Spring 2013 Edition
1. Berkeley alsoargues against abstractionism inAlciphron andA Defenseof Free-thinking in Mathematics (Berkeley 1948-1957, 3: 292-293,331-335, 4: 134-5). See also the First draft of TheIntroduction to the Principles, which differs in important ways fromthe published version (Berkeley 1948-57, 2: 121-145).
2. Interpreters haveusefully distinguished several different types of abstract ideasattacked by Berkeley. See Pappas 2000, 40-44.
3. The question ofwhat exactly Berkeley's argument against abstraction is, and what roleit plays in supporting his immaterialism, is a disputed one. Winkler(1989, 30-35) and Jesseph (1993, 20-33) maintain that Berkeley's mainargument against abstraction is the argument from impossibility,according to which abstract ideas are impossible because they would beideas of impossible objects. Such an argument could only play asupporting role in the attack on materialism. Others (including Pappas2000, Bolton 1987, Atherton 1987, Muehlmann 1992) interpret theargument differently and assign a more central role to it. McKim 1997-8provides a critical review of several relatively recent positions onthe issue.
4. Morespecifically, she inquired as to “how the soul of man (since itis but a thinking substance) can determine the spirits of the body toproduce voluntary actions” (Atherton 1994, 11).
5. The origin of thelabel is Gallois 1974.
6. Analogously, Ican conceive of something not thought of by me right now, even if inorder to do so I must employ a representation that is conceived of byme right now. If Berkeley denies this, he ends up a solipsist and apresentist, not just an idealist, as is noted by many commentators,e.g. Tipton 1974, 161.
7. Campbell (2002,128) attributes something like this point to Berkeley as well.
8. It presupposesrepresentationalism because it assumes that we are immediatelyconfronted with mind-dependent ideas and then raises the question ofwhether we can use them to conceive of unconceived, mind-independentobjects.
9. Saidel 1993provides a useful review and critique of some contemporary approachesto the Master Argument.
10. Anotherinteresting and detailed account of the “identificationargument” and the “argument from perceptualrelativity” is offered by Muehlmann 1992, chapter 5.
11. Moreprecisely, according to mechanism, bodies are not colored in the way wesuppose them to be, based on our sensory ideas. One (Lockean) accountof color is as a (mere) power to cause ideas in us. On that account,bodies are in fact colored and they would be colored even in theabsence of perceivers.
12. For analternative,phenomenalist account of Berkeleyian objects, seeWinkler 1989, 191-203.
13. Contra morerealistic interpretations of Berkeley's ideas (sensible objects)proffered by Luce 1963 and Atherton 1990. On this topic see alsoAtherton 1995 and McCracken 1995.
14. SeeTheSearch After Truth, Elucidation Fifteen (Malebranche 1980,657-668).
15. Of course,“if we open it” also requires an idealistic gloss, whichwould presumably go something like this: “If we form a volitionto open it, which is then followed by the having of series of ideas ofour hands moving, of the watch opening, etc.”.
16. Of course,this isn't true of occasionalists such as Malebranche, who faced thesame problem as Berkeley. It should also be noted that many officiallyrejected Descartes' stance that natural philosophy concerns onlyefficient causation. Boyle, e.g., decreed that it should consider finalcauses, thus allowing it to partner with natural theology. His ownwork, however, had the overwhelming effect of directing attention tomechanical, presumably efficient, causes. Berkeley piously affirms therelevance of final causes to natural philosophy at PHK 107. For more onthese issues see Nadler 1998.
17. For a moredetailed and somewhat subtler account, see Downing, forthcoming.
18. Thisoft-cited limerick and its companion (see below) can be found inFleming 1985.
19. His claimshere are interesting and perceptive. He maintains that the materialistsmust hold that the proper objects of the senses, e.g. light and colors,pop in and out of existence. And he highlights, à la Malebranche,the scholastic doctrine that conservation amounts to continuouscreation. In both cases, however, there are clear grounds for arguingthat the doctrine violates common sense less egregiously than anidealist intermittent existence.
20. JonathanBennett (1971, 170) turned this fact into a subject of scholarlycontroversy.
21. A number ofcontroversial issues lurk here. Does Berkeley hold that ordinaryobjects are mediately or immediately perceived? Does Berkeley hold thatall perception is immediate perception? A good guide here is GeorgePappas (2000, 147-182), who argues that Berkeley does allow for mediateperception, but that ordinary objects are typically immediatelyperceived.
22. Though doneon the basis of regularities established by God.
23. Wilson 1999,241 nicely raises a version of this worry.
24. See Wilson1999, 241, footnote 2, where she cites Nicholas Sturgeon's comments toher as the source of this point.
25. Berkeleyexplicitly affirms that spirits are substances in thePrinciples andDialogues. Nevertheless, RobertMuehlmann (1992, ch. 6) has argued that Berkeley's true view remainsthe Humean “congeries” account, although he concealsit.
26. Note that themarginal “+” sign that accompanies this entry is usuallytaken as Berkeley's indication that he has rejected or droppedconsideration of the point contained therein.
27. Theimportance of regularity is not explicit in these entries, but Winkler(1989, 108-9) argues convincingly that Berkeley acknowledges it.
28. Tipton (1974,307) notes that this definition would be “suspiciouslyuseful” given Berkeley's purposes.
29. Though he ishappy to cite established authors when he agrees with them, moreespecially in his later works.
