Joseph Albo (c. 1380–1444) was a Jewish philosopher active inChristian Spain in the first half of the fifteenth century. His mainphilosophical work isSefer ha-‘Ikkarim [Book ofPrinciples], completed in 1425 in the town of Soria in the crownof Castile. In this work, Albo addresses a wide variety ofinterpretive, theological and philosophical issues, in a styleintegrating logical, methodical analyses with exegetical discussions.Albo’s composition reveals his exposure to the works of manyJewish philosophers that preceded him, particularly Maimonides, HasdaiCrescas (Albo’s teacher in his formative years), and hiscontemporary, Simeon ben Zemah Duran. The historical circumstances inwhich he lived, especially the Catholic Church’s persecution ofthe Jews in Christian Spain, led him to contribute to theanti-Christian polemic, and influenced his writings which reflectexposure to the thought of such Christian philosophers as ThomasAquinas.

Albo’s central contribution to the history of Jewish philosophyis his theory of principles. He determines the fundamental, necessarybeliefs that a person must uphold in order to belong to the systemcalled “divine law.” This theory serves as an alternativeto previous enumerations of principles, especially the thirteenprinciples of faith formulated by Maimonides. Albo’s listincludes three fundamental beliefs: the existence of God, revelation,and reward and punishment. The following paragraphs will outlineAlbo’s theory and several of the prominent issues in histhought, such as the theory of law, the theory of divine attributes,the theory of human perfection and the theory of providence andreward.

• 1. Biographical Sketch
• 2. Historical Background
• 3. Introduction toSefer ha-‘Ikkarim
• 4. The Theory of Law
• 5. The Theory of Principles
• 6. The Theory of Divinity
• 7. The Theory of Humanity
• 8. The Theory of Providence and Recompense
• Bibliography
  • Primary Literature
  • Secondary Literature
• Academic Tools
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

1. Biographical Sketch

The known details of Albo’s life are sparse. He was born inChristian Spain in Monreal, a town in Aragon before 1380 and died inthe crown of Castile around 1444. He was taught by Hasdai Crescas inSaragossa and later served as a rabbi and preacher. In1413–1414, he played a dominant role in the Disputation atTortosa, a major public polemic between the Jewish convert toChristianity Geronimo de Santa Fe (formerly Joshua Lorki), whorepresented the pope, and delegates from many Jewish communities inChristian Spain. In this debate, Albo represented the Jewish communityof Daroca in Aragon (Graetz 1894, 179–220; Baer 1961,170–232; Rauschenbach 2002, 11–47). After this communitywas decimated in 1415, he moved to the town of Soria in Castile(Gonzalo Maeso 1971, 131; Motis Dolader 1990, 148). But Albo is mainlyknown for his philosophical treatise,Seferha-‘Ikkarim[Book of Principles], which he finished around1425. Albo seems to have had a command of Spanish and Latin inaddition to Hebrew, the language ofSefer ha-‘Ikkarim(Husik 1928–30, 67), but his level of fluency in Arabic isunknown.

2. Historical Background

Albo’s philosophical theory reflects the historical reality inwhich he lived and worked. The distressed state of the Jewishcommunity in Christian Spain motivated his composition of hisphilosophical work. In the fourteenth century, the Jews in Spain weresubject to religious persecution by the Catholic Church and Christiansociety. Jewish thought also suffered from sharp ideological conflictbetween conservative thinkers and rationalists over both theologicaland social issues.

In an effort to pressure Jews to convert, the Christian authoritiesinstituted extreme economic measures and passed discriminatory sociallegislation. They used coercive tactics in their exhortations andorganized harsh pogroms, such as those of 1391. These repressivemeasures forced many Jews to die a martyr’s death or led to massconversion of Jews to Christianity and to deterioration on the social,economic, and spiritual planes (Baer 1961, 95–243; Netanyahu1966, cf. index [“Conversions”]; Ben-Sasson 1984,208–220, 232–238; Gutwirth 1993).

Intellectually, this period witnessed the revival of the disputebetween followers of Maimonides and his opponents. On one side of thisconflict, rationalists espoused the study of philosophy and attemptedto integrate it into their religious-spiritual world while resolvingthe contradictions that emerged between philosophy and the sources ofrevelation. On the other side, conservatives rejected the study ofphilosophy and instead adhered to the classic religious sources, theBible and the Talmud, and viewed kabbalistic literature as acontinuation of the chain of revelation. One of the focal points ofthe conflict between these two theological schools was the exchange ofmutual accusations on the issue of responsibility for the diresituation of Jewish society under Christian persecution (Schwartz1991).

Modern scholars have conducted comprehensive studies of therelationship between the characteristics of Jewish philosophy in Spainduring the fifteenth century, including Albo’s thought, and thehistorical reality of that period (Baer 1961, 232–243; Davidson1983, 112–113; Cohen 1993; Manekin 1997).

3. Introduction toSefer ha-‘Ikkarim

Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim is Albo’s monumentalphilosophical treatise. This book offers an extensive description ofthe author’s theoretical doctrine. Forming the basis of thisdoctrine and the framework for the rest of his formulations are hisprinciples of faith, which attempt to define the beliefs that are thenecessary fundamentals of a system of laws whose source is the divine.Before we examine the various philosophical views incorporated withinthis book, we will offer a concise description of its structure,stylistic characteristics, and goals.

Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim is composed of a preface, whichincludes a highly detailed table of contents; an introduction; andfour treatises divided into chapters. Although Albo completed writingthe book around 1425, scholars have long agreed that before the bookwas published in its entirety, a preliminary version appeared,comprising the first of the four treatises (Back 1869, 8–10;Tänzer 1896, 19–22, 27; Schweid 1967, 25).

In the first treatise ofSefer ha-‘Ikkarim, Albopresents in detail his theory of principles and the various issues itincludes. Albo points out several problems with the lists ofprinciples of faith proposed by his predecessors, as he felt that noearlier Jewish philosophical work had adequately dealt with theprinciples of religion. In particular, he challenges Maimonides’list of thirteen principles of faith, proposing in their place aconcise list numbering only three basic beliefs. Albo sought toredefine the principles of Judaism in the universal context of divinelaw. Absent these beliefs, Albo believes that divine law has noexistence or significance: 1) the existence of God, 2) the divineorigin of the Torah, and 3) reward and punishment. This listdetermines the structure of the entire book, since the following threetreatises address each one of the three principles, and theirderivatives, in turn. The main topic of the second treatise is theexistence of God, and it discusses the theory of divinity, especiallythe theory of divine attributes. The third treatise, whose main topicis the divine origin of the Torah, covers the issues of humanperfection, general prophecy, and Mosaic prophecy and law. Itconcludes with a thorough discussion of the religious emotions of fearand love of God. The fourth and last treatise, whose main subject isreward and punishment, divides into two sections. The first sectiondescribes the theory of divine providence, the problem of evil and thesignificance of the precepts of prayer and repentance. The secondsection in the fourth treatise speaks of the theory of recompense,emphasizing that of the world to come. The criteria for a believer indivine law are not only the acceptance of the three principles, butthe derivative principles which he calls “roots,” whichfollow from them. Albo also specifies six dogma of lesser status,“branches,” that are particular to Judaism. The languageofSefer ha-‘Ikkarim is straightforward, and itsphilosophical arguments are formulated in a relatively simple andclear manner. These characteristics mean that a broad audience ofreaders can approach this philosophical work on their own.Furthermore, the modern reader can rely on Albo’s clearformulations to gain a preliminary acquaintance with many of thephilosophical viewpoints offered in the general framework of medievalJewish philosophy, as Albo synthesized the opinions of his Jewishphilosophical predecessors and contemporaries in an accessible stylethat led to the book’s popularity.

An additional stylistic aspect ofSefer ha-‘Ikkarimtouches directly on the body of his theory. The book includes a numberof internal contradictions on a wide variety of philosophical issues.This fact has led most scholars to the conclusion that this is aneclectic work, lacking philosophic originality or systematicconsistency in his individual discussions of philosophical concepts(Guttmann 1955; Guttmann 1964, 247–251; Ravitzky 1988,104–105; Harvey 2015). Yet some recent scholars have proposed anew angle of perception on the significance of these internalcontradictions, identifying inSefer ha-‘Ikkarim anesoteric writing style similar to that of Maimonides’Guideof the Perplexed. According to this viewpoint, the internalcontradictions are not the result of lack of attention on the part ofan eclectic and average philosopher who combined various sourceswithout regard to the differences between them. On the contrary, theybelieve these contradictions demonstrate meticulous attention on thepart of the philosopher. The maverick position claims that Albointentionally embedded in his book conflicting opinions in order tohide his true viewpoint on various theological issues from certaingroups of readers. Among other evidence, this research position relieson Albo’s explicit statement in the introductory comment to thesecond treatise (Schwartz 2002, 183–196; Ehrlich 2009a).

Most scholars assume that we should understand Albo’s goal inwritingSefer ha-‘Ikkarim against the background of thehistorical reality in which he lived. As indicated, the book waswritten as an attempt to address the severe social and religiousdistress of the Jews of Christian Spain in the late fourteenth –early fifteenth centuries. In the framework of this approach, we maydiscern two different goals that the book intends to serve.

Social goal –to offer a uniform defense of Jewish dogmaalongside a refutation of the doctrines of Christianity, with the aimof limiting the conversion and the spiritual decline of the Jews ofChristian Spain at that time (Husik 1928–30, 62–65).

Theoretical goal – to redefine the principles ofJudaism and discuss its theoretical relation to philosophy, in lightof the intensification of internal arguments on these issues withinJewish thought during the period (Back 1869, 5–6; Lerner 2000,90–95).

Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim was initially published in 1485 asone of the first works of Jewish philosophy to reach the printingpress. The book made a considerable impact throughout the fifteenthcentury, with renowned Jewish philosophers including Isaac Arama,Abraham Bibago and Isaac Abravanel, citing it and contending with itsideas. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Albo’sthought continued to engage Jewish and non-Jewish philosophers,including Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn, and several Christiantheologians, such as Grotius, Simon, De Voisin, and de Rossi (Sirat1990, 381). During this period, two authors wrote commentaries onSefer ha-‘Ikkarim: Jacob Koppelman (OhelYa‘akov, Freiburg 1584) and Gedaliah Lipschitz (EtzShatul, Venice 1618). In addition, the book was translated intoLatin, German, English and Russian, and its first treatise wastranslated into Italian. In 1929, Isaac Husik published a criticaledition ofSefer ha-‘Ikkarim, including his translationof the book into English, an introduction, and detailed notes andindices (Albo 1929).

The scholarly consensus in the literature on Albo is that he was notan original philosopher, and that much of his book merely summarizesand synthesizes the various approaches he knew from the works of theJewish philosophers that preceded him. This theory, in its extremeversion, argues that even the theory of principles, the main reasonfor his book’s renown, is not Albo’s unique creation. Incontrast, a more recent trend in research on Albo’s workidentifies clear characteristics of esoteric writing in his book. Thistheory interprets the conflicting opinions on the issues in the bookas belonging to two separate layers of writing – the external,exoteric layer, and the inner, esoteric layer. In many cases, thesetwo research approaches lead to differing opinions regarding thequestion of Albo’s independent philosophical positions (Ehrlich2009). Additionally, philosophic originality can also be found in hishomiletical interpretations integrated within his work on dogma (Weiss2017).

The overview below will present the central issues addressed inSefer ha-‘Ikkarim with a faithful reflection of thestate of present research on Albo’s philosophy. At the sametime, we will refrain from categorizing his various philosophicalviews. This essay will discuss Albo’s theories of: (1) law, (2)principles, (3) divinity, (4) humanity, and (5) providence andrecompense.

4. The Theory of Law

Albo formulates a list of the fundamental beliefs of religion fromwithin his theory of principles (which we will explain in the nextsection), since he considers similar lists composed by hispredecessors to be insufficient. Instead of naming the principles ofMosaic law (“the Torah of Moses”) as, for example,Maimonides did in his well-known list of thirteen principles, Albowidens his target and lists the principles of “divinelaw,” in an effort to understand the principles of Judaismwithin a universal context. By this term he refers to the entiresystem of laws whose source is in the revelation of God to humanity.This change leads Albo to dedicate a particularly long discussion(treatise I, chapters 5–8) to the topic of the various types oflaw. Albo distinguishes three such types. The first of these is divinelaw, a law whose origin is in divine revelation, such as Judaism. Thesecond type is conventional law, a system of laws that human beingsestablish by mutual agreement in numerous political and socialframeworks. Its purpose is to maintain the moral order of society andensure the ongoing function of its systems. The third form of lawaccording to Albo is natural law, or the basic laws of morality thataim to prevent injustice and promote honest behavior. Academicliterature discusses two main aspects of Albo’s theory of lawthat the academic literature covers: the concept of natural law, itsorigins, meaning and influence; and the method of verification ofdivine law.

4.1 Natural Law

Albo was one of the first Jewish philosophers to address specificallythe concept of natural law along with his contemporary Zerahia HaleviSaladin. Apparently, this was due to the influence of the Christiantheologian Thomas Aquinas, who classified laws in his bookSummaTheologica. Albo’s view of natural law has attracted theattention of many scholars, in comparison to other topics in hisphilosophy, but the popular view among these scholars is that Albo didnot attach great importance to this concept (Guttmann 1955,176–184; Lerner 1964; Novak 1983, 319–350; Melamed 1989;Ehrlich 2006; Ackerman 2013).

4.2 Verification of Divine Law

One of the formative factors in Albo’s philosophy was theanti-Christian polemic. For this reason, one of the questions thatengages him is the method of distinguishing between the true divinelaw, meaning the Torah of Moses, and false religions that also claimsto be of divine origin. Albo proposes two criteria for distinguishingbetween the two. Firstly, the true divine law is the one whosebeliefs do not contradict any one of the necessary principles ofdivine law. Secondly, the true divine law provides incontrovertibleproof of the credibility of its messenger, who informs the world ofthe law’s existence and divine origin (treatise I, chapter18). An important study on this issue argued that the first point isproblematic, because it assumes that philosophy defines the basicbeliefs of divine law and thus determines which law is trulydivine. This is in opposition to the Averroistic approach, whichdisallows the use of philosophy for verifying religious matters. Thesolution for this problem lies in an alternate understanding of therole of philosophy in inter-religious debate. Philosophy does notserve as an affirming mechanism to validate certain beliefs, but onlyas a negating tool for identifying beliefs that stand in directconflict with the basic rules of logic. In other words, Albo does notuse philosophy to prove the validity of the beliefs of Judaism, butrather to reject Christianity as a false religion in light of itsbeliefs that stand in contradiction to philosophy (Lasker 1980).

5. The Theory of Principles

Albo’s theory of principles is the focal point of his book, theframework upon which its sections are built, and the element thatgrants the book its name. The academic debate on the theory ofprinciples is quite extensive. Below we will relate to two aspects ofthe theory. First we will present the conceptual structure of thetheory of principles as detailed in the first treatise ofSeferha-‘Ikkarim, and then we will survey the various approachesof the scholarship on this theory.

Albo presents his theory of principles as an alternative to previoustheories of principles, especially that of Maimonides. Additionally,Albo openly criticizes his predecessors’ lists of principles. Intheir stead, he proposes a system of fundamental beliefs divided intothree levels, which he calls “principles,”“roots,” and “branches.” The principles arethose beliefs that are derived necessarily from the term “divinelaw.” They are: (1) the existence of the divine entity(“existence of God”); (2) the divine origin of the systemof laws (“revelation of the Torah”); and (3) the existenceof divine providence, expressed in compensatory retribution forhumanity (“reward and punishment”). From these principlesstem eight “roots,” which are beliefs that instill clearand detailed content into the general concept of the principle. Thefirst principle, the existence of God, develops into four roots: (1)the unity of God, (2) the incorporeality of God, (3) God’sindependence of time, (4) God’s lack of defects. The secondprinciple, revelation of the Torah, leads to three roots: (5)God’s knowledge, (6) prophecy, and (7) the authenticity of thedivine messenger. The third principle, reward and punishment, branchesinto a single root: (8) divine providence. Denial of any of theprinciples or roots represents a heresy of the divine law.

The third category, “branches,” comprises beliefs thatAlbo argues are true and that every follower of divine law mustaccept. But in contrast to the first two categories, Albo does notdefine refusal to accept the branches as heresy of the divine law, butrather only as a sin requiring atonement. Albo lists six beliefs inthis category: (1) creationex nihilo; (2) the supremacy ofMoses’ prophecy; (3) the immutability of the Torah; (4) thepossibility of obtaining human perfection through the performance of asingle commandment; (5) the resurrection of the dead; (6) the comingof the Messiah.

Early scholars of Albo’s work in the late nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries argued that Albo’s contribution to thehistory of Jewish thought was limited to his theory of principles andthe first treatise of his book (Schlesinger 1844, xi–xiv; Back1869, 3–5, 8–9; Tänzer 1896, 23–30). Laterscholars called his theory unoriginal, and identified thephilosophical sources that influenced it, especially Maimonides, IbnRushd, Nissim of Gerona, Hasdai Crescas and Simeon ben Zemah Duran(Guttmann 1955, 170–176; Waxman 1956, 158–161; Schweid1963; Klein-Braslavi 1980, 194–197). A subsequent, thirdscholarly trend attempted to clarify the nature of the internalrelationship between the categories of Albo’s theory ofprinciples (principles, roots, and branches), and examinedAlbo’s position regarding the concept of heresy (Kellner 1986,140–156).

6. The Theory of Divinity

The central discussion in the theory of divinity inSeferha-‘Ikkarim is located in the second treatise, which isdedicated to the principle of the existence of God and its derivativeroots. The philosophical issue at the focal point of this discussionis the theory of divine attributes. Scholars of Albo’s theory ofattributes have discerned an internal contradiction betweenrationalist and conservative positions in his discussion of thistopic. On the one hand, in a number of locations he purports tosupport Maimonides’ negative theology and interprets the variousattributes of God as negative attributes. On the other hand, elsewherehe relates positive attributes to God, in accordance with the methodof his teacher, Crescas. Some scholars have ascribed thiscontradiction to the eclectic character of Albo’s work (Wolfson1916–17, 213–216; Guttmann 1955, 184–191), whileothers have related it to the esoteric style of writing ofSeferha-‘Ikkarim. Possibly, they suggest, his goal here was toconceal his conservative position on this issue from the circles ofrationalist thinkers he frequented (Schwartz 2002, 187–196;Ehrlich 2009a, 88–93).

The second treatise of the book raises another important philosophicalproblem, the significance of the concept of time. One of the roots ofthe principle of the existence of God is God’s independence oftime. In Albo’s discussion of this root, he distinguishesbetween two different concepts of time, Aristotelian-physical andNeoplatonic-ontological. Two central trends appear in the academicliterature on this topic. The first places the concept of time at thefocus of the discussion, attempting to clarify the relationshipbetween the two different concepts of time that appear in Albo’sdiscussion (Harvey 1979–80). Those scholars who take the secondposition discuss Albo’s concept of time as part of their attemptto identify his cosmogonic view, in other words, which theory of theorigin of the world he upholds (Klein-Braslavi 1976, 118–120,126; Rudavsky 1997, 470–473). In this context, we should pointout that comprehensive study of Albo’s writing on this issuereveals a certain difficulty in categorizing his exact position.Together with explicit dogmatic statements supporting the theory ofcreationex nihilo appearing in the first treatise, we findother statements, although less overt, some of which argue for theeternal existence of matter, and some of which even support theeternal existence of the world (Ehrlich 2009a, 94–112).

7. The Theory of Humanity

The central discussion on the theory of humanity inSeferha-‘Ikkarim is located in the third treatise, which coversthe principle of the revelation of the Torah and its roots. Thephilosophical issue present throughout the sections of this treatiseis that of the nature of human perfection. Albo’s discussion onthis topic has not merited intensive treatment in the academicliterature. Aside from this concept, the treatise addresses in depththe idea of prophecy and several aspects of the Torah of Moses and itscommandments. In one section of his discussion on the last topic, Alboresponds to the attacks of a Christian scholar on the Torah of Moses,including both apologetic and polemic elements in his rejoinders.

In the introductory chapters of the third treatise, Albo criticizesthe position of the rationalist Jewish philosophers, who associatedhuman perfection with the level of individual intellectualachievement. In contrast to this approach, Albo proposes aconservative theory, arguing that human perfection depends on thefulfillment of the Torah’s commandments, in other words, thepractical worship of God (treatise III, chapters 1–7). Yet onthis subject as well, we note considerable internal contradictions,which we will illustrate with several examples. Firstly, in the firsttreatise of his book, Albo clearly demonstrates that human perfectiondepends on faith in God and in the principles of divine law (treatiseI, chapters 21–22). Secondly, in several places in the book hediminishes the value of the practical element of fulfilling thecommandments of the Torah, and emphasizes in its stead the element ofawareness, or intent (treatise III, chapters 28–29). A thirdcontradiction is found in the final chapters of the third treatise,which analyze the concepts of reverence and love for God. Alboconsiders these to be the highest levels of divine worship. He defineslove of God as an intellectual phenomenon whose level depends on theintellectual status of the person (treatise III, chapters 35–36;Ehrlich 2004a). According to the two main theories found in theacademic literature, these contradictions may characterize eithereclectic or esoteric writing.

To Albo, prophecy is not a natural characteristic of the human soul,but rather depends on divine will. God, should He so will, grantsdivine inspiration to the prophet. His primary purpose in so doing isto inform humanity of the commandments so that through them they mayachieve human perfection (treatise III, chapter 8). Scholars who havestudied Albo’s theory of prophecy have pointed out that itintegrates both rationalist elements from Maimonides’ paralleldiscussion and spiritual, supra-intellectual elements from thewritings of Rabbi Judah Halevi and Crescas on this subject. Some haveseen in this integration a demonstration of Albo’s purpose inremaining faithful to the Aristotelian tradition of Maimonides, whileattempting (not always successfully) to bend it as far as possible inthe conservative direction (Schweid 1965). Others have considered thisintegration an expression of the general problematic character ofAlbo’s thought that does not contend with the problems itproduces. These scholars also argue that Albo’s basic approachis that prophecy transcends the natural, and that this concept isgrounded in the deep-seated tradition of Jewish thought (Kreisel 2001,540–543). Here as well, we should not ignore the possibilitythat the internal contradictions in Albo’s discussion reflect anesoteric writing style.

Albo distinguishes between various levels of prophecy, with thecentral goal of establishing the supremacy of Mosaic prophecy as thestarting point for validating Mosaic law as the divine law. Accordingto Albo, Moses is the most exalted prophet, for only in his case diddivine inspiration directly reach the intellectual power of his soul,without the mediation of the imagination. The significance of thisproclamation is that only for Moses’ prophecy is there no doubtregarding the validity of its content (treatise III, chapters8–10). Albo also claims that at the giving of the Torah on Mt.Sinai, the Israelites all received prophetic inspiration; however,they were not on the prophetic level, and this is in support ofMoses’ advanced status (treatise III, chapter 11).

After discussing the prophecy of Moses, Albo takes up the topic of thedivine Torah that Moses gave to the people of Israel. He treats anumber of aspects of this issue, such as the classification of themitzvot (commandments), the status of the Ten Commandments,and the importance of the Oral Law. Yet apparently, the thrust of hisefforts is directed toward establishing the idea of the eternity ofthe Torah, apparently in response to the Jewish-Christian polemic onthis topic. Remaining faithful to his dogmatic method, Albo arguesthat in Mosaic law, and in divine law in general, changes in thedetails of the commandments may take place, but their fundamentalprinciples cannot change (treatise III, chapters 13–22).

Within his discussion on Mosaic law, Albo includes a chapterdescribing its condemnation by an anonymous Christian scholar(treatise III, chapter 25). The Christian contends that in everypossible parameter, the religion of Jesus supersedes Mosaic law, andAlbo replies to this assault in detail. The present forum is toolimited to specify the content of this polemic, but suffice it to saythat this chapter in particular reflects Albo’s quite extensiveknowledge of the Christian religion. He demonstrates proficiency inChristian writings, and in addition, he recognizes the internaltension within Christianity between the papacy and the Roman Empire.He reveals knowledge of Church history, and finally, he challenges thecentral Christian doctrines (the Trinity, transubstantiation, and thevirgin birth) while describing them in detail. Due to censorship, theentire discussion has been omitted from several early editions. Itshould be noted that Albo’s polemic against Christianity is notlimited to this chapter, but runs throughout the book, both explicitlyand implicitly (Schweid 1968; Lasker 1977, cf. index [“Albo,Joseph”]; Rauschenbach 2002, 142–156).

8. The Theory of Providence and Recompense

The fourth and last treatise ofSefer ha-‘Ikkarim isprimarily concerned with the principle of reward and punishment andits roots. The first part of this treatise (chapters 1–28)contains Albo’s central discussion on the theory of providence,while the second part (chapters 29–51) incorporates his maindiscussion on the theory of recompense. Below we will discuss thesetwo theories in their order of appearance in the book.

Albo begins this treatise with the statement that humanity has basicfree will, for this is the necessary condition of the concept ofrecompense. Additionally, he argues that this human freedom does notconflict with God’s omniscience, nor with the existence of anastrological-deterministic system in the universe (treatise IV,chapters 1–6; Sadik 2012; Weiss 2017). His direct discussion ofthe concept of divine providence divides into three main parts. First,he discusses the proofs of the veracity of providence from natural andhuman reality, and from intellectual investigation (treatise IV,chapters 8–10). Then he treats the principal theologicalchallenge to the concept of providence, namely, the problem of evil,or the suffering of the righteous and prosperity of the wicked(treatise IV, chapters 12–15). Finally, he examines the specificreligious consequences of providence, paying special attention to thetheoretical infrastructure of the precepts of prayer (treatise IV,chapters 16–24) and repentance (treatise IV, chapters25–28; Ehrlich 2008; Harvey 2015). These last two discussionsare of exceptional scope within medieval Jewish philosophy.

Albo’s discussions of free will, of proofs for divineprovidence, and of the problem of evil include almost no originalideas, and he relies on the writings of the Jewish philosophers whopreceded him. In contrast, his treatment of prayer and repentance seemto reveal a certain level of innovation. Regarding free will, Alboapparently adopts Maimonides’ opinion that divine knowledgediffers significantly from human knowledge, and that God’sabsolute knowledge does not necessarily abrogate free will for humanbeings. The academic literature considers several of Albo’sdiscussions on providence to be nothing more than comprehensivesummaries of the work of his precursors, synthesized in an accessiblemanner. This category includes his methods of proving the existence ofdivine providence over humanity, as well as his attempts to defend theconcept of God’s absolute good, despite what seems to beinjustice in the world (Bleich 1997, 340–358). Still, in therest of the treatise Albo presents broad, methodical discussions onthe various philosophical aspects of the issues of prayer andrepentance, for which his predecessors addressed mainly the halakhicfeatures.

Albo’s central argument on the topic of prayer is that itinfluences a person’s status by causing an internal changewithin that person. This change raises the person to a level where hereceives constant divine inspiration through God’s benevolence.The basic assumption of this concept is that prayer cannot cause anychange in God, since such an assumption would detract from divine(immutable) perfection. Thus we should conceive of prayer as theinternal act of a person upon the self, raising the self to a higherspiritual level (treatise IV, chapters 16–18). This model standsin opposition to the traditional conception of prayer as a channel ofcommunication between the praying person and the listening God.

Albo understands the significance of repentance in two directions. Thefirst is based on his concept of prayer and defines repentance as anact in which a person uplifts himself to a higher level than at thetime of the sin. In this way, he changes his identity, and is nolonger deserving of punishment for the act he performed in hisprevious identity (treatise IV, chapter 18). The second conception ofrepentance focuses not on the person but on the sinful act he hascommitted. Under this rubric, repentance retroactively expropriatesthe conscious foundations of this act. In other words, repentanceredefines the sinful act as unintentional, and thus undeserving ofpunishment (treatise IV, chapter 27). Albo differentiates betweenrepentance out of love and repentance out of fear and furthersubdivides the latter to distinguish ‘repentance out of fear ofGod’ which conveys a general awe of God as the source of bothreward and punishment, from ‘repentance out of fear ofpunishment’ in which the fear of affliction coerces the sinnerto submit in repentance. Albo concludes that repentance requiresfreedom and one who is coerced by fear of punishment does not achieveatonement (treatise IV, chapter 25).

The second half of the fourth treatise ofSeferha-‘Ikkarim presents Albo’s theory of recompense. Themain issue Albo raises here is the character of the reward andpunishment destined for a person in the world to come. Throughout hiswide-ranging discussion on the question of recompense in the nextworld, Albo confronts two conflicting points of view. Maimonides viewsrecompense as applying to the soul alone, while Nahmanides opines thatit affects the body as well (treatise IV, chapters 29–41).Albo’s own opinion on this subject is unclear. At the beginningof the discussion, he seems to support Maimonides’ viewpoint,but he continues the discussion with the assumption that he cannotdefinitely rule out Nahmanides’ approach, which is supported bysources from kabbalistic literature. Scholars who have discerned theunique character of this section have described Albo’s positionin almost every possible way. Some say he avoids commitment (Sarachek1932, 224), while others think he adopts a synthetic middle position(Schwartz 1997, 202–208); still others believe he acceptsMaimonides’ approach (Husik 1966, 426), and their opponentsargue that he accepts Nahmanides’ view (Agus 1959,238–239). Apparently, therefore, this issue in Albo’sphilosophical-religious theory is especially obscure (Ehrlich2009b).

Bibliography

Primary Literature

• Albo, Joseph, 1929,Sefer ha-‘Ikkarim [Book ofPrinciples], I. Husik (trans. and ed.), Philadelphia: The JewishPublication Society of America.

Secondary Literature

• Ackerman, A., 2013, “Zerahia Halevi Saladin and Joseph Alboon Natural, Conventional and Divine Law”,Jewish StudiesQuarterly, 20: 315–339.
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