[290] Spain's seventeenth-century decline has received less studythan any other major period of Spanish history. In part, this is becauseit is more remote than the modern phase that began in the eighteenth century,but it must also be explained by the painful reactions that comparisonswith the glories of the late-fifteenth and sixteenth centuries evoke. Bythe end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century, perceptive Spaniardswere clearly aware that they were living in an age of marked decline, andthe sense of frustration and of waning accomplishment became steadily moreconscious and general as the decades advanced. Subsequently, in the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries, historiographic opinion viewed the period asdecadent, a description still commonly used. More recently, twentieth-centurynationalist historiography has questioned the judgment of decadence, suggestingthat the time was merely one of stagnation in which the country was unableto develop at a rate equal to more expansive powers, because of the weightof imperial responsibilities. While it is true that Spain would have hadto run faster than she had in the sixteenth century in order not to loseground in the seventeenth century--a period of greater competition anddevelopment among west European powers--she was unable to maintain eventhe pace of 1600. The seventeenth century was, in fact, more than a timeof stagnation; it was a period of general decline. Moreover, the society[291] and culture showed signs of decadence in the strict senseof the term.
An actual decline was reflected, first of all, in population. At theend of the sixteenth century, the Spanish homeland (excluding Portugal)had nearly 8,500,000 people, but in 1700 only about 7,000,000. Epidemicdisease was the major cause for this decline, especially the bubonic plaguebut also typhus, smallpox, and other maladies. They were particularly lethalbecause the growth of towns in the sixteenth century had crowded many tensof thousands of the poor together in filthy conditions, and because economicdecline brought a drop in food production, higher prices, lower purchasingpower, reduced imports, and widespread malnutrition, particularly afteryears of poor harvests. The great plague of 1596-1602 attacked widespreadareas of Castile and claimed 600,000 to 700,000 lives, or about 10 percentof the population, a figure almost equal to the gain of the preceding century.A second plague of great magnitude struck the eastern and southern partsof the peninsula in 1647-1652, and other devastating outbreaks occurredduring the trough of the economic decline, between 1676 and 1685. Lesserepidemics raged intermittently throughout the century. It appears thataltogether more than 1,250,000 deaths resulted from the extreme incidenceof plague in seventeenth-century Spain. the worst era of epidemics in recordedpeninsular history save for the period of the Black Death.
The other principal causes of population loss were emigration to America,deaths from warfare, and the expulsion of the Moriscos. The official emigrationstatistics indicate little more than 40,000 "legal" emigrants, but mostwere not licensed and the true figure was probably several times that.Military campaigns in the seventeenth century became increasingly costlyin lives, especially during the middle years when there was widespreadfighting and destruction in Catalonia. Deaths from disease and malnutritionfar outnumbered combat fatalities, and the number of lives lost from warduring the heaviest period of fighting from 1635 to 1659 may have reacheda quarter million. The expulsion of the Moriscos early in the century lostthe peninsula approximately 275,000 people.
Castile was affected more severely than the eastern principalities.The population of Catalonia, Navarre, and the Basque provinces was aboutthe same at the end of the century as in the beginning. That of Aragóndeclined slightly, but proportionately not as much as Castile's. By 1700Valencia was able to make good only half the losses suffered by the expulsionof the Moriscos, and showed a net loss of about 50,000 to 75,000 people.Castile, which bore the main financial and military weight of empire andprovided most of the emigrants, suffered a net loss of some 1,250,000.Its population, excluding the[292]Basque country, dropped fromaround 6,750,000 in 1600 to 5,500,000 in 1700.
Jaime Vicens Vives has suggested seven prime causes of the seventeenth-centuryeconomic decline: 1) continued increase in the size of entailed domainsheld by the aristocracy and the church, which had the effect of withdrawingland from use and of lowering production; 2) increasing social disruptionand vagrancy; 3) deforestation; 4) an overabundance of clerics; 5) thestatus orientation of society; 6) the negative, charity-oriented religiousattitudes toward poverty that precluded serious thought of reform and newenterprise; and most important of all, 7) government policy, which maintainedprohibitive taxes in Castile, produced capricious waves of alternatinginflation and deflation that led to monetary chaos, over-regulated someaspects of the economy, and was incompetent in planning and execution.
The tax burden on Castile, already destructive during the reign ofFelipe II, became unbearable during the course of the seventeenth century.The constitutional systems of the eastern principalities continued to protectthem from all special levies save sporadic grants made grudgingly by theirCortes, which averaged out to a per capita annual rate considerably lessthan that paid by Castilians. The only institution in the east that paidanything approaching a proportionate share of taxes was the church. Infact, the eastern principalities paid much less than did the Italian territoriesof the crown--Sicily, Naples and Milan--which in some years by the endof the sixteenth century were paying over five million ducats and carryingmuch of the cost of imperial defense in the Mediterranean and in south-centralEurope. But the main responsibility still fell on Castile, which from the1590s on was called upon to pay two-thirds of the cost of government outof its ordinary taxes. The nominal tax rates were not in themselves exorbitant,but the power of the aristocracy to shove the weight of them onto the middleclasses and the peasantry, together with the exactions of tax farmers andagents who raked off much of the proceeds, led to crushing imposts on productionthat drove tens of thousands of peasant families off the land and intoemigration or poverty in the crowded cities.
This situation was aggravated by a capricious, irresponsible royalmonetary policy. During the sixteenth century the Spanish monarchy hadmaintained a sound currency based on a fairly steady silver value, butby 1599, with the bulk of royal income already going for[293]debtservice, it was decided to debase the coinage by issuing copper money.This led to a two-year bout of inflation, and after a temporary end tomonetary debasement, a slight price decline from 1601 to 1610. During thenext decade prices were generally stable, but further debasement led toserious inflation in the 1620s and sporadic inflation from 1636 to 1638and in the 1640s. Altogether, prices rose nearly 40 percent in the quarter-century1625-1650. This in itself would not have been so serious had it not beenfor the pendular swings from inflation to deflation that discouraged productionand commerce even further.
Capital and credit were increasingly scarce from the latter part ofthe sixteenth century. The bankruptcy of 1596 was the final blow that completedthe ruin of Medina and the other financial centers of northern Castile.The problem was not the absence of capital, for it existed among the aristocracy;it was a problem of values and priorities. The upper classes and the churchhad already established a pattern of preferring the moderately high rateof interest from state bonds and short-term loans to long-term investmentsinvolving greater risk. In view of these preferences, the existence ofmore capital would not in itself have guaranteed more productive undertakings.At any rate, even the favored "safe" investments proved less and less lucrativewith the eventual near collapse of the state financial system and the declineof agriculture, the source of income from many short-term loans. In turn,the crown came to rely almost exclusively on foreign sources of credit.
The most serious domestic aspect of the seventeenth-century economicdecline was in the most fundamental area -- food production. Agriculturedeclined fairly steadily, with brief moments of recovery due mainly tobetter weather, until it reached a secular trough in the 1680s. The principalfactor was probably the enormous weight of taxation on peasant agriculturein Castile. In some regions, the peasant paid five or six different kindsof duties -- a tithe to the church that in certain districts amounted tonearer a fifth than a tenth of his production, seigneurial dues to hislord, rent to the landlord who held immediate economic jurisdiction (usuallya different and lesser personage than the former), taxes to the crown,and in many instances, interests and payments on short-term loans withoutwhich he could not have stayed in production. In parts of Castile theseamounted to more than half of an income which was often only marginal atbest, and thus made it impossible to maintain a family on the land. Thepressure of sheep-herding interests was lessening, for wool exports werealso declining in a more competitive international market, and market pricerestrictions on the food producer could often be evaded,[294] butin general, nonagrarian prices rose more rapidly than did those for foodproduced, trapping the peasantry in a price scissors. All the while, landrents increased with the general inflation of the period. There was noescape from taxation and dues, and even the weather grew worse during thesecond half of the century. The result was drastic rural depopulation inlarge areas, particularly in the Duero valley of León and Old Castile,and in the Toledo and Guadalajara districts of New Castile.
Domestic manufactures, which had begun to decline in the late sixteenthcentury, continued their decline during the seventeenth century. The chieftextile-producing towns of New Castile suffered a disastrous drop in population.During the course of the century, Toledo fell from 50,000 to 20,000 inhabitants,Segovia from 25,000 to 8,000, and Cuenca from 15,000 to 5,000. Much ofthe Spanish clothing market was lost to foreign competition, especiallyto durable, light-weight English woolens. Again, the chief reasons werethe absence of enterprise, the failure to adapt to new demands and possibilities,the lack of technological improvement in production, and the loss of skilledlabor. Relative inefficiency coupled with comparatively high wages resultedin high production costs that priced many Spanish manufactures out of themarket.
The other two domestic industries that had been important were Basqueiron production and shipbuilding along the northern coasts. These alsodeclined rather precipitously, for the same factors were at work. Afterthe general volume of shipping and commerce started to contract in the1620s, demand for new vessels naturally lessened, but even the boats thatwere bought and chartered were increasingly apt to be foreign, becauseof superior design and construction. The cost of naval stores had beendisproportionately high in the peninsula for a long time. This, plus thefailure to improve techniques or design, left the north Spanish shipbuildingindustry in the doldrums throughout the century. Similarly, Basque ironproduction, which at times had exceeded 3,000 tons annually in the sixteenthcentury, dropped off markedly and was unable to supply the domestic marketor sustain the needs of the Spanish military. There was, however, somerevival in the last two decades of the century.
Regional light industries and local crafts were affected much lessby the general downturn than were the three major industries that had beendirected toward national and international markets. Simple household goodswere still supplied by local artisans, and this relationship was in mostinstances little disturbed by the rise of imported manufactures.
The decline in food and textile production was met by a correspondingrise in imports from abroad. Spain was largely dependent[295] onnorthern Europe for naval stores, and relied increasingly on countriesin that region and on France for textiles, hardware, paper, and enoughgrain to try to make up food deficits. Such increasing need, coupled withthe military failures of the second half of the reign of Felipe IV, ledto a series of commercial treaties between 1648 and 1667 with Holland,France, and England, granting these powers broad commercial privilegesand comparatively low tariff rates on their exports to Spain. Spanish exportssteadily declined. Wool remained the staple export, and Spanish wool continuedto be of comparatively high quality. However, the size of the Mesta's herdshad been dwindling since the late sixteenth century as a result of soilerosion, lack of credit, high export taxes, and legal pressure againstthe Mesta that was finally reducing its grazing privileges. The volumeof wool export remained respectably high through the first half of theseventeenth century, but then sagged irretrievably. The other basic exports--wine,olive oil, Basque iron, and American cochineal--also declined as a resultof the depression in agriculture and domestic manufacture and the slumpin the American trade. The only general exception to this pattern was thetrade of Bilbao, which remained fairly constant as a belated increase iniron exports helped to make good much of the loss suffered in the declineof the wool trade. Overall, however, the balance of Spanish foreign tradeduring the second half of the century was overwhelmingly unfavorable, andwas sustained only by the re-export of American bullion. Yet the declinein bullion production reduced the possibilities of importing enough tocompensate for the failure of domestic production and resulted in povertyand hunger for much of Spanish society.
The foreign share in Spanish commerce grew throughout the century until,by the second half, it was dominant. Not only was the volume of importsextremely high, but foreign capital established its control of the intra-Hispanictrade from the Andalusian ports, while east coast shipping, at least duringthe middle years of the century, was dominated largely by French and Genoesefinanciers and merchants.
The greatest single achievement of the Spanish economy during the sixteenthcentury had been the development of a prosperous colonial trade with theAmerican empire. This had provided an outlet for Spanish textiles and foodproducts and had brought a return in bullion that served to balance Spanishcommerce with Europe. Indeed, the development of the Spanish American colonialeconomy in[296] that period was by far the greatest overseas economicaccomplishment of any European power. The height of the Hispanic colonialtrade was reached during the last third of the sixteenth century, thoughthe high for a single year came in 1608; colonial trade in general remainedrather static during the thirty-year period from 1593 to 1622. From thereit fell into serious decline, dropping to a low by mid-century. Between1606-1610 and 1646-1650 the volume of the colonial trade declined by 60percent, as indicated in table 6, and remained in that trough for nearlyone hundred years, until the middle of the eighteenth century.
| Period | Departures | Arrivals | ||
| Ships | Toneladas (1) of goods | Ships | Toneladas of goods | |
| 1600-1604 | 55 | 19,800 | 56 | 21,600 |
| 1640-1650 | 25 | 8,500 | 29 | 9,850 |
| 1670-1680 | 17 | 4,650 | 19 | 5,600 |
| 1701-1710 | 8 | 2,640 | 7 | 2,310 |
This brought a steady decline in the wealth and population of Seville,the second city of Spain, after the 1620s. Seville was plagued not onlyby the falling off of trade in general, however, but also by the siltingof the Guadalquivir, which made its harbor increasingly difficult to use.Thus the great Andalusian city could not maintain its place of leadershipeven within a diminished commerce. More and more traffic moved to Cádiz,which grew from 2,000 to 40,000 inhabitants between 1600 and 1700, andin the eighteenth century replaced Seville altogether as the main entrepôtof the American trade.
Imports of American treasure followed a roughly similar pattern. Theyaveraged approximately 7,000,000 pesos per year in the 1590s, then droppedto between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 annually between 1600 and 1625. Fromthat point they fell rapidly, dropping to little more than 2,000,000 annuallybetween 1646 and 1650 and only 500,000 in the years 1656-1660. The crown'sshare of the American treasure began to fall both earlier and more rapidly.Royal treasure receipts of American bullion averaged somewhat more than1,500,000 pesos from 1595 to 1615, dropped to less than 1,000,000 annually[297] from 1616 to 1645, dwindled to less than 400,000 during theten years after that, and averaged little more than 100,000 annually between1656 and 1660. Other income from American taxes fell at approximately thesame rate. The general decline in colonial trade not only crippled oneof the two main sources of crown income but deepened the general depressionof production in metropolitan Spain.
Colonial trade declined for a variety of reasons. By the seventeenthcentury, Spanish America had begun to develop its own domestic production,at least in food and simple goods, and no longer needed the products ofSpanish agriculture that had formed the staples of Spanish trade in thesixteenth century. Its economy now required finished industrial goods whichthe Spanish homeland was increasingly ill-prepared to supply. This ledthe colonies to turn more and more to foreign producers, and contrabandtrade increased greatly. In turn, merchants engaged in the American tradetended more and more to invest in American commerce and production ratherthan return their capital to Spain. Coupled with these factors was theprogressive exhaustion of the largest silver mines in northern Mexico andthe southern Andes, while no technique was being developed that would havemade working the marginal deposits profitable. Discovery of several newbut smaller sources of silver did not offset these limitations. Yet anotherfactor was the drastic depopulation of central Mexico in the late sixteenthand early seventeenth centuries as a result of epidemics of European diseasesand of the social and economic exploitation of the Indians. To this wasadded the growing weight of competition from other imperial powers, competitionwhich had been nearly nonexistent through most of the sixteenth century.An increasing proportion of the taxes of Spanish America remained thereto build defenses against English, Dutch, and French intruders. In general,the resistance of Spanish America was quite effective, reflecting the stabilityand rooted-ness of the Hispanic society being formed there, but it usedup funds that the Spanish crown would otherwise have had available forits expenses in Europe. Finally, the pressure of Spanish taxation and thedecline in Spanish shipping further handicapped the colonial trade. Asvolume diminished, taxes and fees on shipping were proportionately increasedto pay for mounting costs of insurance and defense. This led to widespreadfraud in the registration of commerce and gave further encouragement tocontraband.
The shift in the internal economic relations of the Hispanic worldduring the seventeenth century thus resulted from the decline of the peninsulareconomy coupled with the growth of the Spanish American economy. It revealedthe beginning of what would be an increasingly separate and eventuallyindependent Spanish America.
The pattern of society during the seventeenth century merely accentuatedthe trend toward aristocratic dominance established long before. Duringthis period the traditional Spanish nobility reached its apogee. Altogether,nearly l0 percent of the people of Spain were nobles, but wealth was concentratedin the upper strata--the grandes, and just below them, thetítulos.With the economy stagnating, Spanish society remained desperately upwardlymobile. Concern was directed almost exclusively toward winning aristocraticstatus and, if that were already achieved, toward rising into the elite,whose ranks were thus steadily expanded. There had been twenty-five familiesof grandes when the rank was legally defined in 1520, but ten more wereraised to that category in the year 1640 alone. In addition to the grandesthere had been thirty-five títulos in Spain in 1520. Table 7 showsthe number of titles created in the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
| Ruler | Number of Titles | |||
| Dukes | Marquises | Counts | Viscounts | |
| Felipe II, 1556-98 | 18 | 38 | 43 | |
| Felipe III, 1598-1621 | 20 | 25 | ||
| Felipe IV, 1621-65 | 67 | 25 | ||
| Carlos II, 1665-1700 | 209 | 78 | 5 |
Basically, what separated the grandes and títulos from the restof the nobility was wealth, mainly in landed domains under seigneurialjurisdiction and protected by right of entail. The proportion of land heldin seigneuries continued to grow in the seventeenth century for the samereason that it had in the sixteenth. Though the holders of great seigneuriesdid not expand their real income from land at the rate that prices wererising, their preferment at court increased, and many special honors, posts,and gifts were bestowed on them from a swollen royal treasury. More thanever before they were living parastically off not only the land but theroyal income as well. Thus, as the overall production of wealth from townsand commerce declined, the proportionate share of the national wealth heldby the great landholding aristocracy actually increased.
[299] The nobles of middle rank, the caballeros, did not normallyhold seigneuries of importance, but controlled many positions in municipalgovernment and dominated much of local administration. This provided themwith lucrative posts as well as the control of local taxes and governmentfinance.
The hidalgos continued to be numerically the great bulk of the nominalnobility. Though many were indeed poor and lacked land or other possessionsof note, their status was nevertheless of great advantage. It freed themfrom payment of most taxes and provided legal privileges in criminal andcivil suits, and for some it was the status derived from not having topay taxes, more than the money involved, that was important. If there werethose even worse off than their classic prototype, Don Quijote de la Mancha,others were well enough to do, and at the very least, the hidalgos werea stable upper-middle-class elite, between the nobility and the ordinarymiddle classes.
A government minister remarked that every Spaniard:
Flight from reality and unwillingness to face new challenge were alsoevident in the church. It kept its enormous influence and wealth, nearly20 percent of the land in the kingdom, and copious tithes and dues thatgave it a huge share, perhaps nearly one-third, of the Spanish income,but it lost much of the spiritual and missionary zeal. intellectual achievement,and reformist drive of an earlier time. During the seventeenth century,the Spanish Catholic church became the institution of middle class bureaucracy.The great income of the church, contrasted with the general shrinking ofthe economy, made holy orders attractive as the chief opportunity for an"honorable" career for those with some education but few opportunities.A cadastre of 1656 revealed that the Castilian clergy held nine times thewealth of the ordinary Castilian population, and this was a powerful lure.The clergy as a whole were probably never more than 3 percent of the population,but they were as much as 10 percent of adult males. In Catalonia, wherelocal church endowments were more common and the middle strata of societymore developed, the clergy temporarily swelled to about 6 percent of thepopulation. This padding of the ranks of clergy diluted its spiritual zealand moral and intellectual quality. There remained a saving remnant oftruly devout and dedicated priests, and impressive overseas missionarywork was still done by several church orders, but nothing to compare withthe preceding century.
The decadence of some of the clergy was simply one aspect of a changein the spirit of Spanish religiosity, which showed an increasing obsessionwith asceticism and the avoidance of sexual sin. The atmosphere[304]was one of growing gloom and fixation on death and punishment. Mountinghostility to the world and to religious expression through normal, outgoinghuman affairs was probably a not unnatural spiritual-psychological counterpartto the general sense of failure and decline. Gross superstition, alreadycommon in the sixteenth century, increased, and was accompanied by furtherexaggeration of formalism and ritualism.
Religious sensibility was heightened by the expansion of the "missionömovement, particularly in the two Castiles and Andalusia. This was almostexclusively the work of some of the orders, and consisted of local evangelisticcampaigns in villages and small cities by small groups of monks. They preachedan intense and graphic brand of hellfire-and-damnation revivalism, illustratedby vivid paintings and sketches of the nether regions. The effect of thesevisits on the lower classes was often extreme, if rather temporary, andbrought many people into formal confrontation with religion who otherwisepaid relatively little attention to it.
All the while, moral irregularity abounded in the larger towns, andthe stress on external orthodoxy often resulted in a heavy overlay of hypocrisy.As far as behavior patterns were concerned, the extreme "religiosity" ofSpanish society was belied by the life styles of the highest and lowestin the social order, high aristocrats living in self-indulgence, a largelower-class underworld in the towns battening off crime and vice. A singularaspect of moral degeneration was the perverse fascination with the imageof the nun in the romantic imagination of upper-class men. Thegalánde monjas (wooer of nuns) became a stock figure in the erotic typologyof the period.
Ecclesiastically, the Spanish church became increasingly divided. Factionaldisputes within the clergy were pushed to the point of fanaticism. Therewere intense quarrels between orders and among various prelates, as wellas disputes over control of parishes, descending even to vendettas overthe style of clerical clothing.
As had been the rule before, the overweening formal piety of the crowndid not prevent it from asserting a degree of authority over the church.It retained theregium exequator, dating from the fourteenth century,that enabled it to control all papal communications. The majority of churchspokesmen in Spain sided with the authority of the crown, and during thefirst half of the seventeenth century, a considerable number of regalisttreatises were written by both lay and clerical Spanish jurists. In 1617,Felipe III protested the fact that the papacy had placed several of theseon the Index. There were lengthy conflicts between leading Spanish prelatesand papal nuncios, though at the same time there was also an ultramontaneparty within the church. During the reign of Felipe IV some efforts, largelyunsuccessful,[305] were made to reform the clergy and limit theincrease of entailed church estates.
After the first quarter of the seventeenth century, little was seenof the kind of theological, philosophical, and scientific study that hadflourished among the intellectuals of the sixteenth-century church. Notonly did this work decline, but the Hieronymites, Reformed Carmelites,and other orders which had stressed serious work and systematic spiritualmeditation did not prosper. Their program was not attractive to most ofthose being drawn into religious orders.
The church did spend a significant amount of its great income on educationand on charity for the poor, for whom it was the only source of relief,usually of thesopa boba, simple soup kitchen, variety. In addition,orphan asylums and homes for the wayward young were maintained.
By any comparison with other countries, basic educational facilitieswere extensive in Spain at the beginning of the seventeenth century, thoughin the years following they declined. According to one survey, there were32 institutions of higher learning and at least 4,000 grammar schools,many of them founded in the sixteenth century and largely supported bythe church. In 1590 there were 7,000 students attending the universitiesand 20,000 in higher education as a whole, proportionately the largeststudent body in Europe. The dynamics of seventeenth-century Spanish education,however, belie the notion that extensive nominal education is the mainprecondition to societal progress. The Spanish system was increasinglyoriented toward the mere attainment and maintenance of status. Thecolegiosmayores, originally endowed to finance education of students from themiddle classes, were taken over as status symbols for aristocratic youth.Despite these and other limitations, there remained significant schoolopportunities for the middle classes, and the number of degrees or certificatesearned was not inconsiderable. Yet such diplomas were basically licensesin formal letters that served as entrees to the bureaucracy whose ranksin church and state were swelled with diplomates. Such an educational systemdid not encourage a more critical or inquiring attitude or a more productive,efficient elite. Curricula sank into a routine that was backward even bycontemporary European standards, but leading universities maintained aplacement service for clerical and bureaucratic posts that, in terms ofsustained pressure on behalf of graduates, might be judged to have outdonethe efforts of twentieth-century American institutions. The educated werelargely unconcerned with practical problems or with creative service. Ontheir professional level, they aped the nonproductive status-security fixationof the nobility. The involution of Spanish society, general resistanceto the analytic dimension, stress on the medieval intellectual[306]disciplines in opposition to change, and prizing of personalism ratherthan objectivism and achievement, converged to block intellectual development.
The exception in this general trend of decline was the continued floweringof Hispanic esthetic culture during the first half of the seventeenth century,when Spain led Europe in the development of baroque art. The painting ofVelázquez, the dramas of Calderón, and the extravagant poetryof Góngora were achievements of the highest level in the Europeanculture of the period. Through the years of midcentury, the prestige ofSpanish culture remained high, as attested by the use of Spanish art motifsand the vogue of certain writers, such as the Jesuit Baltasar de Gracián,in France and other countries. Hispanic literature reached its height inthe writing of Miguel de Cervantes. His Don Quijote was on one level asatire of extravagant and unrealistic ambitions held by Spanish societyof the imperial period and was the most profound expression of the moodof disillusionment that was setting in. On another, it was the most eloquentexpression of those ideals, a universal work, and the first modern novel.
Church patronage was largely responsible for this paradox of brilliantliterary achievement in an age of social and economic decline. Anotherimportant factor was the great wealth of the high aristocracy, whose elaboratetastes led them to patronize art at a time when society lacked resourcesfor more mundane accomplishment. Yet the Spanish elite were unable to sustaineven these values, leading more and more to what has been termed the paradoxof the Spanish baroque: growing contrast between extravagant style andincreasingly poor materials used to express it in architecture and art.During the second half of the century, the effects of depression, depopulation,disillusion, and flagging energy made it impossible to continue the levelof esthetic activity, which also began to fall into decadence.
The Spanish system of government changed during the seventeenth centurywith the distinctly less competent monarchs and the rising magnitude ofthe problems facing royal administration. The institution of the valido,the favorite and surrogate of the king, became the norm for the weak monarchsof the time. There was a sense in which the valido was understood to bethe chief minister for the crown, but he was more than that, becoming thesubstitute for rulers unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities.He also represented the triumph of the high aristocracy, for their systemof personal status[307] relationships and dispensation of patronagethen dominated the government as well.
The Duke of Lerma, valido of Felipe III, was above all interested inprestige and fortune. He had no special policy for Spanish affairs, butestablished his control over patronage to the aristocracy and became thewealthiest man in Spain. The king himself took great satisfaction in depletingroyal resources by granting concessions to aristocratic favorites. Fromthis time forward, the ascendancy of the aristocracy in government increased.Membership in the Council of State had always been restricted to the aristocracy,but its work had been to some extent administered and coordinated by professionalsecretaries drawn from the petty hidalgo class. In the seventeenth century,the Council of State was directed entirely by the high aristocracy.
The counciliar system of state administration was maintained, but therewas a growing tendency to appoint subcommittees to deal with special problemsand concentrate executive attention. This resulted in further dispersalof leadership and greater division in administrative organization. Thenumbers in state service continued to increase, but a rational, centralbureaucratic system was never worked out. The Council of Castile, whichserved as a ministry of sorts for the kingdom of Castile, lacked an integratedsystem of administration which could enforce its laws and regulations.Though corregidores were still appointed for the towns, local areas wereoften administered as decentralized units by local notables, and what wastrue in Castile held for the empire as a whole.
The government system tended more and more to get out of control. Socialand institutional pressure to hire university diplomates resulted in afantastic degree of featherbedding. As the government bankrupted itself,every possible device for raising money was snatched at. Sale of officesin all branches of state affairs became a standard device for raising revenues,and in the Indies the practice was extended from fee-earning positionsto more important salaried posts as well. Twice, seats on the Council ofIndies were sold, and it was ruled that offices bought might in many instancesbe resold to secondary buyers. The treasury system itself was an enormousrat's nest. Nearly all tax collection was indirect, either farmed out totax collectors, many of them Portuguese cristâos novos, or recruitedsecondhand from municipal officials. One estimate has calculated that nearly150,000 full or part-time agents were involved in Spain and America, andthat after so many local notables, tax farmers, and agents had siphonedoff funds for themselves, little more than 20 percent of the sum originallycollected reached the crown.
[308] Financial stress, favoritism, and maladministration eventuallyled to protest even among the upper classes. By 1618, Lerma had to appointa special reform junta to think of ways of remedying the government's ills.Rule by valido normally meant direction of affairs by a personal factionof the favorite. Lemma's greed and selfish use of patronage, which he controlledabsolutely between 1612 and 1618, built up strong hostility among the majorityof the nobility who were not favored. After twenty years even the indolentFelipe III grew restive, and before the close of 1618 he dismissed hisveteran valido. Yet the change was slight. For the remaining three yearsof the reign a new favorite, Lerma's own son the Duke of Acadia, coordinatedgovernment affairs, though he never held the full authority once enjoyedby Lerma.
Felipe IV succeeded his father in 1621 when only sixteen years old.Though he was more energetic, he was also more frivolous and líttledisposed to devote himself to public affairs. Since he was young, inexperienced,and not well educated, it was inevitable that he devolve direction of governmenton a favorite of his own. This personage was a thirty-three-year-old Andalusiannoble, Gaspar de Guzmán, later known as the Conde-Duque de Olivares.The new head of affairs was altogether different from Lerma. Olivares waswell trained and used to responsibility, a man of great vigor and energyas well as overweening ambition. He was not after personal gain, however,but sought power--the direction and vindication of the Spanish empire.The dark, heavy count-duke was by far the most forceful Spanish figureof the century--authoritarian, stubborn, but also hardworking, attentiveto detail, persistent, and devoted to government rather than patronage.Unlike Lerma, he had a policy, which was to strengthen the Spanish empireand lead it to victory over its many foes despite the formidable obstaclesthat were mounting against it.
The predominant policy in the Council of State since the death of FelipeII had been conservative, devoted simply to preserving and defending theempire as it existed. In terms of international law as well as of actualcircumstance in most of the empire, this was not unrealistic. The Americanempire was developing a unique, symbiotic society that was just beginningto achieve its own natural growth. The European possessions of the crownwere in general satisfied with Spanish rule, conducted on the confederalAragonese pattern and respectful of local rights and customs. None of itsprincipalities at[309] that time sought or were capable of survivingindependently and no other major power had so good a legal claim to themas the Spanish crown. There were four major difficulties: a) the size andpotential wealth of the overseas empire made it an almost irresistibletarget for European rivals; b) the extent of the empire's European territoriesplaced it in a dominant position that was eventually intolerable to a revitalizedFrance determined to cut Spain down to size; c) the geographic patternof the European empire was awkward, for the Low Countries and the FranceComte were isolated from the southern base and were difficult to defend;and d) the government refused to recognize the independence of the onlydissident part of the empire, Holland, which had long since broken awayand made its own place in the world. This led to endless, futile, wastefulwarfare on land and sea with a new power that was the most modern and efficientin Europe in the early seventeenth century. Such conflict in turn madethe defense of the southern Netherlands, which Spain retained, more difficult.During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Spanish crown enjoyedthe services of the finest diplomats to be found in the employ of any power,but the skill of Spanish diplomats, great as it was, could not offset theenormous burdens imposed by a policy determined to retain an anachronisticdynastic claim that kept the empire perpetually at war.
When the Thirty Years War began in central Europe in 1618, the Spanishgovernment plunged in to prevent the triumph of hostile Protestant forcesthat would side with Holland and threaten Spain's remaining position inthe southern Netherlands. In addition to subsidizing the Austrian Habsburgcause, the main Spanish field army, stationed in the southern Netherlandsunder an outstanding general, Ambrosio Spinola, intervened to seize theLower Palatinate in western Germany and safeguard direct land communicationswith Spanish Italy.
The ten-year truce with Holland expired in 1621, and hostilities wereresumed on a naval and commercial front that was literally worldwide. By1625, England had come into the struggle against Spain while France movedagainst the imperial position in northern Italy, but the years 1625-1626were a time of success for Spanish arms. Dutch invaders were thrown outof Brazil by a large Hispano-Portuguese fleet, the offensive was resumedin the Low Countries where Breda was captured (1625), the French were oncemore forced out of Italy and peace was signed with them in 1626. To increasethe pressure on the French crown, the Spanish government had even beennegotiating terms of assistance to French Protestant rebels.
Yet there was a serious drop in American treasure shipments that sameyear, and the crown was unable to sustain its huge military[310]expenses and was forced to another declaration of partial bankruptcy in1627. The entire annual treasure fleet from New Spain was captured by aDutch squadron along the Cuban coast in 1628. The struggle continued againstboth Holland and England, while income to finance it dropped, and Spain'sCatholic allies in central Europe showed no inclination to assist in fightingthe Dutch.
Military commitments were increased still further in 1628 when a disputearose over the succession to the duchy of Mantua in northwest Italy. Thestrongest legal claimant was a French duke, but Olivares ordered Spanishforces to seize the stronghold of Montferrat to prevent a French successionand secure the Alpine communications to the other Spanish possessions farthernorth. This led to a disastrous three-year war with France in northwestItaly that Spain was no longer in a position to win. In 1629, the Spanisharmy lost ground on the border of the southern Netherlands, and in 1630,the Dutch resumed more forcefully their invasion of Brazil. Spain was finallyable to reduce the pressure on herself by negotiating peace with Englandin 1630 and ending the three-year Mantuan War by dropping claims to theduchy, bringing peace with France in 1631.
The quarrel with Holland remained, though it was becoming clear thatSpanish resources alone were not sufficient for victory. Thus a major featureof Spanish policy was the effort to win Austrian Habsburg support. Sucha policy was counterproductive, for it required major Spanish assistanceto the Catholic forces in the Thirty Years' War in Germany, particularlyafter Sweden entered that struggle and turned the tide in 1631-1632. Amutual assistance treaty was signed between the two Habsburg crowns atthe beginning of 1632, and a strong Spanish army was later built up innorthern Italy. Its commander was the king's younger brother, the CardenalInfante D. Fernando, by far the most vigorous of seventeenth-century SpanishHabsburgs, who had been placed in holy orders but found his true callingon the field of battle. In conjunction with Austrian forces, his army reversedthe momentum of the conflict in Germany by smashing the main Swedish armyat Nordlingen in 1634. This involvement increased the strain on Spanishresources, but the Austrian crown never lent any notable assistance againstHolland. Rather, the joint Habsburg alliance and its victories in Germanyso alarmed the French government that it officially entered the war onthe other side, attacking the Spanish Netherlands. In the main northerntheater of operations, Spain's position had become more difficult.
What made prospects more and more discouraging in the l630s was thatgovernment receipts were not recovering from the decline of the previousdecade, payment of state obligations was now falling years behind, andno relief was in sight. New excise taxes were imposed and old ones wereraised further. For the first time, wealthy[311] nobles were requiredto make direct contributions, but it was difficult to raise more moneyfrom a declining economy. Olivares himself had never been oblivious tothe need for basic fiscal and administrative reforms. In 1622-1623, soonafter he rose to power, he had appointed a reform Junta that tried to promotefundamental changes: the establishment of strict sumptuary laws in Castile,import restrictions, curbs on corruption, and a steep reduction in localgovernment offices. Almost nothing had been accomplished, for the effortmet with apathy among the aristocrats who dominated public affairs in Castile.Even before the fifth declaration of partial bankruptcy (1627), it hadbecome increasingly difficult to raise state loans. A new source was foundby encouraging the gravitation to Madrid of wealthy Portuguese cristâonovo financiers, but this provided only limited assistance. Olivares alsotried to promote formation of a sort of national bank to float the royaldebt, but could not muster the resources. The crown could only ask morefrom the already nearly exhausted Castilian taxpayer.
During the seventeenth century the powers of the Cortes of Castile,already minimal, lapsed completely. There were still occasional assemblies.Cortes were summoned six times during the reign of Felipe III and eighttimes during that of Felipe IV. Currency devaluation was carried on inboth reigns with scarcely any attempt to win the approval of the Cortes,and new taxes were forced through with declining opposition. Though thedemands of the crown were greater, there was less resistance than duringthe sixteenth century. The main reason for this was the structure of Cortesrepresentation. The eighteen towns of Castile that had retained the rightof representation were dominated by aristocratic oligarchies, and so wasthe representation in Cortes. The procuradores were allowed a 1.5 percentcommission on new taxes which they voted, and appearance in Cortes alsohelped to win patronage in the form of appointments, pensions or honorsfrom the government. During the reign of Felipe IV, there were effortsby unrepresented towns to win a voice, and a vote was given to Palencia,as well as single collective votes to Galicia and Extremadura. The mainmotive here was not to resist taxation or fight for local rights againstroyal power, but rather to cut the governing aristocracies of these regionsinto the lucrative business of fiscal votes. The idea of representing anyinterest other than that of the aristocracy was dead, and in a civic sensethe Cortes had become completely nonfunctional. After the Cortes of 1662,no regular assembly was summoned for the remainder of the century.
Throughout the reign of Felipe III and the first part of that of FelipeIV, the crown had been unsuccessful in bringing the Aragonese principalitiesto submit to regular taxation or make systematic contributions to the crownfor imperial defense. Only meager, irregular grants were made by the regionalCortes of the eastern principalities. In Catalonia, the urban oligarchseven resisted the payment of the town excises which were owed to the crown;instead, they pocketed the proceeds themselves. Throughout the early seventeenthcentury, the Catalan countryside continued to be plagued with bandits ledby the rural gentry. This banditry, along with contrabandage and counterfeiting,was sheltered by the Catalan constitutional system. To make matters worse,commerce took a downturn after about 1600 and the Catalan elite were determinedto resist any kind of change or concession to the crown.
As early as 1625, Olivares had conceived a long-range plan, calledthe Union of Arms, by which each region of the empire would pay its sharetoward imperial defense. Aragón and Valencia reluctantly agreedto partial cooperation in 1626, and Spanish America, already heavily taxed,assumed an even greater permanent contribution, fully attending to itsown protection. The Catalans, however, were still refractory and made onlytoken contributions. Olivares merely proposed to redistribute the burdenof taxation and recruitment more equally; he did not intend to alter theconstitutional systems of the eastern regions, though he did plan greatercentralization of leadership. He hoped to make heavier contributions morepalatable by providing new economic opportunities within the empire forthe eastern principalities, though this was difficult in that period ofdepression. Unfortunately, he also shared a common belief that there wereapproximately a million Catalans, instead of the four hundred thousandwho actually existed.
The financial problem became even more acute after outbreak of warwith France in 1635. Taxes in Castile were raised arbitrarily, new loansmade, the currency devalued, and offices sold more recklessly than ever,but by 1637, annual expenses were nearly twice the annual state income.The war itself went badly both in Germany and the Netherlands. In 1638,the French invaded the Spanish Basque country, besieging Fuenterrabia.The relief force that drove them out included contingents from all majorregions save Catalonia, which refused to help the rest of Spain.
Desperate to get the Catalans to make some contribution to the wareffort, Olivares and his advisers decided to route the campaign of[313]1639 directly through Catalonia. A counteroffensive was planned acrossthe eastern Pyrenees through the Catalan counties of Rosselló andCerdanya. It was poorly organized and led. The Catalans did participatein sizable numbers, however, and after the border fortress of Celtuce waslost to the French through military incompetence, Catalan forces sufferedheavy casualties in trying to retake it. Shortly afterward, disaster struckin northern waters as the last major Spanish fleet to sail against theDutch was destroyed by Admiral van Tromp at the Battle of the Downs inOctober 1639. It was clearer than ever that the empire lacked the resourcesto deal with such manifold military commitments.
Having committed the principal home forces to the Catalan front, Olivaresresolved to continue the offensive from that base in 1640. Strong measureswere taken to force the Catalans to pay many of the expenses involved,and some 9,000 troops, many of them disorderly and obstreperous, were billetedon the civilian population, causing intense resentment. Hatred of the exactionsof a "foreign" soldiery erupted in general revolt in the north Catalancountryside in May 1640, as peasants attacked Spanish troops throughoutthe district. By June, the rebels had moved into Barcelona, where theymobilized the segadors, or farm laborers, into a revolutionary mob thattook over the city and murdered royal officials, including the viceroy.Catalan resistance to the crown had originally been the work of the privilegedupper-class oligarchy determined to lose none of its financial or administrativeprerogatives, but the revolt of 1640 swelled into something approachinga social revolution. Poor peasants rose against their overlords, the laborersand unemployed in the towns took over the streets, and bandit gangs reassertedthemselves in many parts of the countryside. Catalonia was not merely inrevolt against the crown but nearly beyond the control of its own oligarchy.
The principality could not defend itself alone against the Spanishstate. On the one hand, it was simply too small and on the other, Catalanswere no more willing to submit to organized authority for the purpose ofself-defense than for any other. The only alternative seemed to be helpfrom Spain's powerful enemy, the crown of France. The Diputacióof the Catalan Corts had begun secret negotiations in April 1640, one monthbefore the revolt. In October, an agreement was concluded to supply Frenchmilitary assistance, largely at Catalan expense, and in January 1641, theCatalan leaders officially placed the principality under French protection.Meanwhile, a Spanish force of nearly 20,000 had been laboriously assembledduring the summer and fall of 1640. It occupied Tortosa but was stoppedoutside Barcelona by the joint French and Catalan resistance. Its leadershipwas[314]incompetent, and the killing of a number of Catalan prisonersonly increased the will to resist. For the time being, the crown had togive up any hope of holding a military position in central Catalonia.
The Spanish were thus driven out, but only at the cost of turning Cataloniainto a French protectorate. A French viceroy was appointed for Barcelonaand his administration was packed with French supporters, while steep paymentswere exacted for the support of French troops. In 1642, French units occupiedthe north Catalan regions of Rosselló and Cerdanya and seized thewesternmost city of the region, Lérida. Meanwhile, the French exploitedCatalonia economically much more than had the Spanish crown. The depressedwartime Catalan economy had little opportunity to sell to France, but Frenchexports poured into Catalonia. Food production declined drastically, taxesskyrocketed, inflation and monetary devaluation wracked the economy, andfamine among the poor set the stage for the great plague of 1650-1654,which halved the population of Barcelona and decimated the population inmany parts of the principality. As the years passed, many of the rebelsbegan to feel that the yoke of France was heavier than that of Spain.
The forces of Felipe IV rewon Lérida and western Catalonia in1643-1644 and blocked any further French advance. In 1644, the king tooka formal oath to uphold the Catalan constitutional laws. After a slow butsteady weakening of the French and Catalan position, a considerable Spanisharmy moved in to besiege Barcelona in mid 1651, and the city surrendereda year later. The Spanish crown pledged a general amnesty and preservationof the laws of Catalonia, ending the revolt on the terms of the pre-warstatus quo. Catalonia gained nothing from the revolt but years of miseryand death. Conversely, the Catalan uprising further weakened the Spanishcrown at a time when it was struggling desperately against great odds,and the Pyrenean districts of Rosselló and Cerdanya were never regained.
The Catalan revolt was paralleled by the secession of Portugal fromthe Spanish crown in the same year, 1640. Portuguese separation was a responseto the crisis of the Spanish empire, the frustration of its leadership,the burden of its defense, and above all, the decline of its economy. TheSpanish crown could no longer offer Portugal either the protection or theopportunities of a generation or two earlier. Rather, it would involvePortugal further in the suffering of its wars and their heavy cost. TheCatalan revolt provided Portuguese leaders with a model which they wereable to imitate more successfully.[315] Unlike the Spanish tradein the Atlantic, that of the Portuguese was in a phase of moderate expansionand helped to provide Portugal with an economic base for independence.After 1640, the Spanish crown was in no position to build a new army forthe subjugation of Portugal.
The ambitious policy of Olivares broke down completely after 1640. TheAmerican trade had taken yet another drastic downturn and showed no prospectsof recovery, leaving the crown even more desperate financially. The withdrawalof the Castilian population from involvement had become marked. Even themilitary aristocracy tried to avoid volunteering, and new levies couldscarcely be assembled. Failure of leadership was profound, and those forcesthat were organized failed through incompetent command. Even the Castiliangrandes withdrew from the crown. The powerful and wealthy duke of MedinaSidonia, a cousin of Olivares and brother-in-law of the new king of Portugal,headed a short-lived conspiracy to oust the count-duke and turn Andalusiainto an independent kingdom. The high aristocracy were bitterly opposedto Olivares and determined to break his power. They abandoned the courten masse and pressed the king for his dismissal.
Olivares recognized the failure of state policy and resigned at thebeginning of 1643, leaving Felipe IV resolved to serve as his own chiefminister, encouraged by his correspondence with the noted mystic Sor Maríade Agreda. He had a quick enough mind but was simply too self-indulgentand undisciplined, given to a lechery remarkable even among seventeenth-centurykings, and by mid-1643, Olivares had been replaced with a new valido, hisown nephew (and enemy), the Conde de Haro. Haro was more discreet and prudentthan Olivares and never enjoyed the same overarching authority, for FelipeIV devoted more personal attention to state affairs in the second halfof his reign than during the rule of Olivares. After the death of Haroin 1661, the king directed the government himself for the remaining fouryears of his life.
The resignation of Olivares brought no real change in policy or problems.The financial burden continued to mount. By 1644, the crown's income waspledged four years in advance, bringing further exactions on the shriveledCastilian economy. Still, there was no compromise in the objectives ofroyal policy. In 1643, an underequipped Spanish army was destroyed withgreat loss at Rocroi near the northern French border, the first disastrousfield defeat suffered by[316] Spanish infantry since the unionof the crowns. Though the southern Netherlands held fast, Dunkirk was lostin 1646. In 1647-1648, there was a major revolt in Naples and Sicily, wheretaxes had recently been raised, that was somewhat like the Catalan rebellion.This led to yet another suspension of payments and a new forced debt conversionby the crown. When the Thirty Years' War was finally brought to an endin Germany in 1648, the Spanish crown was forced after enormous expenseand losses to recognize the obvious. It signed a separate peace concedingthe independence of Holland, bringing seventy years of warfare againstthat power to an end.
Yet the war with France remained. The French crown was itself seriouslyweakened by the outbreak of a major civil war (the Fronde), but Spain lackedthe strength to exploit this opportunity beyond regaining Dunkirk and endingthe Catalan revolt. A new round of devaluation and attendant inflationwas resorted to which, together with a major crop failure, resulted insome of the worst suffering of the century, and it was at this time thatthePendón verde riot broke out in Seville. Another partialbankruptcy was declared in 1652. The only fiscal reform of the 1650's wasthe extension of taxation to pensions and honors that had been grantedto the upper classes by the crown, but before long it was common practiceto evade this impost.
With the Franco-Spanish conflict stalemated, England entered the struggleaggressively in 1654 by seizing Jamaica and preparing a fullscale navaloffensive against Spain. In 1656 and 1657, major portions of the Americantreasure fleets were seized by the English, who put the peninsula undera partial blockade for nearly two years. Nevertheless, in 1656 Spanishtroops won an important victory at Valenciennes--the last they would everwin in northern Europe--and Felipe IV had an opportunity to make a compromisepeace with a France that was also weary of the long contest. This he spurned,still hoping for a decisive victory, though his advisers urged him to accepta graceful withdrawal from the war.
By this time Spanish resources, both financial and human, were almostexhausted. In June 1658, the combined French and English forces defeatedthe Spanish army on the northern French front, recapturing Dunkirk. ThePortuguese, emboldened by Spanish weakness, seized the offensive, invadedExtremadura, and besieged Badajoz. Bled white by a quarter-century of warfare,Spain possessed scarcely enough men to defend her own frontiers. Galicia,the most heavily populated region of Castile, had already been heavilyrecruited. The Portuguese front was left largely to the amateur militiaof the Extremaduran towns, who were untrained, ineffective, and reportedin increasingly short numbers. The siege of Badajoz was finally[317]lifted in October by a force of 15,000 sent from Madrid. This army thenpursued the retreating Portuguese across the border and itself laid siegeto the Portuguese town of Elvas. About 20 percent of its effectives promptlydeserted, and a new Portuguese army routed the Spanish, who left 4,000casualties behind. In the Spanish Netherlands, the enemy front had advancedalmost to the gates of Brussels. There were no reinforcements to send,and not enough naval strength to transport them had they existed. Evenwithin Spain, new military units were filled mainly with recruits fromSpanish Italy and with German and Irish mercenaries. The militarily skilled,valiant, and patriotic elements of the aristocracy had themselves beenthinnned by casualties. They no longer provided leadership, and most ofthe nobility simply dodged the call of duty.
Felipe IV had no real alternative to signing the compromise Peace ofthe Pyrenees with France in 1659. Its terms were lenient. France retainedRosselló and Cerdanya, now a center of diehard anti-Habsburg Catalanemigres, and picked up the Artois district on its northeastern frontier,as well as minor border concessions in the Spanish Netherlands. The mainconsideration for the French crown was winning the hand of Felipe IV'sdaughter, Maria Teresa, for the heir to the French throne, Louis XIV. avalued match in view of the fact that the Spanish king had no male heirat that time.
In his last years Felipe IV was extremely depressed and full of remorse,certain as he was that God had punished his economically ruined kingdomfor its monarch's sins. Indeed, Felipe IV had never held any concept ofSpanish interests, but had relentlessly subordinated other considerationsto regaining the dynastic territories of the Habsburg crown, an enterprisein which he failed completely. In the north, the crown retained the FranceComte and the southern Netherlands, which remained staunchly loyal to theirHabsburg sovereign largely because he allowed them almost complete autonomy.These territories remained with the crown, however, not because of thestrength of imperial defense, which was now negligible, but because otherEuropean powers were also eager to thwart French expansion. The crown'soriginal goals--complete control over the Low Countries and Habsburg hegemonyin the Germanies, along with secure land communications from Spanish Italyto the north--were all frustrated. Felipe IV's last consolation had beenthat peace with France and England would leave him free to reconquer Portugal,but even that was not to be. The border district of Extremadura was beingdepopulated by the war, and Portugal gained new assistance from England.The king's last years were a time of unrelieved defeat, and three yearsafter his death the independence of Portugal had to be officially recognized.
A male heir, the future Carlos II (1665-1700), was born to the royalfamily in 1661. When his father died in 1665, Carlos II was only four yearsold, and, moreover, a sickly, retarded child of less than average intelligencewho suffered from rickets. In his will, Felipe IV appointed his Austrianqueen to be regent for the minority of the new king, and also created aJunta de Gobierno to serve as executive council for the crown. DoñaMariana, the regent, was herself in a difficult situation as a woman andforeigner, poorly educated, of only mediocre intelligence, and distrustedby the powerful Spanish aristocracy. While at first cooperating with theJunta, composed of nobles, church hierarchs, and leading state officials,she looked for a personal adviser on whom she could rely and found onein the person of her Austrian Jesuit confessor, Johann Nithard. He wasmade a naturalized Spaniard and appointed to the Junta de Gobierno. Thoughsincere and pious, Nithard lacked talent or preparation for government.He was strongly opposed by royal officials and the aristocracy, not somuch for his inability as for the fact that he was the foreign appointeeof a foreign queen.
In 1667, Louis XIV launched the first of his aggressive wars againstthe Spanish Netherlands, basing his claim to the territory on fictitiousinheritance rights of his Spanish wife. The "War of Devolution" lastedonly a year, thanks not to the feeble Spanish defenses but to the anti-Frenchalliance formed by England, Holland, and Sweden. In the settlement of 1668,Spain was forced to make more territorial concessions to France in thesouthern Netherlands. This further weakened the position of Nithard, wholacked any support in Spanish opinion and was considered to be usurpingthe role of the aristocracy and high royal officials, undercutting thesuccession arrangements made by Felipe IV.
Nithard's chief rival was Felipe IV's most ambitious bastard, D. JuanJosé de Austria. This dark, handsome prince was restless and intermittentlyenergetic, popular with the aristocracy and with Madrid opinion. He hadfought on many fronts in his father's wars, was indisputably Spanish, andcut the figure of gallant and seducer of women that impressed society.Forced from Madrid, D. Juan José gained a following in Aragónand Catalonia by posing as a defender of regional fueros. Collecting localmilitary forces, he moved on Madrid at the beginning of 1669 and forcedthe queen regent to send Nithard into exile.
This represented the triumph of the aristocracy in royal government,[319] eliminating the supervision of a royal valido. Don Juan wassatisfied with appointment as vicar-general of Aragón and Catalonia.From 1669 to 1673, the government was administered jointly by the queenregent and the Junta de Gobierno. A new favorite emerged in 1673 in theperson of Fernando Valenzuela, a petty noble and adventurer, but Valenzuelaserved mainly as personal confidant and patronage boss. He was not a truevalido in the sense of directing the government.
Carlos II was officially declared of age in 1675 when he reached fourteen.By that time, however, it was clearer than ever that this pathetic princewould never rule. The degenerate product of five generations of SpanishHabsburg inbreeding, he remained in a permanent state of decrepitude, sickmore often than well, unable to lead a normal life or even to think clearly.His face was so long and his jaw so malformed that he could not even masticatefood properly and he suffered continually from digestive disorders. Hewas neurotic and superstitious in the extreme and dominated by priests.Although later twice married he was unable to father children. The Juntawould have to govern for him, and the king would never do more than signpapers, and even that but intermittently. His real adviser was the queenmother, and it was she who arranged the dissolution of the Junta in 1676and the appointment of Valenzuela as full valido and head of state affairs.Valenzuela was given the tital ofprimer ministro of government,the first time that such a designation was ever made officially by theSpanish crown.
Within a matter of weeks, the high aristocracy declared their unitedand unremitting opposition to this new valido. They were determined thatroyal government would not be exercised by a favorite who failed to reflectthe interests of the nobility, and particularly not by an upstart of comparativelymodest birth. A joint manifesto was signed by twenty-four high aristocrats,and at the beginning of 1677, D. Juan José crossed into Castilianterritory from Aragón at the head of 15,000 troops. Supporters ofthe befuddled young king stood aside as the aristocratic faction, led byD. Juan José, took over the government. The queen mother was banishedto Toledo, and Valenzuela was sent into colonial exile, where he laterdied.
For the first time in the history of the united Spanish crown, thenobility had taken control of the government from the king. Their leader,D. Juan José de Austria, was hailed by ecclesiastical leaders[320]and by much of common opinion in Madrid, and directed the government fortwo and a half years. He operated simply as a dispenser of patronage tothe victorious aristocracy and persecutor of the former appointees of Valenzuela.
Thus the aristocracy came into almost complete control of affairs duringthe reign of Carlos II, making a mockery of the strong monarchy of Fernandoand Isabel, Carlos I (V), and Felipe II. During the minority of CarlosII and the first years of his formal reign, there was scarcely any attemptat central state regulation, even in Castile. The only major institutionthat might have matched the influence of the aristocracy, the church, wasentirely unable to. Though ecclesiastical income was great, most of itwas committed to specific church expenses, and the leaders of the Spanishhierarchy had at their disposal only a fraction of the wealth of the grandes.The wasteful style and attitudes of the high aristocracy made it impossiblefor most of them to foster, or in many cases even to preserve, the wealthderived from their estates, but new sources were always available fromgovernment, which nobles controlled; during the financially prostrate reignof Carlos II, themercedes and honors taken from the royal treasuryreached a new volume, perhaps three million ducats a year, draining fromthe government the last reserves with which it might have defended a totteringempire. The aristocrats had no pity for the lamentable state of the crown'saffairs or the defense of the empire. The fact that their status was basedessentially on wealth did not mean that the shrinking economy would bringa decline in their numbers. Instead, a quasi-monopoly of the sources oftrue wealth enabled more and more of the middle-rank to rise. The 41 familiesof grandes that were recognized in 1627 had been increased to 113 by 1707.
The apogee of the aristocracy coincided with thenadir of the kingdom and the empire. While the remains of Spain's governmentand economy were picked clean by the nobility, the empire suffered repeatedassaults from the voracious French monarchy of Louis XIV. This aggressivelyexpansionist state had nearly three times the population and four or fivetimes the wealth of Spain. The only hope of resistance lay in the factthat the naked greed and aggression of Louis XIV roused the oppositionof the other major states of western Europe. In 1672, the French king launchedan invasion of both Holland and the Spanish Netherlands. Weak Spanish forceswere swept aside, while Catalonia was also invaded and French forces intervenedin Spanish Sicily, aided by another local rebellion. The northern powersnonetheless fought the French military machine to a standstill, but inthe peace of 1678 Spain was forced to cede Franche Comté and a fewminor territories on the border of the Netherlands.[321] Theselosses, humiliating but not actually important, came as the seventeenth-centuryeconomic depression in Castile reached its depth. The government of D.Juan José de Austria had neither a foreign nor a domestic policybut existed on the basis of patronage to its supporters among the aristocracy.Amid unrelieved defeat, general dissatisfaction, and political bankruptcy,it ended with D. Juan José's death in September, 1679.
The depression hit bottom in the disastrous decade of 1677-1687, inwhich the unhappy people of Castile were struck by every kind of economicmisfortune. The basic cause was the catastrophic weather. This was notaltogether unusual, for the severity and extremes of the Spanish climatehave always retarded agriculture, but the alternation of torrential rainfalland great floods with years of extreme drought during that decade reducedCastilian harvests to their lowest level in many generations. Andalusiawas the hardest hit, but famine was widespread in other parts of the kingdomas well. Severe malnutrition encouraged another outbreak of plague, whichclaimed another quarter million lives in those years.
Economic disaster was intensified by the severest monetary crisis ofthe century. Inflation had continued, due mainly to the persistent depreciationof currency by the government to lighten its debts. Between 1660 and 1680,the price level in Castile increased nearly 65 percent and almost all thecoinage in circulation was copper vellon. Madrid had become the most expensivecity in Europe, and public complaints increased. Finally, in 1680, thenew royal government imposed drastic revaluation. Prices fell nearly 50percent in two years, but the new money supply was totally inadequate forcommerce and finance, and much of the economy virtually ceased to function.Taxes and bills could not be paid, producers now received minimal pricesfor their goods, and the commercial economy went into a complete tailspin.Many local districts had to revert temporarily to a barter system, forlack of money. All this further depressed trade and production at a timewhen new goods, food, and imports were more desperately needed than ever.Particularly in the south, towns filled up with desperate, begging peasantslooking for the smallest scrap of relief. It was a time of misery unparalleledeven in seventeenth-century Castile.
Since the thirteenth century, the social and economic development ofCatalonia and that of Castile have moved according to markedly differentrhythms. The creative phase of the medieval Catalan economy came at a timewhen Castile had just begun to build a modest base of urban manufacturesand finished production. The fifteenth century, which saw the rise of Castile,was a time of decline in Catalonia, and during the sixteenth-century phaseof Castilian expansion, Catalan society remained comparatively static andsecluded.
Another reversal came again in the late seventeenth century, when Cataloniabecame the first region to recover from the great economic decline. After1652, the eastern principalities had complete autonomy under their regionalsystems of law during what, as it turned out, was the last period of theAragonese constitutions. Several factors were responsible for Catalonia'seconomic regeneration: a) the eastern principalities still enjoyed relativemonetary autonomy, and after a currency adjustment in the l650s Cataloniawas not affected by the brusque swings of inflation and deflation thatwracked the Castilian monetary system; b) nonetheless, during the years1688-1699 Catalofha experienced a rather mild inflation, unaccompaniedby a rise in wages, that permitted a somewhat more rapid capital accummulation;c) the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 stipulated freedom for French exportsinto Catalonia and vice versa, opening the Catalan textile market to moderncompetition that stimulated improvement in the region's own productiontechniques and the quality of its textiles; and d) population growth andlower taxes in the smaller towns stimulated a more rapid economic developmentin them and in parts of the countryside than in Barcelona. Wine and brandyexports increased markedly, and textile shops in some of the towns madegreater technical advances than did those of Barcelona. The Catalan capitalnevertheless remained the great commercial and financial center of theprincipality. Maritime activity entered an expansive phase beginning about1675 and grew rapidly in the l680s. During the final years of the century.traffic in the port of Barcelona was almost twice as great as in 1600.Some firms now dealt in extremely large volume, exporting Catalan goodsto western Europe and dealing in the American market by way of Cádizand Lisbon. Their growing interest in the commercial possibilities of adeveloping Spanish America was a sign of an historic change in Catalaninterests and energies. After strong objections, the crown in 1674 removedCatalan merchants dealing through Cádiz from the category of foreigners,allowing them to trade on an[323] equal footing with Castilians.Another sign of change was the significant contribution that a more prosperousand cooperative Catalonia made to the crown during the second half of thecentury, whereas before 1640 it had contributed very little.
The situation in the other two eastern principalities was less promising.Throughout the century, Aragón stagnated under its regional fueros.Its population did not increase appreciably, and no significant changeoccurred in its society. The landed aristocracy retained its overwhelmingpredominance, though now more embarrassed than before by the responsibilitiesinvolved in thederecho de maltratar (the right to punish), andthere were no signs of new economic development. As for manufactured goods,the principality became virtually a colony of France in the second halfof the century.
Valencia was scarcely any better off, for it did not recover from theexpulsion of the Moriscos, either in terms of population or agriculture,until the middle of the eighteenth century. The economy of the city ofValencia did begin to expand in the l660s, but the countryside, under morestern seigneurial control than most of the rest of the peninsula, was slowerto respond. Peasants settling on ex-Morisco land were subjected to steepfeudalistic exactions. Resentment grew more intense toward the end of thecentury as population expanded. The aristocratic oligarchy and church leadersof Valencia were intensely jealous of regional rights, yet they refusedreform or greater rights to peasants on seigneurial domain. A semi-clandestinepeasants' league was founded in the Játiva region south of the cityof Valencia, and in 1693 its members refused to pay seigneurial dues. Theychose asindic, or leader, for their syndicate and were assistedby a few village notables. Their crudely organized force of 2,000 was labeledby its chief the Eixércit dels Agermanats, recalling the great revoltof 1520. This rebellion was put down rather easily, but bitter discontentremained and flared once more during the Succession War that followed theturn of the century.
The depth of the Castilian depression lasted from 1640 to 1685, andduring the l660s and l670s the quality of government declined further.The point of reversal may, for convenience's sake, be put at[324]about 1680. After that new efforts were made to improve government andstimulate the economy. Catalonia was already recovering, and though therewas no similar revitalization in Castile, modest economic gains were madein the l690s, lifting the Castilian economy out of the trough of the precedingdecade.
The restoration of government began early in 1680, when young CarlosII appointed the duke of Medinaceliprimer ministro. Medinaceliwas one of the wealthiest and most important of the grandes, but he wasneither vain nor overweeningly ambitious. Though lacking original ideas,he was genuinely interested in commercial, financial, and colonial reform.His government held fast to the drastic currency revaluation imposed bythe finance council, devastating though its short-term consequences were.After this reform, and a corrective devaluation of silver in 1686, theSpanish monetary system held steady for the remainder of the century andbeyond. Though there was some slight inflation after the mid-1680s, thegeneral price level stayed comparatively stable for the next fifty years.Medinaceli also appointed a capable general secretary to assist the primerministro and prepare plans to increase colonial trade and revenue. Thegovernment tried to stimulate commerce and discussed the reform of taxes,though nothing was accomplished during Medinaceli's tenure, which coincidedwith the trough of the Castilian depression.
The Medinaceli government, like its predecessors, was soon impaledon the horns of French imperialism. After reports of the severe want inCastile, Louis XIV deemed the moment propitious for another assault, invadingCatalonia and the Spanish Netherlands in 1683-1684. This aggression wassoon ended, but only after France received another pound of flesh fromthe nórthern possessions, in this case the duchy of Luxemburg.
Economic and imperial misfortune forced Medinaceli to share power witha new figure, the Conde de Oropesa, who became president of the Councilof Castile in 1684 and replaced Medinaceli altogether as primer ministroin 1685. Like his predecessor, he had won office in large measure throughskill in personal intrigue and factional maneuver. Dynamic, able, and innovative,Oropesa became the outstanding reformist head of government in seventeenth-centurySpain. Plans for tax reform were pressed. The government reduced expenditures,cut the budget for the royal household, eliminated superfluous offices,canceled some of the mercedes to the aristocracy, and drew up plans toshift more of the fiscal burden from the lower to the upper classes, thoughthese plans were largely blocked. A general effort was made to reduce thebureaucracy and the number of seats in state councils, as well as to controlthe sale of offices. Oropesa also tried to arrest the parasitical growthof the clergy, and in 1689 the hierarchy was asked to suspend temporarilythe ordination of new[325] priests. Oropesa thus met head on thekey problems of state finance and taxation and the waste of resources bythe three chief institutions of Spain--aristocracy, church, and state bureaucracy.His government also upheld earlier reform measures of 1679 and 1682 thatencouraged immigration of skilled foreign craftsmen, reduced taxes formanufacturers, and specifically affirmed that commercial and industrialactivity were compatible with aristocratic status. A Junta General de Comerciowas later set up to stimulate commerce and finance.
Oropesa made many powerful enemies, but his administration was a domesticsuccess and would not have ended when it did (1691) but for the latestround of French aggression. This stemmed from the anger of Louis XIV overthe arrangement of Carlos II's second marriage (after the early death ofhis first queen, a French princess) to Mariana of Neuburg, a German princessrelated to the Austrian Habsburgs. The new invasion prompted the usualanti-French coalition in western Europe, and the resulting War of the Leagueof Augsburg lasted from 1689 to 1697. It placed still greater pressureon Spanish finance, and brought a new invasion of Catalonia as well asdefeats in the Netherlands and northern Italy.
During the l690s, royal government relapsed into weakness, confusion,and disunity. The new queen dominated appointments, and there was anotherscramble for lucrative positions as the state suffered through the remainderof the decade without effective leadership. The only bright spot was thepeace treaty of 1697 ending the latest French war without territorial lossto the Spanish crown.
The feeble and degenerate Carlos II survived until the age of thirtynine,which was longer than many had expected. In his last years it became clearerthan ever that, second marriage or not, he would never produce an heirto the throne. Since he had no younger brother, the succession would haveto pass through his sisters or a collateral line. One of his sisters, MariaTeresa, was queen of France, and another had married Leopold I, the AustrianHabsburg emperor. The issue thus resolved itself into the question of aFrench Bourbon versus an Austrian Habsburg succession. After 1696, withthe king more and more decrepit and likely to die at any time, the contestbecame acute. Though Louis XIV had invested much of the wealth and energyof his realm in efforts to conquer Spanish domains on the eastern borderof France, he realized that any attempt to secure the entire inheritancefor a French prince would upset the balance of power and bring forth apowerful international alliance against France. Similarly, he was[326]determined to frustrate the development of a great, new pan-Habsburgempire in western and central Europe, reminiscent of the territorial hegemonyof Carlos V, that would result if the two branches of the Habsburg crownwere reunited by an Austrian inheritance of the Spanish domains. Consequently,at various times during the reign of Carlos II he negotiated three differentpartition treaties with other European powers that attempted to providefor a balanced division of the Spanish empire in Europe.
Such proposals infuriated the Spanish crown, for the only clear goalthat the miserable Carlos II retained was to transmit the entire inheritanceof the Spanish empire undivided to a capable successor. French and Austriandiplomacy employed extreme pressure at the Spanish court, rallying factionsto each side, and this pulling and hauling completed the prostration ofgovernment administration in the last years of the century. French interestshad the better of it for four reasons: a) the prestige of the Bourbon dynasty,ruler of what was now the strongest state in Europe, compared with whichthe Austrian Habsburgs were distinctly less impressive; b) general distrustamong most Spanish opinion, provoked by the intrigues and manipulationsof the German queen, Mariana of Neuburg, and of her German-Austrian favoritesand appointees at court; c) an increasingly strong desire for some kindof renovation and new leadership, which it was felt that a successor fromthe powerful new Bourbon state in France would more likely provide; andd) the fact that the prime French candidate, Philippe, duke of Anjou, wasa younger grandson of Louis XIV and Maria Teresa, and hence removed fromthe direct line of French succession. This would enable him to establishhimself as a separate and independent Spanish king, whereas the Habsburgcandidate, Archduke Karl, was a younger son of the reigning Leopold, andthe succession to his elder brother, Josef, was somewhat uncertain, raisingthe possibility that a Habsburg heir might treat the Spanish domains asa mere appendage to his central European empire. In October 1700, one monthbefore his death, Carlos II made his final will, leaving the Spanish crownand all its empire to Philippe of Anjou on condition that he preserve itundivided under a Spanish Bourbon monarchy.
The last years of the seventeenth century revealed certain signs ofrecovery. The reforms of Oropesa, after about 1687, strengthened royalfinance and permitted a modest expansion of the fleet and the[327]formation of several new military units to bolster Spanish resistance inthe War of the League of Augsburg. The economic resurgence of Cataloniawas fully apparent, and Valencian textile production and commerce werealso advancing. Levantine agriculture finally began to expand, for thefirst time since expulsion of the Moriscos. Even in Aragón, a newgroup of reformers had emerged who were trying to revive industry and commerce.In 1684 they had finally managed to eliminate local toll duties withinAragón. The commerce of the north Castilian ports was increasingslowly, Basque iron production was expanding, and there was also a slightgrowth in Andalusian wine exports. Some efforts were now being made toencourage Castilian agriculture, and some of the secondary cities thathad formerly been productive centers and fallen into decline were now growingonce more in population
There were also signs of new intellectual stimulation. The principalforeign influences came from the University of Montpelier just across theFrench border and from scientists in Italy. The most important intellectualcenter in Spain by the 1690s was the University of Valencia, which provedreceptive to new currents of learning from France and Italy. A new societyfor the study of modern philosophy had also been formed in Seville, andthe basic problems of developing science in Spain were clearly analyzedby Juan de Cabriada'sCarta filosófico-médico-chymica,published in 1687.
The overseas empire had held firm despite numerous assaults from avariety of enemies. From among these vast territories, only the islandof Jamaica had been lost, while Spanish American society was beginningto develop on the basis of its own strength. The Spanish colonial administrationhad demonstrated surprising vigor. Despite venality and widespread saleof offices, the Council of the Indies continued to function with a certainamount of efficiency, and the colonial bureaucracy proved more able thanmight have been expected.
Nevertheless, Castile in the 1690s remained socially and economicallydepressed. Seville, whose population had declined greatly, was handlingonly one-tenth the commercial traffic that it had registered at the beginningof the century. Agriculture and manufacture in Castile, in general, remainedscarcely at the subsistance level. After further bad harvests in 1698-1699,riots broke out in Madrid and several other cities. At that moment therewas promise of renewal and future achievement in Spain, but the countryhad lost much ground compared to the advanced regions of northwest Europeduring the second half of the century, and the Spanish resurgence wouldnot be fully affirmed for half a century more.
The seeming paradox in the degeneration from the power and glory ofsixteenth-century Spain to the misery of the late seventeenth-century havefascinated historical commentators for more than two hundred years. Sincethe seventeenth century was the first great age of modernization for thecountries of northwestern Europe who became prototypes of modernism andsubsequently the leaders of European civilization, the contrast has usuallybeen drawn in terms of differences in economic function and moral valuesbetween the societies of those lands and of Spain. Spanish society stoodin opposition, both figuratively and literally, to them. As for the reasonsfor Spain's growing social and economic weakness, these have been understoodin their basic lines for more than a century, and recent scholarship hasonly added details and sharpened comprehension of certain points.
Yet the Spanish experience appears much less anomalous when comparedwith countries other than Holland, England, France, and Sweden. Only acorner of Europe was actually "modernizing" in the seventeenth century,and it might be argued that this region was out of step with the greaterpart of Europe rather than vice versa. The Spanish pattern was very closeto that of all southern and eastern Europe and much of the center of thecontinent as well. A refeudalization resulting in the expansion of thenumbers and power of the aristocracy, the decline of cities and the middleclasses, the deterioration of the situation of the peasantry, severe regionaland social revolts, economic stagnation, and the weakening of the stateor public power--these were common phenomena throughout half of Europein the seventeenth century. Even the advanced regions of Germany, amongthe best developed in Europe in the early sixteenth century, had lapsedinto a kind of stagnation by the end of that century, and then were dealta further serious blow by the Thirty Years' War. The decline of the ruraleconomy of central and southern Italy in the seventeenth century was verymuch like that of Spain, and the experience of the broad peripheral empiresof Poland and Muscovy in the east also reveals some striking similarities.
Poland, like Castile, developed in the Middle Ages as the strongestbastion of Latin Christendom on one of the crucial frontiers of the continent.The eastward expansion of the kingdom of Poland from the fourteenth centuryparalleled the southward and transoceanic expansion of Castile, and theunion of Poland-Lithuania played a dynastic and expansionist function similarto the union of the Castiíjan and Aragonese crowns and the Habsburgsuccession in Spain. Polish society was also dominated by a militant warrioraristocracy [329]engaged in a broad geographic expansion that duringthe sixteenth century carried far eastward into the Ukraine. The Polishelite were quite conscious of the historical comparison between Polishexpansion and imperial Spain: in the advance on Moscow in 1613 Polish aristocratslikened themselves to the conquerors of Mexico and Peru. This imperial,expansionist experience solidified the power of the aristocracy, whichusurped economic dominion in Poland to a degree at least as great as inSpain. Indeed, in Poland, as in most of eastern Europe, the process developedeven further, as state and aristocracy imposed a second era of serfdom,beginning in the sixteenth century, that progressively shackled peasantsto aristocratic estates and placed them under steep exactions. The opportunitiesand importance of the towns and middle class correspondingly shrank. Inthe early seventeenth century, aristocrat-dominated Poland became involvedin a series of major imperialist wars that wasted her resources, and wasshaken by the great Ukrainian revolt of 1648. With her economy unbalancedand retarded, Poland then relapsed into a deepening stagnation in the secondhalf of the seventeenth century. The power of the nobility only increased,eventually negating the sovereignty of the monarchy itself, destroyingnational unity, and leading to the dissolution of Poland.
Farther east, the sprawling, backward Muscovite empire also underwentan era of stagnation and decline in the late sixteenth and early seventeenthcenturies. There, too, the situation of the peasantry greatly deterioratedwith the steady development of neo-serfdom. Throughout the eastern 60 percentof the continent, the seventeenth century, in particular, was a time ofgeneral social regression.
Seen against this panorama of rural decline and growing caste oppressionin most of Europe during the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,the Spanish decline no longer seems so anomalous. Spanish society was atleast spared the disaster of the mass enserfment that retarded east Europeandevelopment. By the end of the seventeenth century it could even displaya few minor foci of development on the northwest European pattern. In general,the Spanish experience may be placed in a secondary category of stagnation,but not total regression, that embraced most of southwestern and centralEurope.
The great differentiating factor in the case of Spain--and Portugal--wasthe American empire. This provided a unique source of wealth in the sixteenthand early seventeenth centuries that might be compared with the new imperialdomains and serf labor of Poland and Russia in the same period. Thoughit would be incorrect to say that the Castilian peasantry were spared onlybecause of the empire, it is nonetheless correct that the semiservile Indiansociety of Spanish[330] and Portuguese America (or, perhaps morecorrectly in the case of Brazil, the African slaves) constituted to a lesserdegree the Hispanic equivalent of the serf economy that provided the economicsurplus for the Polish and Muscovite states and their aristocracies duringthis period. The divergence of Spain and Portugal from the pattern of modernizationbeing developed in northwestern Europe was fully apparent. Compared withEurope as a whole, however, the Hispanic problems of backwardness werenot anomalous but to a greater or lesser degree common to most of the continent.
[348] The best introduction to seventeenth-century Spain is volume2 of John Lynch'sSpain under the Habsburgs, entitledSpain andAmerica 1598-1700 (London, 1969). It should be supplemented withLasociedad española en el siglo XVII, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1964-70),an excellent social history by the chief Spanish specialist in that period,Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, who has also published an important volumeof articles,Crisis y decadencia de la España de los Austrias(Barcelona, 1969). The classic studies by the great Spanish statesman,Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, still retain their usefulness. SeehisHistoria de la decadencia española (Madrid, 1854, 1911),andEstudios del reinado de Felipe IV, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1888-89,1927); and also Martin Hume'sThe Court of Philip IV (London, 1907).José Deleito y Piñuela has written a series of seven bookson Spanish life during the era of Felipe IV. Perhaps the best of theseisLa vida religiosa española bajo el cuarto Felipe(Madrid,1952), but see also hisEl rey se divierte (1928),SóloMadrid es corte (1942), andEl declinar de la monarquía española(1947), all published in Madrid. The best history of court and governmentaffairs under Carlos II is Gabriel Maura y Gamazo'sVida y reinado deCarlos II, 3 vols. (Madrid, [349]1942); there is a superficialbiography by J. Langdon Davies,Charles the Bewitched (London, 1962).J. A. Maravall'sLa teoría española del Estado en el sigloXVII (Madrid, 1944), helps to explain political attitudes. The onlybiography of Olivares is Gregorio Marañón'sEl Conde-Duquede Olivares (Madrid, 1952), primarily a psychological study. Thereare also useful monographs on the issue of the validos, aristocratic conspiracy,the "Jewish problem," and financial problems: Francisco T. Valiente,Losvalidos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII (Madrid,1963); R. Ezquerra Abadía,La conspiración del Duque deHijar, 1648 (Madrid, 1934); J. Caro Baroja,La sociedad criptojudíaen la corte de Felipe IV (Madrid, 1963); Domínguez Ortiz,Política y hacienda de Felipe IV (Madrid, 1960); and J. L. SuredaCamón,La Hacienda castellana y los economistas del siglo XVII(Madrid, n.d.).
The Catalan rebellion is the subject of one of the major studies inseventeenth-century Spain, John Elliott'sThe Revolt of the Catalans(Cambridge, 1963). See also José Sanabre,La acción deFrancia en Cataluña (Barcelona, 1956); and Joan Regla,Elsvirreis de Catalunya (Barcelona, 1962), andEl bandolerisme cataládel barroc (Barcelona, 1966). Social problems in the Valencia regionare treated in Regla'sAproxiniació a la história delPaís Valencia (Valencia, 1968), and F. de P. Momblanch y Gonzálbez,La segunda Germanía del reino de Valencia (Alicante, 1957).S. García Martínez,Els fonaments del País Valenciamodern (Valencia, 1968), is a key work that deals with the Valencianresurgence of the late seventeenth century.
Three basic studies in cultural history are Ludwig Pfandl'sSpanischeKultur und Sitte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts (Kempten, 1924); R. Bouvier,L'Espagne de Quevedo (Paris, 1936); and Carl Justi'sDiego Velázquezund sein Jahrhundert (Zurich, 1933). For science and the beginningof modern critical philosophy, see J. M. López Piñero,Laintroducción de la ciencia moderna en España (Barcelona,1969), and O. V. Quiroz Martínez,La introducción de lafilosofia moderna en España (Mexico City, 1949).
The classic comparison between Spain and Poland in this period wasJ. Lelewel'sParallèle historique entre l'Espagne et la Pologneau XVI, XVII, XVIIIe siècles (Paris, 1836). This thesis is updatedby M. Malowist, "Europe de l'Est et les Pays Ibériques: Analogieset Contrastes," in the University of Barcelona'sHomenaje a Jaime VicensVives, vol. 1 (Barcelona, 1965), pp. 85-93. Janusz Tazmir,Szlachtai konkwistadorzy (Warsaw, 1969), provides interesting examples of theattitude of the Polish elite toward Spain.
1. A tonelada was equal to about three cubic meters.
2. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz,La sociedadespañola en el siglo XVII, 1:47.
3.Los judíos en la España modernay contemporánea (Madrid, 1961), 3:258-59.
4. Martin González de Cellorigo,Memorialde la Política (Madrid, 1600). This was one of the first andmost incisive analyses of Spanish problems by the arbitristas of the period.