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Map II
The Hollandia Operations
22-26 April 1944

First light in the Hollandia area on 22 April 1944 disclosed a heavily overcastsky from which a light drizzle intermittently fell upon the ships bearing theR Task Force toward its objectives. (Map II) The weather gave no promisethat aircraft aboard the carriers of Task Force 58, standing offshore betweenHumboldt and Tanahmerah Bays, would be able to execute all their assignedsupport missions. On the other hand, the weather conditions aided Alliedforces, for the approach of the convoys to Hollandia was at least partiallyconcealed from Japanese eyes. Chances for local surprise seemed excellent.

The Landings at Tanahmerah Bay

The assault ships of the Western Attack Group, carrying the 24th InfantryDivision to Tanahmerah Bay, anchored some 10,000 yards off R Beach 2, about amile farther than planned. This change was due to bad weather, which obscuredlandmarks expected by ships' pilots to guide them to the proper anchorages. Thetroops of the 24th Division quickly breakfasted and assault personnel thenbegan clambering down nets into waiting landing craft of the 542d Engineer Boatand Shore Regiment. The transfer to small craft, although hampered by roughseas in the transport area, was completed about 0535, and the leading wavesformed rapidly.

The Assault

Naval fire support vessels, operating under the command of Rear Adm. V.A.C.Crutchley (RN), picked up their landmarks through the mist as best theycould, and at 0600 the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMASAustralia and HMASShropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropicalmorning. To this din was added the sharper crack of 5-inch and 4.7-inchweapons from American and Australian destroyers. In order to obtain observationof important targets, the fire support ships stood as close inshore as theweather conditions and incomplete knowledge of the waters at Tanahmerah Bayallowed. The fire continued until 0645, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and1,500 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. The navalbombardment was carried out according to plan and without response fromJapanese shore

LANDINGS AT TANAHMERAH BAY.Landing craft heading toward R Beach 2. Despite unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area.

defenses. At its conclusion Allied destroyers moved stillcloser inshore to fire on targets of opportunity.

Despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 had managed to maintain planeson air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up fromthe Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted onthose strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanesedefenses or defenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58'sscheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were thereforecanceled.

As the leading wave of landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP's),approached R Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment,a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and twolanding craft, support (LCS's), of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment.Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire againstthe beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the

only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automaticweapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small islandin Tanahmerah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyersthat the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore.

The first group of LCVP's, carrying men of the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, andthe 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was eight or nine minutes late in reaching RBeach 2. But this tardiness did not prevent a successful landing, and afterorders were issued to add eight minutes to the starting time of each,succeeding waves were almost perfectly timed. Tactical surprise was evidentlycomplete. No Japanese defended the beaches and the two assault battalionshad no difficulty occupying the initial beachhead.

The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of thebeachhead and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspectedenemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3d ashore, went into anassembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloadingsupplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2d Battalion, 21stInfantry, took the southern half of R Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3dBattalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2d ashore and sent Company Isouth to look for the trail expected to connect with R Beach 1 at Dépapré.

Company A of the 21st Infantry led the way to R Beach 1 aboard LVT's of the542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, protected by the 2d Engineer SpecialBrigade's Support Battery craft. Scheduled for 0725, Company A's landingactually took place about twenty minutes late. LVT's on the flanks of the initial waves had to cross coral barrier reefs on their wayto the shore, while in the center only two LVT's at one time were able toproceed abreast through a narrow channel in the reefs. The landing wasunopposed, and the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, moved ashorequickly.

Red Beach 1 contained a veritable maze of trails which crossed each other,recrossed, and wandered off toward all points of the compass. The 1st Battalionthus found it difficult to accomplish one of its principal missions--locatingthe beginning of the road leading inland to Lake Sentani and the airfields.After an hour's search, the entrance to this important trail was discoveredabout 500 yards south-southeast of Dépapré. While that reconnaissance was underway, Company A secured and expanded the beachhead. Huts which had survivedthe naval bombardment were carefully searched, footpaths throughout the areawere explored, a few Japanese stragglers were killed, and some potentialsupply-dispersal areas were located.

Back at R Beach 2, which had been intended as the principal landing area forboth troops and supplies, operations were not proceeding according to plan.General Irving, when he assumed command ashore at 0930, found the terrain atRed Beach 2 much more difficult than he or members of his staff hadanticipated. A major change in landing plans, not only for the 24th Divisionbut also for the rest of the R Task Force, seemed imminent.

The Landing Plans Are Changed

Contrary to estimates, which had been based primarily on interpretation ofaerial photographs, R Beach 2 proved to be but

thirty yards deep. Behind this narrow beach was discovered a wide swampcovering most of the area which the task force had planned to use for bivouacsand supply dumps. The swamp was soon found to be impassable for everythingexcept individual infantrymen bearing only small arms. Power tools were uselessin the morass. Neither time nor men and equipment were available to adapt RBeach 2 to the role originally planned for it.

A limited dispersal area, rendered inaccessible by a small stream and by an armof the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimatelythe 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment constructed a road into this space.Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial landing, was emplaced thereto deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stoppedthe flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanahmerah Bay.To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directlythrough the center of the beach. This procedure speeded the outward flow ofswamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additionaldry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land fordispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on R Beach 2.

Meanwhile, more obstacles to the execution of the original logistic plans hadbeen discovered. First, it proved impracticable to build planned roads inland500 yards on both sides of R Beach 2 to dry areas behind the swamp. Then itwas found that there was no road connecting R Beach 2 with R Beach 1 orwith the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road. This was an especially seriouscircumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops andsupplies overland from R Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a roadbetween the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day anda half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of roadinto the hills south toward R Beach 1, the project was discontinued. Thesmall completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D Day two batteriesof 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to acramped position on a little ridge immediately south of R Beach 2. From thissite the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inlandfrom R Beach 1, but the direction of this fire was limited by a number ofhills nearby. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a fewof the many vehicles which had been unloaded at R Beach 2 on D Day.

Other difficulties were encountered at R Beach 2. As soon as LST's touchedshore, they began disgorging tanks, 90-mm. antiaircraft weapons, and 155-mm.artillery. Practically all the artillery mounts mired to their hubs in deep mudat the inner side of the beach. Bulldozers then had to be taken off essentialroad coustruction projects to pull the vehicles out of the way. The 2d and 3dPlatoons of Company A, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, ashore at 0830, could not beused tactically and had to find space to bivouac on the beach or on the road tothe south. When it was found that the available beach area was inadequate tohold the many tracked and wheeled vehicles still aboard the LST's, work wasredirected to unloading bulk cargo. Roller conveyors were set up on the beachbut could not be extended into LST cargo decks because those decks were stillso tightly packed with vehicles. A long stream of men had to proceed to thestem of each LST to bring out bulk supplies by hand through narrow spacesbetween vehicles.

UNLOADING LST'S,R Beach 2.

Since it was impossible to move the supplies inland they were piled on thebeach, where many stacks of boxes or crates soon reached heights up to eightfeet. The beach quickly became so crowded that it was soon obvious that theefforts of A Force to secure beach sleds for the 24th Division had been invain--there was simply no room to use them. But, despite the seemingly patentimpossibility of finding room for all men and supplies on R Beach 2, theAPA's and LST's bearing cargo for the division's two assault regiments wereunloaded by 1900 on D Day. By that time the beach was almost solidly coveredwith supplies, troops, tanks, vehicles, and gun emplacements. It was clear thatsupplies and personnel of Headquarters, R Task Force, the task forcereserve, miscellaneous service units, and various organizations attached to the24th Division could not possibly be squeezed onto the beach. Unless R Beach 1provided materially greater dispersal space, convoys scheduled to reachTanahmerah Bay on D plus 1 and D plus 2 would have to be held at eastern NewGuinea ports or diverted to other landing areas.

Now the beneficial results of General Irving's determination to keep R Beach1 in the landing plans became apparent. Behind that beach were found someadditional dry, flat dispersal areas. Access to the beach

was hampered by the fronting reef, but the 24th Division solved this problem bysetting up a shuttle system from R Beach 2. Shallow-draft boats carried thesupplies to the entrance of Dépapré Bay. There, on the water, matériel wastransferred to LVT's which served as ferries to the shore. At high tide smallboats could reach Dépapré--only two could beach there at a time--and at 1730LCM's took the 2d Platoon and the command section of Company A, 1st TankBattalion, to Dépapré through the reefs. Ultimately the water approach toDépapré was improved when naval demolition personnel blasted a wider anddeeper channel through the reef, thus giving small landing craft continuousaccess to R Beach 1.

The shuttle to Dépapré continued throughout the night of 22-23 April. Someof the congestion on R Beach 2 was thereby relieved and, by dint of almostsuperhuman effort, the cargo from seven LST's of the D plus 1 convoy was put onthat beach on the 23d, and the AKA of the D plus 1 echelon was unloaded by noonon the 24th. Transshipments to R Beach 1 were continued, but by noon on 23April it had become obvious that there was no space to be found anywhere alongthe shores of Tanahmerah Bay to unload the supplies and troops aboard the Dplus 2 convoy.

Meanwhile, advance elements of the 24th Division had pushed far inland on theirway toward the airfields over the Dépapré--Lake Sentani road. Contrary toexpectations, this road was found to be ungraded and extremely narrow. It was amere track which, winding in a series of hairpin turns over the Takari Hillseast of Dépapré, hung precariously along the sides of slopes that in some cases were as steep as 60 degrees. It was far from being the well-traveledmotor road expected. Neither the Army's wheeled vehicles nor the Marine's tankscould reach the crest of the Takari Hills over this road. The tanks wererelegated to the role of perimeter defense around Dépapré. Heavyconstruction, which was destined to be impeded by many landslides, had to beundertaken before the trail inland could be used for a main supply line asoriginally planned. Until it was improved, only a small number of men could besustained over the track, and all their supplies would have to be hand-carriedforward from Dépapré.

To Headquarters, R Task Force, the logistic difficulties inherent insupporting a large-scale drive inland over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail faroutweighed the tactical advantages of such a movement. The 41st InfantryDivision, on the other hand, was meeting with unexpectedly rapid success in itsdrive to the airfields from Humboldt Bay, the shores of which had been foundbetter suited to troop and supply dispersal than those at Tanahmerah Bay. TheR Task Force staff therefore recommended that a sweeping change in plansbe made. General Eichelberger, accepting these recommendations, decided to makethe Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing point and to change theemphasis of attack to the 41st Division's drive inland. Accordingly, about noonon D plus 1, the D plus 2 convoy to Tanahmerah Bay was diverted to HumboldtBay. Task force

headquarters, the task force reserve, and miscellaneous service units, all of whichwere still awaiting a chance to unload at Tanahmerah Bay, were also directed tomove to the Humboldt Bay beaches. A part of the task force headquarters whichhad already landed on R Beach 2 was reloaded on an LST and sent to HumboldtBay.

Red Beaches 1 and 2 had proved able to provide dispersal areas for a bareminimum of supplies for the 24th Division's two assault regiments, but theywere inadequate for the larger load assigned to them prior to the landings. Thedivision would therefore have to support its drive inland with only thesupplies and equipment unloaded at Tanahmerah Bay through D plus 1.

The 24th Division's Drive to the Airfields

Leaving Company A at R Beach 1, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, commandedby Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., had started up the Dépapré-Lake Sentanitrail at 0837 on D Day. At any one of the numerous hairpin tums and defilesover the first two or three miles of the track, a squad of Japanese riflemencould have delayed an entire infantry division. Surprisingly, no determinedopposition was encountered. Enemy defensive installations (many of themincomplete) at important points were found to be unoccupied. The Japanese had not been ready for the attack andthose who had been in the Tanahmerah Bay area had apparently fled in panic whenthe 24th Division began to land. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, wastherefore able to advance as rapidly as terrain conditions and necessarysecurity measures permitted.

The First Day of the Advance

Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes inearly stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village ofMariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had beenencountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition.Over three miles by trail inland from Dépapré, Mariboe was the 24th Division'sfirst inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in andaround Mariboe that the Japanese had evacuated that village not long before the1st Battalion's arrival.

Colonel Clifford now halted his men. Since radio communication with thedivision command post on R Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers backover the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same timepatrols were sent toward Kantomé, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. Theyreported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mariboe. ColonelClifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higherheadquarters but, acting on his patrols' reports, ordered the battalion to pushon. Encountering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reachedKantomé about noon.

From that village patrols were sent almost ten mileseastward along the trail through Paipou, Jangkena, Waibron-Baroe, and

Waibron-Bano to Dazai, the division's intermediate objective. The patrolsencountered no active resistance, although signs of recent enemy occupationabounded at numerous points along the trail to Dazai. Colonel Clifford thensent the main body of the battalion on to Jangkena, about eight miles by trailinland from Dépapré. At Jangkena the advance was again halted because night wasapproaching and because only sporadic radio contact could be malntalned withregiment or division headquarters.

Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rearother than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese werethought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampyground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion pushon to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cutits line of communications to Dépapré, and destroy it at leisure. If theJapanese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest ofthe 21st Infantry at any one of the many defiles over the first two or threemiles of the trail inland from Dépapré. Colonel Clifford therefore decided topull his men back to Kantomé for the night, leaving only outposts along thetrail east of that village. Kantomé was located near the foot of the TakariHills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japaneseflanking maneuvers.

The soundness of Colonel Clifford's decision was demonstrated about midnightwhen a small Japanese force, which had apparently moved overland around the 1stBattalion's outposts, struck the battalion's left. The jungled hills in theKantomé neighborhood prevented further enemy movement and the Japaneseforce, although it managed to keep the 1st Battalion awake most of the night, did not penetrate the perimeter. At dawn on the 23d theJapanese gave up their attempts to cut the trail to the rear and withdrew.

About the time that the 1st Battalion had started withdrawing to Kantomé forthe night, radio communications with regimental headquarters had beenre-established. It was then learned that the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (lessCompany I), had moved from R Beach 2 to Dépapré. During the morning of D Daythe 3d Battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Chester A. Dahlen, had beenengaged in probing the southern flank of R Beach 2. It had soon becomeapparent, however, that no Japanese were in that area, and General Irving hadaccordingly ordered the unit to move to R Beach 1 to support the advance ofthe 1st Battalion. This move started about 1400 and as each element of thebattalion reached R Beach 1, it started up the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail.Company I continued overland through the hills between R Beaches 1 and 2. Bynightfall the battalion's forward elements had reached the crest of the TakariHills. The rest of the unit (still less Company I) continued moving after darkto close in on the leading elements, finally bivouacking along the trail.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the 21st Infantry had also begun moving to RBeach 1, responsibility for the defense of R Beach 2 passing to the 19thInfantry. Col. Charles B. Lyman, commanding the 21st Infantry, moved hiscommand post to Dépapré about noon. By the morning of the next day, 23 April,the bulk of the 2d Battalion was concentrated at Dépapré. Company I rejoinedthe regiment about 1400 the same day, after a march over very rough and jungledterrain from R Beach 2. Colonel Lyman now had his entire regiment

under his control, ready to exploit the initial success of the 1st Battalion.Late at night on the 22d, he instructed the regiment to resume the advanceeastward at 0700 on D plus 1.

Logistic Problems Delay the Advance

The 1st Battalion began moving out of Kantomé on schedule on the 23d and by1045 had reentered Jangkena. Shortly after 1200 the unit reached Dazai,farthest limit of patrol advance the previous day, and then pushed on toSabron. No signs of enemy opposition other than a few rifle shots from woods onboth sides of the trail had been encountered. At 1445, after lunch and a rest,the battalion moved cautiously out of Sabron. About 1,500 yards beyond thatvillage a small stream crossed the main track. This crossing had beenreconnoitered by patrols early in the afternoon, and there had been found thefirst signs of organized resistance.

Two platoons of Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed thesmall stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealedJapanese ambush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made thestream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew tothe west, leaving four dead men behind. Over his now well-functioning radios,Colonel Clifford requested air support. The message was relayed to Task Force58 carriers lying offshore and three planes quickly appeared to strafe theenemy position. In addition, the 1st Battalion's 81-mm. mortars and heavymachine guns were also brought forward to lay a barrage on the enemy defenses.But all this fire failed to dislodge the Japanese. In an attempt to outflankthe enemy position, Colonel Clifford sent small patrols across the stream both above and below the crossing. These efforts proved futile, for thepatrols could not locate the enemy flanks and were kept away from the mainJapanese position by small arms fire. After a lively fire fight at thecrossing, which lasted almost to dusk, Colonel Clifford decided to pull backtoward Sabron so that mortars and artillery could fire freely on thestream-crossing area.

During the night 105-mm. howitzers of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion firedon the enemy positions at the crossing for over an hour. The Japanese repliedwith mortar, grenade, and small arms fire which was directed against the 1stBattalion's perimeter near Sabron. About 2100 a Japanese field piece, believedto have been a dual purpose 90-mm. antiaircraft gun, opened fire on thebattalion from the vicinity of the airfields. The enemy's harassing firecontinued almost to dawn on the 24th, and again the American unit was keptawake much of the night.

The rest of the 21st Infantry was now echeloned along the trail behind the 1stBattalion. The 3d Battalion, which had advanced to within 1,000 yards of Dazai,was also harassed by Japanese fire during the night of 23-24 April, but thearea of the 2d Battalion (which had moved up to Mariboe from Dépapré) wasquiet. The 2d and 3d Battalions' advances had been made without opposition.

Even with the support of the remainder of the regiment echeloned on the trailto its rear, the position of the 1st Battalion was not enviable. The unit wasover twelve miles by trail inland; it had only enough rations left forbreakfast; and it was running low on ammunition. No supplies had been receivedsince landing, and hard fighting on the 24th seemed unavoidable.

Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had takeninto

consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encounteredin the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed studywhich had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carryfrom R Beach 2 over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena.When no road connecting R Beach 2 with R Beach 1 had been found, thedivision moved the main supply point to Dépapré, from which the advance inlandwould be supported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook newcomputations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended toDazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weatherconditions would not make the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road nearly impassable.

On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through whichstruggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to saynothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that daylogistic support of the 21st Infantry had therefore become a major problem.There was no question but that the regiment would have to be supported byhand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work byengineers would be required before the road from Dépapré as far as Mariboecould be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had alreadyadvanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates,support by hand-carry would be next to impossible.

When the 2d and 3d Battalions had moved inland on the 23d, both had carriedextra supplies, principally food and ammunition, but these supplies wereinadequate to support the 1st Battalion as well. The 24th Division thereupon decided to increase the number of men assigned tohand-carrying duties. The overwater shuttle system from R Beach 2 to Dépapréwas now working smoothly and few combat troops were needed at R Beach 2 toassist in moving supplies or to defend that area, which had proved to be bareof Japanese forces. Therefore the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry (initiallydivision reserve), was moved to Dépapré on D plus 1. The Antitank and CannonCompanies of both the 9th and 21st Infantry Regiments were also dispatched toRed Beach 1 on the same day. To speed the flow of supplies inland, all thesetroops were stationed at various points along the trail from Dépapré toMariboe. The supplies were moved by a combination of a shuttle system andforward displacement of companies.

But the best efforts of three infantry battalions and four antitank or cannoncompanies proved inadequate to assure continued support of the 1st Battalion,21st Infantry. In addition, trail conditions were becoming worse andhand-carrying progressively more difficult. General Irving therefore requestedthat aircraft (the nearest base for which was at Nadzab, almost 500 milessoutheast of Hollandia) drop supplies at Jangkena on 24 April so that the 1stBattalion could continue its advance without depending on hand-carryingparties.

General Irving himself reconnoitered the trail a little way forward fromDépapré during the afternoon of 23 April. After his trip he realized thatcontinued rapid advance inland was no longer possible under the hand-carryscheme. He also learned that the weather was so threatening that littledependence could be placed on air supply. Accordingly, late in the afternoon ofthe 23d, he ordered the 21st Infantry to consolidate

HAND-CARRYING SUPPLIES.Men of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, carrying supplies forward.

its forward positions at Sabron and Dazai. Elements of the regimentnot already at those two villages were to remain echeloned to the rear forhand-carrying duties. Further offensive efforts were to be limited to patrolaction until the inland supply situation could be improved.

Supply Difficulties, 24-25 April

By exhaustive work during the afternoon of 23 April and the following night,rear elements of the 21st Infantry had managed to build up a small reserve ofrations and ammunition at Dazai. The next morning the 1st Battalion, 19thInfantry, moved to Dépapré from R Beach 2 to augment the number ofhand-carrying parties along the road inland. The Cannon and Antitank Companiesof the same regiment, carrying extra supplies, pushed over the Takari Hills toMariboe and Jangkena, respectively.

Inland, most efforts during the day were limited to patrolling. In the morningGeneral Irving slogged his way overland to Colonel Lyman's forward command postwith the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. After learning about the situation inthe forward

area, he instructed Colonel Lyman to advance no farther than the point at whichthe two forward battalions, the 1st and 3d, could supply themselves fromDazai. Accordingly the 3d Battalion spent the day sending out flanking patrolsand closing up on the 1st. The latter unit sent out patrols to the scene of theprevious day's ambush and found that artillery and mortar fire had killed ordriven away from that area almost all the Japanese defenders. At nightfall the1st Battalion's position had been little changed from that which it had held atdaylight, forward displacement of the main body having been limited to lessthan 200 yards. The 3d Battalion established a new perimeter about 500 yards tothe rear of the 1st, while the 2d Battalion was spread from Dazai back toMariboe, its companies acting as links in an ever-growing chain ofhand-carrying parties.

To the rear of the 2d Battalion, additional links had been established by darkon the 24th. Most of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the Antitank andCannon Companies of the 21st Infantry had been hand-carrying supplies fromDépapré to Mariboe during the day and by nightfall had set up a small supplydump at the latter village. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had been handlingsupplies all day at R Beach 1 and had also taken over responsibility for thesecurity of that beach, allowing Company A, 21st Infantry, to rejoin itsbattalion inland. The Cannon Company of the 19th Infantry had moved forwardwith supplies to Mariboe, and the Antitank Company of the same regiment hadreached Jangkena with some rations and ammunition. The Cannon and AntitankCompanies of both the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments had, perforce, lefttheir organic weapons and transportation behind them and were acting purely asservice troops.

In spite of the efforts of all these units, the supply of rations, ammunition,and medical equipment for the two advance battalions was but little augmentedon the 24th. Worse still, the scheduled airdrop at Jangkena had been canceledbecause of poor weather, and the continuing rain was turning most of theDépapré-Lake Sentani road into a sea of mud. There was little hope for quickimprovement in the situation.

But General Irving was optimistic and he felt sure that conditions wouldimprove on the 25th. He requested another airdrop which, in order to get thesupplies farther forward, he wanted made at Dazai. On the basis of this requestand because the number of carrying parties along the main trail had beenincreased and some supplies had been moved to Dazai on the 24th, the divisioncommander ordered the 21st Infantry to continue its advance the next day.First objectives were wooded hills on either side of the main road about 3,000yards beyond Sabron.

The 25th of April dawned heavily overcast and rain threatened, auguring ill forthe proposed airdrop. Nevertheless, advance patrols of the 1st Battalion, 21stInfantry, moved out at 0500. Colonel Lyman planned to have the two forwardbattalions advance on a wide front to make sure that no Japanese would bebypassed and left behind to cut the tenuous supply line back to Dépapré. Butthe jungle was so thick on both sides of the trail that it was impossible forthe main bodies to move rapidly in the dense undergrowth. The bulk of the twobattalions therefore pushed forward

in column along the road, while numerous small patrols kept up as bestthey could in the jungle off the trail.

After an artillery bombardment of known and suspected enemy positions, the restof the two battalions followed the advance patrols. Only scattered small armsfire slowed the advance, although it was necessary to halt from time to time aspatrols searched the terrain far to both sides of the main trail. About 1115the advance stopped temporarily while demolition teams destroyed two recentlyabandoned Japanese armored vehicles.

The first objectives were cleared by noon, at which time the 1st Battalionhalted to rest at a point about 1,000 yards short of the next natural barrier,a branch of the Dejaoe River. Soon 1st Battalion patrols reached the river. Asmall enemy delaying position at the crossing--a ford--was quickly outflanked bythe 21st Infantry patrols and by midaftemoon patrols had moved across thestream toward Julianadorp, a farm settlement to the east. Meanwhile, automaticweapons fire had been received from Japanese guns emplaced on high ground northof the ford. Scouts sent out to locate the source of this fire found enemyantiaircraft guns protected by riflemen and machine gunners. The Japanesepositions were soon neutralized by mortar fire, and the main bodies resumed theadvance about 1530.

Progress was slow during the rest of the afternoon. Japanese patrols whichthreatened the line of communications became active north of the main road, andit was necessary for the 21st Infantry to send out its own combat patrols tohunt down and disperse the Japanese parties. These operations, which delayed the advance of the main body, were not finished until1700. Then Colonel Lyman halted the advance for the night. The 1st Battaliondug in on the nose of a low hill about 500 yards west of the Dejaoe Riverbranch crossing and approximately 125 yards north of the Dépapré-Lake Sentanitrail. The 3d Battalion and regimental headquarters bivouacked for the nightin the vicinity of the day's first objectives, to the rear of the 1stBattalion.

The supply situation in the forward area had been little improved during the25th. Rain had fallen steadily all day, there had been no airdrop, and theDépapré-Lake Sentani road had become practically impassable. The 2d Battalion,21st Infantry, had moved forward through Sabron to Dazai, laboriouslyhand-carrying supplies as it struggled eastward in the rain and mud. By thismeans small supply dumps had been built up at both villages by dusk, but thebattalion's displacement had left a large gap in the carrying line. West ofDazai the next sizable carrying party was the Antitank Company of the 19thInfantry, at Paipou. Behind that unit was the Cannon Company, 19th Infantry, atMariboe. General Irving ordered both units to move at dawn on the 26th toDazai, carrying with them all possible supplies.

These displacements would leave the trail from Dazai west to Mariboe bare ofhand-carrying parties, thus disrupting the supply relay system. General Irvingtherefore ordered the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, to move to Jangkena andinstructed a company of the 2d Battalion of the same regiment to push on toMariboe. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, which was to be assisted bymiscellaneous artillery, medical, and quartermaster units, was made responsible

for moving supplies up the trail from Dépapré as far as the crest ofthe Takari Hills. Finally, the Antitank and Cannon Companies of the 21stInfantry were ordered to push from Mariboe to Dazai, hand-carrying extrasupplies as they advanced.

Thus, by morning of the 26th, three infantry battalions, two antitankcompanies, and two cannon companies were assigned to carrying supplies. Thesetroops were supported by parts of the Service Companies of both the 19th and21st Infantry Regiments, by elements of various engineer and quartermasterorganizations, and by volunteer groups from other units whose services were notneeded for their normal duties. At least 3,500 combat troops were directlyemployed in moving supplies to the two forward battalions.

Since his two forward battalions were now beyond the most effective andaccurate support range of artillery emplaced at the beaches, Colonel Lymanasked that 4.2-inch mortars of Company A, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, besent inland. Such was the condition of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail thatplans were made to move only one mortar. A detachment comprising two gun crewsand the ammunition carriers of an entire platoon were detailed for the task,and the movement of the mortar was given the highest priority. About the sametime a single 105-mm. howitzer of Battery A, 52d Field Artillery Battalion, wasstarted over the Takari Hills. Battery C, 11th Field Artillery Battalion,offered support a different way. Because its guns could no longer help theinfantry inland, the battery volunteered to a man to carry rations and othersupplies over the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road. Such help was indeed welcome. Thespirit was excellent in the 24th Division, but spirit alone could not conquer all the difficulties of terrain. Neither the 4.2-inchmortar nor the 105-mm. howitzer were to reach positions from which they couldsupport the 21st Infantry's advance on 26 April.

While these steps were being taken to deliver both supplies and support weaponsto the front, General Irving decided to order the advance continued. He reachedthis decision despite the fact that the supply situation was still serious. Ithad been impossible to drop supplies from the air on the 25th and evenhand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which hadflooded many small streams. Parts of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani trail were nowknee deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and theywould have to go on half-rations if the supply situation were not quicklyimproved. But General Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believingthat air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had receivedinformation which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfieldarea. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance wouldnot be unduly hazardous.

In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his menfar beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If theairdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of thetwo forward battalions would probably have to be echeloned back along the trailto augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to behalted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward battalions mighthave to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager suppliesof rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which

assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japaneseopposition.

The Airfields Are Secured

After passing an uneventful night, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry,resumed the advance at 0830 on 26 April. There was no opposition as the mainbodies moved across the Dajaoe River and on through Julianadorp. About 1130both units stopped at Ebeli Plantation, about 1,800 yards east ofJulianadorp, to clear out a bunker which was occupied by four Japaneseriflemen. While the 3d Battalion dispatched Company L north some 600 yards offthe main trail to flush some Japanese from Ebeli Sawmill, the rest of thetroops moved on eastward. By noon advance elements were atop a hill whence theycould see the inland airfields, and minutes later forward patrols reached theoutermost dispersal areas of Hollandia Drome, the most westerly of the threeJapanese airfields on the plain north of Lake Sentani. Now the advance washalted as the battalions regrouped and Colonel Lyman issued a new attack order.

The 1st Battalion was instructed to clear a Japanese encampment area left ofthe trail and north of the center of Hollandia Drome. The 3d Battalion was topush directly on to the airfield, secure it, and then advance as far as theedge of a swamp lying southeast of the strip.

By 1350 the 1st Battalion hadsecured its objective, having encountered little resistance. The 3d Battalion'sforward patrols reached the western edge of the main runway about the same timeand, locating no opposition worthy of mention, arrived at the eastern end ofthe field half an hour later. At 1530 Colonel Lyman radioed to divisionheadquarters that the entire Hollandia Drome area had been secured. By dark the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, hadclosed at Hollandia Drome.

The bad weather which had forced cancellation of attempted airdrops on 24 and25 April had finally broken sufficiently for a few planes from eastern NewGuinea to get through to Hollandia. Twelve B-25's of the 17th ReconnaissanceSquadron, Fifth Air Force, flew the nearly 500 miles from Saidor to drop rifle,carbine, machine gun, and mortar ammunition, hand grenades, and rations atDazai. Moreover, the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had managed to bringforward some extra rations, ammunition, and medical equipment. As the rainstopped, fresh carrying parties following the 2d Battalion found trailconditions greatly improved. Finally, some wheeled transport was now availableat both ends of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road. Hard work by engineers had madethe road passable for jeeps from Dépapré halfway up the first steep slopes ofthe Takari Hills. At Hollandia Drome the 21st Infantry had captured a fewJapanese trucks. These were sent west from the airstrip as far as possiblealong the main trail, which was passable to a point near Julianadorp. There thesupplies dropped from the air during the day, as well as those still beinghand-carried overland from Dépapré, were picked up and taken back to theairfield area.

As soon as Hollandia Drome was secured,

patrols of the 21st Infantry pushed on toward Weversdorp, a farm about 2,500yards beyond the eastern end of the field. At 1645, between Weversdorp and theairdrome, contact was established with elements of the 186th Infantry, 41stDivision, which had been attacking westward from Humboldt Bay into the airfieldarea.

The Seizure of Hollandia Town

While the 24th Division had been driving inland to Hollandia Drome, the 162dand 186th Infantry Regiments of the 41st Division had pushed toward the fieldsfrom Humboldt Bay, twenty-five miles east of Tanahmerah Bay. The 41st Divisionhad begun landing on W Beaches 1-4 on the shores of Humboldt Bay at 0700 on22 April. Initial assaults were made by the 162d Infantry over the sandspitsacross the inner reaches of Humboldt Bay. The 186th Infantry followed the 162dashore to initiate a drive southwest and inland from Humboldt Bay toward theairfields on the Lake Sentani Plain.

The Beachhead at Humboldt Bay

The convoy bearing the 41st Division to Humboldt Bay did not have the samedifficulty locating landmarks as did the ships at Tanahmerah Bay, and the ships found their assigned transport and fire supportareas without much trouble. The naval fire support conducted by American lightcruisers and destroyers and the air support missions flown by Task Force 58planes were executed as planned. There was no opposition to either the navalgunfire or the aircraft activity, and surprise was as complete as that achievedat Tanahmerah Bay. Assault troops of the 41st Division quickly unloaded fromthe APD's which had carried them to Humboldt Bay and boarded landing craft,personnel, ramp (LCPR's), coxswained by naval personnel, for the short run tothe beaches. The first of these boats touched shore exactly on schedule at0700. The leading waves of landing craft were supported by rocket fire from twoSeventh Fleet LCI's which fired principally on Pancake Hill, just north ofW Beach 1, and by rocket or automatic weapons fire from two LCVP's of the532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. There was no answering fire fromJapanese weapons and no opposition at the beaches.

The first assault was made by Companies K and L, 162d Infantry, which landedalong an 800-yard front on W Beach 1, located on the more northern of thetwo sandspits dividing Humboldt Bay from Jautefa Bay. Succeeding waves ofthe 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, came ashore in LCVP's and LCM's manned by theBoat Battalion, 532d Engineer Boat and Shore

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHURand General Horace H. Fuller, on the beach at Humboldt Bay, New Guinea, 22 April 1944.

Regiment. Simultaneously, a reinforced rifle platoon of Company A, 162dInfantry, was put ashore from Army LCVP's on W Beach 2, immediately southof W Beach 1. Company I, 186th Infantry, landed in the same manner on WBeach 3 on the southern sandspit. There was no enemy opposition to these twosecondary landings. Within half an hour the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 162dInfantry, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the same regiment, six tanks of the 603dTank Company, and elements of the 116th Engineer Battalion were all safelyashore on the northern spit.

The rifle platoon of Company A, 162d Infantry, advanced rapidly south along thespit and by 0745 secured Cape Pie, at the peninsula's southern extremity. Thisaction eliminated the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack and secured thesouthern end of the spit. Company I of the 186th Infantry, also unopposed,quickly secured Cape Tjeweri at the northern tip of the southern spit, and thenbegan moving southeast along the shore of Humboldt Bay toward Hollekang toforestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, had landed onW Beach 1 and had started north to secure Pancake Hill which, located atthe inland end of the northern peninsula, overlooked all the 41st Division'slanding beaches. So surprised had the Japanese been by the landings and by thespeed of the 3d Battalion's advance, that the American troops, encounteringonly scattered rifle fire, were able to take Pancake Hill before 0800. Atopthat important terrain feature they found a Japanese antiaircraft gun fromwhich the canvas weather covering had not been removed. This weapon had notbeen touched by the preassault naval bombardment and was still in perfect condition. Had the Japanese antiaircraftmen beenalert, they could have created havoc among the 41st Division troops landing onthe beaches below Pancake Hill.

After the hill was occupied, most of the 3d Battalion pushed up the shores ofHumboldt Bay, while one company moved overland north from Pancake Hill. Noresistance worthy of mention opposed this two-pronged attack, the objective ofwhich was to surround and seize another dominating terrain feature, JarremohHill. This hill, rising some 1,000 feet, overlooked the sandspits and theshores of Challenger Cove, a northwesterly arm of Humboldt Bay. On the westshore of the cove was located the town of Hollandia.

Hollandia Falls

By 1430 the 3d Battalion had cleared Jarremoh Hill and was digging in for thenight along a ridge overlooking Hollandia. The battalion commander wanted topush on into the town before dark, but General Fuller, commanding the 41stDivision, vetoed this proposal. On the basis of intelligence reports whichindicated that the Japanese were occupying Hollandia in some strength, GeneralFuller had decided that the seizure of the town would have to wait until themorning of the 23d. During the night naval guns and 105-mm. howitzers of the146th Field Artillery Battalion--emplaced on firm ground north of W Beach1--bombarded Hollandia, softening the 3d Battalion's task for the morrow.

In the meantime the 2d Battalion had begun advancing from W Beach 1 to thetrack connecting Hollandia with Pim, on the western shore of Jautefa Bay.Company E led off on the left at 0756, moving past

the southwest side of Pancake Hill, while Company G took a route east of thehill. The rest of the battalion soon started out after Company E but found theterrain west of Pancake Hill unexpectedly swampy and rough going for a largebody of troops. The battalion commander therefore ordered the units on thatside to turn and follow Company G. Company E kept on overland and quicklyreached the Pim-Hollandia track at a point about 1,000 yards west of PancakeHill. By midmorning Company G had arrived on the trail north of Company E. Therest of the battalion concentrated on the trail between Companies E and G earlyin the afternoon.

Contact was soon established with the company of the 3d Battalion which hadadvanced to the Pim-Hollandia road from Pancake Hill earlier in the day. The 2dBattalion then moved up the road toward Hollandia, and by nightfall had joinedthe 3d on the ridge overlooking the town. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion hadassembled as division reserve at the base of Pancake Hill.

By dark on the 22d the 162d Infantry had carried its advance to the 41stDivision's first phase line. To that time, opposition had been so light thatAmerican casualties, including those of the 186th Infantry, totaled only sixmen killed and sixteen wounded. As at Tanahmerah Bay, the Japanese had made noeffort to man their prepared defenses which, though not as extensive as hadbeen expected, could have produced considerable trouble for the 41st Division.The division staff was both pleased and worried by the lack of enemy resistanceand could make no estimate as to the character of Japanese opposition whichmight be met on the 23d. Nevertheless, since it was expected that the 162dInfantry would have little trouble in seizing Hollandia, that action wasordered.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, jumped off at 0730 on the 23d. Theunits moved rapidly down the ridge to Hollandia and at 1115 reported that theyhad secured the town. There was no opposition.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, had meanwhile relieved a battalion of the186th Infantry which had been waiting in division reserve west of Pancake Hill.The 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, after helping the 3d to secure Hollandia,moved into high ground west and northwest of that town. During the remainder ofthe attack phase of the Hollandia operation, the entire 162d Infantry patrolledthe hilly environs of Hollandia, securing the northern shores of Humboldt Bay,the beaches of Challenger Cove, and rough hills along the western side ofJautefa Bay. To the 186th Infantry fell the task of driving inland to the mainobjective, the airfields on the north shore of Lake Sentani.

The Drive Inland from Humboldt Bay

The Landing of the 186th Infantry

LVT's carrying Companies K and L of the 186th Infantry hit W Beach 2 about0715, ten minutes ahead of schedule, on 22 April. Original plans hadprovided that these LVT assault waves would cross W Beach 2 and themangrove swamp to its rear and proceed overwater across Jautefa Bay to WBeach 4, located north of Pim, near the eastern terminus of the main roadleading inland to the airfields. But the mangrove swamp proved impassable forthe

LVT's. The amphibians withdrew from the beach and, under cover of SupportBattery craft of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, proceeded into Jautefa Baythrough the narrow channel between Capes Pie and Tjeweri.

At 0810 Company L started moving ashore about 900 yards north of Pim. Company Klanded 500 yards farther north about 0825. The remainder of the 3d Battalion(less Company I, which was operating on W Beach 3) arrived in the WBeach 4 area about 0915. The first objective was Leimok Hill, lying 1,800 yardsnorthwest of Pim. Part of the battalion secured the hill by 1000, and otherelements advanced southward toward Pim. That village and its usable jetty weresecured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suikerbrood Hill, on JautefaBay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that enemy troops atopdominating heights near Pim might make W Beach 4 untenable was over.

The 3d Battalion established a night perimeter at Pim, extending its defensesalong a trail leading west from that village to the point at which thePim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sentani, thus securingthe roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to begin. The 1stBattalion, 186th Infantry, which had followed the 162d Infantry ashore on WBeach 1, had proceeded north and west around the mangrove swamp and down thePim-Hollandia track to Leimok Hill. There it relieved the 3d Battalion andestablished a night defensive perimeter. The 2d Battalion (less two riflecompanies) moved into divisional reserve on the Pim-Hollandia track west ofPancake Hill; its remaining two companies stayed afloat until D plus 1. Orderswere issued late at night on the 22d to the 186th Infantry, Col. Oliver P.Newman commanding, to move out the next morning at daybreak. The objective wasthe inland airfield area and the axis of advance was the Pim-Lake Sentani road.

Back on W Beach 1, the Naval Beach Party and the 532d Engineer Boat andShore Regiment (the Shore Party), augmented by the Cannon Companies of the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments, worked hard to unload all D Day shippingbefore dark. Seven LST's were discharged on W Beach 1. Roller conveyorswere used for the 375 tons of bulk cargo each LST carried in addition to itsmobile load. Cargo and equipment aboard the APA HMASWestralia was lightered toW Beach 1 or 2 by small craft. Since W Beach 3 was very steep and hadno suitable landing spots, most cargo had to be unloaded on the northernsandspit. That spit was already cluttered with Japanese stores; it was narrow;and exits to inland dispersal areas were limited. These factors combined tolead to a great deal of congestion.

To the Shore of Lake Sentani

At 0800 on 23 April the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hilland started out over the main track, passing through the 3d Battalion. Themovement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Battalions, setup near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 0900the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trailsouthwest of Pim. So far, there had been no opposition. Now Companies A and Cparted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River.Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed aseries of unco-ordinated attacks

which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during theafternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained atthe stream-branching during the night of 23-24 April, and on the latter day theymoved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pim-Lake Sentanitrail.

Leaving Companies A and C to guard its right flank, the remainder of the 1stBattalion had continued the advance along the main trail against negligibleopposition. By noon the battalion had reached the outskirts of a large Japanesedump and storage area about 2,500 yards beyond Brinkman's Plantation. The unithalted to await the results of an air strike on suspected enemy positions westof the storage area and for the 3d Battalion to close up from the rear.

It was hoped that the 186th Infantry could reach the second phase line,Koejaboe and the northeast shores of Lake Sentani, during the afternoon of the23d, but air observers and forward patrols had reported considerable Japaneseactivity along the trail west of the storage area. Colonel Newman felt that thenow understrength 1st Battalion did not have enough men to continue an advanceagainst what might prove to be strong enemy defenses. Moreover, the 3dBattalion's movement from Pim had been slow and the unit did not reach theJapanese storage area until 1500, when it was necessary to halt for the day.General Fuller had ordered that offensive action--other than patrolling--ceaseeach day at 1500 so that defensive positions could be prepared before dark. Theforward elements of the 186th Infantry set up their night perimeters at theeastern edge of the Japanese storage area.

By 1500 heavy rain had begun to turn spots of the Pim-Lake Sentani road--thebest yet found in the Hollandia area--into great mudholes. LVT's had started out over the trail from Pim to bring suppliesforward to the advancing infantry and, if necessary, to provide fire support.But many of the LVT's bogged down in the mud along the road. Supply problemsseemed imminent.

Colonel Newman suggested to division headquarters that on the 24th the advancebe resumed with the 3d Battalion passing through the 1st. The latter was toremain in the storage area until rejoined by Companies A and C, after which itwould follow the 3d Battalion and protect the fight flank of the advance bypatrolling along high ground north of the main trail. The 3d Battalion'sinitial objective was a jetty at the point where the main road first touchedthe shore of Lake Sentani. This jetty was to be held as a base for futureoperations. Company I, scheduled to rejoin the 3d Battalion on the 24th, wasordered to take a branch trail to Koejaboe and its jetty, southeast of thefirst jetty. The 2d Battalion was to remain in reserve in the Pim area andalong the track west of that village.

Permission to carry out Colonel Newman's plan came from 41st Divisionheadquarters at 0630 on the 24th, and at 0845 the 3d Battalion moved out. SinceJapanese air action during the night of 23-24 April had succeeded in firing theAmerican ammunition and ration dumps on W Beach 1, the advance of the 186thInfantry had to be made on half-rations, and the troops were ordered toconserve ammunition. Luckily, little enemy opposition was encountered duringthe morning, and by 1100 3d Battalion patrols were within 500 yards of theinitial objective. Light fire from a force of Japanese, estimated at 150, thentemporarily delayed the advance, but the first jetty and its environs weresecured shortly after noon.

It had meanwhile become apparent that the 1st Battalion was too widelydispersed to carry out its assigned support and follow-up roles. Two companiesfollowed along the main track as best they could, but extensive patrolling onthe high ground north of the trail proved necessary because small parties ofJapanese were continually being discovered wandering about on the right flank.While these Japanese parties did not seem aggressive in most cases, ColonelNewman wisely chose to take no chances by leaving his flank unprotected.Companies A and C were again assigned to the arduous patrolling task. The 3dBattalion was now far inland and practically unsupported. General Fullertherefore released the 2d Battalion, until now in division reserve, toColonel Newman's control.

The 2d Battalion pushed rapidly westward from Pim, passed through suchelements of the 1st Battalion as were still on the trail, and took up positionson the right of the 3d Battalion late in the afternoon. The two units then setup night perimeters in the vicinity of the jetty. The 3d Battalion wasestablished along a line running 700 yards inland from Lake Sentani and the 2dBattalion refused the right flank by extending its lines northeast 500 yards tothe right rear. About 1630, Companies A and C rejoined the main body of the 1stBattalion in a night perimeter at the junction of the main Pim-Lake Sentani roadand the track leading to Koejaboe, not yet captured. The 1st Battalion'sposition was about 3,500 swampy yards east of the 2d and 3d Battalions.

During the day the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, R Task ForceReserve, had been transferred from Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay. Its arrivalhad allowed the task force commander to release Company I, 186th Infantry, fromW Beach 3 and the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, from its reserve role.

Amphibious Movement on Lake Sentani

Colonel Newman's plans for the 25th envisaged using his entire regiment ina combined amphibious and overland advance to the airfields, a maneuver nowpossible because the 34th Infantry could free 186th Infantry units from guardduties along the line of communications back to Pim. Colonel Newman ordered the3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, to move west along the main road to Nefaar, sixand one half miles beyond the night bivouac area. The 1st Battalion was to loadon LVT's at the jetty which had been captured the previous afternoon. From thatjetty, the troops were to move by LVT over Lake Sentani to a point on theshore west of Nefaar and, upon landing, help the 1st Battalion to secure thatvillage. Two companies of the 2d Battalion were to clear scattered enemy troopsfrom high ground on the right flank, whence the Japanese had harassed thebattalion's night bivouac. As soon as this task was accomplished, the 2dBattalion would reassemble as regimental reserve and follow the 3d along themain track toward Nefaar. Company I had not reached the 3d Battalion theprevious day and was therefore ordered to operate with the 1st Battalion, atthe perimeter of which it had arrived just before dark. Company B was lent tothe 3d Battalion to bring that unit up to full strength for the advance west.

The 3d Battalion started moving at 0800 on the 25th and by 1000 had marchedalmost 3,000 yards westward against no opposition. The Japanese who had delayedthe advance on the 24th had vanished. Company K, moving to the north of themain

LVT'S CROSSING LAKE SENTANI.Note Fifth Air Force B-25's overhead.

road, flushed the few enemy seen during the morning.

LVT's of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade had now moved up to the jettywhich the 3d Battalion had captured the previous day. There, at 1000, twocompanies of the 1st Battalion loaded on the amphibians and departed forNefaar. No Japanese fire from the shores of Lake Sentani greeted thislandlocked amphibious maneuver, and at 1150 two companies landed at Nefaar. Theremainder of the 1st Battalion moved by LVT to Nefaar later in the day and at1530 the 3d Battalion reached that village after an uneventful march overland.The 2d Battalion closed on the village shortly thereafter.

Vigorous patrolling north and west of Nefaar characterized action the restof the afternoon, during which only slight resistance was encountered. Expectedstrong enemy opposition had not as yet materialized, but before dark a platoonof Company A made a brief reconnaissance of Cyclops Drome, most easterly of thethree Japanese fields on the north shore of Lake Sentani, and reportedevidences of considerable enemy movement and strong defensive positions.Despite these reports, Colonel Newman was confident that his troops would havelittle or no difficulty in securing Cyclops

Drome on the 26th, for he now believed that the enemy had vacated theairfield area.

One of the reasons that the 186th Infantry had not reached the airdromes onthe afternoon of 25 April was that artillery fire was falling on those fields.Some of this fire may have been from the 155-mm. weapons of the 11th or 168thField Artillery Battalions, emplaced on the 24th Division's beaches atTanahmerah Bay, but other artillery fire was undoubtedly from Japanesedual-purpose weapons dug in north of the airfields. Whatever the case,communications difficulties prevented the fire from the 24th Division's areabeing stopped before the time came for the 186th Infantry to set up nightdefenses. The 1st Battalion bivouacked about 1,700 yards west of Nefaar andplaced outposts in high ground 700 yards north of the main trail. The 3dBattalion went into position about 1,000 yards behind the 1st, while the 2dremained at Nefaar for the night.

For the morrow, Colonel Newman ordered the 1st Battalion to seize thenorthwestern half of Cyclops Drome. One company of the 3d was to secure thesoutheastern part of the field and the remainder of the battalion was to act asgeneral reserve. The 2d Battalion was to move by LVT from Nefaar to anotherjetty located about 2,000 yards southeast of Sentani Drome and the village ofIfaar. Pushing rapidly up a trail from the jetty to Ifaar, the battalion was toseize that village and Sentani Drome.

The 1st and 2d Battalions moved out as planned shortly after 0800 on the26th. By 1040 the 1st Battalion had secured Cyclops Drome against noopposition. About 1000, Companies F and G of the 2d Battalion landed againstscattered rifle fire at the jetty below Ifaar, a mile overwater from Nefaar.The rest of the battalion came ashore in the same area in the early afternoon.Advance elements of the 2d Battalion were on Sentani Drome at 1130, and by 1215the battalion commander was able to report that the airfield and its environshad been secured.

During the remainder of the afternoon patrol action around both airfieldsaccounted for a few Japanese stragglers. Opposition throughout the day had beenconspicuous by its absence--the Japanese had disappeared. The 3d Battalionmoved up to the airstrips before dark, and at nightfall the entire 186thInfantry set up a defensive perimeter around Cyclops and Sentani Dromes.Patrols of the 1st Battalion were sent west beyond the fields and at 1645 madecontact with patrols of the 21st Infantry between Weversdorp and HollandiaDrome. This contact completed the pincers movement instituted by the 24th and41st Divisions on 22 April. All important objectives of the R TaskForce had been secured.

Mopping-Up Operations

Although the contact between the 24th and 41st Divisions ended the majortactical phase of the Hollandia operation, it was necessary to clear the areaof scattered enemy troops, attempt to find large organizations of Japaneseforces, and cut enemy escape routes. With these objectives in view,elements of the 186th Infantry reconnoitered the north shores of Lake Sentani,and Poegi and Ase Islands in the lake during 27 April. These and many laterpatrols, most of which were transported by 2d Engineer

Special Brigade LVT's or amphibian 6 x 6 trucks (DUKW's), encounteredfew Japanese in the area covered. Other troops of the 186th Infantry flushedabout 400 Japanese on Hill 1000, approximately 4,000 yards northeast of CyclopsDrome. On the 29th, with the help of fire from the 205th Field ArtilleryBattalion, the 1st Battalion seized the hill, killing or dispersing the enemy.Thereafter the 186th Infantry patrolled into the Cyclops Mountains north andnortheast of the airdromes.

The 162d Infantry's principal action after clearing the environs ofHollandia was to seize Cape Soeadja, at the northwest limits of Humboldt Bay,on 27 April. The regiment continued patrolling in the Hollandia area until 6May when it was relieved by the 34th Infantry.

The latter unit was greatly dispersed. Some elements patrolled around Pimand along the road inland to support the drive of the 186th Infantry, while the2d Battalion moved to the Hollekang-Cape Djar area, east of Humboldt Bay.Ultimately, the entire 2d Battalion moved to Tami Drome, on the coast six mileseast of Hollekang, to protect engineers who were repairing the Tami strip. Thebattalion later established an outpost at Goya, about five miles inland southof Hollekang, in order to halt Japanese movements in that area. The 1st and 3dBattalions furnished guards for supply dumps, working parties at the beaches,truck drivers, and construction personnel for a number of minor projects.

The 21st Infantry sent a reinforced company to Marneda, about five milessouthwest of Lake Sentani, to establish a patrol base, and another company helda base at Iris Bay, northwest of Tanahmerah Bay, for a short time. {SeeMap 2.)The 19th Infantry sent patrols overland to the coast north of the Cyclops Mountains to secure trails running through the mountains to theDépapré-Lake Sentani road or the airfields. Other elements of the regiment weretransported by 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment boats to Demta Bay, westof Tanahmerah Bay, and maintained an outpost there for some days. Still otherunits of the 24th Division probed overland from the western end of Lake Sentanito Genjem, a main inland trail junction through which passed many Japanese whowere attempting to escape westward from the Hollandia area. The 24th CavalryReconnaissance Troop, later reinforced by Company B, 21st Infantry, patrolledalong the western, southwestern, and southern shores of Lake Sentani.

By 6 June the mopping-up efforts of the R Task Force had succeededin clearing all but a few Japanese stragglers from the immediate area of theairfields, Hollandia, Tanahmerah Bay, and Tami.

Logistic Problems of the R Task Force

Evening of 26 April found the R Task Force in an excellent positiontactically. The principal objective--the inland airfields--had been seizedwithin four days despite radical changes in the original scheme of maneuver.Japanese opposition had been negligible and in much less strength thanexpected; there was no evidence that any large-scale enemy counterattack couldor would be made against the Hollandia area; and land-based air support for theR Task Force was being made available from fields captured at

Aitape, 125 miles to the southeast. On the other hand, the restricted beachesat Tanahmerah Bay and the poor condition of the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road gaveno promise that supplies for the 24th Division would be adequate for some timeto come. Congestion on the beaches at Humboldt Bay, the rapid deterioration ofthe Pim-Lake Sentani road, and a disastrous fire on W Beach 1 during thenight of 23-24 April made supply of the 41st Division difficult. In brief, thelogistic problems of the entire R Task Force had assumed amazingproportions.

The Fire

The units moving ashore at Humboldt Bay on 22 April found Japanese suppliescovering W Beaches 1 and 2. Air bombing and naval support fire prior to thelandings had scattered these enemy supplies all over the northern sandspit,while smoke and flames issued from much of the matériel as a result of thebombardment. A complicated dispersal problem for the supplies of the 41stDivision and its attached units was thereby created.

The 116th Engineer Battalion, ashore shortly after H Hour, immediately setto work clearing W Beach 1. In accordance with R Task Force plans,the battalion endeavored to construct an exit road from the beach to thePim-Hollandia track, but the terrain north of the beach proved more rugged thananticipated and the swamp northwest of the beach more formidable than expected.Rapid road building was impossible and the project was temporarily abandonedwhile all efforts were turned to unloading D Day shipping. On D plus 1, more troops, vehicles, andsupplies began pouring onto W Beaches 1 and 2. Only slow progress could bemade on exit roads, and beach congestion increased. The situation was nothelped by the necessity for basing both antiaircraft and field artillery unitsalong the northern sandspit. Some relief was effected during the day as boatsof the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment began ferrying a few suppliesdirectly from the transports to Pim and transferring more there from the twoprincipal unloading beaches.

Shortly after dark on the night of 23-24 April, a lone Japanese aircraft,apparently guided by still smoldering fires in old Japanese dumps, dropped astick of bombs on W Beach 1. One of these bombs, landing at the edge of aJapanese ammunition dump below Pancake Hill, started a series of conflagrationswhich soon spread to an American gasoline dump nearby and thence to otherR Task Force equipment. Efforts to stop the fires during the nightproved fruitless, for intense heat and continuous explosions drove back troopswho tried to put out the flames or salvage matériel. The fires raged all nightand through most of the next day.

Much confusion resulted from the fires. Shortly before midnight it wasrumored at 41st Division headquarters that a Japanese force of unknown strengthhad landed on W Beach 1 or 2 and possibly on W Beach 4. This erroneousreport was relayed to forward units. But even after this rumor had beenproved false, both the 162d and

186th Infantry Regiments were ordered to cease all forward movement, go onhalf-rations, and make every attempt to conserve ammunition. As daylightcame and the situation at the beaches became clearer, the 186th Infantry wasinstructed to continue its advance inland, but was again ordered to issue onlyhalf-rations and to continue all efforts to conserve ammunition and othersupplies. The 162d Infantry was allowed to execute its plans to seize the townof Hollandia but after that was to limit its operations to patrolling anddefensive measures until further notice.

The fire had a far worse effect on the logistical situation than on thetactical. Well over 60 percent of the rations and ammunition landed through Dplus 1 was burned or blown up during the following two days. The equivalent ofeleven LST loads of supplies was lost, while twenty-four men were killed andabout one hundred wounded or injured as a result of the fires andexplosions.

General Eichelberger immediately radioed to A Force a request forduplication of all bulk stores which had been unloaded from LST's at HumboldtBay on D Day and D plus 1. It was further requested that these loadings be sentforward with the first reinforcement convoy, scheduled to arrive on D plus8. When these instructions reached the R Task Force's G-4 liaisongroups at the staging areas in eastern New Guinea, ships of the D plus 8 convoy were already being loaded not only with supplies but also withservice troops. In order that enough matériel might be sent forward to replacethe eleven LST loads which had been lost, the troop space was reassigned tosupplies. A good deal of confusion was caused in the rear bases by the speed atwhich decisions had to be made, lack of traffic control at the loading area,absence of ammunition data except for dead-weight tonnage, and incompleteunderstanding of time and space requirements by those responsible for the newloading plans.

Some of the paper work for shipping plans, especially for resupply echelons,had apparently not been completed, and the R Task Force G-4 laterreported: ". . . the Task Force was extremely handicapped by the lack of stowageplans and manifests on shipping in the harbor and awaiting call forward. Thisresulted in the loss of valuable time in unloading urgently needed cargo andthe calling forward of most ships was like reaching in a grab bag".

As a result of inadequate information and the confusion in the stagingareas, it was impossible for the G-4 Section to ascertain exactly what typesand quantities of ammunition arrived with the hurriedly reloaded D plus 8replacement ships. It can be assumed, however, that all ammunition losses wereadequately replaced at least after D plus 12, by which time the end of Japaneseresistance in the Hollandia area had eliminated the ammunition problem. Even though the ammunition resupply problem had been solved without unduedifficulty, it was the opinion of the G-4 that the R

Task Force had been extremely fortunate: "Had the enemy attack from theair been in force, the loss of life and property would have probably delayedthe operation for a considerable period of time."

But the general congestion at Humboldt Bay was not improved for some time.On D plus 2, with fires still raging on the northern spit, R Task Forceheadquarters, the task force reserve, and miscellaneous service units, togetherwith their supplies and equipment, arrived from Tanahmerah Bay. In addition,five LST's of the D plus 2 convoy from eastern New Guinea bases hove into view.There were now eleven LST's awaiting unloading in Humboldt Bay, and the bestbeaches, W 1 and 2, could not be used. Beaches at Hollandia and otherpoints around the shores of Challenger Cove were obstructed by reefs. Extensivedemolitions would be necessary before LST's could use that area. W Beach 4,at Pim, was inaccessible to LST's. The only remaining area was W Beach 3and the shore line to its south along the Cape Tjeweri sandspit.

W Beach 3 was ill suited for beaching LST's and there were someobjections from Admiral William M. Fechteler's Central Attack Group to RTask Force plans for using that beach. But the admiral realized that many ofthe available LST's had to be unloaded promptly so that they could be returnedon schedule to the Central Pacific Area, whence they had been borrowed. He alsoknew that the cargo aboard some LST's was badly needed ashore to replace thesupplies destroyed on W Beaches 1 and 2. He therefore decided to use WBeach 3 until W Beaches 1 and 2 were again safe. Admiral Fechteler orderedhis LST commander, Capt. Roger Cutler (USN), to run the LST's into W Beach 3 from the northern side ofHumboldt Bay at full speed in order to ram the ships as high as possible on thesandspit. Captain Cutler's LST skippers did such a good job that the CentralAttack Group later had considerable difficulty retracting many LST's from thebeach.

Supplies and equipment unloaded at W Beach 3 were transferred by smallcraft to Pim, where, since very limited dispersal areas were available, abottleneck soon formed. The road inland from Pim, barely passable for wheeledvehicles on D Day, was rapidly deteriorating under continuous heavy truckingand rain. Finally, demands for the use of lighterage between W Beach 3 andPim far exceeded the available supply of small craft. Some additionalcomplications arose from disagreements between naval and engineer specialbrigade units regarding the employment of small boats. Luckily, ample manuallabor was available, especially after the arrival of the 34th Infantry andvarious service units from Tanahmerah Bay. LST's were unloaded rapidly at WBeach 3, and work around the clock kept the unloading areas at Pim clear enoughfor steady use of the limited beach and small jetty there. W Beaches 1 and2 were usable again on D plus 8.

By the morning of 25 April an inventory of supplies could be taken. With thesupplies and ammunition landed from the D plus 2 convoy and those transferredfrom Tanahmerah Bay, the situation appeared brighter. During the afternoonGeneral

Eichelberger was able to report to A Force that three and one half units offire for all weapons were on hand and that enough rations were available tofeed all troops for six days.

Supplying Forces Inland

The problem of supplying the troops on the Lake Sentani plain did not endwith the seizure of the airfields on 26 April. For some time thereafter the24th Division continued to receive some of its supplies by laborious hand-carryfrom Tanahmerah Bay, but this relatively inefficient method did not getadequate quantities of food forward. The division's inland troops were onhalf-rations much of the time. Despite continuous work by engineers, the 41stDivision's main supply line--the Pim-Lake Sentani road--could not stand thedemands made upon it, and from time to time sections of the road had to beclosed so that heavy equipment could make repairs on it.

Early half-successful airdrops had added little to the supplies of thetroops inland, but air supply was the only feasible method of supporting theinland forces. Cyclops Drome was ready for limited employment on 27 April, andHollandia Drome could be used by 1 May. But the mere availability of thesefields did not solve the supply problem. First, weather prevented regular airsupply runs for a while and, second, it was initially somewhat difficult toassemble the needed supplies at rear bases, from which supplies were already ontheir way forward to Hollandia by water or were being loaded aboard ship forwater transportation. Neither time nor planes were available to carry out aprogram of unloading the ships, reloading their cargoes on aircraft, and flying thesupplies to the Hollandia fields. This difficulty was overcome in part by theseizure of Tami Drome, on the coast six miles east of Humboldt Bay.

Tami Drome was ready for use by transport aircraft on 3 May. From unloadingpoints at Humboldt Bay, small craft lightered supplies to the mouth of the TamiRiver, whence trucks hauled the matériel to Tami Drome. From that field C-47aircraft shuttled supplies to Cyclops and Hollandia Dromes, probably executingone of the shortest field-to-field air supply missions on record.

But these efforts at local air supply proved inadequate, and with no markedimprovement of road conditions the supply situation for troops inlanddeteriorated rapidly. The 186th Infantry, for instance, subsisted for three orfour days principally on rice and canned fish from captured Japanese rationdumps. The 24th Division was in like straits. Finally, all local measuresbecame insufficient to meet the needs of the inland infantry units, to saynothing of the thousands of engineer troops who began pouring into the airfieldarea on 27 April. Consequently, on 4 May, the R Task Force requestedthat 20,000 rations be flown daily to the Hollandia airfields from eastern NewGuinea Services of Supply bases. This particular phase of the air transport wasbegun immediately and ceased

about 15 May, by which time local overland transportation had greatly improved.

Many expedients were employed to get the roads into shape both for supplymovements and to send inland the heavy engineering equipment that was needed torepair the three airfields. To avoid some of the worst stretches of thePim-Lake Sentani road, especially those along the north shore of the lake,overwater movements were executed. Small boats and amphibian vehicles werelaboriously hauled to Koejaboe (captured on 25 April) from Humboldt Bay, andfrom the Koejaboe jetty supplies and equipment were transported across the laketo Nefaar. Meanwhile, engineers kept up steady work on the road inland fromPim. Landslides, mud, and lack of heavy equipment hindered rapid reconstructionof the Dépapré-Lake Sentani road, over which few attempts were made to movesupplies after 26 April.

In order to organize and control supply activities, the R Task Forceset up supply "Sub-Sectors" at Tami Drome, Cape Pie, Cape Tjeweri, and Pim. Theofficers in charge of each Sub-Sector were made responsible for clearing thebeaches, making the most efficient use of available lighterage, speeding theflow of supplies inland, and controlling local troop movements. Thisdecentralization of responsibility from the task force G-4 relieved thatsection of burdensome detail work and operating functions, permitting it torevert to the normal role of planning, overseeing, and co-ordinating. As timepassed, roads were repaired or new ones constructed, air supply became automatic, shipping difficulties werestraightened out, and the supply situation gradually improved.

Although the terrain and the unlucky bomb hit on W Beach 1 did much tocomplicate the supply problems of the R Task Force, other explanationsfor the difficulties are to be found in the task force G-4 Section's reports:"Operation 'G' [Hollandia] was a logistical nightmare due primarily to the factthat too much was thrown too soon into too small an area. Under thecircumstances, it is felt that the Operation progressed far more smoothly thanshould be reasonably expected." And again: "Operation G almost completely'bogged down' due to the fact that in both objective areas [Tanahmerah andHumboldt Bays] many more vehicles, pieces of heavy equipment, and supplies werelanded on the first three days than could be cleared from the beaches." What might have happened at Hollandia had the Japanese been prepared can onlybe surmised.

The End of the Operation

The R Task Force retained control over supply and construction in theHollandia area until 6 June. During this period the task force, under thedirection of A Force, initiated that construction which ultimately resultedin the development of Hollandia into a major base from which many futureoperations were supported. The R Task Force paid particular attention toairdromes, roads, docks, headquarters buildings, and dispersal areas. On 6 Junethe Services of

Supply assumed responsibility for the continuation of this development. AtHollandia the Services of Supply established Base G, under which constructionwas speeded. Major headquarters that ultimately moved to Hollandia includedGeneral Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area, United States Army Forcesin the Far East, Allied Air Forces, Allied Land Forces, the U.S. Seventh Fleet,the Fifth Air Force, A Force (Sixth Army), and the U.S. Eighth Army.

After 6 June patrolling in the area continued, much of it by the 24thDivision, which was later succeeded by other units. By the 6th, Americancasualties amounted to 124 men killed, 1,057 wounded, and 28 missing. Duringthe same period, 611 Japanese were captured and over 3,300 killed.Most of the Japanese losses occurred after 26 April (the day the airfields werecaptured) during mopping up, and the bulk of the enemy were killed in smallgroups. The pace of the mopping-up operations is illustrated by the fact that800 Japanese were killed during the week ending 6 June.

In exchange for each American killed or wounded, to 6 June, the enemy lostfour men. For this price, the Allies secured a forward area which lay in theheart of territory previously held by the Japanese. The Hollandia area was toprove an excellent air, naval, and logistic base from which future operationsin western New Guinea were to be staged and protected, and from which a largepart of the force which invaded the Philippines in October 1944 set sail.

Footnotes

1. Information in this and the following subsection is from: 24th Inf Div[N Landing Force] Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 56-79, 223-24; 24th Div G-3Jnl, Ho1landia; 21st Inf Jnl, Hollandia; 19th Inf Jnl, Hollandia; RTF G-3 JnlHollandia; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 24; Ltr, CG2d ESB to Comdr Force, 24 Apr 44, sub: Observations, D Day, R Beach, in AG-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44; draft MS History of the 2d Engineer SpecialBrigade, Ch. VII, "The R Task Force," pp. 13-20, copy in OCMH files; CoA, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Mar Div, Opns Rpt, 15 Apr-13 May 44, pp. 1-2: RTF Opns RptHollandia, p. 46.

2. From a mine sweeper (YMS) accompanying the Western Attack Group. The menworked under the direction of the Naval Beach Party commander.

3. There being no possible way to employ the tanks in their proper roles in theTanahmerah Bay area, they merely bivouacked in that region until 2 May, whenthey were sent to Humboldt Bay. There, the services of the tank company werenot needed, and on 4 May the company left the Hollandia area via LST to rejointhe rest of the 1st Tank Battalion on Pavuvu Island in the Solomons on 13 May.

4. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 46.

5. Unless otherwise indicated, information onthe 24th Division's drive to the airfields is based on: 24th Div Opns RptHollandia, pp. 60-100, 180-82, and 191-93; 24th Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 21st InfOpns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 23; 21st Inf Jnl Hollandia; Notes, 27 Oct 50 and 15 Dec50, provided by Lt Col Chester A. Dahlen [ex-CO 3d Bn 21st Inf] and Mr.Clarence E. Short [ex-S-3, 21st Inf], in OCMH files; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles B.Lyman to Gen Ward, 23 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. The bulk of Company A,21st Infantry, after securing R Beach 1 and finding the trail entrance,remained on the beach until 24 April.

6. One report states that these vehicles were light tanks, but all other sourcesdescribe them as armored cars or trucks.

7. The information on the airdrop on 26 April was supplied to the author on 24May 1949 by Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen, Air Historical Group, Headquarters,USAF. C-47's could not be used for the transport because the nearest Allied airbases were beyond practicable round trip range of such aircraft. While the B-25mission did not fill all the needs of the forward battalions, other rationsbrought over the trail on the 26th, coupled with larger airdrops on the 27thand succeeding days, saved the situation from becoming critical.

8. This final paragraph is based on 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 80; 186thInf Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 8; 21st Inf Jnl Hollandia. These sources disagree asto the locations of the meeting between the 24th and 41st Division units on theafternoon of 26 April, the 186th Infantry report putting it west of Weversdorpand the 21st Infantry journal placing it east of that farm. From a close checkof the timing of all reports concerning this contact, it seems that a pointsome place between Weversdorp and the eastern edge of Hollandia Drome iscorrect.

9. L LF FO 1, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 Annex to 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia.

10. CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, pp. 5, 26-27; CTG77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, pp. 3-4.

11. Information in this and the following subsection is based on: 41st Div OpnsRpt Hollandia, pp. 2-7; 162d Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 1-3; 41st Div G-3 JnlHollandia; 162d Inf Jnl Hollandia; 186th Inf Jnl Hollandia; draft MS 2d ESBHist, Ch. VII, pp. 7-8, 30-31.

12. Information in this and the following two subsections is based principallyon: 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-11; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 9-12;41st Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 186th Inf Jnl Hollandia, 186th Inf Opns RptHollandia, pp. 1-8; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp. 32-34.

13. This subsection is based principally upon: RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p.14; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 11-16; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp.8-12; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 85-92, 98-110; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch.VII, pp. 23-24.

14. Details concerning mopping up in the area west of Lake Sentani after 6June are to be found inChapter IV below.

15. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19; CTF 77 Opns Rpt TanahmerahBay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 28.

16. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19, 55.

17. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 10,19; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 6-7; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 4.

18. Msg, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 2100, 23 Apr 44, in 186th Inf S-1 Jnl Hollandia.

19. Msgs, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 0400 and 0545, 24 Apr 44, in 186th Inf S-1 JnlHollandia.

20. 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 7.

21. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp.11, 19; Rad, CTG 77.2 to CTF 77, 23 Apr 44, in A Jnl Hollandia, 23-24 Apr44.

22. Rad, RTF to A, 5619, 24 Apr 44, in A G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26Apr 44; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 19.

23. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 37, 65-66.

24.Ibid., p. 40.

25.Ibid., pp. 37,65-66.

26. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 36.

27. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; Ltr, Adm Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50,no sub, in OCMH files.

28. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; CTF 77 Opns RptTanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, pp. 28-29; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay,p. 4.

29. Rad, RTF to A, 0304, 25 Apr 44, and Rad, RTF to A, 2050, 25 Apr 44,both in A G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44.

30. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 14, 19-20; A Force Opns RptHollandia-Aitape, pp. 48-51; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 88-89, 153-54.

31.This information on the 186th Infantry was supplied to the author by ColonelNewman, ex-commanding officer of the 186th Infantry, who read and made notes onthis and other draft chapters of the volume during March 1950. These notes arehereafter cited as Newman Notes. Copy in OCMH files.

32. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20. It is the author's remembrance thatthe good road which was finally built from the airfields to Tanahmerah Bay wascompleted in July 1944. This road, an impressive engineering feat, led toSeventh Fleet fuel installations at Tanahmerah Bay, where PT boats were based.

33. RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 20, 39.

34.Ibid., p. 41.

35.Ibid., p. 36.

36. A Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p. 54.

37. A Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 31, 58; A Force, G-2 WklyRpt 43, 31 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files.