Alexander was a Peripatetic philosopher and commentator, active in thelate second and early third century CE. He continued the tradition ofwriting close commentaries on Aristotle’s work established inthe first century BCE by Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor ofAristotle’s ‘esoteric’ writings, which seem to havebeen designed for use in his school only. This tradition reflected agradual revival of interest in Aristotle’s philosophy, beginningin the late second century BCE, and helped to reestablish Aristotle asan active presence in philosophical debates in later antiquity.Aristotle’s philosophy had fallen into neglect and disarray inthe second generation after his death and remained in the shadow ofthe Stoics, Epicureans, and Academic skeptics throughout theHellenistic age. Andronicus’ edition of what was to become theCorpus Aristotelicum consolidated a renewed interest inAristotle’s philosophy, albeit in a different form: activeresearch was replaced by learned elucidations of ThePhilosopher’s difficult texts. The commentaries themselvesserved as material for the exposition of Aristotle’s work to arestricted circle of advanced students. Hence each generation ofteachers produced their own commentaries, often relying heavily ontheir predecessors’ work. Thus, the ‘scholastic’treatment of authoritative texts that was to become characteristic ofthe Middle Ages had already started in the first century BCE.Alexander, due to his meticulous and philosophically astute exegesisof a wide range of Aristotle’s texts, in logic, physics,psychology, metaphysics and ethical topics, became known asthe exemplary commentator throughout later antiquity and theArabic tradition. He is often referred to simply as ‘TheCommentator’ (ho exêgetês), later sharingthis title with Avicenna or Averroes. Because there is little evidenceon Alexander’s life and activities, his commentaries and hisshort treatises on topics related more or less closely to Aristoteliandoctrine provide all the information we have about him as aphilosopher and a man. As these writings show, his main contemporaryopponents were the Stoics, but there is also some evidence of acontroversy with Galen. Alexander is not only regarded as the best ofthe ancient commentators but also as the last strictly Aristotelianone, whose aim was to present and defend Aristotle’s philosophyas a coherent whole, well suited to engage contemporary philosophicaldiscussions. The later commentators were members of the Neoplatonistschools and were concerned to document a substantial agreement ofPlatonic and Aristotelian thought, and to integrate Aristotle’swork into their Neoplatonist philosophical system. But they continuednot only to consult and discuss, but also to criticize,Alexander’s work, a fact that probably accounts for itssurvival.

• 1. Life and Works
  • 1.1 Date, Family, Teachers, and Influence
  • 1.2 Works and their history
• 2. Alexander as commentator and philosopher
• 3. Logic
• 4. Metaphysics
• 5. Psychology
• 6. Ethics and Fate
• 7. Importance and Influence
• Bibliography
  • A. Primary Sources
  • B. Translations
  • C. Secondary Literature: Overviews
  • D. Secondary Literature: Studies on Particular Topics
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Life and Works

1.1 Date, Family, Teachers, and Influence

Next to nothing is known about Alexander’s origin, lifecircumstances, and career. His native city was (probably) theAphrodisias in Caria, an inland city of southwestern Asia Minor. Hisfather’s name was Hermias. The only direct information about hisdate and activities is the dedication of hisOn Fate to theemperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla in gratitude for hisappointment to an endowed chair. Their co-reign lasted from 198 to 209CE; this gives us a rough date for at least one of Alexander’sworks. Nothing is known about his background or his education, exceptthat his teacher was Aristoteles of Mytilene, rather than the morefamous Aristocles of Messene, as had been conjectured by certainscholars since the 16th. century. He is also said to have been astudent of Sosigenes and of Herminus, the pupil of the commentatorAspasius, the earliest commentator on Aristotle whose work has in partsurvived (for information concerning Alexander’s teachers andtheir philosophy, see Moraux 1984, 335–425). How much Alexanderowed to his teachers is hard to guess, for he sometimes criticizesSosigenes and Herminus extensively. But it is clear from the scope anddepth of his work that he was a well-trained philosopher with a broadrange of knowledge and interests.

Though the dedication to the emperors tells us that Alexander wasappointed to a chair in philosophy, there is not sufficient evidenceas to whether, as is often asserted, he obtained one of the fourchairs, representing the four traditional schools, established inAthens by Marcus Aurelius in 176 CE. There were similar establishedchairs in several cities (on Athens see Lynch 1972, 192–207;213–216). Given the amount and scope of his writing he must havebeen an active teacher with a flourishing school. It is thereforepossible that some of the short essays attributed to Alexander areactually the production of one of his collaborators or disciples. Butnothing is known about any of his associates and students (cf.Sharples 1990a). To us his work therefore represents both the heydayand the end of the series of commentators who explained Aristotleexclusively on the basis of Aristotelian texts, without commitment tosome other doctrine. Alexander concludes the series of these purely‘Peripatetic’ commentators (beginning with Andronicus ofRhodes in the first century BCE), who try to explain “Aristotleby Aristotle” (Moraux 1942, xvi, cf. Chiaradonna 2012). Thoughlater commentators, starting with Porphyry, the disciple and editor ofPlotinus, relied heavily on his works, they had a Neo-Platonistapproach. Since Porphyry lived considerably later than Alexander (ca.234–305/10 CE), Alexander’s school may have continued toexist until it became outmoded by the ‘Neo-Platonistturn’. Porphyry’s report that Plotinus included texts byAlexander ‘and related authors in his discussions’(The Life of Plotinus, 14.13) makes this quite likely.Alexander’s commentaries formed a central part of the Arabictradition and were heavily used by Maimonides. His work therebyinfluenced the Latin West after the revival of Aristotelianism in theMiddle Ages. The scarcity of Latin translations of Alexander’scommentaries suggests a certain preference for the interpretation ofthe later, Neoplatonist, commentators. If William of Moerbeke confinedhis translations of Alexander’s commentaries to those on theMeteorologica and theDe sensu that may in part bedue to the availability of Boethius’ commentaries onAristotle’sPrior Analytics and theTopics,but it leaves unexplained why Moerbeke did not translate thecommentary on theMetaphysics (on the reception of Alexanderin the Middle Ages and the Renaissance see Rossi/Di Giovanni/Robiglio2021).

1.2 Works and their history

As the list of his works shows, Alexander was a prolific writer. Hiswritings comprise both commentaries (hupomnêmata) onthe works of Aristotle and several systematic treatises of his own(including works on ‘problems’, consisting of series ofessays on different Aristotelian texts or topics). Of thecommentaries, the following are extant:On Prior AnalyticsI,Topics, Metaphysics, Meteorologica, andOnSense Perception. Of the commentary on theMetaphysicsonly the first five books are by general consent accepted as genuine;the remaining nine books are attributed to the late commentatorMichael of Ephesus (11th-12th century CE.). The commentary on theSophistical Refutations, ascribed to Alexander in somemanuscripts, is considered spurious. References by later commentatorsshow that Alexander’s commentaries covered all ofAristotle’s theoretical philosophy, including his physicalwritings (with the exception of the biological works). The list of hislost works is long: there are references to commentaries on theCategories,De interpretatione,PosteriorAnalytics,Physics, andOn the Heavens, as wellasOn the Soul andOn Memory. Alexander did notwrite commentaries on Aristotle’sEthics orPolitics, nor on thePoetics or theRhetoric. That he had quite some interest in ethicalproblems, however, is witnessed by the discussions in his owntreatises. Among the extant short systematic writings the followingare regarded as genuine:Problems and Solutions, Ethical Problems,On Fate,On Mixture and Increase,On the Souland aSupplement to On the Soul (dubbed ‘De Animalibiri Mantissa’, lit. ‘make-weight for the book ofthe soul’, by its first modern editor, I. Bruns); they not onlycontain discussions of questions concerning psychology but alsoproblems in physics, vision and light, ethics, as well as fate andprovidence. The ‘Mantissa’ may not be by Alexander but acompilation of notes by his students. The rest,Medical Questions,Physical Problems, andOn Fevers are consideredspurious. Of his lost works some have been preserved in Arabic becausethey were highly influential (see D’Ancona & Serra 2002):On the Principles of the Universe,On Providence,Against Galen on Motion, andOn SpecificDifferences. Because of Alexander’s prestige and authorityas an interpreter of Aristotle, many of his works now lost wereincorporated in the commentaries of his successors, whether they namehim or not. For example, Alexander’s commentary onOn theHeavens can to some extent be reconstructed on the basis ofThemistius’ paraphrase of Aristotle’s text andSimplicius’ commentary. Nothing certain is known about therelative chronology of Alexander’s writings, but this is not anissue of much importance, since his commentaries may well representthe results of many years of teaching, with later insertions andadditions, in a way quite similar to Aristotle’s own texts. Thiswould explain the lack of any attempt at elegance and the occurrenceof inconsistencies or unclear transitions in Alexander.

2. Alexander as commentator and philosopher

In general, Alexander goes on the assumption that Aristotelianphilosophy is a unified whole, providing systematically connectedanswers to virtually all the questions of philosophy recognized in hisown time. Where there is no single, clearly recognizable Aristotelianpoint of view on some question, he leaves the matter undecided, citingseveral possibilities consistent with what Aristotle says. SometimesAlexander tries to force an interpretation that does not obviouslyagree with the text, but he avoids stating that Aristotle contradictshimself and, with rare exceptions, that he disagrees with him. Readerswill not always be convinced by his suggestions but they will oftenfind them helpful and informative where Aristotle is overly compressedand obscure. As a remark in his commentary on theTopicsshows, Alexander was quite aware that his own style of philosophicaldiscussion was very different from that of the time of Aristotle(In top. 27,13): “This kind of speech [dialecticrefutation] was customary among the older philosophers, who set upmost of their classes in this way — not on the basis of books asis now done, since at the time there were not yet any books of thiskind.” As this explanation indicates, however, he seems to haveregarded the bookishness of his own time as an advantage over thedialectic style rather than a disadvantage.

Like the works of the other commentators in the ancient tradition,Alexander’s derive from his courses of lectures(‘readings’) on Aristotle’s works. In commenting,Alexander usually refrains from giving comprehensive surveys. Hegenerally starts with a preface on the work’s title, its scopeand the nature of the subject matter. He then takes up individualpassages in rough succession by citing a line or two (this providesthe ‘lemma’ for the ensuing discussion) and byexplaining what he considers as problematic (in explanatoryparaphrases, clarifications of expressions, or refutations of theviews of others), often in view of what Aristotle says about the issueelsewhere. This procedure clearly presupposes that the students hadtheir own texts at hand and were sufficiently familiar withAristotle’s philosophy as a whole. Alexander does not generallygo through the text line by line, but chooses to discuss certainissues while omitting others. Paraphrases are interrupted byclarifications of terminology, and sometimes, at crucial points, bynotes on divergent readings in different manuscripts and ajustification of his own preference concerning Aristotle’soriginal words. Decisions on such philological problems are based onwhat makes better sense in conforming with Aristotle’sintentions here or elsewhere. As Alexander indicates, suchphilological explorations were considered as part of thecommentator’s work (cf.On Aristotle MetaphysicsA, 59, 1–9): “The first reading, however, isbetter; this makes it clear that the Forms are causes of the essencefor the other things, and the One for the Forms. Aspasius relates thatthe former is the more ancient reading, but that it was later changedby Eudorus and Euharmostus.” Alexander’s concern withtextual problems makes him a valuable source for textual criticism, ascan be seen from Kotwick’s (2016) monograph on the text ofAristotle’sMetaphysics.

Though Alexander follows the Aristotelian texts quite conscientiously,he often concentrates on special points and the respective passageswhile passing over others with brief remarks. Thus in his comments onthe first book of Aristotle’sMetaphysics he devotesmore than half of his exegesis to the two chapters in which Aristotleattacks Plato’s theory of Forms (Metaph. A, 6 & 9).Since Aristotle there focuses on Plato’s attempt to connect theForms with numbers, a theory that is not elaborated in the dialogues,Alexander’s disquisition turns out to be our most valuablesource on the vexed question of Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines andalso on the impact of these doctrines on the members of the EarlyAcademy (see Harlfinger & Leszl, 1975; Fine 1993). Though on thewhole Alexander adopts Aristotle’s critical stance towardsPlato’s separate Forms, he sometimes at least indicates thepossibility of dissent. When, for instance, Aristotle claims thatPlato recognizes only two of his own four causes, the formal and thematerial cause, Alexander refers to the demiurge’s activities intheTimaeus as a potential example for an efficient causeacting for the sake of a final cause. But then he adds a justificationto explain why Aristotle acknowledges neither of the two causes in hisreport on Plato (59,28–60,2): “The reason is eitherbecause Plato did not mention either of these in what he said aboutthe causes, as Aristotle has shown in his treatiseOn theGood; or because he did not make them causes of the thingsinvolved in generation and destruction, and did not even formulate anycomplete theory about them.”

The idea that discrepancies in Aristotle’s texts are due to thedevelopment of his philosophy was as alien to Alexander as it was toall other thinkers in antiquity. Instead, he treats Aristotle’sphilosophy as a unitary whole and tries to systematize it by forgingtogether different trains of thought, and smoothing overinconsistencies. Thereby he contributed to the emergence of what wasto become the canonical ‘Aristotelianism’ that wasattacked in early modern times as a severe obstacle to new ideas andscientific development. Though Alexander indicates that he was awareof changes at particular points (he regarded theCategoriesas Aristotle’s earliest work and notes that it does not yetobserve the systematic distinction between genus and species), he doesnot consider the possibility that there were different phases withsubstantial changes in the Master’s work. If such conservatismsurprises us in view of the fact that Alexander’s own work showstraces of revisions and improvement, we must keep in mind that in theeyes of ‘The Commentator’ Aristotle was an authority quiteoutside the common order. The doctrine of the Master was not theproduct of an ordinary human mind, subject to trial and error, but amagisterial achievement in a class of its own.

In his systematic writings, Alexander presents an Aristotelian pointof view that also reflects in many ways the conditions and discussionsof his own time, also on questions that were not or not extensivelydiscussed by Aristotle himself. For example, although Alexander iscritical of Platonism, some Platonizing may be discerned in his ownwritings (see below). HisProblems and Solutions(Quaestiones), in three books, are collections of shortessays, which were apparently grouped together in different booksalready in antiquity. As their Greek title (Physikai scholikaiaporiai kai lyseis. lit. ‘School-discussion of problems andsolutions on nature’, cf. Sharples 1992, 3) indicates, thesethree books address problems in natural philosophy in the broadestsense. A fourth collection,Ethical Problems(Êthika problêmata) proceeds in a similar way. Asthe lists of the essays’ titles at the beginning of eachcollection show, they contain a hodgepodge of topics – such asmatter and form, causes, colours, sleep, recollection – arrangedin a quite loose order. The intellectual level of these discussions isuneven and the titles of the treatises are sometimes misleading. Someof the essays do present problems and solutions, but others containexegeses of problematic passages in Aristotle’s texts. There arealso mere paraphrases or summaries of certain texts, collections ofarguments for a certain position, and sketches of larger projects thatwere never worked out. It is unclear when and by whom thesecollections were put together. As mentioned above, some of the essaysmay be the work of Alexander’s associates, or lecture-notestaken by his students. Most interesting from our point of view arethose questions that deal with metaphysical issues, like the relationof form and matter, or with the status of universals in general (seesection 4). Of particular interest are also those discussions in bookII that are concerned with certain aspects of Aristotle’spsychology, because Alexander’s commentary on theDeanima is lost; they supplement his treatiseOn the Soul,more on which below (see 3.3). Of interest are also the essays on thenotion of providence (an important topic in Alexander’s time, inpart due to the influence of the Stoics’ focus on divineprovidence). These essays defend the view that while there is nospecial care for individuals, providence over the objects in thesublunary sphere is exercised by the movement of the heavenly bodiesin the sense that they preserve the continuity of the species onearth.

Overall, Alexander himself does not signal where he departs fromAristotle. In the past, the understanding was that he presented hisown views only in his treatises, but today scholars tend to think thathe departs from Aristotle both in his systematic works and in hiscommentaries. They may not go so far as to agree with the starchcriticism of Plutarch: that Alexander, in his desire to expound hisown doctrines, and bring down Aristotle to his level, only pretendedto comment on Aristotle (about the commentary onDe Anima,and reported by Philoponus,In dA 21). They might agree withthe more appreciative version of that sentiment, however, that boththe treatises and the commentaries have philosophical significancebeyond their mere exegetical value.

3. Logic

As his commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works show, Alexanderwas fully familiar with the development of logic after Aristotle,under Theophrastus and the Stoics. On the whole, he presents theAristotelian kind of logic as the obviously right one, treating theStoic approach as wrong-headed. When he confronts problems inAristotle’s syllogistic he sometimes expresses bafflement, andindicates the difficulties or even inconsistencies he sees in thetext. But he usually tries to smooth them over or offers an allegedAristotelian solution. In any case he avoids, if at all possible,openly criticizing Aristotle or contradicting him. As his analysesshow, Alexander was not an original logician with innovative ideas ofhis own, as was his contemporary, Galen. He does not always getAristotle right and sometimes blunders in his exegesis. In addition,his style is uninviting. If Aristotle is hard to comprehend on accountof his clipped and elliptic style, Alexander is often hard to followbecause of his long and tortuous periods (cf. the Introduction to hiscommentary onPrior Analytics I in trsl. Barnes et al. 1991).In the past this has made his commentary on thePriorAnalytics inaccessible to all but experts. The Englishtranslations try to make up for these deficiencies by cutting up longperiods into shorter sentences. This will greatly enhance theusefulness of Alexander’s reconstruction and assessment of thoseaspects of Aristotle’s logic that are still a matter ofcontroversy nowadays.

Besides enhancing our understanding of Aristotle, and despite theirlimitations, some developments of interest to the logician may stillbe found in Alexander’s commentaries. For example, even if theyprobably precede Alexander, some elements of late ancient logic seepinto his discussions, such as in the commentary on Aristotle’sTopics. The “Peripatetic program” of mergingAristotelian and Stoic hypothetical logic shows up in his assumptionthat the Stoic indemonstrables are an invention of Aristotle’s,in his merger of Stoic and Aristotelian hypotheticals, and in his useof Stoic logical terminology for logical relations (Bobzien 2014).Another example is the introduction of a new kind of premise, thepremise ‘not only at a certain instant in time.’ This typeof premise seems to be reserved for statements about propria, whichalways hold, although they do not belong to the essence of asubstance, and which are therefore neither described in necessitypremises, nor in contingency premises, but in categorical premisesthat are true at more than one point in time (Gili 2012).

4. Metaphysics

In Alexander’s metaphysical writings, including hiscommentaries, we find some of the major points of ancient discussionconcerning the core, not so much of metaphysics, but of Aristotelianmetaphysics. At times, Alexander seems most focused on criticizingcontemporaries from an Aristotelian perspective, and at times insteadto defend Aristotelianism by elaborating in original ways that addresspossible criticisms. As an example of the former: in the treatiseOn Mixture and Increase Alexander expands on problems thatAristotle touched upon only briefly inOn Generation andCorruption I 10, but his main concern is — as it is in hisOn Fate — to prove that the Stoic position, in thiscase their account of a ‘thorough’ mixture of twosubstances, cannot be maintained. This treatise suggests that at thebeginning of the third century philosophical discussions between thetraditional schools were still lively. We have, of course, no otherevidence on that issue; but there would be little point in proving thesuperiority of the Peripatetic doctrine, as Alexander does inOnFate, in a work dedicated to the emperors, if the issue was bygeneral consent regarded as obsolescent. It is unlikely, therefore,that Alexander’s polemics are only a kind of shadow-boxingagainst long-gone adversaries.

As an example of the second, apologetic feature: in his commentary ontheMetaphysics, we find an elaboration of the questionwhether metaphysics can be a demonstrative science. Alexander makes aneffort to show that it is in fact a demonstrative science in the senseof Aristotle’sPosterior Analytics, i.e. with its owngenus or subject matter, axioms, and derived theorems. As part of thiseffort, he understands the subject matter of metaphysics, being quabeing, as referring to all beings, insofar as they are existent(Bonelli 2001). He also reshapes the concept of common notions, insuch a way that in metaphysics common notions may serve as axioms,i.e. provide its fundamental principles. Common notions, which startedout, in Aristotle and later the Stoics, as shared starting points forinquiry and argument, are expanded by Alexander to incorporatefeatures of dialectical starting points, points about which there isgeneral agreement, and scientific axioms. They are not innate, butimmediately evident to everyone, and serve as indemonstrable startingpoints for scientific knowledge — the prime example formetaphysics being the principle of non-contradiction (de Haas 2021).

Another core problem in theMetaphysics for ancient readersof Aristotle, was the status of theeidos or form, andespecially the relation between the individual as compound of matterand form, and the kind or species. One of the main questionsconcerning this relation, inspired especially byMet. Z, iswhether individuals or kinds are the main substances, or, morebroadly, where we find true being. In this debate, two key positionscan be discerned, which in turn divide into varieties, roughlycorresponding to contemporary positions (Rashed 2007, Kupreeva 2010):either individual substances are the primary beings, with their formsproviding their structures or attributes (the‘predicative’ reading of Aristotle); oreidê, forms in the sense of kinds or species are theprimary beings, and hylomorphic compounds are substances in aderivative sense (the ‘substantialist’ reading). Thepredicative reading is the one adopted by Andronicus of Rhodes andBoethus of Sidon. A more extreme version of this view can be found inearly peripatetic philosophy, such as that of Dicaearchus, whoproposed a materialist reading of Aristotle. The substantialist viewalso comes in two main varieties, which we may call‘idealist’ and ‘individualist.’ According tothe idealist view, true being is found first and foremost in theeidos in the sense of the species. The species is the primarysubstance, and determines the hylomorphic compound consisting of arelation between it and indeterminate matter. We could also call thisa Platonist view. The individualist interpretation, instead, givespriority of being to the individualeidos (Kupreeva 2010,Rashed 2007).

There is an ongoing debate about what precisely was Alexander’sview of Aristotle in this debate. Moraux (1942) stays close to thematerialist view, in suggesting that Alexander was a kind ofnominalist, based on his analysis of form in the commentary ondeAnima. Alexander there seems to elaborate what we may call a‘functionalist’ element of Aristotle’s naturalphilosophy (cf. Caston 2012): form, for Alexander, is precisely whatgives a substance the power (dynamis) to perform certainactivities (On the Soul 9). More recent scholarly work hasadded nuance to the discussion of Alexander’s position, asattempting to bring together Aristotle’s statements aboutsubstance inCategories,Metaphysics, anddeAnima. Rashed (2007), elaborating on a view discussed by Sharples(2005), puts Alexander in the substantialist camp, by arguing for anunderstanding of Alexander’s theory of forms as an essentialism,in the sense that forms, rather than individuals, are primary beings,and that forms are kinds constituting the essences of individuals.These forms should not be understood in the idealist sense, i.e. notas unique paradigms, but as entities that may be multiplied to thenumber of existing individual hylomorphic compounds. They are called‘common’ by Alexander insofar as they are consideredseparately from the material accidents of individual entities (seebelow), but in themselves they are particular, and not universal likePlatonic forms, insofar as each individual has its own instantiationof the relevant form. They are eternal insofar as they are transmittedbetween generations of living beings, and they are essences in thesense that they are the active principles ‘informing’individual beings (corresponding to thegenusanddifferentia specifica in the definition). On thisinterpretation, Alexander ends up between the Platonist and theindividualist camps.

This brings us to two other topics of interest, namelyAlexander’s views on universals, and on matter. With respect toAlexander’s discussions on universals, the established view isthat, as opposed to Aristotle, he emphatically distinguishes formsfrom universals (Sirkel 2011, following Tweedale 1984). This is trueonly, however, if we understand ‘universal’ here as thecommon concept (to koinon,Quaestio 1.3 ortokatholou, 1.11) which thought abstracts from particulars that inturn are caused by an eternal and common essence, form, or nature, asAlexander also calls it. The hylomorphically compound individual isposterior to the form. The individuals in turn are prior to theuniversal or abstracted ‘common’, or the genus.Alexander’s argument is that what a thing is, its form ornature, is not dependent on there being many instances, whereas thedefinition, and so the genus, are dependent on what the instances havein common. These instances need not exist at the same time.(Quaestio 1.11, 1.3, with Sirkel 2011, Rashed 2007). SoPerictione and her great-granddaughter have their individual humannature in common, i.e. their being a human has all features in common,even if both have features the other does not, and the common featuresor the universal, which we abstract from individual humans, can beexpressed in a definition. Because this definition ultimately relieson a correct abstraction of an eternal essence, it founds thepossibility of scientific knowledge (Rashed 2007). At the same time,however – and this again seems to be a polemical point againstPlatonism – such universals depend for their being on theactivity of intellect. If they are not thought, they are not there.Thus universal concepts are like enmattered forms, but in intellect,and active thoughts are their instantiations (De Anima 90with Sirkel 2011; see also 3.3).

What stands out in Alexander’s writings on matter is that he isthe first to elaborate Aristotle’s views into what became theclassic conception of prime matter. Starting from Aristotelianinspiration, and emphasizing the distinction between simple andcompound bodies, Alexander develops his conception of prime matter(prima materia, orkuriôs hulê,‘matter properly speaking’). Simple bodies consist only ofmatter and form (as opposed to compound bodies, which consist of otherbodies), and their matter has to be formless. This prime matter cannotexist independently of form, but it is not tied to any specific formeither. In a simple body like fire, for example, prime matter happensto take on heat and dryness, while it could take on their oppositesjust as well (On the Soul 4–5, see also Caston 5 andn.16). This feature of having the capacity of taking on oppositeattributes in turn, poses a problem for the heavens, which do notshare this feature, yet have to have a material substrate in order tobe natural, i.e. inherently moving. Distinguishing heavenly matterfrom sublunary matter, however, which Aristotle also required forsafeguarding the incorruptible nature of the heavens, results in theissue that the prime matter underlying the sublunary world is nolonger unqualified. Alexander solves this (logical) problem by statingthat the difference between the two is not qualitative: matter, bothbelow and beyond the moon, is the ultimate unqualified substrate;being capable of receiving opposites in turn is not a quality ofsublunary matter in the sense of a differentia distinguishing onespecies of matter from another (Quaestio 1.10, 1.15, withRashed 2007). Although Alexander does not say this explicitly, theunderlying thought seems to be that ultimately receiving opposites isnot a necessary attribute of sublunary matter, but a contingent one.The best definition of prima materia, then, for Alexander, is that itis the unqualified substrate.

As we will see, Alexander’s views on these features ofhylomorphism are important for his understanding of the relationbetween soul and body, and at times are elaborated with that relationspecifically in mind.

5. Psychology

In the realm of psychology, Alexander again in general elaborates onAristotle, while also responding to challenges offered by othercontemporary schools. His most interesting contributions concern therelation between soul and body, and the nature of the intellect.Especially the latter had a very long shadow, that has only recentlybeen recognized as a shadow thrown by Alexander, rather thanAristotle. Alexander’s naturalist approach in psychology isrevealed in his treatment of the human soul as the perishable formimposed upon the bodily elements to constitute a living human being.Aristotelian psychology, according to which the soul is a form of thebody, has to maneuver between the Scylla of Platonism and theCharybdis of reducing soul to a mere attribute of the body. Accordingto Platonic dualism, body and soul are both substances in the sense ofindependent beings, which was unacceptable for Aristotle for a coupleof reasons, among which primarily the fact that the independence ofsoul had to be reconciled with its role as formal cause. Understandingthe soul in a functionalist sense, however, risks reducing the soul toan accident, which means robbing it of the possibility of being thecause of activity, a source of motion. Alexander finds a safe coursebetween the two, by conceiving of forms as causal powers ordispositions of substances (see above), and by viewing the soul assupervening on the body. This means that a specific type of soul fitsonly a body made of a certain kind of mixture, i.e. a body that issuitable to performing certain functions, and that it supervenes onthe body which is its sufficient condition. The ontological priorityof soul or form over body is still guaranteed by the fact that thesoul is not the mixture of bodily elements, but the causal power thatemerges in it (Caston 2012).

The most debated aspect of Alexander’s psychology is no doubthis theory of the intellect. There are some problems regarding theconsistency between and withinOn the Soul andMantissa but we will here assume that they contain the sametheory, albeit with different emphases and within different contexts.One of the most interesting elements of that theory, also in light ofits later reception, is the elaboration of Aristotle’s passiveand active intellect (dA 3.5). Aristotle, after introducingthe intellect and its capacities inde Anima 3.4, in 3.5presents a distinction of two kinds of intellect: passive and active.The passive is also called material and potential, the active is alsocalled productive, separable, impassible and unmixed, immortal andeternal. There are as many readings of this distinction as there arereaders, with the differences centering around the followingquestions: how do active and passive intellect relate? And isAristotle separating two aspects of the human intellect, or is heinstead distinguishing human from divine intellect?

With respect to that last question, and this may well be his mostinfluential interpretation of Aristotle, Alexander chooses the secondoption: the passive intellect is the one found in humans, but theactive intellect is transcendent and divine (although there is a sensein which the human intellect can be called active, and productive,rather than passive, see below). The passive or material intellect isalso “natural”, because it is found in all healthy humans(On the Soul 81). It is tied to the corporeal world in twoways: it is focused upon enmattered forms, in its laying hold of theuniversal as the common feature of particulars (On the Soul83,Mantissa 110), and it is embodied in the sense that it isa capacity of the soul which is a form of a human body. This is notwhy it is called material, however. ‘Material’ in thiscontext refers to the other standard meaning of matter, i.e. of beinga substrate, because the material intellect is purely receptive.Following Aristotle, Alexander argues that all forms are objects ofintellect, and if the intellect had any form itself, that form wouldinterfere with its intellectual reception of other forms (On theSoul 84,Mantissa 106–7; it is moreover receptivein two manners: as receiving the theoretical and the practicaldisposition). It is therefore nothing in actuality, but potentiallyeverything, which is why it is also called the potential intellect.Aristotle’s analogy of the empty writing tablet (dA429b30–430a2) therefore has to be understood, according toAlexander, not as emphasizing that the material intellect is analogousto the tablet, but to its emptiness: it is a condition or an aptitudeof the soul (On the Soul 84).

For a further stage of development of the potential intellect,Alexander introduces a separate term: once it has reached its firstactualization, or fully developed its natural capacity, the materialintellect may be called the “dispositional intellect.”This label refers to the disposition reached by the acquisition ofscientific understanding (epistêmê). This stage is alsocalled “common”, as not all humans reach it, but most doat least reach a certain degree of such universal and syntheticknowledge (On the Soul 82,Mantissa 107), orknowledge of essences as expressed in definitions (On theSoul 87). The final stage of development is the secondactualization, when the intellect actively engages in intellectualacts, and becomes that which it knows. It is then itself intellect inact, and it knows and becomes intelligibles in act (as opposed to thepotential intelligibles, i.e. enmattered forms), so in this sense itmay be said to know itself (On the Soul 87–8,Mantissa 108). As creating the very intelligibles it knows,it may moreover be called active and productive, rather than passive,to distinguish it from the senses (Mantissa 111). Theintelligibles in act, although analogous to the enmattered forms, arequite emphatically described by Alexander as a different kind of forms(Guyomarc’h 2023).

There is a tension in Alexander’ view of the material intellect,as it seems to combine complete receptivity, and hence passivity, withsome kind of cognitive activity, to begin with abstraction. The roleof receptivity guarantees the objectivity of our abstractions, but itis not quite clear how intellection starts (Tuominen 2010). In someinterpretations, Alexander tries to solve this problem using theactive intellect and what Guyomarc’h calls the Principle ofMaximal Causality. That principle is a metaphysical argument withroots in Plato, but also present in Aristotle, which assumes that forall degrees of a property, there has to be something which has thatproperty to the fullest, and that that something has to be the causeof the lower degrees (cf. Guyomarc’h 2023). So Alexander statesthat besides the human intellect developing from potentiality toactuality, there has to be an intellect that is always alreadyessentially in act, preceding all potentiality (cf. AristotleMet. 12). This active or productive intellect is the mostintelligible form (On the Soul 88–90,Mantissa107–110, 113), and because it is immaterial, it also has aseparable or separate existence, and is impassible and unmixed,immortal and eternal. Alexander thus has the active intellecttranscend the human soul, and rules out personal immortality byidentifying this separate active intellect, mentioned by Aristotle inDe anima 3.5, with pure form and with God, the divineintellect from Aristotle’sMet. 12, and possibly evenwith the Good from Plato’sRepublic, as the cause ofall goodness, knowledge and being (On the Soul 89–90with Caston 1999, Fotinis 1979, Guyomarc’h 2023).

How, according to Alexander, this active intellect and the human,passive intellect are related, is not an easy question to answer. Itseems clear, however, that the active intellect is a necessarycondition for development in the potential intellect, whose purepotentiality prevents it from being the agent that starts its owncognitive process. Three main interpretations have been offered forthe causal role of the active intellect: that it is an efficientcause, that it is a final cause, and that it is both (for the lattersee Nyvlt 2012 and Schroeder 2014). That Alexander calls the activeintellect the productive (poietikos) cause of all other intelligibles,is the main argument for understanding it as the efficient cause ofintellection. This reading is problematic, however, insofar as itwould require the active intellect to focus on something other thanthinking itself – and therefore render it a potential intellectto some extent. For the view that it is merely the final cause(Tuominen 2006, de Haas 2021, Guyomarc’h 2023), pleadsAlexander’s claim that the intellect “from outside”(thurathen) is the cause of our knowing because as pure formit is the ultimate object of our intellection, and as pure act theultimate paradigm, which confers on our material intellect thedisposition to think what is potentially intelligible: “it doesnot make [our intellect] intellect, but by its own nature perfects theintellect that exists [already] and leads it to the things that areproper to it” (Mantissa 111–2). This notion ofthe intellect “from outside” is taken fromAristotle’sOn Generation of Animals 437b, where it ismeant to solve the problem of the emergence of the soul, andespecially the rational powers, in embryos: only intellect, Aristotlesays, does not at some point arise in the development of the embryo,but somehow comes “from outside” and is divine. FollowingPlatonist criticisms of Peripatetic discussions of that emergence,Alexander elaborates and interprets the “intellect fromoutside” in an original manner, as referring to the transcendentdivinity and the prior and independent existence of the intellect inact, with respect to our intellects and cognition. This intellect ispresent in us from outside, only in the sense that when we think (of)the active intellect, our intellect thereby becomes the activeintellect “in some way” (On the Soul 89). Thisdoes not mean that the active intellect itself is somehow present inus, except analogously, as object and hence state of our thought. Itis then, that we are closest to the divine (On the Soul 91,Mantissa 113; on the notion “from outside” inAlexander see also Roreitner 2023, Guyomarc’h 2023, de Haas2021, Opsomer and Sharples 2000, Schroeder and Todd 1990). A problemfor this interpretation is that it is still not clear how ourinitially purely potential intellect kicks into gear. A possiblesolution would be that the initial stages of development in theintellect are passive, due to the repeated reception of enmatteredforms through repeated reception, and that the first grasping of theuniversal (as described inAn. Post. II 19), as immaterialand intelligible form, is the moment our intellect intelligizes thedivine active intellect by becoming an active intellect itself (cf. deHaas 2021).

6. Ethics and Fate

Since Alexander did not write a commentary on Aristotle’sethics, hisEthical Problems, despite their somewhatdisorganized state, are of considerable interest (cf. Madigan 1987;Sharples 1990; 2001, 2). For, apart from parts of Aspasius’early commentary on theNicomachean Ethics there are noextant commentaries on Aristotle’s ethics before the compositecommentary by various hands of the Byzantine age (Michael of Ephesusin the 11th/12th c. and his contemporary Eustratius, together withsome material extracted from earlier authors, cf. Sharples 1990,6–7, 95). This gap may suggest that ethics had become a marginalsubject in later antiquity. Alexander’sEthicalProblems are therefore the only link between Aspasius and themedieval commentaries. His essays are moreover worth studying becausemany of the ‘questions’ address central issues in ancientethics. Some, for instance, are concerned with the notion of pleasureas a good and pain as an evil; with pleasure as a supplement ofactivity supporting its connection with happiness; with the relationsupervening upon it and between virtues and vices; with virtue as amean; and with the concept of the involuntary and the conditions ofresponsibility. Alexander’s discussions confirm not only histhorough familiarity with Aristotle’s ethics, but also reflectthe debates of the Peripatetics with the Epicureans and Stoics inHellenistic times, as shown especially by the terminology he uses, aswell as debates within the Peripatetic school. For example, heelaborates on pain as, like pleasure, a supplement of activity, butwith a reverse value in respect to the activity (pain accompanying badactivities is good), in what is apparently a debate between apleasure-friendly and a pleasure-hostile trend in the Peripateticschool (cf. Cheng 2014). In discussing such ethical problems,Alexander pays special attention to logical and (meta)physicalaspects, as in this case the supervenience and causality of pleasure.This approach may be explained from the Hellenistic context in whichhe is working, and the (often implicit) debates of his time. Anotherexample is his discussion of the coming to be of opposites not fromeach other, but from privation as an intermediate state, starting fromthe relation between justice and injustice (Eth.Pr.30, possibly to underpin the anti-Stoic thesis ofEth. Pr.3).

The best example of Alexander’s procedure is his construal of anAristotelian conception of fate in the treatiseOn Fate. Thisessay, though not easy to read, is probably the most interesting for ageneral public (cf. Sharples 1983 and 2001, 1). Not only is it themost comprehensive surviving document in the centuries-long debate onfate, determinism, and free will that was carried on between theStoics, the Epicureans and the Academic Skeptics, it also containssome original suggestions and points of criticism, as a comparisonwith Cicero’sOn Fate would show. It is unclear whetherthere had been a genuinely Peripatetic contribution to this debatebefore Alexander, although the fact that Justin Martyr, his slightlyolder contemporary, uses much the same terminology, suggests that theymay have been inspired by a common source. In any case, Alexanderappears to have filled a significant gap in the Peripatetic school.Though Aristotle himself in a way touches on all important aspects ofthe problem of determinism — logical, physical, and ethical— in different works, he was not greatly concerned with thisissue, nor does he entertain the notion of fate(heimarmenê) as a rational cosmic ordering-force, asthe Stoics did. InDe interpretatione 9, he famously proposedto solve the problem of ‘future truth’ by suspendingtruth-values for statements in the future tense concerning individualcontingent events. In his ethics he deals with the question of whetherindividuals have free choice, once their character is settled. AsAristotle sees it, there is little or no leeway, but he holdsindividuals responsible for their actions because they collaborated inthe acquisition of their character (EN III, 1–5). Inhis physical works Aristotle limits strict necessity to the motions ofthe stars, while allowing for a wide range of events in the sublunaryrealm that do not happen of necessity but only for the most part oraccidentally (Phys. II, 4–6). Though he subscribes tothe principle that the same causal constellations have the sameeffects, he also allows for ‘fresh starts’ in a causalseries (Metaph. E 3). Given these various limitations,Aristotle had no reason to treat determinism as a centralphilosophical problem either in his ethics or in his physics. Thesituation changed, however, once the Stoics had established arigorously physicalist system ordered by an all-pervasive divine mind.It is this radicalization of the determinist position that sharpenedthe general consciousness of the problematic, as witnessed by therelentless attacks on the Stoics by their opponents, most of all bythe Academic skeptics and the Epicureans, which lasted forcenturies.

This long-standing debate prompted Alexander to develop anAristotelian concept of fate by identifying it with the naturalconstitution of things, including human nature (On Fate, ch.2–6). Since there is always the possibility that somethinghappens against the natural and normal order of things, there areexceptions to what is ‘fated’ and there is room for chanceand the fortuitous. Most of the treatise is occupied not with thedefense of this Peripatetic position, but rather with attacks on thevarious aspects of the determinist position. Alexander claims to showwhy the Stoics’ attempt (though he nowhere names them) to defenda compabilitist position must fail. The determinists, he says, areneither entitled to maintain a coherent concept of luck and thefortuitous, nor of contingency and possibility, nor of deliberationand potency. The bulk of this polemical discussion concentrates on thedifficulties for the Stoic position by claiming that their concept offate makes human deliberation superfluous and therefore importsdisastrous consequences for human morality and life in general (chs.7–21). Alexander also presents, albeit in a dialectical fashionintended to lead to the defeat of the Stoic tenets, the arguments usedby the Stoics in their defense of contingency, chance, and humanresponsibility. As he claims time and again, the Stoics can defend theuse of these terms at best in a verbal sense. In addition, theirnotion of divine foreknowledge and prophecy turns out to be incoherent(chs. 22–35). The stringency and originality ofAlexander’s critique cannot be discussed here (cf. Sharples1983; Bobzien 1998; Adamson 2018). While his presentation is not freefrom repetition and while the order of the arguments leaves somethingto be desired, it is an interesting text that displays a livelyengagement with the issues and quite some philosophicalsophistication. He argues that truly free action requires that at thetime one acts, it is open to one both to do and not to do what onedoes in fact then do. Thus Alexander originates the position laterknown as ‘libertarianism’ in the theory of free action.Alexander’s construction of an Aristotelian account of fate anddivine providence that limits them to nature and its overall benignorder clearly argues for a weak conception of fate; but it is the onlyone that Alexander regards as compatible with the principles ofAristotelian philosophy of nature and ethics. That the concept of fategreatly intrigued him is confirmed by the fact that he returns to theissue in hisSupplement (henceforthMantissa) to thetreatiseOn the Soul and in some of hisProblems(2.4.5, cf. Sharples 1983, esp. the Introduction).

7. Importance and Influence

There is no information concerning the impact of Alexander’steaching in his lifetime. But certain indications of critical attackson his contemporary Galen (129–216 CE), for example of hiscriticism of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, suggest that he wasengaged in controversy with other contemporaries as well. Whether hispolemics against contemporary versions of Stoic doctrine were part ofa personal exchange or rather a bookish exercise is unclear. IfAlexander held the chair of Peripatetic philosophy at Athens it isquite possible that he was in direct contact with the incumbents ofthe other philosophical chairs there. He was, of course, not the firstcommentator on Aristotle. But posterior exegetes certainly treated asexemplary his method and his standards for explaining problems andobscurities in Aristotle’s texts. This is indicated both byexplicit references in later commentators, and by the unacknowledgedexploitation of his work in some extant later commentaries on the sametexts, as well as in systematic writings – including some in thePlatonic schools, as shows from the use of Alexandrian material byPlatonists such as Plotinus and Syrianus (for examples see Chiaradonna2012). As the translations of his work into Arabic and, to a lesserdegree, into Latin show, he continued to be treated as a leadingauthority and his work influenced the Aristotelian traditionthroughout late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance(see Rossi/Di Giovanni/Robiglio 2021). In the modern age interest inAlexander, both as a commentator and as a philosopher, was greatlyenhanced when, under the general editorship of Hermann Diels, theCommentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (together with themany-volumedSuppelementum Aristotelicum) were published bythe Prussian Academy of Science between 1882–1909. Scholarsnowadays continue to make use of his commentaries, not only forhistorical reasons but also because his suggestions are often worthconsidering in their own right. Because in recent years much moreattention has been paid to the philosophers in late antiquity, notonly to the Neo-Platonists, Alexander’s work has come underdetailed scrutiny in various respects by specialists, as witnessed byan increase in publications both on general and on special aspects ofhis exegetical and philosophical work. The accessibility of most ofhis writings in translations makes apparent to a more generalreadership that Alexander’s work is not only relevant forspecialists in the history of philosophy, but opens up an interestingage of transition in the history of philosophical and scientificideas.

Bibliography

A. Primary Sources

1. Commentaries

• Diels, H. (ed.), 1882–1909,Commentaria in AristotelemGraeca, Berlin: Reimer.
  • Hayduck, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 1,On the Metaphysics.
  • Wallies, M. (ed.), 1883, Vol. 2.1,On Prior Analytics1.
  • Wallies, M. (ed.), 1891, Vol. 2.2,On the Topics.
  • Wallies, M. (ed.), 1898, Vol. 2.3,On SophisticalRefutations.
  • Wendland, P. (ed.), 1899, Vol. 3.1,On De sensu.
  • Hayduck, M. (ed.), 1901, Vol. 3.2,On Meteorology.

2. Treatises considered genuine and fragments

• Accattino, P., & Donini, P. (eds.), 1996,Alessandro DiAfrodisia: L’Anima: Traduzione, Introduzione e Commento.Roma/Bari: Laterza.
• Bergeron, M., & Dufour, R. (eds.), 2008,Alexandred’Aphrodise. De l’âme. Texte Grec Introduit, Traduitet Annoté. Paris: Vrin.
• Bruns, Ivo (ed.), 1887, 1892Scripta Minora, vols. 1 and2, Berlin: Reimer.
• Groisard, J. (ed.), 2013,Sur la mixtion et la croissanced’ Alexandre d’Aphrodise, Texte établi, trad. etcommenté, Paris: Belles Lettres.
• Rashed, M. (ed.), 2011,Alexandre d’Aphrodise,Commentaire perdue à la Physique d’Aristote (livresIV-VIII). Les scholies byzantines, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Rescigno, A. (ed), 2004/2008,Alessandro di Afrodisia:Commentario al De caelodi Aristotele, 1. Frammenti del primolibro, 2.Frammenti del secondo, terzo e quarto libro,Amsterdam: Hakkert.
• Thillet, P. (ed.), 1984,Traité Du Destin, Texteétabli et traduction,Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

3. Spuria

• Kapetanaki, S. & R. W.Sharples, 2006,Pseudo Aristoteles(Pseudo Alexander), Supplementa Problematorum (edited withintroduction and annotated translation), Berlin: De Gruyter.

B. Translations

1. Latin translations

• Alexandre d’Aphrodiasias. Commentaire sur lesmétéores d’Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume deMoerbeke, A.J. Smet (ed.), Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1968.
• Alexandre d’Aphrodisias. De fato ad imperatores: Versionlatine de Guillaume de Moerbeke, P. Thillet (ed.), Paris: Vrin,1963.
• Alexander Aphrodisias: Enarratio de anima ex Aristotelisinstitutione, Hieronymus Donatus (trans.), reprint of firstedition Brescia 1495 (with intr. by Eckard Kessler).Commentariain Aristotelem Graeca: Versiones latinae temporis resuctitatarumlitterarum, (CAGL.) 13, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2008.
• Alexander von Aphrodisias:In libros meteorologicorum,Alexander Piccolomineus (trans.), reprint of first edition Venice1561, with introduction by Cristina Viano, Stuttgart:Frommann-Holzboog, 2010.

2. English translations of the commentaries (with notes):

Richard Sorabji (gen. ed.), London: Duckworth, Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press. Later: London: Bristol Classical Press. Presently:London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics1, W.E. Dooley, 1989.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 2& 3, W.E. Dooley & A. Madigan, 1992.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics4, A. Madigan, 1993.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Metaphysics5, W. E. Dooley, 1993.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Meteorology4, E. Lewis, 1996.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics1.1–7, J. Barnes et al., 1991.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s PriorAnalyticsI.8–13, I. Mueller with J. Gould,1999.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior AnalyticsI,14–22. I. Mueller with J. Gould, 1999
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics1.23–31, I. Mueller, 2006.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics1.32–46, I. Mueller, 2006.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s On SensePerception, A. Towey, 2000.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Topics 1,J. M. van Ophuisen, 2001.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Topics 2,L. Castelli, 2020.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Topics 3,L. Castelli, 2021.
• Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle’s Coming-to-Be andPerishing 2.2–5, E. Gannagé, 2005.

3. Other translations of the commentaries (with notes)

Lavaud, L. & Guyomarc’h, G., 2021,Alexandred’Aphrodise. Commentaire à la Métaphysiqued’Aristote.Livre petit alphaet beta,introduction, traduction et notes, Paris: Vrin.

4. Major Treatises

• Todd, R. B., 1976,Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics:a study of the De mixtione with preliminary essay (text,translation and commentary), Leiden: Brill.
• Fotinis, A. P., 1980,The De anima of Alexander ofAphrodisias (translation and commentary), Washington, D.C.:University Press of America.
• Sharples, R.W., 1983,Alexander of Aphrodisias On Fate(text, translation and commentary), London: Duckworth.
• Sharples, R.W, 2004,Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement toOn the Soul, London: Duckworth
• Sharples, R.W., 2008,Alexander Aphrodisiensis De anima librimantissa (a new edition of the Greek text with introduction andcommentary), Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Caston, V., 2012,Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Soul: PartI (translation with introduction and commentary), London: BristolClassical Press.

5. Minor works

• Sharples, R.W., 1990,Ethical Problems (translation withnotes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Sharples, R.W., 1992,Quaestiones 1.2–2.15(translation with notes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.
• Sharples, R.W., 1994,Quaestiones 2.16–3.15(translation with notes), London: Duckworth and Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.

6. Works extant in Arabic

• D’Ancona C. & G. Serra, 2002 (eds.), ‘AlexanderOn the Principles of the Universe,On Providence,Against Galen on Motion, andOn SpecificDifferences,’ inAristotele et Alessandro di Afrodisianella tradizione araba, Padova: Il Poligrafo.
• Genequand, C., 2001,Alexander of Aphrodisias: On theCosmos, Leiden: Brill.
• Rescher, N. & M. Marmura, 1969,The Refutation byAlexander of Aphrodisias of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory ofMotion (translation with introduction and notes), Islamabad:Islamic Research Institute.
• Thillet, P., 2003,Alexandre d’Aphrodise: Traitéde la providence (Peri pronoias, version Arabe de Abu Bissar Matthaeibn Yunus. Intr. ed. et trad.), Lagrasse: Verdier.

C. Secondary Literature: Overviews

• D’Ancona C. & Serra, G. 2002,Aristotele etAlessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba, Padova: IlPoligrafo.
• Blumenthal, H. & H. Robinson (eds.), 1991,Aristotle andthe Later Traditions, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Blumenthal, H., 1996,Aristotle and Neoplatonism in LateAntiquity, London: Duckworth.
• Gottschalk, H.B., 1987, ‘Aristotelian philosophy in theRoman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second centuryA.D.,’ in W. Haase (ed.),Aufstieg und Niedergang derRömischen Welt, Berlin: De Gruyter, II.36.2,1079–1174.
• Lamprakis, A., 2022, “Did the Arabic Tradition Know a MoreComplete Version of Alexander’s Commentary on Aristotle’sTopics? The Evidence from Ps-Jābir’sKitāb al-Nukhab / Kitāb al-Baḥth”,Methodos 22. doi:10.4000/methodos.8763
• Lynch, J. P., 1972,Aristotle’s School. A Study of aGreek Educational Institution, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.
• Mercken, P., 1973,The Greek Commentaries on the NicomacheanEthics of Aristotle, Leiden: Brill.
• Moraux, P., 1942,Alexandre d’Aphrodise:exégète de la noétique d’ Aristote,Liège: Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres del’Université de Liège.
• Moraux, P., 1973,Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,Volume 1 (Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v.Chr.), Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Moraux, P., 1984,Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,Volume 2 (Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jahrhundert n.Chr.), Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Moraux, P., 2001,Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen,Volume 3 (Alexander von Aphrodisias), J. Wiesner (ed.),Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Pfeiffer, R., 1968,A History of Classical Scholarship,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rashed, M., 2007,Essentialisme. Alexandre d’Aphrodiseentre logique, physique et comologie, Berlin: De Gruyter.
• Rashed, M. (ed.), 2008,Alexandre d’Aphrodise,Paris: Les Etudes Philologiques.
• Rossi, R.B., Di Giovanni, M., and Robiglio, A.A (eds.), 2021,Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Middle Ages and theRenaissance (Studia Artistarum: 45), Turnhout: Brepols.
• Schroeder, F. M.,2014,‘From Alexander to Plotinus‘,The Routledge Handbook in Philosophy, London: Routledge,293–309
• Sharples, R. W., 1987, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias:Scholasticism and Innovation,’ in W. Haase (ed.),Aufstiegund Niedergang der Römischen Welt, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987,pp. 1176–1243.
• Sorabji, R. (ed.), 1990,Aristotle Transformed: the ancientcommentators and their influence, London: Duckworth.
• Sorabji, R., 2004,The Philosophy of the Commentators. ASource-Book, 4 volumes, London: Duckworth.
• Sorabji, R. (ed.), 2016,Aristotle re-interpreted: Newfindings on seven hundred years of the ancient commentators,London: Bloomsbury Publishers.
• Trego, K., 2015,La liberté en actes: éthique etmétaphysique d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à JeansDuns Scotus, Paris: Vrin.
• Tuominen, M., 2009,The ancient commentators on Platon andAristotle, Berkeley: University of California Press.

D. Secondary Literature: Studies on Particular Topics

• Accattino, P., 2005,Alessandro di Afrodisia: De anima II(Mantissa), Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso.
• Adamson, P., 2018, ‘Dialectical Method in Alexander ofAphrodisias’ Treatises on Fate and Providence,’OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy, 54: 279–308.
• Adler, J., 2014, ‘Mortality of the soul from Alexander ofAphrodisias to Spinoza,’Spinoza and medieval Jewishphilosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,13–35.
• Angelelli, I. & Cerezo, M. (eds.), 1996,Studies on theHistory of Logic, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 107–127.
• Benevich, F., 2019, ‘The Priority of Natures against theIdentity of Indiscernibles; Alexander of Aphrodisias, Yahya bin Adi,and Avicenna on Genus as Matter,’Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, 57: 205–234.
• Bobzien, S., 1998,Determinism and Freedom in StoicPhilosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2014, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias onAristotle’s Theory of the Stoic Indemonstrables,’ in M.Lee (ed.),Strategies of Argument. Essays in Ancient Ethics,Epistemology, and Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press,199–227.
• Bodnar, I., 1997, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on CelestialMotions,’Phronesis, 42: 190–205.
• Bonelli, M., 2001,Alessandro di Afrodisia e la metafisicacome scienza dimostrativa, Naples: Bibliopolis.
• Caston, V., 1999, ‘Aristotle’s Two Intellects: AModest Proposal,’Phronesis, 44: 199–227.
• Chaniotis, A., 2004, ‘Epigraphic evidence for thephilosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias,’Bulletin of theInstitute of Classical Studies, 47: 79–81.
• Cheng, W., 2014, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Pleasure andPain in Aristotle,’ in W. Harris (ed.),Pleasure and Pain inClassical Times, Leiden: Brill, 174–200.
• Chiaradonna, R. 2012, ‘Interpretazione Filosofica eRicezione Del Corpus. Il Caso Di Aristotele (100 a.C. – 250d.C.),’Quaestio, 11: 83–114.
• Chiaradonna, R. & Rashed, M., 2010, ‘Before and afterthe Commentators: An Exercise in Periodization. A Discussion ofRichard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators,200–600AD,’Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 38:251–297.
• Coroleu, A., 1996, ‘The Fortuna of Juan Ginés deSepúlveda’s Translations of Aristotle and of Alexander ofAphrodisias,’Journal of the Warburg and CourtauldInstitutes, 59: 325–332.
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