Liberal Feminism

First published Thu Oct 18, 2007; substantive revision Thu Dec 31, 2020

Liberalism is a family of doctrines that emphasize the value offreedom and hold that the just state ensures freedom for individuals.Liberal feminists embrace this value and this role for the state andinsist on freedom for women. A disagreement concerning how freedomshould be understood divides liberalism into two different sorts; thisdisagreement also divides liberal feminism.

Some liberals understand freedom as freedom from coerciveinterference. The convention in the literature is to call such folks“classical liberals”. This is fitting since the view theyembrace is historically prior. (Some call it “oldliberalism” (Gaus, Courtland, & Schmidts 2018; Paul, Miller,& Paul 2007).) However, as readers will see, there arecontemporary classical liberals, and among them contemporary classicalliberal feminists.

Other liberals understand freedom as personal autonomy—living alife of one’s own choosing—and politicalautonomy—being co-author of the conditions under which onelives. While some historians call such folks “newliberals” (Rosenblatt 2018), the convention in the contemporaryphilosophical literature is to simply call them“liberals”. To avoid using the same term for both genusand species, this article calls the second sort of liberals“egalitarian liberals” and the second sort of liberalfeminism “egalitarian-liberal feminism”.

Classical-liberal feminism and egalitarian-liberal feminism are,themselves, families of doctrines with significant internaldifferences, many of which this article seeks to describe.Nonetheless, the difference between classical and egalitarian-liberalfeminist thinking about freedom has significant consequences for howeach frames the problem feminism aims to address, how each specifiesthe content of a liberal feminist agenda, and what role is assigned tothe state.

Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that much can and should be done tosupport the personal and political autonomy of women and to achieveparity in the processes of democratic self-governance in liberalsocieties like the United States. They tend to see the state as apotential ally in the pursuit of these ends and endorse measures likeanti-discrimination law, affirmative action, and welfare stateprograms, as well as measures to change the culture and secure parityin participation in democratic self-governance. These features putegalitarian-liberal feminism squarely on the left side of thepolitical spectrum.

Classical-liberal feminists, by contrast, tend to hold thatfeminism’s political task is limited to opposing laws that treatwomen differently from men, a task which they hold has been largelyaccomplished in societies like the United States. They tend to endorsethe outcomes of largely unfettered economic and associationalarrangements and oppose, for example, anti-discrimination law,affirmative action, and welfare state programs. These features placeclassical-liberalism on the right side of the political spectrum.However, some classical-liberal feminists hold that the task ofliberalizing the culture remains on the liberal feminist agenda,although they consider this a non-political task and reject uses ofstate power to this end. Such classical-liberal feminists are on theleft culturally. Other classical-liberal feminists reject the projectof liberalizing the culture and are on the right culturally.

This article presents an overview of work in both contemporaryclassical-liberal feminism and contemporary egalitarian-liberalfeminism. The first section explores egalitarian-liberal feministworks by academic philosophers; it focuses on the value of personaland political autonomy, the role of the state in securingwomen’s autonomy, and how egalitarian-liberal feminist claimsmay be justified; and it concludes with discussion of criticisms ofegalitarian-liberal feminism. The second section takes upclassical-liberal feminist writing, much of which is oriented towardpublic policy and popular, rather than academic, audiences; itexplores classical-liberal feminism’s core idea of women’srights, the role this suggests for the state, and howclassical-liberal feminist claims may be justified; and it concludeswith discussion of criticisms of classical-liberal feminism.

1. Egalitarian-Liberal Feminism

Egalitarian-liberal feminism conceives of freedom as personal autonomy(living a life of one’s own choosing) and political autonomy(being co-author of the conditions under which one lives).Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the exercise of personalautonomy depends on certain enabling conditions that areinsufficiently present in women’s lives or that social andinstitutional arrangements often fail to respect women’spersonal autonomy and other elements of women’s flourishing.They hold also that women’s needs and interests areinsufficiently reflected in the basic conditions under which they liveand that basic arrangements that perpetuate those conditions lacklegitimacy because women are inadequately represented in the processesof democratic self-determination. Egalitarian-liberal feminists linkautonomy deficits like these to the “gender system” (Okin1989: 89), that is, inherited patriarchal traditions and institutions,and they hold that the women’s movement should work to identifyand remedy them. As the protection and promotion of citizens’autonomy is an appropriate role of the state on theegalitarian-liberal view, egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that thestate can and should be the women’s movement’s ally inpromoting women’s autonomy. There is disagreement amongegalitarian-liberal feminists, however, about the role of personalautonomy in the good life, the appropriate role of the state, and howegalitarian-liberal feminism is to be justified.

Egalitarian-liberal feminists draw from the broad tradition offeminist theorizing for insight concerning the gender system. Forexample, some draw on radical feminist insights into the nature ofviolence against women (Nussbaum 1999a) and the nature of genderhierarchy (Watson 2019); some draw on psychoanalytic feminist theory(Meyers 2002, Cornell 2003); some draw on feminist work on caregiving(Bhandary 2019); and some draw on socialist feminist thinking aboutthe exploitation of women’s work in the home (Gheaus 2008).Contemporary egalitarian-liberal feminism may be understood as acontribution to the larger scholarly philosophical conversationconcerning egalitarian-liberalism. Since John Rawls’s work(1971, 1993, 2001) has played a very large role in that conversationover the past 50 years, it figures centrally in muchegalitarian-liberal feminist philosophy.

1.1 Personal Autonomy

1.1.1 Procedural Accounts of Personal Autonomy

Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that women should enjoy personalautonomy. That is, they hold that women should live lives of their ownchoosing. Some offer “procedural” accounts of personalautonomy (Mackenzie & Stoljar discuss these, 2000a: 13–19).These accounts suggest that to say women should enjoy personalautonomy means they are entitled to a broad range of autonomy-enablingconditions. On this view, the women’s movement should work toidentify and promote these conditions. Identifying these enablingconditions requires careful attention to the particular ways in whichautonomy deficits are produced in diverse women’s lives.Procedural accounts avoid judging directly the substance ofwomen’s choices or the arrangements that ensue. The followinglist of enabling conditions is representative.

Being free of violence and the threat of violence: Violenceand the threat of violence violate women’s dignity; they makewomen do what others want or reduce women’s sphere of activityto avoiding harm. In some cases violence fractures the self and takesfrom women their sense of self-respect (Brison 1997). The feministliterature on violence against women documents the particular rolethat violence and the threat of violence play in unfairlydisempowering and limiting women (Cudd 2006: 85–118).

Having access to options: On the egalitarian-liberal feministview, women are entitled to access to options (Alstott 2004: 52).Women’s access to options is frequently and unfairly restricteddue to economic deprivation, in particular due to the“feminization of poverty” (Pearce 1978; see also Cudd2006: 119–154). Other sources of unfairly reduced options forwomen are stereotyping and sex discrimination in education andemployment (Smith 2004; Rhode 1997). Such stereotyping anddiscrimination affect some racial, ethnic and cultural groups inparticularly pernicious ways. Egalitarian-liberal feminists also pointto the way cultural homogeneity unfairly limits women’s options(Cudd 2006: 234), for example when culture assigns identities andsocial roles according to sex (Okin 1989: 170ff; Alstott 2004; Meyers2004; Cornell 1998: x; Chambers 2008).

Being free of the limits set by patriarchal paternalistic andmoralistic laws and policies: Patriarchal paternalistic laws andpolicies restrict women’s options on the grounds that suchlimits are in women’s interest. Think for example of laws thatlimit women’s employment options on the grounds that takingcertain jobs is not in women’s interest (Smith 2004).Patriarchal moralistic laws and policies restrict women’soptions on the grounds that certain options should not be available towomen because morality forbids women’s choosing them. Think forexample of laws that prohibit abortion, or laws that favor certainkinds of sexual expression or family forms (Cornell 1998; Brake 2004).Welfare state programs that distinguish between the supposedly“deserving” and “undeserving” poor aremoralistic responses to poverty among women (Folbre 1984). Together,patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws and policies steer womeninto socially preferred ways of life. These are unfair restrictions onwomen’s choices, on the egalitarian-liberal feminist view,because women’s choices should be guided by their own sense oftheir self-interest and by their own values. (But see Chambers [2008:203–231] for egalitarian-liberal feministuses ofpaternalism.)

Some emphasize the importance of internal, psychological enablingconditions as well, for examplethe ability to assess one’sown preferences and imagine life otherwise (Meyers 2002: 168;Cudd 2006: 234–235; Mackenzie 2000). Without the ability toassess the preferences on the basis of which one makes choices and toimagine life otherwise, one can’t meaningfully be said to haveoptions other than affirming the status quo (see also Chambers 2008:263–4). These internal enabling conditions are related to theexternal ones. Violence and the threat of violence, stereotyping anddiscrimination, material deprivation, and cultural homogeneity all canhave the effect of closing down reflection and imagination.

On this view, the women’s movement should work to identify andpromote autonomy-enabling conditions. Identifying these conditionsrequires careful attention to the particular ways in which autonomydeficits are produced in particular women’s lives. On theegalitarian-liberal feminist view, the state has an important role toplay in promoting these conditions (see§1.1.4,§1.2.1, and§1.2.2). Some egalitarian-liberal feminists emphasize that there is much thatcannot be done by the state (Cudd 2006: 223). For example, while thestate can refrain from blocking such endeavors, women themselves mustdevelop new “alternative emancipatory imagery” (Meyers2002: 168), and fashion new ways of being a woman and new kinds ofrelationships through experiments in living (Cudd 2006: 234; Cornell1998).

Some critics argue that freedom is of limited value because, even whenenabling conditions like these are in place, women may choose limitingand disadvantaging social arrangements. Some point to the phenomenonof deformed preferences: when attractive options are limited orarrangements unfair, people may develop preferences for those limitsor for less than their fair share (Nussbaum 1999a: 33, 50; Cudd 2006:152). This phenomenon makes changing preferences through increasedfreedom problematic and leads some feminists to reject theories thatprioritize free choice (Yuracko 2003). Advocates of proceduralaccounts of autonomy concede that the enabling conditions do not ruleout that a woman could choose, for example, to undergo clitorectomy(Meyers 2004: 213) or become a pornographic model (Cudd 2004: 58). AsAnn Cudd explains, possibilities like these must be accepted becauseliberal feminism values freedom and thus cannot advocate direct“preference education” (Cudd 2004: 57). Liberal feminismmust offer only a

gradualist approach. Individuals and groups will make variousexperiments in living that we cannot now precisely imagine. They… will sometimes go on a mistaken path. (2004: 57)

But they must be freed up to find their own way. As Diana Meyersexplains, the moral imagination of feminist theorists and activists islimited (as is everyone’s); they cannot know with certainty whatsubstantive choices are compatible with personal autonomy (Meyers2004: 213). Moreover, one should expect autonomous lives to takediverse forms in diverse cultural contexts. On this view, “amorally defensible and politically viable conception of autonomy foran era of global feminism” must be agnostic about the content ofwomen’s choices as long as they do not close off autonomy (2004:205).

1.1.2 Fairness in Personal Relationships

Some egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the social arrangementsof personal life should not only be freely chosen but should becharacterized by fairness or justice. Jean Hampton draws on thecontractualist tradition in moral and political philosophy to describeone way in which heterosexual intimate relationships often fail to befair or just (Hampton 1993). (For extended discussion ofHampton’s feminism, see Abbey 2011: 120–151. For more onfeminist uses of contractualism, see§1.2.1.)

On Hampton’s view, a personal relationship is fair only if bothparties to it could

reasonably accept the distribution of costs and benefits (that is, thecosts and benefits that are not themselves side effects of anyaffective or duty-based tie between us) if it were the subject of aninformed, unforced agreement in which we think of ourselves asmotivated solely by self-interest. (Hampton 1993: 240)

Of course, many women choose to enter or remain in relationships inpart because of affective benefits; for example women often getsatisfaction from satisfying others or fulfilling a duty. Why setaside these affective benefits, as Hampton recommends, when evaluatingthe fairness of a relationship? Hampton does not set them aside out ofa conviction that a woman’s affective nature is not part of heressential self. Nor does she set them aside out of a conviction thatthis aspect of a woman’s nature is not valuable. (For criticismof Hampton, see Sample 2002.) Her test sets them aside becauseaffective benefits of relationships are not receivedfrom theother; they are benefits that flow from one’s own nature (Radzik2005: 51). Thus while they may, and probably should, figure in awoman’s overall decision about whether to enter or remain in aparticular relationship, Hampton believes they should not figure inthe evaluation of a relationship’s fairness. As Linda Radzikexplains in her defense of Hampton, a relationship is fair or just ifthe benefits that flowfrom eachto the other are onpar, that is, if each gives as much as she gets (2005: 51). When oneparty gets from the other significantly more than he gives, he isdenying the other her legitimate entitlement to reciprocation.

This test formalizes an important insight of the women’smovement: personal relationships, in particular traditionalheterosexual relationships, are often unfair to women, indeed oftenexploit women’s tendency to care about others. Injustice of thissort is not uncommon. Thus Hampton’s test invites criticism of awide swath of human social life (Sample 2002: 271). But Hampton doesnot call on women to cease valuing others’ satisfaction or thefulfillment of duty (Hampton 1993: 227). Instead, she calls on thewomen’s movement to cultivate in women and men a sensitivity andan aversion to this kind of injustice and to develop remedies. (For anearly feminist articulation of this idea, see Alex KatesShulman’s “A Marriage Agreement” (1970) in Shulman2012.)

Procedural accounts of personal autonomy (see§1.1.1) do not require that relationships be just in the way Hamptonrecommends. According to procedural accounts, it is possible that achoice to enter or remain in a personal relationship in which onegives more than she gets from the other can be autonomous. Therefore,the focus should be on ensuring that women are not pressured into orunable to exit them.

To be sure, Hampton’s account of justice in personalrelationships can be a resource to women and men reflecting on theirown preferences. It invites reflection on how one’s ownpreferences affect the distribution of benefits and burdens within arelationship. Also, moral criticism of relationships that exploitwomen’s preferences reminds us that relationships can beotherwise (because ought implies can). This reminder enhances personalautonomy by broadening the imagination. Thus procedural accounts ofpersonal autonomy can include Hampton’s test, not as definitiveof the acceptability of social arrangements, but as a contribution tothe kind of reflection about the good life on which the personalautonomy of individuals depends.

1.1.3 Personal Autonomy and Human Flourishing

Martha Nussbaum proposes an account of the good life that has

at its heart, a profoundly liberal idea … the idea of thecitizen as a free and dignified human being, a maker of choices.(Nussbaum 1999a: 46)

Echoing procedural accounts of personal autonomy (§1.1.1), Nussbaum explains:

if one cares about people’s powers to choose a conception of thegood, then one must care about the rest of the form of life thatsupports those powers. (1999a: 45)

But for Nussbaum personal autonomy is merely one of the “majorhuman functionings” (1999a: 43) which define “a good humanlife” (1999a: 42). These functionings include, among otherthings, bodily health and integrity, affiliation, and politicalparticipation (1999a: 41–42). To be sure, personal autonomy, orin Nussbaum’s words “practical reason”, is a goodthat “suffuses all the other functions” (1999a: 44). Butpersonal autonomy is not prioritized. A good life is one in which oneis able to enjoy all of the major human functionings, that is, toflourish.

Nussbaum’s approach takes on the problem of deformed preferences(see§1.1.1) directly. To be sure, some may choose lives that do not include theactual exercise of some of the functionings—an ascetic maychoose to compromise bodily health, for example. But, Nussbaumexplains, one mustbe able to function in each of these ways.Social arrangements are to be criticized if they render theirparticipantsunable to function in the valued ways regardlessof their preferences (1999a: 50). The women’s movement shouldsensitize women and men to the injustice of denying women the abilityto function in these valued ways, identify arrangements that areunjust to women by paying careful attention to diverse women’slives, and recommend remedies. Nussbaum holds that her account iscompatible with global moral pluralism and thus may function as afoundation for a global feminism (Nussbaum 1999a: 40).

Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” may be comparedwith procedural accounts of autonomy (see§1.1.1). Procedural accounts suggest that the women’s movement shouldwork to protect and promote women’s ability to live lives oftheir own choosing by identifying particular autonomy deficits inwomen’s lives and promoting the conditions that enable autonomy.These approaches avoid directly judging the substance of the choiceswomen make or the arrangements that result. They leave it toindividuals and groups to fashion new, diverse, non-oppressive ways oflife. The list of enabling conditions for personal autonomy is notunlike Nussbaum’s list of human functionings. But advocates ofprocedural approaches may worry that the goal of the women’smovement, according to the capabilities approach, is to bring to womena particular way of life, namely one in which women canfunction in these ways, instead of freeing women up to find their ownway (Cudd 2004: 50). As Drucilla Cornell, an advocate of a proceduralapproach explains, “social equality [should be] redefined so asto serve freedom” (Cornell 1998: xii) because “there isnothing more fundamental for a human being” (1998: 17; see alsoCudd 2004: 51–52). Procedural accounts of autonomy can includeNussbaum’s approach, not as definitive of the kinds of liveswomen should live, but as an important contribution to the kind ofreflection on the good life on which personal autonomy depends. (Thereis a large literature on Nussbaum’s liberal feminism; see forexample Abbey 2011: 152–205; and Robeyns 2007.)

1.1.4 Personal Autonomy and the State

There is substantial agreement among egalitarian-liberal feministsthat the gender system—that is, inherited patriarchal traditionsand institutions—plays an important role in perpetuating morallyobjectionable deficits in personal autonomy in women’s lives andthat the state can and should take action to remedy them. There isalso substantial agreement concerning what the state should do. Thereis disagreement about some hard cases, however, that pit liberalvalues against one another.

Egalitarian-liberal feminists agree that the state must effectivelyprotect women from violence, regardless of where that violence takesplace (Cudd 2006: 85–118, 209; Rhode 1997: 1193–95). Theyalso hold that sexist paternalistic and moralistic laws and policiesare an unjust use of state power. Such laws place control overwomen’s lives in the hands of others and steer women intopreferred ways of life. Laws restricting access to birth control andabortion are of particular import in this context because they take anextremely momentous choice away from women and, together with thecultural assignment of caregiving duties to women, steer women intothe social role of mother. Women must have a legal right, andmeaningful access, to birth control and abortion services. Inaddition, egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the state must notgrant preferential treatment to particular family forms (Brake 2004:293; Lloyd 1995: 1328; McClain 2006: 60) which means giving gay andlesbian partnerships the same recognition currently available toheterosexuals (Brake 2012; Hartley & Watson 2010; McClain 2006:6). Others argue for removing marriage’s privileged legal statusaltogether or treating it legally more like other associations (Case2006; Chambers 2017; Metz 2010).

Egalitarian-liberal feminists also support laws against sexdiscrimination in education, employment, and public accommodations.According to egalitarian-liberal feminists, the refusal to hire orpromote a woman or do business with her because she is a woman is amorally objectionable limit on her options. So are workplaces that arehostile to women. Liberal feminists argue that laws prohibiting sexualharassment and requiring affirmative action and comparable worthpolicies are often called for to remedy past and ongoing sexdiscrimination (Williams 2000: 253).

Egalitarian-liberal feminists agree also that a significant source ofwomen’s reduced options is the structure of the workplace whichassumes that workers are free of caregiving responsibilities (Okin1989: 176; Williams 2000). Women, and increasingly men, do not fitthis model. The effect of not fitting the model is dramatic. As AnneL. Alstott explains: “Caretakers at every income level havefewer options than noncaretakers at the same income level”(Alstott 2004: 97). She continues: “I am worried thatchild-rearing too dramatically contracts the options among whichmothers can choose” (2004: 23). Alstott and others argue thatthe state must ensure that the socially essential work of providingcare to dependents does not unreasonably interfere with the personalautonomy of caregivers. Policies proposed to ensure sufficientpersonal autonomy for caregivers include parental leave, statesubsidized, high quality day care, and flexible work schedules (Cudd2006: 228; Eichner 2021; Okin 1989: 175). Joan Williams hasargued for legal recognition of the right to not be discriminatedagainst in employment on the basis of one’s caregivingresponsibilities. Williams recommends, if necessary, legal actionalleging failure to recognize this right as an incentive to employersto accommodate caregivers (Williams 2000: 274). (See§1.2.1 for discussion of caregiving and distributive justice.)

The egalitarian-liberal feminist literature concerned withwomen’s personal autonomy emphasizes the role the state shouldplay in protecting women from violence and discrimination; theimportance of ridding the law and policy of patriarchal paternalismand moralism; and the role the state can play in restructuring theworkplace, including ensuring access to childcare. Note, however, thategalitarian-liberal feminists are egalitarian-liberals and, as such,hold that among the proper uses of state power is to ensure that allindividuals can enjoy a decent standard of living, including access toadequate income, education and healthcare (Eichner 2010; on aguaranteed minimum income, see Cudd 2006: 154; see also Stark2021). Egalitarian-liberals also tend to support the right tocollective bargaining to secure decent wages and working conditions(Cornell 1998: 57; Cudd 2006: 211). (For more on distributive justice,see§1.2.1.)

There is disagreement among egalitarian-liberal feminists about somehard cases that pit liberal values against one another. Several hardcases concern autonomy and the body. Consider pornography.Egalitarian-liberal feminists tend to reject legal limits onpornography (Cornell 1998: 57–58). But some hold that argumentsfor restricting violent pornography are not unreasonable (Laden 2003:148–149; Watson 2019 and 2007: 469; for what such a notunreasonable argument might look like, see Eaton 2007) and that thebest arguments for freedom of expression fail to show that it shouldnot be limited (Brison 1998). Indeed some argue that violentpornography can undermine the autonomy of viewers (Scoccia 1996) andthe status of women as equal citizens (Spaulding 1988–89; seealso Watson 2015). Prostitution is a similar case. Egalitarian-liberalfeminists tend to reject laws prohibiting prostitution and advocate,instead, the legal regulation of the sex trade prioritizingwomen’s safety and women’s control over their own workingconditions (Cornell 1998: 57; Nussbaum 1999a, 295). But someegalitarian-liberal feminists suggest that liberal values can supportan argument for criminalizing the purchase of sex (Watson &Hartley 2018: 163–188). Surrogate motherhood is another casearound which there is egalitarian-liberal feminist disagreement withsome arguing that women have a right to sell procreative bodilyservices (see for example Church 1997) and others raising seriousconcerns (see for example Anderson 1990 and Satz 2010).

Some hard cases concern the role of the state in family life. Familylife has dramatic effects on the personal autonomy of its adultmembers. Assuming the role of caregiver, for example, can dramaticallycontract options. On an egalitarian-liberal feminist view, the statehas an interest in ensuring that family life does not underminewomen’s personal autonomy. Some hold that the state shouldpromote justice in the family—for example, the sharing of paidand unpaid labor by its adult members (Okin 1989: 171). Others holdthat the state may not be guided by a substantive ideal of family life(Alstott 2004: 114; see also Nussbaum 2000a: 279–280; andWolf-Devine 2004). In response to the disadvantage and vulnerabilityto which full-time care-givers in the home are commonly exposed, someegalitarian-liberal feminists suggest guaranteeing a non-wage-earningspouse one half of her wage-earning spouse’s paycheck (Okin1989: 181). Others propose financial support for caregivers, forexample state-funded care-giver allowances (Alstott 2004: 75ff; Baehr2021; compare Eichner 2010: 77–80). Some warn againstcare-giver allowances however because, if women took disproportionateadvantage of them—which is not unlikely—the gendereddivision of labor might be reinforced (Schouten 2021; see alsoGheaus 2008 and Gheaus & Robeyns 2011). (See§1.2.1 for more discussion of this issue.)

Girls’ participation in families is, especially in the earlyyears, nonvoluntary. The family affects the development ofgirls’ sense of self-worth as well as their preferences and thecapacities, like the capacity for reflection and imagination, on whichtheir ability to live lives of their own choosing depends (Okin 1989:97). Egalitarian-liberal feminists hold that the state must protectand promote the development of autonomy capacities in children,especially girls. For example they hold that child-marriage should belegally prohibited (McClain 2006: 79); girls should have access toabortion without parental consent or notification (Rhode 1994: 1204);girls must receive a formal education free of sexist stereotyping,including instruction in the legal equality of women (McClain 2006:81; Lloyd 1995: 1332), including autonomy-promoting sex education(McClain 2006: 57–58), and ensuring that girls are prepared tobe economically independent (Lloyd 1995: 1332). Beyond this, some holdthat girls’ interest in developing autonomy capacities requiresthat families be internally just, that is, that there be an equaldivision of paid and unpaid labor between adults so that families arenot characterized by “dependence and domination” (Okin1989: 99–100; see also Follesdal 2005). Others are not convincedthat there is a necessary connection between this kind of justice infamilies and the development of girls’ autonomy capacities(Lloyd 1995: 1335–1343) and hold that the state may not beguided by a substantive ideal of family life (Alstott 2004: 114; seealso Nussbaum 2000a: 279–280; and Wolf-Devine 2004). (See§1.2.1 for more discussion of this issue).

1.2 Political Autonomy

Some egalitarian-liberal feminists emphasize the importance ofpolitical autonomy, that is, being co-author of the conditions underwhich one lives. Some use contractualist political theory to arguethat the state should ensure that the basic structure of societysatisfies principles of justice that women, as well as men, couldendorse (see§1.2.1). And some argue that the democratic legitimacy of the basic conditionsunder which citizens live depends on the inclusion of women in theprocesses of public deliberation and electoral politics (see§1.2.2).

1.2.1 Distributive Justice

Some egalitarian-liberal feminists, inspired by John Rawls’contractualist liberal theory of justice (Rawls 1971; 1993; 2001),argue that the state should ensure that the basic structure of societydistributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation fairly,that is, in a manner that women as well as men could endorse (forexample Alstott 2004; Baehr 2021; Bhandary 2019; Bojer 2002;Lloyd 1998; McClain 2006; Okin 1989; Thompson 1993; for an overview offeminist responses to Rawls, see Abbey 2013a). They argue that thebasic structure currently distributes benefits and burdens unfairly,in part due to the gender system, that is, inherited patriarchaltraditions and institutions.

As Rawls puts it, the basic structure of society is

the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamentalrights and duties and determine the division of advantages from socialcooperation. By major institutions I understand the politicalconstitution and the principal economic and socialarrangements.… Competitive markets and the monogamous family[are] examples of major social institutions.… The basicstructure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are soprofound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is thatthis structure contains various social positions and that men borninto different positions have different expectations of lifedetermined, in part, by the political system as well as by economicand social circumstances. In this way the institutions of societyfavor certain starting places over others. (Rawls 1971: 6–7)

Rawls argues that the fairness of the basic structure of society maybe assessed by asking what principles representatives of citizens(parties) would choose to determine the distribution of primary goodsin society if they were behind a “veil of ignorance”(Rawls 1971: 12). The veil of ignorance blocks from the partiesknowledge of their place in society: for example their socio-economicstatus, religion, and sex. (Rawls does not include sex inA Theoryof Justice (Rawls 1971), but adds it in “Fairness toGoodness” (Rawls 1975: 537).) Susan Okin proposes we

take seriously both the notion that those behind the veil of ignorancedo not know what sex they are and the requirement that the family andthe gender system, as basic social institutions, are to be subject toscrutiny. (Okin 1989: 101)

Rawls argues that parties behind a veil of ignorance would choose twoprinciples: a liberty principle providing for the “mostextensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with asimilar system of liberty for all” and a principle of equalityrequiring equality of opportunity and permitting inequalities inwealth and income only if they are to the benefit of the least welloff (Rawls 1971: 302–303).

Okin argues that the gender system violates both the liberty andequality of opportunity principles because by effectively assigningroles to citizens according to sex it circumvents citizens’“free choice of occupation” (Okin 1989: 103). OnOkin’s view, this means that in a just society “gendercould no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure,whether inside or outside the family” (1989: 103). None of theinstitutions of the basic structure, including the family, couldassign roles according to sex. It is common to argue that the state,educational institutions and workplaces should not assign rolesaccording to sex. But Okin argues that this applies to the family aswell. Gender blindness must play the same role in the family that itplays in these institutions. In Okin’s words, there must be“congruence” between the principles that govern theseinstitutions and those that govern family life (1989: 21). That is,families must be just.

Okin offers a second argument to support the claim that families mustbe just. Rawls explains that a society satisfying his two principlesof justice can be stable because within it citizens develop a sense ofjustice (Rawls 1971: 453ff). For our purposes consider that citizensmust develop the conviction that citizens generally are due the rightsof equal citizenship. Okin argues that when children are raised withinunjust families, families that lack “equality andreciprocity” and are sites of “dependence anddomination”, they are not likely to develop the requisite senseof justice (Okin 1989: 99–100; see also McClain 2006:73–84). Instead, girls and boys may grow to believe that womenare not entitled to equal citizenship. Therefore, if the societygoverned by Rawls’ two principles of justice is to be stable,families must be just.

So, Okin’s view is that the state may and should promote aparticular ideal of family life. She tells us that the stateshould

encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and women of paidand unpaid work, or productive and reproductive labor. (1989: 171)

Okin discusses several measures that might contribute to ensuring thatgender no longer forms “part of the social structure, whetherinside or outside the family” (Okin 1989: 103), including statesubsidized daycare, a legal entitlement to parental leave and flextime(1989: 176, 186), as well as autonomy-promoting public education forchildren (1989: 177). She also recommends protecting fromvulnerability those women who do choose traditional roles by makingthem legally entitled to half of their spouse’s paycheck (1989:181). While Okin argues that what is desired is a “future inwhich all will be likely tochoose this mode of life”(1989: 171, my emphasis), the fact that many people currentlydon’t choose egalitarian family life is not, for Okin, a reasonfor the state to not take measures to promote it (1989: 172). At thesame time, Okin does not endorse simply any and all state involvement;for example, while she thinks justice requires the 50-50 sharing ofdomestic work, she doesn’t recommend that the state enforce it(1989: 171) (on this issue, see Neufeld & van Schoelandt 2014: andBaehr 2017: 18–19). (There is a substantial literature onOkin’s use of Rawls’ theory of justice. See for exampleAbbey 2011; Reich & Satz 2009.)

Since Okin published these arguments (1989), a substantial literaturehas developed by other egalitarian-liberal feminists—more orless in the Rawlsian tradition—which argues that women’sshouldering a disproportionate share of the costs of socialreproduction is unjust. (See for example: Alstott 2004; Baehr2021; Barclay 2013; Bhandary 2019; Brighouse & Wright 2008;Eichner 2010; Engster 2001, 2010; Gheaus 2009, 2012; Gheaus &Robeyns 2011; Gornick & Meyers 2008; Lloyd 1995, 1998; Nussbaum2006: 96–223; Robeyns 2007; Reiheld 2015; Schouten 2017, 2019;Stark 2021; Watson & Hartley 2018; and Wright 2008.)Okin’s claim that the state should promote a particular,substantive ideal of family life is a central matter for discussion inthis literature. So, for example, while Lloyd and Alstott endorse manyof Okin’s policy proposals (Lloyd 1995: 1332; 1998: 218; Alstott2004), they reject her claim that the state should promote aparticular substantive ideal of family life (Lloyd 1995:1340–1341; Lloyd 1998: 218; McClain 2006: 78). Alstottwrites:

The egalitarian family is, even in principle, a troubling ideal.Strictly equal sharing seems unduly constraining, not merely becausefamilies today deviate from the ideal, but because free people mightwant to organize their lives differently. (Alstott 2004: 113)

Other egalitarian-liberal feminists have voiced similar concerns. AnnCudd worries that state action intended to promote gender fairness andfoster women’s autonomy could impose a homogenizing conceptionof the good life and stifle the very reinventions of self andexperiments in living that women’s liberation requires (Cudd2006: 209, 223; see also Wolf-Devine 2004). Elizabeth Andersonwrites:

The plurality of conceptions of the good that are likely to survive ina world in which the state has done all it can be reasonably andjustly expected to do will include a host of unreasonable conceptionsof the good, some of which may well be patriarchal. In the face ofsuch injustices, liberals counsel feminists to redirect their claimsfrom the state to those promulgating such unreasonable conceptions ofthe good, and to redirect their activism from a focus on state actionto other domains, including civil society, churches, and the family. Ithink this counsel is wise, which is why I am a liberal feminist.(Anderson 2009: 131; see also 141–144)

Recent work by egalitarian-liberal feminists Lori Watson and ChristieHartley (2018) and Gina Schouten (2019), however, may be understood asresponding to these concerns as it aims to establish that some stateaction to undermine the gendered division of labor and promoteegalitarian family life is both reasonable and just.

The gendered division of labor allocates to women the work ofproviding care for individuals who cannot care for themselves or whorequire help doing so. A full accounting of justice in caregivingfocuses not only on the fairness of the distribution of caregivingwork but also on the needs of individuals who receive care. Someegalitarian-liberal feminist work includes this dual focus. AshaBhandary argues that the whole “system of practices”through which care is given and received must be subject to liberalevaluation with an eye to both those who provide and those who receivecare (Bhandary 2019: 71, quoting Rawls 1958: 169). Elizabeth Brakeargues that doing so requires recognizing “the social bases ofcaring relationships [as] primary goods” (2012: 175). And MarthaNussbaum argues that liberal political theory must begin with a“political conception of the person [that] holds that humanbeings are vulnerable temporal creatures, both capable andneedy” (Nussbaum 2006: 221). (See also the essays in Bhandaryand Baehr (2021) on caregiving and liberalism).

Rawlsian political philosophy provides the framework for the bulk ofegalitarian-liberal feminist writing on distributive justice. Thefocus of much of that writing has been to explore Rawlsian resourcesfor criticizing the role gender has and continues to play in the basicstructure of societies like the United States and to lay out what agender just society might look like. However, as Nancy Holmstromwrites (in a rather different context),

a feminism concerned only with ending the oppression womenbasedon gender would be a very limited version, far from theemancipatory vision at its core. (Holmstrom 2011: 137)

Thus we should note that although egalitarian-liberal feminists areegalitarian-liberals, and as such hold that the state should ensurethat all individuals enjoy a decent standard of living, poverty hasnot been a major focus of much egalitarian-liberal feminist work (butsee Bhandary 2019; Cudd 2006; Eichner 2010; Stark 2021; Watson& Hartley 2018: 167–168, 228–9). Nor has muchegalitarian-liberal feminist work attended directly to the role racehas played and continues to play in the basic structure of societieslike the United States (but see Bhandary 2019; and Mills 2017).

1.2.2 Public Deliberation and Electoral Politics

Some egalitarian-liberal feminists who emphasize the importance ofpolitical autonomy—that women be co-authors of the conditionsunder which they live—focus in particular on participation inthe processes of democratic self-determination. These processesinclude both political deliberation in the many arenas of publicpolitical discourse and electoral politics. Some egalitarian-liberalfeminists hold that the conditions under which women live lacklegitimacy because women are inadequately represented in theseprocesses. They hold that this political autonomy deficit is, in largepart, due to the “gender system” (Okin 1989: 89), that is,inherited patriarchal traditions and institutions, and that thewomen’s movement should work to identify and remedy it.

Attempts to increase women’s participation in publicdeliberation and electoral politics confront a vicious circle ofwomen’s exclusion. The gender system leads to women’sbeing underrepresented in influential forums of public deliberation,including in elected law-making bodies. For example women have lessfree time to engage in public deliberation because of thedouble-burden of paid and unpaid labor; sex stereotyping leads many tothink that women (especially women from particular ethnic and culturalgroups) are less capable of leadership than men; the behavior calledfor in agonistic public deliberation and electoral politics isunderstood to be masculine; issues of particular interest to women areseen as personal and not political issues; and women lack power in themany institutions (like churches, universities, and think tanks) thatinfluence political debate. But when women are underrepresented inthese forums and law-making bodies, it is unlikely that the justice ofthe gender system will become the subject of public conversation orits dismantling a target of legislative action.

Some egalitarian-liberal feminists explore ways to escape this viciouscircle. Because women are excluded from important forums of publicdeliberation and electoral politics in complex ways, remedies mustaddress a variety of problems. Justice in the distribution of benefitsand burdens in society would go some way towards enabling women toaccess forums of public debate on equal terms with men (Okin 1989:104). But cultural change is necessary as well if stereotypes aboutwomen’s abilities are not to interfere with their participation,if women’s needs and interests are to be understood aslegitimate claims on democratic power, and if men’s dominance ininstitutions of influence is to be overcome. Seyla Benhabib arguesthat the women’s movement, along with other new social movementslike the gay and lesbian liberation movement, has begun this work(Benhabib 1992). While much of this change is cultural, the state hasa role to play. Linda McClain argues that all children must receivecivic education—to equip them for democraticcitizenship—including instruction in women’s equality(McClain 2006: 81). She also argues that the state may use itspersuasive power to put traditionally excluded issues, like violenceagainst women or the dilemma of balancing work and family, on theagenda for public deliberation (2006: 78).

Others take on the vicious circle of women’s exclusion byrecommending legal mechanisms for the inclusion of women in electoralpolitics (see Rhode 1994: 1205–1208; Phillips 1991). Somesuggest that legal mechanisms for including those who have beensystematically excluded may be justified as remedies for the unjustdisproportionate political power enjoyed by others (Phillips 2004:6–10). Suggested mechanisms include targets or quotas for womenand other underrepresented groups on party slates, or proportionalrepresentation in elected bodies. Karen Green, for example, argues for“guaranteed equal representation of both sexes inparliament” (Green 2006). There is diversity of opinion,however, among egalitarian-liberal feminists about the justice andefficacy of such mechanisms (Rhode 1994: 1205; and Mansbridge1997).

1.3 Justification

John Rawls distinguishes between what he calls comprehensive andpolitical liberal doctrines (Rawls 1993). This distinction has been ofinterest to egalitarian-liberal feminist philosophers. (For explicitdiscussion of the distinction in liberal feminism, see for exampleAbbey 2007; 2011: 72–82, 226–247; Baehr 2008; 2013;Chambers 2008: 159–201; Enslin 2003; Lloyd 1998; Neufeld 2009;Neufeld & Schoelandt 2014; Nussbaum 1999b: 108; 2000b: 76 fn38;Okin 1994; 1999: 129–130; Watson & Hartley 2018.)

Comprehensive egalitarian-liberal feminisms are grounded in particularmoral doctrines. As we have seen, egalitarian-liberal feministstypically claim that some social and institutional arrangements areunjust and that such arrangements should be remedied; some claim thatstate power is an appropriate tool for such remediation. For example,and as we have seen, egalitarian-liberal feminists argue that familiesshould foster women’s and girls’ personal autonomy andthat domestic associations should distribute benefits and burdensfairly; and, as we have seen, some argue that state power may andshould be used to these ends. Comprehensive egalitarian-liberalfeminisms ground such claims in particular moral doctrines.

Among comprehensive liberal feminists we may count Jean Hampton, CarolHay, Drucilla Cornell, Ann Cudd, Susan Okin, and Clare Chambers.Kantian moral theory serves as a foundation for Hampton’sfeminist contractualist account of justice in personal relationships(Hampton 1993: 241; see Abbey 2011: 120–151) (see§1.1.2) and for Hay’s liberal feminist theory of oppression (Hay 2013),as well as for Cornell’s psychoanalytically informed liberalfeminism that focuses on the right to intimate and sexualself-determination (Cornell 1998: 17–18; 2003; see alsoThurschwell 1999: 771–772). Cudd explains that her liberalfeminist account of oppression as harm is grounded in a“background moral theory”, namely

a liberal contractarian view of the sort developed by John Rawls in ATheory of Justice, or the more libertarian version of DavidGauthier inMorals by Agreement. (Cudd 2006: 231)

Okin’s liberal feminism draws on Rawls’A Theory ofJustice, which Rawls himself claims is a comprehensive liberalism(Okin 1999: 129; Rawls 1993: xvii). (But note that Okin claims hers is“in between” comprehensive and political liberalism (Okin1999: 129–130).) Chambers’ liberal feminism—whichexplores the relationship between social construction andchoice—may also be counted among comprehensive liberal feminismsas it is grounded in personal autonomy as a moral value (Chambers2008).

Political liberal feminisms are accounts of how state power may andshould be used to feminist ends that are grounded in public politicalvalues. Public political values are not the particular values of anyone moral doctrine; they are values that are shared by the manyreasonable comprehensive moral doctrines citizens hold (Rawls 1993:227–230). Advocates of political liberal feminism hold thatstate power is used justly when supported by values that areendorsable by all reasonable citizens.

Among political liberal feminists we may count S.A. Lloyd, LindaMcClain, Martha Nussbaum, Gina Schouten, Christie Hartley, LoriWatson, and Amy Baehr. Lloyd constructs an argument based on publicpolitical values to the conclusion that “women’sdisproportionate burden in social reproduction [must] beeliminated” (Lloyd 1998: 214). McClain argues that sex equalityis a public and constitutional value (2006: 60; see also 22–23,60–62, and 76) which requires state opposition to relations ofsubordination and domination in the family (2006: 62); state supportfor autonomy in intimate matters (2006: 22); and support for thedevelopment of autonomy capacities in children, especially girls(2006: 109). Nussbaum (see§1.1.3) also presents her “capabilities approach” as a political,and not a comprehensive, liberalism. The capabilities list, Nussbaumargues, can be shared by citizens holding a wide variety ofcomprehensive conceptions of the good life, and thus should be able tofunction as a foundation for a political liberalism (Nussbaum 2000b:76 fn38). Schouten argues that the political liberal value ofreciprocity undergirds state measures to alleviate the gendereddivision of labor (Schouten 2019). And Watson and Hartley argue thatpublic deliberation based on shared values is incompatible with“pervasive social hierarchies” (Hartley & Watson 2010:8; see also Watson & Hartley 2018). As Watson puts it,

a central task of public reason arguments, in the context of socialhierarchy and inequality, is to expose the ways in which backgroundconditions (inequalities) undermine the necessary conditions forreasonable deliberations among citizens to occur. (Watson 2007:470)

Political liberal feminists suggest some advantages of politicalliberal over comprehensive liberal feminism. According to S.A.Lloyd,

it’s true that confining the argument to talk of sociallyrecognized values requires operating with one hand tied behindone’s back, so to speak. Conclusions that would be quite easy toreach from stronger feminist principles, or other comprehensiveprinciples, are much harder to reach using the sparse … toolbox[of public reason]. (Lloyd 1998: 210)

But if we can reach feminist conclusions on these sparse grounds, theywill be much more difficult to reject. Amy Baehr suggests thatarguments to feminist ends from public political values can move thepolitical community toward a more reasonable understanding of thosevalues (Baehr 2013; see also Rawls 1993: 227). Comprehensive liberalfeminists, in turn, worry that the public political values on whichfeminist political liberalism must rely render the latterinsufficiently critical of precisely those hierarchies and forms ofdisadvantage egalitarian liberal feminism aims to criticize andundermine (Abbey 2007; Baehr 1996; Chambers 2008: 12, 159–201;Enslin 2003; Hay 2013: 34–39; Okin 1994; see also Munoz-Darde1998: 347).

1.4 Criticism

Egalitarian-liberal feminism has been subject to a variety ofcriticisms. Addressing some of these criticisms is a focus of someegalitarian-liberal feminist work.

Some reject egalitarian-liberal feminism because, they argue, feministtheory must rely on a much more robust feminist ideal of the good lifethan egalitarian-liberal feminism is able to provide (Yuracko 2003;Jaggar 1983). Some argue that liberalism’s focus on theindividual renders it unable to adequately conceptualize injustice togroups (I. Young 1990: 18). Some argue that liberalism’s focuson distribution neglects relations of power (I. Young 1990: 37) andthe eroticization of domination and subordination (MacKinnon 1987;1989) which are the true linchpins of the gender system. Lori Watsonand Christie Hartley’s recent feminist political liberal workmay be profitably read as a response to worries like these as it aimsto show how feminist political liberalism can conceptualize injusticeto groups as a matter of relations of domination and subordination(Watson & Hartley 2018).

Critics have focused on the role played by ideals in liberal politicalphilosophy, especially in Rawlsian liberalism. For example, LisaSchwartzman argues that Rawls’ ideal of the fully just societyobscures race and sex as “social markers of inequality”(Schwartzman 2006: 59). Charles Mills argues that a focus ondismantling an “existing unjust basic structure” requiresa shift from

ideal theory [which] asks what justice demands in a perfectly justsociety…[to] non-ideal theory [which] asks what justice demandsin a society with a history of injustice. (Mills 2017: 34; see alsoPateman & Mills 2007; but compare Mills 2017: 201–215)

Egalitarian liberal feminist Asha Bhandary addresses these concerns bydeveloping what she calls a “two-level contract theory”which is attentive to non-ideal contexts (Bhandary 2019).

Some are concerned that egalitarian-liberal feminist embrace of theideal of the egalitarian family effectively elevates one particularcomprehensive conception of the good life over the many others foundin multicultural societies and across the globe (Shachar 2009; fordiscussion see Okin 1999 and Khader 2011). As we have seen (§1.2.1) some egalitarian-liberal feminists eschew the ideal of theegalitarian family and thus avoid this criticism. Some argue that anegalitarian-liberal feminism that holds that women’sindependence and self-sufficiency are central feminist ideals fails torecognize many relational goods on which many women depend for theirwell-being, and thus a women’s movement guided by such an idealmay harm many of the very women it aims to benefit (Khader 2018). Careethicists also raise a concern about an egalitarian-liberal feminismfor which independence and self-sufficiency are central ideals. Theyargue that centering such ideals obscures the fact that human beingscome into the world dependent upon others and that many are dependenton others throughout their lives; this, in turn, obscures the value ofbeing cared for and the role that caregiving plays in a good society(Held 1987, 2006b; Kittay 1999). Conceptualizing personal autonomy asrelational, and thus downplaying independence and self-sufficiency,has been a focus of some recent egalitarian liberal feminist work (seethe end of§1.1.1; see also the essays in Bhandary and Baehr (2021).)

Egalitarian-liberal feminism has been subject to socialist feministcritique. Nancy Fraser, for example, has issued a“provocation” by “contending that feminism hasentered a dangerous liaison with neoliberalism”, that is, withpolitical forces that promote largely unfettered capitalism (Fraser2013: 14, see also 209–226). Arruzza, Bhattacharya and Fraserargue that a non-elite feminism, a “feminism for the 99%”,must eschew such a liaison (Arruzza, Bhattacharya, & Fraser 2019;see also Holmstrom 2011). Egalitarian-liberal feminists have notfocused a great deal of attention on capitalism. But as someegalitarian-liberals embrace “liberal socialism”, it isnot clear that egalitarian-liberal feminism couldn’t do the same(Rawls 2001: 138; see also Edmundson 2017; Baehr 2017: 10–12;Robeyns 2012; and Stark 2021).

Conservative critics of egalitarian-liberal feminism argue thatreformers can do more harm than good when they undermine theinstitutions and norms which, while surely offending in many ways,also serve as the foundation for many people’s well-being(Muller 1997a; see also Fox-Genovese 1996). Such conservatives worryabout the radical implications of egalitarian-liberal feminism, itswillingness to put women’s autonomy ahead of institutions andnorms on which, they believe, many people rely for their well-being.While Ann Cudd suggests that the expansion of opportunity and equalitypromised by liberal feminism “makes us all better off”(Cudd 2006: 237), conservatives encourage us to consider also the lossthat is in liberation.

Classical-liberal critics of egalitarian-liberal feminism arguethat

the very arguments that rightly led to the legal reforms affecting thestatus of women during the 19^th century militate againstthe demands for reform from the late 20^th centurywomen’s movement. (Epstein 2002: 30; see also Tomasi 2009)

That is, they hold that the defense of equal rights and independencefor women promulgated by these early feminists is incompatible withthe tendency of the contemporary women’s movement to call on thestate to improve the lives of women (see§2).

2. Classical-Liberal Feminism

In this article the termclassical-liberal feminism is usedfor a family of doctrines that range from libertarian feministdoctrines that endorse very little (if any) state power to doctrinesthat endorse more, yet still limited state power, largely unfetteredmarkets, and an expansive understanding of individual rights. Thedoctrines in this family share the following. They conceive of freedomas freedom from coercive interference; they hold that women, as wellas men, have a right to freedom from coercive interference due totheir status as self-owners; and they hold that coercive state poweris justified only to the extent necessary to protect the right tofreedom from coercive interference.Equity feminists areclassical-liberal feminists who hold that, in societies like theUnited States, the only morally significant source of oppression ofwomen is the state. They hold that feminism’s political role isto bring an end to laws that limit women’s freedom inparticular, but also to laws that grant special privileges to women.Some equity feminists see a nonpolitical role for feminism, helpingwomen to benefit from their freedom by developing beneficial charactertraits or strategies for success, or navigating among their increasingoptions. Other equity feminists are socially conservative and arguethat, while the state should not enforce them, traditional valuesfunction as bulwarks against state power and produce independent andself-restraining citizens.Cultural libertarian feminists areclassical-liberal feminists who hold that the culture of societieslike the United States is patriarchal and a significant source ofoppression of women. They hold that the patriarchal culture and thestate are complementary systems of oppression. Cultural libertarianfeminists hold that much of the oppression women suffer today isnoncoercive, however, and thus should not be met with state remediesbut with a nonviolent movement for feminist social change.

Classical-liberal feminists understand themselves as heirs to thefirst generation of feminist political philosophers, for example MaryWollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor Mill, and John Stuart Mill (Taylor1992: 25–39); the first generation of feminist politicalreformers in the United States, for example the abolitionist feministsElizabeth Cady Stanton and Sarah Grimke (McElroy 2002a: 6–7));and the tradition of 19^th century anarchist feminism whichincludes figures such as Voltairine de Cleyre (McElroy 2002a: 8;Presley 2000; Presley & Sartwell 2005). Equity feminists (see§2.2.1) stress the extent to which these early thinkers and activistsidentify women’s liberation with equal respect for women’sright against coercive interference (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth2001: 1–2). Cultural libertarian feminists (see§2.3) emphasize the extent to which these thinkers and activists challengedboth coercive state power and the patriarchal culture (Presley 2000;Long & Johnson 2005—seeOther Internet Resources).

2.1 Self-Ownership and Women’s Rights

Classical liberalism holds that women and men are self-owners capableof acquiring property rights over things. As such women and men,equally, have the right to freedom from coercive interference withtheir person and property. This right to freedom from coerciveinterference consists in, at least, rights to freedom of conscienceand expression, freedom to control what happens to one’s body,freedom of association, freedom to acquire, control and transferproperty, freedom of contract, as well as the right to compensationwhen rights are violated. The state’s role is, exclusively, toprotect citizens from coercive interference by protecting theirrights. Some reject even a limited state, however, holding thatnongovernmental means of protecting rights are to be preferred.

Classical-liberal feminists hold that the right to freedom fromcoercive interference has powerful implications for women’slives. It implies that women have the right to freedom in intimate,sexual and reproductive matters. This includes sexual autonomy (theright to engage in sexual activity of one’s choosing includingthe buying and selling of sex (Almodovar 2002; Lehrman 1997: 23), andthe right to defend oneself against sexual aggression, including theuse of firearms (Stevens, Teufel, & Biscan 2002)); freedom ofexpression (the right to appear in, publish, and consume pornographyfree of censorship (McElroy 1995; Strossen 2000)); freedom of intimateassociation (the right to partner or enter into a private marriagecontract (McElroy 1991a: 20)); and reproductive freedom (the right touse birth control, have an abortion (on the minority of pro-lifelibertarians see Tabarrok 2002: 157), and buy and sell bodilyreproductive services, for example as in surrogate motherhood (Lehrman1997: 22; McElroy 2002c; Paul 2002)). Freedom from interference withperson and property also means that women have the right to engage ineconomic activity, entering contracts, and acquiring, controlling andtransferring property free of sexist state limits (Epstein 2002; Kirp,Yudof, & Franks 1986: 204).

One way to characterize the wrong involved when states fail torecognize these rights of women is as a failure to respectwomen’s right to be treated as men’s equal, or the rightto equal treatment under the law. To be sure, classical-liberalfeminists hold that the law should not treat women and mendifferently. But this is because they believe everyone has the samerights, not because they believe women have a right to be treated thesame as men. This is clear when we note that, for classical-liberalfeminism, equal treatment under unjust law is not justice (McElroy1991a: 3).

Same treatment under the law does not guarantee same outcomes.Classical-liberal feminists hold that women’s rights are notviolated when citizens exercise their rights in ways that createunequal outcomes (Epstein 2002: 30). A woman’s rights areviolated only when she is interfered with coercively, that is, whenthere is, or is a threat of, forced loss of freedom, property or life(which does not serve as just restraint or compensation).

2.2 Equity Feminism

Equity feminism is a form of classical-liberal feminism that holdsthat feminism’spolitical role is simply to ensure thateveryone’s, including women’s, right against coerciveinterference is respected (Sommers 1994: 22). Wendy McElroy, an equityfeminist writes:

I’ve always maintained that the only reason I call myself afeminist is because of [the] gov[ernment]. By which I mean, if thegovernment (or an anarchist defense assoc[iation]) acknowledged thefull equal rights of women without paternalistic protection oroppression, I would stop writing about women’s issues. (McElroy1998c—seeOther Internet Resources)

Feminism’s political role involves assuring that women’sright against coercive interference by private individuals isrecognized and protected by the state (for example women’s rightagainst groping on the street or rape within marriage (McElroy1991b)), and that women’s right against coercive interference bythe state itself is respected. The latter means feminists shouldobject to laws that restrict women’s liberty in particular (forexample laws that limit women’s employment options (Taylor 1992:228)), and laws that protect women in particular (for example lawsgranting preferential treatment to women (Paul 1989)). Equityfeminists suggest that this has been largely accomplished in countrieslike the United States. Joan Kennedy Taylor explains: feminism’s“goal of equal political liberty for women has been pretty muchreached in the United States” (Taylor 2001; see also Sommers1994: 274).

2.2.1 Equity Feminism on the Oppression of Women

On the equity feminist view, the feminist slogan “the personalis political” is accurate when the state fails to recognizewomen’s right against coercive interference, especially inwomen’s personal lives. So, for example, in some countrieshusbands have legal control over their wives’ persons andproperty. (Some equity feminists argue that the women’s movementin Western countries should not hesitate to criticize countries inwhich this occurs (Sommers 2007).) But in countries like the UnitedStates, where the right of women against this sort of coerciveinterference is recognized and protected by law, equity feminists holdthat “the personal is no longer political” (Lehrman 1997:5; see also 21).

If an individual or group of individuals suffers sustained andsystematic denial of their rights, on the equity feminist view, we maycall them oppressed. Women were oppressed in the United States duringmost of its first two centuries; people of African descent wereoppressed before the dismantling of Jim Crow laws. While the cultureof the United States supported this denial of rights, equity feministshold that the oppressor was the state (McElroy 1998cc—seeOther Internet Resources), which refused to recognize and protect the right of women and peopleof African descent to treatment as self-owners. When the staterecognizes and protects this right of women and Americans of Africandescent, they are no longer oppressed, even if the culturedisadvantages them. So, for example, in a discussion of whether Muslimwomen are oppressed, Cathy Young focuses on whether women’sconformity with a religious tradition that subordinates them isenforced by law. If it is, then women are oppressed (C. Young2006).

If women are to be described as currently oppressed in societies likethe United States, on the equity feminist view, one must show that thestate fails to protect women, as a group, from sustained andsystematic rights violations. Some feminists have argued that violenceagainst women is pervasive in societies like the United States sothat, even though the law recognizes women’s right against it,that right is insufficiently protected and thus women endure sustainedand systematic denial of their right to bodily integrity (Dworkin1991). Equity feminists endeavor to refute this claim by showing thatthe prevalence of violence against women has been exaggerated. Forexample Rita Simon contests the claim that as many as 154 out of 1,000women have been raped. On her accounting, the number is closer to 19per 1,000; and “rape is less common than other violentcrimes” (Simon 2002: 235). In addition, she claims, “thecriminal justice system does not ignore or make light of crimesagainst females” (2002: 236). Katie Roiphe argues that date rapeis not a significant threat to women (Roiphe 1994). Concurring withRoiphe, Cathy Young writes:

women have sex after initial reluctance for a number ofreasons.… [F]ear of being beaten up by their dates is rarelyreported as one of them. (C. Young 1992)

Women have also been said to be oppressed because their right to betreated the same as men by employers, educational institutions, andassociations has been violated in a sustained and systematic way. Thatis, some argue, women have been regularly denied the right to equalaccess to opportunities because they are women. Equity feministsgenerally hold that no rights are violated when employers, educationalinstitutions, public accommodations or associations discriminateagainst women. Nonetheless, equity feminists argue that discriminationagainst women is not a serious problem. Diana Furchtgott-Roth andChristine Stolba argue that “complaints about systematiceconomic discrimination against women simply do not square with theevidence” (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xi; see also2001). They argue that “women’s wages and education levelsare closing the gap with those of men” (1999: xii). In addition,Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth claim that women have “surpassed menin education” (23; see also 23–43). Christina Hoff Sommersconcurs, arguing that, rather than failing to provide girls with aneducation equal to that of boys, our current educational systemdisproportionately benefits girls (Sommers 2000: 20–23,178).

Equity feminists argue that the differences in outcomes between womenand men can be explained, not by violence against women and sexdiscrimination, but by differences in the preferences of women and men(Epstein 2002: 33; Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii). “Inmany cases where women remain behind men, personal choices explainoutcomes more readily than does overt discrimination” (Stolba& Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii). To be sure, classical-liberalfeminists hold that women and men are sufficiently the same that theyhave the “same political interests”, in particular theinterest in being treated as a self-owner (McElroy 2002a:14–15). But, for some equity feminists, biological differencesbetween the sexes largely explain the sex segregation in the workplaceand in family roles still common in countries like the United States(Epstein 2002; Lehrman 1997: 5, 31).

Other equity feminists think biological sex differences alone do notexplain this phenomenon (C. Young 2004). Women’s preferences mayreflect the effects of socialization or incentives: for example womenmay be socialized to prefer stereotypically female roles, or therewards associated with such roles for women may provide motivationfor women to take them up. But equity feminists hold that, becausewomen are not legally required, or actually forced in some other way,to choose traditional roles, their choices are not coerced and thusstate remedies are inappropriate. On the equity feminist view, a lawprohibiting women from becoming surgeons is coercive because itconstitutes a threat of loss of liberty or property. But if one issocialized to prefer stay-at-home motherhood, or one discovers thatone prefers to stay home with children given the other real options,one may still choose to become a surgeon without risking loss ofliberty or property. As Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth put it (using theword “prevents” in a very strong sense): “Nothingprevents women from choosing the surgical specialty”(Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: 60; my emphasis).

2.2.2 Feminism’s Nonpolitical Role

While equity feminists hold that feminism’s politicaltask—securing for women the right to freedom from coerciveinterference—is nearly completed, some equity feminists believethat feminism has anonpolitical role to play inwomen’s personal lives. In its nonpolitical role, feminism canhelp women to develop character traits and strategies that will helpthem benefit from their freedom; and it can help women to navigatepersonally among their increasing options.

Karen Lehrman writes:

Men have typically held title to quite a few traits that women can nowput to good use. In addition to ambition, assertiveness, andindependence, there’s also decisiveness. (Lehrman 1997: 33; seealso 62)

Other character traits emphasized by equity feminists include“self-confidence” (Stevens et al. 2002: 255), being ableto think and argue independently (McElroy 1998a), and takingresponsibility for oneself (Taylor 1992: 86). Some equity feministssuggest that feminism offers individual women and men the opportunityfor freedom from conformity with sex roles (Lehrman 1997: 6; Taylor1992: 23–24).

Equity feminists recommend strategies for success for women ineducation and employment as alternatives to state regulation. In maledominated fields, for example, equity feminists recommend that womenmentor one another or organize supportive associations, making use ofthe techniques of 1960’s feminism like consciousness-raising(Taylor 1992: 100–101). Some recommend that, instead of beingambivalent about work outside of the home, women should “leanin” to it (Sandberg 2013). InWhat You Can Do About SexualHarassment When You Don’t Want to Call the Cops, JoanKennedy Taylor argues that women can avoid sexual harassment or lessenits impact if they learn to diffuse conflicts with men and understandthe role of sexual banter in male culture (Taylor 1999). Equityfeminists also recommend that women make full use of their right tocontract by turning their preferences—for example the preferencefor being paid and/or promoted on the basis of one’s jobperformance and not on the basis of sexual favors—into rightsthrough contract (Epstein 2002: 40; Taylor 1992: 169).

Some equity feminists stress that women need not give up their genderdifference to benefit from their freedom (Lehrman 1997: 198). As KarenLehrman writes, “completing the feministrevolution…primarily involves [women] completing their ownpersonal evolutions” (1997: 35). Lehrman quotes Elizabeth CadyStanton:

the strongest reason for giving woman … a complete emancipationfrom all forms of bondage of custom, dependence, superstition …is the solitude and personal responsibility of her own individuallife. (1997: 201, quoting “The Solitude of Self”[1892])

An important part of this individual life, on Lehrman’s view, isnavigating among sexual difference and sameness in the personalconstruction of a satisfying life.

2.2.3 Socially Conservative Equity Feminism

Some equity feminists are socially conservative (Morse 2001; Sommers2000). To be sure, equity feminism as described here is a form ofclassical-liberalism. As such it involves the claim that traditionalvalues should not be imposed on citizens by the state. For example,the state should not tax citizens to support institutions that promotetraditional values; nor should the criminal or civil law createincentives for adherence to such values. But some equity feministshold that it is best when citizens voluntarily adhere to traditionalvalues. They hold that widespread voluntary adherence to traditionalvalues is conducive to well-being in society because traditionalvalues make possible the reproduction of independent and“self-restraining citizens” who are “the basis offree institutions, both economic and political” (Morse 2001:161).

Socially conservative equity feminists do not take the classicalliberal theory of the limits of state power to imply endorsement of alibertine cultural ethos. So, for example, while socially conservativeequity feminists hold that the state should not force citizens toaccept traditional family forms (because individuals have a rightagainst such coercive interference), they hold that society shouldstrongly discourage disfavored ways of life and encourage favored onesthrough noncoercive, nonstate means. Socially conservative equityfeminists hold that when feminism strays from its political role ofassuring equal rights and ventures into women’s personal livesit tends to discourage in women the kinds of delayed gratification andself-sacrifice on which vital social institutions, like the family,depend (Morse 2001: 133).

To be sure, there arepolitical conservatives who take equityfeminism’s claim that women and men should be treated the sameby the law as a rule of thumb. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese is an example ofsuch a political conservative (Fox-Genovese 1991; 1996). Thedifference between political conservatives who embrace the equityfeminist account of women’s equality and socially conservativeequity feminists is that the former endorse the use of state power topromote traditional values while the latter do not. Also, sociallyconservative equity feminists hold that individuals’ politicalrights derive from their status as self-owners (Morse 2001: 57) whilepolitical conservatives hold that citizens’ political rightsderive from their status as members of communities (Fox-Genovese 1991:9). In contemporary popular political discourse it is often hard todistinguish these two, as they are in political coalition. To appealto both classical liberal and socially conservative constituencies, onoccasion theorists help themselves to a bit of both traditions. Forexample, Jennifer Roback Morse identifies herself as a libertarian:“When the topic is the proper relationship between theindividual and the state, libertarianism is pretty much the rightpath” (Morse 2001: 4). But she also makes the un-libertarian andpolitically conservative recommendation that the state shouldintervene in personal relationships by making it “costly todivorce” (2001: 164, see also 104, 111).

2.3 Cultural Libertarian Feminism

Cultural libertarianism is a form of classical liberalism that is

concerned about constraints on individual freedom from government aswell as from traditionalist familial, religious, and communityinstitutions—the same civil institutions that conservatives seeas necessary for ordered liberty to thrive. (C. Young 2007)

Cultural libertarian feminism holds that these institutions reflectthe patriarchal nature of society and oppress women. Thus culturallibertarian feminism recognizes sources of women’s oppressionother than the state (Presley 2000; Long & Johnson 2005—seeOther Internet Resources). As Charles Johnson and Roderick Long put it, patriarchal culture andthe state are “interlocking systems of oppression” (Long& Johnson 2005—seeOther Internet Resources), both of which should be opposed by feminists. They explain:

There is nothing inconsistent or un-libertarian in holding thatwomen’s choices under patriarchal social structures can besufficiently “voluntary,” in the libertarian sense, to beentitled to immunity from coercive legislative interference, while atthe same time being sufficiently “involuntary,” in abroader sense, to be recognized as morally problematic and as alegitimate target of social activism. (Long & Johnson2005—seeOther Internet Resources).

Calling this view “anarchist feminism”, Sharon Presleywrites: “What the anarchist feminists are calling for is aradical restructuring of society, both in its public and privateinstitutions” (Presley 2000). Such feminists hold that much ofthe oppression women currently suffer is noncoercive, however. Lawsagainst prostitution are coercive—the state can put a violatorin jail or force her to pay a fine. But on the cultural libertarianfeminist view much of the pressure to conform to gender roles is notcoercive. Noncoercive oppression can be resisted, although it is oftennot easy to do so. Cultural libertarian feminists hold thatnoncoercive oppression should not be remedied by the state (see alsoTomasi 2009). As Presley and Kinsky explain, on the culturallibertarian view, to try to remedy the noncoercive oppression of womenwith coercive state action “just changes the sort of oppression,not the fact” (Presley & Kinsky 1991: 78). This oppressionshould be opposed by a nonviolent movement for feminist socialchange.

Cultural libertarian feminists target the patriarchal culture by, forexample, developing in individuals (especially women) the ability tobe independent. This involves enabling individuals to resist authorityand think for themselves (Presley 2001). Cultural libertarianfeminists also recommend the development of more deeply consensualrelationships and institutions (Heckert 2004—seeOther Internet Resources), relationships and institutions in which there is an equality ofauthority (Long 2001—seeOther Internet Resources). While some equity feminists (see§1.2) would applaud this work, they would call it “personal”,reserving the term “political” for the work of securingfor women their right against coercive interference. Equity feministWendy McElroy writes:

I understand that there is a cultural form of feminism and many womenwould still fight for improved prestige or status, and Iwouldn’t criticis[e] them for doing so. It just wouldn’tgrip me. Guess I’m a political animal after all. (McElroy1998c—seeOther Internet Resources)

But cultural libertarian feminists consider this work to be anintegral part of a larger political struggle for women’sfreedom.

2.4 Anti-Discrimination Law and Preferential Treatment

Classical-liberal feminism requires same treatment of women and menunder just law. This means that sex discrimination by the state, forexample when the state functions as an employer, is impermissible(Block 1991: 102; Epstein 2002: 34; Warnick 2003: 1608). Butclassical-liberal feminists oppose laws that prohibit discriminationagainst women by nonstate actors, for example in employment,education, public accommodations, or associations (McElroy 1991b:22–23; Epstein 2002). They hold that the interaction of citizensshould be subject to state control only to the extent necessary toprotect citizens’ right against coercive interference.Businesses violate citizens’ right against coercive interferenceif they steal from their customers or employees; associations violateit if they extort their members; colleges violate it if they kidnapstudents. But businesses do not violate this right if they refuse todo business with women, pay women less for the same work, or create aworking environment that is hostile to them because of their sex.Private educational institutions do not violate this right if theyrefuse to educate girls or women, offer them an inferior education, orcreate a learning environment that is hostile to them because of theirsex. Business and professional associations do not violate this rightif they refuse to admit women as members or make them feel unwelcomebecause of their sex.

Classical-liberal feminism, as described here, clearly impliesrejection of the legal prohibition against private discrimination inemployment, education, public accommodations, and associations. But inthe literature one finds a range of views. Some categorically rejectany legal protection against private discrimination (Taylor 1992: 62).Others accept basic protections such as those afforded in U.S. law bythe Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; but reject morerobust protections, such as non-remedial affirmative action orcomparable worth (Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 2001: 179; see also107–108).

Classical-liberal feminism holds that private businesses, educationalinstitutions, and associations are free to give or withholdpreferential treatment to women. But the state may not treat womenpreferentially because the state must treat citizens the sameregardless of sex. Nor may the state require that private businesses,educational institutions, or associations treat women preferentially.This is because, on the classical-liberal feminist view, failure totreat women preferentially is not a violation of anyone’s rightagainst coercive interference. Examples of preferential treatmentunder the law, which classical-liberal feminists oppose, includeaffirmative action in employment and education (Lehrman 1997: 25),comparable worth (Paul 1989) and advantages for women in the legaltreatment of custody and domestic violence (Simon 2002).

While classical-liberal feminists resist state remedies for privatediscrimination against women, they also hold that such discriminationis not currently a serious problem in countries like the UnitedStates. In addition, they argue,

even where discrimination may exist, we find little, if any, evidencethat expanded government intervention would serve any useful purpose.(Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 1999: xii)

and speculate that freer markets would make whatever discriminationcurrently takes place even more rare (McElroy 2002b, 187).

2.5 Justification

Much of the classical-liberal feminist literature, especially theequity feminist literature, is written for public policy and popularaudiences, so emphasis is on policy implications rather thanphilosophical justifications. Nonetheless, we find in the literature avariety of justifications, some consequentialist and somenon-consequentialist.

The most common justification offered in the classical-liberalfeminist literature is consequentialist. This argument says that thepolitical arrangements recommended by classical-liberalism, ascompared with the alternatives, will provide women with more of whatis good for them: for example safety, income and wealth, and options.Liberalizing guns laws will make women safer (Stevens, et al. 2002);legalizing prostitution and pornography will improve the lives ofwomen in those trades (Almodovar 2002; Strossen 2000) and openopportunities for others; freer markets will root out discriminationagainst women and stimulate the proliferation of amenities essentialto working women, like daycare centers (Epstein 2002: 33; Paul 2002:208–209; Stolba & Furchtgott-Roth 2001: 124, 180; Conway1998). Indeed, some argue that liberalizing the market will releasesuch an “explosion of prosperity” that women will not needhelp from a welfare state (Long 1997—seeOther Internet Resources).

A variety of non-consequentialist arguments are offered as well. Kirp,Yudof, and Franks, for example, refer to Kant’s categoricalimperative and claim that treating individuals as self-owners is whatis meant by treating individuals as ends in themselves ((Kirp, et al.1986: 13–14). Wendy McElroy grounds her thought in the naturallaw tradition (McElroy 1998b). Some imply a perfectionistjustification according to which the perfection of the human beingrequires being treated as a self-owner (Presley 2001).

2.6 Criticism

Some criticism of classical-liberal feminism addresses theconsequentialist argument offered in support of classical-liberalfeminism. The consequentialist argument says that the politicalarrangements recommended by classical-liberalism, as compared with thealternatives, will provide women with more of what is good for them(see§2.5). Following Ashlie Warnick, we can distinguish the claim thatparticular liberty-restricting policies are bad for women (and thatsome liberty-enhancing policies are good for women) from the claimthat all liberty-restricting policies harm women, or that a minimalstate (or no state) would be better for women overall (Warnick 2003).It is surely possible to cite liberty-restricting policies that arebad for women—laws limiting women’s employmentoptions—and thus to cite liberty-enhancing policies that aregood for women—not having such laws. But it is also possible tocite liberty-restricting policies that are good for women—forexample the legal prohibition against sex discrimination inemployment, education, and public accommodations (whichclassical-liberal feminists recommend dismantling (see§2.4)). Of course, if sex discrimination is rare, as some classical-liberalfeminists contend (see§2.2.1), laws prohibiting it will not produce much benefit. But, asegalitarian-liberal feminists Deborah Rhode and Ann Cudd argue, sexdiscrimination remains a significant problem (Rhode 1997: 156; Cudd2006: 140–142). Think also of the classical-liberal feministrecommendation that women and men be treated exactly the same by thestate (see§2.1 and§2.4). While different treatment can stigmatize and entrench stereotypes,same treatment can disadvantage women if they are not similarlysituated to men—which, arguably, is the case (Minow 1990). Sothe larger case—that all liberty-restricting policies harmwomen, or that a minimal state (or no state) would be better for womenoverall—has not been made convincingly (Warnick 2003). Anotherconcern about the larger case is that much of the support offered isspeculative, for example Roderick Long’s assertion that“the explosion of prosperity” classical liberalarrangements would bring about ”would go a long way towardproviding women with an economic safety net more effective than anygovernment welfare program” (Long 1997—seeOther Internet Resources).

Some criticism addresses non-consequentialist arguments forclassical-liberal feminism. These arguments say that, regardless ofthe consequences, women and men should be treated as self-owners withrights to property justly acquired and to freedom from coerciveinterference because this is what they deserve as ends in themselves,because this is what insight into natural law teaches, or because thisis what their perfection requires (see§2.5). Critics contend that even if we concede the relevantclassical-liberal premises—that women and men should be treatedin ways they deserve as ends in themselves, or as natural law teaches,or in ways their perfection requires—it does not follow that thestate should treat individuals merely as self-owners entitled only toproperty justly acquired and freedom from coercive interference. Forexample, egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that treatingindividuals as ends in themselves requires legal measures to protectwomen’s personal and political autonomy—measures such asanti-discrimination law, workplace changes to accommodate caregivingresponsibilities, and adequate material means (see§1.1.4 and§1.2.1). Since classical-liberal feminism rejects such measures,egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that it fails to treat women asends in themselves. Also, that treating individuals as ends inthemselves means treating them as entitled merely to protection fromcoercive interference is plausible only if one ignores the fact ofhuman dependency. By the fact of human dependency is meant the factthat all human beings are utterly dependent on the caregiving ofothers for many years at the start of life, that many come to need thecaregiving of others due to temporary or permanent disability later inlife, and that many require caregiving when they become infirm at theend of life; and also, that those who provide caregiving for those whocannot care for themselves become dependent on others for support(Kittay 1995: 10). If human beings are dependent in these ways, thentreating them as ends in themselves will, at least for some of thetime, mean something other than merely leaving them alone. Failure torecognize this suggests that classical-liberal feminism assumes thatthere is a nonpolitical “realm of private life in which thereproductive and nurturant needs of human beings are taken careof” (Okin 1989: 75). Such an assumption makes it impossible toevaluate the justice of the arrangements under which caregiving isgiven and received and removes from our consideration the nature ofobligations to, and entitlements of, members of society who requirecaregiving to survive and thrive. Some worry that one form ofclassical liberalism—libertarianism—seriouslymisunderstands the political relevance of caregiving because itconstrues one key caregiving arrangement, the parent-childrelationship, as one of ownership (see Okin 1989: 80–85; seealso Nozick 1974; Andersson 2007; and Jeske 1996). As Jennifer RobackMorse, herself a libertarian puts it: ”I think it is well toadmit… that our inattention to family life and communityresponsibility has left libertarians open to the charge that we do notcare very much about these matters” (Morse 2001: 28).

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