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1. Austin’s emphasis on the good standing of distinctions drawnwithin ordinary language echoes a similar emphasis in Cook Wilson. SeeMarion 2009. It is recapitulated and developed in Grice and Strawson1956 and Putnam 1962.

2. Ultimately, the dispute between Austin’s approach andapproaches based broadly on Grice’s work turns on delicateissues concerning the extent to which, and ways in which, ordinaryjudgments, and our views about the sources and status of ordinaryjudgments, can be overturned either on the basis of attempts tosystematize and generalize those judgments, or on the basis of ourcommitment to general principles taken to govern specific judgments.Grice recognizes a special case of the general issue in hisStudies (1989: 49).

3. This component of Austin’s views about truth has figuredimportantly in recent discussions about the context- oroccasion-sensitivity of our use of language. See, for example, Travis2008: 1–18.

4. The distinction between performative and descriptive functions hadearlier been articulated and exploited by Austin in his “OtherMinds” (1946). Austin’s feel for the distinction appearsto have stemmed from his engagement with some of H. A.Prichard’s work on the nature of promises, about which Austinand Prichard had corresponded. See e.g., Prichard 1979: 171.

5. Austin’s paper formed part of a symposium with Strawson 1950,as co-symposiast, offering a critical response. Others soon joined thefray. The ensuing dispute was messy, and served, I think, to hinderunderstanding of, and engagement with, Austin’s initialdiscussion. A useful discussion of some of the initial mess may befound in Wheatley 1969. See also Chisholm 1964; Mates 1974; Strawson1964b, 1965; Warnock 1962, 1964, 1973c, 1989: 45–64; C.J.F.Williams 1973.

6. Austin writes: “the statement…is a ‘logicalconstruction’ out of the makings of statements” (1962b: 1fn.1).

7. Note that Austin doesn’t claim that the formula specifies anecessary condition for truth.

8. These are conventions only in the general sense that they arecorrelations that are both arbitrary and instituted on the basis ofmanifest human decision. Thus ‘conventional’ is employedto contrast with ‘natural’ in something like the waysuggested in Plato’sCratylus.

9. The distinction here partly reflects a distinction that figuresthroughout Austin’s work between general (type) abilities,opportunities for their exercise, and their particular exercises. Adistinction of this sort plays a central role in Austin’s“Other Minds” (1946) andSense and Sensibilia(1962a) discussions of knowledge and perception, and also figures inhis “Ifs and Cans” (1956a) discussion of abilities.

10. Although Austin doesn’t take a stand on the matter, it would bean over-simplification to think that the demonstrative conventionsmust function independently of the descriptive conventions. It maywell be, for example, that the descriptive conventions aid selectionof a target situation—for instance, by indicating that thetarget situation is, or might easily be taken to be, one in which acat is on a mat.

11. It is because decision or judgment is required in order to determineclassification of the present case as e.g., red, rather than thisbeing determined by purely natural relations of similarity, thatAustin speaks here of a role for an additionalconvention.The two most important aspects of Austin’s thought here are these. First, sameness of type is registered in judgment or (in an attenuated sense) decision, rather than in experience (which registers only similarities). Second, what is a matter for judgment or decision is not simply whether there is a sameness present but rather whether the sameness that is required by a particular linguistic typing is present. What Austin says leaves open whether he means to be sketching an account of the determination of types or rather offering only an outline account of the registration of, and selection amongst, independently determined types. On the former view, Austin would be outlining a theory of types or universals; on the latter, he would be offering an account of the connection between types or universals and linguistic practice. Austin makes some relevant observations about theories of universals in his 1940ms, especially: 69–75.

12. It’s plausible that in appealing to states of affairs,situations, and events as a range of particulars, Austin was in effectfollowing Cook Wilson’s lead. See Marion 2009 for discussion ofCook Wilson’s views concerning the existence of suchparticulars.

13. This provides the context for Austin’s favorable reference to“‘coherence’ and pragmatist theories of truth”triggered by the following question: “Is it true or false thatthe dog goes round the cow?” (1950a: 130, 130 fn.1). Plausibly,this alludes to William James’ discussion of theoccasion-sensitivity of the question whether, in a case in which botha squirrel and a man are circling a tree, the man goes round thesquirrel (James 1907/1975).

14. The requirement here would have to be made more complicated in orderto cope with the different way that truth can vary across contexts dueto indexicals (e.g., “here”, “now”) ordemonstratives (e.g., “this”). However, since thesentences we are considering do not (explicitly) involve indexicals ordemonstratives, we can ignore that complication for presentpurposes.

15. For discussion of the bearing of Austin’s views on the standingof literal meaning, see Crary 2002 and Hansen 2014.

16. Austin considers taking the third line with a range of casesincluding definitions, value judgments, and performatives in“Truth” (1950a: 131–132). It is a good question howwell this approach can be fitted with his deflationary leanings.

17. 1962b. Austin first appeals to a version of the distinction in“Other Minds” (1946: 97–103), in discussing thefunction of claims to know.

18. Austin’s doesn’t explicitly state that the illocutionaryact is the fundamental locus of assessment as to truth. However, theclaim is of a piece with his claim (considered earlier in discussingwhether Austin is a deflationist about truth) that assessment as totruth covers a variety of more specific assessments as to merit(including happiness), assessments which themselves most naturallytarget illocutionary acts: assessments as to fairness, reasonableness,and so forth. See 1950a: 130, 1956b: 250–251, 1957: 180. Inaddition, Austin emphasises that, on his view, therheme—the core of the locutionary act—“is aunit ofspeech; its typical fault is to be vague or void orobscure, &c.” (1962b: 98); its characteristic fault is notto be false. Similarly, Austin considers the types of failures towhich locutionary acts are characteristically susceptible and says,“…failures here will not be unhappinesses as [in the caseof the illocutionary act], but rather failures to get the words out,to express ourselves clearly, etc.” (1962b: 106). Finally, ifAustin viewed the locutionary act rather than the illocutionary act asthe fundamental target of assessment as to truth, then it would bedifficult to understand Austin’s treatment of performativeutterances in the context of his distinction between locutionary andillocutionary acts. Performative utterances differ from otherutterances in an illocutionary, rather than a locutionary, way. Hence,the default prediction would be that performative utterances are aptfor any form of assessment that applies to locutionary acts ingeneral. If those forms of assessment included assessment as to truth,then it would be natural to expect Austin to use the distinctionbetween locutionary and illocutionary acts as the basis for explicitlyrejecting the earlier suggestion that performative utterances are notup for assessment as to truth. What Austin does instead is to arguethat performative utterancesmay be at the service ofillocutionary acts that are apt for assessment as totruth—in particular, acts of stating (see 1962b:133–147).

19. Austin 1946 is ostensibly an engagement with Wisdom 1946 on the topicof knowledge of other minds. Although Austin focuses on general issuesabout knowledge, he also draws on the general discussion in makingsome interesting and distinctive proposals about knowledge of otherminds (see Austin 1946: 103–116).

20. For example, Austin writes: “Surely, if what has so been saidis correct, then we are often right to say weknow even incases where we turn out subsequently to have been mistaken—andindeed we seem always, or practically always, liable to bemistaken” (1946: 98).

21. Austin focuses on the slightly unusual presentation of such anargument in Ayer 1940, together with some consideration of itsdevelopment in Price 1932, as well as the connected discussion inWarnock 1953. Austin’s explicit aim is to undermine one form ofargument, in a small number of particular presentations. However, hetakes the texts that he considers to be “…the bestavailable expositions of the approved reasons for holding theorieswhich are at least as old as Heraclitus…” (1962a: 1), andhe expresses the hope that some of the arguments and methods that heemploys may have wider applicability. However, it is a legitimatesource of complaint that Austin doesn’t give the argument thathe considers the best possible run for its money, and doesn’tconsider closely related and more convincing arguments. For example,Austin fails to consider arguments based upon the apparent possibilityof hallucinations that are induced by brain manipulation and thatperfectly match (are indistinguishable from) genuine cases ofperception. For discussion see Martin ms.

22. Austin’s position is a clear precursor of forms ofdisjunctivism about perception, as developed for example in Hinton1973, Martin 1997, McDowell 1982, and Snowdon 1981. However, Idon’t think that Austin can be read straightforwardly as aproto-disjunctivist. A minimal commitment of disjunctivism isrejection of the more general principle that it follows from the factthat twoexperiences are indiscriminable on the basis ofintrospection (contrast: theobjects of two experiences areindiscriminable) to their subject that the experiences are of the samefundamental kind (contrast: have objects of the same fundamentalkind). And as far as I know, Austin doesn’t clearly andexplicitly reject the general principle. He therefore leaves somewhatopen that an argument for sense-data, or against his favored view ofperception, might be mounted on the basis of the more generalprinciple. And to that extent, he isn’t (clearly and explicitly)a disjunctivist about sensory experience. See Soteriou 2009.

23. Austin seems later to withdraw, or at least to weaken, the claim hereabout “intentionally”, perhaps due in part to theinfluence of G. E. M. Anscombe. See Austin 1966: 283–285.

24. Austin appears to endorse the following style of account. Anaggravating modifier is (normally) correctly applicable toactions of typeA when and only when the followingtwo conditions are met: (a) the piece of machinery targetedby the modifier isnot involved in normal or standard (freeand responsible) instances ofA; and (b) the piece ofmachinery targeted by the modifieris involved in thisparticular instance ofA. Where an application failscondition (a) and meets condition (b), it is liable to represent to anaudience that the piece of machinery in question isnotinvolved in normal or standard instances ofA. Similarly, anexcusing modifier is (normally) correctly applicable toinstances of action typeA when and only when the followingtwo conditions are met: (a) the piece of machinery targeted by themodifieris involved in normal or standard (free andresponsible) instances ofA; and (b) the piece of machinerytargeted by the modifier isnot involved in this particularinstance ofA. Where an application fails condition (a), itis liable to represent that the piece of machinery in questionis involved in normal and standard (free and responsible)instances of typeA. Where such an application meetscondition (b), it’s liable to represent that machinery whichnormally serves to underpin free and responsible actions of the typein question is not operative in the present instance. See 1957:189–193; 1966.

25. Austin in effect allows (for the sake of argument) that in cases inwhich we would take (i) “S canA” to betrue, we would also be prepared to take to be true (ii)“S canA, ifS chooses to”.However, Austin rejects both Moore’s claims (iii) that itfollows that the conditional claim made using “IfSchooses toA,S canA” is true and(iv) that it follows that the conditional claim made using “IfS chooses toA,S willA” istrue. In both cases, Austin’s point is very simple. As Austinunderstands the claims in (iii) and (iv), both claims—ashypothetical or causal conditionals—ought to contrapose. Thus,if Moore’s proposal were correct, then we ought to be in aposition to derive from (i) and/or (ii) the following: (v) “IfS can’tA, it’s not the case thatS chooses toA” and (vi) “IfSdoesn’tA, it’s not the case thatSchooses toA”. However, it seems obvious that neither(v) nor (vi) follows from (i) or (ii). Ergo, according to Austin, weshould reject that claims that (iii) and (iv) follow from (i) and(ii), and with them Moore’s pretensions to have avoided theproblem posed to (i) by determinism.

However, there is a flaw in Austin’s argument, arising from itsdependence on contraposition. On the most natural construal, theconditionals comprising Moore’s proposal are subjunctiveconditionals, for example, “If it were the case thatSchose toA, then it would be the case thatS couldA.” However, subjunctive conditionals do notcontrapose. From “If it were not the case that I took thehomeopathic remedy, then I would have been ill for two weeks” itdoes not follow that this is true: “If I had not been ill fortwo weeks, then I would have taken the homeopathic remedy”.Nonetheless, although Austin’s direct argument fails, at leastas directed against a subjunctive Moore, it is plausible that he isanyway right to reject at least Moore’s claim about (iii). Morepressing against that claim is the credibility of Austin’scounter-proposal, on which “S canA, ifS chooses to” is construed as “S can(A ifS chooses to)”, rather than as “IfS were to choose toA, then it would be the casethatS couldA”. That is, it is more plausibleto understand the claim as one about our abilities to act on ourchoices, than as one about what abilities we would possess were we tomake certain choices. After all, it’s implausible to supposethat one’s choices bear in that way on whether or not onepossesses the ability to implement them. Moore’s claim about(iv), detached from its dependence on (iii), is a special case of thesecond proposal of Moore’s that Austin considers.