Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was one of the leading figures innatural philosophy and in the field of scientific methodology in theperiod of transition from the Renaissance to the early modern era. As alawyer, member of Parliament, and Queen's Counsel, Bacon wrote onquestions of law, state and religion, as well as on contemporarypolitics; but he also published texts in which he speculated onpossible conceptions of society, and he pondered questions of ethics(Essays) even in his works on natural philosophy (TheAdvancement of Learning).

After his studies at Trinity College, Cambridge and Gray'sInn, London, Bacon did not take up a post at a university, but insteadtried to start a political career. Although his efforts were notcrowned with success during the era of Queen Elizabeth, under James Ihe rose to the highest political office, Lord Chancellor. Bacon'sinternational fame and influence spread during his last years, when hewas able to focus his energies exclusively on his philosophical work,and even more so after his death, when English scientists of the Boylecircle (Invisible College) took up his idea of a cooperativeresearch institution in their plans and preparations for establishingthe Royal Society.

To the present day Bacon is well known for his treatises onempiricist natural philosophy (The Advancement of Learning,Novum Organum Scientiarum) and for his doctrine of the idols,which he put forward in his early writings, as well as for the idea ofa modern research institute, which he described inNovaAtlantis.

• 1. Biography
• 2. Natural Philosophy: Struggle with Tradition
• 3. Natural Philosophy: Theory of the Idols and the System of Sciences
  • 3.1 The Idols
  • 3.2 System of Sciences
  • 3.3 Matter Theory and Cosmology
• 4. Scientific Method: The Project of theInstauratio Magna
• 5. Scientific Method: Novum Organum and the Theory of Induction
• 6. Science and Social Philosophy
• 7. The Ethical Dimension in Bacon's Thought
• Bibliography
  • Major Philosophical Works by Bacon
  • Selected Works on Bacon
  • Other Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Biography

Francis Bacon was born January, 22, 1561, the second child of SirNicholas Bacon (Lord Keeper of the Seal) and his second wife Lady AnneCooke Bacon, daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, tutor to Edward VI and oneof the leading humanists of the age. Lady Anne was highly erudite: shenot only had a perfect command of Greek and Latin, but was alsocompetent in Italian and French. Together with his older brotherAnthony, Francis grew up in a context determined by political power,humanist learning, and Calvinist zeal. His father had built a new housein Gorhambury in the 1560s, and Bacon was educated there for some sevenyears; later, along with Anthony, he went to Trinity College, Cambridge(1573–5), where he sharply criticized the scholastic methods ofacademic training. Their tutor was John Whitgift, in later lifeArchbishop of Canterbury. Whitgift provided the brothers with classicaltexts for their studies: Cicero, Demosthenes, Hermogenes, Livy,Sallust, and Xenophon (Peltonen 2007). Bacon began his studiesat Gray's Inn in London in 1576; but from 1577 to 1578 heaccompanied Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador, on his mission inParis. According to Peltonen (2007):

During his stay in France, perhaps in autumn 1577,Bacon once visited England as the bearer of diplomatic post,delivering letters to Walsingham, Burghley, Leicester, and to theQueen herself.

When his father died in 1579, he returned to England. Bacon's smallinheritance brought him into financial difficulties and since hismaternal uncle, Lord Burghley, did not help him to get a lucrativepost as a government official, he embarked on a political career inthe House of Commons, after resuming his studies in Gray's Inn. In1581 he entered the Commons as a member for Cornwall, and he remaineda Member of Parliament for thirty-seven years. He was admitted to thebar in 1582 and in 1587 was elected as a reader at Gray's Inn. Hisinvolvement in high politics started in 1584, when he wrote his firstpolitical memorandum,A Letter of Advice to Queen Elizabeth. Right from thebeginning of his adult life, Bacon aimed at a revision of naturalphilosophy and—following his father's example—also triedto secure high political office. Very early on he tried to formulateoutlines for a new system of the sciences, emphasizing empiricalmethods and laying the foundation for an applied science (scientiaoperativa). This twofold task, however, proved to be tooambitious to be realized in practice. Bacon's ideas concerning areform of the sciences did not meet with much sympathy from QueenElizabeth or from Lord Burghley. Small expectations on this front ledhim to become a successful lawyer and Parliamentarian. From 1584 to1617 (the year he entered the House of Lords) he was an active memberin the Commons. Supported by Walsingham's patronage, Bacon played arole in the investigation of English Catholics and argued for sternaction against Mary Queen of Scots. He served on many committees,including one in 1588 which examined recusants; later he was a memberof a committee to revise the laws of England. He was involved in thepolitical aspects of religious questions, especially concerning theconflict between the Church of England and nonconformists. In a tractof 1591, he tried to steer a middle course in religious politics; butone year later he was commissioned to write against the Jesuit RobertParson (Jardine and Stewart 1999, p. 125), who had attacked Englishsovereignty.

From the late 1580s onwards, Bacon turned to the Earl of Essex ashis patron. During this phase of his life, he particularly devotedhimself to natural philosophy. He clearly expressed his position in afamous letter of 1592 to his uncle, Lord Burghley:

I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as Ihave moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be myprovince; and if I could purge it of two sorts of rovers, whereof theone with frivolous disputations, confutations, and verbosities, theother with blind experiments and auricular traditions and impostures,hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in industriousobservations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions anddiscoveries; the best state of that province. This, whether it becuriosity, or vain glory, or nature, or (if one take it favourably)philanthropia, is so fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And Ido easily see, that place of any reasonable countenance doth bringcommandment of more wits than of a man's own; which is the thing Igreatly affect. (Bacon 1857–74, VIII, 109)

In 1593 Bacon fell out favor with the queen on account of hisrefusal to comply with her request for funds from Parliament. Althoughhe did not vote against granting three subsidies to the government, hedemanded that these should be paid over a period six, rather thanthree, years. This led Sir Robert Cecil and Sir Walter Raleigh to argueagainst him in Parliament. Bacon's patron, the Earl of Essex, forwhom he had already served as a close political advisor and informer,was not able to mollify the queen's anger over the subsidies; andall Essex's attempts to secure a high post for Bacon(attorney-general or solicitor-general) came to nothing. Nevertheless,the queen valued Bacon's competence as a man of law. He wasinvolved in the treason trial of Roderigo Lopez and later on in theproceedings against the Earl of Essex. In his contribution to theGesta Grayorum (the traditional Christmas revels held inGray's Inn) of 1594–5, Bacon had emphasized the necessity ofscientific improvement and progress. Since he failed to secure forhimself a position in the government, he considered thepossibility of giving up politics and concentrating on naturalphilosophy. It is no wonder, then, that Bacon engaged in many scholarlyand literary pursuits in the 1590s. His letters of advice to the Earlof Rutland and to the Earl of Essex should be mentioned in thiscontext. The advice given to Essex is of particular importance becauseBacon recommended that he should behave in a careful and intelligentmanner in public, above all abstaining from aspiring to militarycommands. Bacon also worked in this phase of his career for thereform of English law. In 1597 his first book was published, theseminal version of hisEssays, which contained only ten pieces(Klein 2004b). His financial situation was still insecure; but hisplan to marry the rich widow Lady Hatton failed because she wassuccessfully courted by Sir Edward Coke. In 1598 Bacon was unable tosell his reversion of the Star Chamber clerkship, so that he wasimprisoned for a short time on account of his debts. His parliamentaryactivities in 1597–98, mainly involving committee work, wereimpressive; but when the Earl of Essex in 1599 took command of theattempt to pacify the Irish rebels, Bacon's hopes sank. Essex didnot solve the Irish question, returned to court and fell from grace, asBacon had anticipated he would. He therefore lost a valuable patron andspokesman for his projects. Bacon tried to reconcile the queen andEssex; but when the earl rebelled against the crown in 1601, he coulddo nothing to help him. The queen ordered Bacon to participate in thetreason trial against Essex. In 1601 Bacon sat in Elizabeth'slast parliament, playing an extremely active role.

Bacon looked forward to the next reign and tried to get in contact withJames VI of Scotland, Elizabeth's successor. During James'reign Bacon rose to power. He was knighted in 1603 and was created alearned counsel a year later. He took up the political issues of theunion of England and Scotland, and he worked on a conception ofreligious toleration, endorsing a middle course in dealing withCatholics and nonconformists. Bacon married Alice Barnhem, theyoung daughter of a rich London alderman in 1606. One year later he wasappointed Solicitor General. He was also dealing with theories of thestate and developed the idea, in accordance with Machiavelli, of apolitically active and armed citizenry. In 1608 Bacon became clerk ofthe Star Chamber; and at this time, he made a review of his life,jotting down his achievements and failures. Though he still was notfree from money problems, his career progressed step by step. In theperiod from 1603 to 1613 Bacon was not only busy within Englishpolitics. He also created the foundations of his philosophical work bywriting seminal treatises which prepared the path for theNovum Organum and for theInstauratio Magna.In 1613 he became Attorney General and began the rise to the peak ofhis political career: he became a member of the Privy Council in 1616,was appointed Lord Keeper of the Great Seal the following year—thus achieving the same position as his father—and was grantedthe title of Lord Chancellor and created Baron of Verulam in 1618. In1621, however, Bacon, after being created Viscount of St Alban, wasimpeached by Parliament for corruption. He fell victim to an intriguein Parliament because he had argued against the abuse of monopolies,indirectly attacking his friend, the Duke of Buckingham, who was theking's favorite. In order to protect Buckingham, the kingsacrificed Bacon, whose enemies had accused him of taking bribes inconnection with his position as a judge. Bacon saw no way out forhimself and declared himself guilty. His fall was contrived byhis adversaries in Parliament and by the court faction, for which hewas a scapegoat to save the Duke of Buckingham not only from publicanger but also from open aggression (Mathews 1996). He lost all hisoffices and his seat in Parliament, but retained his titles and hispersonal property. Bacon devoted the last five years of his life—the famous quinquennium—entirely to his philosophicalwork. He tried to go ahead with his huge project, theInstauratioMagna Scientiarum; but the task was too big for him to accomplishin only a few years. Though he was able to finish important parts oftheInstauratio, the proverb, often quoted in his works,proved true for himself:Vita brevis, ars longa. He died inApril 1626 of pneumonia after experiments with ice.

2. Natural Philosophy: Struggle with Tradition

Bacon's struggle to overcome intellectual blockades and thedogmatic slumber of his age and of earlier periods had to be fought onmany fronts. Very early on he criticized not only Plato, Aristotle andthe Aristotelians, but also humanists and Renaissance scholars such asParacelsus and Bernardino Telesio.

Although Aristotle provided specific axioms for every scientificdiscipline, what Bacon found lacking in the Greek philosopher'swork was a master principle or general theory of science, which couldbe applied to all branches of natural history and philosophy (Klein2003a). For Bacon, Aristotle's cosmology, as well as his theoryof science, had become obsolete and consequently so too had many of themedieval thinkers who followed his lead. He does not repudiateAristotle completely, but he opposes the humanistic interpretation ofhim, with its emphasis on syllogism and dialectics (scientiaoperativa versus textual hermeneutics) and the metaphysicaltreatment of natural philosophy in favor of natural forms (ornature's effects as structured modes of action, not artifacts),the stages of which correspond—in the shape of a pyramid ofknowledge—to the structural order of nature itself.

If any ‘modern’ Aristotelians came near to Bacon, it wasthe Venetian or Paduan branch, represented by Jacopo Zabarella. On theother hand, Bacon criticized Telesio, who—in his view—had only halfway succeeded in overcoming Aristotle'sdeficiencies. Although we find the debate with Telesio in anunpublished text of his middle period (De Principiis atqueOriginibus, secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Coelum orOnPrinciples and Origins According to the Fables of Cupid andCoelum, written in 1612; Bacon V [1889], 461–500), Baconbegan to struggle with tradition as early as 1603. InValeriusTerminus (1603?) he already repudiates any mixture of naturalphilosophy and divinity; he provides an outline of his new method anddetermines that the end of knowledge was “a discovery of alloperations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if it werepossible) to the meanest mechanical practice” (Bacon III [1887],222). He opposes Aristoteliananticipatio naturae, whichfavored the inquiry of causes to satisfy the mind instead of those “as will direct him and give him light to new experiences andinventions” (Bacon III [1887], 232).

When Bacon introduces his new systematic structure of thedisciplines inThe Advancement of Learning (1605), hecontinues his struggle with tradition, primarily with classicalantiquity, rejecting the book learning of the humanists, on the groundsthat they “hunt more after words than matter” (Bacon III[1887], 283). Accordingly, he criticizes the Cambridge Universitycurriculum for placing too much emphasis on dialectical and sophisticaltraining asked of “minds empty and unfraught with matter”(Bacon III [1887], 326). He reformulates and functionally transformsAristotle's conception of science as knowledge of necessarycauses. He rejects Aristotle's logic, which is based on hismetaphysical theory, whereby the false doctrine is implied that theexperience which comes to us by means of our senses (things as theyappear) automatically presents to our understanding things astheyare. Simultaneously Aristotle favors the application ofgeneral and abstract conceptual distinctions, which do not conform tothings as they exist. Bacon, however, introduces his new conception ofphilosophia prima as a meta-level for all scientificdisciplines.

From 1606 to 1612 Bacon pursued his work on natural philosophy,still under the auspices of a struggle with tradition. This tendency isexemplified in the unpublished tractsTemporis partusmasculus, 1603/1608 (Bacon III [1887], 521–31),Cogitata et Visa, 1607 (Bacon III, 591–620),Redargutio Philosophiarum, 1608 (III, 557–85), andDe Principiis atque Originibus…, 1612 (Bacon V [1889],461–500). Bacon rediscovers the Pre-Socratic philosophers forhimself, especially the atomists and among them Democritus as theleading figure. He gives preference to Democritus' natural philosophyin contrast to the scholastic—and thus Aristotelian—focuson deductive logic and belief in authorities. Bacon does not expectany approach based on tradition to start with a direct investigationof nature and then to ascend to empirical and general knowledge. Thiscriticism is extended to Renaissance alchemy, magic, and astrology(Temporis partus masculus), because the ‘methods’of these ‘disciplines’ are based on occasional insights,but do not command strategies to reproduce the natural effects underinvestigation. His criticism also concerns contemporary technicalliterature, in so far as it lacks a new view of nature and aninnovative methodological program. Bacon takes to task the ancients,the scholastics and also the moderns. He not only criticizes Plato,Aristotle, and Galen for these failings, but also Jean Fernel,Paracelsus, and Telesio, while praising the Greek atomists and RogerBacon.

Bacon's manuscripts already mention the doctrine of the idolsas a necessary condition for constitutingscientia operativa.InCogitata et Visa he compares deductive logic as used by thescholastics to a spider's web, which is drawn out of its ownentrails, whereas the bee is introduced as an image ofscientiaoperativa. Like a bee, the empiricist, by means of his inductivemethod, collects the natural matter or products and then works them upinto knowledge in order to produce honey, which is useful for healthynutrition.

In Bacon's follow-up paper,RedargutioPhilosophiarum, he carries on his empiricist project by referringto the doctrine of twofold truth, while inDe Principiis atqueOriginibus he rejects alchemical theories concerning thetransformation of substances in favor of Greek atomism. But in the sametext he sharply criticizes his contemporary Telesio for propagating anon-experimental halfway house empiricism. Though Telesio proves to bea moderate ‘modern’, he clings to the Aristotelianframework by continuing to believe in thequinta essentia andin the doctrine of the two worlds, which presupposes two modes ofnatural law (one mode for the sublunary and another for the superlunarysphere).

3. Natural Philosophy: Theory of the Idols and the System of Sciences

3.1 The Idols

Bacon's doctrine of the idols not only represents a stage inthe history of theories of error (Brandt 1979) but also functions asan important theoretical element within the rise of modern empiricism.According to Bacon, the human mind is not atabula rasa.Instead of an ideal plane for receiving an image of the world in toto,it is a crooked mirror, on account of implicit distortions (Bacon IV[1901], 428–34). He does not sketch a basic epistemology butunderlines that the images in our mind right from the beginning do notrender an objective picture of the true objects. Consequently, we haveto improve our mind, i.e., free it from the idols, before we start anyknowledge acquisition.

As early asTemporis partus masculus, Bacon warns thestudent of empirical science not to tackle the complexities of hissubject without purging the mind of its idols:

On waxen tabletsyou cannot write anything new until you rub out the old. With the mindit is not so; there you cannot rub out the old till you have written inthe new. (Farrington 1964, 72)

InRedargutio Philosophiarum Bacon reflects on his method,but he also criticizes prejudices and false opinions, especially thesystem of speculation established by theologians, as an obstacle to theprogress of science (Farrington 1964, 107), together with anyauthoritarian stance in scholarly matters.

Bacon deals with the idols in the Second Book ofThe Advancementof Learning, where he discussesArts intellectual(Invention, Judgment, Memory, Tradition). In his paragraph on judgmenthe refers to proofs and demonstrations, especially to induction andinvention. When he comes to Aristotle's treatment of thesyllogism, he reflects on the relation between sophistical fallacies(Aristotle,De Sophisticis Elenchis) and the idols (Bacon III[1887], 392–6). Whereas induction, invention, and judgmentpresuppose “the same action of the mind”, this is not truefor proof in the syllogism. Bacon, therefore, prefers his owninterpretatio naturae, repudiatingelenchesas modes of sophistical ‘juggling’ in order to persuadeothers inredargutions (“degenerate and corrupt use… for caption and contradiction”). There is no findingwithout proof and no proof without finding. But this is not true forthe syllogism, in which proof (syllogism: judgment of the consequent)and invention (of the ‘mean’ or middle term) are distinct.The caution he suggests in relation to the ambiguities inelenches is also recommended in face of theidols:

there is yet a much more important and profound kind offallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or enquired atall, and think good to place here, as that which of all othersappertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as itdoth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars, butdoth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof.For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass,wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their trueincidence, nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full ofsuperstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. Forthis purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposedupon us by the general nature of the mind …. (Bacon III[1887], 394–5)

Bacon still presents a similar line of argument to his reader in1623, namely inDe Augmentis (Book V, Chap. 4; see Bacon IV[1901], 428–34). Judgment by syllogism presupposes—in amode agreeable to the human mind—mediated proof, which, unlikein induction, does not start from sense in primary objects. In order tocontrol the workings of the mind, syllogistic judgment refers to afixed frame of reference or principle of knowledge as the basis for“all the variety of disputations” (Bacon IV [1901], 491).The reduction of propositions to principles leads to the middle term.Bacon deals here with the art of judgment in order to assign asystematic position to the idols. Within this art he distinguishes the‘Analytic’ from the detection of fallacies (sophisticalsyllogisms). Analytic works with “true forms of consequences inargument” (Bacon IV [1901], 429), which become faulty by variation anddeflection. The complete doctrine of detection of fallacies, accordingto Bacon, contains three segments:

1. Sophistical fallacies,
2. Fallacies of interpretation, and
3. False appearances or Idols.

Concerning (1) Bacon praises Aristotle for his excellent handling ofthe matter, but he also mentions Plato honorably. Fallacies ofinterpretation (2) refer to “Adventitious Conditions or Adjunctsof Essences”, similar to the predicaments, open to physical orlogical inquiry. He focuses his attention on the logical handling whenhe relates the detection of fallacies of interpretation to the wronguse of common and general notions, which leads to sophisms. In the lastsection (3) Bacon finds a place for his idols, when he refers to thedetection of false appearances as

the deepest fallacies of thehuman mind: For they do not deceive in particulars, as the others do,by clouding and snaring the judgment; but by a corrupt and ill-orderedpredisposition of mind, which as it were perverts and infects all theanticipations of the intellect. (IV, 431)

Idols are productions of the human imagination (caused by the crookedmirror of the human mind) and thus are nothing more than“untested generalities” (Malherbe 1996, 80).

In his Preface to theNovum Organum Bacon promises theintroduction of a new method, which will restore the senses to theirformer rank (Bacon IV [1901], 17f.), begin the whole labor of the mindagain, and open two sources and two distributions of learning,consisting of a method of cultivating the sciences and another ofdiscovering them. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of thenatural obstacles to efficient scientific analysis, namely seeingthrough the idols, so that the mind's function as the subject ofknowledge acquisition comes into focus (Brandt 1979, 19).

According to Aphorism XXIII of the First Book, Bacon makes adistinction between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of thedivine mind: whereas the former are for him nothing more than“certain empty dogmas”, the latter show “the truesignatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are foundin nature” (Bacon IV [1901], 51).

3.1.1 Idols of the Tribe

The Idols of the Tribe have their origin in the production of falseconcepts due to human nature, because the structure of humanunderstanding is like a crooked mirror, which causes distortedreflections (of things in the external world).

3.1.2 Idols of the Cave

The Idols of the Cave consist of conceptions or doctrines which aredear to the individual who cherishes them, without possessing anyevidence of their truth. These idols are due to the preconditionedsystem of every individual, comprising education, custom, or accidentalor contingent experiences.

3.1.3 Idols of the Market Place

These idols are based on false conceptions which are derived frompublic human communication. They enter our minds quietly by acombination of words and names, so that it comes to pass that not onlydoes reason govern words, but words react on our understanding.

3.1.4 Idols of the Theatre

According to the insight that the world is a stage, the Idols of theTheatre are prejudices stemming from received or traditionalphilosophical systems. These systems resemble plays in so far as theyrender fictional worlds, which were never exposed to an experimentalcheck or to a test by experience. The idols of the theatre thus havetheir origin in dogmatic philosophy or in wrong laws ofdemonstration.

Bacon ends his presentation of the idols inNovum Organum,Book I, Aphorism LXVIII, with the remark that men should abjure andrenounce the qualities of idols, “and the understanding [must be]thoroughly freed and cleansed” (Bacon IV [1901], 69). Hediscusses the idols together with the problem of information gainedthrough the senses, which must be corrected by the use of experiments(Bacon IV [1901], 27).

3.2 System of Sciences

Within the history of occidental philosophy and science, Baconidentifies only three revolutions or periods of learning: the heyday ofthe Greeks and that of the Romans and Western Europe in his own time(Bacon IV [1901], 70ff.). This meager result stimulated his ambitionto establish a new system of the sciences. This tendency can already beseen in his early manuscripts, but is also apparent in his first majorbook,The Advancement of Learning. In this work Bacon presentsa systematic survey of the extant realms of knowledge, combined withmeticulous descriptions of deficiencies, leading to his newclassification of knowledge. InThe Advancement (Bacon III[1887], 282f.) a new function is given tophilosophia prima,the necessity of which he had indicated in theNovum Organum,I, Aphorisms LXXIX–LXXX (Bacon IV [1901], 78–9). In bothtexts this function is attributed tophilosophia naturalis,the basis for his concept of the unity of the sciences and thus ofmaterialism.

Natural science is divided by Bacon into physics and metaphysics.The former investigates variable and particular causes, the latterreflects on general and constant ones, for which the termformis used.Forms are more general than the four Aristoteliancauses and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms ofsubstances as the most general properties of matter is the last stepfor the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinctfromphilosophia prima. The latter marks the position in thesystem where general categories of a general theory of science aretreated as (1) universal categories of thought, (2) relevant for alldisciplines. Final causes are discredited, since they lead todifficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological andteleological points of doctrine. At the summit of Bacon's pyramidof knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). Atits base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariantrelations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches thestage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from naturalhistory via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidentalcorrelations and relations are eliminated by the method of exclusion.It must be emphasized thatmetaphysics has a special meaningfor Bacon. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of individualexperience by generalization with a teleological focus and (2) opensour mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient applicationof general laws.

3.3 Matter Theory and Cosmology

According to Bacon, man would be able to explain all the processesin nature if he could acquire full insight into the hidden structureand the secret workings of matter (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 101).Bacon's conception of structures in nature, functioning accordingto its own working method, concentrates on the question of how naturalorder is produced, namely by the interplay of matter and motion. InDe Principiis atque Originibus, his materialistic stance withregard to his conception of natural law becomes evident. TheSummary Law of Nature is avirtus(matter-cum-motion) or power in accordance with matter theory, or

the force implanted by God in these first particles, form themultiplication thereof of all the variety of things proceeds and ismade up. (Bacon V [1889], 463)

Similarly, inDe Sapientia Veterum he attributes to thisforce an

appetite or instinct of primal matter; or to speakmore plainly, the natural motion of the atom; which is indeed theoriginal and unique force that constitutes and fashions all things outof matter. (Bacon VI [1890], 729)

Suffice it to say here that Bacon, who did not reject mathematics inscience, was influenced by the early mathematical version of chemistrydeveloped in the 16^th century, so that the term‘instinct’ must be seen as a keyword for his theory ofnature. The natural philosopher is urged to inquire into the

appetites and inclination of things by which all thatvariety of effects and changes which we see in the works of nature andart is brought about. (Bacon III [1887], 17–22; V [1889],422–6 and 510ff.:Descriptio Globi Intellectualis; cf.IV [1901], 349)

Bacon's theory of active or even vivid force in matter accounts forwhat he calls Cupid inDe Principiis atque Originibus (BaconV [1889], 463–5). Since his theory of matter aims at anexplanation of the reality which is the substratum of appearances, hedigs deeper than did the mechanistic physics of the 17^thcentury (Gaukroger 2001, 132–7). Bacon's ideas concerningthequid facti of reality presuppose the distinction

between understanding how things are made up and ofwhat they consist, … and by what force and in what manner theycome together, and how they are transformed. (Gaukroger 2001,137)

This is the point in his work where it becomes obvious that he triesto develop an explanatory pattern in which his theory of matter, andthus his atomism, are related to his cosmology, magic, andalchemy.

InDe Augmentis, Bacon not only refers to Pan and hisnymphs in order to illustrate the permanent atomic movement in matterbut in addition revives the idea of magic in a ‘honourable meaning’ as

the knowledge of the universal consents ofthings …. I … understand [magic] as the science whichapplies the knowledge of hidden forms to the production of wonderfuloperations; and by uniting (as they say) actives with passives,displays the wonderful works of nature. (Bacon IV [1901],366–7:De Augmentis III.5)

Bacon's notion of form is made possible by integration intohis matter theory, which (ideally) reduces the world of appearances tosome minimal parts accessible and open to manipulation by theknower/maker. In contrast to Aristotle, Bacon's knowing-why typeof definition points towards the formulation of an efficientknowing-how type (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 119). In this sense aconvergence between the scope of definition and that of causation takesplace according to a ‘constructivist epistemology’. Thefundamental research of Graham Rees has shown that Bacon'sspecial mode of cosmology is deeply influenced by magic andsemi-Paracelsian doctrine. For Bacon, matter theory is the basicdoctrine, not classical mechanics as it is with Galileo. Consequently,Bacon's purified and modified versions of chemistry, alchemy, andphysiology remain primary disciplines for his explanation of theworld.

According to Rees, theInstauratio Magna comprises twobranches: (1) Bacon's famous scientific method, and (2) hissemi-Paracelsian world system as “a vast, comprehensive systemof speculative physics” (Rees 1986, 418). For (2) Bacon conjoinshis specific version of Paracelsian cosmic chemistry to Islamiccelestial kinematics (especially in Alpetragius [al-Bitruji]; see Zinner 1988, 71). The chemicalworld system is used to support Bacon's explanation of celestialmotion in the face of contemporary astronomical problems (Rees 1975b,161f.). There are thus two sections in Bacon'sInstauratio,which imply the modes of their own explanation.

Bacon's speculative cosmology and matter theory had beenplanned to constitute Part 5 ofInstauratio Magna. The theoryput forward refers in an eclectic vein to atomism, criticizesAristotelians and Copernicans, but also touches on Galileo, Paracelsus,William Gilbert, Telesio, and Arabic astronomy.

For Bacon, ‘magic’ is classified as applied science,while he generally subsumes under ‘science’ pure scienceand technology. It is never identified with black magic, since itrepresents the “ultimate legitimate power over nature”(Rees 2000, 66). Whereasmagia was connected to crafts in the16^th and 17^th centuries, Bacon's scienceremains the knowledge of forms in order to transform them intooperations. Knowledge in this context, however, is no longerexclusively based on formal proof.

Bacon's cosmological system—a result of thoughtexperiments and speculation, but not proven in accordance with theinductive method—presupposes a finite universe, a geocentricplenum, which means that the earth is passive and consists oftangible matter. The remaining universe is composed of activeorpneumatic matter. Whereas the interior and tangible matterof the earth is covered by a crust which separates it from thepneumatic heaven, the zone between earth and the “middle regionof the air” allows a mixture of pneumatic and tangible matter,which is the origin of organic and non-organic phenomena. Bacon speakshere of “attached spirit” (Rees 1986, 418–20), whileotherwise he assumes four kinds of free spirit: air and terrestrialfire, which refer to the sublunary realm; ether and sidereal fire,which are relevant to the celestial realm. Ether is explained as themedium in which planets move around the central earth. Air and ether,as well as watery non-inflammable bodies, belong to Bacon's firstgroup ofsubstances or to theMercury Quaternion.

Terrestrial fire is presented as the weak variant of sidereal fire;it joins with oily substances and sulphur, for all of which Baconintroduces theSulphur Quaternion. These quaternions compriseantithetical qualities: air and ether versus fire and sidereal fire.The struggle between these qualities is determined by the distance fromthe earth as the absolute center of the world system. Air and etherbecome progressively weaker as the terrestrial and sidereal fire growstronger. The quaternion theory functions in Bacon's thought as aconstructive element for constituting his own theory of planetarymovement and a general theory of physics. This theory differs from allother contemporary approaches, even though Bacon states that“many theories of the heavens may be supposed which agree wellenough with the phenomena and yet differ with each other” (BaconIV [1901], 104). The diurnal motion of the world system (9^thsphere) is driven by sympathy; it carries the heavens westward aroundthe earth. The sidereal fire is powerful and, accordingly, siderealmotion is swift (the stars complete their revolution in 24 hours).Since the sidereal fire becomes weaker if it burns nearer to the earth,the lower planets move more slowly and unevenly than the higher ones(in this way Bacon, like Alpetragius, accounts for irregular planetarymovement without reference to Ptolemy's epicycle theory). Heapplies his theory of consensual motion to physics generally (e.g.,wind and tides) and thus comes into conflict with Gilbert'sdoctrine of the interstellar vacuum and Galileo's theory of thetides (for Bacon, the cycle of tides depends on the diurnal motion ofthe heavens but, for Galileo, on the earth's motion).

With quaternion theory we see that, in the final analysis, Bacon wasnot a mechanist philosopher. His theory of matter underwent animportant transformation, moving in the direction of‘forms’, which we would nowadays subsume under biology orthe life sciences rather than under physics. Bacon distinguishesbetween non-spiritual matter and spiritual matter. The latter, alsocalled ‘subtle matter’ or ‘spirit’, is morereminiscent of Leibniz' ‘monads’ than of mechanicallydefined and materially, as well as spatially, determined atoms. Thespirits are seen as active agents of phenomena; they are endowed with‘appetition’ and ‘perception’ (Bacon I [1889],320–21:Historia Vitae et Mortis; see also V, 63:Sylva Sylvarum, Century IX:“It is certain thatall bodies whatsoever, though they have no sense, yet they haveperception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a kind ofelection to embrace that which is agreeable, and to exclude or expelthat which is ingrate”).

These spirits are never at rest. In theNovum Organum,then, Bacon rejected the “existence of eternal andimmutable atoms and the reality of the void” (Kargon 1966, 47).His new conception of matter was therefore “close to that of thechemists” in the sense of Bacon's semi-Paracelsiancosmology (Rees 2000, 65–69). The careful natural philosophertries to disclose the secrets of nature step by step; and therefore he says of his method: “I propose to establishprogressive stages of certainty” (Bacon IV [1901], 40:NovumOrganum, Preface). This points towards his inductive procedure andhis method of tables, which is a complicated mode of induction byexclusion. It is necessary because nature hides her secrets. InAphorism XIX of Book I in hisNovum Organum Bacon writes:

There are and can be only two ways of searching into anddiscovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to themost general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which ittakes for settled and immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to thediscovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The otherderives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by gradual andunbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last ofall. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV [1901],50)

The laws of nature, which Bacon intended to discover by means of hisnew method, were expressed in the ‘forms’, in whichthe ‘unbroken ascent’ culminates. Through these forms thenatural philosopher understands the general causes of phenomena(Kargon 1966, 48). In his endeavor to learn more about the secretworkings of nature, Bacon came to the conclusion that the atomisttheory could not provide sufficient explanations for the “realparticles, such as really exist” (Bacon IV [1901], 126:Novum Organum, II.viii), because he thought that theimmutability of matter and the void (both necessary assumptions foratomism) were untenable. His language turned from that of Greek physicsto the usage of contemporary chemists. This is due to his insight that“subtlety of investigation” is needed, since our senses aretoo gross for the complexity and fineness of nature, so that method hasto compensate for the shortcomings of our direct comprehension. Onlymethod leads to the knowledge of nature: inSylva Sylvarum,Century I.98 Bacon deals explicitly with the question of theasymmetrical relationship between man's natural instrument (i.e.,the senses) and the intricacy of nature's structures andworkings.

Bacon distinguishes ‘animate’ or vital spirits, whichare continuous and composed of a substance similar to fire, fromlifeless or inanimate spirits, which are cut off and resemble air: thespirits interact with gross matter through chemical processes (BaconIV, 195–6 (Novum Organum, II.xl)). These spiritshave two different desires: self-multiplication and attraction of likespirits. According to Kargon (1966, 51):

Bacon's latertheory of matter is one of the interaction of gross, visible parts ofmatter and invisible material spirits, both of which are physicallymixed.

Spirits interact with matter by means of concoction, colliquation andother non-mechanical chemical processes, so that Bacon's scientificparadigm differs from Descartes' mechanist theory of matter inhisPrincipia Philosophiae (1644), which presupposesresextensa moving in space. Bacon's theory of matter is thusclosely related to his speculative philosophy:

The distinction between tangible andpneumatic matter is the hinge on which the entire speculative systemturns. (Rees 1996, 125; Paracelsus had already stated thatknowledge inheres in the object: see Shell 2004, 32)

Bacon's theory of matter in its final version was morecorpuscular than atomist (Clericuzio 2000, 78). Bacon'sparticles aresemina rerum: they are endowed withpowers, which make a variety of motions possible and allow theproduction of all possible forms. These spirits are constitutive forBacon's theory of matter. As material, fine substances,composed of particles, combined from air and fire, they can, as we haveseen, be either inanimate or animate. Bacon thus suggests a corpuscularand chemical chain of being:

Small wonder, then, that Bacon's spirits are indispensable forhis conception of physiology:

the vital spirits regulate all vegetative functions ofplants and animals. Organs responsible for these functions, fordigestion, assimilation, etc., seem to act by perception, merereaction to local stimuli, but these reactions are coordinated by thevital spirit. These functions flow from the spirit's airy-flamyconstitution. The spirit has the softness of air to receiveimpressions and the vigour of fire to propagate its actions. (Rees inOFB VI, 202–3)

This physiological stratum of Bacon's natural philosophy wasinfluenced by his semi-Paracelsian cosmology (on Paracelsus seeMüller-Jahncke 1985, 67–88), which Graham Rees (Rees andUpton 1984, 20–1) has reconstructed from the extant parts of theInstauratio Magna. Detailed consideration therefore has to begiven to Bacon's theory of the ‘quaternions’.

Bacon's speculative system is a hybrid based on different sourceswhich provided him with seminal ideas: e.g., atomism, Aristotelianism,Arabic astronomy, Copernican theory, Galileo's discoveries, the worksof Paracelsus, and Gilbert. In his theory he combines astronomy,referring to Alpetragius (see Dijksterhuis 1956, 237–43; Reesand Upton 1984, 26; Gaukroger, 2001, 172–5; and see Grant1994, 533–66, for discussion of the cosmology of Alpetragius),and chemistry (Rees 1975a, 84–5):

[i]t was partly designed to fit a kinematic skeletonand explain, in general terms, the irregularities of planetary motionas consequences of the chemical constitution of the universe. (Rees1975b, 94)

Bacon had no explanation for the planetary retrogressions and saw theuniverse as a finite and geocentric plenum, in which the earthconsists of the two forms of matter (tangible and pneumatic). Theearth has a tangible inside and is in touch with the surroundinguniverse, but through an intermediate zone. This zone exists betweenthe earth's crust and the pure pneumatic heavens; it reaches somemiles into the crust and some miles into air. In this zone, pneumaticmatter mixes with tangible matter, thus producing ‘attachedspirits’, which must be distinguished from ‘freespirits’ outside tangible bodies. Bacon's four kinds of freespirits are relevant for his ‘quaternion theory’:

The planets move around the earth in the ether (a tenuous kind ofair), which belongs to the ‘mercury quaternion’: itincludes watery bodies and mercury. Terrestrial fire is a weakenedform of sidereal fire. It is related to oily substances and sulphur,and constitutes the ‘sulphur quaternion’. The twoquaternions oppose each other: air/ether vs. fire/sidereal fire. Airand ether loose power when terrestrial and sidereal fires grow moreenergetic—Bacon's sulphur and mercury are not principles in thesense of Paracelsus, but simply natural substances. The Paracelsianprinciple of salt is excluded by Bacon and the substance, which playsa role only in the sublunary realm, is for him a compound of naturalsulphur and mercury (Rees and Upton 1984, 25).

Bacon used his quaternion theory for his cosmology, which differsgreatly from other contemporary systems (Rees 2000, 68):

• the diurnal motion turnsthe heavens about the earth towards the west;
• under powerful siderealfire (i.e., principle of celestial motion) the motion is swift: therevolution of the stars takes place in twenty-four hours;
• under weaker siderealfire—nearer to the earth—planets move more slowly andmore erratic.

Bacon, who tried to conceive of a unified physics, rejecteddifferent modes of motion in the superlunary and in the sublunary world(Bacon I [1889], 329). He did not believe in the existence ofthe (crystalline) spheres nor in the macrocosm-microcosm analogy. Herevised Paracelsian ideas thoroughly. He rejected the grounding of histheories in Scripture and paid no attention at all to Cabbalistic andHermetic tendencies (Rees 1975b, 90–1). But he extended theexplanatory powers of the quaternions to earthly phenomena such as windand tides.

Bacon's two systems were closely connected:

System 1: (The Two Quaternions)

explained and comprised thecosmological aspect of his natural philosophy.

System 2: (Theory of Matter)

explained terrestrial nature, that is,it “dealt with the manifold changes in the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms of the frontier zone betweenthe celestial heavens and the Earth's interior” (Rees1996, 130; the two tables are taken from Rees).

System 2 depends on System 1, since explanations for terrestrialthings were subordinated to explanations of the cosmological level. Thetable of System 2 shows Bacon's matter theory. His quaterniontheory is relevant for System 1. System 2 is explained in terms of‘intermediates’, which combine the qualities of the itemsin one quaternion with their opposites in the other.

Bacon's system is built in a clear symmetrical way: eachquaternion has four segments, together eight and there are four typesof intermediates. Thus, the system distinguishes twelve segments inall. He wanted to explain all natural phenomena by means of thisapparatus:

There are two principal intermediates:

Bacon's bi-quaternion theory necessarily refers to thesublunary as well as to the superlunary world. Although the quaterniontheory is first mentioned inThema Coeli (1612; see Bacon V[1889], 547–59), he provides a summary in hisNovumOrganum (Bacon II [1887], 50):

it has not been ill observed by the chemists in theirtriad of first principles, that sulphur and mercury run through thewhole universe … in these two one of the most general consentsin nature does seem to be observable. For there is consent betweensulphur, oil and greasy exhalation, flame, and perhaps the body of astar. So is there between mercury, water and watery vapors, air, andperhaps the pure and intersiderial ether. Yet these two quaternions orgreat tribes of things (each within its own limits) differ immenselyin quantity of matter and density, but agree very well inconfiguration. (Bacon IV [1901], 242–3; see also V [1889],205–6; for tables of the two quaternions and Bacon's theory ofmatter see Rees 1996, 126, 137; Rees 2000, 68–9)

Bacon regarded his cosmologicalworldview as a system of anticipations, which was open to revision inlight of further scientific results based on the inductive method(Rees 1975b, 171). It was primarily a qualitative system, standingaside from both mathematical astronomers and Paracelsian chemists. Itthus emphasized the priority which he gave to physics over mathematicsin his general system of the sciences.

Bacon's two quaternions and his matter theory provide aspeculative framework for his thought, which was open to the futureacquisition of knowledge and its technical application. HisNovaAtlantis can be understood as a text which occupies anintermediate position between his theory of induction and hisspeculative philosophy (Klein 2003c; Price 2002).

It is important to bear in mind that Bacon's speculativesystem was his way out of a dilemma which had made it impossible forhim to finish hisInstauratio Magna. His turn towardsspeculation can only be interpreted as an intellectual anticipationduring an intermediate phase of the history of science, when a giganticamount of research work was still to be accomplished, so that empiricaltheories could neither be established nor sufficiently guaranteed.Speculation in Bacon's sense can therefore be seen as apreliminary means of explaining the secrets of nature until methodicalresearch has caught up with our speculations. The speculative stanceremains a relative and intermediate procedure for the ‘man ofscience’.

4. Scientific Method: The Project of theInstauratio Magna

The Great Instauration, Bacon's main work, waspublished in 1620 under the title:Franciscus de Verulamio SummiAngliae Cancellaris Instauratio magna. This great work remained afragment, since Bacon was only able to finish parts of the plannedoutline. The volume was introduced by aProoemium, which givesa general statement of the purpose, followed by aDedicationto the King (James I) and aPreface, which is a summary of all“directions, motifs, and significance of his life-work”(Sessions 1996, 71). After that, Bacon printed the plan of theInstauratio, before he turned to the strategy of his researchprogram, which is known asNovum Organum Scientiarum.Altogether the 1620 book constitutes the second part of Part II of theInstauratio, the first part of which is represented byDeAugmentis and Book I ofThe Advancement of Learning. WhenBacon organized hisInstauratio, he divided it into six parts,which reminded contemporary readers of God's work of the six days(the creation), already used by writers like Guillaume Du Bartas(La Sepmaine, ou Création du Monde, 1579, transl. byJoshua Sylvester,Bartas His Devine Weekes &Workes, 1605) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola(Heptaplus, 1489).

Bacon sees nature as a labyrinth, whose workings cannot beexclusively explained by reference to “excellence of wit”and “repetition of chance experiments”:

Our stepsmust be guided by a clue, and see what way from the first perception ofthe sense must be laid out upon a sure plan. (Bacon IV [1901],18)

Bacon'sPlan of the Work runs as follows (Bacon IV[1901], 22):

1. The Divisions of the Sciences.
2. The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation ofNature.
3. The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and ExperimentalHistory for the foundation of Philosophy.
4. The Ladder of Intellect.
5. The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the NewPhilosophy.
6. The New Philosophy; or Active Science.

Part 1 contains the general description of the sciences includingtheir divisions as they presented themselves in Bacon's time.Here he aimed at a distinction between what was already invented andknown in contrast to “things omitted which ought be there”(Bacon IV [1901], 23). This part could be taken fromTheAdvancement of Learning (1605) and from the revised and enlargedversionDe Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623).

Part 2 develops Bacon's new method for scientificinvestigation, theNovum Organum, equipping the intellect topass beyond ancient arts and thus producing a radical revision of themethods of knowledge; but it also introduces a new epistemology and anew ontology. Bacon calls his new artInterpretatio Naturae,which is a logic of research going beyond ordinary logic, since hisscience aims at three inventions: of arts (not arguments), ofprinciples (not of things in accordance to principles), and ofdesignations and directions for works (not of probable reasons). Theeffect Bacon looks for is to command nature in action, not to overcomean opponent in argument. TheNovum Organum is the only part oftheInstauratio Magna which was brought near tocompletion.

Part 3 was going to contain natural and experimental history or therecord of the phenomena of the universe. According toDe AugmentisScientarum (Bacon IV [1901], 275), natural history is split upinto narrative and inductive, the latter of which is supposed “tominister and be in order to thebuilding up ofPhilosophy”. These functional histories support human memoryand provide thematerial for research, or the factualknowledge of nature, which must be certain and reliable. Naturalhistory starts from and emphasizes the subtlety of nature or herstructural intricacy, but not the complexity of philosophical systems,since they have been produced by the human mind. Bacon sees this partofInstauratio Magna as a foundation for the reconstruction ofthe sciences in order to produce physical and metaphysical knowledge.Nature in this context is studied under experimental conditions, notonly in the sense of the history of bodies, but also as a history ofvirtues or original passions, which refer to the desires of matter(Rees 1975a). This knowledge was regarded by Bacon as a preparationfor Part 6, theSecond Philosophy orActive Science,for which he gave only the one example ofHistoria Ventorum(1622); but—following his plan to compose six prototypicalnatural histories—he also wroteHistoria vitae etmortis(1623) and theHistoria densi, which was left inmanuscript. The text, which develops the idea of Part 3, is calledParasceve ad Historiam Naturalem et Experimentalem.

Part 4, which Bacon calledThe Ladder of Intellect orScala Intellectus, was intended to function as a link betweenthe method of natural history and that of Second Philosophy/ActiveScience. It consists not only of the fragmentFilum labyrinthi(Bacon III [1887], 493–504), but also includes theAbecedarium nouum naturae (OFB XIII, xxi), which wasplanned as a preface to all of section 4 “[to] demonstrate thewhole process of the mind” (OFB XIII, xxii).Filumlabyrinthi is similar to, but not identical with,Cogitata etVisa. Speaking of himself in an authorial voice, Bacon reflects onthe state of science and derives his construction of a research programfrom the gaps and deficiencies within the system of disciplines:sciences of the future should be examined and further ones should bediscovered. Emphasis must be laid on new matter (not on controversies).It is necessary to repudiate superstition, zealous religion, and falseauthorities. Just as the Fall was not caused by knowledge of nature,but rather by moral knowledge of good and evil, so knowledge of naturalphilosophy is for Bacon a contribution to the magnifying of God'sglory, and, in this way, his plea for the growth of scientificknowledge becomes evident.

Part 5 deals with the forerunners or anticipations of the newphilosophy, and Bacon emphasizes that the ‘big machinery’of theInstauratio Magna needs a good deal of time to becompleted. Anticipations are ways to come to scientific inferenceswithout recourse to the method presented in theNovum Organum.Meanwhile, he has worked on his speculative system, so that portions ofhis Second Philosophy are treated and finished:De Fluxu et RefluxuMaris andThema Coeli. For this part of theGreatInstauration, texts are planned that draw philosophicalconclusions from collections of facts which are not yet sufficient forthe use or application of Bacon's inductive method.

Part 6 was scheduled to contain Bacon's description of the newphilosophy, as the last part of hisGreat Instauration; butnothing came of this plan, so that there is no extant text at all fromthis part of the project.

5. Scientific Method: Novum Organum and the Theory of Induction

Already in his early textCogitata et Visa (1607) Bacondealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name ofinduction. He repudiates the syllogistic method and defineshis alternative procedure as one “which by slow and faithful toilgathers information from things and brings it into understanding”(Farrington 1964, 89). When later on he developed his method indetail, namely in hisNovum Organum (1620), he still notedthat

[of] induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken anyserious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hastento the formulae of disputation. I on the contrary reject demonstrationby syllogism …. (Bacon IV [1901], 24)

Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot,

applied to all stages of knowledge, and at every phasethe whole process has to be kept in mind. (Malherbe 1996, 76)

Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending toworks, so that from axioms new particulars are gained and from thesenew axioms. The inductive method starts from sensible experience andmoves via natural history (providing sense-data as guarantees) tolower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables ofpresentation or from the abstraction of notions. Bacon does notidentify experience with everyday experience, but presupposes thatmethod corrects and extends sense-data into facts, which go togetherwith his setting up of tables (tables of presence and of absence andtables of comparison or of degrees, i.e., degrees of absence orpresence). “Bacon's antipathy to simple enumeration as theuniversal method of science derived, first of all, from his preferencefor theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are notimmediately observable” (Urbach 1987, 30; see: sect. 2). Thelast type can be supplemented by tables of counter-instances, whichmay suggest experiments:

To move from the sensible to the real requires thecorrection of the senses, the tables of natural history, theabstraction of propositions and the induction of notions. In otherwords, the full carrying out of the inductive method isneeded. (Malherbe 1996, 85)

The sequence of methodical steps does not, however, end here,because Bacon assumes that from lower axioms more general ones can bederived (by induction). The complete process must be understood as thejoining of the parts into a systematic chain. From the more generalaxioms Bacon strives to reach more fundamental laws of nature(knowledge of forms), which lead to practical deductions as newexperiments or works (IV, 24–5). The decisive instruments in thisprocess are the middle or ‘living axioms,’ which mediatebetween particulars and general axioms. For Bacon, induction can onlybe efficient if it is eliminative by exclusion, which goes beyond theremit of induction by simple enumeration. The inductive method helpsthe human mind to find a way to ascertain truthful knowledge.

Novum Organum, I, Aphorism CXV (Bacon IV [1901], 103) endsthe “pulling down” of “the signs and causes of theerrors” within the sciences, achieved by means of threerefutations, which constituted the condition for a rationalintroduction of method: refutation of ‘natural humanreason’ (idols); refutation of ‘demonstrations’(syllogisms) and refutation of ‘theories’ (traditionalphilosophical systems).

The Second Part of theNovum Organum deals withBacon's rule for interpreting nature, even if he provides nocomplete or universal theory. He contributes to the new philosophy byintroducing histables of discovery (Inst.Magna, IV), by presenting an example of particulars(Inst. Magna, II), and by observations on history(Inst. Magna, III). It is well known that he workedhard in the last five years of his life to make progress on his naturalhistory, knowing that he could not always come up to the standards oflegitimate interpretation.

Bacon's method presupposes a double starting-point: empiricaland rational. True knowledge is acquired if we want to proceed from alower certainty to a higher liberty and from a lower liberty to ahigher certainty. The rule of certainty and liberty in Bacon convergeswith his repudiation of the old logic of Aristotle, which determinedtrue propositions by the criteria of generality, essentiality, anduniversality. Bacon rejectsanticipatio naturae(“anticipation of nature”) in favor ofinterpretationaturae (“interpretation of nature”), which startswith the collecting of facts and their methodical (inductive)investigation, shunning entanglement in pure taxonomy (as in Ramism),which establishes the order of things (Urbach 1987, 26; see also Foucault 1966 [1970]), but does not produce knowledge. ForBacon, making is knowing and knowing is making (Bacon IV [1901],109–10). In accordance with the maxim “command nature… by obeying her” (Sessions 1996, 136; Gaukroger 2001,139ff.), the exclusion of superstition, imposture, error, andconfusion are obligatory. Bacon introduces variations into “themaker's knowledge tradition” as the discovery of the formsof a given nature lead him to develop his method for acquiring factualand proven knowledge.

Bacon argues against “anticipation of nature”, which heregards as a conservative method, leading to theories that recapitulatethe data without producing new ones conducive to the growth ofknowledge. Moreover, such theories are considered to be final, so thatthey are never replaced.

“Anticipation of nature” resembles“conventionalism” (Urbach 1987, 30–41), according towhich theories refer to unobservable entities (e.g., atoms, epicycles).The theories are “computation rules” or “inferencelicences” within this given framework, which give explanationsand predictions of particular kinds ofobservable events. Theconventionalist acceptance of making predictions concerning futureevents cannot be separated from the question of probability.Bacon's procedure of knowledge acquisition goes against“conventionalism”, because “anticipation ofnature” does not reject authoritative and final speculationsconcerning “unobservables” and because it permits “adhoc adjustments”. Nowadays, however,

philosophers would not accept the idea that justbecause we can't observe something directly … it follows thatthere is no such thing. (Huggett 2010, 82. See also VonWeizsäcker and Juilfs 1958, pp.67–70; Rae 1986 [2000], 1–27and passim)

Conventionalist deep-level theories of the world are chosen from amongalternative ways of observing phenomena. Although theories revealingthe world structure are not directly provable or disprovable by meansof observation or experiment, conventionalists might maintain theirchosen theory even in the face of counter-evidence. They thereforeavoid changes of theory. Any move to a new theory is not taken on thebasis of new evidence, but because a new theory seems to be simpler,more applicable or more beautiful. Laws of nature are generallyunderstood as being unrevisable (O'Hear 1995, 165). The famousdebate, sparked by Thomas Kuhn, on paradigmatic and non-paradigmaticscience and theory is relevant here. Bacon's position—open toscientific progress—is nearer to Kuhn than to Duhem orPoincaré. For Bacon, “anticipation of nature” (asa mode of “conventionalism”) produces obstacles to theprogress of knowledge. Traditional methods shun speculation concerningthings which are not immediately visible; Bacon's speculation,however, is an element of “interpretation of nature”. Hepresupposes hypothetical theories, but these do not go beyond thecollected data. His acceptance of hypotheses is connected with hisrejection of“anticipation of nature”. Thus, hypotheses arerelated to the axioms of “interpretation of nature”, whichgo beyond the original data. The amount of established facts is notidentical with that of possible data (Gillies 1998, 307).Anticipation is rejected, only if it “flies from the senses andparticulars to the most general axioms” (OFB XI, xxv). Because of the dangers of premature generalization, Bacon is carefulabout speculations and rigorously rejects any dogmatic defense of themand the tendency to declare them infallible.

…the philosophy that we now possess clutches to its breastcertain tenets with which (if we look into it carefully) they wantwholly to conceive men that nothing difficult, nothing with real powerand influence over nature, should be expected from art or humaneffort; […] These things, if we examine them minutely, tendwholly towards a wicked circumscription of human power and anintentional and unnatural despair which not only confounds thepresages of hope but breaks every nerve and spur of industry, andthrows away the chances afforded by experience itself—while allthey care about is that their art be considered perfect, expendingtheir effort to achieve the most foolish and bankrupt glory of havingit believed that whatever has not been found out or understood so farcannot be found out or understood in the future. (OFB XI,141)

Bacon sees nature as an extremely subtle complexity, which affords allthe energy of the natural philosopher to disclose her secrets.

For him,new axioms must be larger and wider than thematerial from which they are taken. At the same time,“interpretation of nature” must not leap to remote axioms.In terms of his method, he rejects general ideas as simpleabstractions from very few sense perceptions. Such abstract words mayfunction as conventions for organizing “new observations”,but only in the sense of means for taxonomical order. Such a sterileprocedure is irrelevant for “interpretation of nature”,which is not final or infallible and is based on the insight thatconfirming hypotheses do not provide strict proofs. Bacon's method istherefore characterized by openness:

Nevertheless, I do notaffirm that nothing can be added to what I prescribe; on the contrary,as one who observes the mind not only in its innate capacity but alsoinsofar as it gets to grips with things, it is my conviction that theart of discovering will grow as the number of things discovered willgrow. (OFB, XI, 197)

Peter Urbach's commentary exactly underlines Bacon's openness:

He believed that theoriesshould be advanced to explain whatever data were available in aparticular domain. These theories should preferably concern theunderlying physical, causal mechanisms and ought, in any case, to gobeyond the data which generated them. They are then tested by drawingout new predictions, which, if verified in experience, may confirm thetheory and may eventually render it certain, at least in the sense thatit becomes very difficult to deny. (Urbach 1987, 49)

Bacon was no seventeenth-century Popperian. Rather, on account of histheory of induction, he was:

the first great theorist of experimentalism”: “thefunction of experiment was both to test theories and to establishfacts” (Rees, in OFB XI, xli).

Encyclopaedic repetition with an Aristotelian slant is being displacedby original compilation in which deference to authority plays no partwhatever. Individual erudition is being dumped in favour of collectiveresearch. Conservation of traditional knowledge is being discarded inthe interest of a new,functional realization of naturalhistory, which demands thatlegenda—things worth reading—be supplanted bymaterials which will form the basis of a thoroughgoing attempt toimprove the material conditions of the human race. (Rees, in OFBXI, xlii)

Form is for Bacon a structural constituent of a natural entity or akey to its truth and operation, so that it comes near to natural law,without being reducible to causality. This appears all the moreimportant, since Bacon—who seeks out exclusively causes whichare necessary and sufficient for their effects—rejectsAristotle's four causes (his four types of explanation for a completeunderstanding of a phenomenon) on the grounds that the distributioninto material, formal, efficient, and final causes does not work welland that they fail to advance the sciences (especially the final,efficient, and material causes). Consider again the passagequoted in Section 3.3:

There are and can be only two ways of searching intoand discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particularsto the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth ofwhich it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and tothe discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. Theother derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by agradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most generalaxioms at last. This is the true way, but as yet untried. (Bacon IV[1901], 50:Novum Organum, I, Aphorism XIX).

Since for Bacon the formal necessity of the syllogism does notsuffice to set up first principles, his method comprises two basictasks: (1) the discovery of forms, and (2) the transformation ofconcrete bodies. The discovery from every case of generation and motionrefers to a latent process according to which efficient and materialcauses lead to forms; but there is also the discovery of latentconfigurations of bodies at rest and not in motion (Bacon IV [1901],119–20).

Bacon's new mode of using human understanding implies aparallelism between striving towards human power and constituting humanknowledge. Technical know-how leads to successful operations, whichconverge with the discovery of forms (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 108;Bacon IV [1901], 121). To understand the workings of naturepresupposes an arrangement of facts which makes the investigativeanalysis of cause and effect possible, especially by means of newexperiments. At this point the idea ofscientiaoperativa comes in again, since the direction for a true andperfect rule of operation is parallel to the discovery of a true form.Bacon's specific non-Aristotelian Aristotelianism(Pérez-Ramos 1988, 113, 115) is one of the main features of histheory. Other indispensable influences on Bacon, apart from a modifiedversion of Aristotle, are critically assessed Hermeticism, rhetoric(Vickers) and alchemy (Rees).

Two kinds of axioms correspond to the following division ofphilosophy and the sciences: the investigation of forms ormetaphysics; and the investigation of efficient cause andmatter, which leads to the latent process and configuration inphysics. Physics itself is split up by Bacon intoMechanics, i.e., the practical, andMagic, i.e., themetaphysical.

Nowadays the view that Bacon “made little first-handcontribution to science” (Hesse 1964, 152) no longer coincideswith the opinion that we have to assume an underestimation of the“place of hypothesis and mathematics” in his work (Urban1987; Sessions 1999, 139; Rees 1986). But there were few doubts inthe past that Bacon “encouraged detailed and methodicalexperimentation” (Hesse 1964, 152); and he did this on accountof his new inductive method, which implied the need for negativeinstances and refuting experiments. Bacon saw that confirming instancescould not suffice to analyze the structure of scientific laws, sincethis task presupposed a hypothetical-deductive system, which, accordingto Lisa Jardine, is closely connected to “the logical andlinguistic backgrounds from which Bacon's New Logic proceeds…” (Sessions 1999, 140; Jardine 1974, 69ff.).

Bacon'sinterpretation of nature uses “Tablesand Arrangements of Instances” concerning the natural phenomenaunder investigation, which function as a necessary condition forcracking the code of efficient causation. Hisprerogativeinstances are not examples or phenomena simply taken from naturebut rather imply information with inductive potential which showpriority conducive to knowledge or to methodological relevance wheninserted into tables. The instances do not represent the order ofsensible things, but instead express the order of qualities (natures).These qualities provide the working basis for the order of abstractnatures. Bacon's tables have a double function: they areimportant fornatural history, collecting the data on bodiesand virtues in nature; and they are also indispensable forinduction, which makes use of these data.

Already inTemporis Partus Masculus (1603) Bacon haddisplayed a “facility of shrewd observation” (Sessions1999, 60) concerning his ideas on induction. In hisNovumOrganum the nature of all human science and knowledge was seen byhim as proceeding most safely by negation and exclusion, as opposed toaffirmation and inclusion. Even in his early tracts it was clear toBacon that he had to seek a method of discovering the right forms, themost well known of which washeat (Novum Organum II,Aph. XI–XII) or “the famous trial investigation of the formof heat” (Rees 2000, 66; see Bacon IV [1901], 154–5).

In his “[m]ethod of analysis by exclusion” (Sessions1999, 141), negation proved to be “one of Bacon's strongestcontributions to modern scientific method” (Wright 1951, 152).Most important were his tables of degrees and of exclusion. They wereneeded for the discovery of causes, especially for supreme causes,which were called forms. The method of induction works in twostages:

1. Learned experience from the known to the unknown has to beacquired, and the tables (of presence, absence, degrees) have to be setup before their interpretation can take place according to theprinciple of exclusion. After the three tables of the firstpresentation have been judged and analyzed, Bacon declares theFirst Vintage or the first version of the interpretation ofnature to be concluded.
2. The second phase of the method concentrates on the process ofexclusion. The aim of this procedure is the reduction of the empiricalcharacter of experience, so that the analysis converges with an anatomyof things. Here, too, tables of presence and of absence are set up. Theresearch work proper consists of finding the relationship of the twonatures of qualities. Here exclusion functions as the process ofdetermination. Bacon's method starts from material determinationin order to establish the formal determination of real causes, but doesnot stop there, because it aims at the progressive generalization ofcauses. Here, again, the central element of the inductive method is theprocedure of exclusion.

Forms, as the final result of the methodical procedure, are:

nothing more than those laws and determinations of absoluteactuality which govern and constitute any simple nature, as heat,light, weight, in every kind of matter and subject that is susceptibleof them (Bacon IV [1901], 145–6);

They are not identical with natural law, but with definitions ofsimple natures (elements) or ultimate ingredients of things from whichthe basic material structure has been built (Gaukroger 2001,140). Forms are the structures constituted by the elements in nature(microphysics). This evokes a cross-reference to Bacon's atomism,which has been called the “constructivist component”(Pérez-Ramos 1988, 116) of his system, including an alchemicaltheory about basic kinds of matter. He aims at “understandingthe basic structures of things … as a means to transformingnature for human purposes” (Gaukroger 2001, 140; Clericuzio2000, 78ff.); and thus he “ends” the unfinishedNovumOrganum with a list of things which still have to be achieved orwith a catalogue of phenomena which are important and indispensablefor a future natural history.

Historians of science, with their predilection for mathematicalphysics, used to criticize Bacon's approach, stating that“the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, hasnothing to do with and even contradicts today's form ofscience” (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this verdict, however,they overlooked the fact that a natural philosophy based on a theory ofmatter cannot be assessed on the grounds of a natural philosophy orscience based on mechanics as the fundamental discipline. One canaccount for this chronic mode of misunderstanding as a specimen of theparadigmatic fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986).

Bacon came to the fundamental insight thatfacts cannot becollected from nature, but must be constituted by methodicalprocedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in orderto ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. Hisinduction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factualqualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be arevolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which noexample in classical antiquity existed. Hisscala intellectushas two contrary movements “upwards and downwards: fromaxiomata toexperimenta andopera and backagain” (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 236). Bacon's inductionwas construed and conceived as an instrument or method of discovery.Above all, his emphasis on negative instances for the procedure ofinduction itself can claim a high importance with regard to knowledgeacquisition and has been acclaimed as an innovation by scholars of ourtime. Some have detected in Bacon a forerunner of Karl Popper inrespect of the method of falsification. Finally, it cannot be deniedthat Bacon's methodological program of induction includes aspectsof deduction and abstraction on the basis of negation and exclusion.Contemporary scholars have praised his inauguration of the theory ofinduction. This theory has been held in higher esteem since the 1970sthan it was for a long period before (see the work of Rees, Gaukrogerand Pérez-Ramos 1988, 201–85). Nevertheless, it isdoubtful that Bacon's critics, who were associated with thetraditions of positivism and analytical philosophy, acquired sufficientknowledge of his writings to produce solid warrants for theircriticisms (Cohen 1970, 124–34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; on thegeneral problem of induction see, e.g., Hempel 1966; Swinburne(ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]). In comparison to theneglect of Bacon in the twentieth century, a more recent and deeperassessment of his work has arisen in connection with the “OxfordFrancis Bacon” project, which was launched in the late 1990s byGraham Rees, who directed it until his death in 2009; it is now underthe general editorship of Brian Vickers.

6. Science and Social Philosophy

In Bacon's thought we encounter a relation between science andsocial philosophy, since his ideas concerning a utopian transformationof society presuppose an integration into the social framework of hisprogram concerning natural philosophy and technology as the two formsof the maker's knowledge. From his point of view, which wasinfluenced by Puritan conceptions, early modern society has to makesure that losses caused by the Fall are compensated for, primarily byman's enlargement of knowledge, providing the preconditions for anew form of society which combinesscientia nova andthe millennium, according to the prophecy of Daniel 12:4 (Hill 1971,85–130). Science as a social endeavor is seen as a collectiveproject for the improvement of social structures. On the other hand, astrong collective spirit in society may function as aconditio sinequa non for reforming natural philosophy. Bacon's famousargument that it is wise not to confound the Book of Nature with theBook of God comes into focus, since the latter deals with God'swill (inscrutable for man) and the former with God's work, thescientific explanation or appreciation of which is a form of Christiandivine service. Successful operations in natural philosophy andtechnology help to improve the human lot in a way which makes thehardships of life after the Fall obsolete. It is important to note thatBacon's idea of a—to a certain extent—Christiansociety by no means conveys Christian pessimism in the vein ofpatristic thinkers but rather displays a clear optimism as the resultof compounding the problem of truth with the scope of human freedom andsovereignty (Brandt 1979, 21).

With regard to Bacon's Two Books—the Book of God andthe Book of Nature—one has to keep in mind that man, when givenfree access to the Book of Nature, should not content himself withmerely reading it. He also has to find out the names by which thingsare called. If man does so, not only will he be restored to his statusa noble and powerful being, but the Book of God will also loseimportance, from a traditional point of view, in comparison to the Bookof Nature. This is what Blumenberg referred to as the “asymmetryof readability” (Blumenberg 1981, 86–107). But the processof reading is an open-ended activity, so that new knowledge and theexpansion of the system of disciplines can no longer be restricted byconcepts such as the completeness and eternity of knowledge (Klein2004a, 73).

According to Bacon, the Book of God refers to his will, the Book ofNature to his works. He never gives a hint in his works that he hasconcealed any message of unbelief for the sophisticated reader; but heemphasized: (1) that religion and science should be kept separateand, (2) that they were nevertheless complementary to each other.For Bacon, the attack of theologians on human curiosity cannot befounded on a rational basis. His statement that “all knowledge isto be limited by religion, and to be referred to use and action”(Bacon III [1887], 218) does not express a general verdict ontheoretical curiosity, but instead provides a normative framework forthe tasks of science in a universal sense. Already in the dedicatoryletter to James I in hisAdvancement of Learning, Baconattacks “the zeal and jealousy of divines” (Bacon III, 264) and in his manuscriptFilum Labyrinthi of 1607, he“thought … how great opposition and prejudicenatural philosophy had received by superstition, and the immoderate andblind zeal of religion” (Bacon VI [1863], 421). As Calvinhad done long before him in theInstitutes, Bacon stated thatsince God created the physical world, it was a legitimate object ofman's knowledge, a conviction which he illustrated with thefamous example of King Solomon inThe Advancement of Learning(Zagorin 1999, 49–50; see also Kocher 1953,27–8). Bacon praises Solomon's wisdom, which seems tobe more like a game than an example of man's God-given thirst forknowledge:

The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but theglory of the king is to find it out; as if, according to the innocentplay of children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide his works, tothe end to have them found out; and as if kings could not obtain agreater honour than to be God's playfellows in that game,considering the great commandment of wits and means, whereby nothingneedeth to be hidden from them. (Bacon III [1887], 299;Blumenberg, 1973, 196–200)

From this perspective, the punishment of mankind on account of thevery first disobedience by Adam and Eve can be seen in a differentlight from that of theological interpretations. In Bacon's view, thisdisobedience and its consequences can be remedied in two ways: (1) byreligion and moral imperatives, and (2) by advancement in the arts andsciences: “the purpose in advancing arts and sciences is theglory of God and the relief of man's estate” (Wormald 1993,82).

The two remedies, which are interconnected with the moral dimension,refer to the advancement of learning and religion. All three together(the advancement of learning, religion, and morality) are combined insuch a way that they promote each other mutually; consequently, limitedoutlooks on coping with life and knowledge are ruled out completely inthese three fields.

7. The Ethical Dimension in Bacon's Thought

The ethical dimension of Bacon's thought has been underratedby generations of scholars. Time and again a crude utilitarianism hasbeen derived from Book I, Aphorism 1 of theNovum Organum;this cannot, however, withstand a closer analysis of his thought. SinceBacon's philosophy of science tries to answer the question of howman can overcome the deficiencies of earthly life resulting from theFall, he enters the realm of ethical reflection. The improvement ofmankind's lot by means of philosophy and science does not startfrom a narrow utilitarian point of view, involving sheer striving forprofit and supporting the power or influence of select groups of men,but instead emphasizes the construction of a better world for mankind,which might come into existence through the ascertaining of truthsabout nature's workings (Bacon III [1887], 242). Thus, theperspective of the universal in Bacon's ethical thought is givenpredominance. The range of science and technology in their ethicalmeaning transcends the realm of the application of tools and/orinstruments, in so far as the aim is the transformation of wholesystems. Since causality and finality can interact on the basis ofhuman will and knowledge, a plurality of worlds becomes feasible(Bacon V [1889], 506–7). Moral philosophy is closely connectedto ethical reflections on the relationship between the nature ofvirtues—habitual or innate?—and their use in life,privately and collectively. Any application of the principles of virtuepresupposes for Bacon the education of the mind, so that we learn whatis good and what should be attained (Gaukroger 2006, 204–5 andpassim):

The main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth tobe into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regimen of Culture ofthe Mind; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribingrules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of manthereunto (Bacon III [1887], 419).

So, already in hisAdvancement of Learning Baconstudied the nature of good and distinguished various kinds of good. Heinsisted on the individual's duty to the public. Private moralself-control and the concomitant obligations are relevant for behaviorand action in society. One's ethicalpersona isconnected to morality by reference to acceptable behaviour. Though whatwe can do may be limited, we have to muster our psychological powersand control our passions when dealing with ourselves and withothers. We need to apply self-discipline and rational assessment, aswell as restraining our passions, in order to lead an active moral lifein society.

Thus, for Bacon, the acquisition of knowledge does not simplycoincide with the possibility of exerting power. Scientific knowledgeis a condition for the expansion and development of civilization.Therefore, knowledge and charity cannot be kept separate:

I humbly pray … that knowledge being now discharged ofthat venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mindof man to swell, we may not be wise above measure and sobriety, butcultivate truth in charity…. Lastly, I would address one generaladmonition to all; that they consider what are the true ends ofknowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind,or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, orfame, or power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefitand use of life; and that they perfect and govern it in charity. For itwas from the lust of power that the angels fell, from lust of knowledgethat man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angelor man ever come in danger by it (Bacon IV [1901], 20f.:Instauratio Magna, Preface).

Finally, the view that Bacon'sNova Atlantis“concerns a utopian society that is carefully organized for thepurposes of scientific research and virtuous living” (Urbach1988, 10) holds true for his entire life's work. In NovaAtlantis, social, political, and scholarly life are all organizedaccording to the maxim of efficiency; but the House of Solomon is aseparate and highly esteemed institution for research, whichnevertheless is closely connected to the overall system of Bensalem. Inhis utopian state, Bacon presents a thoroughgoing collective life insociety and science, both of which are based on revealed religion.Religion—Christian in essence—is not dogmatic, but itinstills into the people of Bensalem veneration for the wise andmorally exemplary members of society, and—which is of the utmostimportance—the strictest sense of discipline (Gaukroger 2001,128–30). Discipline is indispensable for those involved in thereligious life as well as for the researchers, since both must proceedmethodically. The isomorphic structures of nature and science, on theone hand, society and religion, on the other, prescribe patterns ofpolitical procedure, social processes, and religious attitudes, whichovercome any craving for individuality. If religion and scientificresearch are both shown as truthful in Bensalem, then, according toBacon, the imagination functions as a means of illustrating scientificrevelation: “Bacon's purpose is … to show thatscientific research properly pursued is not inconsonant with religiouspropriety and social stability…” (Bierman 1963, 497). Thescientists in Bensalem are sacred searchers for truth: ethics,religion, and science merge. Bacon's parabolic strategy, which weshould not separate from the power of the idols, enables him to makemuch of his trick of introducing new ideas like a smuggler: his coloredwares are smuggled into the minds of his readers by being visualized interms of sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175).Science and religion are separated in Nova Atlantis, but they are alsointerrelated through the offices of the society of Bensalem. What Baconobviously wants to make clear to his readers is that the example ofBensalem should free them from any fear that scientific progress willlead to chaos and upheaval. This crucial point has made by JürgenMittelstrass, who understands Bacon'sNova Atlantis as autopia and regards utopias as

blueprints of practical reason,not of theoretical, that is: they set in exactly there, where the earlymodern idea of progress appears meagre with regards to thecontents: within ethics and political theory. (Mittelstrass1960, 369)

Bibliography

Major Philosophical Works by Bacon

• 1857–74,The Works, edited by J. Spedding,R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath, 14 vols. London.
• 1861,The Works, edited by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, 15 vols. Boston: Taggard and Thompson.
• 1861–74,The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon,edited by J. Spedding, 7 vols. London: Longman, Green, Longman, andRoberts.
• 1889–1901,The Works, edited by J. Spedding,R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath. Volumes I (1889), II (1887),III (1887), IV (1901), V (1889), VI (1890), VII (1892).
• 1898,Novum Organum or True Suggestions for theInterpretation of Nature, London and New York.
• 1958,Essays, intr. by O. Smeaton. London and NewYork.
• 1962,The Advancement of Learning, edited byG. W. Kitchin, London and New York: Dent.
• 1982,Neu Atlantis, transl. by G. Bugge, editedby Jürgen Klein, Stuttgart.
• 1996–,The Oxford Francis Bacon [OFB], GeneralEditors: Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine; Brian Vickers; OxfordUniversity Press. In order of publication: Volume VI(1996),Philosophical Studies c. 1611–c. 1619, editedby G. Rees; Volume IV (2000),The Advancement of Learning,edited by M. Kiernan; Volume XIII (2000),The Instauratio Magna:Last Writings, edited by G. Rees; Volume XV (2000),TheEssayes or Counsels, Civill and Moralledited by M. Kiernan;Volume XI (2004),The Instauratio Magna: Part II. NovumOrganum, edited by G. Rees and M. Wakely; Volume XII (2007),The Instauratio Magna. Part 3, Historia naturalis etexperimentalis, Historia ventorum and Historia vitæ &mortis, edited by G. Rees and M. Wakely; Volume VIII(2011),The Historie of the Raigne of King Henry the Seuenth andOther Works of the 1620s, edited by M. Kiernan.
• 2000,A Critical Edition of the Major Works, edited byBrian Vickers. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Selected Works on Bacon

• Anderson, F. H., 1948,The Philosophy of Francis Bacon,Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Bierman, J., 1963, “Science and Society in theNewAtlantis and other Renaissance Utopias”,PMLA,78(5): 492–500.
• Blumenberg, H., 1973,Der Prozess der theoretischenNeugierde, Frankfurt am Main.
• Bowen, C. D., 1963 [1993],Francis Bacon. The Temper of aMan, New York: Fordham University Press. First edition 1963,Boston: Little, Brown.
• Brandt, R., 1979, “Francis Bacon, Die Idolenlehre”, inGrundprobleme der großen Philosophen. Philosophieder Neuzeit I, edited by Josef Speck. Göttingen, pp.9–34.
• Burtt, E. A., 1924 [1932],The Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Physical Science, London. First Edition, April 1924;Second Edition (revised) January 1932; reprinted 1972.
• Cassirer, E., 1922 [reprint 1994],Das Erkenntnisproblem inder Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit,Darmstadt.
• Clericuzio, A., 2000,Elements, Principles, andCorpuscles, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Dampier, W. C., 1929 [1948],A History of Science and itsrelations with Philosophy and Religion, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. Fourth edition, 1948; reprinted with postscript byI. Bernard Cohen 1966.
• Dijksterhuis, E. J., 1969,The Mechanization of the WorldPicture, Oxford.
• Farrington, B., 1964,The Philosophy of Francis Bacon,Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
• Fischer, K., 1923,Francis Bacon und seine Schule,Entwicklungsgeschichte der Erfahrungsphilosophie,Heidelberg.
• Gaukroger, S., 2001,Francis Bacon and the Transformation ofEarly-Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• –––, 2006,The Emergence of a ScientificCulture. Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1210–1685,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Giglioni, G., 2011,Francesco Bacone, Rome.
• Henry, J., 2002,Knowledge is Power. Francis Bacon and theMethod of Science, Cambridge: Icon Books.
• Hesse, M. B., 1964, “Francis Bacon's Philosophy ofScience”, inA Critical History of Western Philosophy,edited by D. J. O'Connor, New York: Free Press, pp.141–52.
• Hill, C., 1965,Intellectual Origins of the EnglishRevolution, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Jardine, L., 1974,Francis Bacon. Discovery and the Art ofDiscourse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Jardine, L. and A. Stewart, 1999,Hostage to Fortune. TheTroubled Life of Francis Bacon 1561–1626, London: VictorGollancz.
• Kargon, R. H., 1966,Atomism in England, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Klein, J., 1984,Radikales Denken in England:Neuzeit, Frankfurt, Berne and New York.
• –––, 1987,Francis Bacon oder dieModernisierung Englands, Hildesheim, Zurich and New York.
• –––, 2003a “Bacon's Quarrel with theAristotelians”,Zeitsprünge, 7: 19–31.
• –––, 2003b, “Francis Bacon(1561–1626)”, inMetzler Philosophen Lexikon,B. Lutz (ed.), Stuttgart.
• –––, 2003c, “Nachwort”, in FrancisBacon,Neu-Atlantis, Stuttgart, 64–9.
• –––, 2004a, “Francis Bacon'sTheAdvancement of Learning. An Early Modern Programme for theRevision of the Systems of Disciplines”, inScholarlyEnvironments. Centres of Learning and Institutional Contexts1560–1960, edited by Alasdair A. MacDonald and ArendH. Huusen. Leuven, Paris, and Dudley, MA, pp. 65–73.
• –––, 2004b, “Francis Bacons Essays von1597: Der politische Subtext”, inAgainst the Grain/GegendenStrich gelesen. Studies in English and American Literature andLiterary Theory. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wicht, Peter Drexler and Rainer Schnoor (eds.), Berlin, pp.201–223.
• –––, 2008, “Francis Bacon'sScientiaOperativa, The Tradition of the Workshops, and the Secrets ofNature”, inPhilosophies of Technology. Francis Bacon andHis Contemporaries, Claus Zittel, Gisela Engel, RomanoNanni, and Nicole C. Karafyllis (eds.), Leiden and Boston,pp.21–49.
• –––, 2010,Elisabeth I und ihre Zeit,2nd ed., Munich.
• Krohn, W., 1987,Francis Bacon, Munich.
• Lange, F. A., 1898,Geschichte des Materialismus, Bd 1.Leipzig.
• Losee, J., 1972,A Historical Introduction to the Philosophyof Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Malherbe, M., 1996, “Bacon's Method of Science”, inPeltonen (ed.) 1996, pp. 75–98.
• Martin, J., 1992,Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform ofNatural Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Mathews, N., 1996,Francis Bacon. The History of a CharacterAssassination, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
• Matthews, S., 2008,Theology and Science in the Thought ofFrancis Bacon, Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Mittelstrass, J., 1960,Neuzeit und Aufklärung. Studienzur Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und Philosophie,Berlin and New York.
• Peltonen, M. (ed.), 1996,The Cambridge Companion toBacon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Peltonen, M., 2007, “Bacon; Francis, Viscount St Alban(1561–1626)”,Oxford Dictionary of NationalBiography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
• Pérez-Ramos, A., 1988,Francis Bacon's Idea of Scienceand the Maker's Knowledge Tradition, Oxford: ClarendonPress.
• Price, B. (ed.), 2002,Francis Bacon's New Atlantis. NewInterdisciplinary Essays, Manchester and New York: ManchesterUniversity Press.
• Quinton, A., 1980,Francis Bacon, Oxford, Toronto, andMelbourne: Hill and Wang.
• Rees, G., 1975a,b, “Francis Bacon's Semi-ParacelsianCosmology”,Ambix, XXII: 82–101;165–73.
• –––, 1977, “Matter Theory: A Unifyingfactor in Bacon's Natural Philosophy?”,Ambix, XXIV:110–25.
• –––, 1980, “Atomism and‘Subtlety’ in Francis Bacon'sPhilosophy”,Annals of Science, XXXVII:549–71.
• –––, 1985, “Quantitative Reasoning inFrancis Bacon's Natural Philosophy”,Nouvelle de larepublique des lettres: 27–48.
• –––, 1986, “Mathematics in Francis Bacon'sNatural Philosophy”,Revue internationale dephilosophie, 159(4): 399–426.
• –––, 1996, “Bacon's SpeculativePhilosophy”, in Peltonen (ed.) 1996, pp.121–45.
• –––, 2000, “Francis Bacon(1561–1626)”, in W. Applebaum (ed.),Encyclopedia ofthe Scientific Revolution From Copernicus to Newton, New York andLondon, pp. 65– 69.
• –––, 2004, “On Francis Bacon'sOriginality”,ISIH: Intellectual News, 14:69–73.
• Rees, G. and C. Upton, 1984,Francis Bacon's NaturalPhilosophy: A New Source. A transcription of manuscript Hardwick 72Awith Translation and Commentary (The British Society for theHistory of Science Monographs, 5), Chalfont St Giles.
• Rossi, P., 1968,Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science,translated by S. Rabinovitch, London: University of ChicagoPress.
• Schäfer, L., 1993,Das Bacon-Programm.Von derErkenntnis,Nutzung und Schonung der Natur, Frankfurt amMain.
• Schmidt-Biggemann, W., 1983,Topica Universalis. EineModellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker Wissenschaft,Hamburg.
• Sessions, W. A. (ed.), 1990,Francis Bacon's Legacy ofTexts, New York: AMS Press.
• –––, 1996,Francis Bacon Revisited, NewYork and London: Twayne Publishers.
• Urbach, P., 1987,Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: AnAccount and a Reappraisal, La Salle, IL: Open Court.
• Vickers, B., 1968a,Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 1968b,Essential Articles for theStudy of Francis Bacon, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.
• –––, 1978,Francis Bacon, Harlow:Longman Group.
• Webster, C., 1975,The Great Instauration. Science, Medicine,and Reform 1626–1660, London: Duckworth.
• Zaller, R., 1971,The Parliament of 1621: A Study inConstitutional Conflict, Berkeley CA: University of CaliforniaPress.
• Zagorin, P., 1999,Francis Bacon, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Other Secondary Literature

• Ayer, A. J., 1973,The Central Questions of Philosophy,London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
• Blumenberg, H., 1981,Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Frankfurtam Main.
• Carnap, R. and W. Stegmüller, 1959,Induktive Logik undWahrscheinlichkeit, Vienna.
• Cohen, I. B., 1985,Revolution in Science, Cambridge, MA:Belknap Press.
• Cohen, J. L., 1970,The Implications of Induction,London: Methuen.
• Curd, M. and J. A. Cover (eds.), 1998,Philosophy ofScience. The Central Issues, London and New York:W.W. Norton.
• Dijksterhuis, E. J., 1956,Die Mechanisierung desWeltbildes, Berlin etc.
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Acknowledgments

Some of the passages in this entry are borrowed from Klein2008.