Though little known in the Anglophone world, and largely forgotteneven in the Germanic world, August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757-1836) was apivotal thinker in the era of classical German philosophy from Kant toHegel. No thinker from that fertile period has been more unjustlyneglected. He wrote some acute and highly-regarded reviews of Kant,and he corresponded with Kant about the philosophy of mathematics.^[1] Kant's reply to Rehberg's objections is oneof his most important explanations of his mathematical doctrines.^[2] Such, indeed, was Rehberg's grasp of Kant thatJ.B. Jachmann, Kant's friend and biographer, regarded him as“the finest head among all your students.”^[3] But Rehberg was much more than a Kantian epigone. He also made anoriginal contribution to the pantheism controversy, where he stakedout his own positionvis-à-vis Jacobi, Mendelssohn,Herder and Kant; and he wrote an influential critique of Reinhold'sElementarphilosophie, which was a potent source of theskepticism surrounding neo-Kantian foundationalism in the early 1790s.All these facts are sufficient to give Rehberg a notable, if minor,place in the intellectual pantheon of his age. They are not, however,the main reason for remembering him.

Rehberg's historical importance lies chiefly in his critique of theFrench Revolution. In the early 1790s he became renowned as itsforemost conservative critic. He was the chief spokesman for theso-called ‘Hannoverian Whigs’, a group of conservativewriters based in Göttingen who defended the oldStändesstaat (i.e., a state based on the old societyof estates) against revolutionary ideology.^[4] Rehberg provided the philosophical foundations for the politics of theHannoverians, and he saw more clearly than they, or any otherconservative writer of his day, the general philosophical issuesraised by the Revolution. The basis for his attack on revolutionaryideology was his skeptical epistemology, which grew out of his studyof Hume and Kant. For all these reasons, Rehberg has been rightlyregarded as a founding father of German conservatism.^[5]

• 1. Life, Reputation, and Influences
• 2. Early Philosophy
• 3. Political Convictions
• 4. Critique of the Revolution
• 5. Dispute with Kant
• 6. Rehberg and the Historicist Tradition
• Bibliography
  • Primary Sources: Rehberg's Chief Works
  • Secondary Sources
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life, Reputation, and Influences

In the few cases Rehberg has been recognized, his reputation has notbeen fairly assessed. He has been described as “next toFriedrich Gentz, the ablest literary opponent of the French Revolutionin Germany”.^[6] But such a tribute does not do him fulljustice, for the comparison should really be to the advantage ofRehberg, who was politically wiser and philosophically deeper thanGentz. To some scholars, Rehberg has seemed a pale German imitationof Edmund Burke, whoseReflections on the Revolution inFrance became extremely popular in Germany in the early 1790s.^[7] It has been indeed customary to stress theindebtedness of the Hannoverians to Burke, as if they were all hismere epigones.^[8] Here again, though, Rehberg has been donean injustice. He wrote his critique of the Revolution before Burke,and it is superior to Burke's in its philosophical content. AlthoughRehberg's writing has none of the rhetoric of Burke's, it makes up forits lack of style with greater substance. Unlike Burke, Rehbergrealized that it was pointless to indulge in diatribe, no matter howflashy or brilliant, and that what was needed amid the passion andpartisanship of revolutionary politics was sober and solid argument.

Rehberg's early articles on the French Revolution, which werepublished in theAllgemeine Literatur Zeitung, the mostprominent journal of the day, quickly won him a national reputation.In the early 1790s, when pro-revolutionary sentiment swept throughGermany, Rehberg stood out as an articulate spokesman for theconservative cause. He seemed to show that a case could be made forconservatism, that it was intellectually respectable to honor thehistorical traditions of the old German states. Apart from theimmediate effect of his early articles, Rehberg's critique of theRevolution had a more lasting influence, and in two basic respects.First, by criticizing the abstract idealism of the radicals, and bystressing the importance of historical continuity for social andpolitical stability, Rehberg made himself an important figure in thedevelopment of historicism. Second, as the close friend of Karl vonStein, the leader of the Prussian Reform movement, Rehberg's thinkinghad a direct effect on the politics of his age. Though Stein andRehberg later fell out, Stein always acknowledged his great debts to Rehberg.^[9]

Rehberg was born in 1757 into a middle class Protestant family. Hisfather was a secretary for the estates of Calenberg, one of theduchies of Hannover. Although Rehberg aspired to an academic career,he was foiled in his ambitions. A plan to get him a teaching post atthe BerlinRitterakademie was thwarted by no less thanFrederick the Great, who turned him down on the grounds that royalpractice was to hire only cooks from Hannover. After a humiliatingfour years teaching German to Englishmen, he became in 1783 thesecretary to the Duke of York, who was then bishop of Osnabrück.So impressed was the Duke with Rehberg's abilities that he made him in1786 a secretary to the HannoverianGeheime Ratskollegium (thesecret counsel). TheRatskollegium consisted in aristocrats,though its affairs were usually conducted by bourgeois secretarieslike Rehberg, who were denied any vote. It was one of the tragediesof Rehberg's career that his onerous duties gave him little time forphilosophy. Hence his writings are scattered and occasional, andsometimes lack precision and polish. For the same reason, he nevergave a systematic exposition of his philosophy.

It was a striking curiosity of Rehberg's cultural milieu that hisfather was a close friend of Johann Adolf Schlegel, the father ofAugust Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, two founding spirits ofRomanticism. The families would often meet, and so the little Rehbergwould often romp with the Schlegel kids. As it happened, Rehberg'syounger sister Caroline became the first love of Friedrich Schlegel,who immortalized her as Luise in hisLucinde. During one ofthe family outings, Caroline sketched a drawing of the young FriedrichSchlegel, which now introduces the critical edition of his works.^[10] If the Rehbergs inspired the Schlegels, theSchlegels did little for Rehberg. Known for his dry, sober andpuritanical temperament, Rehberg distrusted the self-indulgence andlibertinism of Romanticism. He always kept his critical distance fromRomanticism when it spread throughout Germany in the early 1800s. Thebest indicator of his attitude toward Romanticism is his review ofsome of Adam Müller's writings, in which he deplored theirmysticism and obscurantanism.^[11]

Rehberg's early interests were in philosophy and literature ratherthan politics. Intellectually precocious, he learned to read Greek,Latin, Italian, Spanish, French and English before he was fifteen.From 1774 to 1777 he attended the University of Göttingen, thenone of the main centers of intellectual life in Germany. Findinglittle inspiration from thePopularphilosophie then prevalentin Göttingen, Rehberg resolved to educate himself, and did so bystudying Leibniz and Spinoza on his own. One hallmark of Rehberg'sintellectual character—central for his philosophy and politics—washis skepticism, which he formed in his earliest years. When he wasonly fourteen, he had doubts about Christianity, and soon became anunbeliever, which he remained for the rest of his life. Hisskepticism soon extended to metaphysics itself. He had his doubtsabout Leibniz and Spinoza, because their systems rested uponquestionable and indemonstrable first principles. In 1779 he wrote anessay for a competition organized by the Berlin Academy, where he tooka skeptical position regarding metaphysics in general.^[12]Although he argued that Leibniz's system was the best defense againstSpinozism and skepticism, he also strongly suggested that it was by nomeans an adequate defense. The only reason he defended Leibniz, helater confessed, is that the Berlin Academy was dominated byLeibnizians, who would never have awarded a prize critical of their founder.^[13] His real convictions were that Spinoza'ssystem is the epitome of abstract thinking, though it suffers fromirresolvable problems that demonstrate the inadequacies of all metaphysics.^[14]

Three philosophers had a formative influence on Rehberg'sintellectual development. He greatly admired Hume, a favourite authoramong Hannoverian circles, for his skepticism.^[15] It wasfrom Hume that Rehberg most probably learned how skepticism couldserve the cause of political conservatism. Another crucial influencewas Justus Möser, so-calledadvocatus patriae, fameddefender of theKleinstaat and seminal influence onhistoricism. When Rehberg did his apprenticeship as an Hannoverianbureaucrat, he was sent to Osnabrück, where he met Möser,who soon became his “fatherly friend”. It was Möserwho taught him to appreciate the traditions and workings of theKleinstaat, “the basic principles of [German] civilsociety as they prevailed before the French Revolution”.^[16] Last but not least, Rehberg'sskepticism was greatly abetted and strengthened by his study of Kant.Although his skepticism was already ripening in the late 1770s, beforethe publication of the firstKritik, Kant greatly assistedRehberg in formulating his own skepticism.^[17] He fullyendorsed Kant's critique of rationalist metaphysics, accepted hisaccount of the limits of human knowledge, and greatly admired hismoral philosophy. However, for reasons we shall soon see, he tookissue with Kant's attempt to extend his moral philosophy into thepolitical world.

2. Early Philosophy

The basis of Rehberg's critique of the Revolution was his earlyphilosophical views, which he developed from the late 1770s to theearly 1790s. It has been a mistake of traditional scholarship onRehberg that it attempts to compartimentalize his thought, separatinghis philosophical and political thinking.^[18] No one wouldhave been more astonished by such an artificial separation thanRehberg himself, who, in his retrospective account of his writings inthe introduction to hisSämmtliche Schriften, stressed thecentrality of his general philosophical principles. Apart from theirimportance for his politics, Rehberg's early philosophical viewsdeserve attention in their own right. Rehberg staked out a unique andoriginal position amid the controversies of his age.

Like so many intellectuals who came of age in the 1780s, the youngRehberg's intellectual landscape was formed by the pantheismcontroversy. This controversy began in 1785 when Friedrich HeinrichJacobi proclaimed in hisBriefe über die Lehre von Spinozato a stunned public that Lessing had been a Spinozist. Jacobi usedthis juicy bit of gossip to make a provocative philosophical point:that all rational enquiry, of which Lessing was such a eminentexemplar, ends in the atheism and fatalism of Spinozism. The only wayto save oneself from such atheism and fatalism, Jacobi suggested, wasto take a “saltomortale”, a leap of faithin a personal God and freedom. Hence Jacobi presented hiscontemporaries with a dilemma: either a rational atheism anda-moralism or an irrational theism and morality. There could be nocomfortable middle path: rational demonstrations of the essentialbeliefs of morality and religion. Jacobi's dilemma was a profoundchallenge to the German Enlightenment orAufklärung, whoseultimate article of faith was that there must be some rationalfoundation for our moral and religious beliefs. The effect ofJacobi's book on the German intellectual stage was like “abombshell”. Within the next year, Kant, Fichte, Herder,Reinhold and Mendelssohn would write responses to it. Virtually everyyoung romantic—Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Hölderlin andSchleiermacher—would take a stand in the ensuing debate.

The young Rehberg too was drawn into the vortex of the pantheismcontroversy. Although his skepticism began in the late 1770s, heformulated much of his philosophy in response to the issues it raised.His contribution to the controversy were his reviews of Jacobi andHerder in theAllgemeine Literatur Zeitung, and his 1787tractÜber das Verhältnis der Metaphysik zu der Religion.^[19] In these writings Rehberg continues todevelop his skepticism, which now became his settled position. Inthis task he was greatly assisted by his close study of Kant'scritical philosophy. Rehberg agreed with some of Kant's centralcritical teachings: that pure reason cannot know anything without theaid of sense experience, and that it is impossible for the senses toknow anything beyond appearances. He found Kant's critique ofdogmatic metaphysics compelling, and even defended Kant againstEberhard and the old dogmatic Wolffians.^[20] He rejected,however, Kant's solution to the pantheism controversy: the concept ofpractical faith, the defense of religious belief on the basis ofpractical reason. While Rehberg agreed with Kant that the onlyjustification of religion is practical,^[21] he could notaccept that a practical justification has its basis in reason alone.The only practical justification of religion was political: itsutility in maintaining order among the people. A more educated man,however, did not need religious faith to love virtue and do his duty.Rehberg affirmed an austere stoic ethic, which demanded acting on dutyalone, regardless of personal happiness. Like many of hiscontemporaries, he held that the doctrine of moral faith violatedKant's own strictures about the autonomy of morals. The moral lawdemands acting for the sake of duty alone, regardless of supernaturalrewards and punishments.

Throughout the pantheism controversy, Rehberg maintained hisskeptical attitude toward all religious belief. Such skepticism wasunique, his original contribution to the controversy. All his fellowdisputants— Kant, Herder, Jacobi, Mendelssohn, Goethe, Novalis,Schleiermacher, Hölderlin—affirmed some kind of religion,whether theism or pantheism. Although Rehberg agreed with Jacobi thatall metaphysics ends in Spinozism, he did not take this as proof forpantheism, still less as reason for asalto mortale intotheism. Since he rejected all metaphysics as empty speculation, hedid not think that reason obliges us to accept pantheism, let alonetheism. Metaphysics could never justify theism, Rehberg argued,because it at best establishes that there is a first cause of things,but never that this first cause is a personal being with understandingand will.^[22] Although we can attribute understanding andwill to God, we have to realize that such attributes are onlyanthropomorphisms that are true for us and never for things-in-themselves.^[23] When his friend J.J. Engel laterasked him “Do you want to reduce all religion down topoetry?”, Rehberg did not demur; his only qualification was thatpoetry sometimes has a moral worth.^[24]

Already inÜber das Verhältnis, published twoyears before the Revolution, some of Rehberg's conservative views makea brief appearance. His skepticism was beginning to bear politicalresults. It is dangerous, he argues, to assume that reason is thebasis for civil administration, because it leads to unwarrantedexpectations. The everyday administration of the state often rests onad hoc or arbitrary decisions, and it is impossible to expectall of them to be based on some rational standard. Since conflictbetween people is inevitable, even in a purely rational constitutionsome things have to be decided on the basis of force alone.^[25] Rehberg was also convinced of the necessity of elite rule, of theneed for someone to make judgements about what is in the best interestof everyone. What is in the best interests of a state is a matter ofspecialized knowledge, which is not the concern of every man.^[26]

After participating in the pantheism controversy, Rehberg made hismark in other philosophical controversies of his day. In the early1790s he wrote several reviews for theAllgemeine LiteraturZeitung of Karl Leonhard Reinhold'sElementarphilosophie,which had been at the centre stage of the new debates surroundingKant's critical philosophy.^[27] Reinhold'sElementarphilosophie was a radical form of foundationalism,whose basic aim was to derive all the results of Kant's philosophyfrom a single self-evident first principle. The crucial question forReinhold's contemporaries concerned the very possibility of suchfoundationalism. Is it possible to found all knowledge upon a singlefirst principle? Given Rehberg's skepticism, it should not besurprising that he took a negative stand on this basic question. Inhis January 1791 review of Reinhold'sBeyträge zurBerichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der Philosophen,the chief exposition of theElementarphilosophie, Rehbergsketched his misgivings about foundationalism. It is striking thathis chief objections are strictly Kantian, coming straight out of theKritik der reinen Vernunft itself. Rehberg implies thatReinhold is guilty of ignoring Kant's own strictures about the limitsof knowledge; it is as if he were insinuating that Reinhold wouldbetter have heeded Kant's advice to limit himself to popularizing thecritical philosophy. The problem with Reinhold's philosophy, Rehbergargues, is that it begins with definitions, ignoring Kant's warningsthat definitions should end rather than begin philosophy. Reinholdneglected Kant's teaching that there is a fundamental difference inkind between the methods of mathematics and those of philosophy.While mathematical definitions can construct their objects inintuition, philosophical definitions have no such advantages. What wederive from a definition depends on how we interpret it, on what weread into it in the first place; and there are all kinds ofinterpretations of the same definition, so no basis of unanimityshould be expected simply by beginning with a definition, no matterhow simple and unproblematic. The chief theme of Rehberg'sreview—and indeed theleitmotif of all his politicalthought— is contained in his remark that “a definition need notcontain a criterion of that which falls under it” (202).Rehberg develops this remark so that it becomes an objection againstany attempt to apply general principles of philosophy to the practicalworld (205-6). To apply a general first principle, it is necessary tohave a criterion to show the subordinate principles to which itapplies; but there are no such criteria, because how we apply aprinciple is a matter of judgment, which, as Kant demonstrated, has no criteria.^[28] As one might suspect, Rehberg's argument hereis politically motivated, because he singles out Reinhold as one ofthose philosophers who think that his first principles are guidelinesfor the social and political world (204). The general conclusion ofRehberg's reasoning could not be more expressly political:“...the whole system of education and culture of man that shouldbe based on scientific insight is false in theory and impossible inexecution.” (205).

In the rest of his reviews, Rehberg doggedly pursued Reinhold'sargument throughout theBeyträge, showing preciselyhow his principles are insufficient to derive even the most basicresults of Kant's philosophy. We cannot begin to reconstruct here thedetails of his arguments.^[29] Suffice it to say thatRehberg's reviews made an impact on his contemporaries, not leastReinhold himself, who fell into a fit of depression after reading them.^[30] Rehberg's articles had made a great contributiontoward skepticism about foundationalism, which would soon have aprofound impact on the development of Romanticism.

The net result of Rehberg's participation in the philosophicalcontroversies of the late 1780s and early 1790s was a deeperskepticism. There were two basic themes behind his skepticism.First, his adoption of Kant's critical thesis that we cannot knowthings-in-themselves, and that all knowledge is limited toappearances. Second, Rehberg's insistence that, even within the realmof appearances, there is a fundamental chasm between the universal andparticular, between what we think and what we sense. There were inturn two aspects behind this latter dualism: that the universalconcepts oftheoretical reason cannot sufficiently explain ordescribe something particular; and that there is no criterion by whichto apply the universal principles ofpractical reason toordinary life. It was this latter aspect of the second theme, whichwas essentially an argument in behalf of the necessity of judgment tosolve the basic problems of politics, that was decisive for Rehberg'spolitical philosophy.

3. Political Convictions

Rehberg formed his political convictions early, long before theRevolution. Like all the Hannoverians, the inspiration for hispolitics came from the British constitution.^[31]Hannoverian admiration for the British constitution is not surprising,given that Britian had long standing dynastic relations with the Houseof Hannover. But there were other sources for this admiration, all ofthem, ironically, perfectly French. Rehberg and the Hannoverians hadread their Voltaire, Montesquieu and Jean Louis De Lolme, who had allpraised the English constitution, making it their model for moderngovernment and their antidote to absolutism. Like their Frenchforbears, the Hannoverians admired the British constitution for itsmixture of modern freedom and ancient institutions. The British hadpreserved their monarchy, their aristocracy and the ancient role ofParliament as a representative institution; but they had alsoliberalized these institutions by granting toleration, freedom ofspeech, and the right of commoners to hold office and participate ingovernment. The great strength of the British constitution, in theHannoverian view, is that it served as a bulwark against the two chiefdangers of the modern political world: radical democracy and monarchicabsolutism. The British constitution wisely limited the franchise tothe aristocracy and wealthy bourgeoisie, which saved their system fromochlocracy; but it also ensured that the king had to govern with theco-operation of parliament. Contrary to Montesquieu and De Lolme,however, the Hannoverians did not see the balance of power, the systemof checks and balances, as the reason for the success of the Britishsystem; they found it instead in the British party system, whichthey admired for two grounds: it organized politicans into effectivegroups in behalf of the public good, and it avoided corruption andcomplacency through opposition.^[32]

Although Rehberg's conservative views were formed before theRevolution, his early reaction to events in France was not hostile.He was sympathetic to the moderate French reformers in the NationalAssembly, and he was hostile to royalists who insisted that Francereturn to the days of absolute rule. Unlike Burke, he refused towhitewash theancien régime, and he fully recognizedthat, before the Revolution, France had been in desperate need ofsocial and political reform. Its taxes fell heavily on the poor, itsaristocrats had undeserved privileges, and its monarchs had ruled bywhim. Like all the Hannoverians, Rehberg's great hope was that Francewould evolve toward something like the British constitution, that itwould become something like a Parliament along the Seine. He knewthat France and Britian were very different societies, havingdifferent languages, traditions and values, and that it was impossiblefor one country to adopt wholesale the constitution of another.Nevertheless, he still hoped that the Estates General could becomesomethinglike the British parliament. If onlyFrench aristocrats could be more like their British cousins, and ifonly Louis XVI could be persuaded to limits his powers like GeorgeIII. When, however, it became clear that the Constituent Assembly wasbent on more radical democratic and egalitarian changes, Rehberg'ssympathy transformed into antipathy. His opposition became resolute,even passionate, when he saw that the French were ready to importthese radical changes into Germany.

Despite his implacable hostility to radical democracy andegalitarianism, Rehberg's general stance toward the Revolution, asthat of the Hannoverians in general, is best described as reformconservatism. Its task was to walk the fine middle path betweenrevolution and reaction. Rehberg disapproved of the reactionaries inGermany no less than the revolutionaries in France. He realized thatthe expectations aroused by the Revolution made it impossible toreturn to the old authoritarian ways.^[33]The only means to preserve the old order against revolutionary fermentwas through timely reforms. Reform from above should placate anddampen the revolutionary demands coming from below. The best wayforward, he believed, was for the GermanKleinstaat to evolvein the direction of the English Parliament. The estates should becomeagain what they had been in the medieval past: representative bodiesthat could check the power of kings and serve the interests of thepublic. Given Rehberg's mistrust of democracy and egalitarianism, itis perhaps going too far to describe his reform program as “oneof constitutional advance under the disguise of antiquarian claims”.^[34] Nevertheless, when we consider hisliberal values and contempt for reactionaries, it is necessary toadmit that there is some measure of truth to this description.

Although Rehberg and the Hannoverians were eager to uphold thetraditional order against the radical currents of the Revolution, itis also important to be clear about just what kind of order theywanted to preserve. They were sharply critical of theancienrégime of Friedrich II's Prussia and of Louis XVI's France.They feared and condemned the despotic power of absolute monarchs,which they saw as threats to the traditional liberties of theestates. Their sympathies were for the pluralistic structure of theoldKleinstaat, where each locality or province had itstraditional laws and customs, and where the estates gave some degreeof representation. The Hannoverians saw the constitution of their ownElectorate as the norm for the GermanKleinstaat. In the lateeighteenth century the Electorate of Hannover still had a thrivingaristocracy, a pliable peasantry, and a still nascent middle class.The government was still in the hands of theStände, i.e.,governing committees representing clergy, town and landed interests.If these could only be reformed along the lines of the BritishParliament, Rehberg believed, German states would not have to fear theexcesses of absolutism or radical democracy.

The core of Rehberg's reform program came with his ideas aboutreforming theStände. In the past theStände had been dominated by aristocratic cliques who wereconcerned chiefly with their own interests rather than the publicgood. They would quarrel constantly with the princes to preservetheir old privileges. The best positions were held by aristocrats,who alone had voting rights. Despite these defects, Rehberg believedthat theStände still had a valuable role to perform inthe modern state, and that it would be a disaster to replace them witha bureaucracy. Whereas a bureacracy fostered a spirit of obedienceand order, theStände were open to discussion and debateabout the public interest. Its members were not beholden to amonarch, but the interests of their locality and constituency. If theStände were to survive in the modern era, they would haveto respond more directly to their constituency, work moreco-operatively with the monarch, and hold regular meetings to discussand debate public affairs. Most importantly, they would have to beaccessible to the bougeoisie as well as the aristocracy, so that men oftalent could have the opportunity to rise to the top. AlthoughRehberg wanted theStände to be more representativeinstitutions, he still wanted to limit access to them. He feareddirect representation of people—the slippery slope toward the dreadeduniversal franchise— and advocated representation on the basis ofproperty. His chief demand for reform is thatLandstandschaft—the right to participate and vote incommittees—be extended to anyone who owned land and not simply to thetraditional aristocracy. Hence a bourgeois purchaser of traditionalaristocratic land could now be accepted into theStände.Such a proposal is very modest and cautious; but it was also intendedonly for the near future; for Rehberg also advocated, though for themore distant future, the participation of the peasantry in the estates.^[35]

Prima facie it is strange to find Rehberg, a burgher whosetalents were thwarted by the aristocracy, to be such an advocate ofits preservation. It seems as if he were a humble and obedientservant in his politics as well as in his bureacratic work. Yetaristocracy was fundamental to Rehberg's whole political outlook.Aristocracy was natural for him, given his insistence that rights andobligations are inherited, handed down from one generation to another(see below, section 4). More importantly, aristocracy was his bulwarkagainst major fears: democracy and egalitarianism. The chief dangerto democracy is that it could lead to ochlocracy, government by themob. It was axiomatic for Rehberg that all government had to bemeritocratic, and he could see no way of ensuring this principle in aradically democratic and equalitarian society. He believed firmly inthe value of a social and political hierarchy, the importance ofmaintaining class differences between people.^[36] Classdifferences were in his view both desirable and inevitable: desirable,because they allow merit to rule; and inevitable, because people havemore or less merit or talent according to circumstances, temperamentand birth.

4. Critique of the Revolution

Rehberg's critique of revolutionary ideology was based upon hisgeneral skepticism toward reason. He worked out his criticismsgradually and on scattered occasions from 1789 to 1792 in his reviewsfor theAllgemeine Literatur Zeitung. He later revised andcollected these reviews, publishing them in 1793 under the titleUntersuchungen über die Französische Revolution.^[37] This work stands as one of the bestGerman critiques of the French Revolution. In fundamental respects itlaid the groundwork for German conservatism. Its significance wasimmediately recognized by Fichte, who devoted much effort to itsrefutation in hisBeiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile desPublikums über die französische Revolution.

For Rehberg, the Revolution was a failed experiment in idealism, amisguided attempt by French radicals to recreate society and stateaccording to the principles of reason. There lay a fundamentalfallacy behind this experiment: the belief that the principles ofreason are guidelines for concrete political practice, that they areblueprints to reconstruct all society and the state. It was thisbelief, Rehberg argues, that sanctioned the frenzy of destructionbehind the Revolution, the eagerness to abolish all the traditionalpolitical institutions of France. Since the French radicals believedthat the principles of reason mandate a specific kind of constitution,and since traditional French institutions were very far from thatideal, they held that these institutions arecontrary toreason, so that it was obligatory to abolish them. The chief fallacybehind revolutionary ideology, therefore, was itshyperrationalism, its belief that reason by itself dictatespolitical practice. Hence Rehberg made it his chief business toexpose this fallacy. In his many writings on the Revolution he arguedemphatically and repeatedly that reason has no such powers. Althoughhe accepted that pure reason does determine the general principles ofmorality, he denied that it is by itself sufficient to dictatepolitical practice.^[38] Reason by itself demands only thatour principles are just and universal, applying without exception toeveryone alike; but such principles are indifferent regarding thespecific form of a constitution; they determine nothing aboutwhich laws are just and universal in the specific circumstancesof a country. On their own, the general principles of reason areconsistent with monarchy, democracy or aristocracy. Which form ofgovernment is best can be determined by experience alone, by seeing whichlaws have the greatest utility under specific circumstances.

It was one of Rehberg's central themes that the gap between theoryand practice, between general principle and specific constitution, hasto be bridged by judgment. Judgment is the special faculty andprovince of the statesman. Its task is to determine how best to applythe principles of reason under specific circumstances. It shouldnever be confused simply with reason, the intellectual power ofdetermining general rules; for, as Kant taught in the firstKritik,^[39] judgment is that faculty that determinesthe application of rules and therefore does not stand under any ruleitself. Judgment, however, is no easy task: there are many ways ofapplying the same principles; and the consequences of applying themhave to be weighed against one another. Judgment is a faculty thatimproves with age and experience, and that sometimes requirestechnical expertise. The shortcoming of the French radicals is thatthey had underestimated judgment as they had overestimated reason.They assumed that each principle involves the criterion for itsapplication, and that it should be applied in just one unique way,regardless of the circumstances.

Recognizing the role of judgment in politics means for Rehbergthat another fundamental tenet of revolutionary ideology collapses:the principle of the autonomy of reason, i.e., the belief that eachindividual alone has the power and right to determine how to act inthe state (15-17). Rousseau and Kant are right to claim that reason isinalienable, and that each individual is sovereign in having the powerand right to ascertain general moral principles. But this does notgive them, Rehberg argued, the power and right to determine how toapply these principles in specific circumstances. Since knowing howto apply these principles is a matter of judgment, and since judgmentdepends on experience and expertise, only a few qualified individualswill be able to determine the best form of a constitution and the lawsof a country. Hence, in these cases, the individual should alienatehis powers of judgment to those who are more qualified. Rehberg'sadvocacy of the role of judgment in politics thus became the basis forhis defense of elite rule.

A central pillar of Rehberg's conservatism was his defense oftradition. The basis for that defense was, again, his critique ofreason. Since reason by itself cannot determine the specific form ofa constitution, it never lays down a mandate to abolish theestablished institutions of a country, and so it is permissible forthe statesman to follow tradition. Sometimes, Rehberg argued, it isnot onlypermissable but alsoobligatory for thestatesman to respect the traditions and established institutions of a country.^[40] A state is the product of the history of itspeople, of the experience of many generations; and eachgeneration lays down the foundations on which another must build.What our forefathers built grew out of the unique circumstances of thecountry, and it has gradually adapted to them; to abolish it wouldleave us nothing to build upon and make it necessary to createexnihilo. Rehberg's defense of tradition and precedent went evenfurther: he argued that many of our social and moral obligations arethemselves essentially historical, arising from inheritance. No statecould persist for long, he argued, if future generations did not takeover the obligations of past generations, or if children did notassume the duties of their parents (52-53). It was therefore afundamental rule of civil society that children inherit the duties andresponsibilities of their parents. Rehberg knew that this was asomewhat harsh doctrine, because it would mean accepting inequalitiesfrom birth and aristocratic privileges; yet he insisted upon it allthe same:

“Human beings incivil society must be compelled to honor what their parents promisedand began. No state could exist for long if children and other heirswere not made to take the place where the deceased once stood. Whowould want to enter into commitments when the uncertain death of oneof the committed parties released them of all obligations?”(52)

Given Rehberg's critique of rationalism and his respect fortradition, his reaction to social contract doctrine should not besurprising. He condemned it in the sharpest terms. This doctrine notonly assumed that every individual has the power to judge politicalaffairs, but it also seemed to absolve him from all traditionalresponsibilities and obligations. The social contract doctrinefalsely holds, he argued, that we enter society and the state at will,as if we were born free and had some natural criterion by which tojudge them; but we are born into society and the state, and thecriteria by which we judge things are formed by them. We must give upthe assumption, he insisted, that civil rights belong to people bynature; ranks and rights are inherited and depend upon the place insociety into which we are born (62).

Rehberg saw the chief inspiration for French radicalism in theseductive and paradoxical writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (6, 21).It was Rousseau who first advanced the principle of the autonomy ofreason, and who made reason alone the touchstone of politicallegitimacy. His doctrine of the general will meant that everypolitical principle should be tested in the light of reason, oraccording to what an ideally rational person would will. Rehbergfound irresolvable ambiguities in Rousseau's doctrine, which, heclaimed, made its application to the political world impossible.Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of allmade it clear that it was not possible to determine the general willsimply by what people happen to want; the general will was understoodby Rousseau to be a norm that determines what everyone ought to will.But how is it possible to determine what everyone ought to will? And,more importantly,who is to determine it? The ambiguities ofRosseau's doctrine made it ripe for exploitation by Jacobinideologues, who felt justified in “forcing people to befree”.

Another source of revolutionary ideology that became the specialtarget of Rehberg's wrath was physiocratic doctrine. Though thisdoctrine was often associated with absolutism, Rehberg still saw it asa basic influence on radical thinking. He especially disliked what hetook to be the physiocrats' leading principle: that everyone shouldhave the right to do whatever they want as long as they do notinterfere with anyone else. Such a principle laid down the pathtoward “a very crude egoism”. If this were made thegoverning principle of civil society, he argued, then people wouldrecognize no obligations other than to leave others alone; the wholeculture of social virtue would disappear (25-26). The physiocraticsystem also leads to materialism, he believed, because it valueseverything according to its utility, its ability to satisfy our basicneeds. People will regard themselves as machines, who work to eat and eat only to work more(27). Since they show no immediate profit, there will be no point indeveloping our higher powers or in cultivating the arts (28).

5. Dispute with Kant

In the late 1780s, before his encounter with Reinhold, Rehberg tookpart in some of the heated debates surrounding Kant's criticalphilosophy. He was both an admirer and critic of Kant. While hedefended Kant against the polemics of the Wolffians, he also wrote acritical review of the secondKritik, which was widely read inhis day.^[41] But the review of the secondKritik wasonly the first skirmish of a greater battle. Rehberg realized thathis case against revolutionary ideology could triumph only if hedefeated Kant. For Kant's ethical rationalism gave a strongphilosophical foundation for the doctrines of Rousseau, which had beensuch an inspiration for the radicals in France. Some of Kant's basicconcepts—the categorical imperative and moral autonomy— seemedpost facto rationalization for Rousseau's social contracttheory and republicanism. What was only a feeling or intuition inRousseau became a concept or principle in Kant. These implications ofKant's doctrines became explicit in 1793 when Kant published hisfamous ‘Theory-Practice’ essay in theBerlinische Monatsschrift.^[42] Here Kant argued that there is nogap between theory and practice in politics, and that reason ispractical in political as well as moral life. He maintained that theprinciples of morality, which are determined by pure reason alone, arealso binding in politics, and that pure reason provides the basis fora republican constitution involving the principles of liberty,equality and independence. Kant's theses were a direct challenge toRehberg, who had made the gap between theory and practice theleitmotif of his critique of the Revolution. Sooner or later,then, he would have to reckon with the sage of Königsberg. Hisreply to Kant duly appeared in theBerlinischeMonatsschrift in February 1794.^[43]

Rehberg began his essay by expressing his agreement with the basicprinciples of Kant's moral philosophy. Unlike many opponents ofKant's moral theory, Rehberg was not an empiricist in ethics. Heflatly denied that utility could settle matters of right,^[44]and he held that the first principles of morality have to beestablished independent of experience, apart from any knowledge of theconsequences of acting upon them. It was Kant's great merit, Rehbergdeclares, to have shown that the first principle of morality—‘Act so that the maxim of your will becomes a universallaw’—is determinable by pure reason alone. Where Rehbergdisagrees with Kant is in his attempt to establishspecificmoral and political maxims from the first principle of morality. Likemany later critics of Kant, Rehberg maintains that the categoricalimperative is a purely formal principle, insufficient to determine thecontent of our specific duties. The categorical imperative amounts tonothing more than the general demand that our principles beuniversalizable, that they hold for everyone alike without exception,or that we treat like cases alike (117-118). As such it provides amerely negative condition for accepting a moral principle; the problemis that it does not provide a positive criterion to distinguishbetween the many maxims that satisfy this condition. The principle isstill compatible with many different maxims, all of which areuniversalizable.

But why is the categorical imperative such a formal principle? Whycannot it derive any of our more specific duties? Rehberg's argumenthere becomes somewhat blurred and confused. While his intention is toshow that the categorical imperative is a purely formal principle,some of his arguments tend to demonstrate not its formality but theimpossibility of acting according to it in the real empirical world.It is one thing to show that the categorical imperative is notpractical because it cannot determine specific duties; it is anotherthing to show that it is not practical because no one in the realworld could act according to it, whether it derives specific duties ornot. All told, Rehberg's polemic against Kant is an extraordinarymixture of insight and confusion. We can best summarize it in thefollowing points:

• If the categorical imperative is to derive any specificduties, it must tell us how to act in the empirical world. Yet purereason can never determine a priori anything regarding the empiricalworld; hence the categorical imperative cannot determine any of ourspecific duties. Thus, for Rehberg, the dualism between the a prioriand a posteriori in Kant's philosophy entails that the first principleof morality must be formal (119-120).
• Yet this argument seems to suppose that because the categoricalimperative cannot derive the content of a principle—how we should actin specific circumstances—it cannot determine its form—whether it isobligatory, permissible or forbidden. Kant always recognized,however, that the particular content of a maxim has to be derived fromexperience. All that must be derived a priori is its form. Hence onthis score Rehberg's critique missed its mark.
• Kant is right to hold that the first principle of moralityis that man ought to be treated as an end in himself. However, oncewe examine the presuppositions of this principle, it becomes clearthat it is severely limited in its application to the real world.This principle presupposes that everyone has a physical body that istheir exclusive possession, which they are the sole master of, andwhich cannot be used by others as means to their ends. Yet such apresupposition is rarely, if ever, fulfilled in daily life. Topreserve our bodies, it is sometimes necessary for people to use oneanother, to be means for one another's ends (118-119). The Kantianprinciple of morality as an end in itself is true only for a nation ofangels, but not for human beings in the real world who depend on oneanother to survive.
• In his ‘Theory-Practice’ Essay Kant attempts toderive from the categorical imperative the idea of equality before thelaw, or what he calls “the principle of equality”:Each member of a state has rights of coercion in relation toothers. This means that everyone should enjoy equal protectionbefore the law; in other words, if you violate my rights I canprosecute you as you can prosecute me if I violate your rights.Rehberg points out, however, that such a principle does not imply theradical view that everyone has equal rights; it entails only thateveryone's rights must be equally respected, whatever the differencesbetween them might be. The principle is indeed compatible with thegreatest divergence in the extent and kind of rights (124).
• Kant's principle of freedom — Everyone can seekhappiness in their own manner as long as they do not interfere with asimilar quest by others — applies to us only insofar as we areperfectly free beings who can live in complete independence of oneanother. But we are not such beings, because we depend on otherssimply to survive. What should these relations of dependence be?Kant's principles offer no concrete guidance (124).
• All these difficulties with Kant's moral theory show, Rehbergconcluded, that there is a gap between theory and practice, morals andpolitics after all. Kant's principles are either too general, so thatthey do not determine the specific maxims by which we should live, orthey are too idealistic, incapable of application at all to the realworld. If we are to determine our specific duties in the concreteworld, and if we are to determine the best constitution for ourcountry, we have no recourse but considerations of utility. We haveto consider the needs of people in specific circumstances to ascertainwhich laws and policies are most beneficial. In some cases, however,even utility does not work, because we will have to decide betweenpolicies where the utility is indeterminable, incommensurable orequally balanced. In these cases we have no choice but to actaccording to convention or tradition (127).^[45]

6. Rehberg and the Historicist Tradition

Rehberg's importance for the historicist tradition has long beenappreciated by the few scholars who know him. It is scarcelyrecognized, however, among scholars of historicism, who either ignorehim or treat him in a footnote.^[46] In his magisterialEntstehung des Historismus Friedrich Meinecke treated Rehbergen passant, as if he were but a disciple of Möser.^[47] This too is an injustice, since Rehberg wasas great an influence on the historicist tradition as Möserhimself. Though Möser was the more original thinker, Rehberg hada better understanding of its relevance for the post-revolutionaryera. It is surely a telling sign of Rehberg's significance forhistoricism that Friedrich Savigny, the founder of the historicalschool of law, had praised him repeatedly for his critique of theCode Napoleon, the French attempt to impose a rationalconstitution upon the Electorate of Hannover.^[48] Resistanceto theCode Napoleon was the firstcausecélèbre of historicism, its first case in itsbattle against the legal rationalism of the Enlightenment; and in thisrespect Rehberg was Savigny's most weighty precedent. In sum,Rehberg's chief contribution to historicism was making it theantithesis to revolutionary ideology.

We find in Rehberg some standard historicist tropes before theybecame widespread in the nineteenth century. Like Herder andMöser, he taught that each nation is an organic whole, a uniqueindividual, which cannot be reduced down to the mere sum of itsmembers. Each nation has a singular and characteristic spirit(Volksgeist), which pervades every aspect of its life, andwhich persists over the generations. This meant for Rehberg, as laterhistoricists, that moral and political values aresui generisand incommensurable, so that we should not judge one nation or epochby the values of another. Rehberg also shared some of Möser'sskepticism about the natural law tradition, which attempted toformulate universal values or moral standards above all the changes of history.^[49] He too believed that these values often turnedout to be the product of their own time and place, that they restedupon illicit generalizations from the values of one culture.

What was new to Rehberg's historicism was his critique of reason.His skepticism regarding the practical powers of reason gavehistoricism a new firmer foundation, one deeper than that dug byMöser or Herder. The ultimate upshot of his skepticism, as wehave seen, is that there is a gap between theory and practice, betweenreason and conduct, in the realms of morality and politics. Sincereason cannot lay down specific maxims for moral conduct, and since itcannot determine the specific form of a constitution, it proves to bea useless guide to moral and political action. What fills the gapbetween theory and practice is, for Rehberg, nothing less thanhistory. There are two senses in which this is the case. First, wedetermine the specific maxims of our moral conduct, or the properpolitical constitution for a country, only by judging their utility,by seeing how well they fit into their cultural context, which is theproduct of history. Second, we sometimes have to lay aside utilityand determine how to act by precedent and tradition, by learning thecustoms of a culture; but precedent, custom and tradition are alsoresults of history. Both points show, Rehberg believes, that we arenot completely free moral agents who simply choose to become part of aculture, and who choose principles of action based on pure reasonalone; rather, we are born into our culture, which shapes our veryidentity, and which supplies the content for our principles. Wecannot escape our history because it makes us who we are.

It is necessary to be precise, however, about the exact role playedby history in Rehberg's philosophy. The historical strands of histhought have often been exaggerated, as if he completely rejected thenatural law tradition and all rationalism in politics.^[50]Although he was indeed skeptical about many claims made for naturallaw, he never denied its very existence; and although he doubted thatpractical reason determines concrete maxims, he never questioned thatit could lay down the most general principles of morality. Moreexactly, his position is that natural law and practical reason arenecessary, but not sufficient, for moral and political practice.History completes reason, but it does not replace it. This residualrationalism in Rehberg's political thought appears in some of hislater articles on the historical school of law.^[51]Reaffirming the Kantian view that there is an a priori dimension ofright, he argued against the doctrine that all laws are nothing morethan arbitrary commands. In this regard, Fichte's critique of Rehbergis unfair and misses the point.^[52] Rehberg taught not thathistorical traditions determine the standard of right, as Fichteclaimed, but only that they determine how it should be applied anddeveloped in specific circumstances.

It is also important not to exaggerate Rehberg's traditionalism. Hisinsistence on the indispenable role of tradition in political life wasone of the characteristic features of his conservatism. It isimportant to add, though, that his faith in tradition was not that ofa reactionary. He never went so far as to hold that custom andtradition are sacred. He admitted, indeed insisted, that we shouldchange custom and tradition if they become oppressive or inconvenientin changing circumstances.^[53]

Bibliography

Primary Sources: Rehberg's Chief Works

• Sämmtliche Schriften. Hannover: Hahn, 1828-31.Planned to have four volumes, though only three appeared.
• Cato. Basel: Thurneysen, 1780.
• Philosophische Gespräche über das Vergnügen.Nürnberg, 1785.
• Ueber das Verhältnis der Metaphysik zu der Religion.Berlin: Mylius, 1787.
• Untersuchungen über die französische Revolution.Hannover: Ritscher, 1793. 2 vols.
• Ueber den deutschen Adel. Göttingen: Röwer,1803.
• Ueber die Staatsverwaltung deutscher Länder und dieDienerschaft des Regenten. Hannover: Hahn, 1807.
• Ueber den Code Napoleon und dessen Einführung inDeutschland. Hannover: Hahn, 1814.
• Constitutionelle Phantasien eines alten Steuermannes im Sturmedes Jahres 1832. Hamburg, 1832.

Secondary Sources

• Epstein, Klaus, 1966,The Genesis of German Conservatism,Princeton: Princeton University Press; pp. 547–595 are onRehberg.
• Lessing, Kurt, 1910,Rehberg und die französischeRevolution, Freiburg: Bielenfels.
• Mollenhauer, Karl, 1904–05,A.W. Rehberg, einhannoverscher Staatsmann im Zeitalter der Restauration, Blankburgam Harz.
• Ritter, Gerhard, 1931,Stein. Eine Politische Biographie,Berlin: Deutsche Verlags Ansalt.
• Rexius, Gunner, 1911, ‘Studien zur Staatslehre der historischenSchule,Historische Zeitschrift, 107: 513–26.
• Vogel, Ursula, 1972,Konservative Kritik an der bürgerlichenRevolution. August Wilhelm Rehberg, Darmstadt: Luchterhand.
• Weniger, Erich, 1925, ‘Stein und Rehberg’,Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch, 2: 1–124.

Academic Tools

	How to cite this entry.
	Preview the PDF version of this entry at theFriends of the SEP Society.
	Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO).
	Enhanced bibliography for this entry atPhilPapers, with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Rehberg, August. 1787.Ueber das Verhältnis der Metaphysik zu der Religion, scanned fascimile, in PDF.
• Rehberg, August. 1814.Ueber den Code Napoleon und dessen Einführung in Deutschland.

Related Entries

conservatism |Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich |Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy |Rousseau, Jean Jacques