idea a person under conditions of constraint in theformulation of her preferences should not be considered autonomous nomatter how “voluntary” (or autonomous) was the choice thatput her in that position (cf. Meyers 2000). This claim, however,threatens to rob the attribution of autonomy of any claim to valueneutrality it may otherwise carry, for if, conceptually, one is notautonomous when one (freely, rationally, without manipulation) choosesto enter conditions of choice that are severely limited byothers’ command or authority, then the concept is reserved toonly those lifestyles and value pursuits that are seen as acceptablefrom a particular political or theoretical point of view. I willreturn to these lines of thought in a moment. In rejoinder, it hasbeen claimed that merely procedural neutrality could not capture thevalue autonomy has for people, and moreover, a “weaklysubstantive” view can be compatible with a political form ofliberalism as long as the values inherent in the concept could beaccepted by reasonable persons in an overlapping consensus (seeFreyenhagen 2017).

One variation on the internal self-reflection model focuses on theimportance of the personal history of the agent as an element of herautonomy (Christman 1991, Mele 1993; cf. Fisher & Ravizza 1998;cf. also Raz 1986, 371). On these views, the question of whether aperson is autonomous at a time depends on the processes by which shecame to be the way she is. It is not clear that such a focus will beable to avoid the problems raised about internal reflection models(see Mele 1991, Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000b, 16–17), but sucha move attempts to embrace a conception of the self of self-governmentwhich is not only social but diachronically structured (see, e.g.,Cuypers 2001).

For those who are wary of the postulate of reflective selfendorsement, an alternative approach is to equate autonomy with simplya set of competences, such as the capacity to choose deliberatively,rationally, and, as Berofsky claims, “objectively” (seeBerofsky 1995, Meyers 1989). This locates autonomy in the generalcapacity to respond to reasons, and not, for example, in acts ofinternal self-identification. However, even in these accounts, thecapacity to think critically and reflectively is necessary forautonomy as one of the competences in question, even though thereflective thought required need not refer to external values orideals (Berofsky 1995, ch. 5).

Further difficulties have been raised with the requirement of secondorder self-appraisal for autonomy. For it is unclear that such higherlevel judgments have any greater claim to authenticity than theirfirst order cousins. Clearly if a person is manipulated or oppressed(and hence non-autonomous), it could well be that the reflectivejudgments she makes about herself are just as tainted by thatoppression as are her ground-level decisions (Thalberg 1989, Friedman1986, Meyers 1989, 25–41, Noggle 2005), and often our secondorder reflective voices are merely rationalizations and acts ofself-deception rather than true and settled aspects of our character(for general discussion see the essays in Veltman and Piper 2014).This has led to the charge that models of autonomy which demandsecond-order endorsement merely introduce an infinite regress: forsecond-level judgments must be tested for their authenticity in thesame way as first order desires are, but if that is so, then everhigher levels of endorsement would be called for. Various responses tothis problem have been made, for the most part involving the additionof conditions concerning the manner in which such reflection must bemade, for example that it must be free of certain distorting factorsitself, it must reflect an adequate causal history, and the like(Christman 1991, Mele 1995).

Other aspects of the inner reflection model should be noted. As justmentioned, this view of autonomy is often stated as requiring criticalself reflection (see, e.g., Haworth 1986). This has been understood asinvolving a rational appraisal of one’s desires, testing themfor internal consistency, their relation to reliable beliefs, and thelike. But an overly narrow concentration onrationalassessment exposes such conceptions to charges of hyperintellectualism, painting a picture of the autonomous person as acold, detached calculator (see Meyers 2004, 111–37). Connectionsto values, desires, and personal traits are often grounded inemotional and affective responses, ones connected with care,commitment, and relations to others (see Friedman 1998, MacKenzie& Stoljar 2000b, Meyers 1989, de Calleja, Mirja Perez 2019). Forparallel reasons, some theorists have noted that concentration on onlydesires as the focal point of autonomy is overly narrow, aspeople can (fail to) exhibit self-government relative to a wide rangeof personal characteristics, such as values, physical traits,relations to others, and so on (see Double 1992, 66).

2. Autonomy in Moral Philosophy

Autonomy is central in certain moral frameworks, both as a model ofthe moral person – the feature of the person by virtue of whichshe is morally obligated – and as the aspect of persons whichgrounds others’ obligations to her or him. For Kant, theself-imposition of universal moral law is the ground of both moralobligation generally and the respect others owe to us (and we oweourselves). In short, practical reason – our ability to usereasons to choose our own actions – presupposes that weunderstand ourselves as free. Freedom means lacking barriers to ouraction that are in any way external to our will, though it alsorequires that we utilize a law to guide our decisions, a law that cancome to us only by an act of our own will (for further discussion seeHill 1989; for doubts about this reading, see Kleingeld and Willaschek2019). This self-imposition of the moral law is autonomy. And sincethis law must have no content provided by sense or desire, or anyother contingent aspect of our situation, it must be universal. Hencewe have the (first formulation of the) Categorical Imperative, that byvirtue of our being autonomous we must act only on those maxims thatwe can consistently will as a universal law.

The story continues, however: for the claim is that this capacity (toimpose upon ourselves the moral law) is the ultimate source of allmoral value – for to value anything (instrumentally orintrinsically) implies the ability to make value judgments generally,the most fundamental of which is the determination of what ismorally valuable. Some theorists who are not (self-described)Kantians have made this inference central to their views of autonomy.Paul Benson, for example, has argued that being autonomous implies ameasure of self-worth in that we must be in a position to trust ourdecision-making capacities to put ourselves in a position ofresponsibility (Benson 1994; cf. also Grovier 1993, Lehrer 1997, andWestlund 2014). But the Kantian position is that such self-regard isnot a contingent psychological fact about us, but an unavoidableimplication of the exercise of practical reason (cf. Taylor 2005).

So we owe to ourselves moral respect in virtue of our autonomy. Butinsofar as this capacity depends in no way on anything particular orcontingent about ourselves, we owe similar respect to all otherpersons in virtue of their capacity. Hence (via the second formulationof the Categorical Imperative), we are obliged to act out offundamental respect for other persons in virtue of their autonomy. Inthis way, autonomy serves as both a model of practical reason in thedetermination of moral obligation and as the feature of other personsdeserving moral respect from us. (For further discussion, seeImmanual Kant and moral philosophy.)

Recent discussions of Kantian autonomy have downplayed thetranscendental nature of practical reason in this account (see, forexample, Herman 1993 and Hill 1991). For example, Christine Korsgaardfollows Kant in seeing our capacity for self-reflection as both theobject of respect and the seat of normativity generally. On her view,we are all guided by what she calls a “practicalidentity”, a point of view which orients reflection on valuesand manifests an aspect of our self concept. But unlike Kant,Korsgaard argues that we have different practical identities that arethe source of our normative commitments, and not all of them are offundamental moral worth. But the most general of such identities– that which makes us members of a kingdom of ends – isour moral identity, which yields universal duties and obligationsindependent of contingent factors. Autonomy is the source of allobligations, whether moral or non-moral, since it is the capacity toimpose upon ourselves, by virtue of our practical identities,obligations to act (Korsgaard 1996).

Traditional critiques of autonomy-based moral views, and Kant’sin particular, have been mounted along various lines. I mention twohere, as they connect with issues concerning autonomy in social andpolitical theory. The first concerns the way in which autonomy-basedmoral theory grounds obligation in ourcognitive abilitiesrather than in our emotions and affective connections (see, e.g.,Williams 1985, Stocker 1976). The claim is that Kantian moralityleaves too little room for the kinds of emotional reactions that areconstitutive of moral response in many situations: the obligations ofparents for example concern not only what they do but the passions andcare they bring forth in doing it. To view obligation as arising fromautonomy but understanding autonomy in a purely cognitive manner makessuch an account vulnerable to this kind of charge.^[3]

The difficulty this criticism points to resides in the ambiguities ofthe self-description that we might utilize in valuing our“humanity” – our capacity to obligate ourselves. Forwe can reflect upon our decision-making capacities and value thispositively (and fundamentally) but regard that “self”engaging the capacity in different ways. The Kantian model of such aself is of a pure cognizer – a reflective agent engaged inpractical reason. But also involved in decision-making are ourpassions – emotions, desires, felt commitments, senses ofattraction and aversion, alienation and comfort. These are both theobjects of our judgement and partly constitutive of them – topassionately embrace an option is different from cooly determining itto be best. Judgment is involved with all such passions when decisionsare made. And it (judgment) need not be understood apart from them,but as an ability to engage in those actions whose passionate andreasoned support we muster up. So when the optimal decision for me isan impassioned one, I must value my ability to engage in the rightpassions, not merely in the ability to cold-heartedly reflect andchoose. Putting the passions outside the scope of reasoned reflection,as merely an ancillary quality of the action – to consider howto do something not merely what we are doing – is to make onekind of decision. Putting passions inside that scope – sayingthat what it is right to do now is to act with a certain affect orpassion – is another. Determining which action (maxim) is theright one to will require judgment, even if it is judgment about whatkinds of passion are appropriate to be moved by. When we generalizefrom our ability to make the latter sort of judgments, we must valuenot only the ability to weigh options and universalize them but alsothe ability to engage the right affect, emotion, etc. Therefore, wevalue ourselves and others as passionate reasoners not merelyreasoners per se. (For a general discussion of autonomy, emotion, andacting for reasons, see Tappolet, 2014.)

The implication of this observation is that in generalizing ourjudgments in the manner Korsgaard (following Kant) says we must, weneed not commit ourselves to valuing only the cognitive capacities ofhumanity but also its affective, and hence (relatively) subjectiveelements.

A second question is this: since the reflection that is involved inautonomy (and which, according to this view, is the source ofnormativity) need only behypothetical reflection uponone’s desires and mental capacities, then the question arises:under what conditions is this hypothetical reflection meant to takeplace? If the capacity for reflection is the seat of obligation, thenwe must ask if the conditions under which such hypothetical reflectiontakes place are idealized in any sense – if they are assumed tobe reasonable for example. Are we considering merely the reflectionsthe (actual) person would make were she to turn her attention to thequestion, no matter how unreasonable such reflections might be? If so,why should we think this grounds obligations? If we assume they arereasonable, then under some conditions moral obligations are notimposed by the actual self but rather by an idealized, more rationalself. This implies that morality is not literally self-imposed if by“self” one means the actual set of judgments made by theagent in question. Indeed, a Platonist/realist about moral value couldclaim that the objective values which (according to the theory) applyto all agents independent of choice are in fact“self-imposed” in this idealized sense: they would beimposed were the person to reflect on the matter, acting as aperfectly reasonable agent. This shows the complex and potentiallyproblematic implications of this ambiguity.

This points to the question of whether autonomy can be the seat ofmoral obligation and respect if autonomy is conceived in a purelyprocedural manner. If no substantive commitments or value orientationsare included in the conceptual specification of autonomy, then it isunclear how this capacity grounds any particular substantive valuecommitments. On the other hand, if autonomy includes a specificationof particular values in its conditions – that the autonomousperson must value her own freedom for example – then it turnsout that moral obligation (and respect) attaches only to those alreadycommitted in this way, and not more generally to all rational agentsas such (as traditionally advertised by the view). This echoes, ofcourse, Hegel’s critique of Kant.

These difficulties point to ambiguities in autonomy-based moral views,ones which may well be clarified in further developments of thosetheories. They also pick up on traditional problems with Kantianethics (though there are many other such difficulties not mentionedhere). Before leaving moral philosophy, we should consider ethicalviews which focus on autonomy but which do not depend directly on aKantian framework.

2.1 Autonomy as an Object of Value

Autonomy can play a role in moral theory without that theory beingfully Kantian in structure. For example, it is possible to argue thatpersonal autonomy has intrinsic value independent of a fully workedout view of practical reason. Following John Stuart Mill, for example,one can claim that autonomy is “one of the elements ofwell-being” (Mill 1859/1975, ch. III). Viewing autonomy as anintrinsic value or as a constitutive element in personal well-being inthis way opens the door to a generally consequentialist moralframework while paying heed to the importance of self-government to afulfilling life (for discussion see Sumner 1996).

It may also be unclear why autonomy – viewed here as thecapacity to reflect on and endorse one’s values, character andcommitments – should have value independent of the results ofexercising that capacity. Why is one person’s autonomyintrinsically valuable when she uses it to, say, harm herself or makerash or morally skewed choices? More generally, how can we takeaccount of the systematic biases and distortions that plague typicalhuman reasoning in valuing people’s capacity to make decisionsfor themselves (see, e.g., Conly 2013)? This question becomes moreacute as we consider ways that autonomy can obtain in degrees, forthen it is unclear why personal autonomy should be seen as equallyvaluable in persons who display different levels of it (or differentlevels of those abilities that are its conditions, such asrationality).

For example, Swaine argues that on most accounts, personal autonomy isconsistent with agents’ engaging in any number of morallyheinous acts. It therefore should be rejected in favor of what hecalls “ethical autonomy”, a notion that links personalautonomy to moral character. Specifically, ethical autonomy isindividual self-rule modulated by moral character; as such it can beseen as unqualifiedly valuable in ways that standard, value-neutral,accounts cannot. He claims that such a notion need not beproblematically perfectionist nor must it be seen as part of acomprehensive moral doctrine, in Rawls’s sense. Yet it uniquelycaptures a sense of autonomy which is both morally respectable andvaluable as a personal trait (Swaine 2020; for a view that amounts toa critical response to Swaine, see Roessler 2021).

Indeed, autonomy is often cited as the ground of treating allindividuals equally from a moral point of view. But if autonomy is notan all-or-nothing characteristic, this commitment to moral equalitybecomes problematic (Arneson 1999). It can be argued that insofar asthe abilities required for autonomy, such as rational reflectiveness,competences in carrying out one’s decisions, and the like, varyacross individuals (within or between species as well), then it isdifficult to maintain that all autonomous beings have equal moralstatus or that their interests deserve the same weight in consideringdecisions that affect them.

Further, if autonomy is understood as self-government –being moved only in ways consistent with our deepest cares and valueswhen we act – it is unclear how that has particular moral valueindependent of either the results of such action (advancing ourwell-being for example) or the value simply of acting intentionally.For example, Buss argues that the reasons we have to valueself-governing agency, in some metaphysical sense, are unconnected tothe various glosses on “personal autonomy” that aregenerally offered and the value these conditions have for the agent.She claims that we “need to distinguish the metaphysicalcondition of being a self-governing agent from various desirablephenomena that are too often identified with this condition”(Buss 2022, 114). For example, many see autonomy as involving criticalself-reflection on our motives and value that move us to action. ButBuss points out that in many cases, such as acting spontaneously or ona whim, non-reflective actions better express and grow out of ourdeepest cares and commitments (a mark of self-government) than dothose we might submit to critical appraisal (ibid.,118–19).

The move that must be made here, I think, picks up onKorsgaard’s gloss on Kantianism and the argument that ourreflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and,in turn, others’ obligations to regard us as moral equals.Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity aswell – the ability to reflectively consider options and choosesensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning theambiguities of Korsgaard’s account concerning the degree towhich the self-reflection that grounds obligation is idealized at all.If it is, then it is not the everyday capacity to look withinourselves and make a choice that gives us moral status but the morerarified ability to do so rationally, in some full sense. But wesurely vary in our ability to reach that ideal, so why should ourautonomy be regarded as equally worthy?

The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from ouractual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have suchcapacities to some minimal degree), but rather from the way in whichwe mustview ourselves as having these capacities. We givespecial weight to our own present and past decisions, so that wecontinue on with projects and plans we make because (all other thingsbeing equal)we made them, they are ours, at least when we dothem after some reflective deliberation. The pull that our owndecisions have on our ongoing projects and actions can only beexplained by the assumption that we confer status and value ondecisions simply because we reflectively made them (perhaps, though,in light of external, objective considerations). This is anall-or-nothing capacity and hence may be enough to ground our equalstatus even if perhaps, in real life, we exercise this capacity tovarying degrees.^[4] Much has been written about conceptions of well being that rehearsethese worries (see Sumner 1996, Griffin 1988). Such a view might bebuttressed with the idea that the attribution of autonomous agency,and the respect that purportedly goes with it, is itself a normativestance, not a mere observation of how a person actually thinks andacts (for discussion of this position see Christman 2009, chap. 10 andKorsgaard 2014)

2.2 Autonomy and Paternalism

Autonomy is the aspect of persons that undue paternalism offendsagainst. Paternalistic interventions can be both interpersonal (thepermissibility of which are governed by social and moral norms) and amatter of policy (mediated by formal or legal rules). Suchinterventions are identified not by the kind of acts they involve butby the justification given for them, so that paternalism involvesinterference with a person’s actions or knowledge against thatperson’s will for the purpose of advancing that person’sgood. Respect for autonomy is meant to prohibit such interventionsbecause they involve a judgment that the person is not able to decidefor herself how best to pursue her own good. Autonomy is the abilityto so decide, so for the autonomous subject of such interventionspaternalism involves a lack of respect for autonomy. See alsoPaternalism.

But as our discussion of the nature of autonomy indicated, it is oftenunclear exactly what that characteristic involves. Important in thiscontext is whether autonomy can be manifested in degrees –whether the abilities and capacities that constitute autonomy obtainall at once or progressively, or I can enjoy sufficient autonomy insome areas of my life but not in others. If autonomy is a matter ofdegree in any of these ways, then it is unclear that a blanketprohibition against paternalism is warranted. Some people will be lessable to judge for themselves what their own good is and hence be moresusceptible to (justified) paternalistic intervention (Conly 2013; seealso Killmister 2017, chap. 7).

Often such an obligation toward another person requires us to treather as autonomous, independent of the extent to which she is soconcerning the choice in question. At least this is the case when aperson is autonomous above a certain threshold: she is an adult, notunder the influence of debilitating factors, and so on. I might knowthat a person is to some degree under the sway of external pressuresthat are severely limiting her ability to govern her life and makeindependent choices. But as long as she has not lost the basic abilityto reflectively consider her options and make choices, if I interveneagainst her will (for her own good), I show less respect for her as aperson than if I allow her to make her own mistakes. (Which is not tosay, of course, that intervention in such cases might not, in the end,be justified; only that something is lost when it is engaged in, andwhat is lost is a degree of interpersonal respect we owe eachother.)

However, as we saw in the last section, this move depends on thedetermination of basic autonomy and an argument that such a thresholdis non-arbitrary. Also relevant here is the question of proceduralversus substantive autonomy as the ground of the prohibition ofpaternalism. For if by “autonomy” we mean the ability togovern oneself no matter how depraved or morally worthless are theoptions being exercised, it is unclear that the bar to paternalism(and respect for persons generally) retains its normative force. As Imentioned above, the response to this challenge must be that thedecision making capacity itself is of non-derivative value,independent of the content of those decisions, at least if one wishesto avoid the difficulties of positing a substantive (and potentiallynon-neutral) conception of autonomy as the basis for interpersonalrespect.

Issues connected to respect for autonomy, especially ones that raisequestions about paternalism, are particularly germane to the field ofbioethics, where much discussion of the nature of autonomy has takenplace. This is because respecting patient autonomy has been seen asone of the fundamental pillars of bioethical principles (Beauchamp andChilders 1979). However, the complexities of the cases whereappraising client autonomy (in order to judge what respect for itrequires) inevitably give rise to how to conceptualize that notion,specifically with regards to whether one adopts a substantive orprocedural account. On the one hand, certain values and aims thatpatients bring to medical situations – for example the aversionto eating on the part of a possibly anorexic patient – might bytheir nature undercut a judgment of competence at the heart of theirautonomy (hence suggesting a substantive view). Some, such as Dive andNewson, have used observations of this sort to urge a revitalizationof substantive accounts of autonomy in such settings, while othershave resisted that turn. (See Dive and Newson 2018; and see Pugh 2020for a defense of a procedural account; for a general discussion ofpaternalism and health care, see Taylor 2009 and the essays in Nys,et. al., 2007.)

This is merely a sampling of some of the central ways that the idea ofautonomy figures in moral philosophy. Not discussed here are areas ofapplied ethics, for example in medical ethics, where respect forautonomy grounds such principles as that of informed consent. Suchcontexts illustrate the fundamental value that autonomy generally isthought to represent as expressive of one of the fundamentals of moralpersonhood.

3. Autonomy in Social and Political Philosophy

3.1 Autonomy and the Foundations of Liberalism

The conception of the autonomous person plays a variety of roles invarious constructions of liberal political theory (for recentdiscussion, see, e.g., Coburn 2010, Christman 2015 and the essays inChristman and Anderson, eds. 2005). Principally, it serves as themodel of the person whose perspective is used to formulate and justifypolitical principles, as in social contract models of principles ofjustice (Rawls 1971). Also (and correspondingly) it serves as themodel of the citizen whose basic interests are reflected in thoseprinciples, such as in the claim that basic liberties, opportunities,and other primary goods are fundamental to flourishing lives no matterwhat moral commitments, life plans, or other particulars of the personmight obtain (Kymlicka 1989, 10–19, Waldron 1993: 155–6).^[5] Moreover, autonomy is ascribed to persons (or projected as an ideal)in order to delineate and critique oppressive social conditions,liberation from which is considered a fundamental goal of justice(whether or not those critiques are described as within the liberaltradition or as a specific alternative to it) (cf. Keornahan 1999,Cornell 1998, Young 1990, Maite 2024, Stoljar 2022; cf. alsoHirschmann 2002, 1–29).

For our purposes here, liberalism refers generally to that approach topolitical power and social justice that determines principles of right(justice) prior to, and largely independent of, determination ofconceptions of the good (though seeLiberalism; see alsoChristman 2017, ch. 4). This implies that the liberal conception ofjustice, and the legitimation of political power more generally, canbe specified and justified without crucial reference to controversialconceptions of value and moral principles (what Rawls calls“comprehensive moral conceptions” (Rawls 1993,13–15). The fact of permanent pluralism of such moralconceptions is therefore central to liberalism.^[6]

Indeed, Colburn argues that a commitment to autonomy (understood as anindividual’s deciding for herself what is valuable and livingher life in accordance with that value) implies a commitment toanti-perfectionist liberalism, one centered on pluralism and valuerelativism. The tightrope that views like this must walk is betweenadopting perfectionism in one sense – the view that the stateshould promote a good, namely autonomy – but anti-perfectionistin another, perhaps more important sense – that in promotingpersonal autonomy for citizens, the state does not constrain thepursuit of a wide array of other conceptions of the good life (Colburn2010; see also Raz 1986 and Wall 1998).

One manner in which debates concerning autonomy directly connect tocontroversies within and about liberalism concerns the role that stateneutrality is to play in the justification and application ofprinciples of justice. Neutrality is a controversial standard, ofcourse, and the precise way in which liberal theory is committed to arequirement of neutrality is complex and controversial (see Raz 1986,110–64, Waldron 1993, 143–67). The question to be askedhere is whether the conception of autonomy utilized in liberaltheories must itself attempt to be neutral concerning variousconceptions of morality and value, or, alternatively, does thereliance on autonomy in the justification and specification of liberaltheories of justice render them non-neutral simply because of thisreliance (no matter how “neutral” the conception ofautonomy utilized turns out to be) (Christman 2015).

Let us consider this first question concerning neutrality and in sodoing revisit the issue of whether the independence implicit inautonomy should best be conceived in a purely “procedural”manner or more substantively. Recall that some theorists view autonomyas requiring minimal competence (or rationality) along withauthenticity, where the latter condition is fleshed out in terms ofthe capacity to reflectively accept motivational aspects of oneself.This view can be called “proceduralist” because it demandsthat the procedure by which a person comes to identify a desire (ortrait) as her own is what is crucial in the determination of itsauthenticity and hence autonomy. This conception of autonomy isadopted, according to its defenders, because doing so is the only wayto ensure that autonomy is neutral toward all conceptions of value andthe good that reasonable adults may come to internalize (Dworkin 1989,Freyenhage 2017).

Critics of this view have pointed to cases where it is imagined thatpersons adopt what most would call oppressive and overly restrictivelife situations but in a way that meets the minimal conditions ofautonomy on proceduralist accounts, so that on such accounts theycount as autonomous because of the self-governing processes by whichthey entered such oppressive conditions. These critics argue that anyconception of autonomy that ascribes that trait to such people iswrongly conceived (Benson 1987, MacKenzie & Stoljar 2001b and2017, Waller 1993, and Oshana 1998). On the basis of such a judgment,they argue that normatively substantive conditions should be added tothe requirements of autonomy, conditions such as the ability torecognize and follow certain moral or political norms (See Benson1987, Wolf 1980; for criticism, see Berofsky 1995, ch. 7). Thiscriticism suggests that considerations concerning the autonomous selfcannot avoid questions of identity and hence whether the self ofself-government can be understood independently of the (perhapssocially defined) values in terms of which people conceive ofthemselves; this is a subject to which we now turn.

3.2 Identity and Conceptions of the Self

Autonomy, as we have been describing it, certainly attachesparadigmatically to individual persons; it is not (in this usage) aproperty of groups or peoples. So the autonomy that grounds basicrights and which connects to moral responsibility, as this concept isthought to do, is assigned to persons without essential reference toother people, institutions, or traditions within which they may liveand act. Critics claim, however, that such a view runs counter to themanner in which most of us (or all of us in some ways) defineourselves, and hence diverges problematically from the aspects ofidentity that motivate action, ground moral commitments, and by whichpeople formulate life plans. Autonomy, it is argued, implies theability to reflect wholly on oneself, to accept or reject one’svalues, connections, and self-defining features, and change suchelements of one’s life at will. But we are all not only deeplyenmeshed in social relations and cultural patterns, we are alsodefined by such relations, some claim(Sandel 1982, 15–65). Forexample, we use language to engage in reflection but language isitself a social product and deeply tied to various cultural forms. Inany number of ways we are constituted by factors that lie beyond ourreflective control but which nonetheless structure our values,thoughts, and motivations (Taylor 1991, 33f; for discussion see Bell1993, 24–54). To say that we are autonomous (and hence morallyresponsible, bear moral rights, etc.) only when we can step back fromall such connections and critically appraise and possibly alter themflies in the face of these psychological and metaphysical realities.^[7]

In a different manner, critics have claimed that the liberalconception of the person, reflected in standard models of autonomy,under-emphasizes the deep identity-constituting connections we havewith gender, race, culture, and religion, among other things. Such“thick” identities are not central to the understanding ofthe self-governing person who, according to standard liberal models,is fully able to abstract from such elements of her self-concept andto either identify with or to reject such them. But such an ideal toonarrowly valorizes the life of the cosmopolitan “man”– the world traveler who freely chooses whether to settle intothis or that community, identify with this or that group, and so on(see Young 1991, Alcoff 2006 and Appiah 2010; for discussion, seeMeyers, 2000b).

These challenges have also focused on the relation of the self to itsculture (Margalit and Raz, 1990, Tamir 1993, Colburn 2010, ch. 4,Levey 2022). What is at issue from a policy perspective is thatemphasis on the individual’s self-government, with thecosmopolitan perspective that this entails, makes it difficult if notimpossible to ground rights to the protection and internal self-government of traditional cultures themselves (Kymlicka, 1995). Thisis problematic in that it excludes from the direct protection ofliberal policies those individuals and groups whose self-conceptionsand value commitments are deeply constituted by cultural factors. Or,conversely, the assumption that the autonomous person is able toseparate himself from all cultural commitments forestalls moves toprovide state protection for cultural forms themselves, insofar assuch state policies rest on the value of autonomy.

There have been many responses to these charges on behalf of a liberaloutlook (e.g., Kymlicka, 1989, Gutman, 1985, Appiah 2005; for ageneral response to question of cultural identities see Kymlicka1997). The most powerful response is that autonomy need not requirethat people be in a position to step away from all of theirconnections and values and to critically appraise them. Mere piecemealreflection is all that is required. As Kymlicka puts it: “Noparticular task is set for us by society, and no particular culturalpractice has authority that is beyond individual judgement andpossible rejection” (Kymlicka, 1989:, 50).

There is a clarification that is needed in this exchange, however. Forinsofar as defenders of liberal principles (based on the value ofautonomy) claim that all aspects of a person’s self-concept besubject to alteration in order to manifest autonomy, they needlesslyexaggerate the commitments of the liberal position. For such a view isopen to the charge that liberal conceptions fail to take seriously thepermanent and unalterable aspects of the self and its social position(Young, 1990, 46). Our embodiment, for example, is often not somethingwhich we can alter other than marginally, and numerous otherself-defining factors such as sexual orientation (for some), nativelanguage, culture and race, are not readily subject to ourmanipulation and transformation, even in a piecemeal manner. To saythat we are heteronomous because of this is therefore deeplyproblematic. What must be claimed by the defender of autonomy-basedliberalism is that the ability in question is to change those aspectsof oneself from which one is deeply alienated (or with which one doesnot identify, etc.). For in those cases where, upon reflection, oneexperiences one’s body, culture, race, or sexuality as anexternal burden constricting one’s more settled and authenticnature, and still one cannot alter that factor, then one lacksautonomy relative to it (see Christman,2009 ch. 6). But if one feelsfully at home within those unalterable parameters one does not lackautonomy because of that unalterability (for a different way ofapproach this issue see Mahmoud 2005, Khader 2011, Roessler 2021).

3.3 Relational Autonomy

As we said, several writers have claimed that proceduralist accountsof autonomy would wrongly attribute autonomy to those whose restrictedsocialization and stultifying life conditions pressure them intointernalizing oppressive values and norms, for example women who haveinternalized the belief in the social authority of husbands, or thatonly by having and raising children are their lives truly complete,and the like. If such women reflect on these values they may wellendorse them, even if doing so is free of any specificreflection-inhibiting conditions. But such women surely lack autonomy,it is claimed; so only if autonomy includes a requirement that one beable to recognize basic value claims (such as the person’s ownequal moral standing) will that concept be useful in describing theoppressive conditions of a patriarchal society (see, e.g., Oshana,1998, Stoljar, 2000; for discussion see Christman 2009 chap. 8,Benson, 1990, Friedman, 2000, Meyers, 1987, 1989).^[8]

These and related considerations have sparked some to develop analternative approach to autonomy meant to replace allegedly overlyindividualistic notions. This replacement has been called“relational autonomy” (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000a).Spurred by feminist critiques of traditional conceptions of autonomyand rights (Nedelsky, 1989, Code, 1991), relational conceptions ofautonomy stress the ineliminable role that relatedness plays in bothpersons’ self- conceptions, relative to which autonomy must bedefined, and the dynamics of deliberation and reasoning. These viewsoffer a provocative alternative to traditional models of theautonomous individual, but it must be made clear what position isbeing taken on the issue: on the one hand, relational accounts can betaken as resting on a non-individualist conception of the person andthen claim that insofar as autonomy is self-government and the self isconstituted by relations with others, then autonomy is relational; orthese accounts may be understood as claiming that whatever selves turnout to be, autonomy fundamentally involves social relations ratherthan individual traits (Oshana, 2006). Some such views also waiverbetween claiming that social and personal relations play a crucialcausal role in the development and enjoyment of autonomy and claimingthat such relations constitute autonomy (for discussion see Mackenzieand Stoljar, 2000b, 21–26; for a recent overview, see Mackenzie2014).

Another relational element to autonomy that has been developedconnects social support and recognition of the person’s statusto her capacities for self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect. Thecore argument in these approaches is that autonomy requires theability to act effectively on one’s own values (either as anindividual or member of a social group), but that oppressive socialconditions of various kinds threaten those abilities by removingone’s sense of self-confidence required for effective agency.Social recognition and/or support for this self-trusting status isrequired for the full enjoyment of these abilities (see Anderson andHonneth 2005, Grovier 1993, Benson 2005, McCleod and Sherwin 2005, andWestlund 2014).^[9]

These claims often are accompanied with a rejection of purportedlyvalue-neutral, proceduralist accounts of autonomy, even those thatattempt to accommodate a fully social conception of the self. Onequestion that arises with relational views connected to self-trust inthis way: why, exactly are such relations seen as conceptuallyconstitutive of autonomy rather than contributory to it (and itsdevelopment), where the self-confidence or self-trust in question isthe core element to which these sorts of social relations are animportant (albeit contingent) contributor. Another question to beconsidered arises from those cases where self-trust is establisheddespite lack of social recognition, as when runaway slaves manage toheroically push on with their quest for freedom while facing violentdenials from surrounding others (and surrounding social structures)that they enjoy the status of a full human being capable of authenticdecision making. Finally, self-trust is not always merited: considerthe brash teenager who insists on exercising social independence basedon her unwarranted confidence in her abilities to make good judgments(see Mackenzie 2008, n. 36).

Development of relational accounts of autonomy have often been part ofa critical project of analyzing the possibilities of self-governmentunder non-ideal, indeed overtly oppressive conditions. Largely from afeminist perspective (though not confined to that), these analyseshave insisted that our understanding of autonomy must take intoaccount the pronounced inequality of power and cultural dominationthat marks most of the social world, and some use this as a startingpoint in criticizing certain models, for example, purely proceduralaccounts of self-government for implying that those who are forced toembrace the identities and value structures of those oppressiveenvironments will count as autonomous. (See Stoljar 2022; for aresponse to this criticism, see Maite 2024 and Roessler 2021; on thequestion of adaptive preference formation, see Khader 2011 andTerlazzo 2016.)

However, Khader and McGill argue that debates over procedural versussubstantive accounts of autonomy embedded in discussions of relationalviews often result in people talking past each other. That is,defenders of substantive accounts are often engaged in a kind of“ameliorative theorizing” – finding the mostpowerful conceptualization of concepts like autonomy to best expressthe need for liberation – while proceduralists analyze theconcept with reference to competing points of view, including that ofvictims of oppression whose autonomy is in question, to achieve a kindof reflective equilibrium about the concept. (See Khader and McGill2022.)

Nevertheless, these approaches have all importantly shiftedphilosophical attention concerning autonomy to the social andinterpersonal dynamics that shape its enjoyment, connecting ideasabout autonomy with broader issues of social justice, recognition, andsocial practices. This brings us back, then, to considerations of theliberal project and its potential limitations, where autonomy remainscentral.

3.4 Autonomy, Liberalism, and Perfectionism

As noted earlier, there are various versions of liberal politicalphilosophy. All of them, however, are committed to a conception ofpolitical legitimacy in which political power and authority isjustified only if such authority is acceptable to all citizens boundby it (see Rawls 1993, 144–50). This connects to a broader viewof the foundations of value that at least some liberal theoristspresent as central to that tradition. That is the claim that valuesare valid for a person only if those values are or can be reasonablyendorsed by the person in question. By extension, principles guidingthe operation of institutions of social and political power –what Rawls calls the institutions of the basic structure (Rawls 1993,258) – are legitimate only if they can be endorsed in this wayby those subject to them. In this way, liberalism (in most of itsforms) is committed to what some have called the “endorsementconstraint” (Kymlicka 1989, 12f, R. Dworkin 2000,216–18).

Models of autonomy considered above include a condition that mirrorsthis constraint, in that a person is autonomous relative to someaction-guiding norm or value only if, upon critical reflection of thatvalue, she identifies with it, approves of it, or does not feel deeplyalienated from it. Combining this view with the endorsementconstraint, liberalism carries the implication that autonomy isrespected only when guiding values or principles in a society can beembraced in some way by those governed by them. This will connectdirectly to the liberal theory of legitimacy to be discussedbelow.

Perfectionists reject this set of claims. Perfectionism is the viewthat there are values valid for an individual or a population evenwhen, from the subjective point of view of those agents or groups,that value is not endorsed or accepted (Wall 1998, Sumner 1996,45–80, Hurka 1993, Sher 1997; see alsoPerfectionism).In short, it is the view that there are entirely objective values.While there are perfectionist liberals, this view generally resiststhe liberal claim that the autonomous acceptance of the centralcomponents of political principles is a necessary condition for thelegitimacy of those principles. Moreover, perfectionists question theliberal commitment to neutrality in the formulation and application ofpolitical principles (Hurka 1993, 158–60).

Perfectionists specifically target the liberal connection betweenrespect for autonomy and neutrality of political principles (Wall1998, 125–204). For many, liberalism rests on the value ofindividual autonomy, but this reliance either assumes that respect forautonomy is merely one value among others in the liberal view, orautonomy has overriding value. In either case, however, neutrality isnot supported. If autonomy is merely one value among others, forexample, then there will clearly be times when state support of thoseother values will override respect for autonomy (paternalisticrestrictions imposed to promote citizen safety, for example) (Sher1997, 45–105, Hurka 1993, 158–60, Conly 2013). On theother hand, autonomy could be seen as an absolute constraint on thepromotion of values, or, more plausibly, as a constitutive conditionof the validity of all values for a person, as the endorsementconstraint implies. Perfectionists reply, however, that this is itselfa controversial value position, one that may not find unqualifiedgeneral support (Hurka 1993, 148–52, Sher 1997, 58–60,Sumner 1996, 174–83; cf. Griffin 1986, 135– 36). To answerthese objections, one must turn to consideration of the liberalprinciple of legitimacy. For the claim that liberals make concerningthe limits of state promotion of the good – a limit set byrespect for autonomy – depends heavily on their view about theultimate ground of political power.

3.5 Autonomy and Political Liberalism

Liberalism is generally understood to arise historically out of thesocial contract tradition of political philosophy and hence rests onthe idea of popular sovereignty. The concept of autonomy, then,figures centrally in at least one dominant strand in this tradition,the strand the runs through the work of Kant. The major alternativeversion of the liberal tradition sees popular sovereignty as basicallya collective expression of rational choice and that the principles ofthe basic institutions of political power are merely instrumental inthe maximization of aggregate citizen welfare (or, as with Mill, aconstitutive element of welfare broadly considered).

But it is the Kantian brand of liberalism that places autonomy ofpersons at center stage. Rawls’sTheory of Justice wasseen as the contemporary manifestation of this Kantian approach tojustice, where justice was conceived as those principles that would bechosen under conditions of unbiased rational decision-making (frombehind the veil of ignorance). The original position where suchprinciples would be chosen was said by Rawls to mirror Kant’sCategorical Imperative. That is, it is a device in which persons canchoose principles to impose upon themselves in a way which isindependent of contingencies of social position, race, sex, orconception of the good (Rawls 1971, 221–27). But as is wellknown, the Kantian foundations of Rawls’s theory of justicerendered it vulnerable to the charge that it was inapplicable to thosepopulations (all modern populations in fact) where deep moralpluralism abounds. For under such conditions, no theory of justicewhich rests on a metaphysically grounded conception of the personcould claim full allegiance from members of a population whose deepdiversity causes them to disagree about metaphysics itself, as well asabout moral frameworks and conceptions of value related to it. Forthis reason, Rawls developed a new (or further developed)understanding of the foundations of his version of liberalism, apolitical conception (Rawls 1993).

Under political liberalism, autonomy of persons is postulated, not asa metaphysically grounded “fact” about moral personalityor practical reason as such, but rather as one of several“device[s] of representation” under which diverse citizenscan focus on the methods of derivation (such as the original position)for substantive principles of justice (Rawls 1999, 303–58).Justice is achieved only when an overlapping consensus among peoplemoved by deeply divergent but reasonable comprehensive moral views canbe attained, a consensus in which such citizens can affirm principlesof justice from within those comprehensive views.

Political Liberalism shifts the focus from a philosophical conceptionof justice, formulated abstractly and meant to apply universally, to apractical conception of legitimacy where consensus is reached withoutpretension of deep metaphysical roots for the principles in question.More than merely a “modus vivendi” for the participatingparties, justice must be affirmed in a way that finds a moral basisfor all participating citizens, albeit from different frameworks ofvalue and moral obligation. The operation of public reason, then,serves as the means by which such a consensus might be established,and hence public discussion and democratic institutions must be seenas a constitutive part of the justification of principles of justicerather than merely a mechanism for the collective determination of thesocial good.

But the role of autonomy in the specification of this picture shouldnot be under- emphasized (or the controversies it invites ignored).For such a consensus counts as legitimate only when achieved underconditions of free and authentic affirmation of shared principles.Only if the citizens see themselves as fully able to reflectivelyendorse or reject such shared principles, and to do so competently andwith adequate information and range of options, can the overlappingpolitical consensus step beyond the purely strategic dynamics of amodus vivendi and ground legitimate institutions of political power.(See A. Taylor 2022.)

Indeed, the assumption that all those subject to political authorityenjoy the developed capacity to reflectively accept their life pathand the values inherent in it invokes a level of idealization thatbelies the conditions of many victims of past and ongoing oppression.This virtually ensures that such structural conditions of society asracial domination, profound inequality of power, and patterns ofexclusion of groups from equal standing in social space will beassumed away as irrelevant to the question of legitimacy (Mills2005).

Therefore, social conditions that hamper the equal enjoyment ofcapacities to reflectively consider and (if necessary) rejectprinciples of social justice, due, say, to extreme poverty,disability, ongoing injustice and inequality, or the like, restrictthe establishment of just principles. Autonomy, then, insofar as thatconcept picks out the free reflective choice operating in theestablishment of legitimacy, is basic to, and presupposed by, evensuch non-foundational (political) conceptions of justice.

Critics of political liberalism arise from several quarters. However,among the objections to it that focus on autonomy are those thatquestion whether a political conception of legitimacy that rests onshared values can be sustained without the validity of those valuesbeing seen as somehow objective or fundamental, a position thatclashes with the purported pluralism of political liberalism.Otherwise, citizens with deeply conflicting worldviews could not beexpected to affirm the value of autonomy except as a meremodusvivendi (see, e.g., Wall 2009; cf. also Larmore 2008,146–6). A line of response to this worry that could be pursuedwould be one that claimed that values that amount to autonomy (in someconceptualization of that idea) are already functional in the socialstructures and cultural practices of otherwise defensible democraticpractices (as well as some critical projects that emphasize oppressionand domination, as we saw above). This point raises the issue, towhich we now turn, of the connection between autonomy, politicalliberalism, and democracy.

3.6 Autonomy, Justice and Democracy

In closing, we should add a word about the implications of politicalliberalism for the traditional division between liberal justice anddemocratic theory. I say “division” here, but differentviews of justice and democracy will convey very different conceptionsof the relation between the two (see Christiano 1996, Lakoff 1996).But traditionally, liberal conceptions of justice have vieweddemocratic mechanisms of collective choice as essential but highlycircumscribed by the constitutional provisions that principles ofjustice support. Individual rights and freedoms, equality before thelaw, and various privileges and protections associated with citizenautonomy are protected by principles of justice and hence not subjectto democratic review, on this approach (Gutmann 1993).

However, liberal conceptions of justice have themselves evolved (insome strains at least) to include reference to collective discussionand debate (public reason) among the constitutive conditions oflegitimacy. It could be claimed, then, that basic assumptions aboutcitizens’ capacities for reflective deliberation and choice– autonomy – must be part of the background conditionsagainst which an overlapping consensus or other sort of politicalagreement concerning principles of justice is to operate. (Fordiscussion, see Claassen 2022.)

Some thinkers have made the connection between individual or“private” autonomy and collective or “public”legitimacy – prominent, most notably Habermas (Habermas 1994).On this view, legitimacy and justice cannot be established in advancethrough philosophical construction and argument, as was thought to bethe case in natural law traditions in which classical social contracttheory flourished and which is inherited (in different form) incontemporary perfectionist liberal views. Rather, justice amounts tothat set of principles that are established in practice and renderedlegitimate by theactual support of affected citizens (andtheir representatives) in a process of collective discourse anddeliberation (see e.g., Fraser 1997, 11–40 and Young 2000).Systems of rights and protections (private, individual autonomy) willnecessarily be protected in order to institutionalize frameworks ofpublic deliberation (and, more specifically, legislation andconstitutional interpretation) that render principles of socialjustice acceptable to all affected (in consultation with others)(Habermas 1994, 111).

This view of justice, if at all acceptable, provides an indirectdefense of the protection of autonomy and, in particular,conceptualizing autonomy in a way that assumes reflective self-evaluation. For only if citizen participants in the public discoursethat underlies justice are assumed to have (and provided the basicresources for having) capacities for competent self- reflection, canthe public defense and discussion of competing conceptions of justicetake place (cf. Gaus 1996, Parts II and III, Gaus 2011). Insofar asautonomy is necessary for a functioning democracy (considered verybroadly), and the latter is a constitutive element of just politicalinstitutions, then autonomy must be seen as reflective self-appraisal(and, I would add, non-alienation from central aspects of one’sperson) (see Cohen 2002, Richardson 2003, Christman 2015).

This approach to justice and autonomy, spelled out here in rough andgeneral form, has certainly faced criticism. In particular, thosetheorists concerned with the multi-dimensional nature of social andcultural “difference” have stressed how the conception ofthe autonomous person assumed in such principles (as well as criteriafor rational discourse and public deliberation) is a contestable idealnot internalized by all participants in contemporary political life(see, e.g., Brown 1995, Benhabib 1992). Others motivated bypost-modern considerations concerning the nature of the self,rationality, language, and identity, are also suspicious of the mannerin which the basic concepts operative in liberal theories of justice(“autonomy” for example) are understood as fixed,transparent, and without their own political presuppositions (see,e.g., Butler 1990; for general discussion see White 1990).

These charges are stated here much too generally to give an adequateresponse in this context. But the challenge remains for any theory ofjustice which rests on a presumption of the normative centrality ofautonomy. To be plausible in a variously pluralistic social setting,one marked by ongoing histories of oppressive practices andinstitutions, such a view must avoid the twin evils of forciblyimposing a (reasonably) contested value on resistant citizens, on theone hand, and simply abandoning all normative conceptions of socialorder in favor of open ended struggle for power on the other. The viewthat individuals ought to be treated as, and given the resources tobecome, autonomous in one of the minimal senses outlined here will, Isubmit, be a central element in any political view that steers betweenthe Scylla of oppressive forms of perfectionism and the Charybdis ofinterest-group power politics.

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