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Title: The British Campaign in France and Flanders, Vol. VAuthor: Arthur Conan Doyle* A Project Gutenberg of Australia eBook *eBook No.: 1202591h.htmlLanguage: EnglishDate first posted: July 2012Most recent update: July 2012This eBook was produced by: Roy GlashanProject Gutenberg of Australia eBooks are created from printed editionswhich are in the public domain in Australia, unless a copyright noticeis included. We do NOT keep any eBooks in compliance with a particularpaper edition.Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check thecopyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing thisfile.This eBook is made available at no cost and with almost no restrictionswhatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the termsof the Project Gutenberg of Australia License which may be viewed online athttp://gutenberg.net.au/licence.htmlTo contact Project Gutenberg of Australia go to http://gutenberg.net.au
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The prospects of the Allies—Great dangers from theRussian collapse—State of the British line—Huge Germanpreparations—Eve of the Great Offensive
Disposal of the Third Army—Attack upon the ThirdDivision—Upon the Thirty-fourth Division—Upon the Fifty-ninthDivision—Terrible losses—Loss of Henin Hill—Arrival ofThirty-first Division—Hard fighting of the Fortieth Division—TheEast Yorkshires at Ervillers—The 10th West Yorks atMoyenneville—Recapture of Ayette—Grand resistance of Third,Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions before Arras—Final German check in thenorth
Attack on Sixth and Fifty-first Divisions —Engagement of the Twenty-fifth and Forty-first Divisions—Attack onForty-seventh, Sixty-third, Second, and Nineteenth Divisions—The Germantorrent—Serious situation—Arrival of Sixty-secondDivision—Fighting before Albert—Gallant defence by TwelfthDivision—Arrival of the New Zealanders, of the Australians, of theThirty-fifth Division—Equilibrium
The Fifth Army front—The story of a Redoubt —Attack upon Congreve's Seventh Corps—Upon Watts' NineteenthCorps—Upon Maxse's Eighteenth Corps—Upon Butler's ThirdCorps—Terrific pressure—Beginning of the Retreat—Losses ofGuns
Problems before General Gough—His masterful action— Arrival of Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and FiftiethDivisions—Retreat of Tudor's Ninth Scottish Division—Destruction ofthe South Africans—Defence of the Somme—Arrival of the EighthDivision—Desperate fighting—The Carey line—Death of GeneralFeetham—"Immer fest daran"—Advance, Australia!—Greatachievement of General Watts
Retreat of the Sixty-first Division—The Gloucestersat Beauvais — Fall of Ham—Retreat of the Thirtieth and Thirty-sixthDivisions—Great privations of the men—Fine feat at LeQuesnoy—Summary of the experience of Maxse's Corps
Movement across the Crozat Canal—Fight of the 173rdBrigade—Forcing of the Canal Line—Arrival of the French—Fightof Frières Wood—Splendid work of the Cavalry—Loss ofNoyon—Final equilibrium—General retrospect of the Battle
The last waves of the storm—The Twelfth Division atAlbert— The Forty-seventh Division at Aveluy Wood—The Australiansin the south—Capture of Villeis-Bietonneux by the Germans—Recaptureby Australians and Eighth Division—Fierce fighting—The first turnof the tide
The Flanders front—Great German onslaught —Disaster of the Portuguese—Splendid stand at Givenchy of the Fifty-fifthDivision—Hard fight of the Fortieth Division—Loss of theLys—Desperate resistance of the Fiftieth Division—Thirty-fourthDivision is drawn into the Battle—Attack in the north upon the Ninth,Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions—British retreat—Generalsurvey of the situation
Desperate situation—Sir Douglas Haig's "Win or Die"message—Epic of the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck—Arrival ofFirst Australian Division—Splendid services of Thirty-thirdDivision—Loss of Armentières, Bailleul, and NeuveÉglise—The First Division at Givenchy—Fall ofKemmel—Battle of Ridge Wood—Great loss ofground—Equilibrium
The rest cure of the Aisne—Attack upon the FiftiethDivision—Upon the Twenty-first— Fifth Battery R.F.A.—GloriousDevons—Adventure of General Rees—Retreat across theAisne—Over the Vesle—Arrival of Nineteenth Division—Desperatefighting—Success of 4th Shropshires—General Pelle'stribute—General prospect of the Allies midway through 1918
THIS fifth volume deals with one of the most tremendousepisodes in history, when the vigour of the German attack and the desperateresistance of the British both on the Somme and in Flanders, held an awestruckworld in suspense. A million men released from the Russian front, rolled acrossEurope and, swelling that great tide which was already banked up before theBritish breakwater, it washed over all the front line barriers and threatenedat one time to sweep down to the sea. The account of how the British Army, uponwhich incomparably the greater pressure fell, rose to the occasion and firstslowed and then held the terrific flood is one of the most wonderful ofmilitary epics. At the same time every credit must be given to the loyalty ofthe French commanders who, while guarding their own extended lines, endeavouredto spare all possible help to their hard-pressed Allies. This volume carriesthe story of the German attack to its close. The next and final one willdescribe the enormous counter-attack of the Allies leading up to their finalvictory.
The Chronicler has been faced by many obstacles in endeavouring to preserveboth accuracy and historical proportion while writing contemporary history. Hewould gratefully acknowledge that his critics in the press have shown a kindlyindulgence, which arises, no doubt, from an appreciation of these difficulties.There has, however, been one conspicuous exception to which he would desire tocall attention, since a large question of literary etiquette is involved. Fromthe beginning a series of unflattering and anonymous articles have appeared inThe Times Literary Supplement, commenting adversely upon each volume inturn, and picking out the pettiest details for animadversion. Upon enquiry,these articles—in whole or part—are admitted to have been writtenby the Hon. J.W. Fortescue, who is himself the official historian of the War.On being remonstrated with, this gentleman could not be brought to see that itis not fitting that he should make anonymous attacks, howeverbona fide,upon a brother author who is working upon the same subject and is therefore inthe involuntary position of being a humble rival.
Having stated the facts they may be left to the judgment of the public.
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE.
Crowborough, May 1, 1919.
The prospects of the Allies—Great dangers from theRussian collapse—State of the British line—Huge Germanpreparations—Eve of the Great Offensive
THE New Year of 1918, the fourth of the world war, opened withchequered prospects for the Allies. Upon all subsidiary fields of action thedevelopments were good. In Palestine, General Allenby, the victor of Arras, hadshown himself to be a fine soldier upon the larger scale, and. had fought hisway up the old highway of history which leads from Egypt by Gaza to Jerusalem.Homely crusaders in tattered khaki stood where once Godfrey de Bouillon and hischivalry had worshipped before the shrine of religion, and the cavalry ofAustralia, the yeomen of the Shires, and the infantry of London won once morethe ground which Richard of the Lion Heart with his knights and bowmen hadcontested in the long ago. Surely in all the strange permutations andcombinations of the world war there could be none more striking than that! ByApril the British force covered all the northern approaches to the city andextended its right wing to the Jordan, where our Arab allies in the land ofMoab were pushing the Turks back along the line of the Damascus railway.
On another road of world conquest, that from Bagdad to Nineveh, the Britishand Indian columns were also both active and victorious. The knightly Maude hadperished from cholera contracted by his own courtesy in drinking a profferedcup of village water. His successor, General Marshall, formerly his Chief ofStaff, and as such conversant with his aims and his methods, carried on bothone and the other, moving his men north until the spectator who compared theirnumbers with the immensity of the spaces around them, was appalled at theapparent loneliness of their position. By May his raiding cavalry were not farfrom the Turkish supply depot of Mosul, where the barren mounds, extending overleagues of desert, proclaim both the greatness and the ruin of Nineveh.Salonica continued in its usual condition of uneasy and malarial somnolence,but gratifying reports came of the belated rally of the Greeks, who, actingwith the French, won a smart little victory against their Bulgarian enemiesupon May 31. German East Africa had at last been cleared of German forces, butGeneral Lettow-Vorbeck, to whom we cannot deny remarkable fortitude andleadership, wandered with his piebald commands in the depths of the forests andmarshes of Mozambique, still evading his inevitable capture, and master only ofthe ground on which he camped.
But these distant campaigns had only a remote and indirect effect upon thewar in Europe. Here the late winter and the early spring of 1918 saw thebalance tilted against the British and their comrades in the West; throughcauses over which they had no control. Russia had completely broken down. Inher case, with a rapidity which made it difficult to realise the situation,autocracy had changed to liberty, liberty to license, and license to chaos. Theabsolute dissolution of all fighting power was partly due to national folly andpartly to deliberate treachery. The leaders of the extreme party had arrivedfrom Switzerland with a free pass granted by the German authorities. Instantlythey set to work to subvert the comparatively sane government with which thename of Kerensky is chiefly associated. Lenin and his associates seized thereins of power and guided their mad team up to and over the precipice. It wasclear to any observer that such a frenzy of insanity must have its reaction,and great pity was felt for those more honourable Russians who were compelledto look on at the degradation of their country. The new super-democracy beganits career by repudiating its debts of honour, and by betraying all the otherdemocracies of the world. Such conditions could not last; but meanwhile theGermans overran the country at their pleasure, practically annexed both Finlandand the Ukraine, and helped themselves to harvests, warships, or anything elsethey might desire. Chivalrous little Romania, with the foe in front and thetraitor in the rear, was compelled to make such hard terms as she might —surely one of the most bitter tragedies of history.
As a result of this huge defection the whole force of Germany and ofAustria, together with a good deal of captured Russian artillery, was availablefor the Western war, and from November to March an endless succession of trooptrains were bearing the divisions which had extended from the Baltic to thesouthern frontiers of Russia, in order to thicken the formidable array alreadymarshalled across France. A great Austrian army assembled on the line of thePiave, where the Italians had formed their new front, while a second force inthe mountains upon their flank seemed to hang suspended like an avalanche,ready at any instant to crash down into the valleys. In spite of this imminentdanger the situation was so threatening in France that half of the British andFrench force in Italy had to be recalled, while the gallant Italians actuallysent some divisions of their own best troops to aid the Allies in the morevital theatre of war. It was not only the vast concentration of infantry whichformed the immediate menace, but it was the addition to the German gun power,in which the Austrians greatly assisted. The enemy was acting also uponinternal lines and with excellent radiating communications, so that byassembling large bodies in certain central points he could hurl them againstany portion of a long arc of the Allied line and depend upon several days ofbattle before the reinforcements could intervene. This, as it proved, was avery great advantage. He had also used his Russian experiences to initiate andimprove a new form of attack by which he was confident, with a confidence whichproved to be well justified, that he could certainly make a deep impressionupon the Allied line, and turn the war, for a time at least, into one of openmovement. Such was the very favourable position of the German army at theopening of the tremendous campaign of 1918, which was enhanced by the fact thatthey had reduced to slavery the population in their rear, and had thus gained avery solid present advantage at the cost of a universal hatred and execrationof which no man now living will see the end. In the hope of being a nation ofvictors they took steps which will brand them as a nation of monsters so longas history is read—a nation with modern minds but with worse thanmediaeval souls.
The Allies were not without their consolations, though they lay rather inthe future than in the present. Their veteran armies, though somewhatoutnumbered, had done so well in the offensive of the year before that they hadgood reason to believe that, acting upon the defensive, they would either holdthe German onslaught, or at worst inflict such losses that they would graduallybring them to an equilibrium. Neither France nor Britain had called upon itslast reserves to the same extent as Germany, and behind both was the mightypower of America. Up to date the American forces landed in France had not beensufficiently trained or numerous to influence the course of events, but fromthe spring onwards there was a steady flow, and hardly a day elapsed withoutone or more transports laden with troops arriving in the British or Frenchports. The men were of splendid spirit and physique, and the mere sight of themrevived the weary souls of those who had fought the hard fight so long. It wasthe knowledge of these reinforcements and the constant drafts from Britainwhich stiffened men's courage and steeled their breasts in the desperate daysto come.
Turning our eyes now from the general prospect and concentrating ourattention upon the dispositions of the British army, it may be said that theranks had been filled once more after the very expensive fighting of theautumn. Divisions were, however, weaker than before for, following the Germanmodel, one battalion had been taken out of each brigade, so that in future adivision consisted of nine ordinary units and one pioneer. Of the six divisionslent to Italy three had been brought back in view of the German menace. Theline still ran from Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele in the north along thefamiliar curve by La Bassé and Lens to the east of Vimy Ridge, andthence along the first Hindenburg Line, with the one six-mile breach in frontof Cambrai. The Third Army, under Sir Julian Byng, covered the ground betweenArras and Cambrai, whilst the Fifth, under Sir Hubert Gough, carried it southfrom that point. His junction with the French was an indeterminate one and wastwice moved to the south, the second move on February 15 carrying his rightwing across the Oise as far south as Barisis, eight miles beyond LaFère. There is no doubt that in lengthening his line to this extent SirDouglas Haig took on more ground than his troops could be reasonably expectedto hold, and that General Gough was given a hard task. It was done, as wasshown in a subsequent debate, against the better judgment of the British at theurgent behest of M. Clemenceau. We must remember, however, that our Allies hadfrequently taken risks in order to help us, and that it was for us toreciprocate even though it might occasionally, as in this instance, lead totrouble. There was a tendency at the time for soldiers and politicians to putthe blame upon each other, whereas all were equally the victims of the realcause, which was the crushing burden placed upon us by the defection of ourAlly. It is easy to be wise after the event, but it was impossible to tell withany certainty where the impending blow might fall, and M. Clemenceau was verynaturally anxious about the French line in Champagne, which was strengthened bythis extension of the British flank. There is in truth no need for mutualreproach, as everyone acted for the best under the almost intolerablecircumstances imposed by the new conditions.
Before referring in detail to the tremendous storm which was visibly bankingup in the East, and which broke upon March 21 along the British lines from theScarpe to the Oise, some allusion should be made to one or two sharp Germanattacks in the extreme north, by which the enemy endeavoured to draw theattention of the Allies away from the district in which their first real attackwas planned. In the first of these, delivered upon March 8 to the south ofHouthulst Forest, in the area formerly occupied by the Second Army, the Germanstormers, attacking on a mile of front, gained a footing in the advancedtrenches over a space of 500 yards, but were driven out again and past theirown front line by a spirited counter-attack. The losses of the Thirty-sixthReserve Division, who carried out the operation, were considerable, and theirgains were nil. The second attack was made upon the same evening in theneighbourhood of Polderhoek Château, to the south of the Ypres front.Here again some trench elements were secured in the first rush, but wereentirely regained by the 10th K.R.R. and 13th Fusiliers of the 111th Brigade,who restored the line. Neither attempt was serious, but they were operations ona considerably larger scale than any others during the winter. These attackswere delivered upon the front of Jacob's Second Corps, which belonged toRawlinson's Fourth Army, but within a few days Plumer had returned from Italy,and he, with the Second British Army, took over this sector once again.
We must now turn to the long stretch from in the north to La Fère inthe south, a front of fifty miles, upon which the great German blow was aboutto fall. It is said that after a tour of the whole line General Ludendorffdetermined upon this as being the most favourable region for a grand attack.Granting that for general motives of policy the assault should be on theBritish rather than on the French army, it is clear that he could have come tono other decision since Flanders at that time of year might have been a morass,and the rest of the line was to a large extent upon commanding ground. On theother hand the desolate country which had been already occupied and abandonedby the Germans was in front of their new advance, and it was likely that thiswould act as a shock-absorber and take the momentum off a victorious advancebefore it could reach any point of vital strategic importance. The German Staffscepis, however, to have placed great confidence upon their secrecy, theirnumbers, and their new methods. Their ambitious plan was to break right throughto Amiens, to seize the line of the Somme so as to divide the Allied armies,and then to throw their weight to right or to left as might seem best, the onemovement threatening the Channel ports and the other Paris. Their actualsuccess, though it was considerable, fell so far short of their real intentionsthat disappointment rather than triumph must have been their prevailingemotion. Looking first upon their side of the line one can appreciate in ageneral way the efficient methods which they took to ensure success. The troopshad been exercised in the back areas during the whole winter in the new arts ofattack, which will be more fully indicated when the battle opens. They werethen assembled at various railway junctions, such as Valenciennes, Maubeuge,Wassigny, and Vervins, sufficiently far from the front to escape directobservation. Then for seven nights in successive marches the troops werebrought forward, finally reaching the front lines on the night before theattack, while the guns, the mine-throwers, and the munition dumps had alreadybeen prepared. The whole affair was upon a gigantic scale, for sixty divisions,or half a million of infantry, were thrown into the battle upon the first day,with half as many in immediate reserve. Secrecy was preserved by every possibleprecaution, though the British aeroplanes, casting down their flare lights uponcrowded roads, gave few hopes that it could be sustained. Three of the mostfamous generals in the German service were in immediate charge of theoperations. General Otto von Below, the victor of the Italian disaster, withthe Seventeenth Army in the north; General von Marwitz, who had distinguishedhimself at Cambrai, with the Second Army in the centre; and General von Hutier,the conqueror of Riga and the inventor of the new tactics, with the EighteenthArmy in the south. It was to the last, which was under the nominal command ofthe Crown Prince, that the chief attack was allotted. Forty divisions, withlarge reserves, were placed under his command for an assault upon GeneralGough's lines between Cambrai and the Oise, while twenty divisions, withcorresponding reserves, were thrown against the British Third Army, especiallythat section of it opposite Croisilles and Bullecourt. Never in the history ofthe world had a more formidable force been concentrated upon a fixed andlimited objective. The greatest possible expectations were founded upon thebattle, which had already been named the "Kaiser- Schlacht," while theday chosen had been called Michael's day, or the day of Germany's revenge.
We shall now turn from the German preparations and examine that Britishposition upon which the attack was about to fall. It was divided into twosections, a point north of Gauche Wood upon the Cambrai front being roughly thepoint of division between the Third and the Fifth Armies. These armies were ofequal strength, each having twelve divisions of infantry in the line or inimmediate support. These divisions with their respective positions and varyingexperiences will presently be enumerated. For the moment it may be stated thatthe Third Army consisted of four cOrps, the Seventeenth (Fergusson) in theArras—Monchy sector, the Sixth (Haldane) carrying the line pastBullecourt, the Fourth (Harper) continuing it to near the Cambrai district, andthe Fifth (Fanshawe) covering that important point where the gap in theHindenburg Line seemed to make an attack particularly Likely. The Fifth Army inturn consisted of the Seventh Corps (Congreve) in the southern part of theCambrai district, the Nineteenth Corps (Watts) from south of Ronssoy toMaissemy, the Eighteenth Corps (Maxse) in front of St. Quentin, and the ThirdCorps (Butler) covering the great frontage of 30,000 yards from Urvillers,across the Oise, down to Barisis, eight miles south of La Fère. Thislong curve of fifty miles chapter was strongly fortified throughout its wholelength, but the position was stronger in the north where the British had beenin their lines for a year or more. In the southern sector the new ground whichhad been taken over was by no means so strongly organised as its defendersdesired, either in the portion formerly held by the British or in the Frenchsector, where only two lines existed. In the north a system of successive lineshad been adopted, called respectively the forward line, the corps line, and thearmy line. In the south there was less depth to the defence, but every possibleeffort was made to improve it, the work proceeding night and day, and thesoldiers being tied to it to an extent which gave little time for militaryexercises. In this work the cavalry and special entrenching battalions gavevaluable help. As a result, by the third week of March the south was as wellprepared as the number of men available would allow. There were not enough toman continuous lines of trenches over so great a front. A system was adopted,therefore, by which there was an advanced zone, consisting of a thin line ofinfantry supported by numerous small redoubts, each of which contained severalmachine-guns and a company of infantry. These were to take off the edge of theassault, and it was hoped, as half a mile separated the two armies, and thefields of fire were good, that before reaching the position at all the enemywould suffer severely. A thousand yards behind the 'advance zone was the truebattle zone, where the main body of the infantry lay behind barbed wire withthe support of isolated forts. Beyond these again was a third zone, 2000 yardsfarther to the rear, but this had not yet been completed. Behind the wholeposition in the southern part of the line was the great bend of the RiverSomme, which was also being organised as a reserve line, but was veryincomplete. It should be emphasised that these deficiencies were in no way dueto the British command, which was so assiduous in its preparations that itrather raised the ridicule of certain unimaginative people upon the spot whocannot see a danger until it actually materialises in front of them. The factthat General Gough had been a cavalry general, and that his actions in the warhad been aggressive rather than defensive, gave a false impression at the timein certain quarters. It is certain that nothing was neglected in the way ofdefence which skill could devise or industry carry out.
The general situation then upon the night of March 20, when the Germanpreparations were complete, was that along the whole front the Germans werecrouching for their spring, and that their first line consisted of sixtydivisions, or more than half a million infantry, against the twenty-fourdivisions, or about 200,000 infantry, who awaited them. The odds were greatlyincreased by the fact that the Germans held some thirty divisions in immediatereserve, whereas the British reserves, especially in the south of the line,were few and distant. The German concentration of gun power was more than twicethat of the British. The published account of a German officer claims it asfourfold, but this is probably an overstatement. In describing the results ofthis great attack we shall deal first with the sequence of events in the sectorof the Third Army in the north, and then turn to those connected with the FifthArmy in the south.
Disposal of the Third Army—Attack upon the ThirdDivision—Upon the Thirty-fourth Division—Upon the Fifty-ninthDivision—Terrible losses—Loss of Henin Hill—Arrival ofThirty-first Division—Hard fighting of the Fortieth Division—TheEast Yorkshires at Ervillers—The 10th West Yorks atMoyenneville—Recapture of Ayette—Grand resistance of Third,Fifteenth, and Fourth Divisions before Arras—Final German check in thenorth
TAKING the account of this great action upon March 21 from thenorth, we shall begin with Sir Julian Byng's Third Army. The left of this forcejoined the Thirteenth Corps, which formed the flank of the First Army, to thenorth of Fampoux, while the extreme right touched the left of the SeventhCorps, the northern unit of the Fifth Army to the east Metz-en-Couture oppositeto Cambrai.
The Seventeenth Corps consisted of the Fifteenth and Fourth Divisions withthe Guards Division in reserve. They extended as far south as the SenséeRiver, and were not seriously engaged upon March 21, though exposed to heavyshelling. We may for the time leave them out of the narrative. It wasimmediately to the south of them, upon the Sixth Corps commanded by GeneralHaldane, that the storm burst in its full fury. Nothing can exaggerate theconcentrated weight of the blow which fell upon this and the next portion ofthe line. The divisions from the north were the old fighting Third upon theSensée section, the Thirty-fourth to Third the south of it, and theFifty-ninth North Midland Territorials on the right. The Fortieth Division wasin close support. These were the devoted units who upon that terrible day hadto bear the heavy end of the load in the northern half of the line. Let us turnfirst to the arduous experiences of the Third Division. This veteran division,still commanded by General Deverell, had all three brigades in the line, the76th upon the left, the 8th in the centre, arid the 9th upon the right, thebattalions in the advanced line being the 2nd Suffolks, 2nd Royal Scots, and1st Northumberland Fusiliers. The front covered was 8000 yards from Croisillesto the Arras-Cambrai road in the north, both inclusive. This front had beenstrengthened by every device which experience could suggest, and was organised,as already explained upon three lines, which may be called the front, support,and reserve lines. Its backing of artillery was formidable, its moral high, andit offered a solid barrier to any enemy, however numerous.
The preliminary bombardment here as elsewhere broke out shortly after fivein the morning, and contained a large proportion of gas-shells which searchedthe rear lines and battery positions as well as the front defences. So far asthe 76th Brigade in the north was concerned no serious infantry attackfollowed, and save for some sporadic advances which were easily shot to pieces,there was no organised attempt upon their sector. The same applies, though in aless degree, to the central unit, the 8th Brigade. Here there were continualblasts of heavy fire during the day which decimated but were unable to shakethe Royal Scots in the front trenches. Several times the enemy infantry madewhat was rather a menace than an attack, but on each occasion it dissolved intonothing. It is clear that nothing serious was intended and that thesedemonstrations were to hold the troops to their ground. On the right, however,in front of the 9th Brigade, the attempts were far more deadly and earnest. Thefirst of these lasted from 7:30 till 10, and gained a footing in the fronttrenches, but failed before a determined attack by bombing parties of theNorthumberland Fusiliers. In the afternoon the intermittent shelling becamevery severe, the trench mortar fire upon the front lines being so heavy as toknock them to pieces and stop all lateral communication. It was anerve-shattering ordeal to the garrisons of these posts, crouching hour afterhour in the midst of these terrible explosions. The bravest man on earth mayfind his spirit wilt under such conditions. Finally, about half-past three,there came a forward surge of grey infantry from Fontaine Wood which reachedand occupied the front line, or the irregular hummocks where the front line hadbeen. Every effort to extend this advantage was crushed almost before it couldget started. There was complete stability here, but it was known that thingswere not altogether well with the Thirty-fourth Division upon the right, andmasses of German infantry were seen moving down the Cherisy valley in thatdirection, a fair mark for the heavy guns. The 4th Royal Fusiliers were broughtforward to reinforce their old comrades of Northumberland, and the line on theright was thrown back to get touch with the 11th Suffolks of the The 101stBrigade. In this support position they were solidly linked with the units toright and left, so that the close of the day found the whole of this portion ofthe front absolutely intact, save for the loss of the obliterated frontline.
We shall now turn to the fortunes of the next unit upon the right, theThirty-fourth Division, a composite hard fighting body composed ofNorthumbrians, Scots, and East Anglian troops. General Nicholson, commandingthis division, had learned from a prisoner that the coming German attack wouldbegin at Bullecourt and then turn to the north. Such incidents make onedoubtful of the wisdom of that policy of "teaching men to take an intelligentinterest in the operations" which is so often advocated. In this case flankdefences were arranged and all due preparation was made.
The blow fell even as had been foretold, but the portion of the line whichwas crushed in was on the front of the Fifty-ninth Division, to the right ofthe Thirty-fourth. The result was, however, that after the capture ofBullecourt, which occurred about ten, the German stormers began to work roundthe right rear of the 102nd Brigade, the nearest unit of the Thirty-fourthDivision. The flanking line of defence was manned by the 22nd NorthumberlandFusiliers and strengthened by many Lewis guns, so that it took heavy toll fromthe masses of German infantry who were moving across. This flanking line wasthickened by the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers and by the 1st East Lancashires.The heavy blow had forced back the Fifty-ninth Division, and by one o'clockEcoust also was in the hands of the enemy, bringing them considerably to therear of the fourth. Up to 4:30 in the afternoon the Germans were attacking the102nd Brigade from the flank, but up to that hour they had not succeeded inshifting the solid Tynesiders who held the improvised line. Nevertheless theheavy and constant shelling reduced the strength of the defenders, who in manycases were quite cut off, and had to hold their positions with bombs and riflesas best they could. Farther south the Germans, passing Noreuil in their westernadvance, had turned in considerable numbers to the north, well to the rear ofthe flanking line, so that the British in reserve found themselves facingsouth-west, but fought on none the less, the 22nd, 23rd, and 25thNorthumberland Fusiliers in a mixed line holding firmly to their ground at theimminent risk of being cut off, while the 160th Brigade R.F.A. were firing atranges of 800 yards. As the German flood rolled on it engulfed these guns, butthe gunners withdrew the blocks and retired slowly, fighting in line with theinfantry. This movement in turn affected the British garrisons of the moreforward trenches, who in any case were very severely pressed by the Germanbombers, so that there was a general retirement towards the north in thedirection of Croisilles. Outside this village the remains of the 101st and102nd Brigades formed a line, and with the aid of the 10th Lincolns and 9thNorthumberland Fusiliers of the 103rd Brigade held the enemy off from occupyingit. The Fortieth Division was, as will be shown, coming up to fill the gap, andthus, although the Thirty-fourth had been curled backwards as if a huge steelplough had driven a furrow to the south of them, there was still no absolutefracture of the Towards evening patrols of the enemy had succeeded in filteringthrough into the village of Croisilles, but General Haldane had already seenthat his corps front needed reorganisation in view of what had occurred to thesouth. Orders were given, therefore, to the 15th Royal Scots, who were stillholding on near Croisilles, to abandon the village and take up new positions tothe west of it. With the help of the 119th Brigade of the Fortieth Divisionthese changes were made, and a line built up in front of Henin Hill for thenext day's battle. The general result, therefore, of the day's fighting was, sofar as the Thirty-fourth Division was concerned, that the left flank was stillin touch with the Third Division in the northern support line, but that theright and centre had to hinge back upon it on account of the break through tothe south of them, and had been compelled to uncover Croisilles and abandon itto the enemy. The casualties had been high, especially in the 102nd Brigadeupon the defensive flank. Of these, about 1200 out of a total trench strengthof 1800 were lost, some being cut off but the greater number injured by thebombardment. Three companies of the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers were engulfedin the German tide and submerged, as were the field-guns already mentioned,which were fought by their crews until the very last instant. The 11th Suffolksupon the left flank of the 101st Brigade held absolutely fast all day, and bytheir fire gave great help to the Third Division to their north.
The next unit upon the line was the Fifty-ninth North Midland Division(Romer) which had a front of over 5000 yards. They covered the importantChapter villages of Bullecourt, Ecoust, and Noreuil, the former being in thevery front line. The 178th Brigade of Sherwood Foresters were upon the rightand the 176th of Staffords upon the left, with the 177th of Lincolns andLeicesters in reserve. In the southern section of this position was the longshallow slope of the Noreuil valley, the nearer half of which came within theFifty-ninth area, while the farther was held by the Sixth Division. It wasspeedily apparent by the intensity of the bombardment and by the rumouredconcentration of the infantry that this was the centre of danger. About teno'clock a demonstration was made against the 2/6 Sherwood Foresters upon theleft, but the real attack came later when on the right centre a heavy mass ofthe enemy surged through the outpost line and established itself within thesupport line. At about the same hour the German infantry struck in great forceup the channel of the Noreuil valley, and having pushed their way as far as thewestern edge of Noreuil turned to the north-west, working along a hollow roadbetween Noreuil and Longatte. Two companies of the 2/5 Sherwoods, together withthe 470th Field Company R.E., were caught between the pincers of this doubleGerman attack, and were entirely destroyed on the Noreuil-Ecoust road, only oneofficer and six sappers making their way safe to Vraucourt. The 2/5 Lincolns ofthe supporting brigade, moving up to the support of their comrades, werethemselves involved in the tragedy and three companies were practicallyannihilated. This rapid German advance, with the heavy British losses, had alltaken place by 11 A.M., and created the situation which reacted so unfavourablyupon the Thirty-fourth in the north. The Germans having got so far forward inthe south were able to assail the flank of the 176th Brigade in the north,which threw out a defensive line as far as Ecoust and defended itself strongly.Their position, however, was an almost impossible one, and when later in theday the enemy took Ecoust and swung round to their rear these battalions,already much reduced, were overwhelmed by the attack, the survivors joining upwith the Thirty-fourth Division in their retreat. The machine-guns, so long asthey were in action, caused heavy casualties to the enemy, but the latter wereswarming on all sides, and eventually the guns had either to withdraw or werecaptured.
With the two front brigades destroyed and the whole position occupied, theGermans may well have thought that a long advance was within their power, butin this they were soon undeceived. The support brigade, the 177th, still barredtheir way, and it had been strengthened by Headquarters staffs, bands,transport men and others, and very especially by the pioneer battalion, the 6/7Scots Fusiliers. These men occupied the third defence line, and from the Hog'sBack on which it was sited, they defied every effort of the Germans to getforward from Ecoust. This position was well covered by artillery and supportedby machine-guns. So strong was the defence that the enemy were beaten backthree times, and on the last occasion, late in the afternoon, fairly took totheir heels. Shortly afterwards the 120th Brigade from the Fortieth Divisioncame into support, and the situation was saved for the day. How terrific hadbeen the strain upon the Fifty-ninth Division may be reckoned from the factthat their losses were close upon 5000 out of a ten-battalion unit. It is truethat they had been driven by vastly superior numbers out of their two frontlines with the attendant villages, but evening found them still defiant, and,for the time, victorious, with their right still linked up with the SixthDivision and their left with the Thirty-fourth. There could not have been afiner recovery under more arduous circumstances. It was the last of theFifty-ninth Division, however, for many a day to come, for the Fortieth(Ponsonby) taking charge in this sector, gathered to itself the fifteenfield-guns still left of the artillery and the only remaining brigade. It wasas well, for they would need every gun and every rifle in the dark days tocome. Four German divisions, the 111th, 221st, 6th Bavarian, and 2nd GuardsReserve, had been engaged in the attack. Even admitting that some of thesedivisions were concerned also with the attack upon the Thirty-fourth Division,the latter had the 234th and some smaller units in front of it, so that it iswithin the mark to say that five German had attacked two British divisions, andby the aid of a vastly superior light and heavy artillery equipment had pushedthem back to their reserve line, but had failed to break them. It was not afight of which either nation need be ashamed.
This completes a superficial view of the experiences of the Sixth Corps uponMarch 21. In order to get the full picture one should understand that the SixthDivision upon the right had also been driven from their sector, includingseveral important villages. For the sake of continuity of narrative it will bebest to merely indicate this fact for the moment, and to continue to follow thefortunes of Haldane's Corps during the fateful days which followed, casting aglance also to the north where the Seventeenth Corps was gradually involved inthe fight. We shall bear in mind, then, the long slanting front from the oldpositions on the left to Henin Hill and the Hog's Back upon the right, and weshall return to the Third Division at the northern end of the line.
The night had been quiet along the whole corps front, which seemed to implysome exhaustion of the attack. In the morning this lull still continued in theregion of the Third Division, which had up to now been just outside the trackof the storm. During the morning and afternoon of March 22 no serious attackwas made upon this point, but in the evening the enemy, having made a lodgmentupon Henin Hill in the south-west, was able to make a powerful onslaught fromthe flank which met with very little success. Its first onrush pushed back the20th K.R.R., pioneer battalion of the division, in the trench called HindAvenue, but the ground was regained by the 13th King's Liverpool, while the 4thRoyal Fusiliers loosened the German grip of another small corner of trench. Upto nightfall the attempts continued, alternating with bombardments, but noprogress was made, the 9th Brigade beating down every new advance.
About ten o'clock at night orders reached the division that as theSeventeenth Corps were falling back for strategic reasons to the west of Monchyon the north, while the Thirty-fourth were also retreating upon the south, theThird Division must retire in conformity with them. It was no easy task under aheavy shell-fall and with an elated enemy in close contact. It was ofimportance that the telephoned orders should not be tapped, and it issuggestive of the world-wide services of the British soldier that they weresent over the wires in Arabic and Hindustani. Before morning the weary troopshad been quickly withdrawn without confusion or mishap, and all were safelyaligned in their new positions. Their defence of their battleground had been asplendid one, and though they had no huge mass attack to contend with, such ashad dashed the line of the Fifty-ninth to pieces, still they had constantsevere pressure and had withstood it completely.
We left the Thirty-fourth Division upon the evening of March 21 stillholding its reserve lines, with its three brigades in line, the 103rd on theright in touch with the Fortieth Division, and the 101st on the left where theThird Division joined it. A spirited little body, the J Special Company R.E.,had joined the fighting line of the Thirty-fourth, and did good work with it.About 8 A.M. upon March 22nd the enemy attacked the 102nd Brigade in theCroisilles sector, but two attempts had no result, though the general Britishline was now 500 yards west of the village. About ten o'clock a misfortuneoccurred, for a heavy column of the enemy, moving up through a dense mist,broke through the 101st Brigade and carried the greater part of Henin Hill, amost important strategic point. The possession of the hill was, however,contested most strongly by the Fortieth Division machine-gun company and by the11th Suffolks, who by their valiant resistance prevented the enemy from gainingthe whole crest, though they could not stop them from extending north andsouth, which turned the line of the troops at the flanks and caused them tofall back. The troops to the south, the 15th and 16th Royal Scots, withdrewslowly to a new position west of Boyelles; the remains of the 102nd Brigade (itwas but 500 strong at the beginning of the action) fell back upon the supports;while the valiant men of Suffolk, aided by Colonel Roberts' machine-guns, stillfought stoutly upon the top of the incline, though entirely isolated upon theright flank. Finally the shattered remains of this staunch battalion withdrewtowards the north-west, their slow retreat being covered by Lieutenant Woods,who met his death in the venture, and by a handful of machine-gunners.
The chief evil result from the capture of Henin Hill was in the south, whereit enabled the enemy by a joint frontal and flank attack at the junction of theThirty-fourth and Fortieth Divisions, to push back the 9th NorthumberlandFusiliers and 13th Yorkshire, and to get possession of the village of St.Leger. The 103rd Brigade moved back to Judas' Farm to the west of St. Leger,while the 119th Brigade prolonged the line to the south. A few machine-guns,with their feed blocks removed, were lost on Henin Hill, but otherwise no bootywas obtained by the enemy. On the evening of the 22nd the infantry of theThirty-first Division was rushed to the front, and the Thirty-fourth Divisionafter their two days of desperate and honourable battle, were drawn back for arest. During March 22 the 103rd Brigade held on to St. Leger and St. LegerWood, and so blocked the valley of the Sensée.
To the south of the Thirty-fourth Division the Fifty-ninth Division had nowbeen entirely replaced by the Fortieth, save for the 177th Brigade, theartillery, and machine-guns, some of which rendered splendid service during theday. There was little fighting in the morning of March 22, but about mid-day itwas found that some hundreds of Germans s with a profusion of machine-guns("many bullets but few men" was the key-note of the new advanced tactics) wereclose to the divisional front in the region of St. Leger Wood. These weredriven back, and fourteen of their guns taken, after some confused but vigorousfighting, in which Lieutenant Beal captured four guns himself before meeting aglorious death. Several times the enemy pushed strong patrols between the Sixthand Fortieth Divisions in the Vaux-Vraumont sector, but these were alwaysexpelled or digested. Shortly after mid-day, however, a very strong attackbroke upon this line, pushing back the left of the Sixth Division and causingheavy losses to the Highlanders of the 120th Brigade upon the right of theFortieth Division. The 14th Argyll and Sutherlands, with the 10/11 HighlandLight Infantry, were the units concerned, and they restored their line, whichhad been bent backwards. Finding, however, that they had lost touch with theSixth Division to the south, they fell back until communication was restored.All day groups of German machine-gunners could be seen rushing forward, theircrouching figures darting from cover to cover, while all day also the guns ofthe division observed and shattered the various nests which were constructed.Major Nesham distinguished himself in this work. Towards evening of the 22nd itwas known that Vraumont to the south was in German possession, and orders weregiven to withdraw to the new general line which this change and the Capture ofHenin Hill must entail. In the new position the Fortieth was still in closetouch with the Sixth in the neighbourhood of Beugnatre, the general line of thewithdrawal being in a south-westerly direction. The losses had been heavyduring Sixth the day, and included Colonel Eardley-Wilmot of the 12thSuffolks.
The line of the Seventeenth and of the Sixth Corps, upon the morning ofMarch 23, stretched from the south of Fampoux, west of Heninel.and of St. Legerdown to Mory. The Seventeenth Corps had not yet been seriously attacked. Weshall continue with the record of the Sixth Corps, which now consisted of theThird Division in the north, parts of the Guards Division, which had formed upto their right, the Thirty-first Division north of Mory, and the FortiethDivision to the west of Mory, with outposts in the village. We shall againtrace the events from the northern flank. No serious movement occurred duringthe day in front of the Third Division or of the Guards, but there was a reportof concentrations of infantry and other signs which indicated that the stormsof the south would soon spread upwards in that direction. The Thirty-firstDivision, the well-tried Yorkshire unit, still retained two of its oldbrigades, but had an additional 4th Brigade of Guards, cut from the old GuardsDivision by the new system of smaller units. General Bridgford had taken overcommand just before the battle and would be the first to admit that thesplendid efficiency of his troops was due to General Wanless 0'Gowan, who hadbeen associated with them so long. They carried a high reputation into thisgreat battle and an even higher one out of it. On the morning of March 23 thedivision faced the Germans to the north of Mory Copse, having the 4th GuardsBrigade upon the right and the 93rd Brigade upon the left. Two German divisionswhich had already been engaged, the 111th and the 2nd Guards Reserve, tried tobreak this fresh line and were each in turn broken themselves, as were theGerman batteries which pushed to the front and found themselves under thedouble fire of the Thirty-first and Thirty-fourth divisional artillery.Prisoners taken in this repulse gave the information that the Germans werealready a full day behind their scheduled programme in this quarter. Allattacks upon the Thirty-first met with the same fate during the day, but theenemy, as will be shown, had got a grip of Mory for a time, and pushed back theFortieth in the south. Instead of a retirement the 92nd Brigade was broughtfrom reserve and placed upon the exposed flank, while the Guards andYorkshiremen still stood firm. In the evening the general line extended fromnorth of Ervillers, where the 92nd Brigade was on watch, to the region ofHamelincourt, where the 93rd had their line.
The heaviest work of the day had fallen upon the Fortieth Division, whichhad dug itself in west of Mory and of Mory Copse, with strong posts in thevillage itself. The enemy attacked in the morning of March 23 in great forceand got complete possession of Mory. A splendid counter-attack, however, by the13th East Surreys and 21st Middlesex at 2:30 P.M. regained the village. A deepcutting ran up to Mory from Vraucourt in the south-east, and along this theGermans sent their reinforcements, but the artillery of the British got therange of it and caused heavy losses. The village was held all day, under thelocal direction of Colonel Warden of the Surreys, and was violently attacked bythe enemy after dark, with the result that desultory hand-to-hand fighting wenton among the houses during the whole night. At one time the British had won tothe eastern edge, and then again they were forced back to the centre. When oneremembers that these men had been fighting for three days, with little food andless sleep, it was indeed a fine performance. One small post of the 18th Welshunder Sergeant O'Sullivan was isolated for nearly two days and yet cut its wayout, the gallant Irishman receiving a well-deserved honour. The morning ofMarch 24 found little change along the line of the corps. If the Germans werealready a day behind they showed no signs of making up their time. The 40thMachine-gun Battalion had done particularly fine work during the day. As anexample of the gallantry which animated this unit it may be recorded that twoof the guns having been rushed by the Germans near Ervillers, Lance-CorporalCross volunteered to recover them single-handed, which he did in such fashionthat seven German prisoners appeared carrying them and marching at the point ofhis revolver, an exploit for which he was decorated.
March 24 was marked by considerable activity in the Mory district, but nostrong attack developed to the north of it. On the front of the Thirty-firstand Fortieth Divisions, however, the battle raged with great intensity. Theenemy had full possession of Mory by 9 A.M., and was attacking the depletedbattalions opposed to them along the, whole divisional front so that they werecompelled to fall slowly back, and by the late afternoon held a line about halfa mile east of the Arras-Bapaume road. The situation to the south had been suchthat the Fourth Corps had to arrange to withdraw to the west of Bapaume, sothat in any case the Sixth Corps would have been compelled to throw back itsright flank. The Sixth Division on the immediate right had been relieved by theForty-first, but touch had been lost and a gap formed, the enemy pushing on toFavreuil. The Forty-second Division was on the march up, however, in order torelieve the Fortieth, and two brigades of this formed a defensive line coveringGomiecourt.
These events had their reaction upon the Thirty-first Division to the north.When the enemy were seen in Mory at 9 A.M. they were upon the flank of the 4thGuards Brigade, which at the same time could see heavy columns massing to theeast of St. Leger. The Guards at once dug in a new support switch line towardsErvillers and so kept touch with the Fortieth in its new position. The 93rdupon the left was in the meanwhile heavily attacked in front, the enemy comingon again and again with a powerful support from trench mortars. These attackswere all beaten back by the stout Yorkshire infantry, but nothing could preventthe enemy from working round in the south and occupying Behagnies andSapignies. The British artillery was particularly masterful in this section,and no direct progress could be made by the Germans.
In the late afternoon of the 24th the Germans made a new and violent attackupon the exhausted Fortieth Division and upon the 4th Guards Brigade on theright of the Thirty-first. In this attack the enemy succeeded in forcing theirway into Ervillers, while the Fortieth reformed upon the west of it, so as tocover Hamelincourt and Moyenneville. The situation in the morning of March 25was exceedingly critical for the two advanced brigades of the Thirty-first, theGuards and the 93rd, who had not budged from their position. The enemy were nowto the right rear, and if they advanced farther northwards there was imminentdanger that the defenders would be cut off. As usual the best defence of adashing commander is an attack, so the reserve brigade, the 92nd, was orderedto advance upon Ervillers, which had already been consolidated by the 91stGerman Infantry Regiment. The 10th East Yorkshires led the attack and seizedthe village once again, but the situation was still critical, for the enemywere round the south-west, so that they enveloped the whole right wing of thedivision, which was stretched to cracking point with every man in the line.Touch had for the moment been lost with the troops on the right. As the Germanspoured past the right wing of the Thirty-first they presented a menace for thefuture, but a most tempting mark for the present, and ten machine-guns werekept in continuous action for three hours upon ideal targets ranging from 300to 1500 yards. The enemy losses upon this occasion were undoubtedly very heavy,but with fine persistency they kept upon their way, as one-idea'd andundeviating as a swarm of ants in a tropical, forest. A thick trail of theirdead marked their westward road.
There had been comparative quiet at the north of the line so that thenarrative may still concern itself with the situation which centred round theThirty-first Division. The relief of the Fortieth upon the right was now longoverdue, and the men had been worked to the bone, but the fact thatSolly-Flood's Forty-second Division had been deflected to chapter the southwithheld their succours. The Forty-first (Lawford), however, was graduallycoming into action and thickening their shredded lines. Sapignies in theextreme south of the corps area had been taken by the Germans, but wasrecaptured in the morning of March 25 by parts of the 120th Brigade workingwith the 127th Brigade of the Forty-first Division. Strong Germanreinforcements came up, however, and the British line was pushed back in thisquarter to the north-west until it crossed the high ground east of Gomiecourt.This southern sector was handed over before noon from the Sixth Corps to theFourth, and in the evening the remains of the Fortieth Division were finallydrawn out, having finished a splendid spell of service. The strain upon GeneralPonsonby, and upon his three Brigadiers, Crozier, Campbell, and Forbes, hadbeen enormous, but under the most extreme pressure their units had alwaysmaintained the line. Part of the 126th Brigade of the Forty-second Division wasnow on the immediate right of the Thirty-first Division, the 10th Manchestersconnecting up with the 11th East Yorks and doing great work in covering thatflank.
It has already been recorded how the 92nd Brigade, all of East Yorkshire,had beaten the 91st Prussian Regiment out of the village of Ervillers. A secondregiment of the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, the 77th, essayed the adventure ofturning the Yorkshiremen out, but met with a bloody repulse. "It was a sight tosee," says one who was present. "We were only a battalion, probably 800 strong,while he had massed artillery and many thousands of infantry. They came over tous in columns, and they kept coming. They swarmed towards us, but they made noprogress, and we could not shoot fast enough. For three and a half hours theycame, and for three and a half hours we knocked them out. They were fallinglike ripe corn before the reaper. As fast as they fell others took theirplaces, but they could not move the East Yorks." The 2nd Guards Reserve wereworn out by this experience, and it must be admitted that their service in thebattle had been long and arduous. They were relieved by the 16th Bavarians andthe 239th Division, so that there was no surcease in the endless pressure.
At 1:15 the 93rd West Yorkshires upon the left of the line were attacked,but could no more be shifted than their brother Tykes in the south. The Germanstormers never reached the line, partly owing to the excellent barrage andpartly to the steady rifle-fire. After a long interval of following false gods,such as bombs and rifle grenades, the British soldier was reasserting himselfonce more as the best average shot of all the forces engaged, though it must beadmitted that the specialised German snipers with their weapons of precisionwere of a high excellence. All day the division stood its ground and hit backhard at every attack, but by evening the salient had become so extreme that itwas necessary to readjust the line. They fell back, therefore, the 92ndcovering the operation, and took up the line from Moyenneville toAblainzeville, where they faced round on the morning of March 26, the 92nd onthe right of the line, the 93rd upon the left, and the 4th Guards in reserve.On their north lay the division of Guards, on their south the Forty-secondDivision.
It was on this morning that an incident occurred leading to the loss of avillage, but also to a singular instance of military virtue. It is the episodeof Moyenneville and of the 15th West Yorkshire Battalion. It appears that anofficer in a state of concussion from the explosion of a shell, sent an orderto the left of the line that they should retire, The Guards and other observerswere surprised to see two British battalions walking back with sloped armsunder no pressure from the enemy. By some chance the mistaken order did notreach the 15th West Yorkshires, who remained isolated in their position, andColonel Twiss refused to follow the brigade until a positive command shouldarrive. In their loneliness they extended each flank in search of a friend, andfinally stretched their left into Moyenneville village, which they foundalready strongly occupied by the Germans. To many minds this would haveappeared to be an excellent excuse for retirement, but its effect upon theYorkshire temperament was that they instantly attacked the village and drovethe intruders out. One considerable body of Germans was driven down into ahollow and pelted with bullets until the survivors raised the white flag. Verylarge numbers of German wounded lay in and around the village, but it was notpossible to send them to the rear. The enemy attacked Moyenneville again, butthe battalion covered the western exits and denied all egress. For the whole ofthat day, the whole night, and up to the afternoon of March 27, this heroicbody of infantry held their . ground, though shot at from every side and nearlysurrounded. Not one yard backwards would they budge without a definite writtenorder. Not only did they hold their own front but their machine-guns playedupon nine successive waves of Germans advancing from Courcelles to Ayette, andsorely hampered their movements to the south. They covered 2000 yards forthirty-six hours and relieved the front of the Thirty-first Division frompressure during that time. When at last the survivors made their way back onlyfour officers and forty men represented that gallant battalion. Colonel Twisswas among the missing. "This battalion," says the official record, "by itsbrave action relieved the pressure on our front throughout the whole day andgave the division time to establish its position near Ayette." It was as wellthat this pressure should have been taken off, for both upon the 26th and the27th the ammunition question had become serious, and disaster might havefollowed a more extended action.
If we continue to follow the fortunes of the Thirty-first Division, so as tobring them to their natural term, we find it now covering the line from Ayettein the south to Ablainzeville. The enemy were driving up on the right of thedivision between Courcelles and Ablainzeville, a space which was covered by the92nd Brigade, who were fighting as brilliantly as ever. Touch had been lostwith the Forty-second upon March 27. The East Yorkshires lost their outpostline four times this morning and four times they cleared it with the bayonet.Colonel Rickman, the senior officer on the spot, fought for every inch ofground as he retired before the ever-increasing pressure. Finally the 92nd,worn to rags, were ordered to reform behind the 4th Guards Brigade at Ayette,but so high was their spirit that when during the night there was word that theGuards were themselves hard pressed they eagerly sent help forward to them,while the Guards, with equal chivalry of spirit, strictly limited the numberwho should come. About six in the evening the Guards threw out a line to thesouth and joined up with the 10th Manchesters of the Forty-second Division tothe west of Ablainzeville, so that the line was once more complete.
March 28 found the battle still raging in front of the division, which hadnow been engaged for four days without a break and had beaten off the attacksof five separate German divisions. Two attacks were made, the one upon the 93rdBrigade, the other upon the Guards. Each attack got into the line and each waspitchforked out again. So broken was the enemy that they were seen retiring incrowds towards the north-east under a canopy of shrapnel. The British barragewas particularly good that day, and many assaulting units were beaten intopieces by it. The division was terribly worn, and the men could hardly standfor exhaustion, and yet it was a glad thought that the last glimpse which theirweary and bloodshot eyes had of their enemy was his broken hordes as theystreamed away from the front which they had failed to break. So thin were theranks that the pioneer battalion, the 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, wasbrought up to form the line. The Guards had taken their position somewhat tothe west of Ayette, and some of the enemy from the south filtered into thevillage, but they were shortly afterwards put out again by Shute'sThirty-second Division, which had come up for the relief. There was no attackupon the 29th, and upon the 30th the Thirty-first was able to withdraw, havingestablished a record which may have been equalled but cannot have beensurpassed by any division in this great battle. Five German divisions, the111th, 2nd Guards Reserve, 239th and 16th Bavarians, and 1st Guards Reserve,had been wholly or partially engaged with the Thirty-first. Both sides had lostheavily and were exhausted. It was here, near Ervillers, that a German warcorrespondent has described how he saw the long line of German and Britishwounded lying upon either side of the main road.
It has been stated that the Thirty-second Division carried Ayette after thisunit had relieved the Thirty-first Division, and the operation may be treatedhere to preserve continuity of narrative. It was of more than local importance,as it was one of the earliest indications that the British army was still fullof fight and that in spite of every disadvantage it meant to hit back at everyopportunity. On taking over his section of the front. General Shute foundbefore him the village of Ayette, which was strongly held, but was on theforward slope of a hill so that it could obtain little help from the Germanguns. He at once determined to attack. The 10th Highland Light Infantry of the14th Brigade were directed upon the village on the night of April 2, while the96th Brigade continued the attack to the south. The result was a veryheartening little success. Three companies of the Highlanders, numbering under300 in all, carried the village, though it was held by a German battalion. Onthe right, the 16th Lancashire Fusiliers made the attack, and in spite of onecheck, which was set right by the personal intervention of General Gird wood ofthe 96th Brigade, the objectives were reached. The two attacks were skilfullyconnected up by the 5/6th Royal Scots, while a party of sappers of the 20GthField Company under Lieutenant Cronin followed on the heels of the infantry andquickly consolidated.
Whilst these stirring events had been in progress in the south, the north ofthe line had slowly drawn back in order to preserve conformity. The SeventeenthCorps, as already stated, were to the west of Monchy, and the left of the SixthCorps was on the line of Henin, where the Third Division occupied a strongdefensive position. This was strongly attacked upon the forenoon of March 24,especially on the 8th Brigade front, which was the right of the line, theGermans swarming up from the south-east of Henin and trying hard to work up theHenin-Neuville-Vitasse road. This attack fell particularly upon the 1st ScotsFusiliers, and it was completely repulsed with heavy losses, though it wasfacilitated by the sunken roads which converged upon Henin. The Germans intheir retirement had to pass along a slope where once again they lostheavily.
Shortly after noon the left of the Third Division was also attacked, and theenemy obtained a temporary footing between the 1st Gordons and 8th RoyalLancasters of the 76th Brigade. From this he was very soon ejected, and thoughmany bombing attacks were pushed with great resolution they had no results.March 25 was quiet upon the front of the Third Division, though the right ofthe Guards Division to the south near Boyelles was subjected to one heavyunsuccessful attack. That evening both the Guards and the Third Division had tomake some retraction of their line in order to conform to the situation alreadydescribed in the south, but March 26 passed without an attack, the soldierslistening with anxious impatience to the roar of battle on their right, unableto see the fight, and yet keenly conscious that their own lives might dependupon its results. The 27th was also a day of anxious expectancy, andculminating upon the 28th in a very severe battle, which was the greater testcoming after so long a period of strain. All three brigades were in the line,the 8th upon the right, 9th in the centre, and 76th in the north. Still fartherto the north was the 44th Highland Brigade of Reed's Fifteenth Division uponwhich the storm first burst.
This brigade at 6:45 was assailed by a bombardment of so severe a characterthat its trenches were completely destroyed. The German infantry pushed homebehind this shattering fire and drove back the front line of the Highlanders.This enabled them to get behind the left flank of the 2nd Suffolks and nearlysurround them, while at the same time they pierced the front of the 1stNorthumberland Fusiliers on their right. The front line of the 8th RoyalLancasters had also been penetrated, and the British infantry were pushed backand split up into various small squads of men, intermingled in the north withHighlanders of the 44th Brigade, and all fighting desperately with the enemyswarming thickly upon them. By 9:45 the whole front was in German hands. Enemyfield-guns were lining Wancourt Ridge, and as the shattered formations tried toform a new line they were heavily shelled by them. The loss in officers and menwas very heavy, Colonel James of the Royal Lancasters being among the dead. Thewithdrawal was made to the reserve line, which the 44th Brigade had alreadyoccupied in the north. This included the village of Neuville Vitasse whichbecame untenable from shell-fire, and into the northern portion of which theenemy was able to push, but in the main the reserve system was occupied, themovement being covered by some of the 1st Gordons. At this point an equilibriumwas attained and the enemy held after as desperate a conflict as any troopscould be called upon to endure.
On the right of the 76th Brigade the 9th Brigade had also been fighting veryhard, and been compelled to yield some ground before the overpowering weight ofthe attack, especially that of the preliminary trench-mortar fire. The firstenemy advance in the morning was completely beaten off with great loss. Asecond attack had driven in the 8th Brigade on the right, which enabled theGermans to get behind the two companies of the 13th King's Liverpool who werein the front line. These men fought to the end and were last seen standing onthe parapet without a thought of surrender. At the same time a company of theNorthumberland Fusiliers on their left shared their fate, save for one officerand twelve men who survived. The front line of the 8th Brigade had now ceasedto exist, but the reserve line still held. An attack upon the 7th Shropshireswho, with the remains of the other battalions, held on to it, was successfullyshattered, even the battalion headquarters being brought into the desperatebattle, while the guns on each side fought as hard as the infantry, barrage andattack succeeding each other with mechanical accuracy, and being answered by anequally efficient barrage and defence, for the British guns wereextraordinarily well handled that day. About mid-day the enemy got a lodgmenton the right of the reserve line, but the Fusiliers, whose Colonel, MoultonBarrett, had been hit, and the 13th King's still fought furiously for what wasleft, and retained their ground until dusk, when they were drawn back into thereserve line in order to conform with the 76th Brigade.
The 8th Brigade upon the extreme right of the division had also enduredheavy losses in men and some loss in ground. The front line was held bycompanies of the 1st Scots Fusiliers and of the 7th Shropshires. The enemy,after an unsuccessful attempt, got into the trenches of the latter and bombedtheir way along them, clearing that section of the front. It was bomb againstrifle. in the tortuous ditches, and the bomb proved the more handy weapon. TheScots Fusiliers, who were the next to be assailed, made shift withrifle-grenades, but these also ran short, and they were forced back, so thatthe survivors of the two front companies were driven across the Arras-Bapaumeroad. Finally, as in the case of the other brigades, the reserve line wassuccessfully maintained until evening.
No soldiers could have fought with greater bravery and skill than did theThird Division on March 28. They were assailed by at least three Germandivisions and by a crushing artillery, but they disputed every inch of ground,and finally fought their formidable adversary to such a complete standstillthat he could not, with several hours of daylight at his disposal, anddisorganised ranks before him, continue his attacks. It is true that he securedHenin and Neuville Vitasse, but he paid a rich price in blood. So broken werethe enemy that the British wounded came back through their ranks without let orhindrance. A strong counter would have swept them out of the ground that theyhad gained, but neither the Third nor the Fifteenth, which had endured an equalattack upon the left, was in a condition to advance, while the Guards had beenalready withdrawn in accordance with the situation on their right, sixth Theblow which the Germans had received was shown even more clearly by theirfailure to attack upon the next day. On March 30 the Third Division wasrelieved by the Second Canadians. Their record was a great one, and theirlosses, 139 officers and 3500 men, were a measure of their services. In ninedays, before a vastly superior force, they had only gone back 7000 yards, mostof which was strategic withdrawal. Well might General Byng say, "By theirconduct they have established a standard of endurance and determination thatwill be a model for all time."
This desperate German attack on March 28 to the north of the British linehad spread right across the face of the Fifteenth Scottish Division through theline of Orange Hill and on to Telegraph Hill, finally involving the FourthDivision on the other side of the Scarpe, and the right-hand unit of theThirteenth Corps on their left, so that Horne's First Army was now drawn intothe fray, which reached as far north as Oppy and Gavrelle. Along the whole ofthis long front there was constant fighting, which in the case of the FifteenthDivision was as desperate as that of the Third. All three brigades were in theline, each of them having two battalions in front and one in reserve. Never hasthe grand tough Scottish fibre been more rudely tested than on this terribleday of battle, and never has it stood the strain more splendidly. GeneralReed's men undoubtedly saved Arras and held up at least six German divisionswhich broke themselves on that rugged and impenetrable line, formed in thefirst instance by the 7th Camerons upon the right, the 13th Royal Scots in thecentre, the 9th Black Watch and 7/8 Scots Borderers on the left. As alreadytold, the shattering bombardment destroyed a large part of the right front,burying the garrison amid the ruins of their trenches, near their junction withthe Third Division. Some fifty Camerons, under Colonel MacLeod, fought mostdesperately round their headquarters, and then fell back slowly upon the 8/10Gordons, who were holding the Neuville Vitasse trench behind them. This wasabout 6 A.M. By 7.40 the whole front line, shot to pieces and with their rightflank gone, readjusted their line to correspond, winding up near the Feuchyroad. There was no rest nor respite, however, for the whole German plan ofcampaign depended upon their getting Arras, so they poured forward their wavesof attack regardless of losses. It was a really desperate battle in which theScots, lying in little groups among the shell-holes and ditches, mowed theGermans down as they swarmed up to them, but were themselves occasionally cutoff and overpowered as the stormers found the gaps and poured through them. Thepressure was very great on the front of the Black Watch, north of the Cambrairoad, and there General Reed determined upon a counter-attack, for which hecould only spare a single company of the 10th Scottish Rifles. In spite of thesmall numbers it was carried out with such dash, under the personal lead ofColonel Stanley Clarke, that the front was cleared for a time, and the Germansthrown back east of Feuchy.
Meanwhile the Germans had made some advance to the north of the Scarpe, andthe 7/8 Scots Borderers on the left wing had to fall back to preserve the line.At 11 A.M. the enemy were raging in the centre of the line, and the 6thCamerons, north of the Cambrai road, were forced backwards, the enemy piercingtheir front. Up to 1:45 the weight of the attack was mostly in the north, andended by all three brigades moving back, with the enemy still striving with theutmost fury and ever fresh relays of men to burst the line. At 3 P.M. theGerman stormers had won the Bois des Boeufs, but were driven out again by the9th Black Watch and by the 11th Argylls, who had lost their CO., ColonelMitchell. The division was worn to a shadow, and yet the moment that the Germanattack seemed to ease both they and the Fourth Division on their north advancedtheir front. In this single bloody day the Fifteenth Division lost 94 officersand 2223 men, but there can be no doubt that their action, with that of theThird Division and the Fourth on either side of them, was the main determiningfactor in the whole of this vast battle. General Reed (a V.C. of Colenso) withhis Brigadiers, Hilliard, Allgood, and Lumsden, might well be proud of the waythey held the pass.
North of the Scarpe all three brigades of the Fourth Division were exposedto a furious attack, and lost the village of Roeux, which was defendedliterally to the death by the 2nd Seaforths of the 10th Brigade, but the 1stHants in the front line of the 11th Brigade and the 2nd Essex of the 12th stoodlike iron, and in a long day's fighting the enemy was never able to make anyserious lodgment in the position, though the rushes of his bombing parties weresaid by experienced British officers to have been extraordinarily determinedand clever. Very little ground was gained by the Germans, and of this a sectionupon the left flank near Gavrelle was regained by a sudden counter-attack ofthe Fourth Division. Of the attack to the north of the Third Army in theBailleul and Oppy district, it should be noted that it fell upon theFifty-sixth London Territorial Division, who for once had the pleasantexperience of being at the right end of the machine-gun. They took everyadvantage of their opportunity, and there are few places where the Germans haveendured heavier losses with no gains to show in return. The Westminsters andL.R.B.'s of the 169th Brigade were particularly heavily engaged, and a party ofthe former distinguished themselves by a most desperate defence of an outlyingpost, named Towy Post, near Gavrelle, which they held long after it was passedby the enemy, but eventually fought their way to safety. The attack lasted fromseven in the morning till six at night, and the Londoners had full vengeancefor their comrades of July 1916 or August 1917, who had died before the Germanwire even as the Germans died that day.
It was a successful day for the British arms, so successful that it markedthe practical limit of the German advance in that quarter, which was the vitalsection, covering the town of Arras. There is no doubt that the attempt was avery serious one, strongly urged by six divisions of picked infantry in frontand four in support, with a very powerful concentration of artillery, which wasexpected to smash a way through the three divisions chiefly attacked. Theonslaught was whole-hearted and skilful, but so was the defence. The Germanlosses were exceedingly high, and save for a strip of worthless ground therewas really nothing to show for them. It was the final check to the Germanadvance in this quarter of the field, so that the chronicler may well bring hisrecord to a pause while he returns to the first day of the battle andendeavours to trace the fortunes of the Fourth and Fifth Corps, who formed theright half of the Third Army. We have fixed the northern sector of thebattle-field from Bailleul in the north right across the Scarpe and down to theCojeul in its position, from which it was destined to make no change for manymonths to come. It was the first solidification of the lines, for to the southall was still fluid and confused.
A word should be said before one finally passes from this portion of thegreat epic, as to the truly wonderful work of the Army Medical Corps. In spiteof the constant fire the surgeons and bearers were continually in the frontline and conveying the wounded to the rear. Many thousands were saved from thetortures of a German prison camp by the devotion which kept them within theBritish lines. It may be invidious to mention examples where the same spirit ofself-sacrifice animated all, but one might take as typical the case of theFortieth Division, some details of which are available. Colonel M'Cullagh andhis men conveyed to the rear during five days, always under heavy fire, 2400cases of their own or other divisions, the whole of the casualties of theFortieth being 2800. M'Carter, a British, and Berney, an American surgeon, bothhad dressing-posts right up to the battle-line, the latter being himselfwounded twice. Wannan, a stretcher-bearer, carried thirty cases in one day, andended by conveying a wounded friend several miles upon his shoulders. PrivateM'Intosh, attacked by a German while binding an injured man, killed thecowardly fellow with his own bayonet, and then completed his task. It is hardto work detail into so vast a picture, but such deeds were infinitelymultiplied along that great line of battle. Nor can one omit mention of theuntiring work of the artillery, which was in action often for several days andnights on end. Occasionally in some soldier's letter one gets a glimpse of thespirit of the gunners such as no formal account can convey: "Our battery firedtwo days and nights without ceasing until spotted by the German observers. Theythen kept up a terrible fire until the British guns were silenced insuccession. One officer was left standing when I was wounded. He shook my handas they carried me away. I went, leaving him with about seven men and two guns,still carrying on as if nothing had happened. This is only one battery amonghundreds which showed as great pluck and tenacity as we did."
Attack on Sixth and Fifty-first Divisions —Engagement of the Twenty-fifth and Forty-first Divisions—Attack onForty-seventh, Sixty-third, Second, and Nineteenth Divisions—The Germantorrent—Serious situation—Arrival of Sixty-secondDivision—Fighting before Albert—Gallant defence by TwelfthDivision—Arrival of the New Zealanders, of the Australians, of theThirty-fifth Division—Equilibrium
TO the immediate south of the Sixth Corps the front line uponMarch 21 was held by Harper's Fourth Corps, which consisted of the SixthDivision (Harden) opposite to Lagnicourt with the Fifty-first Highland BattleDivision to the right of them, which famous unit was now under the command ofGeneral Carter-Campbell, whose name has been recorded in a previous volume asthe only officer left standing in his battalion after the action of NeuveChapelle. To the south of the Fourth Corps was the Fifth Corps (Fanshawe) withthe Seventeenth Division (Robertson) on the left, the Sixty-third (Lawrie) inthe centre, and the Forty-seventh (Gorringe) on the right covering the wholeCambrai salient from Flesquières in the north to the point nearGouzeaucourt Wood where the Third Army met the left flank of the Fifth. Theline took a considerable bend at this point, marking the ground gained at thebattle of Cambrai, and it was part of the German scheme to break through to thenorth and south, so that without attacking the Fifth Battle Corps they wouldeither cause it to fall back or else isolate and capture it. Had their advancebeen such as they had hoped for, they would certainly have placed it in greatperil. Even as it was, it was necessary to withdraw the line, but without unduehaste or confusion. Great pressure was laid upon the Fifth Corps in laterstages of the battle, but beyond a considerable shell-fall and demonstrationthere was no actual attack upon March 21. It was by holding certain sections ofthe line in this fashion that the Germans were able to pile up the odds atthose places which were actually attacked.
It will be possible to describe the sequence of events with considerablyless detail in this and other sectors of the line, since the general conditionsof attack and defence may be taken as similar to that already described. Herealso the bombardment began with its full shattering force of high explosive,blue cross invisible gas, mustard gas, phosgene, and every other diabolicaldevice which the German chemist has learned to produce and the British toneutralise. In the case of the British infantry, many of them had to wear theirgas masks for eight hours on end, and the gunners were in even worse plight;but these appliances, which will no doubt find a place in the museums of ourchildren, were of a surprising efficiency, and hampered the experienced soldierfar less than would have been thought.
The infantry advance was at 9:45, the Germans swarming in under the cover ofNature's smoke barrage, for here, as in several other parts of the line, athick morning mist greatly helped the attack and screened the stormers untilthey were actually up to the wire, which had usually been shattered in advanceby the trench-mortars. The line from Flesquières to Dernicourt in theregion of the Fifty-first Division was less seriously attacked, and remainedinviolate, but the northern stretch from Dernicourt to Lagnicourt was struckwith terrific impact, and gave before the blow to very much the same extent asthe divisions to the immediate north. The 71st Brigade in the Lagnicourt sectorwas especially hard hit, and was very violently assailed by a strong force ofGermans, which included the 1st Prussian Guard. This famous regiment was at onetime all round the 9th Norfolks, who succeeded at last in fighting themselvesclear, though their Colonel, Prior, and the great majority of the officers andmen in the battalion were killed or wounded. Even these wounded, however, weresafely carried off, thanks to the devotion of Captain Failes and a handful ofbrave men. In this desperate struggle the whole brigade was decimated. The 16thand 18th Brigades had also suffered severely, but the division, in spite of itslosses, was splendidly solid, and fell back slowly upon the support of the 75thBrigade of the Twenty-fifth Division, which had hastened up to the dangerpoint. By evening, the Germans, advancing in great numbers and with fineresolution, had occupied the four villages of Doignies, Boursies, Louverval,and Lagnicourt, their total penetration from Boursies in the south to Ecoust inthe north, a stretch of seven miles, averaging about 3000 yards. This advancehad completely turned the left wing of the Fifty-first, which was compelled tofall back in consequence, after stopping several attacks from across the Canaldu Nord. All three brigades of the Fifty-first Division were in line, and ofthe three the left and centre had been seriously engaged, the enemy enteringthe front line of both before mid-day, and finally reaching the second systembetween Louverval and Lagnicourt, so that the defence lay along theBeaumetz—Morchies line. The Nineteenth Division was in general support inthis quarter, and the 57th Brigade became practically the right of theFifty-first Division. About 7 P.M. in the evening two battalions of it, the 8thGloucesters and 10th Worcesters of the 57th Brigade, tried to turn the tide offight by a counter-attack, with the aid of tanks, against the village ofDoignies. This attack was successful in retaking half the village, but in thecourse of the night it was found necessary to withdraw before the increasingpressure of the enemy, who brought many machine-guns into the village. Duringthe night it was arranged that the Fifth Corps should fall back from itsdangerous position in the Cambrai salient, and by eleven next day the divisionswhich composed it were ranged from Highland Ridge, through Havrincourt andHermies, in touch with the Fourth Corps in the north and with the left of theFifth Army in the south.
Whilst this very heavy attack had been made upon the Fourth Corps,Bainbridge's Twenty-fifth Division had been in close support of the twodivisions in the front line. While the 75th Brigade, as already stated, waspushed up under very heavy fire to strengthen the Sixth Division in theirdesperate resistance, the 74th was allotted to the Fifty-first Division, whichwas in less serious need of help during the day. Griffin's 7th Brigade remainedin reserve in front of Morchies, where upon the following morning its presencewas invaluable as a solid unshaken nucleus of resistance. Eight Germandivisions were identified that day among those which attacked the two Britishdivisions in the front line of the Fourth Corps.
There was no attack during the night, but the Germans thickened theiradvanced line and were all ready for another strenuous day, while the British,though hustled and overborne by the tremendous onslaught which had pushed themback, were still within their battle positions and as doggedly surly as Britishinfantry usually are in hours of stress and trial. Three strong attacks weremade in the morning and early afternoon between Hermies and Beaumetz, all ofwhich were driven back. There is no method of gauging the losses of the enemyupon such occasions, but when one knows that the machine-guns fired as many as9000 rounds each, and that a single Lewis gun discharged 30,000 bullets, onecan say with certainty that they were very heavy. These attacks fell upon theHighlanders on the right, the 7th Brigade in the centre, and the remains of theSixth Division upon the left. Unhappily, a chain of defence is no stronger thanits weakest link, which finds itself so often at points of juncture. Upon thisoccasion the Germans, continually filtering forward and testing every possibleorifice, found a weakness between the 120th Brigade of the Fortieth Division inthe north and the Sixth in the south. This weak point was to be mended by theForty-first Division, which had been hurried up from Favreuil, but the time wastoo short, or the rent was too wide, so that the Germans pushed rapidly throughand seized the village of Vaulx-Vraumont, separating the Fourth Corps from theSixth. It was an anxious moment, and coupled with the German success at HeninHill in the north it might have meant the isolation of the Sixth Corps; but thenecessary changes were rapidly and steadily effected, so that before eveningthe Highlanders of the 120th Brigade feeling out upon their right and fearingall would be void, joined hands suddenly with the 15th Hampshires of theForty-first Division in the neighbourhood of Beugnatre. Before night had fallenupon March 22 the line had been restored and built up once more, though somefive thousand yards westward of where it had been in the morning. That eveningthe Sixth Division was drawn out, weak and dishevelled, but still full offight. With all the hammering and hustling that it had endured, it had savedits heavy guns and nearly all its field batteries. The Forty-first Divisiontook its place, and incorporated for the time the 7th Brigade, a unit which hadendured hard fortune, for it had held its ground splendidly with little lossuntil, after the fashion of modern war, events upon the other side of thehorizon caused it to get the order to retire, an order which could not beobeyed without complete exposure and very heavy casualties, including ColonelBlackall of the 4th South Staffords. Each day of arduous battle was followed bya no less arduous night, during which, under heavy fire and every conceivabledifficulty the various divisions were readjusted so that the morning lightshould show no impossible salients, no outlying indefensible positions, nonaked flanks, and no yawning gaps. How easy are such exercises over a map upona study table, and how difficult when conducted by dazed, overwrought officers,pushing forward their staggering, half-conscious men in the darkness of awilderness of woods and fields, where the gleam of a single electric torch maymean disaster to all! And yet, as every morning dawned, the haggardstaff-captain at the telephone could still report to his anxious chief that allwas well, and his battle-line still intact between the Hun and his goal.
On the morning of the battle the general disposition of the Fifth Corps hadbeen that the Seventeenth Division (Robertson) was in the line on the left, theSixty-third Naval Division (Lawrie) in the centre, and the Forty-seventhDivision (Gorringe) on the right, being the southern unit of the Third Army, inclose liaison with the Ninth Division, the northern unit of the Fifth Army. Twodivisions were in close reserve, the Second (Pereira) on the right, and theNineteenth (Jeffreys) on the left.
The Forty-seventh Division was in a particularly important position, sinceit was the flank unit and the liaison between the two armies depended upon it.It had only come into line the day before the battle, taking the place of theSecond Division, which was now in immediate support. On March 21 the 140thBrigade covered the right of the divisional front, and the 141st the left, thesector being that of La Vacquerie. In view of the menacing attitude of theenemy both the 142nd Brigade and the 4th Welsh Fusiliers Pioneer Battalion werebrought nearer to the front line. So heavy was the gas bombardment in themorning that the front battalion of the 140th Brigade, the 17th London, had toevacuate some advanced trenches and to wear their gas masks for hours on end.The front line trenches were blown to fragments, and so also were many of theirgarrison. The following infantry advance, however, though vigorously conducted,had no great weight, and seems to have been the work of two battalions carryingout a subsidiary attack. By a counter-attack of the 19th London they weredriven out once more.
Whilst this partial attack had been made upon the Forty-seventh Division,similar assaults had been made upon the Sixty-third in the centre, and upon theSeventeenth in the northern sector of the Fifth Corps. None of them made morethan petty gains, but in each case the bombardment was formidable, chiefly withtrench-mortar bombs and with gas. In the case of the Forty-seventh Divisionthere was a considerable interval between the front brigades, because a numberboth of the 18th and 17th London had been absolutely destroyed, together withtheir trench. There were several other partial attacks during the day, but thepressure was never extreme, and the withdrawal to Highland Ridge after dusk wascarried out on account of the general tactical position. All wounded men werecarried back, and no booty left to the enemy.
Meanwhile the left flank of the Fifth Corps had been covered by the 58thBrigade of the Nineteenth Division, the 9th Welsh Fusiliers being heavilyengaged. During March 22, Havrincourt, Hermies, and the Beaumetz-Hermies linewere held by the Seventeenth, Nineteenth, and Fifty-first divisions againstrepeated German attacks, and in the evening the Nineteenth was in touch withthe Forty-first on its left and with the Second on its right.
On this night of March 22 the principal change was this movement backwardsof the whole Fifth Corps. The retirement of the Fifth Corps continued duringthe day of March 23, and was caused by the necessity of conforming with theSeventh Corps to the south of it which, after valiant exertions, soon to bedescribed, had lost Nurlu, so placing the enemy upon the right rear of thedivisions in the north. Fins had also been taken in the same neighbourhood. TheFifth Corps was now heavily pressed in its retreat, all five divisions enduringconsiderable losses and having the menace of the enemy constantly upon theirright flank. At noon the general line was east of Equancourt, and this line washeld for a time, but the enemy was still thundering on in the north, his freshdivisions rolling in like waves from some inexhaustible sea. At 1:30 they werepushing their attack most desperately upon the weary fringes of riflemen andgroups of tired machine-gunners, who formed the front of the Forty-firstDivision between Beugny and Lebucquière. In all, this division, with theNineteenth and Fifty-first upon their right, sustained five strong attacks inthe afternoon of this day, most of them from Vaulx-Vraumont. EventuallyLebucquière was taken, the enemy breaking their way at this pointthrough the line of the exhausted Fifty-first Division, who had fought withsplendid resolution. This German success placed the Nineteenth Division southof Beaumetz and at Beugny in a very serious position, as the enemy infantry gotbehind the 9th Welsh Fusiliers and 6th Wiltshires, who were only saved fromtotal destruction by the staunch support of the 9th Welsh at Beugny, who heldon desperately until the remains of the 58th Brigade could get back to them.These remains when the three battalions were reunited were only a few hundredmen.
The case of the 57th Brigade, which was fighting a hard rearguard action allafternoon, was little better, and both the 8th Gloucesters and 10th Worcesterswere almost overwhelmed by the swarms of Germans who poured up against theirfront and flank. A splendid stand was made by this brigade north-east of Velu,in which the men of Gloucester especially distinguished themselves. CaptainJones of A Company receiving the V.C. for his heroic resistance. Colonel Hoathof the 10th Warwicks conducted this arduous retreat, and his own battalionshares in the honours of a fight which was tragic in its losses, but essentialfor its effect upon the fortunes of the army. Captain Gribble of this battalionalso received the V.C, his D Company falling to the last man after the besttraditions of the British army. The 5th Brigade of the Second Division, uponthe right of the Nineteenth Division, shared in the honours of this desperatebusiness, the 2nd Oxford and Bucks being very heavily engaged. After theprolonged action the final line of the Nineteenth Division ran west ofBertincourt, the movement of retreat being to the south-west. So confused hadbeen the fighting of the last two days that the Nineteenth Division which hadbeen on the right of the Fifty-first was now upon their left. Still keeping aclosely-knit line and their faces to the foe, the Third Army stretched thatnight from Sailly in the south to the west of Henin and Monchy. The FourthCorps, which had been so badly mauled, was strengthened that evening by theinclusion of the Forty-second Division. The towers of Bapaume in the rearshowed how far across the ravaged and reconquered land the British line hadretreated.
The pressure here described had been upon the left of the Fifth Corps, butthe situation upon its right flank had also been very awkward. The terrificweight thrown upon the Ninth Division had, as will be described, driven themfarther westward than their left-hand companions of the Forty-seventh Division.The result was a most dangerous gap which exposed the whole rear of the ThirdArmy. The 99th Brigade in the Equancourt district endeavoured after the fall ofFins to fill this front, but they were not nearly numerous enough for thepurpose. The result was that the Forty-seventh Division, which moved back onthe night of March 22 from Highland Ridge to the Metz-Dessart Wood line, had toreach out more and more upon the right in order to save the situation. In thisoperation two battalions, the 4th Welsh Fusiliers Pioneers and the 23rd London,sustained most of the attack and suffered very heavily upon March 23, while inthe preliminary fighting upon March 22 the 18th London had many losses. By themorning of March 24, the Forty-seventh, beating off all attacks and keepingtheir position in the unbroken line, had fallen back to a new position, the142nd Brigade, which formed the rearguard, fighting hard in its retreat, andhaving to brush aside those groups of Germans who had slipped in at therear.
The morning of March 24 found the German March 24. torrent still roaringforward in full spate, though less formidable than before, since the heavierguns were far to the rear. Their light artillery, trench-mortars, andmachine-guns were always up with the storming columns, and the latter wererelieved in a manner which showed the competence of their higher command. Itwas a day of doubt and difficulty for the British, tor the pressure waseverywhere severe, and the line had frayed until it was very thin, whileofficers and men had reached the last limits of human endurance. At 8:30 in themorning the enemy was pressing hard upon the Seventeenth and Forty-seventhDivisions in the region of Bus and Le Mesnil, where they were endeavouring tokeep in touch with the worn remains of the heroic Ninth Division on the left ofthe Seventh Corps. Sailly Saillisel was still clear of the enemy, but the tidewas flowing strongly towards it. The 51st Brigade of the Seventeenth Divisionoccupied this village and threw out its left to the Londoners on the north ofthem. Bertincourt, which had become a dangerous salient, was evacuated, and theline now ran east of Haplincourt and Rocquigny, the three brigades of theSeventeenth Division occupying this latter village, Barastre, andVillers-au-Flos. On their north were two brigades of the Forty-seventh, theremaining brigade being south of Le Transloy. North of the Forty-seventhDivision the Sixty-third Naval Division and the Second Division carried theline on to the junction with the Fourth Corps, where the exhausted NineteenthDivision lay across the Cambrai road, with the even more shattered Fifty-firstDivision at Riencourt to the north of them. There was some very furiousfighting in front of Rocquigny about mid-day, in which the 12th Manchesters ofthe Seventeenth Division, and the three battalions (18th, 19th, 20th London) ofthe 141st Brigade made a very desperate resistance. The fighting was continueduntil the defenders found themselves in danger of being surrounded, when theywere withdrawn. The 140th Brigade, under Colonel Dawes, also did great servicethat day in holding the Germans from getting behind the line. The enemy was sofar round that there was the greatest difficulty in clearing the transport,which was only accomplished by the fine rearguard work of the 4th WelshFusiliers, aided by the 11th Motor Machine-gun Battery, and 34th BrigadeR.F.A.
It was, however, to the south, where the Third and Fifth Armies wereintermittently joined and vaguely interlocked, that the danger chiefly lay.About noon, the enemy, finding the weak spot between the two armies, had forcedhis way into Sailly Saillisel in considerable force, and pushed rapidly northand west from the village. So rapid was the German advance upon the right rearof the Fifth Corps that Rancourt and even Combles were said to have fallen. Invain the Seventeenth Division overstretched its wing to the south, trying tolink up with the Seventh Corps. Early in the afternoon Morval and Les Boeufshad gone, and the troops were back upon the mud-and-blood areas of 1916. Forthe moment it seemed that the British line had gone, and it was hard to saywhat limit might be put to this very serious advance. By midnight the enemywere north of Bapaume, and had reached Ervillers, while in the south they hadtaken Longueval, the key village of Delville Wood. It was indeed a sad relapseto see all that the glorious dead had bought with their hearts' blood revertingso swiftly to the enemy. In the north, however, as has already been shown inthe story of the Sixth Corps, the enemy's bolt was shot, and in the south hisswift career was soon to be slowed and held.
In the Favreuil, Sapignies, and Gomiecourt district, north of Bapaume, theadvance was mainly accomplished through the pressure of fresh German forcesupon the exhausted and attenuated line of the Forty-first Division, which stillstruggled bravely, and in the end successfully, against overwhelming odds. Inthe effort to hold a line the divisions which had been drawn out as too weakfor service turned back once more into the fray like wounded men who totterforward to strike a feeble blow for their comrades in distress. The SixthDivision was led in once more, and sustained fresh and terrible losses. Itsleft fell back to Favreuil, exposing the right wing of the Fortieth Division.The Twenty-fifth Division to the east of Achiet found itself also once moreovertaken by the battle. By evening the line had been built up again in thisquarter, and the dead-weary British infantry snatched a few hours of sleepbefore another day of battle. The Nineteenth Division, reduced to 2000 rifles,lay from Le Barque to Avesnes, with the Second upon their right and theForty-first upon their left, while the whole of this difficult retreat had beencovered by the weary but indomitable Highlanders of the Fifty-first.
The really serious situation was to the south of Bapaume upon the old Sommebattle-field, where the Germans had made sudden and alarming progress. Theirtemporary success was due to the fact that the losses in the British lines hadcontracted the ranks until it was impossible to cover the whole space or toprevent the infiltration of the enemy between the units. The situation requiredsome complete and vigorous regrouping and reorganisation if complete disasterwas to be avoided. Up to this point the British Higher Command had been unableto do much to help the two hard-pressed armies, save to supply them with thescanty succours which were immediately available. Now, however, it interferedwith decision at the vital spot and in the vital moment. To ensure solidity andunity, Congreve's Seventh Corps, which had been the northern unit of the FifthArmy, became from this time onwards the southern unit of the Third Army,passing under the command of General Byng. With them went the First, Second,and Third Cavalry Divisions, which had been doing really splendid service inthe south. Everything north of the Somme was now Third Army. At the same timethe three fine and fresh Australian Divisions, the Third, Fourth, and Fifth,were assembling near Doullens in readiness to strike, while the Twelfth BritishDivision was also hurried towards the place of danger. The future was dark anddangerous, but there were also solid grounds for hope.
On the morning of March 25 the line of the Third Army, which had defineditself more clearly during the night, ran from Curlu near the Somme, east ofBazentin, west of Longueval, east of Martinpuich, through Ligny Thilloy,Sapignies, Ervillers, and hence as before. The enemy, whose cavalry were wellup and in force, at once began his thrusting tactics in the southern section ofthe field, and may have expected, after his advance of the day before, to findsome signs of weakening resistance. In this he was disappointed, for both the47th Londoners in front of Contalmaison and the Second Division at LignyThilloy beat off several attacks with very great loss to the assailants. Theunits were much broken and mixed, but the spirit of the individuals wasexcellent. The pressure continued, however, to be very great, and in theafternoon the line was once more pushed to the westwards. There was severefighting between Bapaume and Sapignies, where mixed and disorganised unitsstill held the Germans back, but in the late afternoon three distinct gaps hadappeared in the line, one between the Seventh and Fifth Corps, one in the FifthCorps itself in the Pozières area of the Sixty-third Division, and onebetween the Fifth and the Fourth Corps. Fortunately, the resistance had been sodesperate that by the time the Germans had their opportunity they were alwaysso bedraggled themselves that they could not take full advantage of it. Thegeneral order of divisions in this area, counting from the south ofContalmaison, was Seventeenth, Forty-seventh, Sixty-third, Second, upon themorning of March 25.
The Seventh Corps, the previous adventures of which will be described underthe heading of the Fifth Army, had now become the right wing of the Third Army.It had been strengthened by the advent of the Thirty-fifth Division, and thisunit now covered from west of Curlu to east of Maricourt, where it touched theright of the Ninth Division—if the thin ranks of that gallant band can bedignified by so imposing a title. The Highlanders covered the front toMontauban, where they touched the First Cavalry Division, but beyond that theenemy were pouring round their flank at Bernafoy and Mametz Woods. It was underthese trying conditions that the Twelfth Division was ordered up, about noon,to secure the left of the Seventh Corps and entirely stopped the dangerousgap.
Another had formed farther north. The Seventeenth Division, who were on theright of the Fifth Corps, held from Mametz to Contalmaison. Thence toPozières was held by the Forty-seventh. A gap existed, however, upontheir left, between them and the Sixty-third Division, who were graduallyfalling back upon Courcelette. The left of the Naval Division was also in theair, having lost touch with the right of the Second Division who were coveringLe Sars. North of them the Nineteenth Division extended from the west ofGrevillers to the south of Bihucourt. The 57th Brigade in the north, under thelocal command of Colonel Sole, fought a fine rearguard action as the enemytried to debouch from Grevillers. Considering how terribly mauled this brigadehad been a few days before, this was a really splendid performance of thesebrave Midlanders, and was repeated by them more than once during the day. Fromtheir left flank to the north stretched a new division, Braithwaite'sSixty-second, which had upheld the honour of Yorkshire so gloriously atCambrai. Their line ran west of Sapignies and joined the Forty-second Divisionat the point where they touched the Sixth Corps, east of Ervillers.
The front of the Sixty-second stretched from Bucquoy to Puisieux. The enemykept working round the right flank, and the situation there was very dangerous,for everything to the immediate south was in a state of flux, shreds andpatches of units endeavouring to cover a considerable stretch of all-importantcountry. South of Puisieux there was a gap of four or five miles before onecame to British troops. Into this gap in the very nick of time came first the4th Brigade of the Second Australian Division, and later the New ZealandDivision in driblets, which gradually spanned the vacant space, It was a veryclose call for a breakthrough without opposition. Being disappointed in thisthe Germans upon March 26 spent the whole afternoon in fierce attacks upon theSixty-second Division, but got little but hard knocks from Braithwaite'sYorkshiremen. The 186th Brigade on the right threw back a flank to RossignolWood to cover the weak side.
Meanwhile the enemy had made a spirited attempt to push through between theSeventh Corps and the Fifth. With this design he attacked heavily, bending backthe thin line of the Ninth Division, who were supported by the Twenty-firstDivision, numbering at this period 1500 men. At four in the afternoon theGerman stormers got into Maricourt, but they were thrust out again by theThirty-fifth Division. They had better success farther north, where in the lateevening they got round the left flank of the Forty-seventh Division andoccupied Pozières. The Londoners threw out a defensive line to the northand awaited events, but the general position between the Fifth and Fourth Corpswas serious, as the tendency was for the gap to increase, and for the FourthCorps to swing north-west while the other turned to the south-west. The TwelfthDivision was transferred therefore from the Seventh to the Fifth Corps, and wasgiven a line on the west bank of the Ancre from Albert to Hamel. This moveproved in the sequel to be a most effective one. In the evening of this day,March 25, the line from Bray to Albert exclusive was allotted to the SeventhCorps, which was directed to leave a covering party as long as possible on aline from the River Somme to Montauban, in order to safeguard the retirement ofthe Fifth Army. Then came the Twelfth Division covering Albert, then theremains of the Forty-seventh and of the Second from Thiepval to Beaumont Hamel,all moving across the Ancre. It is said that during the retreat from Moscow anofficer having asked who were the occupants of a certain sledge, was answered:"The Royal Regiment of Dutch Guards." It is in a somewhat similar sense thatall mentions of battalions, brigades, and divisions must be taken at this stageof the battle. The right of the Fourth Corps was threatened by an irruption ofthe enemy at Pys and Irles, who threatened to get by this route round the flankof the Sixty-second Division, but found the Twenty-fifth Division still hadvitality enough left to form a defensive flank looking south. At the same timethe Forty-second Division had been driven back west of Gomiecourt, and was outof touch with the right of the Sixth Corps. Things were still serious and thefuture dark. Where was the retreat to be stayed? Was it destined to roll backto Amiens or possibly to Abbeville beyond it? The sky had clouded, the dayswere mirk, the hanging Madonna had fallen from the cathedral of Albert, thetroops were worn to shadows. The twilight of the gods seemed to have come.
It was at that very moment that the first light of victory began to dawn. Itis true that the old worn divisions could hardly be said any longer to exist,but the new forces, the Yorkshiremen of the Sixty-second in the north, the NewZealanders and the Twelfth in the centre, and very particularly the threeSplendid divisions of Australians in the area just south of Albert, were thestrong buttresses of the dam which at last held up that raging tide. Nevershould our British Imperial troops forget the debt which they owed to Australiaat that supreme hour of destiny. The very sight of those lithe, rakishdare-devils with their reckless, aggressive bearing, or their staiderfresh-faced brethren with the red facings of New Zealand, was good for tiredeyes. There was much still to be done before an equilibrium should be reached,but the rough outline of the permanent positions had even now, in those hoursof darkness and danger, been traced across the German path. There was but onegap on the morning of March 26, which lay between Auchonvillers andHébuterne, and into this the New Zealand Division and one brigade of theSecond Australians were, as already stated, hurriedly sent, the New Zealanderssupporting and eventually relieving the Second British Division, while theAustralians relieved the Nineteenth. The line was attacked, but stood firm, andthe New Zealanders actually recaptured Colincamps.
The chief fighting both of this day and of the next fell upon Scott'sTwelfth Division, which lay before Albert, and was occupying the western sideof the railway line. So vital was the part played by the Twelfth in thisquarter, and so strenuous their work, that a connected and more detailedaccount of it would perhaps not be out of place. The 37th Brigade was in thenorth-east of Mesnil and Aveluy Wood, the 36th in the centre, and the 35th onthe west bank of the Ancre, with outposts to cover the crossings at Albert andAveluy. The men were fresh and eager, but had only their rifles to trust to,for they had neither wire, bombs, rifle-grenades. Very lights, or signals,having been despatched at the shortest notice to the battlefield. Their orderswere to hold their ground at all costs, and most valiantly they obeyed it. Itis only when one sees a map of the German forces in this part of the field,with the divisions marked upon it like flies upon fly-paper, that oneunderstands the odds against which these men had to contend. Nor was theefficiency of the enemy less than his numbers. "The Germans scouted forward ina very clever manner, making full use of the old chalk trenches," says anobserver. In the north upon the evening of March 26 the enemy crept up toMesnil, and after a long struggle with the 6th Queen's forced their way intothe village. Shortly after midnight, however, some of the 6th Buffs and 6thWest Kents, together with part of the Anson battalion from the Sixty-thirdDivision, won back the village once more, taking twelve machine-guns and anumber of prisoners. The other two brigades had not been attacked upon the26th, but a very severe battle awaited them all upon March 27. It began by aheavy shelling of Hamel in the morning, by which the garrison was driven out.The Germans then attacked southwards down the railway from Hamel, but were heldup by the 6th West Kents. The pressure extended, however, to the 9th RoyalFusiliers of the 36th Brigade upon the right of the West Kents, who had a long,bitter struggle in which they were assisted by the 247th Field Company of theRoyal Engineers and other elements of the 188th Brigade. This brigade, beingalready worn to a shadow, was withdrawn, while another shadow, the 5th Brigade,took its place, one of its battalions, the 24th Royal Fusiliers, fightingstoutly by the side of the West Kents. There was a time when the pressure wasso great that all touch was lost between the two brigades; but the and line washeld during the whole of the day and night of the 27th and on into the 28th. Ateleven o'clock in the morning of this day a new attack by fresh troops was madeupon the West Kents and the 7th Sussex, and the men of Kent were at one timedriven back, but with the aid of the 24th Royal Fusiliers the line was entirelyre-established. The whole episode represented forty-eight hours of continualclose combat until, upon March 29, this front was relieved by the SecondDivision. Apart from the heavy casualties endured by the enemy, this gain oftime was invaluable at a crisis when every day meant a thickening of theBritish line of resistance.
The fight upon the right wing of the 36th Brigade had been equally violentand even more deadly. In the fight upon March 27, when the Royal West Kents and9th Fusiliers were so hard pressed in the north, their comrades of the 5thBerks and 7th Sussex had been very heavily engaged in the south. The Germans,by a most determined advance, drove a wedge between the Berkshires and theSussex, and another between the Sussex and the Fusiliers, but in each case theisolated bodies of men continued the desperate fight. The battle raged for atime round the battalion headquarters of the Sussex, where Colonel Impey,revolver in hand, turned the tide of fight like some leader of old. The losseswere terrible, but the line shook itself clear of Germans, and though theyattacked again upon the morning of March 28, they were again beaten off, andheavily shelled as they plodded in their sullen retreat up the hillside to LaBoisselle.
Meanwhile, the 35th Brigade had also been fighting for its life to thesouth. Albert had fallen to the Germans, for it was no part of the plan ofdefence to hold the town itself, but the exits from it and the lines on eachside of it were jealously guarded. At 7 P.M. on March 26 the Germans were inthe town, but they had practically reached their limit. Parties had crossed theAncre, and there were attacked by the 7th Norfolks, who were supported in along fight upon the morning of the 27th by the 9th Essex and the 5th NorthantsPioneer Battalion. The line was held, partly by the aid given by the 51stBrigade of the Seventeenth Division, who numbered just 600 men and were led byMajor Cubbon. Whilst the line was held outside Albert, the Germans in the townhad a very deadly time, being fired at at short ranges by the 78th and 79thBrigades Royal Field Artillery. The 7th Suffolks were drawn into the infantryfight, which became a more and more desperate affair, involving every man whocould be thrown into it, including two battalions, the 1st Artists and 10thBedfords from the 190th Brigade of the Sixty-third Division. These latter unitssuffered very heavily from machine-gun fire before ever they reached thefiring-line. At 8 A.M. upon March 28 the Germans were still pouring men throughAlbert, but were utterly unable to debouch upon the other side under themurderous fire of the British. A single company of the 9th Essex fired 15,000rounds, and the whole slope which faced them was dotted with the German dead.The town of Albert formed a covered line of approach, and though the Britishguns were still pounding the buildings and the eastern approaches, the Germanswere able to assemble in it during darkness and to form up unseen in greatnumbers for the attack. At ten in the morning of the 28th another desperateeffort was made to get through and clear a path for all the hordes waitingbehind. The British artillery smothered one attack, but a second broke over the7th Norfolks and nearly submerged them. Both flanks were turned, and in spiteof great work done by Captain Chalmers with his machine-guns the battalion wasnearly surrounded. The losses were terrible, but the survivors formed up againhalf a mile to the west, where they were again attacked in the evening andagain exposed to heavy casualties, including their commanding officer. Fewbattalions have endured more. Late that night the 10th West Yorkshires of theSeventeenth Division came to their relief. The whole of the Twelfth Divisionwas now rested for a time, but they withdrew from their line in glory, for itis no exaggeration to say that they had fought the Germans to an absolutestandstill.
We shall now return to March 26, a date which had been darkened by thecapture of Albert. Apart from this success upon the German side, which broughtthem into a town which they had not held for years, the general line in thisquarter began to assume the same outline as in 1916 before the Somme battle, sothat Hébuterne and Auchonvillers north of Albert were in British hands,while Serre and Puisieux were once more German. The existence of the oldtrenches had helped the weary army to hold this definite line, and as alreadyshown it had received reinforcements which greatly stiffened its resistance.The dangerous gap which had yawned between the Fourth and Fifth Corps was nowsuccessfully filled. In the morning of March 27 all was solid once more in thisdirection. At eleven on that date, an inspiriting order was sent along the linethat the retreat was over and that the army must fight out the issue where itstood. It is the decisive call which the British soldier loves and never failsto obey. The line was still very attenuated in parts, however, and it was fatedto swing and sway before it reached its final stability.
The fighting upon the front of the Sixty-second Division at Bucquoy uponMarch 27 was as heavy as on the front of the Twelfth to the south, and cost theGermans as much, for the Lewis guns had wonderful targets upon the endless greywaves which swept out of the east. The 5th West Ridings, east of RossignolWood, were heavily engaged, the Germans bombing their way very cleverly up theold trenches when they could no longer face the rifle-fire in the open. Therewere three separate strong attacks on Bucquoy, which covered the slopes withdead, but the persistent attempts to get round the right wing were moredangerous. These fell chiefly on the 2/4 Yorks Light Infantry between RossignolWood and Hébuterne, driving this battalion in. A dangerous gap thendeveloped between the British and the Australians, but a strong counter-attackof the 5th Yorkshire Light Infantry after dark, with the Australians and fourtanks co-operating, recovered nearly all the lost ground.
On March 28 there was again a very heavy attack upon the 1 86th Brigade. Thestormers surged right up to the muzzles of the rifles, but never beyond them.Over 200 dead were found lying in front of one company. One isolated platoon ofthe 5th West Ridings was cut off and was killed to the last man. Farther to theright there were several determined attacks upon the 187th Brigade and the 4thAustralian Brigade, the latter being under the orders of the Sixty-secondDivision. These also were repulsed in the open, but the bombing, in which theGermans had the advantage of a superiority of bombs, was more difficult tomeet, and the 5th Yorkshire Light Infantry were driven from Rossignol Wood andthe ground which they had so splendidly captured the night before.
About 11 A.M. on this day the Forty-first Division had been ordered up toman the east of Gommecourt. A brigade of this division, the 124th, co-operatedwith the 8th West Yorkshires and some of the Australians in a fresh attack uponRossignol Wood, which failed at first, but eventually, after dark, secured thenorth end of the wood, and greatly eased the local pressure. On March 29 and 30the positions were safely held, and the attacks less dangerous. On the eveningof the latter date the Sixty-second Division was relieved by theThirty-seventh.
Whilst these events had occurred upon the front of the Sixty-secondDivision, Russell's New Zealanders were holding the line to the south in theirusual workmanlike fashion. From March 26 they held up the Germans, whose mainattacks, however, were north and south of them, though March 27 saw severallocal advances against the Canterburys and the Rifles. On March 30 the NewZealanders hit back again at La Signy Farm, with good results, taking 295prisoners. It was a smart little victory at a time when the smallest victorywas indeed precious.
Reverting now to the general situation upon March 27, the weak point wasnorth and south of the Somme to the south of Albert. Between the river andHarbonnière the left wing of the Fifth Army had been broken, as will betold when we come to consider the operations in that area. The German advancewas pouring down the line of the river with the same fierce rapidity with whichit had recently thundered forward over the old Somme battlefields. Havingannihilated the local resistance on the left bank of the river, where ColonelHorn and 400 nondescripts did all that they could, they were pushing on fromCerisy to Corbie. General Watts of the Nineteenth Corps, whose defence was oneof the outstanding features of the whole operations, was hard put to it tocover his left wing, so in loyal co-operation the Third Army north of the riverdetached the hard-worked Cavalry Corps, who were always called upon at momentsof supreme crisis, and who never failed to answer the call. It was actuallyengaged to the north of the river at the time, but disengaged itself in part,though the enemy was holding Cerisy and Chipilly and had got a bridge acrossthe river which would enable them to get to the rear of General Watts' Corps.The means by which this very dangerous German move was kept within bounds comeswithin the history of the Fifth Army. Suffice it to say that the cavalry passedover the river and that the Seventh Corps, north of the river, extended tocover the wider front, throwing out a defensive flank along the north bank fromSailly-le-Sec to Aubigny.
Along the whole line to the north the pressure was great all day upon March27, but the attacks upon the Fourth Corps, which were particularly severe, wererepulsed with great loss at Beaumont Hamel, Bucquoy, north of Puisieux, and atAblainzeville. Near Bucquoy the Sixty-second Division in these two daysrepelled, as already narrated, eight separate German attacks. This fighting hasto be fitted in with that recounted in the previous chapter near Ayette, inconnection with the Thirty-first Division, in order to get a complete view ofthe whole German effort and the unbroken British line. Hamel was the only freshvillage to the north of Albert which was taken by the Germans that day.
March 28 was remarkable for the very desperate engagement upon the front ofthe Sixth and Seventeenth Corps, which has been already described, and whichmarked the limit of the whole German advance in the northern area. The FourthCorps farther south had its own share of the fighting, however, as already toldin connection with the defence of Bucquoy by the Sixty-second Division. Theline was held, however, and save for a small strip of Rossignol Wood, no gainat all came to solace the Germans for very heavy losses.
All through these operations it is worthy of note that an important part wasplayed by reorganised bodies of men, so mixed and broken that no name can beassigned to them. Officers stationed in the rear collected these stragglers,and led them back into gaps of the line, where their presence was sometimes ofvital importance. A divisional general, speaking of these curious and irregularformations, says: "There was no panic of any kind. The men of all divisionswere quite willing to halt and fight, but as the difficulty of orders reachingthem made them uncertain as to their correct action, they came back slowly andin good order. Once they received some definite orders they fell into line anddug themselves in at once." At one point 4000 men were collected in thisfashion.
In the Australian area the enemy occupied Dernancourt, but otherwise thewhole line was intact. It was still necessary, however, to keep a defensiveline thrown back along the north bank of the Somme, as the situation to thesouth, especially at Marcelcave, was very dangerous. Thus, the Seventh Corpscovered this flank from Corbie to Sailly, and then ran north to Treux on theAlbert—Amiens Railway. The arrival of the cavalry to the south of theriver had spliced the weak section, so that on the morning of March 29 theBritish commanders from north to south had every cause to be easier in theirminds. An inactive day was the best proof of the severity of the rebuff whichthe Germans had sustained the day before, nor were matters improved from theirpoint of view when upon March 30 they attacked the Australians near Dernancourtand lost some thousands of men without a yard of gain, or when the NewZealanders countered them, with the capture of 250 prisoners and manymachine-guns.
This small chronicle of huge events has now brought the southern half of theThird Army to the same date already reached in the previous chapter' by thenorthern half. The narrative has by no means reached the limit of the fightingcarried on by this portion of the line, but equilibrium has roughly beenattained, and if the story be now continued it leaves too wide a gap for thereader to cross when he has to return to the history of the Fifth Army upon the21st of March. Therefore we shall leave the Third Third Army for the time andonly return to it when we have followed the resistance of the Fifth Army up tothe same date.
Before starting upon this new epic, it would be well to remind the reader ofthe general bearing of the events already described, as it is very easy inattention to detail to lose sight of the larger issues. The experience of theThird Army then, put in its briefest form, was that the attack upon March 21fell with terrific violence upon the two central corps, the Sixth and Fourth;that these, after a most valiant resistance, were forced to retire; that thestrategical situation thus created caused the Seventeenth Corps in the northand the Fifth Corps in the south to fall back, and. that both of them were thenpressed by the enemy; that for six days the army fell slowly back, fightingcontinual rearguard actions against superior numbers; that this movementinvolved only a short retreat in the north, but a longer one in the south,until in the Albert region it reached its maximum; that finally the Germansmade a determined effort upon March 28 to break the supple and resilient linewhich had always faced them, and that this attempt, most gallantly urged,involved the Corps in the north as well as the whole line of the Third Army.The result of this great battle was a bloody defeat for the Germans, especiallyin the northern sector, where they made hardly any gain of ground and lost suchvast numbers of men that their whole enterprise was brought to a completestandstill and was never again resumed in that quarter.
The losses of the Third Army during that week of desperate fighting when, inspite of the heroic efforts of the Medical Corps, the wounded had frequently tobe abandoned, and when it was often impossible to get the guns away intact,were very severe. Many divisions which numbered their 9000 infantry upon March21 could not put 1500 in the line upon March 28. These losses were not,however, so great as they might appear, since the constant movement of troops,carried on very often in pitch darkness, made it impossible to keep the mentogether. An official estimate taken at the time and subject to subsequentrevision put the loss of guns at 206, only 23 of which were above the 6-inchcalibre. Forty three others were destroyed. The casualties in the Third Armyduring the period under review might be placed approximately at 70,000, dividedinto 10,000 killed, 25,000 missing, and 35,000 wounded. The heaviest losseswere in the Fifty-ninth Division, which gave 5765 as its appalling total, butthe Sixth Division was little behind it, and the Forty-second, Forty-seventh,and Fifty-first were all over 4000. The Thirty-fifth Division had also a mosthonourable record, enduring very heavy losses in which the numbers of missingwere comparatively small. Its work, however, was chiefly done at a later datethan that which closes this chapter. In the estimate of losses there has to beincluded practically the whole personnel of the devoted battalions who held theforward line upon the first day of the German attack. In connection with thelarge number of stragglers, who were afterwards gathered together and showed bytheir conduct that they had no want of stomach for the fight, it is to beremembered that the men had been accustomed to the narrow routine of trenchoperations, that most of them had no idea of open warfare, and that when theyfound themselves amidst swift evolutions over difficult country, carried onfrequently in darkness, it was very natural that they should lose their unitsand join the throng who wandered down the main roads and were eventuallyrounded up and formed into formations at the river crossings or other placeswhere they could be headed off. Among the casualties were many senior officers,including General Bailey of the 142nd Brigade.
The Fifth Army front—The story of a Redoubt —Attack upon Congreve's Seventh Corps—Upon Watts' NineteenthCorps—Upon Maxse's Eighteenth Corps—Upon Butler's ThirdCorps—Terrific pressure—Beginning of the Retreat—Losses ofGuns
IN dealing with the German attack upon the Fifth Army, thefirst point which should be emphasised is, that heavy as the fighting was inthe north, still it was this southern advance which was the main one. Theofficial account of the disposition of the German forces brings this fact outvery clearly. From the Sensée River to the Bapaume-Cambrai road they arestated to have had nine divisions in line and eight in close reserve, coveringa front of nine miles. In the eight miles from Cambrai road to La Vacqueriethey had four divisions. In the southern area from La Vacquerie down to LaFère they had twenty-three divisions in the line and seventeen inreserve, covering a front of over forty miles. This front was defended byeleven British divisions, with three divisions of infantry and three of cavalryin reserve. So far as infantry was concerned the odds were 40 to 14, while theGerman guns numbered about 3500 to 1300 on the British line. These odds wereserious enough if directed equally along the whole area, but when thrown in onspecial sectors they became more crushing. To add to the total picture ofGerman strength, it should be added that twenty-five fresh divisions werethrown into the fight during the first week, nine upon Scarpe front, threebetween the Ancre and the Somme, seven between the Somme and Montdidier, andsix between Montdidier and the Oise. Against these have to be set Britishreinforcements, and the influx of French from the south. It was only on thefirst five days of battle that the odds were so overpoweringly with theGermans.
In this chapter we shall endeavour to gain a superficial view of the generalcourse of events upon the whole front of the Fifth Army upon the fateful March21. We shall then be in a position to appreciate the situation as it was in theevening and to understand those decisions on the part of General Gough and hissubordinates which influenced the subsequent operations.
The front of the Fifth Army extended from its junction with the Third Armyin the neighbourhood of La Vacquerie to Barisis, a village some miles south ofthe Oise, the total frontage being nearly forty miles. This was occupied byfour corps. The northern was the Seventh, under General Congreve, a well-knownsoldier, whose V.C. and shattered arm proclaimed his past services to theEmpire. This corps covered the southern part of the dangerous Cambrai salientand extended to the region of Ronssoy. From this point to Maissemy the line washeld by General Watts with the Nineteenth Corps. Upon his right, extending asfar as north of Essigny, was General Maxse with the Eighteenth Corps. Fromthence to Barisis lay, the Third Corps under General Butler. All four weresoldiers of wide experience, their leader, General Gough, had never failed inany task to which he had laid his hand, and the troops in the line comprisedsome of the flower of the British army, so that in spite of all disparity ofnumbers there was a reasonable hope for success. Arrangements had been made bywhich the French or British could send lateral help to each other; but it mustbe admitted that the liaison work proved to be defective, and that the succourswere slower in arriving, and less equipped for immediate action, than had beenexpected.
The fortifications along the front of the Fifth Army were of various degreesof strength, depending upon the nature of the ground and upon the time that ithad been in British possession, the north being stronger than the south. TheOise, which had been looked upon as an obstacle, and the presence of which hadseemed to justify the extraordinarily long sector held by the Third Corps, hadto some extent dried up and had ceased to be a real protection. In the main,the defences consisted of a forward line, a chain of small redoubts, each withfour machine-guns and all connected by posts; a battle-line which was stronglywired and lay about 3000 yards behind the forward line; and a rear zone, thefortifications of which were not complete. If anything were wanting in thedepth of the defences it has to be remembered that we are speaking of a vasttract of country, and that to dig a serviceable trench from London, we willsay, to Guildford, furnishing it with sandbags and wire, is a mighty task.There were no enslaved populations who could be turned on to such work. Formonths before the attack the troops, aided by the cavalry and by severalspecial entrenching battalions, were digging incessantly. Indeed, the remarkhas been made that their military efficiency was impaired by the constant navvywork upon which they were employed. There is no room for criticism upon thispoint, for everything possible was done, even in that southern sector which hadonly been a few weeks in British possession.
Before beginning to follow the history of March 21, it would be well todescribe the position and number of the reserves, as the course of eventsdepended very much upon this factor. Many experienced soldiers were of opinionthat if they had been appreciably more numerous, and considerably nearer theline, the positions could have been made good. The three infantry divisions inquestion were the Thirty-ninth, which was immediately behind the Seventh Corps,the Twentieth, which was in the neighbourhood of Ham, and was allotted to theEighteenth Corps, and the Fiftieth, which was in general army reserve, andabout seven hours' march from the line. The First Cavalry Division was in therear of the Nineteenth Corps, while the Second Cavalry Division was on theright behind the Third Corps. The Third Cavalry Division was in billets uponthe Somme, and it also was sent to the help of the Third Corps. Besides thesetroops the nearest supports were at a distance of at least three days' journey,and consisted of a single unit, the Eighth Division.
The German preparations for the attack had not been unobserved and it wasfully expected upon the morning of the battle, but what was not either expectedor desired was the ground mist, which seems to have been heavier in thesouthern than in the northern portion of the line. So dense was it that duringthe critical hours when the Germans were pouring across No Man's Land it wasnot possible to see for more than twenty yards, and the whole scheme of theforward defence, depending as it did upon machine-guns, placed in depth andsweeping every approach, was completely neutralised by this freak of nature,which could not have been anticipated, for it was the first time such a thinghad occurred for two months. Apart from the machine-guns, a number of isolatedfield-guns had been sown here and there along the front, where they had lurkedin silence for many weeks waiting for their time to come. These also wererendered useless by the weather, and had no protection from the German advance,which overran and submerged them.
The devastating bombardment broke out along the line about five o'clock, andshortly after ten it was known that the German infantry had advanced and hadinvaded the whole of the forward zone, taking a few of the redoubts, but inmost cases simply passing them in the fog, and pushing on to the main Britishline. As it is impossible to give the experiences of each redoubt in detail,the story of one may be told as being fairly typical of the rest. Thisparticular one is chosen because some facts are available, whereas in most ofthem a deadly silence, more eloquent than words, covers their fate. The Enghienredoubt was held by Colonel Wetherall with a company of the 2/4 Oxford andBucks Light Infantry upon the front of the Sixty-first Division. The redoubtformed the battalion headquarters, and was connected to brigade headquarters bya cable buried eight feet deep. In front were two companies of the battalion inthe outpost line; behind was the fourth company ready for counter-attack. Earlyin the morning heavy trench-mortar fire was raining bombs upon the redoubt, andthe wire was flying in all directions. At 6 the redoubt was so full of gas thateven the masks could not hold it out, so the men were ordered below and put upgas blankets to fend it off. This could be safely done, as when gas is so thickit is not possible for the stormers to advance. At 6:15, what with fog and gasand blurred respirators, it was hardly possible to see anything at all. At 7:30the gas cleared and there was a shower of high explosive shells with shatteringeffect. At 9:30 the barrage lifted and the garrison rushed up from theirshelters and manned their posts, but the fog rolled white and thick acrosstheir vision. The cloud banked right up to their wire, while from behind itcame all the noises of the pit. So nerve-shaking was the effect that some ofthe outlying men came creeping into the redoubt for human company. At 9.40 thewhizzing of bullets all around showed that the infantry was on the move. Thegarrison fired back into the mist, whence came vague shoutings and tramplings.A request was cabled back for a protective barrage, but the inadequate replyshowed that the British guns had suffered in the shelling. Suddenly the mistdarkened at one point; it broke into running figures, and a wave of men rushedforward, scrambled through the broken wire, and clambered into the redoubt. TheOxfords rushed across and bombed them back into the mist again. There was apause, during which the attack was reorganised, and then at 11 o'clock theGerman stormers poured suddenly in from three sides at once. The garrison stoodto it stoutly and drove them out, leaving many bodies on the broken wire. Thefort was now entirely surrounded, and there was a fresh attack from the rearwhich added fifty or sixty more to the German losses. At 11:45 there was somelifting of the fog, and Colonel Wetherall endeavoured to get across to thevillage, 300 yards behind him, to see if help could be obtained. He found itdeserted. Stealing back to his fort he was covered suddenly by German rifles,was dragged away as a prisoner, but finally, late in the evening, escaped andrejoined the main body of his own battalion. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Cunninghamhad taken over the defence of Enghien redoubt, assisted by Lieutenant Richardswith the machine-guns. Hour after hour fresh attacks were repelled, but showersof bombs fell in the confined space, and the garrison were continually thinnedout. Despairing messages—"What shall we do? What shall we do?"—weresent back over the cable, but nothing could be done, for these outliers are theenfants perdus of the army, marked from the first for destruction.Finally, at 4:30, the great deep all around them sent one heavy wave tosubmerge them, and the cable was for ever silent.
Such is the typical history of a redoubt. Some succumbed more readily, somesurvived until the afternoon of the next day; but the difference may sometimeshave depended upon the various degrees of severity of attack, which was by nomeans the same upon all sectors. The total effect was the complete destructionof the eleven gallant battalions which held the advanced line of the FifthArmy, and the loss of all material therein. One can but hope that the enemypaid a full price. Occasionally a sudden rise of the mist gave the defence asplendid opening for their machine-guns. On one occasion such a chance exposeda German officer standing with a large map in his hand within thirty yards ofthe fort, his company awaiting his directions beside him. Few of themescaped.
We shall now follow the line of the Fifth Army from the north. The SeventhCorps upon the left consisted of the Ninth (Tudor), the Twenty-first(Campbell), and the Sixteenth (Hull) Divisions in the order named, and itcarried the line down as far as Ronssoy, where it joined on to Watts'Nineteenth Corps. The Ninth Division had two brigades in the line, and all thebattalions both of the Twenty-sixth and of the South Africans were in theforward zone and exposed to the usual devastating losses. Their front joinedthat of the Forty-seventh Division at Fifteen Ravine in the north, and theTwenty-first at Chapel Hill in the south. About eleven o'clock the main advanceof the Germans struck up against this front. There was no action upon the leftbetween Gauche Wood and the canal, though the bombardment was exceedinglyheavy. On the right in the neighbourhood of Gauche Wood the fighting was verysevere all day, and the stormers were able to make little progress, althoughthey attacked again and again with the utmost resolution. This attack fellmainly upon the South African Brigade, who held on with the same firm couragewhich they had shown at Delville Wood, and proved once more that there are nobetter soldiers in all the vast army of the Empire. It was only at this point,however, near the junction with the Twenty-first Division that the NinthDivision was attacked, for the German infantry was crushed by the artilleryfire upon the left in front of Gonnelieu, so that the total losses of the Ninthupon this murderous day were probably less than those of other divisions in theFifth Army. Gauche Wood was continually attacked, but the Quentin redoubt tothe immediate north of it was left alone during the whole day. It was the 2ndor Natal South African regiment which held the extreme front, and after a veryfine resistance they were driven through the wood, until at 11:30 the Germansheld it all, but the Africans still clung to the system of Chapel trenches tothe immediate west and south of it. To this they held all day, being muchhelped by a local rise in the mist about eleven, which enabled the guns inQuentin redoubt to see their targets in the south. Finally, the Germans werecompelled to dig in in Gauche Wood, and give up the attempt to get farther. Noother point was gained upon the Ninth Divisional front.
Meanwhile, the enemy had pressed their attack with great violence upon theimmediate right, where it fell with special strength upon the 2nd Lincolns ofthe Twenty-first Division. At 12 they were well behind the right rear of theAfricans, who were compelled to throw back a flank. The Lincolns held onsplendidly, however, and the danger was arrested. At 3:30 a new concentrationof the enemy developed in front of Vaucelette Farm, and was heavily shelled bythe British guns. At 5 o'clock the fight was very desperate upon Chapel Hill onthe southern limit of the South African area, where the Lincolns were stillholding out but were being gradually pressed back. The 4th South AfricanRegiment (South African Scots) was therefore ordered to counter-attack in thisdirection, which was done with great dash, the position upon Chapel Hill beingre-established. Such was the general situation when at 8:15 orders were issuedfor the withdrawal of all units to the rear zone. This was done during thenight, the general line of retirement being towards Sorel and Heudicourt, whilethe Scottish Brigade kept position upon the left. The order to retire came as acomplete surprise, as all was well upon the immediate front, but the reasongiven was the penetration of the line at other points.
Upon the right of the Scots and South Africans of the Ninth Division theline was held by Campbell's Twenty-first Division, consisting of the LeicesterBrigade and two brigades of North Country troops, all of them the veterans ofmany battles. They covered the ground from south of Gauche Wood in the north toEpehy in the south. Two brigades were in the line, the 62nd in the north andthe 110th in the south, and were exposed all day to a very severe attack whichthey held up with great steadiness and resolution. Heudicourt, Peizière,and Epehy were the scenes of particularly severe fighting. In the evening theseplaces, and the whole line through Quentin Ridge and east of Gouzeaucourt, werestill firmly held by the defenders. It may truly be said that along the wholefifty-mile front of battle there was no point where the enemy met with a moreunyielding resistance than in the area of the Twenty-first Division. During thelong day three German divisions essayed the task of forcing Epehy andovercoming the defence of Chapel Hill, but as the night drew in all three layexhausted in front of their objectives, and there would certainly have been noBritish retirement had it not been for the movements in the other sections ofthe line. Only at one seventh post had the enemy made any lodgment, namely atVaucelette Farm, and here he could have been thrown out by a counter-attack hadthe general situation permitted it. The Leicesters and the NorthumberlandFusiliers upheld the fame of their historic regiments on this day of battle,but two of the outstanding exploits in the fight lie to the credit of theLincolns, who kept an iron grip upon Chapel Hill, and to the 15th Durhams, whomade a dashing counter-attack which swept back the German advance when it triedto penetrate between Epehy and Chapel Hill. The village of Peizière washeld by the 7th Leicesters of the 110th Brigade, who fought as this brigade hasalways fought and held the Germans out. Once with the help of flame-throwersthey gained a lodgment among the houses, but the brave Midlanders came back toit and threw them out once more. It was a party of this same Leicester regimentwhich held the farm of Vaucelette, and fought it out to the very last manbefore they suffered it to pass from their keeping.
The fighting upon Chapel Hill was particularly severe, and was the moreimportant as this eminence, lying almost upon the divisional boundary,enfiladed the Ninth Division to the north. There was a trench in front of thehill, called Cavalry Trench, and a farm behind called Revelon Farm, and thebattle swung and swayed all day, sometimes the British holding all the ground,and sometimes being pushed back as far as the farm. The 1st Lincolns gainedgreat honour that day, but they could not have held the hill were it not forthe co-operation of the South Africans, who twice helped to retake it when ithad been temporarily lost. The 11th Royal Scots from the Ninth Division ReserveBrigade struck in also with effect when the enemy filtered round the north edgeof the hill and worked to the rear of it. They had got as far as Genin Copsewhen the Royal Scots attacked and hunted them back once more. The weak point ofthe Twenty-first Division lay upon their right where they had to throw out adefensive flank 3000 yards deep. They had not troops enough to cover thisground, and it was only the splendid work of the batteries of the 94th BrigadeR.F.A. which prevented a disaster.
The Sixteenth Irish Division (Hull) lay upon the right of the Twenty-firstDivision, carrying the line to the south of Ronssoy. This division had twobrigades in the line, the 48th to the left and the 49th to the right, and itappears to have sustained an attack which was of a peculiarly crushing nature.It cannot be denied that the wretched parochial politics which tear Ireland intwo, and which are urged with such Celtic extravagance of language, cannot havea steadying effect upon national troops, but none the less every soldier willadmit that the men who carried Guillemont and breasted the slope of theMessines Ridge have proved themselves to be capable of rising to the highestexercise of military virtue. If, therefore, they gave way upon this occasionwhile others stood, the reason is to be sought rather in the extra severity ofthe attack, which had the same crushing effect upon other divisions both in thenorth and in the south of the line. All these brigades were desperately engagedduring the day, as was the 1 1 6th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division whichcame to the help of the Irish, while the other two brigades of this supportingdivision endeavoured to strengthen the line of defence in the rear zone with aswitch line from Saulcourt to Tincourt Wood. On the right the attack was toosevere to be withstood, and not only the advance line but the battle positionalso was deeply penetrated, the Germans pouring in a torrent down the Cateletvalley and occupying Ronssoy and Lempire, by which they turned the flanks bothof the Twenty-first in the north and of the Sixty-sixth Division in the south.Especially fierce was the resistance offered by the 48th Brigade in the north,some units of which were swung round until they found themselves sharing withthe Twenty-first Division in the defence of Epehy. The 2nd Munsters lived up totheir high reputation during a long day of hard fighting, and were for thethird or fourth time in the war practically destroyed. Colonel Ireland was hitabout 10:30 in the morning, and one company, which counter-attacked nearMalassise Farm, was annihilated in the effort; but the survivors of thebattalion were undismayed, and under Major Hartigan they continued to opposeevery effort of the stormers. One of the features of the battle in this areawas the fight maintained all day by C Company scattered in little parties overRidge Reserve and Tetard Wood. Lieutenant Whelan was the soul of this finedefence, contesting every bay of his trench, and continuing to rally and leadhis dwindling band until noon of the next day. A road ran past this position,and it was all-important for the enemy to move their artillery down it in orderto press the retreat; but the Irishmen shot down the horse teams as they cameup until the passage was blocked with their bodies. Finally, all the scatteredbands rallied near Epehy village where, under Captain Chandler, who was killedin the contest, they fought to the last, until in the late evening theircartridges gave out, and the gallant Hartigan, with the headquarter staff ofthe battalion, was overwhelmed. Lieutenant Whelan, meanwhile, held his postnear Epehy until noon of March 22, when he and his men fired their last roundand threw their last bomb before surrender. The defence of Malassise Farm byLieutenant Kidd and his men was also a glorious bit of fighting to the last manand the last cartridge.
The general situation upon the front of the Seventh Corps on the night ofMarch 21 was that the Sixteenth Division, reinforced by the 116th Brigade, heldthe main battle positions, save on the extreme right, as far north as St.Emilie. Thence the line followed approximately the railway round and east ofEpehy, in the region of the Twenty-first Division. East of Chapel Hill andChapel Crossing it entered the holding of the Ninth Division, and passed westof Gauche Wood, through Quentin redoubt and so to the original line. Behindthis indented position the 118th and 117th Brigades with the Sappers andPioneers of the Thirty-ninth Division were hard at work upon the switch line,which should form a cover for retreat or a basis for reorganisation.
Upon the right of the Seventh Corps lay Watts' Nineteenth Corps, which hadtwo divisions in the line, the Sixty-sixth Lancashire Territorial Division(Malcolm) in the north, and the Twenty-fourth Division (Daly) in the south.They covered a front from south of Ronssoy to south of Maissemy. The LancashireDivision, the same which behaved so splendidly in the mud battle ofBroodseinde, had all three brigades in the front, covering 4000 yards, and wereexposed all day to a most terrific assault. From the north they were in theorder 197th, 199th, 198th. To the south of them an even more strenuous attackwas launched upon the Twenty-fourth Division, which had two brigades in theline. These were the 17th upon the left and the 72nd upon the right, with the1st North Staffords, 8th West Kents, 1st Rifle Brigade, and 8th Queen's infront. About 11 o'clock the news came that the enemy was pushing through at thepoint of junction with the Eighteenth Corps upon the right, where there seemsto have been a gap of some hundreds of yards between divisions, and later thatthey had penetrated into the village of Hargicourt in the rear of theSixty-sixth Division. There was heavy fighting all day, and by evening thewhole forward zone held by the 2/3 Lanes Fusiliers, East Lancashires, andManchesters had passed into the hands of the enemy. Colonel Stokes-Roberts ofthe former battalion being among the casualties. The twelve redoubts whichconstituted the main defences of the. battle zone held out stoutly all day, allthree brigades fighting with great valour. The Germans were continually pushingin, however, upon the right of the Twenty-fourth Division and enlarging theirgains in that direction, so that the First Cavalry Division was called up, andthe Pioneer Battalion of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was thrown in on the right ofthe Sixty-sixth Division near Roisel to form a defensive flank. By 1 o'clockthe battle zone of the Twenty-fourth Division was seriously compromised. The72nd Brigade upon the right had been turned and the village of Maissemy hadbeen taken by the Germans. Stone's 17th Brigade Corps held a tight grip,however, upon the hamlet of Le Verguier, and though many assaults were madeupon it the place remained untaken in the evening. In the area of theSixty-sixth Division the enemy was still gaining ground, however, and they hadpushed on from Hargicourt to Templeux, where a counter-attack by the 6thLancashire Fusiliers held them for a time. The fighting continued to be verybitter until late in the evening, for though the Germans had infiltrated allthe ground between the redoubts, they were unable to overcome their resistance,or to take possession of their gains. At 10:15 the order from General Watts wasthat there should be no retreat, and that however great the odds againstthem—and it was manifest that they were indeed very great—the twodivisions should prepare for a fight to a finish. Meanwhile, the FiftiethDivision (Stockley) in army reserve had been ordered, after a march of sevenhours, to support the line of the Nineteenth Corps, taking up a position in therear from the Omignon River to the Cologne River, upon a front which had beenpartly wired. With the early morning of March 22 there came a renewed Germanattack which forced back the left of the Sixty-sixth, who were always muchhandicapped by the deep incursion the enemy had made into the area of theSixteenth Division to the north, which continually endangered their flank andeven their rear.
The battle was soon general along the whole front, and everywhere theresistance was most desperate, though the troops were gradually pressed back bythe ever-increasing weight of the attack as Hindenburg's legions came rollingin from the east. Many a bitter curse went up that day from overwrought menagainst the perjured traitors on the Russian front, who to ease their ownburden had thrown a double weight upon those who had helped and trusted them.At 11:30 in the morning the post of Le Verguier, which had been held so longand so gallantly by the 8th West Surreys, was at last carried by storm and itsbrave garrison destroyed or taken, though Colonel Peirs, who had been the soulof this defence, dashed out, revolver in hand, at this last moment, and gotaway in the mist. The whole line of the Twenty-fourth Division was shaken bythe gap thus created. The pressure was very great also at Roisel, and the 151stBrigade from the Fiftieth Division had to be hurried up in order to hold backthe advance down the valley of the Cologne, which would have turned the rightflank of the Lancashire men to the north. The 9th Sussex was heavily engaged inthis quarter and suffered severely. About noon a valiant attempt was also madeby some tanks and dismounted troopers . to turn the tide by recapturing thevillage of Hervilly, which had some temporary success. The German penetrationhad been too deep, however, and there was very pressing danger of isolationunless the corps fell back. This they did in the late afternoon and evening,passing through the ranks of the Fiftieth Division behind them. "They werenearly all gassed and dead weary," said one who observed them as they passed.The 11th Hussars and 19th Entrenching Battalion most gallantly covered theretreat. The enemy were close at their heels, however, in great force and mostaggressive mood, as the Fiftieth Division soon discovered. This unit will beremembered as the famous Yorkshire Territorial division who helped to turn thetide at the second battle of Ypres, and have shown their worth upon manyfields; but on this occasion the odds were too heavy, though they held theenemy for the rest of the day.
The lower half of the line between the Omignon and the Cologne rivers washeld by Riddell's 149th Brigade of Northumberland Fusiliers, while the northernhalf was held by Rees' 150th Brigade of Yorkshiremen. Against this thin walldashed the full tide of the German advance as it swept on in the wake of theNineteenth Corps. It was a long and hard fight in which the enemy had heavylosses, especially in front of Poeuilly, where considerable sheets of wire layin front of the position of the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers. It was a mostgallant affair—gallant on both sides. Their Colonel, Robinson, laid outhis machine-guns in the long grass upon each side of this wire and enfiladedthe German line with most murderous results. In the south the 4thNorthumberland Fusiliers were attacked in front and on the right flank, and thepressure was so great that they had to abandon Caulaincourt, which was thenrecaptured and again abandoned by the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers from thesupporting line. The enemy, with his usual wile, telephoned from the mausoleum,a central building, that reinforcements be sent to that point. Upon asking thename of the officer and getting no reply, General Riddell, in local command,turned on five batteries of 18-pounders and blew the mausoleum to pieces. AtPoeuilly also there had been two successful counter-attacks, but the enemy wasswarming round the southern flank in great numbers, and the river, which is notmore formidable than an average South of England trout stream, was of littleuse as a protection. An important point named Nobescourt Farm, lying near thejunction of brigades, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the villageof Poeuilly was also taken. By evening the Fiftieth Division had done its work,however, as it had held up the pursuit and enabled the Nineteenth Corps toreach the line of the Somme without severe pressure. That night they receivedorders to withdraw, which were carried out in the morning of March 23, Martin's149th Brigade in the south making a show of fighting in order to cover themovements of their companions in the north who were moving over a perfectlyflat plain from Mons to Brie. Finally, General Riddell destroyed Tertry bridgeand dropped back to St. Christ. During all these operations the German infantrywere moving slowly forward in successive lines of skirmishers, about a thousandyards from the British, who retired in leisurely fashion, continually turningand holding them up, so that the whole spectacle was exactly that of awell-ordered field-day. When the main body had reached the bridges, a singlecompany of the 10th Northumberland Fusiliers lay out in the higher ground,under the leadership of Captain Proctor, who received the D.S.O. for his ableconduct of the operation. This company held up a brigade for two hours, andthen, their comrades being safely across, they withdrew in their turn, leavinghalf their number behind them. Every one being across, both the St. Christ andBrie bridges were blown up. The latter was a brand-new construction and was incharge of an American officer of engineers who distinguished himself by hiscool courage, starting out alone, and bringing across the river a train full ofammunition which lay upon the farther side. The Twenty-fourth Division hadcrossed at Falvy, the rearguard action being fought by the depleted battalionsof the 72nd Brigade. Colonel Pope of the 1st North Staffords, Colonel Charltonof the 4th Yorks, and Colonel Le Fleming of the 9th East Surreys were amongthose who had fallen.
The Nineteenth Corps was now covering a total front of 20,000 yards alongthe western bank of the stream, which is shallow and marshy in these reaches.Their line was from Rouy-le-Crane in the south to near Peronne, with some smalloutposts to the east of the river. The Eighth Division (Heneker) had come up onthe morning of March 23, and occupied the southern end of the line, with theremains of the Twenty-fourth, the Sixty-sixth, and the Fiftieth extending tothe north. There we shall leave them while we return to the history of thefront line upon March 21.
On the right of the Nineteenth Corps was Maxse's Eighteenth Corps coveringthe ground from the Omignon valley to a point just west of St. Quentin, withthree divisions in the line. These were the Sixty-first on the left, theThirtieth in the centre, and the Thirty-sixth in the south. The Sixty-firstDivision, under General Colin Mackenzie, was one of those fine second-lineTerritorial units which have done so well in the later stages of the war. Allthree brigades were in the line, the 183rd Brigade of Scottish troops in thenorth, the 184th in the centre, and the 182nd in the south, both of the lastbeing from the South Midlands. The 2/4th Oxfords, 2/5th Gordons, and 2/8thWorcesters were the devoted battalions which held the forward line, and sofierce was their defence that the battle-line was able to maintain itself alongthe whole divisional front, in spite of very valiant efforts upon the part ofthe German stormers, who showed absolute contempt of death in their efforts tocut the wire at those points where their artillery had failed to do so.
The story of the Enghien redoubt and its devoted defence has already beentold, but belongs to the record of this division. The battle zone ran in themain along the eastern edge of the Bois d'Holnon, and this was desperatelydefended from morning to night. In the afternoon the high ground south ofMaissery, in the left rear of the division and outside their area, had beencaptured, and the 2/4th Berkshires endeavoured to help the Twenty-fourthDivision in their counter-attack. The Berkshires lost heavily in this venture,and their gallant Colonel, Dimmer, who had won the V.C. in the early days ofthe war, was shot through the head leading his men on horseback to the very lipof a trench full of Germans. Horse and groom fell before the same volley. TheSixty-first resumed its line after this action in the north, and it maintainedit intact until evening, the three divisions of the German attack beingpractically held up by the three heroic battalions in the front line, so thatthe full weight of attack never reached the main line. It was as solidlyestablished in the evening as in the morning. The position of the enemy ontheir left rear had become more and more menacing, as after taking Maissemythey had pressed on to Villescholes. This led to dangerous attacks from thenorth on the early morning of March 22, in the course of which the 183rdBrigade had to fight desperately to preserve the flank of the division. Theweight of this fighting fell chiefly upon the 8th Argyll and Sutherlands, whocounter-attacked most valiantly, aided by the remains of the gallant 2/4Berkshires, who had suffered so severely the day before. Colonel M'AlpineDownie of the Argylls was wounded, and died next day. Even when the enemy hadgot as far westward as Vermand, the Sixty-first Division was still rooted toits ground, and the Highlanders on the left flank recovered by a spiritedadvance nine guns which had been overrun by the German advance between Maissemyand Villescholes. The 9th Royal Scots extended their line to the westward, andfacing north presented an unbroken front to the constant hordes of Germans whowere moving down the northern slopes of the Omignon valley in the direction ofCaulaincourt. It was not until late in the afternoon of March 22 that theSixty-first Division retired, still fighting, to a prepared position north ofVaux.
Next to the Sixty-first Division was the Thirtieth under General Williams.This division had two brigades—the 21st (Goodman) and the 90th (Poyntz)— in the line, the latter officer being known to all sportsmen as thefamous Somerset batsman. The front of 4000 yards was from the immediate west ofSt. Quentin to the Somme, and included two notable strong points, ManchesterHill and the Épine du Dallon. The 89th Brigade under General Stanley wasin the immediate rear. It was not used as a unit during the day, but the threefine battalions of the King's Liverpool Regiment, the 17th, 18th, and 19th,were dispersed in the evening to reinforce three separate units.
The fighting along the front of the Thirtieth Division was of a verydesperate character. The forward battalions were the 2nd Wilts and the 16thManchesters. Rushing through the gaps in their line of defence, the Germansflung themselves upon the battle zone, where after long fighting which lastedinto the afternoon they gained possession of the two posts already mentioned,and worked into the main battle-line at Savy. Both brigades lost very heavilyduring these attacks, but the addition of the 18th and 19th King's fromStanley's brigade helped them to carry on under most trying conditions. Boththese reinforcing battalions came in for severe fighting in the evening, andthe 18th King's, which joined in a counter-attack by the 21st Brigade, wasparticularly hard hit, while the 19th had hardly an officer left, the colonelfalling at the head of his men. As a final result of the day's battle both thebrigades were somewhat driven in upon the front, but each held its . line andwas ready to renew the battle next morning. The 2nd Bedfords particularlydistinguished themselves during this day of incessant fighting, making no lessthan six successful counter-attacks in order to clear their sector when it waspartly occupied by the Germans. Up to 4 o'clock in the afternoon of March 22the Thirtieth were still firm in their positions, and it was only the generalsituation of the Army which finally compelled them to abandon them. Theydropped back upon the general line of Ham, where the three scattered battalionsof the 89th Brigade had been ordered to form one unit once more. Of theManchester men in the front rank upon the day of battle hardly a man ever gotaway, and their splendid Colonel Elstob lay dead with the greater part of hisbattalion around him. He had said: "The Manchesters will defend Manchester Hillto the last," and he lived and died true to his word. A superior officerreporting upon this episode said: "At about 11 o'clock Colonel Elstob informedme that the Germans had broken through and were swarming round the redoubt. Atabout 2 P.M. he said that most of his men were killed or wounded, includinghimself; that they were all getting dead beat, that the Germans had got intothe redoubt and hand-to-hand fighting was going on. He was still quite cheery.At 3:30 he was spoken to on the telephone and said very few were left and thatthe end was nearly come. After that no further answer could be got."
On the right of the Thirtieth Lancashire Division was the Thirty-sixthUlster Division under the command of General Nugent, one of the many goodsoldiers who were trained by South Africa for this greater ordeal. Thatscrambling and difficult campaign has, though its lessons were most imperfectlyapprehended, proved to be an invaluable preparation for the leaders in theworld's war of the future. The Ulster division had all three brigades in theline, the 109th (Ricardo) to the north, the 107th (Witteycombe) in the centre,and the 108th (Griffiths) in the south. The three outlying battalions were the12th and 15th Irish Rifles and the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, which sufferedthe common fate of all who held that post of danger. Not a man returned, save afew of the Irish Rifles, who swam down the canal that night.
The front held by the Ulstermen was from the Somme on the left to theneighbourhood of Urvillers Battle on the right, a distance of 6000 yards. ThreeGerman divisions attacked upon this frontage, but the edge of their onslaughtwas blunted by the splendid resistance of the three doomed battalions in thevan. None the less, it surged with great violence all along the edge of thebattle zone, but it was everywhere held save only at the hamlet of Contescourt,where the Germans obtained a lodgment. The whole defence of the division wasimperilled, however, by the fact that the Germans had bitten deeply into theBritish line to the south of the 108th Brigade, getting as far as Essigny ontheir right rear, with the effect that a deep defensive flank had to be thrownback in this direction, which used up all the reserves of the division. Thus,when the Germans late that day and in the following morning pressed theiradvantage at Contescourt, and were stopped by the magnificent resistance of the1st Inniskilling Fusiliers at the neighbouring village of Fontaine-les-Clercs,they should have been permanently held, as they were driven back in twelvesuccessive attacks. As there were no reserves available for a counter-attack,however, the defence was gradually worn down by a great disparity of numbers,so that by March 22 the Germans had advanced into the sector of the line whichran down the course of the rivulet which is dignified by the name of theSomme.
Such, in brief, was the experience of the three divisions which held theline of the Eighteenth Corps on March 21. The Twentieth Division in reserve wasnot employed during the day, nor were its services needed, for Maxse's Corps,though attacked by eight German divisions, was able to hold its ground, thankslargely to the splendid resistance of the shock-absorbing battalions in thefront-line. Up to 4 P.M. of March 22 the enemy had made no permanent advanceinto the battle zone, but at that hour both flanks of the Corps had been turnedat Maissemy in the north and at Essigny in the south, and the alternative wasretirement or absolute isolation and destruction. It may then briefly be saidthat, thanks to the resolute resistance of the battalions in the forward zone,and to the solidity of those in the battle zone, the Eighteenth Corps was ableto maintain its ground until it was ordered to leave it, and that save for someindentation of its front, especially at Contescourt, its main positionsremained inviolate.
Upon the right of the Eighteenth Corps lay the Third Corps, which coveredthe enormous front of 30,000 yards. Of the nine brigades in the corps, eightwere in the line and only one in reserve, so that between the tenuity of theline and its want of support it was an extremely tempting mark for the Germanassault, especially as by ignoring the two brigades south of the Oise theycould concentrate their whole force upon the six brigades in line in the north.It is true that the wide marshes of the Oise offered an impediment whichcovered part of the British line, but as already remarked, the waters wereexceedingly low for the time of year, and the Germans very cleverly overcamewhatever obstacle was left.
The three divisions which formed Butler's Third Corps were the FourteenthLight Division (Cowper), which extended as far south as Moy, the EighteenthDivision (Lee) covering the ground between Moy and Travecy, and finally theFifty-eighth Division (Cator) extending to Barisis, five or six miles south ofthe Oise. As usual, we will take them from the north, confining the narrativeto the point at which the fighting in the front line came to an end.
The Fourteenth Division had all three brigades in the line, their orderbeing 41st, 42nd, and 43rd from the north. This division, composed entirely oflight infantry battalions, has had more than its share of desperate adventuresduring its service in France. Again and again, notably in the fire-attackbefore Ypres in 1915, in the third battle of Ypres, and upon the presentoccasion, they have been exposed to ordeals of the most tremendous kind. Theirfrontage was 5500 yards, which was not excessive as compared with that of otherdivisions, and it contained some high ground north of Essigny which should havebeen valuable for observation and defence, but none the less the attack was sosevere and so concentrated that it rapidly made an impression upon the defence,which became more serious as the day wore on. The three outlying battalionswere the 8th and 9th King's Royal Rifles and the 6th Somerset Light Infantry,and these, as usual, were sacrificed almost to a man. The enemy then stormed inupon the line, making his advance here, as elsewhere, with a systematic skillwhich showed how thoroughly he had been drilled and exercised behind the line.This process of infiltration by which small bodies here, there, and everywhereextend their advance where they find a cranny into which to push and establishmachine-gun posts which, unless they be instantly rooted out, soon grow intoformidable positions, shows the remarkable adaptability of the Germansoldier—a quality with which, it must be admitted, the world had notcredited him in the past.
It may also be admitted that we yielded too easily to such tactics, and thatthere was a tendency, as Third was pointed out in a memorandum from the HigherCommand, to consider a position as untenable because it was outflanked, insteadof closing in upon the intruders and pressing each side of the nut-crackersagainst the intrusive nut. In many cases this was done, but in others smallbodies of daring men with a few machine-guns were able to dislodge whole lineswhich they had managed to enfilade. On this occasion the Germans pushed in uponboth flanks of the Fourteenth Division, but their most serious gains occurredabout mid-day, when they captured Manufacture Farm north of Essigny, and.shortly afterwards the weighbridge west of that village. The 41st Brigade onthe left were driven out of their headquarters, while the 43rd on the rightwere pushed back to the Gibercourt road. A very weak point was evidentlydeveloping, so General Butler hurried up part of the Second Cavalry Division(Greenly), and also his only spare infantry brigade, the 54th (Sadleir-Jackson)in order to make a line of resistance at the switch line between Camas andLizerolles. About 1:30 the Germans had got in between Essigny and Benay andtaken Lambay Wood. In view of their accelerating advance and the ominousreports which were also coming in from the 173rd Brigade on the right. GeneralButler continued to build up his rear line, putting into it not only all threebrigades of the Second Cavalry and the 54th Infantry Brigades, but also the12th and Entrenching Battalions, thus covering the whole rear zone of thecorps. Isolated parties of the 41st Brigade were holding out in the mainposition upon the left, but Hinacourt had also fallen and the line was slowlyrolling westward, so that by evening the Fourteenth Division had practicallylost its hold of the whole of its battle position.
Things were going better, however, with the Eighteenth Division, which held9000 yards of front in the centre of the Third Corps. As this great frontagewas maintained by only two brigades, the 53rd (Higginson) in the north and the55th (Wood) in the south, it must have been very thinly held, and evenadmitting that the pressure was less than on either of the wing divisions, itwas none the less a fine achievement to keep a grip on so wide an area. Threebattalions were in the forward zone, the 8th Berks on the left, the 7th WestKents in the centre, and the 7th Buffs on the right, all of whom didsplendidly, so that the defence of Fort Vendeuil, Cork, Cardiff, Durham, andother redoubts upon this point form a whole series of epics. Besides theinfantry, the 79th Company Royal Engineers shared in the peril and the glory ofthis defence. The wires connecting up these forward garrisons were speedilycut, and no news came back all day, save the rattle of their rifle-fire. Thefirst definite tidings of the German advance came back through the fog about 12o'clock, when some gunners emerged from its folds and announced that theadvanced guns had been overrun by the enemy. Soon after came a runner with amessage from Colonel Crosthwaite of the West Kents to say that his headquarterswas surrounded, and asking for a barrage on one side of it. A second messagearrived from him: "Still holding, 12:30 P.M. Boche all round within fifty Theyards except rear. Can only see forty yards, so it is difficult to kill theblighters." It was the last word.
At 1:30 the enemy had closed in on the battle zone, and the high ground atCerisy in the area of the 53rd Brigade had been lost. On the front of the 55thBrigade at the same hour strong parties of the enemy who had pushed between theredoubts in the fog had occupied Vendeuil, while a section of guns in RonquenetWood had been rushed by them. The reserve company of the Buffs in front of thebattle zone fought desperately against these intruders, while near the Dublinredoubt Captain Dennis fought his guns till 5 P.M., inflicting heavy lossesupon the Germans, who collected in masses in front of the wire at this point.Eventually his gun-pits were rushed, all the gunners being killed or taken. Themain weight of the attack fell upon the 53rd Brigade upon the left, and by themiddle of the afternoon all the redoubts upon this front had gone, while the55th was still well covered. The battle zone, however, was still intact, thoughthe enemy massed heavily in front of Moulin Farm and opposite the switch linefrom Vendeuil to Ly-Fontaine. They came forward several times, but the mist hadrisen and the rifle-fire was accurate so that they made no progress. At CaponneFarm there was also a brisk attack, but the 10th Essex, the only battalion leftin the brigade, held firmly to its position, though much plagued by low-flyingaeroplanes who skimmed their very heads, while the British Headquarters wasequally disturbed by a captured anti-tank gun with which the Germans kept up apoint-blank fire. To ease the pressure upon this wing, General Lee put in the8th East Surreys from divisional reserve to thicken the line in theneighbourhood of Remigny.
At 3:30 the covering forts upon the front of the 55th Brigade were stillholding out. Fort Vendeuil had made a particularly fine defence and broke up aheavy attack. There was lamp signalling from this fort till 6 P.M., when thelamp went out for ever. The 7th Buffs, who had charge of all this portion ofthe battle front, did a magnificent day's work, and the famous regiment towhich this battalion belongs has won no prouder laurels in all the centuries.Little is known of their fate save the pregnant facts that the front wasscreened all day, that repeated messages for help were received up to 8:30 inthe evening, and that rifle-fire was heard from their posts till midnight. Baldwords—and yet to him who can see they convey a sure picture of fadinglight, dwindling cartridges, and desperate men, baited from all sides and dyingwith clenched teeth amid the ever-flowing German hordes.
About 4 o'clock the Germans had not only penetrated deeply into the battlezone of the Fourteenth Division to the north, but had also dented that of theFifty-eighth in the south, so that both wings of the Eighteenth were in aperilous state. The East Surreys were pushed forward, therefore, into theswitch line from Gibercourt to Ly-Fontaine. Two regiments of dismounted cavalryfrom the Second Division were sent also to form a defensive flank upon theright of the 55th Brigade. At 6 P.M. the attack upon the battle zone of theEighteenth had ceased, but it was being pushed hard upon the two wingdivisions, and the Fifty-eighth had lost both Quessy and Fargniers. Orders werethen issued to get behind the Crozat Canal after dark, this having always beenchosen as the second line of defence. The 64th Brigade, which behaved withgreat steadiness, was directed to cover the retirement of the FourteenthDivision, and the guns were withdrawn first, so as to cover the infantry at thecanal crossings. A few of the outlying posts were gathered up and brought backin safety. The East Surreys covered the withdrawal of the poor remains of the53rd Brigade, while the 3rd Hussars covered the 55th Brigade on the right. Itwas a most difficult and delicate operation with a victorious and elated enemyswarming upon the rear, but it was successfully carried out, and by 6 A.M. theThird Corps were all across the canal, and the bridges in that sector had beendestroyed.
The performance of the Eighteenth Division had been a very fine one, and- itwas one of the units which could boast that on the evening of that terrible daythey still held the main position which they had covered in the morning. Themain German attack seems to have been conducted by four divisions, theThirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, One hundred and third, and Two hundred andeleventh, while four more were identified as either partly engaged or inimmediate reserve. The direction of the attack was mainly from the north andcame upon the front and flank of the 53rd Brigade, which could hardly callitself a battalion in the evening. The gunners had to fire by guess until themist lifted, after which time they did great execution, and stuck to theirpieces to the last moment. A particularly notable performance was that ofCaptain Haybittle of C Battery, 83rd Brigade Royal Field Artillery, whose guns,just south of Benay, were rushed in the mist at noon. He and his crews removedthe blocks and held a neighbouring position with their rifles, directing at thesame time the fire of two guns in the rear which played upon the German massesas they debouched from Lambay Wood. Afterwards he and his men fell back uponthese guns and fought them until late in the evening, when both of them wereknocked out. Nineteen hundred rounds were fired, and this stubborn defence didmuch to hold the northern flank of the battle zone.
It only remains now to give some account of the events upon the front of the173rd Brigade (Worgan) of the Fifty-eighth London Division (Gator) upon theextreme right, in order to complete this rapid bird's-eye view of the events ofMarch 21 upon the front of the Fifth Army. This brigade, which filled the spacebetween Travecy on the left and the Oise upon the right, had the 2/1 Londons inthe forward zone, the 2/4 Londons in the battle zone opposite La Fère,and the 2/3 Londons in the rear zone upon the Crozat Canal. The single battalion in front was attacked by the impossibleodds of three German divisions, but held out for a long time with greatconstancy. Their brave Colonel, Richardson, was last seen surrounded by theenemy, but still fighting with his headquarters troops around him.
When two numbers are givento a Territorial battalion, for instance 2/4 Londons, it means that the 4thLondons have two battalions and that this is the second of them.
The Germans stormed forward to the battle zone, but there on the high groundacross the Oise they also met with a very vigorous resistance from the 4thLondons, aided by some sappers and a company of pioneers. It was indeed a greatachievement of Colonel Dann and his men to hold up the attack with suchdisparity of numbers, for according to the official German account severaldivisions took part in the attack. Finally, as the afternoon wore on the enemyobtained a lodgment in the left of the position, and before evening theyoccupied Travecy and part of Fargniers, winding up by the capture of Quessy.The 2/3 Londons had been drawn into the fight, and now the 2/8 Londons from the174th Brigade were brought north and placed in reserve along the line of theCrozat Canal, across which the troops were now ordered to fall back. Thisbattalion with the 18th Entrenching Battalion guarded the whole canal line fromCondren Crossing on the right to the junction with the Eighteenth Division onthe left. By 5 A.M. all troops were across and the bridges had been destroyed.The 2/4th Londons succeeded in removing all their stores and munitions, andtheir remarkable achievement in holding the high ground of La Fèreagainst ten times their numbers for as many hours, during which they inflictedvery heavy losses upon their assailants and repulsed six separate attacks, wasamong the outstanding military feats of that difficult day.
It is needless to say that the losses in men were very heavy on March 21,though it is difficult to separate them from the general losses of the retreat,which will be recorded later. Among senior officers of note who died for theircountry that day, besides those already mentioned, were Colonels Acklom of theNorthumberland Fusiliers, Thorne of the North Staffords, Wrenford of the EastLancashires, and Stewart of the Leicesters.
British Battle Line, March 21
Problems before General Gough—His masterful action— Arrival of Thirty-ninth, Twentieth, and FiftiethDivisions—Retreat of Tudor's Ninth Scottish Division—Destruction ofthe South Africans—Defence of the Somme—Arrival of the EighthDivision—Desperate fighting—The Carey line—Death of GeneralFeetham—"Immer fest daran"—Advance, Australia!—Greatachievement of General Watts
THE reader is now in a position to form some conception of thesituation of the Fifth Army upon the evening of March 21, and to understand theproblems which confronted its commander. He was of opinion, and the opinion wasshared by some at least of his corps commanders, that had he had four or fiveFifth divisions of reserves within easy call, he could unquestionably have heldthe line. He had, however, to deal with the situation as it stood, and no mancould have had a more difficult and responsible task. His own reserves werealready practically engaged. On the other hand, both his air service and thereports of prisoners assured him that those of the enemy were numerous andnear. His line had been deeply dented in four places: in the sector of theSixteenth Division at Ronssoy, in that of the Twenty-fourth Division atMaissemy, in that of the Fourteenth Division at Essigny, and in that of theFifty-eighth Division opposite La Fère. These various points are, itwill be observed, almost equidistant along the line, which tends to show thatthe German attack was conducted upon a plan which threw such forces uponlimited areas that the result was almost a certainty, whatever troops might beholding them. It was the misfortune and not the fault of these gallantdivisions that their thin ranks were in the very places which huge hordes ofthe enemy had marked in advance as their objectives.
It must have been clear to General Gough and to his corps commanders that asecond day of battle, with the German reserves pouring up, would certainly meana penetration of the line at these various weak points, and that the enemywould then be in a position to cut off large portions of the force. Theseunits, be they divisions or corps, would no doubt fight to the last, but theend must surely be annihilation. In that case the general situation would havebeen an appalling one. It might indeed have been decisive for the whole war.There was nothing between the Germans and Amiens. Pouring westwards they wouldhave destroyed all reserves almost before they could have alighted from theirtrains or their motors, and within a few days would have entirely cut off theBritish from the French, with the estuary of the Somme between the two armies.Any hesitation would have been fatal. An immediate decision was imperative.That decision could only be that the British Army should retard the Germanadvance by an obstinate rearguard action, that it should endeavour to preserveits line, and allow no unit to be cut off, that it should fall back in anorderly fashion upon its reserves, and that when it met them it should turn atbay and prevent the enemy from reaching his objective. This was the plan whichGeneral Gough instantly formed, and which he proceeded with firmness and moralcourage to carry out. Orders were at once given that the weaker portions of theline should drop back behind the obstacles which had already been marked out asthe best defensive lines. At the same time with great foresight he gave ordersthat the old French Somme trenches, from the river southwards, should be set inorder as a last line of defence. He despatched his chief army engineer. GeneralGrant, to carry out this order, and it was eventually a very vital one inensuring the safety of the army in the last stages of its retreat.
The orders to each corps commander were given in the form of generalindications, the details being left to his own judgment, for the position ofeach corps and the pressure upon it formed a number of independent problems. Weshall turn to the north therefore, where, upon the whole, the situation wasleast critical, and we shall follow first the Seventh and then the NineteenthCorps in their various movements until a condition of equilibrium was at lastsafely established. Let it be at once stated that the design was duly carriedout along the whole line, and that the operation, which at the time wasdesignated as a disaster, was really a remarkable example of how by thecoolness of commanders and the discipline of their men, the most desperatesituation may be saved and the most powerful and aggressive foe foiled in hisattempts. What complicated the military problem of the Fifth Army was that theGerman threat was really aimed at Paris as much as at Amiens, and that if theycould have got through at Essigny and cut off the Fifty-eighth Division therewere hardly any reserves between them and the all-important metropolis.
The morning of March 22 again presented those conditions of fog and lowvisibility which are favourable to the attack. There was no advance in theearly hours upon the new positions of the Ninth Division, but the enemydirected his attention entirely to the Chapel Hill front of the Twenty-firstDivision upon the right, which was still held by the Lincolns. An attempt wasmade to relieve them by the Scots battalion of the South Africans, who tookover some of the northern line. The defence was a splendid one, but by 4o'clock in the afternoon the Germans had gained most of this high ground byoutflanking it, and the South Africans at Revelon Farm, who had been reinforcedby the 11th Royal Scots Battalion from the 27th Brigade, were badly enfiladedin consequence by rifle and machine-gun fire from the south. Colonel M'Leod ofthe South African Scots, and many officers and men, were among the casualties.There was a withdrawal therefore of the right of the Ninth Division, and about6:30 P.M. the Germans had got as far as Heudicourt, and the brigade staff atSorel had to line up in order to resist his turning movement to the north. Sofar round had the Germans penetrated that the Africans were compelled to fallback due north for some distance until their rear was clear, when theyretreated with the rest of the division westwards towards Nurlu. By two in themorning of March 23 the new positions had been reached, and the attenuatedSouth African Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, was takeninto divisional reserve.
This difficult retreat was rendered possible by the The desperate resistanceoffered by the 6th Scots Borderers, who formed a defensive flank south of Soreland gave the troops to the north time to gain the new position. One company ofthe 11th Royal Scots was cut off in Revelon Farm, but managed to fight theirway back, bringing with them an officer and eighteen other prisoners. No gunswere lost by the Ninth Division save ten, which were without teams and weretherefore destroyed.
At this period there was some dislocation between the left of the NinthDivision and the right of the Forty-seventh, as is likely to occur where eachbelongs to a different corps and army. For a time there was a gap between them.This was partly overcome, however, on the evening of the 22nd by means of theSecond Division, which lay in reserve behind the Forty-seventh and put its 99thBrigade under the orders of the Ninth Division so as to ensure unity of commandin this position of danger.
Turning to the right wing of the Seventh Corps allusion has been made in thelast chapter to the severe pressure upon the Sixteenth Division and itsdetermined resistance. It will be remembered that it was reinforced by the116th Brigade of the Thirty-ninth Division, and all three brigades wereinvolved in the same heavy fighting on the morning of March 22, the Germanattack being relentless in its vigour. In the course of this severe action thevillage of St. Emilie was lost, and was afterwards retaken in a very gallantfashion by the 1st Hertfords, a battalion which had greatly distinguisheditself already at St. Julien and elsewhere. The orders were to retreat,however, and in this movement the switch line from Saulcourt dug and manned bythe 117th and 118th Brigades proved invaluable. The army policy was to fightrearguards and delay the enemy, and this was most efficiently done during theevening of March 22, the flank of the Twenty-first Division being covered inits retirement, and the line held against vigorous attacks. Many of the guns ofthe Thirty-ninth Divisional artillery were lost through their extreme devotionin covering the retreat of the Sixteenth Division, for they frequently carriedon until the infantry were behind them. The enemy was pressing his attacks withgreat vigour, and every withdrawal was followed up by strong bodies of troopsand of field artillery.
During these Operations General Hornby had been in command of the division,but on March 23 General Feetham returned from leave and took over the duties.All day the Thirty-ninth Division was fighting rearguard actions as it fellback upon the Somme. In the course of them General Hornby, now in command ofthe 116th Brigade, was severely wounded. The roads running westwards to Peronneand Clery were crowded with traffic, but the Thirty-ninth Division turned atbay again and again, giving them time to get clear. By evening the remains ofthe Sixteenth Division had been practically squeezed out of the line, and theThirty-ninth had the Sixty-sixth Division on its right and the Twenty-first onits left. At night it held a line from La Maisonnette along the canal to southof Ommiecourt. The enemy appeared to be much exalted by the capture of Peronne,and the 118th Brigade on the right heard them singing lustily during thenight.
On March 23 the German attack continued to be very heavy upon the front ofthe two Scottish brigades of the Ninth Division, which were in touch with theFifth Corps in the north and with the Twenty-first seventh Division in thesouth. So close and violent was the fighting that the 6th Scots Borderers wereonly extricated with difficulty. At 2 P.M. the line was east of Bouchavesnes,but by 4 P.M. the Twenty-first Division on the right had lost ground, and theflank and even the rear of the Ninth was for a time exposed until the NatalRegiment was thrown out south of Bouchavesnes to cover it. The three brigadesof the Twenty-first Division were engaged all day as they slowly retreatedbefore the swarming enemy.
March 23 was a most arduous day for both the Highland and the Lowlandbrigades, for each of them was attacked again and again with the utmostviolence. Though the attacks were repulsed each of them had the effect ofweakening still further these units which were already much exhausted by hardfighting and incessant exertion. Gradually they were pushed to the westwarduntil they found themselves lining the eastern edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood,and manning the ridge which extended from that forest to the ruins ofSaillisel. Their left at this period seems to have been in the air, as the 99thBrigade had been returned to its division, and they had failed to make contactwith the Seventeenth Division, who were at the time just west of Saillisel. Atthis period the front of the Ninth Division seems to have covered 11,000 yards,and to have extended for at least two miles into the area of the Third Army,showing how desperate were the exertions needed to cover the ground and toprevent a break-through.
In the morning of March 24 the Scots could see the German infantry streamingforward over the open ground which had been evacuated upon the evening before.It was clear that a great attack was imminent, and at 9 o'clock, after a veryheavy cannonade, it developed along the whole line. For three hours the Germansmade repeated efforts to force their way through the Ninth Division, but oneach occasion they were repulsed, and their losses at this point wereexceedingly heavy. About mid-day, however, they had gained so much ground uponthe flanks that the South Africans were almost surrounded, and shot into fromnorth and south. The general British line had fallen back to the ridge east ofCombles, 1000 yards behind, but General Dawson found it impossible to withdrawin daylight, so that his brigade was compelled to defend itself in its isolatedposition at Marrières Wood as best it could. The result was a disaster,but one of a most glorious kind, for the men fought until their last cartridgeshad been expended, and a large proportion of the survivors were wounded men.General Dawson was among the prisoners. It was reported afterwards from Germansources that he was taken while working a machine-gun with his brigade-majorlying dead beside him. The whole defence was said by the Germans to have beenone of the finest things in the war. From that time forward the South AfricanBrigade had practically ceased to exist until it was reorganised in Flanders.The supporting parties alone were left, and these were formed at once into acomposite battalion under Colonel Young, for no rifle could be spared from thefighting line at such a time, Whilst the South Africans had been engaged inthis death struggle the 27th Lowland Brigade had been in a similar plight. Allthese battalions, the 6th Scots Borderers and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots,were very hard pressed, particularly the former. The seventh Lowlandersextricated themselves from an almost desperate situation and fell back from St.Pierre Vaast to the position covering Combles. So great was the generaldislocation of troops that one portion of the 5th Camerons found themselvesthat evening fighting with the Forty-seventh Division, while another was withthe Seventeenth.
The main effort of the enemy upon March 24 was directed against the-Fifthand Seventh Corps in the centre of the British line, though his energy at otherpoints was sufficient to engage the full attention of all the other units.Heavy and fresh masses were poured in at the centre and the pressure was great.For the Seventh Corps it was the fourth day of incessant and desperatefighting. There were few men left, and these were very exhausted. Towardsevening the left of the Seventh had been turned, and had been compromised bythe occupation of Sailly Saillisel. All attempts at counter-attack, howevergallant, were destined to failure, or at the best evanescent success, for therewas not the weight to carry them through. At 4:15 the report was: "The enemy isthrough on the right flank and has occupied Combles, Morval, and Lesboeufs."The Seventh Corps then fell back to the line Hem—Maurepas and threw outevery stray unit it could get together — troops of cavalry, Canadianmotor-guns, crews and machine-guns of tanks, and all the powdered debris ofbroken formations, in the direction of Bernafoy Wood to cover the exposedflank. It was still out of touch with the Fifth Corps. This movement gave theline an awkward angle from Peronne and made it almost impossible to hold thestretch of river. For the time the right of the Third Army was a good fivemiles behind the left of the Fifth Army—the result, as Sir Douglas Haighas stated, of an unauthorised local withdrawal due to misunderstanding oforders. The line near Peronne was still held by the Thirty-ninth Division.Throughout the morning of the 24th strong enemy forces were seen by thempushing forwards between Clery and Rancourt, where they were harassed by theBritish fire in enfilade, particularly on the roads, where the artillery of theSixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions caused much havoc and confusion, doinggreat work at short range over open sights. Many excellent targets were missed,however, owing to that difficulty in liaison between the infantry and the guns,which was one of the greatest problems of the operations. During the day theaverage number of rounds fired per battery was 3000, most of which wereobserved fire.
As March 24 wore on the position of the Thirty-ninth Division becameuntenable, as they heard upon one side of the loss of Saillisel, and on theother of the forcing of the Somme at Brie, Pagny, and Bethencourt. They movedback, therefore, at night with orders to hold the line from Buscourt toFeuillères. The average strength of brigades at this time was not morethan 20 officers and 600 men. From the morning of March 25 the Thirty-ninthDivision passed to the command of the Nineteenth Corps, and its furtherarduous. work will be found under that heading. During all this day Campbell'sTwenty-first Division, still fighting hard in a succession of defensivepositions, had its right upon the Somme, while its left was in Battleintermittent touch with the Ninth Division.
The Ninth Division had fallen back, the two seventh Scottish brigades beingcontinually in action until they reached the Maricourt—Montauban line,where they supported the First Cavalry Division who were in front of BernafoyWood. The general line at this period from Montauban southwards was held ^ bythe Ninth Division, the First Cavalry, the newly-arrived and most welcomeThirty-fifth Division (Franks), the Twenty-first Division, now reduced to asingle composite brigade under General Headlam, and then some oddments underColonel Hunt. This brought the line to the Somme, on the south side of whichwere the remains of the Sixteenth and Thirty-ninth Divisions. This might soundan imposing force upon so short a front, but save for the Thirty-fifth eachdivision wasnominis magni umbra, none of them stronger than brigades.The Forty-seventh Division was retiring at this time upon Contalmaison, and agap of several miles was appearing between the Fifth and Seventh Corps. Duringthe movements upon March 24 the guns of the 65th and 150th K.F.A. did greatwork and earned the warm gratitude of the weary infantry. The enemy targetsround Combles were all that a gunner could wish.
All troops north of the Somme were upon March 25 transferred to the FifthCorps, and became part of the Third Army. The 27th Brigade was drawn out of theline, and the 26th was under the orders of the Thirty-fifth Division which tookover the defence of this sector, relieving the exhausted Twenty-first Division.March 25 saw heavy attacks on Bernafoy, which was lost once, but regained bythe 106th Brigade. There was still a gap to the north, and no touch had beenmade with the Seventeenth Division, though the cavalry had built up a defensiveflank in that direction. At 2 P.M. the Germans attacked from Ginchy towardsTrones Wood, names which we hoped had passed for ever from our war maps. In thefirst onset they pressed back the 12th and 18th Highland Light Infantry of the106th Brigade, but there was a strong counter-attack headed by the 9th Durhamswhich retook Faldere Wood and restored the situation. A second attack about 3P.M. upon the Thirty-fifth Division was also repulsed. The German pressure wasso great, however, that the line of defence was taken back during the night tothe Bray—Albert position. The enemy followed closely at the heels of therearguards, though the guns were active to the last so as to conceal theretreat as long as possible. Early in the morning of March 26 the LowlandBrigade was again attacked with great violence, but the 12th Royal Scots, uponwhom the main assault fell, drove it back with loss. Changes in other parts ofthe line, however, necessitated a withdrawal across the Ancre, so as to keep intouch with the Twelfth Division which had now come up on the left. The NinthDivision upon this date numbered 1540 rifles with 20 machine-guns. It wasshortly afterwards drawn from the line after as severe a spell of service astroops could possibly endure. The story of the retreat of the Seventh Corps hasbeen indicated mainly from the point of view of this northern unit, but it willbe understood that the Twenty-first, as tried and as worn as its Scottishneighbour, was keeping its relative position to the south, while the Sixteenthwas conforming in the same way until the time when it passed into theNineteenth Corps.
The Thirty-fifth Division, newly arrived from Flanders, did great and indeedvital work in upholding the weakening-line at the moment of its greateststrain. A consecutive account of its work may make this clear. Pushing throughthe remains of the Twenty-first Division on March 24, Franks threw his meninstantly into the thick of the fight, attacking the Germans in front of Clery.Marindin's 105th Brigade did great work that day, the 15th Cheshires on theright and 15th Sherwood Foresters on the left, attacking and, for a time,carrying the ridge of Clery, though it was impossible in view of the generalretreat to hold it for long. The Germans were staggered by the sudden,unexpected blow, and they poured troops against their new antagonist, losingvery heavily in their reconquest of the ridge. Finally the front line of theSherwoods was practically annihilated, and the Cheshires were in almost as bada way, but with the help of some Sussex men who were formed into an emergencyunit, together with some signallers, they were able to draw off, and a line ofdefence was organised under General Marindin, but general orders arrived for awithdrawal to the front Curlu—Maurepas, which was safely carried out, the17th Royal Scots covering the rear. It was a most ticklish business, as touchhad been lost with the Ninth Division, but the wounded were safely evacuated,and all withdrew in good order, the 12th Highland Light Infantry finallybridging the gap upon the left. This battalion had lost in these operations itssplendid Colonel, Anderson, whose work has earned a posthumous V.C. The enemyfollowed closely, and attacked again before dusk. but was driven off. Theattack was renewed on the morning of March 25, but still without success, the4th North Staffords bearing the brunt. The weary troops of the Scottishdivision, who had been engaged for four long days, were rallied here and formedinto provisional fighting units, which did good service by relieving the 106thBrigade at Maricourt, when it was forced back. The pressure upon the divisionwas desperately severe, but was slightly eased by the arrival of aNorthumberland Fusilier battalion from the Twenty-first Division. That nightthe order was to withdraw to the line Bray—Albert.
The general command of the retiring line in this section, including theNinth, Twenty-first, and Thirty-fifth Divisions had for the time fallen toGeneral Franks, who handed his own division over to General Pollard. Theposition was exceedingly critical, as not only were the units weak, butammunition had run low. The line was still falling back, and the enemy waspressing on behind it with mounted scouts in the van. In this retreat tankswere found of the greatest service in holding the German advance. The route wasthrough Morlancourt and Ville-sur-Ancre to a defensive position upon the rightbank of the Ancre in the Dernancourt area, the orders being to hold the linebetween that village and Buire. Both villages were attacked that evening, butthe Thirty-fifth Division on the right and the 26th Brigade on the left, droveback the enemy. By the morning of March 28 the line seemed, to have reachedequilibrium in this part, and the welcome sight was seen of large bodies oftroops moving up from the rear. This was the head of the Australianreinforcements. During the day the enemy got into Dernancourt, but was thrownout again by the 19th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneer Battalion. The 104thBrigade also drove back an attack in front of Treux Wood. It was clear that themoving hordes were losing impetus and momentum. That same evening theAustralians were engaged upon the right and inflicting heavy losses on theenemy. On the night of March 30 the Thirty-fifth Division, which had lostnearly half its numbers, was relieved by the Third Australians.
We shall now follow the Nineteenth Corps in its perilous retreat. It will beremembered that on the evening of the first day of the battle it had been badlyoutflanked to the north, where the Sixty-sixth Division had made so stout aresistance, and had also lost a great deal of the battle zone in the south,which was made more disastrous by the fall of Le Verguier at nine on themorning of March 22. The supporting line formed by the Fiftieth Division hadalso been pushed in at Poeuilly and other points, and it was with no littledifficulty that the depleted and exhausted corps was able to get across theSomme on the morning of March 23, where they were ordered to hold the wholefront of the river, including the important crossings at Brie. This, as aglance at the map will show, was a very considerable retreat, amounting to noless than ten miles in two days, but it was of the first importance to get aline of defence, and also to lessen the distance between the sorely tried armyand its reserves. It was hard indeed to give up ground and to be back on theline of Peronne, but there was at least the small solace that this was theravaged ground which the Germans had themselves turned into a waste land, andthat there was no town of any consequence nor any military point of importancein its whole extent.
By the late afternoon of March 23 the bulk of the Nineteenth Corps wasacross the Somme. The Germans had followed closely, and there was rear-guardfighting all the way in which the Fiftieth Division slowed down the pursuit ofthe enemy. The officers who were entrusted with the defence of the line ofriver soon realised that they had a difficult task, for the dry weather hadshrunk it into insignificance in this section, and owing to trees and thickundergrowth the fields of fire were very limited, while the thin line ofdefenders scattered over some twelve miles of front offered, even after theadvent of the Eighth Division, an ineffective screen against the heavy advancefrom the east. Heneker's Eighth Division, a particularly fine unit consistingentirely of Regular battalions, had made heroic exertions to reach the field ofbattle, 'and fitted itself at once into its correct position in that verycomplicated operation in a way which seemed marvellous to soldiers on thespot.
In the evening of March 23 a number of Germans, some of them cavalry, wereobserved upon the farther side of the Somme and were heavily punished byartillery fire. None got across before dark, but during the night numerousbodies established themselves upon the western side. Local reserves had beenplaced near the probable crossings, and these in several cases hunted the enemyacross again; but the fact was that the river could be forded anywhere, andthat a German concentration on a Battle given point could always overpower thethin local defence. The line of resistance was further weakened by the FirstCavalry Division, which had linked up the Nineteenth Corps with the EighteenthCorps on the south, being now ordered to join the Seventh Corps in the north.The general order of the troops at this moment was, that the newly arrivedEighth Division was on the extreme right touching elements of the EighteenthCorps at Bethencourt and extending with the aid of one brigade of the Fiftiethas far as Éterpigny, nearly eight miles. From Éterpigny toBiaches, south of Peronne, were the remains of the Sixty-sixth Division,covering about four miles, and joining the Thirty-ninth Division on the rightof the Seventh Corps near that point. The Twenty-fourth was lining up betweenHattencourt and Chaulnes.
It was on the front of the Eighth Division, at Bethencourt, at Pargny, andat St. Christ, that the Germans made their chief lodgments upon the westernbanks of the river on the morning of March 24. The Bethencourt attack wasparticularly formidable, both for its energy and because it aimed at thejunction of the two corps. By two in the afternoon the German infantry wereacross in considerable numbers, and had forced back the right flank of theEighth Division, which fell back hinging upon the river farther north, so as tooppose the repeated efforts which were made to enfilade the whole line. GeneralWatts' responsibilities were added to next morning, March 25, for the two muchexhausted divisions of the Seventh Corps which were holding the northern bendof the river from Biaches to beyond Frise were handed over to him when the restof Congreve's Corps was incorporated in the Third Army. These two divisionswere the Thirty-ninth and the Sixteenth, the former holding as far as Frise andthe latter the Somme crossings to the west of that point.
March 25 was a day of great anxiety for General Watts, as the enemy werepressing hard, many of his own units were utterly exhausted, and thepossibilities of grave disaster were very evident. A real fracture of the lineat either end might have led to a most desperate situation. The French were nowat the south end of the river position, but their presence was not yet stronglyfelt, and with every hour the pressure was heavier upon the bent line of theEighth Division, on which the whole weight of the central battle had fallen. By10 o'clock on the morning of March 25, the defensive flank of the EighthDivision had been pushed back to Licourt, and had been broken there, but hadbeen mended once more by counter-attack, and was still holding with the aid ofthe Fiftieth. The cyclists of the Nineteenth Corps, the armoured-car batteries,and other small units were thrust in to stiffen the yielding line, which wasstill rolled up, until after one o'clock it lay back roughly from Cizancourt toMarchelepot and the railway line west of that place. Later in the day came thenews of fresh crossings to the north at St. Christ and Éterpigny wherethe Sixty-sixth Division had been pushed back to Maisonette. It was evidentthat the line was doomed. To stay in it was to risk destruction. At 4:15 theorder was given to withdraw to a second position which had been preparedfarther westward but to retain the line of the Somme as the left flank. Duringthese operations the Eighth Division had performed the remarkable feat ofholding back and defeating fourteen separate German divisions during thirty-sixhours on a nine-mile front, and finally withdrew in perfect order. Every unitwas needed to cover the ground, and the general disposition of divisions wasroughly as drawn:
R. - Hattencourt. Chantres. Estrées. Assevillers. Herbecourt. Frise - L. 24 8 50 66 39 16
It will be seen that General Watts' command had increased from two divisionsto six, but it is doubtful whether the whole six had the normal strength oftwo. The new line had not yet been completed and was essentially unstable, butnone the less it formed a rallying point for the retreating troops. It shouldbe noted that from the morning of March 25 General Fayolle took over thecommand south of the Somme.
The Twenty-fourth Division, which had suffered so severely in the first twodays of the action, was again heavily engaged during this arduous day. In themorning it had been directed to counter-attack in the direction of Dreslincourtin co-operation with the French Twenty-second Division. In the meantime,however, the whole situation had been changed by the right flank of the EighthDivision being turned, so that General Daly's men as they went up for theattack were themselves heavily attacked near Curchy, while the junction withthe French could not be made. They fell back therefore upon their originalposition where hard fighting ensued all day, and a most anxious situationdeveloped upon the southern flank, where a wide gap existed and the enemy wasmustering in force. Colonel Walker, C.R.E. of this division, was killed thatday.
On the morning of March 26 the new line had been occupied. The SeventeenthCorps had retired in the night to the Bray—Albert line, which left aconsiderable gap in the north, to the west of Frise, but this was filled up byan impromptu line made up of stragglers and various odds and ends from the rearof the army. It was in the south, however, that the attack was most severe, andhere it soon became evident that the line was too long and the defenders tooweak, so that it could not be maintained against a determined assault. Beforethe sun had risen high above the horizon it had been shaken from end to end,the Twenty-fourth Division being hard put to it to hold Fonches, while theSixty-sixth were driven out of Herbecourt. At 9:30 the order was given towithdraw, and with their brave rearguards freely sacrificing themselves to holdback the swarming enemy, the troops—some of them in the last stage ofexhaustion—fell back upon a second position. It was at this period of thebattle that Major Whitworth, the gallant commander of the 2/6 Manchesters,stood at bay with his battalion, which numbered exactly 34 men. He and 17 ofhis men were dead or wounded after this last stand, and 17 survivors were allthat could be mustered that evening.
Before the right wing fell back to Vrely there had been a good deal offighting. The Twenty-fourth Division, which was now a mere skeleton, wasstrongly attacked in the morning of March 27, and Dugan's 73rd Brigade waspushed back towards Caix, the 8th Sussex having very heavy losses, includingColonel Hill, and Banham, the second-in-command.
The situation upon the other flank of the Twenty-fourth Division was alsoparticularly desperate, and the 9th East Surrey, under Major Clark, sacrificeditself to cover the withdrawal of the 72nd Brigade. There were few more gallantactions in the war. Major Clark, writing from a German prison, gave a smallaccount which enables us to get a glimpse of the actual detail of such acombat. The enemy's infantry were in force, he says, within 100 yards of hisscattered line. "We managed to get back some hundred yards when I saw that ourposition was really desperate. The enemy were sweeping up from the south, andseveral lines of them were in between us and our next defensive line.... Wewere seen and the enemy began to surround us, so I decided to fight it out. Wetook up position in a communication trench, and used our rifles with greateffect. Grant was doing good work till shot through the head, and Warre-Dymondbehaved admirably. It was a fine fight, and we held them until ammunition gaveout. They then charged and mopped up the remainder. They were infuriated withus. My clothing had been riddled with shrapnel, my nose fractured, and my faceand clothing smothered with blood. There are 3 officers and 59 men unwounded.The rest of the battalion are casualties. It was a great fight, and the menwere simply splendid. I have the greatest admiration for them. It was aglorious end." Such were the class of men whom the East End of London sent intothe New Army.
The new position on March 26 may be depicted as follows:
R. - Rouvroy. Rosierea. Vauvillers. Framerville. Proyart. Froissy. - L. 24 8 50 66 39 16
The Germans followed up closely all along the line, the pressure being greateverywhere, but greatest on the left, where the Thirty-ninth and Sixty-sixthdisengaged themselves with difficulty, both of them being heavily attacked, andthe Cambridgeshires fighting a fine rearguard action in Biaches. About two inthe afternoon the troops were solidly established in their new positions, butthe extreme north of the line was in a very unstable condition, as theSixteenth were fired upon from the north of the river and their left was in nocondition to meet an attack. On the right, however, there was earlier in theday some very spirited fighting, for the Eighth and Fiftieth Divisions, thoughvery worn, were in far better shape than their comrades who had endured thegassings and the losses of the first day.
The Fiftieth Division fought particularly hard to stop the enemy's advance,turning at every rise, and hitting back with all the strength that was left it.A very fine little delaying action was fought by its rearguard this day uponthe line Lihons—Vermandovillers—Foucaucourt. The 5th and 8thDurhams, with a few of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers and a couple ofbatteries, held up the advance for several hours and stood their ground withsuch resolution that two platoons of the Northumberlands were never seen again,for they held on to Foucaucourt until both they and the village were submerged.As the day wore on and the pressure increased, the Sixty-sixth Division wasforced to let go of Framerville, for these men had fought without sleep forfive days and nights. They staggered back through the rear ranks of theFiftieth Division, consisting of the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, who at once,under the personal leading of General Riddell and Colonel Anstey, both of themon horseback and in red-banded caps, rushed the village once again. It was afine The advance which was much helped by the way in which Captain Thompson inVauvillers brought his machine-guns to bear upon the flank of the Germansadvancing to the south of him. Brigade-Major Paget, a very rising officer, waskilled in this spirited affair.
No gains could ever be held, as the general line was receding, but all suchsuccessful blows were of use as slowing down the German advance, teaching himcaution, and gaining time—for time was the very essence of the matter. Ifthere were time the line could be built up behind. If there were no time Amiensmust fall. "I will fight before Amiens, in Amiens, or behind Amiens!" criedFoch. Brave words, but if Amiens went, the future was dark indeed.
At eight on the morning of March 27 the Germans were raging once more alongthe whole line of the British breakwater. The gallant weary Eighth Division washeavily attacked near Rosières and the stormers reached the village, butHeneker's men counter-attacked in most heroic fashion, and cleared them outagain, taking a number of prisoners. The 2nd Devons, 1st Sherwoods, and 22ndDurham Light Infantry were the units engaged in this fine action.
News was bad from the north end of the line, and it was understood that theGermans were in Proyart, so both the Eighth and Fiftieth Divisions, out oftheir scanty ranks, sent reinforcements (R.E. details and the 2nd Devons) tohelp the Thirty-ninth Division. At 3 P.M. on March 27 the Germans were inFramerville, and an hour later were on the top of the Eighth and Fiftieth oncemore, in front of Harbonnière. The rearguard of the latter were the 4thand 6th Northumberland Fusiliers. The German guns were in full blast thatmorning, and the infantry full of ginger, but they could not break thatprotective line, thin, disciplined, and flexible. The two battalions could notcover the around, and the Germans streamed past their flank. In order tosupport the advanced line every available man was assembled on the reverseslope of a rise, just out of sight of the Germans. In front of them they couldhear the roar of the battle, ever growing nearer as the British line was rolledback. "We were a mixed crowd," says one who was among them. "Staff officers inred caps, clerks in spectacles, signalling officers, cooks, sappers, and thatextraordinary never-beaten infantry." It was indeed one of the crises of thewar, for the situation was desperate just south of the Somme, and if the enemywas through at this point also the line would be in fragments. The whole arraywaited over the curve of the hill, and as the enemy, in eight or ten waves,poured over the brow they fired at close range in the traditional Busacofashion of the peninsula. A bayonet charge as of old completed the transaction,and the enemy broke and fled, with a barrage beating down upon his supports.The British infantry from the top of the rise was treated to the welcome, and,as it must be confessed, unusual sight of a large force of Germans all shreddedout and hurrying for the nearest shelter, "like a football crowd caught in therain." It is an instance of the incurable levity of British troops that theybroke into the refrain of"Goodbyee! Goodbyee! There's a silver lining inthe skyee!"
In spite of their cheerfulness, however, the losses had been heavy, bothColonel Robinson of the 6th and Colonel Wright of the 5th NorthumberlandFusiliers being among the casualties. Each of the battalions now numberedlittle more than a hundred men.
This brisk counter-attack was a healthy little reminder to the Germans uponthis section of the line that the British infantry might be overborne bynumbers or by strategy, but that they were still the men who had in theprevious year chased them again and again from the most formidable positionswhich, they could construct. But these points of aggressive resistance were nowrare and the men were worn out. It does indeed seem to be an extreme example ofthe weakness of the reserves at this period in France, that in spite of thefact that the battle broke out upon March 21, no help save the one division hadin the course of a week reached the overmatched and exhausted troops. It istrue that the Higher Command may well have reckoned upon the French asreserves, and this would have been perfectly true had they been able to takeover the ground in the south and contract the British line. They did take overthe ground, but they took over most of the two British Corps as well, so thatthe Nineteenth Corps was little the better for their presence. Unaided byeither their own people or by the French, the Nineteenth Corps still held ondesperately with dwindling numbers to a line which was far beyond theirstrength.
Bad as was the position of the Nineteenth Corps, it was made worse by theever-changing position in the north. When the Seventh Corps fell back to theline of Bray it was behind the left flank of the Nineteenth Corps. But now itwas compelled to make a further move to the line Chipilly—Morlancourt,while all bridges were ordered to be destroyed up to Cherisy. This dispositionwas absolutely necessary in view of what was happening in the Third Army but itmade the position more and more difficult for the men in the south, who hadeither to fall back or to see the gap of undefended river upon their left reargrow wider and wider. General Watts is a stubborn fighter with no idea of goingback if it can be in any way avoided, so he held on in the south and fought abrisk, successful action there, while he sent such poor reinforcements as hecould to the Sixteenth Division in the north, stopping the dangerous rent withany odds and ends upon which he could lay his hands. Three hundred improvisedinfantry, six Lewis guns, and a battery in armoured cars were the best that hecould do, and these troops actually did hold the river line in the north fromthe early morning of March 27 until nightfall, against an ever-growing menace.But they could not cover all the ground, and the enemy, as was foreseen, wascoming over the river and getting behind the British line. The SixteenthDivision was practically destroyed, and the Thirty-ninth was in little bettercase, though General Feetham showed great energy in re-organising all thedebris of units upon the road, so that the line of resistance was very weak. Inthe afternoon a considerable party of Germans with machine-guns had got acrossthe river at Cherisy, west of Morcourt, held by seventy men of the SixteenthDivision, and pushed on in the most daring way south-west to Lamotte andBayonvillers. They were right across the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, and agreat disaster seemed inevitable, but weary as the men were, and tired as weretheir leaders, they were still capable of clear decision and swift action. Theriver was for the moment abandoned, the left of the line was swung south, andearly upon March 28 they faced north in this sector, along the track of theAmiens-La Fère railway. Roughly, the new position may be traced asfollows:
R. - Warvillers. Vrely. Caix. Gillancourt. Wiencourt—Marcelcave. - L. 24 8 50 66 39
This very difficult-and remarkable disengagement was particularly trying forthe Thirty-ninth Division since it had farthest to go and was in close contactwith the enemy. It was carried out in broad daylight in the morning of March28, and with such skill that there was no great loss in the 118th Brigade whichcovered it, but so close was the enemy that both General Bellingham and hisbrigade-major, Major F. Gunner, were captured while personally supervising thewithdrawal. After this operation the remains of the Thirty-ninth Division wereoccupying the line from Marcelcave to Wiencourt inclusive, along the railwaytrack. Germans were found in Wiencourt, and the two brigades, now reduced totwo composite battalions under Colonel Saint, attacked them with success, buteventually occupied a line to the west. All the guns had been saved and were inaction once more.
On the occasion of the reforming of the line as already described on March28, the Fiftieth Division had fallen back upon Caix, where it held fast to theimportant bridge across the River Luce upon which a number of troops fromvarious units were converging. Many of these were disorganised, and some, touse the expression of a spectator, "stone-cold"; but the same witness hasrecorded the splendid moral effect produced by one battalion which, marching infours and with everything in most precise order, came swinging down the road,with no change after its seven days of purgatory save that two-thirds of itspersonnel had disappeared. This was Colonel Hancock's 1st Battalion of RoyalFusiliers from the Twenty-fourth Division—an object-lesson to all who sawit as to how discipline can outlast the most terrific tests which a soldier canbe asked to endure.
The enemy, still working down from the north, had threatened the newdefensive flank at a point between Caix and Cayeux, but were held by a veryspirited attack made by the men of the 22nd Entrenching Battalion. Withconsiderable loss both to themselves and to the Germans, they held the line ofthe river until reinforcements arrived. The Thirty-ninth from the north and theEighth and Twenty-fourth from the south were all converging upon the one pointto take up their new positions. A Brigadier in command of the infantry, with800 men and 3 batteries, held the bridge; but the Germans might have rushed ithad it not been for a charge by the 151st Brigade, when the 5th and 7th Durhamsdrove back their advancing line. This spirited attack was led by GeneralJackson in person, who encouraged his men by blasts upon his hunting-horn.Speaking of one of their military heroes, a French historian has said:"Ilavait la graine de folie dans sa bravoure que les Français aiment."All soldiers love it, and it is a wise leader who knows how to employ it. Itwas a time when every possible device was needed to hold the men, for the enemywas close upon the bridge, and the safety of the remains of several divisionsdepended upon the bridge being held.
Returning to the general survey of the line of the Nineteenth Corps theSixteenth Division was now rather a crowd of warlike particles than anorganised unit. It was ordered, however, that every individual particle shouldbe reassembled at Hamel so that the nucleus of a division should exist oncemore. Hard marching and hard fighting had reduced the Twenty-fourth Division toalmost the same condition, though, thanks to a miraculous survival of most ofthe senior officers, the unit was still efficient. On the other hand, theSixty-first Division from the Eighteenth Corps, numbering at this period 2400men, was given to General Watts to help to form his new line. It was at firstintended with the aid of these new troops to endeavour to clear the left flank,and for this purpose a counter-attack upon Lamotte was ordered. Thenewly-arrived men from the south, the 183rd and 184th Brigades, who couldhardly stagger a mile, did actually carry the twin village of Warfuséeand hold the edge of it for a time under very heavy fire— an operation inwhich Major Bennett of the Oxfords did conspicuously fine work. Several grandsoldiers fell in this attack, including Captain Willick who had commanded the2/4 Berkshires after the fall of the heroic Dimmer. His last speech to his menis worth recording. It was, "I know how you feel, boys, tired and worn out, butwe have to stop them from breaking through." The support to this brave attackis said to have been "one gun, firing wildly."
The line sloped back now from Demuin in the south to the Somme at a pointopposite Sailly-le-Sec, the Sixty-first occupying the general sector just southof the Lamotte-Amiens road. From there to the river had been a gap which it wasabsolutely vital to fill. An old line of trench existed here, extending fromthe river to Demuin, and early in the battle General Gough, amid all hispreoccupations, had realised that it might be of great importance to have readyas a rallying place. He had therefore deputed General Grant, his own chief ofengineers, together with Colonel Harvey, his chief of staff, to organise it andto endeavour to man it, with any spare troops that they could find. This hadbeen done, and after three days of feverish work, Grant had prepared a line andhad thrust into it a most curious assortment of all sorts of details, made upof entrenching troops, American sappers, the staffs of various army schools,reinforcing units, and stragglers. On the third day General Grant was recalledto his official duties, but General Carey happened to be passing from the frontto take over a divisional command, and he was deflected and placed in charge ofthis assembly of military samples, which included 500 cases out of hospital.There was a sprinkling of machine-guns with trained instructors to use them,but the line was thin and there was a want of cohesion in the elements whichformed it. The great thing, however, was that the gulf was spanned betweenWatts in the south and Congreve in the north. There was still a trench and aline of British soldiers between the Germans and the open country that led toAmiens.
March 28 was a day of destiny along the line, for upon that date were thefirst definite signs that the assault had failed so far as its ultimateobjective was concerned, and that the Germans were not destined to overcome theBritish resistance. In the north, this was clearly indicated by the victory infront of Arras. In the south, the situation was still obscure and dangerous;but the mere fact that the day was got over without a catastrophe was in itselfa success, for on March 27 the prospects were very ominous. The line now ranfrom Demuin to Marcelcave, and thence the improvised trench garrison carried iton to the river. The First Cavalry Division, which had come across from thenorth bank, formed a link between the Sixty-first in the north of Watts' line,and what we will now call the Carey line. The cavalry men were still full offight, but they had done wonderful work since the first day of the battle,cementing every weak seam, and they were terribly reduced in numbers if not inspirit. Nothing can exaggerate the debt which the infantry owed to all threedivisions of cavalry for their tireless support during that awful week. Theynow tried to advance towards Lamotte, but they came upon the right flank of avery strong German force moving south-west from Cherisy, and though theyendeavoured to harass it they were unable to make much impression. The 61st wasalso terribly worn. Upon this day the 184th Brigade lost Colonel Belton, itsfifth commander, and was taken over by Colonel Pagan of the Gloucesters. Thesouthern end of the British line had troubles enough before, but they were nowaccentuated by the fact that the Germans had made a very rapid advance in theMontdidier sector which placed them in the right rear of the Nineteenth Corps.On this right flank there was much confused fighting, and a mixture of unitswhich reached such a point before the morning of March 29 that theTwenty-fourth, or what remained of it, found that it had unwittingly changedfrom the right to the left flank of the Eighth Division. There could perhaps beno clearer illustration of the dimensions to which the division had shrunk.These confused movements caused loss of touch, and there was a time when CorpsHeadquarters had completely lost the right of the line, which was badlydisorganised. It was a time of great danger. Yet another division, however, theTwentieth, was given to Watts, and though it was already worn to the bone, andcould not reckon a thousand men in all three brigades, it was stillbattleworthy and formed an invaluable asset at such a time. They were lined up,or perhaps dotted along would be a fitter term, upon the front ofMézières—Demuin, and formed a frail barrier behind whichthe hard-pressed men could have a brief breathing space while they endeavouredto reform. By the late afternoon of March 28 this operation was in progress,and before 11 P.M. the new positions were actually occupied. The line, whichwas partly wired, now ran from Mézières, through Demuin,Marcelcave, and Hamel to the Somme, but it would be hard to add the exactalignment of the units, as in many places they were inextricably mixed. TheSixty-first and the Cavalry had been placed behind Carey's line in order tosupport it should it weaken. South of this was the Twentieth Division,reinforced by fragments of other divisions, which among them had the strengthand spirit to beat off a strong German attack delivered by the force which hadbeen engaged by the cavalry in the morning. The country here was seamed by theold French trenches, which were woefully out of repair but none the less wereof great value to the defence. Carey's force was involved in this German attackon March 28, but with the help of the First Cavalry Division they managed tohold their line. Upon that date the exhausted troops received the followingwell-timed message from the Fifth Army Battle commander: "By the grand andstubborn way you are holding out and delaying the advance of the enemy, theBritish and French reserves are being given the necessary time to come up andassume the offensive. Your great exertions and sacrifices are not being thrownaway: they are of immense importance, and your resistance and your deeds inthis great battle will live for all time, and will save our country."
March 29 was another eventful and critical day for the Nineteenth Corps, andbegan badly for them, since the remains of the Eighth and Twenty-fourthDivisions had, as already explained, been thrust out of their positions andwere mostly on the west side of the Avre and out of the line. The FiftiethDivision was only partly in position, the fighting strength of the Sixty-sixthwas reckoned at 750 bayonets, and that of the Thirty-ninth at 500 bayonets. TheNineteenth Corps at this moment was nominally composed of eight infantrydivisions—Eighth, Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, Sixteenth, Thirty-ninth,Fiftieth, Sixty-first, and Sixty-sixth; but it is questionable whether theirunited strength greatly exceeded that of a single full division, to such apoint had the army been reduced. On the other hand, there was no directevidence of excessive wastage upon the part of the Germans, who could be seenin large well-organised bodies moving in front of the British lines. The oneconsolation lay in the fact that their heavy guns, and even a good many oftheir field-guns, had been left behind. The machine-guns, however, and theirnewly-developed light field artillery were as energetic as ever. The Britishartillery had been weakened by capture and destruction, but it was greatlysupplemented by several armoured-car batteries, Nineteenth Canadian andBritish, which did splendid service during these all-important days.
About mid-day on March 29 the French, and the remains of the ThirtiethDivision under the French Higher Command, had abandoned Mézièresupon the right flank of the Nineteenth Corps, and by so doing they exposed theright of the steadfast Twentieth Division. The fighting extended from the RiverAvre to Demuin. The 59th Brigade, which was in the south of the line, wasforced to fall back, but two battalions of the 60th Brigade were thrown out tocover the flank and hold the German advance from getting behind the Britishline. At 2 o'clock these two brigades gathered their thin ranks together for acounter-attack, aided by the Fiftieth Division, which had now been telescopedinto a single weak brigade. It was a remarkable attack, for most of the menwere stumbling with utter fatigue, and could hardly totter forward with theirrifles at the port. It was the Riflemen and Shropshires who made the advanceupon Mézières while their comrades stormed the surrounding woods.The 5th Durhams, 6th Northumberland Fusiliers, and 22nd Entrenching Battalionof the Fiftieth Division also did great things. There is evidence from theprisoners that the Germans at that particular point had lost very heavily andwere much distressed, so that the combat was like those closing rounds of ahard-fought boxing contest, where the two exhausted combatants can but push andpaw as they lurch against each other. The village was actually carried by theBritish, and a temporary easement secured, together with a handful of the 352ndRegiment, who stated that they had lost three entire companies in their firstadvance upon Mézières. This spirited counter-attack wasNineteenth covered by the guns of the Fiftieth Division which, under MajorJohnson, had worked very hard during those last trying days.
About 2 o'clock on March 29 Watts' Corps was reinforced by another skeletondivision, the Eighteenth — 2000 bayonets in all. It was merged with theSixty-first and placed in the Berteaucourt—Bois de Blangy line. The thinranks of the Twenty-fourth were still able to muster at the south end of theposition, but only one brigade of the Eighth Division, the Twenty-fifth, was ina condition for service. This unit moved to the edge of Moreuil Wood, andco-operated with the French One hundred and thirty-third Division which washolding the line at that point. From this time onwards theMoreuil—Ailly-sur-Noye road and everything south of it was French. As theBritish force dwindled its front also contracted, otherwise the situation wouldhave indeed been impossible.
As it was, it continued to be desperately critical, for beyond thetelescoping of units and the contraction of front there was no help for theBritish line, while the assailants were still very numerous and aggressive.About noon on this day, March 29, the Thirty-ninth Division, and indeed thewhole army, sustained a severe loss in the person of General Feetham, a leaderof great valour and experience, who was killed by a shell while walking withColonel Gosset, his chief of staff, in the village of Demuin.
His death was to some extent revenged at once by his devoted troops, for aGerman attack which followed at once down the valley of the Luce was drivenback with heavy loss by the rifles of the Nineteenth infantry. General Feethamwas replaced next day by General Blacklock. It is a remarkable fact thatFeetham was the second commander of the Thirty-ninth Division killed within afortnight, for General Cape, hislocum tenens, fell upon the 13th ofMarch.
On the morning of March 30 the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth Division was onthe south end of the line covering the bridge over the Luce at Hangard, whilethe 59th covered that at Dornart, the 60th lining up from Dornart toBerteaucourt. The Fiftieth Division had been now incorporated in the-Twentieth. All the bridges had been prepared for demolition. The enemy wereslowly pushing the French out of the Moreuil Wood upon the extreme right, smallbodies of infantry gradually infiltrating the whole position. The Germans soondeveloped activity also in the Luce valley, and finally along the whole corpsfront. The Second Cavalry Division was sent into Moreuil Wood to help theFrench, but the whole right of the line began gradually to crumble in face ofthe repeated assaults. The remains of the Sixty-sixth and Twentieth Divisionswere bent back, though the latter continued for a long time to hold the Demuin— Marcelcave line of road, but about 8 A.M. the Sixty-sixth Division waspushed out of Aubercourt.
There was some weakness farther north also, between Villers and Marcelcave,but the never-failing First Cavalry Division stiffened the yielding line. At 10o'clock the situation had improved in Moreuil Wood, where Seely's Canadiancavalry, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in support, were making their presencefelt. They held the line along the edge of the wood from east of Moreuil, buthad lost touch with the Twentieth upon their left. Later in the morning therewas a strong German counter in this quarter which drove the cavalry back intothe wood. Here at a later hour they were reinforced by the Eighth Division, ifsuch a sonorous name can be given to a handful of dazed and exhausted men. Theline at mid-day ran roughly as follows:
Moreuil Wood. Demuin. W.of Aubercourt. W.of Marcelcave. 2nd Cav. 20th. 63th. Carey. 61st. 1st Cav.
The great bulk of the British force lay to the north of the Luce River, andthe Germans were making every effort to push the flank backwards or aside andto ford the stream. A wood named Little Wood lay in such a position as to helpor hinder such an attempt, and it was the scene of some fierce fighting. It wasfirst occupied by one of the enemy's advanced parties. It was then retaken bysome of the West Yorkshires of the 60th Brigade. These in turn were pushed outby the enemy. Finally, in the. evening the 12th Rifles and 12th Rifle Brigade,with some French and scattered units of the Fiftieth Division, charged forwardthrough the twilight, recaptured the wood, and re-established the whole line inthis quarter. Nine machine-guns and fifty-three prisoners were taken. Wellmight General Watts telegraph: "Well done, the Twentieth! Such a counter-attackafter all your hard work is splendid."
Now at last there were signs of some relaxation in the dreadful strain. Onthis, the ninth day of the battle, the first British reserves, save only theEighth Division, began to appear in the line. They were the 9th AustralianBrigade, who came into the fight between Demuin and Aubercourt with their usualbrisk gallantry. Their attack made some progress, and the 12th Lancers whoadvanced with them shared something of the glory. Although the final objectiveswere not attained, the line north of the Luce was stayed by their presence andmade firm for the morrow. On, this evening several of those heroic units whichhad fought themselves to the last point of human endurance from the beginningof the battle were taken from that stage where they had played so glorious andtragic a part. The remains of the Thirty-ninth, the Fiftieth, the Sixteenth,and the Sixty-sixth were all drawn back for re-organisation. It was theirs totake part in what was a defeat and a retreat, but their losses are the measureof their endurance, and the ultimate verdict of history upon their performancelies in the one single undeniable fact that the Germans could never get pastthem. Speaking of these troops an observer remarked: "They had been fightingfor nine days, but were very cheerful and still full of vigour." The losses ofsome units and the exertions of the individuals who composed them can seldomhave been matched in warfare. The 2/6th Lancashire Fusiliers, for example, hadfought in the rearguard of the Sixty-sixth Division for the whole retreat underCaptain Porter, the only officer left standing. They were now reduced to abouta hundred men. Many battalions were in no better condition. Carey's nondescriptforce was also broken up on the evening of March 30. They had served a mostuseful purpose at a critical moment of the battle, and their formation may haveprevented a disaster, but it should be emphasised that their existence was notimpromptu, but had been pre-arranged by the wise foresight of GeneralGough.
On March 31 there were signs that the German flood was reaching full tide.They had acted to a wonderful degree up to their own saying:"Immer festdaran!" but they had now far outstripped their artillery support and thetenacious elastic British defence had worn them down. There was no attack onthe morning of this day, but about noon the fighting broke out once more in theMoreuil Woods, the enemy pushing their way through them and slowly driving backthe line of the Eighth and the Twentieth, while the French were again drivenout of the village of Moreuil. North of Marcelcave there was a day of quiet andre-organisation. The Sixty-first was still holding theBerteaucourt—Gentilles line, while the Eighteenth was holding the line ofthe Luce. In the evening the Eighth and Twentieth were again reinforced by thecavalry, and by the superior and heroic exertions of every one concerned theposition on the right flank was maintained. The 2nd Berkshires distinguishedthemselves in this fighting. There is something more than a name even in thisstage of the war in the old Regular battalions, for the chronicler finds thatthey stand out amidst the other units out of all proportion to their numbers.The 2nd Bedfords, 1st Royal Fusiliers, 2nd Scots Fusiliers, and many othersupheld the honour of the grand old force.
The right wing had been considerably hustled in the Moreuil quarter on March31, but on April 1 the Second Cavalry Division, which included the CanadianBrigade, made a sudden fierce counter-attack which threw the enemy back. Fiftyprisoners and thirteen machine-guns were the fruits of this action. The Britishguns had played upon the wood during the whole night, and the enemy hadsuffered severely, for the assailants found the brushwood to be full of deadGermans. There was no other movement of importance on this day. The reformedFourteenth Division was brought back into the battle and took the place of theTwentieth, the Fiftieth, and of the cavalry upon the front to the south of theLuce. Speaking of the latter troops after their nine days of martyrdom, asenior officer who saw them at this stage said: "In the last attack they weredriven back about a mile towards Amiens, but after the first Bosch onrush theystood like rocks, repelling attack after attack, counter-attacking andregaining ground in such a manner that every day I marvelled at the doing ofit, and at the men who did it."
April 2 and 3 were quiet days, but on the 4th there was a very violent andgeneral attack along the line of the Nineteenth Corps, and of the Thirty-sixthFrench Corps (General Nollet) which lay to the immediate south. The main weightof the battle fell upon the Fourteenth Division in their new positions, and bynine o'clock in the morning the Germans had gained some success to the north ofthe main Amiens road. The Australian 9th Brigade, which was south of the road,held their line, but had to fall back 500 yards in order to conform with thegeneral position. At 11:30 the enemy was still making progress, mostly on thefront of the Fourteenth Division, and had reached the east edge of Hamel and ofBois de Vaire. The Third Cavalry Division, those indomitable troops, werethrown in to thicken the line of the Fourteenth, and the Canadian motor gunsfrom Villers-Bretonneux were also brought into the battle. Later two battalionsof the invaluable Australian infantry came up at the double from the 15thAustralian Brigade. If ever the arrival of strong loyal men in a time ofdarkness brought joy and comfort with it, it was when the Australians relievedthe British line in these later days of the second battle of the Somme. "Godbless them!" was the silent prayer that went down the weary line. Ground hadbeen lost south of Villers-Bretonneux, and the line was bent, but the whole ofthe Third and Fifth Australian Divisions were streaming down to their places inthe defence. The end of the retreat was at hand.
Upon the evening of April 4, the line which was to be permanent for manymonths to come began to define itself, and order gradually evolved out ofever-shifting chaos. Lee's Eighteenth Division was now in touch with theThirty-sixth French Corps at Hangard. Then at the Bois l'Abbé lay the9th Australian Brigade. North of this, at the Bois de Gentilles, was the ThirdCavalry Division. Thence in succession came the 15th Australian Brigade, the43rd Brigade, the remains of the Twenty-fourth Division, the 8th AustralianBrigade, the other elements of the Fourteenth Division, the Fifth AustralianDivision near Aubigny, and the Fifty-eighth Division in the north. This summarywill show how Australia had braced the line. Upon the next day, April 5,Butler's Third Corps took over the whole area of the Nineteenth Corps, and theepisode was at an end. The retreat of General Watts across the ravaged country,his attempt to hold the long front of the Somme, his successive short retreats,his continual stands, and his eventual success, will always remain one of themost remarkable incidents in the war. This officer, who at the beginning ofhostilities was a "dug-out," hardly rescued from a premature ending of hismilitary career, showed in the highest degree those qualities of neverdespairing, and of rapidly adapting means to an end, which mark the competentsoldier. He began with two units under his control, and he ended with fifteen,but no general ever had to handle more weary troops, or had more need of aclear head and a high heart. The strain upon him had beenextraordinary—though indeed that is true of every corps and divisionalcommander in the line. As to the special features of this operation, it may besaid to be remarkable for the improvisations of troops, for the continual useof entrenching battalions as combatants, for the work of the dismountedcavalry, for the self-sacrifice and energy of the motor batteries, and veryspecially for the degree of mobility attained by the heavy artillery and therapidity with which it came into action in successive positions. Militarycritics will draw many deeper lessons from these operations, but these at leastare sufficiently obvious to catch the eye of the least experienced student.
The total losses of the Nineteenth Corps during this fourteen days of battlecame to from 35,000 to 40,000, killed, wounded, and missing. The losses in gunswere 41 heavy pieces and 73 field-guns, twelve of which were anti-tank guns inthe forward line. The pressure sustained by some of the divisions would beincredible if the facts were not fully authenticated. Thus the Eighth EnglishDivision was attacked from first to last by eighteen different Germandivisions, including three of the Guards. Prisoners were taken from each sothat their identity could not be disputed. Yet this same Eighth Division wasengaged within three weeks in the victorious advance at Villers-Bretonneux. TheGerman oracle Clausewitz has said that a retreating army should go back notlike a hunted deer but like a wounded lion. His commentators would hardly finda better example than the British armies in the second battle of the Somme.
Retreat of the Sixty-first Division—The Gloucestersat Beauvais — Fall of Ham—Retreat of the Thirtieth and Thirty-sixthDivisions—Great privations of the men—Fine feat at LeQuesnoy—Summary of the experience of Maxse's Corps
IT has been shown that Maxse's Eighteenth Corps, covering theSt. Quentin front, maintained its whole position on March 21, thanks to thesplendid conduct of the three battalions in the forward line, and to the stoutresistance in the zone of battle. It has also been told how the Sixty-firstDivision, the most northern unit, withdrew on the afternoon of March 22, veryattenuated but still full of fight, to a prepared position between Vaux andVilleveque.
At 4 P.M. that day the three brigades, or what was left of them, were inline 1500 yards east of Beauvais, the 184th being in the centre, with the 182ndon its right, and the 183rd on its left. As they faced their pursuers theycould plainly see the Germans pouring in successive waves from Atilly. Thecentral brigade was commanded by General the Hon. Robert White, one of twogallant brothers who sowed their military wild oats in the Jameson Raid, andthis unit, reduced now to a mere handful of Gloucesters, Berkshires, andOxfords, was exposed to a scourging fire of shrapnel, which further thinnedtheir ranks, their General being one of the casualties. No field ambulanceswere available at the moment, and as General White was led away badly woundedhe saw the German cavalry breaking into the south side of Beauvais, while alarge artillery dump west of the village was exploded by the enemy fire. Thewhole situation was chaotic, but the British infantry still hung together,retreating slowly and turning continually upon their pursuers. Some twentyGerman aeroplanes were quartering the district like so many fierce hawks, anddiving with great daring from time to time into the very streets of thevillage, while the British falling back into cover fired up at them with their'rifles and light machine-guns. Two of them came crashing down upon the roofsof the houses. It was rumoured that the enemy had already got close to Ham uponthe right rear of the division, and they were round the left flank in theregion of Holnon Wood. There was little artillery support available, for sixtyper cent of the forward guns had been taken or destroyed in Holnon Wood, andthe remaining batteries were getting away with their reduced teams, so that theretreat of the infantry was correspondingly slow in order to cover thewithdrawal.
In the north the Scotsmen of the 183rd Brigade were moving back nearVillescholles in touch with the 72nd Brigade of the Twenty-fourth Division,both of them being much helped in their retirement by the 11th Hussars. Allalong the line the Germans were pressing very closely, but the Sixty-first keptwonderfully steady, though at Beauvais, where Colonel Wetherall had taken overthe command when General White was wounded, the two parties were continuallyintermingled, so ardent was the pursuit and so leisurely the retreat. So mixedwere the combatants that Major Howitt, brigade-major of the 184th, was draggedout from among his men, and was in the hands of the Germans for some excitingand instructive hours. "I must say the officers treated me well, though theescorts were very rough," says he. "For all my hatred I could not help admiringthem intensely, for their deployment, discipline, and preparation were aneye-opener. They extended into battle order with hardly a sound and lay downpreparatory for the next assault, bringing up mules dragging lighttrench-mortars, machine-guns, and ammunition." Major Howitt finally broke awayfrom his escort, and by keeping so near to a burning ammunition dump that noone dared to follow him, he succeeded in regaining his own lines.
The defence of the line in front of Beauvais was kept up with remarkabletenacity and ended by 150 men of the 2/5th Gloucester battalion performing whatwas an extraordinary feat, even in this war of miracles, for they held on to aline 2000 yards in length until 3:30 in the morning of March 23, holding up thewhole German advance. All night the enemy tried to rush or to bomb this thinline of determined men, but it was not until the cartridges ran low that theBritish made their retreat, sneaking round the outskirts of the village whichblazed behind them, and making their way to Longuevoisin where they joinedtheir comrades, who had already given them up as lost, for they had been fivemiles behind the army. Colonel Lawson was in command during this heroicepisode, and was ably supported by his two lieutenants, Rickerby and Dudbridge.Of the latter, it is recorded that in a later stage of the retreat he was insuch a condition of absolute exhaustion that he was wounded three times in thecourse of a single day without ever observing it until evening. Utter nervefatigue has its compensations as well as its terrors.
The Thirtieth Division had held on to its ground until four in the afternoonof March 22. Some units lingered to cover the retreat, the 2nd Yorkshires andthe 17th Manchesters holding on to their redoubts until six o'clock, when theywere in danger of isolation.
During their withdrawal both the Sixty-first Division and the ThirtiethDivision to the south of it were covered by the 59th and 60th Brigades of theTwentieth Division. These two fine brigades, still intact and full of fight,allowed the weary soldiers to pass through their ranks, while they opposed atenacious resistance to the pursuing Germans. When the Sixty-first andThirtieth were across the canal of the Somme the covering division fell back inorderly fashion, and itself crossed the canal between Canizy and Bethencourt,the 60th Brigade being on the right and the 59th on the left. The 60th Brigadewas compelled to fight hard to make good its retirement, and it struck backagain and again at the German vanguard. In this fighting the 12th Rifle Brigadeparticularly distinguished itself, but its losses were heavy, and included itsgallant Colonel, Maclachlan.
Early in the morning of March 23 it was known that the enemy had crossed theline of the Somme at Ham. The Thirtieth Division had retreated upon theimportant little town, which had been thrown into a state of defence by GeneralStanley of the 89th Brigade, but his garrison was so utterly inadequate tocover the ground that his dispositions were useless, as the Germans could getround him on either side. He had with him in the first instance two entrenchingbattalions, the 21st and 23rd, two companies of gas engineers, the corpscyclists, and a mere handful of infantry. Late on March 22 he was joined,however, by his own three attenuated battalions of the King's, each of whichhad been heavily engaged in different parts of the battle. At the same time the90th Brigade dropped back to the left of Ham and the 21st to the right. Thedivision was bare on both flanks, however, and it was determined to continuethe retreat. The bridges were blown up and such rolling stock as was possiblewas destroyed, but there were very many stores in the town which had to beabandoned to the enemy. It was a very great disaster, for it supplied him withmuch, and indeed served him as an advanced base, all ready-made for hisoperations in this part of the field. As to the loss of the river line, it hasalready been explained that in these higher reaches it is a very slightbarrier.
When the enemy had taken Ham he pushed along swiftly towards Esmery-Hallonon the heels of the retiring Thirtieth Division. The Thirty-sixth Division,which had been assisted in its retreat by the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth,had crossed the Somme to the east of Ham, and was now to the right of theThirtieth (right and left being used all through these operations on thesupposition that the unit is turning and facing the enemy). The Thirty-sixthDivision crossed the Somme Canal at St. Simon, closely pressed by the enemy,and the 121st Field Company Royal Engineers and other sapper units performedgreat work under heavy fire, destroying e no less than twenty-seven bridges.After the passing of the river by the Germans there were constant rear-guardactions, one of the most spirited of which was at Villeselve, where the 9thIrish Fusiliers and the Royal Dragoons fought together and drove in the Germanvanguard. The general situation of Maxse's Corps upon the forenoon of March 23was that the Thirty-sixth Division was over the Somme and near Golancourt andBronchy, that the Thirtieth Division was dropping back upon Esmery-Hallon, andthat the Sixty-first Division, retreating in the direction of Nesle had crossedthe Somme at Voyennes and Offoy, continuing its retreat to the Nesle Canal.Between the Thirtieth and Sixty-first Divisions were the 60th Brigade on theright and the 59th on the left, who were also covering the Nesle Canal, butwere quite ready to counter-attack should an opening present itself.
A British corps does not allow itself to be driven without hitting back,however great the odds may seem. A series of brisk skirmishes was going on allalong the line. In one of these, just south of Ham, Colonel Watson with the17th Bang's Liverpools came back on his pursuers and held them up for a time.More serious was the counter-attack organised by the main body north ofEsmery-Hallon. This attack struck southwards from Canizy and hit upon the rightflank of the Germans, staggering them for the instant. It was carried out bythe 60th Brigade and the 182nd Brigade, all under General Duncan of the formerUnit. This spirited advance was led upon the field by Colonel Bilton of theSixty-first Division, and was delivered with such force that this small Britishdetachment drove back for some distance the great army which was rollingwestwards. It was impossible, of course, to recover ground permanently, but itgained invaluable time and eased the pressure upon the south end of the linefor the whole of a critical evening. It was clear, however, that the capture ofHam and the crossing of the stream had turned the flank of the Twentieth andSixty-first Divisions, who were defending the higher reaches of the same river.They were not to be frightened prematurely out of their positions, however, andat Bethencourt the 11th Rifle Brigade drove back a German attempt at crossing,while at Offoy the 12th Rifles also inflicted a sharp repulse upon thepursuers. That evening, March 23, the Sixty-first Division was practicallyamalgamated with the Twentieth, and both were concentrated near Nesle. Theyreceived at this time a most useful reinforcement in the shape of two batteries(16 guns) of Canadian motor machine-guns under Captain Meerling. There is notan officer or man of these much-tried battalions who would not admit a deepdebt of gratitude to these splendidly efficient and energetic guns, which hadsuch mobility that they were always where they were most wanted. The troops hadon the morning of March 24 got behind the Somme Canal, which runs beside theriver, all bridges had been broken, and patrols were pushed across wherepracticable so as to keep in touch with the enemy. It was not in this southernarea, however, but at Bethencourt that the Germans did actually get across inforce, by which they turned the flank of the 25th Brigade of the EighthDivision in the north and of the 59th Brigade in the south. An attack wasinstantly organised by the 11th Rifle Brigade, who had lost their Colonel,Cotton, the day before, and were now led by Major Bertie. They succeeded by afine effort in driving the Germans for the time across the canal and gainingtouch with the Eighth Division. The Germans pushed across once more at Pargny,upon the other flank of the Eighth Division, and also renewed their attempt ingreater force at Bethencourt, getting possession of the higher ground there.This time it was the Highlanders and Royal Scots of the 183rd Brigade whocounter-attacked, acting as part of the Twentieth Division, and by half-pasttwo in the afternoon the position had once more been re-established. TheCanadian motor-guns were invaluable in this operation.
Upon the morning of March 24 the Sixty-first Division was barring the roadfrom Ham to Nesle. The German progress had been checked in this direction by aspirited counter-attack carried out by the 5th Cornwalls, the pioneer battalionof that division, together with a mixed array of police, bandsmen, and otherdetails, who advanced from Offoy to a depth of five miles, under Major Bennett.This little improvised force held on all night, and seems eventually to havejoined up with the French in the neighbourhood of Esmery-Hallon.
The British were still holding the crossings at Voyennes and Offoy, but veryhard fighting had broken out to the south, and the Germans, who had poured overin the neighbourhood of Ham, were now thrusting hard for Canizy. The roadbridges had all been destroyed, but there was a railway bridge at Ham which hadbeen taken out of the hands of the army authorities and left in charge of therailway department. This was either uninjured or at any rate inadequatelydestroyed, and was of immediate use to the enemy, enabling him to keepuninterrupted pressure upon the retiring troops. Canizy was now taken, but the12th Rifles made an immediate counter-attack and forced the Germans back fromthe village.
In this spirited operation they lost their gallant Colonel, Moore, who hadled them with the utmost fearlessness.
Whilst the Germans were pushing forward at Canizy they had also maintainedstrong and continuous pressure upon the Thirtieth Division near Moyencourt, andupon the Thirty-sixth Division at Golancourt, causing the Ulster men, whoseleft wing was entirely in the air, to fall back westwards. The next line ofdefence, after the Somme had been forced, lies along what is called theLibermont Canal between Nesle and Libermont. It was necessary to fall back,fighting as best they could, and to place this obstacle, narrow as it was,between the weary soldiers and their pursuers. It was the third day since themen had had a decent meal or an uninterrupted rest, and they were verydisorganised and broken. "Hundreds of men were streaming back," says oneobserver. "They had been without food for days and were done in completely.They were stopped and reformed at the bridges, where as many as 2000 werecollected." It is such plain sobering sentences which help one to realise thatwar is not, as large scale descriptions might seem to imply, a question of themoving of pieces upon a board, but that underneath the strategy lie thecountless human tragedies, the tortured frames, the broken nerves, the prayersof brave men that they may still be brave, the torturing anxiety of officers,the ever-pressing burden which sometimes breaks the weary back which tries tohold it. Strategy reckons nothing of these things, but their accumulation makesup the terrible human tragedy of war, which brings humility to the most proudand fear to the most valiant. All equally feel the weakness of nature, but heis blessed who has the strength of spirit to cover and to combat it.
By mid-day on March 24 the Thirtieth Division was over the Libermont Canal,holding from Buverchy to Libermont, with the village and bridge of Raincourt asa joining point between the 90th Brigade to the north and the 89th to thesouth. It may be recorded, to descend suddenly from divisions to individuals,that the first sign of the new German advance was a single scout who appearedin the open in front of the canal, and was engaged in a prolonged anddeliberate rifle duel by Lieutenant Harrop, with the result that he was finallybrought in as a wounded prisoner. The Twentieth Division had also fallen back,the orders of brigades from the south being the 60th with its flank onBuverchy, the 59th resting on Quiquery, and the 183rd to link up with theEighth Division near Mesnil St. Nicaise. The Thirty-sixth Division prolongedthe line to the south of Libermont. The French reinforcements from the southwere beginning by the afternoon of this day to get as far north as thissection, and if not very weighty at the moment they were of great moral use asa promise for the future.
From the new positions of the British line the German infantry could now beseen advancing in platoon columns in three lines on each side of the Voyenneroad and heading for the Libermont Canal. Second Several parties of horsemencould be seen also, who Battle were conjectured to be battery staffs, keepingup with the fight. The weak point was still near Bethencourt, between theTwentieth and the Eighth Divisions, where the gap tended to be wider as theenemy got more troops across and endeavoured to push the 25th Brigade north ashas been described in dealing with the experiences of the Nineteenth Corps.They were reported before evening as having got as far as Morchain. The flankbrigade of the Eighteenth Corps, the 183rd, was ordered to extend as far to thenorth-west as Potte in the hope of regaining touch, but though they reachedthat village they were still unable to bridge the gap. During the night therewere heavy attacks upon Mesnil St. Nicaise in this region, which fell chieflyupon the Rifle battalions of the 59th Brigade, which had been reinforced by the20th Entrenching Battalion and the 1 1th Durhams, the divisional pioneerbattalion. The general result was to force the British line some littledistance to the westward. At Buverchy in the evening the German infantry alsoadvanced in great numbers, but came under the very efficient guns of theThirtieth Division, and lost very heavily. The enemy artillery was also veryactive so that both the Thirtieth near Buverchy and the Thirty-sixth farthersouth had many casualties. The French relief was making itself more felt,however, in this southern section, where they were already outnumbering theBritish. The latter were greatly worn—so much so that the 21st Brigade ofthe Thirtieth Division could hardly be said to exist, only about 100 of theYorkshires being left in the line. By evening the centre chapter of theposition was near Moyencourt, some little distance to the west.
In spite of the French reinforcements, which were not accompanied withartillery, the attack was still markedly stronger than the defence, so thatMarch 25 was a most dangerous and critical day in this quarter of the field. Totrace the developments from the north the enemy continued to press through thegap between the two corps, the Nineteenth and the Eighteenth, making a seriesof heavy attacks towards Mesnil-le-Petit and Nesle from the direction of Potte.This movement, powerfully followed up, pushed back the left flank from Quiqueryto a point on the high ground 1000 yards west of Nesle. The 183rd Brigade,which was now a mere handful of Scottish infantry, superb in quality butreduced to the last stage of exhaustion, together with the thin ranks of the59th Brigade of Rifles, could not, even with the aid of the Canadianmotor-guns, hold the heavy masses who pressed down upon them. The French Onehundred and thirty-third Division moving up in support had dug a line betweenBillancourt and Herly, but Nesle was abandoned to the enemy, the Twenty-secondFrench Division retiring from this sector and falling back towards Roye. The60th Brigade of the Twentieth Division, much helped by the 23rd EntrenchingBattalion—these valiant diggers made their presence felt all along theline—still held stoutly to their positions from Quiquery to Buverchy, buttheir left and left rear were so compromised that it was clear they could nothold out longer. To the south the French, who had relieved the Thirty-sixthDivision at Libermont, had been pushed back, and the British position wasturned in their direction also. By the afternoon the French had taken over theline as far north as Buverchy, and the Thirtieth Division was ordered to fallback, but the Germans had advanced so rapidly from Libermont and got so far totheir Eighteenth right rear that it was no easy matter either for the Britishor the French to get past them. Many had to swim the canals which striate thispart of the country, and the 2nd Bedfords were especially hard-pressed beforethey were able to get away. The Twenty-second French Division was doing all itcould to cover the approaches to Nesle upon the south, and the 184th Brigadecheered them loudly as they passed through their ranks. "They looked very finemen and seemed very much for it." General Wetherall of this brigade was badlywounded by a shell splinter in this period of the battle. And we have a vividpen-picture drawn by a spectator of Brigade-Major Howitt, some of whoseadventures have already been recorded, holding Wetherall' s wounded artery withone hand, while he wrote brigade orders with the other, for more than two hourson end. The 184th lost five commanders during the retreat.
Even if the local pressure had not caused a rapid withdrawal at this portionof the line, it would have been enforced by the general strategic position, forthe German advance in the south had been so masterful that on this night ofMarch 25 Roye was taken, which is far to the south-west of Nesle. The 61stBrigade had been sharing the hard fortunes of the Thirty-sixth Division, butnow, as the latter had been drawn out, it was restored to the TwentiethDivision. So severe had been the strain upon it that it only numbered about 500bayonets, and some battalions, such as the 2/6th Royal Warwicks, had not asingle combatant officer left standing. None the less, it was at once sent toman a supporting line stretching through Gruny, Cremery, and Liancourt, and hadhardly reached it before the Germans were also at Liancourt. The brigade heldthem, however, and so enabled the front line to fall back upon an organisedposition whence, on the next morning, a swift retreat became necessary.
After dark on March 25 the One hundred and thirty-third French Division hadcome up to relieve the Twentieth and Sixty-first, but the situation was suchalong the line of the Nesle Canal that no fixed line could be formed, and thethree divisions were finally greatly mixed up in the darkness and there was agood deal of confusion in their councils, since the general directions of theFrench were, to fall back to the south, while the line of retreat of theBritish lay rather to the west. There was little time for deliberation, forword had come in that the Germans were closing in upon Liancourt, pressingsouth and west, in a way which threatened to cut off the whole forward line. Atmidnight, the British, many of them hardly able to move for fatigue, staggeredoff in such formations as they could assemble, with orders to concentrate northand east of Roye. Thanks largely to the presence of the remnants of the 61stBrigade near Liancourt, this most hazardous march was successfullyaccomplished, but as Roye was within the grasp of the enemy the movement wascontinued so as to reach a line between Hangest and Le Quesnel. The Germanswere close upon them in the north, so the 61st Brigade, now down to 400 men,acted as flank-guard, fending off their constant attacks.
The war has shown few finer instances of disciplined and tenacious valourthan in the case of the three handfuls of men who represented what had oncebeen the 12th King's, 7th Somersets, and 7th Cornwalls. The enemy were inLiancourt, and their patrols were in actual hand-to-hand fighting with a Frenchdetachment aided by some of the Somersets. Other German troops pouring downfrom the north and using to the utmost the gap which had opened between thecorps, endeavoured to cut in and to seize Le Quesnoy (not to be confused withLe Quesnel, towards which the troops were marching). It was, however, upontheir line of retreat, and about halfway to their destination, so that a Germanoccupation would have been serious. The post was most desperately defended byCaptain Combe, the brigade-major of the 61st Brigade, with two Lewis guns and100 men. Only eleven were left standing at the end of this defence, but thevillage was held for the necessary time, and the survivors only withdrew uponreceipt of a positive order. Thus the flank march of the British from Roye toLe Quesnel upon the morning of March 26 was successfully accomplished, owing tothe devotion of their covering party to the north. "It was very much of arabble," says an officer, "and there was great difficulty in sorting out themen and arranging the units." None the less the future was to show that theforce was no more beaten than were the old contemptibles after Mons.
The Thirtieth Division had been drawn out of the line on the arrival of theFrench, but they were hardly started on their movement towards the rest whichthey had earned so well, when this great pressure arose, and every man whocould still carry a rifle was needed once more in the line. On the morning ofMarch 26 they were back then, between Bouchoir and Kouvroy. The 21st Brigadehad now entirely disappeared, but the remains of the 2nd Yorks and the SouthLancashire Pioneer Battalion were added to the 89th Brigade which was in thenorth at Rouvroy, while the 90th, under General Poyntz, filled the gap toBouchoir. The Thirtieth Division had got considerably to the west of this linebefore they were recalled, and it was only by some splendid marching that theywere able at last to throw themselves down upon the coveted ground before theGerman armies, which were streaming along the Roye-Amiens road, were able toreach it. As they faced the Germans the Twenty-fourth, now the mere shadow of adivision, was on their left at Warvillers, while the Sixty-first and Twentiethwere in support at Beaufort and Le Quesnel. Near Erches the Thirty-sixth Ulstermen, whose relief, like that of the Thirtieth, had proved to be impossible,were still battling bravely, retaking the village of Erches after it had fallento the enemy. The 109th Brigade also distinguished itself greatly in this area,the Irish Fusiliers Battalions of which it is composed holding on mostdesperately to the village of Guerbigny, at the extreme south of the corpsfront, and continuing a heroic defence during March 26, and long after it wasisolated upon March 27. The artillery of the Ulster Division was particularlygood in its covering fire during these operations, gaining the very gratefulacknowledgments of the French troops and generals who were more and moreconcerned with this southern sector of the line. Speaking generally the troopshad now reached the region of the old French trenches, which grid-ironed aconsiderable area of country, so that it was certain that if men could be foundto man them, the pursuit would no longer continue at the Battle pace of thelast two days.
Great work was done at this period by four of the Canadian motor-guns at thecross-roads, north-west of Rouvroy, where they not only inflicted heavy lossesupon the enemy but delayed his advance while the exhausted troops were settlingdown into this new position. Every hour was of importance as givingreinforcements time to come up from the rear, and the general orders to thedivisional generals were to hold on at all costs wherever defence was possible.A small body of corps cyclists under Lieutenant Quartermain co-operatedsplendidly with the motor-guns and did good service at this critical period ofthe retreat, during which there was very little artillery support behind thethin line of infantry.
The German pressure on March 27 fell chiefly, as already shown, upon theTwenty-fourth Division and the other units on the extreme south of theNineteenth Corps, which were forced back for some distance, and so threatenedthe stability of the line in the south. The 17th King's Liverpool, which wasthe flank battalion, held fast, however, and flung back their left to form adefensive line to the north. A small body of German cavalry performed abrilliant piece of audacious work in the darkness of the early morning of thisdate, pushing through the outposts of the Thirty-sixth Division in the southnear Guerbigny, and capturing the Brigade Headquarters of the 109th Brigade,and also the chief staff officer of the division.
The future was full of menace, for the Germans were pressing on in greatnumbers. An observer near Bouchoir that evening (March 27) says: "I have neverseen so many Germans in all my life—one huge dark mass about a mile away.With glasses one could see howitzers, machine-guns, trench-mortars, and fieldbatteries, as well as infantry. It was a most wonderful sight. They seemed tobe coming down the Roye road, then moving off to the south, and some stoppingin a mass."
The main German attack upon the extreme south of the corps line on March 27fell upon the Thirty-sixth Division in the direction of Erches, with the resultthat the Ulster men fell slowly back upon Arvillers, the 60th Brigade throwingback a defensive flank to correspond. By 12:30 Bouchoir, held by the 90thBrigade, was gained by the Germans, but the British formed a new line to theimmediate westward of the village. An attack upon Folies was thrown back by the59th Brigade. Towards evening some order came out of a rather tangled position,which may well be obscure both to writer and reader, since soldiers upon thespot found the greatest difficulty in separating the various confused elements.As night fell upon March 27 after much desultory and inconclusive localfighting, there was no great change in the British line which ran fromWarvillers, still held by the Twenty-fourth Division, to the west of Bouchoir,where the Thirtieth held the line, and down to Arvillers held by the 60thBrigade of the Twentieth Division, which was temporarily out of touch with theThirty-sixth Division. Hangest was held by the Sixty-first Division, and LeQuesnel by the Sixty-first and the French. That night the Twentieth Divisionwas ordered to join the Nineteenth Corps, and their record under this newcommand will be found in the preceding chapter. One would have thought thatthey had reached the limits of human endurance, and their total numbers werenot more than a thousand, and yet they were but at the beginning of a newchapter in their glorious history.
The same words apply to their comrades of the Sixty-first Division, who werealso ordered north. They were relieved by the French at Arvillers, and thisportion of the line was on March 28 pressed back to the west of Hangest.
The removal of the Twentieth Division at so critical a time could only bejustified by the extreme and pressing need of the Nineteenth Corps, for it hadthe effect of producing an almost impossible position for the line in thesouth. Had it been possible to replace it at once with a solid French division,it would have mattered less, but as matters stood the One hundred andthirty-third French Division had itself been involved in the retreat and wasgreatly worn. There was so little time also to get it into its new positionsthat there was never any solid bastion upon that corner of the line. The resultwas speedily seen in the morning of March 28, when the Thirtieth Division werefirst subjected to a very heavy bombardment, and then looking south saw ageneral retreat going on from Arvillers, while their left flank at Warvillerswas also very weak, since the Twenty-fourth Division was hardly strong enoughto maintain itself. By 2 P.M. both flanks were bare, and the enemy were wellround them in the north and in the south at Hangest. At one time it seemedimpossible for the division to get clear, and even now their extrication seemsmiraculous to the officers who effected it. A rapid retreat was made throughMézières and on to Moreuil, which only just avoided the closingpincers of the German advance. The French, who were in the act of relieving theThirtieth Division, came away with them and had the same narrow escape. Theblock upon the road which formed the only egress is described as having beenappalling, fugitives, refugees, and small disciplined columns of troops beingcrowded together from one end of it to the other. "The men were excellent,"says an officer of the Thirtieth Division. "Their discipline was not a bitshaken." Such words, could not truthfully be said of every unit, and yetsoldiers can have seldom been more highly tried in any operation in history.Even the Imperial Guard may reach its breaking point, as the retreat fromMoscow has shown. At Moreuil there is only one bridge, and had the Germanartillery been able to find it the result would have been a Beresina. As itwas, the troops got across and speedily reformed upon the farther side of theriver Avre.
This may be taken as the limit of the retreat of the Eighteenth Corps, sincethe stand in the north of the line and the thickening French resistance in thesouth brought the momentum of the German advance to a halt. How terrible theordeal had been may be gathered from the fact that the Twentieth Division, asalready mentioned, was not more than 1000 strong, the Thirtieth Division about2000 strong, the Sixty-first Division 2100 strong, and the Thirty-sixthDivision only a little stronger at the end of it. Again and again it had beenon the brink of absolute disaster, but always by the wise dispositions ofGeneral Maxse and his divisional generals, seconded by the splendid tenacity ofhis men, the worst consequences had been avoided. Rapid readjustments had beenneeded, but a fatal break was always averted. The troops were handicapped inevery possible way, for not only was their artillery far below strength, butfor some reason the British Air Service during these days of stress was veryweak in this southern area, while the German machines were very numerous andaggressive. The artillery officers were splendidly cool and efficient allthrough, and in the case of the 92nd Brigade Royal Field Artillery nearEsmery-Hallon, it is said that the last gun was just 25 yards from the Germanswhen it limbered up. For two days the whole corps artillery was with theFrench, and did fine work with them, but to the great detriment of their owninfantry. Some of the batteries remained for a long time with the French, andone French general has left it upon record that the failure of the Germans tocapture Moreuil on April 4 was almost entirely due to the splendid shooting ofthe 306th Brigade Royal Field Artillery. After the first two days of theretreat no guns were abandoned by the Eighteenth Corps. The total losses ofguns might be put at about 90 field pieces and 4.5 howitzers, with about 60heavier pieces.
Movement across the Crozat Canal—Fight of the 173rdBrigade—Forcing of the Canal Line—Arrival of the French—Fightof Ffieres Wood—Splendid work of the Cavalry—Loss ofNoyon—Final equilibrium—General retrospect of the Battle
WE shall now complete this slight survey of a vast subject byfollowing the fortunes of Butler's Corps upon the extreme right of the wholeBritish Army. It has already been shown that the condition of this corps at theend of the first day of battle was most perilous, as its left flank in theregion of Essigny, where the battle zone of the Fourteenth Division had beendeeply pierced, was completely turned. The Eighteenth Division in the centrehad, it is true, retained its ground, but the left brigade of the Fifty-eighthDivision upon the right, the only brigade of that unit which was engaged, hadalso after a very desperate resistance lost their front positions at Quessyopposite to La Fère. Therefore orders had been given to draw off thetroops during the night of March 21 across the Crozat Canal, and a coveringline had been built up from the 54th Brigade, the Second Cavalry Division, andthe 12th and 18th Entrenching Battalions in order to hold the German pursuitand to give the somewhat dishevelled troops time to re-organise their ranks. By5 A.M. on March 22 they were over the canal and the bridges had been destroyed.The artillery had been got over first to cover the crossings, and the 54thBrigade, which had covered the rear of the Fourteenth Division, was lined upfrom Jussy to Mennessis. The Eighteenth Division (less the 54th Brigade) fellback in the line of Frières Wood, behind the canal. Many guns had beenlost but the cavalry had thrown the 3rd and 6th Brigades of the R.H.A. into thefiring-line to support the infantry, and two new batteries of the 96th K.F.A.,only arrived the day before from England, came in at the nick of time.
It was of the first importance to destroy the bridges along the canal, butthis was found to be no easy matter. They had all been mined and prepared fordestruction some time before by the French, but either the lapse of time orfaulty material had caused such deterioration that the charges failed toexplode, and had to be renewed and discharged under circumstances of greatdifficulty and danger. It was carried out none the less with great tenacity bythe British sappers, but several weak points remained, notably a canal lockwhich had been so injured that the bed of the canal was exposed for somedistance. The railway bridges here, as elsewhere, were also a source ofweakness.
As the corps turned to face the enemy upon the south side of the canal thegeneral line of battle showed the 41st Brigade just south of St. Simon,connected up on the left by the only surviving battalion of the 42nd Brigadewith the 61st Brigade of the Twentieth Division who were in support of theThirty-sixth Ulsters at that place. Then came 43rd and 54th Brigades, facingJussy and Mennessis with the 3rd and 5th Dismounted Cavalry Brigades insupport. South of this point were the 4th Cavalry Brigade, the 55th Brigade,and the 63rd Brigade, all in the Frières area. Then came the 173rdBrigade in the Vouel neighbourhood with the 18th Entrenching Battalion and the6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade. This force had already lost heavily, and manyof the men were suffering from gas, but they were sustained by the certaintythat French reinforcements would speedily reach them from the south, as asystem of mutual lateral support had been agreed upon between thecommanders.
A line of trenches had been begun in this neighbourhood by the French sometime before, and it had been carried on by Italian labour, but it was stillvery unfinished, with many gaps, so that the tired soldiers had to lay downtheir rifles and take to their trenching tools to get some cover. It wasalready clear that they would need it, for with early daybreak on March 22 theGermans showed that they had reached the north bank of the canal at Jussy. Itwas again very misty, and they were able to bring up their machine-guns andsmall artillery with perfect impunity and place them under cover. It was notuntil between 10 and 11 A.M. that the mist began to lift, and the Britishoutposts peering through it could see the flash of the guns among theplantations on the farther side. At an earlier hour the Germans had tried tocross at Jussy, but had been driven back. It was already evident, however, thatthey were in a position to repair the bridges in such a way as to find apassage wherever they desired. The general situation might be described as acurious reproduction of the first action of the war when the two armies layupon either side of the Mons Canal.
The French Sixth Army on the right had acted with loyal promptitudc, and theOne hundred and twenty-fifth Division, under General Diebold, was alreadymoving up from the south. One would have imagined that the most efficientrelief would have been to replace the two British brigades in the south of theOise, and so re-unite the Fifty-eighth Division. For some reason this was notdone, and General Worgan's 173rd Brigade continued to be a lone unit. A verywelcome reinforcement consisted of nine batteries of French 75's. It wasunderstood also that the whole Fifth French Corps, under General Pelle, was dueat Noyon that evening, and that the Third British Corps would be relieved by itas soon as possible, but further help was slow in materialising.
At about 1 P.M. on March 22 the enemy made their first crossing of the canalin the region of the 173rd Brigade. They advanced from Fargniers in thedirection of Tergnier village. The range of vision in this water-sodden regionwas not more than fifty yards, which greatly handicapped Colonel Dervicke-Jonesof the 8th London, who was in local command of this sector, as it put hismachine-gun defence out of action. The troops were spread over a front of 3000yards, so that the various companies were widely separated. The first Germanadvance was made across a lock gate by a number of men dressed in the uniformsof some of the 1st London, taken the day before—a ruse which was the moresuccessful as a number of genuine stragglers had actually been coming in inthis fashion during the morning. An attack followed during which C Company ofthe 8th Londons, while holding the enemy in front, were attacked by thesepretended comrades upon the right rear, so that they were almost entirelydestroyed. A road was thus opened across the canal, and the enemy opened outboth north and south of the Quessy-Tergnier road, cutting off those of the 3rdand 8 th March 22. London who were on the farther side. These men fought to afinish, and only a few of them ever got back. Colonel Dervicke-Jones had takenup a position in an old French reserve line called the Butt line, with twocompanies of his battalion and some machine-guns, and was able to hold up theenemy all day in his immediate front, and to prevent several battalions fromdeploying out of Tergnier. The artillery also got on to the German infantry inthis part of the field with good results. This Butt position was maintaineduntil the morning of March 23. Farther up the line, in the region of theFourteenth Division, other troubles had developed, and the pressure of theenemy was great. At 4:30 P.M. the defenders were reinforced, but the enemy werealready across at several points and were advancing upon Cugny. There wasdesultory fighting along the whole corps front, and though there was promise ofimmediate French relief, no French troops seem to have been actually engagedupon March 22. About 6 o'clock in the evening the enemy was across at JussyBridge and also at Montague, but a fine counter-attack was made at this pointby the 7th Bedfords and 6th Northamptons of the 54th Brigade, aided by the 16thLancers, which drove the German infantry across once more and causedconsiderable losses. In spite of this success the general situation upon theevening of March 22 was not cheering, and the task of the Third Corps which hadbeen ordered to stand fast and form the southern hinge upon which the wholeretreat should turn, was clearly a very difficult one. It was the morealarming, as the rapid progress of the enemy at Beauvais and Vaux at the centreof the army led to a demand for cavalry which could not be complied withwithout denuding the line to a dangerous and almost impossible extent.
It was soon clear on the morning of March 23 that the Butt position on theright could not be maintained. The French had taken it over, but they wereunable to hold it. A line was built up near Noreuil, where the remains of the8th and 3rd Londons, aided by some French details, endeavoured all day to checkthe German advance. The main attacks were driving down from the north, and wereheralded by a very severe machine-gun barrage, which rained bullets over theBritish position. The defence was much aided by a French armoured car upon theQuessy-Rouez road, and by a battery of 76's. The 4th London were to the southof the village and less exposed to the force of the advance. About six, afteran hour of intense shelling, the Germans closed in upon Noreuil, the defenders,after a stout resistance which occasionally came to hand-to-hand fighting,being driven westwards. Colonel Burt, commanding the 6th Cavalry Brigade,barricaded his headquarters in the village and held the Germans off a long timeby his deadly fire. It was not until long after the lines had been withdrawnthat this brave officer had to be specially summoned to leave his post and fallback on Chaimy. Finally, the retreat became general, but was rallied at the endof the Noreuil valley, where some 200 men collected, and with a good field offire to help them, remained for some time on the defence. Late at night thissmall force was ordered to fall back to a new line at Chauny. Battle
It has already been stated that two companies (C and D) of the 8th London(Post Office Rifles) had been cut off when the Germans got across the lock-gateon the afternoon of March 22. These men, under Captain Gunning, had made aremarkable defence, crawling out with Lewis guns on to the lock-gates in orderto enfilade the advancing Germans. In the afternoon of March 23 they foundthemselves with the Germans on three sides of them and the canal on the fourth.Captain Gunning and Captain Kelly with the survivors then fought their waythrough to Condren, where they still continued their resistance. Thesesoldiers, who made so admirable a resistance, were largely men who had beencombed from the Army Service Corps.
Whilst the 23rd of March had brought this heavy fighting to the 173rdBrigade, it had been a day of severe trial to all the other units of the corpsfront. The 54th Brigade was still covering the crossing at Jussy and Montague,but the pressure was rapidly increasing as fresh German divisions made theirpresence felt. The situation was the more serious as General Butler alreadyknew that the enemy were across the canal at Ham and had turned his left flank,but it was still hoped that a counter-attack in this quarter might throw himback, and so it was determined to hold on to the line. An emergency force ofodds and ends, dismounted troopers, labour men, and returned leave men weregathered together at Crisolles and placed under the command of General Harmanto co-operate with General Greenly who now led the remains of the FourteenthDivision, in guarding the left wing. Meanwhile there was very brisk fighting atJussy, where the German infantry had once again, under the cover of many guns,got a footing upon the south side of the canal. They were at once vigorouslyattacked by a small body of the 11th Royal Fusiliers and of the Scots Greys andpenned up in the village of Jussy. At 11 A.M. the Germans had also got acrossat Mennessis, but came under the fire of four machine-guns of the CanadianMounted Brigade which inflicted heavy losses upon them. None the less at asecond effort the Germans were across once more, driving back by the weight oftheir attack the worn ranks of the 7th Bedfords and of the 9th Scottish Rifles.At 11:30 they were half a mile south of Jussy, and might have got round theflank of the Bedfords but for the interposition of 200 Canadian dragoons."These grim, square-faced men, with their parchment skins and their granitefeatures, were a glad sight to our weary eyes," says one who was fightingbeside them. There was a time when it was doubtful whether in this quarterthere was anything but a line of dismounted troops between the enemy andParis.
Every man who could be spared was hurried up to hold the weak points of theline, including the 8th Sussex, the pioneer battalion of the EighteenthDivision, the rest of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, and the 7th CavalryBrigade, but the mischief had gone too far, and the situation upon the right ofthe line was even worse than at Jussy. The counter-attack of the French Onehundred and twenty-fifth Division in the direction of Tergnier had not been asuccess, which is not to be wondered at, for the French infantry had come fastand far, their ammunition was not plentiful, and they were working over strangeground against an aggressive and victorious enemy. Next to the French on thatfront was the 7th Queen's. Colonel Bushell found himself at one period incommand of the left of the French as well as of his own Surrey men, and he ledon this mixed following under an intense fire, being himself severely woundedand yet rallying them again and again. Little progress could be made, but atleast he held the line firm for a time. This gallant colonel, after having hiswound dressed, returned to the field of battle, fell insensible, and had atlast to be carried off. Next to the 7th Queen's was the 8th East Surreys (bothof 55th Brigade), which was also in the thick of the battle, as was theneighbouring 12th Entrenching Battalion. This line made a very fine resistance,but was slowly pressed back by weight of numbers until at 4 P.M. they were onthe line Noreuil—Frières—Faillouel, to the left of the spotwhere the 173rd Brigade was still holding its ground. The remains of the 7thBuffs fell back also with the rest of the 55th Brigade, fighting hard, throughFrières Wood, where to the south-west of the wood they found some oldFrench trenches, in which, with the aid of the survivors of the Queen's, they,under Colonel Ransome, organised a line for the rest of that arduous day. Thisresistance held up some strong drives of the enemy which were evidentlyintended, in conjunction with the attack from Jussy in the north, to cut offall the troops in the woody country round Frières, and it acted as amost efficient screen during the withdrawal of the rest of the line.
The whole eastern limit of the British area was spotted at this period bysmall bodies of men who were working desperately to keep the German infantryfrom sweeping in from that side. At Noreuil, as has been shown, were theremains of the 173rd Brigade. At Frières Wood were the decimated 55thBrigade. Opposite Jussy were the 54th Brigade and the dismounted cavalry,slowly retiring before the ever-increasing pressure. In between these organisedbodies were many smaller units all striving hard for the same end. Among thesemay be mentioned two companies of sappers, 80th and 92nd Field Companies R.E.,who were extended upon the road north of Noreuil in touch with the 173rdBrigade on one side. These valiant men not only held their position all day,but actually made a counter-attack under Lieutenant Richardson in the evening,when they advanced until they were nearly surrounded. Finally they fought theirway back to the Caillouel area.
As evening drew in the situation had become more and more difficult. Theenemy had been driving in from every quarter all day without a respite, and thetroops, many of whom had been engaged for more than two days without a momentfor rest or re-organisation, were in a great state of exhaustion. Only ahandful of several battalions remained as a fighting force. The confusion wasmade worse by the fact that the light blue uniforms of the French were mistakenfor the grey of the Germans, so that misleading and alarming reports werecontinually brought in to the commanders. All reserves were in the fight, andthe need of relief was urgent. About 4 o'clock the Faillouel position was foundto be no longer tenable, and the troops fell back through the village, whichwas immediately occupied by the enemy who were pushing up their troops inmotor-lorries in this quarter. By 5 o'clock the right wing had come back 500yards, and by evening the main position was at Caillouel, when the 54thassembled, numbering 650 bayonets all told, the three battalions of Bedfords,Northamptons, and Royal Fusiliers being each a little over 200 strong.Detachments of the Scots Greys and 20th Hussars joined them at thatvillage.
The 53rd Brigade, fighting upon the left of the 55th Brigade^ was as heavilyengaged on March 23 as the other units of the Third Corps on the south side ofthe canal. At noon they had lent the 10th Essex to support their neighbours,and they consisted henceforth of only two weary battalions, the 6th Berks and7th West Kents. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon they were heavily attacked andwere pushed slowly back, struggling hard to keep the line. Major Tween led acounter-attack of his battalion headquarters, and checked the German advance ata critical moment, but was mortally wounded in the gallant endeavour. The twobattalions were so weak that they had been telescoped into one, but good steelremains tough be it ever so thin, and the line still held. At 5:30 the 9thFrench Cuirassiers, long-booted giants, came up to help them, as did the 79thField Company and various small details. At 7 the remains of the 55th Brigadewere falling back through their ranks. When they had passed, the 53rd was alsowithdrawn as far as Commenchon, while the 55th reassembled at Bethencourt tothe north. Three gallant Cuirassier regiments of the 1st French CavalryDivision covered the rear. All the troops that night were worn to rags, for itis to be remembered always that the great local disparity of force enabled theGermans to bring up perpetually lines of perfectly fresh men with a new impetusand inspiration, against men, many of whom had been gassed on the first day,and who were now weary to death and hardly able either to stand or to think, toorder or to understand an order. On the whole long, tormented, struggling linethere was no time or place where the pressure was greater than here. In spiteof all the ardour of the attack the stubborn constancy of the defence may bemeasured by the fact that, save for one battery which was destroyed byshell-fire upon the afternoon of the 23rd, no guns were lost in this corpseither upon March 22 or 23. On the other hand, so great had been thedestruction of machine-guns, especially upon the first day, that only two wereleft out of forty-eight in the Eighteenth Division, though these were augmentedby six new ones on March 24.
The Sixth French Army, on the right of the British, was doing all it couldto send up help, but it seems certain that none of this force was actuallyengaged before March 23, though it is stated upon good authority that in theliaison plans of the army the aid from the south was promised for the veryfirst day. Any delay was not due to want of energy or loyalty of officers andmen upon the spot. By the evening of March 23 the French units in thefighting-line were the One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, which made theunsuccessful counter-attack towards Tergnier, the First French DismountedCavalry Division, who fought side by side with the Eighteenth British Division,the Ninth and the Tenth French Divisions, both of which were on the extremeleft of the Third Corps, and can hardly be said to have been engaged. As theFrench troops were now predominating in this sector, the command passed on theevening of March 23 to General Humbert, a dark, wiry little French veteran,commanding the Third Army. General Butler continued, of course, to command hisown corps.
On the morning of March 24 the situation to the south of the Crozat Canalwas as follows. The Fifty-eighth Division still held its original line fromBarisis to the Buttes de Rouy, with a party holding the bridgehead at Condren.Then on the general line north and north-east of Chauny were the broken butindomitable remains of the Londoners of the 173rd Brigade, mixed up withfragments of the French One hundred and twenty-fifth Division, the 18thEntrenching Battalion, and troopers of the 6th Dismounted Cavalry Brigade,together with the dust of smaller broken units. Up to La Neuville was coveredby the worn brigades of the Eighteenth Division supporting the FrenchCuirassiers. North of that was the 326th Regiment of the Ninth French Division,and north of that what was left of the British Fourteenth Division up to apoint within a mile of Cugny, which was in German hands. On the extreme leftflank on this sector the Thirty-sixth Division and the 61st Brigade were inOllezy and Eaucourt. There had been some fighting on the front of theFifty-eighth Division during the night, but otherwise it was quiet, and thesoldiers were able to snatch a few hours of sleep.
Once again there was a thick morning fog, under cover of which the Germaninfantry broke suddenly upon the One hundred and twenty-fifth French Division,north-east of Chauny, driving them back towards Abbecourt. This placed theBritish troops at Condren in a perilous position, but it was essential to holdthe line of the Oise, and any abandonment of the bridge would have been fatal.The Fifty-eighth Division was ordered to stand fast therefore, and the 173rdBrigade was reinforced by the 16th and 18th Entrenching Battalions. Theseentrenching battalions are, it may be remarked, entirely apart from the LabourCorps, and were soldiers, well officered and organised, formed from those unitswhich remained over after the re-organisation of the three-battalion brigades.Apart from these were the labour battalions who also in those hard days wereoccasionally the final weight which tilts the balance where the fate of armiesand finally of empires was in the scale. Manfully they rose to the occasion,and the Empire owes them a very special word of thanks. During the afternoonall the British and French troops in this quarter passed over the Oise, mostlyin the Abbecourt district, blowing up the bridges behind them and passing underthe command of General Duchesne of the Sixth French Army. This left a blankupon the right of the Eighteenth Division upon the north of the river, butGeneral Seely brought up his cavalry and endeavoured to cover it, while theSecond Dismounted Cavalry Division was pushed out upon the left of theFourteenth Division in the north, to preserve the connection between the Thirdand Eighteenth Corps. The Third Cavalry Division under General Harman wasthrown in also at this point, and about 2:30, having mounted their horses, theycharged most gallantly in order to re-establish the line north of Villeselve onthe front of the Ulster Division. The Royal Dragoons were prominent in thisfine charge in which they sabred many of the enemy, took over 100 prisoners,and relieved the pressure upon the Irish Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade at atime when it was very heavy.
The whole corps front was slowly falling back during the day, partly onaccount of the steady pressure of the German attack and partly in order toconform with the line to the north. The Fourteenth Division, moving south-westthrough Crisolles, found itself in the evening on the west side of the NoyonCanal, covering the two crossings at Haudival and Beaurains. A vamped-updetachment of stragglers and nondescripts under Colonel Curling were placed tofill up the gap between the Fourteenth Division and Noyon. The left of theFourteenth Division at Guiscard was covered by General Harman's detachment, andit is characteristic of the adaptability of the British soldier that seventyNorthumberland Hussars who had become cyclists were suddenly whipped off theirmachines, put upon horses and sent up to reinforce the thin ranks of thecavalry.
The centre of the line covering Caillouel was held all day by the EighteenthDivision, with the First French Cavalry Division still acting as a breakwaterbefore the advancing flood. In spite of the gallant Cuirassiers the pressurewas very great from the 54th Brigade who were in the north, through the 55thand down to the 53rd, which covered the north of Noyon. Some of the edge wastaken from the German attack by the efficient work of the 82nd Brigade RoyalField Artillery and the 3rd and 5th Royal Horse Artillery, who were hard at itfrom morning to night. The French infantry on the left of the EighteenthDivision lost Guivry towards evening, but they held fast to Beaugies untilafter nightfall. About ten o'clock, however, the German infantry was intoBeaugies, and the situation became dangerous as they were getting round theleft flank of the Eighteenth Division, so that there was a general retreat tothe rearward position called the Crepigny Ridge, which was not fully reachedand occupied until 3 A.M. on March 25. That evening the Fifty-eighth Divisionreported that early in the day they had blown up all bridges and also the RoyalEngineer dump at Chauny. So intersected is the whole country at the back of theline of the Fifth Army by watercourses, that the total number of bridges blownup during the retreat amounted to about 250; and only in two cases, that of theHam road bridge and that at Chipilly, was the result unsatisfactory.
In the early morning of March 25 the Germans, who were still marchingrapidly and fighting hard, were close to Guiscard, pushing on so swiftly thatspecial troops had to be detailed to cover the heavy guns. General Butler hadso far as possible pulled his dismounted troopers out of the fight and hadrestored them to their proper role, so that now he possessed a force of about2000 horsemen, who were ready to execute the all-important functions of mountedinfantry, so invaluable in a retreat. Under Generals Greenly and Pitman thesehorsemen did great work during the remainder of the operations.
Since the German pressure was still very heavy and the enemy were sweepingonwards in the north, it was necessary to continue the withdrawal of the linenorth of the Oise, while holding fast to the southern bank along its wholelength. The first movement in this withdrawal was to the lineMondescourt—Grandru, and the second to the line Appilly—Baboeuf—Mont de Béthéricourt. By 8:30 the EighteenthDivision in the middle of the line was effecting this retirement, the northernflank, which was the post of danger, being covered by the 11th Royal Fusiliersof the 54th Brigade. It was a most difficult and delicate business with theenemy pressing down continually through the woods and villages with which thecountry is studded. On the south the 53rd Brigade and the French Cuirassierswere withdrawing through Mondescourt in some disorder. When the troops wererallied and rearranged, there were no French troops upon the right. At 10 A.M.the 54th Brigade had reached the Grandru position, but were out of touch bothwith the French on their left and with the 55th Brigade on their right. Theytherefore continued to fall back upon Béthencourt. At 1 o'clock a strongGerman infantry attack, in many lines, developed upon the right near Appillyand a heavy machine-gun barrage burst out over the 53rd Brigade and theirimmediate comrades upon the right, the 289th French Regiment. Up to 3 o'clockthe Allies in this quarter were retiring under a very heavy fire, much helpedby four valiant cars of the French Cavalry's Mitrailleuses Automobiles, who didsplendid service in covering the exhausted infantry. The German infantry,pressing eagerly forward in expectation of that general debacle which neveroccurred, was riddled by the fire of these motor-guns and left swathes of deadbehind them. The attack had the effect, however, of driving back the Alliedline to such a point that a French force which was defending MontBéthéricourt was entirely isolated and in great peril ofdestruction. Under these circumstances the French officer in command appealedto General Sadleir-Jackson of the 54th Brigade to make a great effort to rescuehis imperilled men. Sadleir-Jackson without hesitation led back his men intothe village of Baboeuf, cleared it of the Germans, captured ten machine-gunswith nearly 300 prisoners, and regained touch with the French, who were enabledto withdraw. The 7th Bedfords and 11th Royal Fusiliers were the heroes of thischivalrous exploit, where we were able to repay the loyalty which the Frenchhave so often shown to us. It should be added that a company of the 12thEntrenching Battalion, which like all the other entrenching units had gonethrough this severe infantry fighting without light artillery, signals, or anyof the ordinary adjuncts of well-equipped infantry, was still so full ofmilitary spirit that without orders it joined in this victorious charge.
On March 25 the Germans were within shelling distance of Noyon, and theBritish evacuated successfully nearly 2000 wounded from that town. Thecounter-attack of the 54th Brigade had stopped the German advance for a time,and the Eighteenth Division w^as able to get across the river Oise, the gunsand transport passing in the afternoon while the infantry got across that nightand in the morning of March 26, without serious molestation, being covered bytheir sappers and pioneers, who blew up the bridges as soon as the troop's weresafely across. At two in the morning of March 26 the French abandoned Noyon. Atthis time there were no British troops upon the north of the river save theremains of the Fourteenth Division which were finally relieved upon this date,and the Second and Third Cavalry Divisions, now under Generals Pitman andPortal, who harassed the German advance at every opportunity, and renderedconstant help to the French rearguards. The Second Cavalry Division secured thehigh ground immediately west of Noyon, and held it until it could be handedover to the French infantry. The general line of the cavalry was facingnorth-east from west of Noyon, through Suzoy to Lagny, where they were in touchwith the Tenth French Division. The left of the Second Cavalry Division hadbeen prolonged by the addition of the Canadian Dismounted Brigade. These mensoon found themselves involved in some hard fighting, for the Germans attackedthe French at Lagny and drove them out. On one occasion this day, at the Boisdes Essarts, the troopers of the Second British Cavalry Division gallopedthrough the French infantry to hold off the attacking Germans, an episode inwhich Lieutenant Cotton and other officers gained the honour of mention in theFrench order of the day. The left of the cavalry was compelled to fall backfinally to Dives, and the Canadians after a determined struggle were driven outof the woods which they occupied. Finally, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade(Bell-Smyth), consisting of the 5th and 16th Lancers with the 4th Hussars werenearly surrounded, and had the greatest difficulty in fighting their way out.Before night they were in touch once more both with the French and with theircomrades of the 4th Brigade. On the morning of March 27 word came that theBritish cavalry was imperatively needed at the junction between the French andBritish, armies. It was despatched forthwith to do splendid service in thenorth after having played a glorious part in the south.
From now onwards the fighting upon the Roye and Montdidier front (both townspassed soon into German possession) was no longer connected with the ThirdCorps. The position to the south of the Oise showed that the Fifty-eighthBritish Division held from Barisis to Manicamp. Thence to Bretigny was the Onehundred and twenty-fifth French Division. Thence to the east of Varennes werethe Fifty-fifth French Division, with cavalry, and the First French Division upto Sempigny. Thence the line ran in an irregular curve through Lassigny toCanny, the enemy being well past that line on the north, and the direction ofattack being rather from the north-west. On the morning of March 28 orders wereissued that the remains of the Third Corps should be transferred to the north,where they should join their comrades of the Fifth Army, from whom they werenow separated by a considerable distance. Within the next two days, after somedifficulties and delays in extricating the artillery, these orders were carriedout, though it was not till some days later that the Fifty-eighth LondonDivision could be relieved. This unit had not, save for the 173rd Brigade, beenengaged in the recent fighting, but it had held a line of over ten miles ofriver, along the whole of which it was within touch with the enemy. One effortof the Germans to get across at Chauny on March 31 was met and repelled by the16th Entrenching Battalion, who killed many of the assailants and capturednearly 100 prisoners.
So ended the vicissitudes of the Third Corps, which had the strangeexperience of being swept entirely away from the army to which it belonged, andfinding itself under French command, and with French troops fighting uponeither wing. Its losses were exceedingly heavy, including 20 heavy and Third100 field-guns, with about 15,000 killed, wounded, or missing. The FourteenthDivision was the chief sufferer with 5880 casualties, 4500 of which came underthe head of "Missing," and represent the considerable detachments which werecut off in the first day of the battle. The losses of some of the battalionsapproached annihilation. In spite of all pressure and all misfortunes there wasnever a time when there was a break, and the whole episode was remarkable forthe iron endurance of officers and men in the most trying of allexperiences—an enforced retirement in the face of an enemy vastlysuperior both in numbers and in artillery support. When we realise how greatwas the disparity it is amazing how the line could have held, and one wondersat that official reticence which allowed such glorious epics to be regarded aspart of a great military disaster. Against the two and a half British divisionswhich were in the line on March 21 there were arrayed seven German divisions,namely, the Fifth Guards, First Bavarians, Thirty-fourth, Thirty-seventh, Onehundred and third. Forty-seventh, and Third Jaeger. There came to the ThirdCorps as reinforcements up to March 26 two British cavalry divisions, oneFrench cavalry division, and three French infantry divisions, making eight anda half divisions in all, while seven more German divisions, the Tenth, Twohundred and eleventh, Two hundred and twenty-third, Eleventh Reserve, Twohundred and forty-first, Thirty-third, and Thirty-sixth came into line, makingfourteen in all. When one considers that these were specially trained troopswho represented the last word in military science and efficiency, one canestimate that an unbroken retreat may be a greater glory than a victoriousadvance.
Every arm—cavalry, infantry, and artillery— emerged from thisterrible long-drawn ordeal with an addition to their fame. The episode wasrather a fresh standard up to which they and others had to live than a faultwhich had to be atoned. They fought impossible odds, and they kept on fighting,day and night, ever holding a fresh line, until the enemy desisted from theirattacks in despair of ever breaking a resistance which could only end with theannihilation of its opponents. Nor should the organisation and supply servicesbe forgotten in any summing up of the battle. The medical arrangements, withtheir self-sacrifice and valour, have been already dealt with, but of theothers a high General says: "A great strain was also cast upon theadministrative staffs of the army, of corps and of divisions, in evacuating agreat mass of stores, of hospitals, of rolling stock, of more than 60,000non-combatants and labour units, while at the same time supplying the troopswith food and ammunition. With ever varying bases and depots, and eternal rapidshifting of units, there was hardly a moment when gun or rifle lacked acartridge. It was a truly splendid performance."
We have now traced the movements and the final positions of the eight corpswhich were involved in this terrible battle from the foggy morning whichwitnessed the German attack, up to those rainy days of early April which showeda stable line—a line which in spite of occasional oscillations continuedfrom that date until the great British victory in August, to mark the point ofequilibrium of the giant forces which leaned from east and from west. In thisaccount we have seen the Seventeenth and Sixth Corps in the north fall backupon Arras and the Vimy Ridge, where they turned and dealt their pursuers sucha blow that the battle in that sector was at an end. We have seen the Fourth,Fifth, and Seventh Corps struggling hard to make a line from Arras to Albertand down to the Somme; we have seen the Nineteenth Corps covering a huge frontand finally holding firm near Villers-Bretonneux, and we have seen theEighteenth and Third Corps intermixed with our French Allies helping todetermine the line in the southern area of the great field of battle. That linerunning just to the west of Montdidier, Moreuil, and Albert was destined forfour months to be a fixed one, though it was advanced during that time by thesplendid audacity of the Australians, who gave their opponents no rest, andfinally, with the help of the British Eighth Division, entirely re-won the townof Villers-Bretonneux when it was temporarily lost, and extended our outposts amile or more to the east of it, as will be presently described. Save for thisaction there was no movement of importance during that time, though the generalset of the tide was rather eastwards than westwards.
One cannot leave so vast a theme as the second battle of the Somme without afew words as to the general impression left upon the mind of the writer by themany documents bearing upon the subject which he has had to peruse. In thefirst place, we cannot possibly deny that it was a great German victory, andone which was well earned, since it depended upon clever and new dispositionsentailing laborious preparation with the intelligent and valiant co-operationof officers and men. The overpowering force of the blow, while it removed allreproach from those who had staggered back from it, depended upon the able wayin which it was delivered. Having said so much, we must remind the Germancommentator that he cannot have it both ways, and that if a gain of guns,prisoners, and ground which fails to break the line is, as we admit, a victoryto the Germans, then a similar result is a victory to the British also. Hecannot claim the second battle of the Somme to be a victory, and yet deny theterm to such battles as Arras, Messines, and Passchendaele. The only differenceis that the Germans really did try to break the line upon March 21, and failedto do so, while no such design was in General Haig's mind during the battles of1917, save perhaps in the last series of operations.
There was a regrettable tendency after the battle to recriminations in thePress, and General Gough, who had been the head of the Fifth Army, wassacrificed without any enquiry as to the dominant force which he had to face,or as to the methods by which he mitigated what might have been a reallycrushing disaster. It can be safely stated that in the opinion of many of thosewho are in the best position to know and to judge, there was absolutely nothingupon the military side which could have been bettered, nor has any suggestionever been made of anything which was left undone.
Position at the Close of the Great Retreat, March 30
The entrenching had been carried out for several months with an energy whichraised protests from the men who had to do it. There might almost be room forthe opposite criticism that in the constant work of the navvy the training ofthe soldier had been unduly neglected; but that was the result of theunavoidable scarcity of non-military labour. The extension of the front wasundoubtedly too long for the number of men who had to cover it; but this wasdone at the express request of the French, who had strong military reasons fordrawing out and training a number of their divisions. It was taking a riskundoubtedly, but the risk was forced upon the soldiers, and in any case theFrench have taken risks before now for us. The blowing up of the bridges waswell done, and the only exception seems to have been in the case of railwaybridges which, for some reason, were taken out of the hands of the armycommander. The reserves were insufficient and were perhaps too far back, butthe first item at least depended upon the general weakness of manpower. Nowherecan one lay one's hand upon any solid ground for complaint, save against therogues and fools of Brest-Litovsk, who by their selfish and perjured peaceenabled the Germans to roll a tidal wave of a million men from east to west,with the certainty that they would wash away the first dam against which theystruck. If there is any military criticism to be made, it lies rather in thefact that the French help from the south was nearly sixty hours before it madeitself felt at the nearest part of the British line, and also in the surprisingnumber of draft reserves kept in England at that date. Within a month of thebattle 350,000 had been sent to the front—a very remarkable feat, but asign, surely, of an equally remarkable omission. Had ten emergency divisions ofinfantry been made out of the more forward of these drafts, had they been heldready in the rear zones, and had the actual existing reserves been pushed up tothe front, it is safe to say that the German advance would have been stoppedearlier and would probably not have got beyond the Peronne—Noyon line.If, as was stated in Parliament, it was confidently expected that the Germanattack would strike exactly where it did, then it does seem deplorable that thenearest reserve to the Fifth Army, a single division, had, through our weakman-power, to be kept at a three days' journey from the point of danger. If,instead of searching the record of the General for some trace of weakness, ourcritics had realised the rapidity of his decision, with the moral courage andgrasp of actuality which he showed by abandoning his positions—no easything for one of his blood and record—and falling back unbroken upon anew line of defence beyond the German heavy artillery, they could not havefailed to admit that the country owes a deep debt of gratitude to GeneralGough. Had he hesitated and his army been isolated and destroyed, the whole warmight well have taken a most sinister turn for the worse.
Granting, however, that the disaster was minimised by the promptappreciation of the situation by the General in command, by the splendid workof his four corps-commanders, and by the co-operation of every one concerned,it is still undeniable that the losses were very heavy, and the result, evenafter making every allowance for German wastage, a considerable militarydisaster. In killed, wounded, and missing in the Fifth Army alone the figurescould not be less than 50,000, including Feetham and Malcolm, army divisionalgenerals, with Dawson, Bailey, White, Bellingham, and numerous other brigadiersand senior officers. In field-guns 235 were lost or destroyed out of 600, inmedium heavies 108 out of 494, in 8-inch or over pieces 19 out of 98. Greatquantities of stores, especially at Ham, fell into the hands of the enemy, butso far as possible they were burned or made useless. Bad as the episode seemedat the time, it is clear now to any one who looks back upon it that it had noevil effect upon the result of the war. The Germans were exposed to very heavylosses which they could ill afford. They have admitted to 180,000 in documentspublished since the armistice but this may be an understatement. They weredrawn away from their famous lines to which they did not return until they wereso reduced that they could not hold them. Finally, it led to that concentrationof power in the hands of Marshal Foch which was worth many sacrifices toattain. Sir Douglas Haig, from his many services and long experience, mightwell have put forward claims to the supreme place, and it is characteristic ofthe nobility of this great soldier that it was in response to a telegram fromhim to the Prime Minister, in which he named General Foch for the position,that the change was eventually carried through.
The last waves of the storm—The Twelfth Division atAlbert— The Forty-seventh Division at Aveluy Wood—The Australiansin the south—Capture of Villeis-Bietonneux by the Germans—Recaptureby Australians and Eighth Division—Fierce fighting—The first turnof the tide
THE limit and results of the second battle of the Somme hadbeen defined when the Australians, New Zealanders, Second Canadians, and freshBritish divisions took the place of their exhausted comrades towards the end ofMarch. The German reserves, great as they were, were, nearly exhausted, andthey had no more men to put into the fight. The final line began to clearlydefine itself, running from a few miles east of Arras where the Seventh andSixth Corps had struck back so heavily at the German pursuit, through NeuvilleVitasse, Boyelles, Ayette, Bucquoy, Hébuterne, Auchonvillers, Aveluy,just west of Albert, Denancourt, Warfusée, and Marcelcave. The worststorm was over, but even as the sinking sea will still send up one great wavewhich sweeps the deck, so the German battle front would break from time to timeinto a spasm of energy, which could effect no great purpose and yet would leadto a considerable local engagement. These episodes must at least be indicatedin the order of their occurrence.
One great centre of activity was the ruined town of Albert, for the Germanswere able to use it as a covered approach, and thus mass their troops andattempt to break through to the westward. The order of divisions in this sectorshowed that the Sixty-third and Forty-seventh, still fighting in spite of theirwounds, were to the immediate north-west. The Twelfth Division was due west.South-west was the Third Division of Australians and south of these the Fourth.On each of these, and sometimes upon all of them, the strain was very great, asthe Germans struggled convulsively to burst the bonds of Albert. It should benoted that the Fifth Army had for the time passed out of being, and that allthe southern end of the line was now held by the Fourth Army under GeneralRawlinson.
The main attack upon the Albert sector was on April 4, when the Germans madea violent effort, and the affair reached the proportions of a considerablebattle. About eight in the morning the action began by a severe and suddenattack upon the Australian Division 1000 yards south of Albert, and also on therailway near Denancourt. The Australians fought as Australians have alwaysfought in this war, but the onset was very heavy, supported by a shatteringfire, and they were forced to yield some ground.
North of the Australians was the Twelfth Division with the 35th and 36thBrigades in the line, in that order from the south. The temporary recoil of theAustralians rendered the 35th Brigade vulnerable, and the Germans with theirusual quick military perception at once dashed at it. About 1 o'clock theyrushed forward in two waves, having built up their formation under cover of theruined houses of Albert. The attack struck in between the 7th Suffolks and 9thEssex, but the East Anglians stood fast and blew it back with their rifle-fire,much helped by the machine-guns of the 5th Berks. Farther north the attack beatup against the left of the Forty-seventh and the right of the Sixty-thirdDivisions, but neither the Londoners nor the naval men weakened. The pressurewas particularly heavy upon the Forty-seventh, and some details of the fightingwill presently be given. The next morning, April 5, saw the battle still ragingalong the face of these four divisions. The Germans attempted to establishtheir indispensable machine-guns upon the ridge which they had taken on thesouth, but they were driven off by the Australians. The 36th Brigade in thenorth of the Albert sector had lost some ground at Aveluy, but about noon onApril 5 the 9th Royal Fusiliers with the help of the 7th Sussex re-establishedthe front, though the latter battalion endured very heavy losses from anenfilade fire from a brickfield. The 5th Berks also lost heavily on this day.So weighty was the German attack that at one time the 4th Australians had beenpushed from the high ground, just west of the Amiens-Albert railway, and the35th Brigade had to throw back a defensive wing. The position was soonre-established, however, though at all points the British losses wereconsiderable, while those of the Germans must have been very heavy indeed.
It has been stated that to the north of the Twelfth Division, coveringBouzincourt and partly occupying Aveluy Wood, was the Forty-seventh Division(Gorringe), which had been drawn out of the line, much exhausted by itsprolonged efforts, some days before, but was now brought back into the battle.It stood with the 15th and 20th London of the 140th Brigade on the right, whilethe 23rd and 24th of the 142nd Brigade were on the left. Units were depletedand the men very weary, but they rose to the crisis, and their efforts wereessential at a time of such stress, for it was felt that this was probably thelast convulsive heave of the dying German offensive. It was on April 5 that theGerman attack from the direction of Albert spread to the front of theForty-seventh Division. The bombardment about 8 A.M. reached a terrific pitchof intensity and was followed by an infantry advance through clouds of gas andsmoke. The main attack fell upon the left of the divisional line, and was metby a sustained rifle, Lewis gun, and artillery fire, which could not be facedby the stormers. At one time the left of the 23rd London was penetrated, but arally re-established the position. The enemy were rushing forward in massformations, and their desperate tactics offered targets which ensured veryheavy losses.
About 9 o'clock the right brigade was also involved in the fighting, theenemy advancing in force towards Aveluy Wood. Here also the assault was verydesperate and the defence equally determined. The 15th (Civil Service Rifles)was heavily attacked, and shortly afterwards the Blackheath and Woolwich men ofthe 20th Battalion saw the enemy in great numbers upon their front. The wholeline of the division was now strongly engaged. About 10 A.M. a company of the24th London was driven from its position by concentrated rifle-grenade fire,but a support company sprang to the front and the line was unbroken. At 10:30,however, things took a grave turn, for a sudden rush brought the assailantsinto the line between the two left flank battalions, outflanking and destroyingthe outlying company of the 23rd London. These men fought bravely to the endand took heavy toll of the enemy. At the same time the 20th London came under ashattering shell-fire which put every Lewis gun out of action. It was alsoenfiladed by machine-guns from the corner of Aveluy Wood, where the Germans hadpenetrated the line. The 20th threw out a defensive flank and held on. The 15thon their right were still in their original positions.
At 11.40 the 23rd London, which had suffered from the German penetration ofits left company, was exposed all along its line to machine-gun fire from itsleft rear, where the enemy had established three posts. The result was that theposition in Aveluy Wood had to be abandoned. The 22nd London from the reservebrigade was now pushed up into the firing-line where the pressure was verygreat. The weight of the attack was now mainly upon the 20th, who held theirposts with grim determination in spite of very heavy losses, chiefly fromtrench mortars and heavy machine-guns. It was a bitter ordeal, but the enemywas never able to get nearer than 300 yards to the line of the 20th, and ifthey caused heavy losses they endured as much from the British fire. About12.40 the enemy seemed to be mustering at the south end of the wood for a grandfinal attack, but the gathering was dispersed by the machine-guns of theLondoners.
At four in the afternoon, after a truly terrible day, the Forty-seventhDivision determined to counter-attack, and the 22nd Battalion was used for thispurpose. They had already endured heavy losses and had not sufficient weightfor the purpose, though eight officers and many men had fallen before they wereforced to recognise their own inability. The failure of this attack led to afurther contraction of the line of defence. The Sixty-third Division on theleft had endured a similar day of hard hammering, and it was now very exhaustedand holding its line with difficulty. For a time there was a dangerous gap, butthe exhausted Germans did not exploit their success, and reserves were hurriedup from the Marines on the one side and from the 142nd Brigade on the other tofill the vacant position.
When night fell after this day of incessant and desperate fighting the linewas unbroken, but it had receded in the area of Aveluy Wood and was bent andtwisted along the whole front. General Gorringe, with true British tenacity,determined that it should be re-established next morning if his reserves couldpossibly do it. Only one battalion, however, was available, the pioneer 4thWelsh Fusiliers, who had already done conspicuous service more than once duringthe retreat. An official document referring to this attack states that "notroops could have deployed better or advanced more steadily under such intensefire, and the leadership of the officers could not have been excelled." Thecasualties, however, were so heavy from the blasts of machine-gun fire that thefront of the advance was continually blown away and no progress could be made.Two platoons upon the left made some permanent gain of ground, but as a wholethis very gallant counter-attack was unavailing.
This attack near Albert on April 4 and 5 was the main German effort, but itsynchronised with several other considerable attacks at different points of theline. One was just north of Warfusée in the southern April 5. sector,where once again the Australians were heavily engaged and prevented what at onetime seemed likely to be a local break-through. As it was the line came backfrom Warfusée to Vaire, where the Australian supports held it fast.Farther north the Fourth Australian Division was sharply attacked oppositeDenancourt, and had a very brisk fight in which the 13th Brigade, and moreparticularly the 52nd Regiment, greatly distinguished itself. The object of thefight was to hold the railway line and the position of the Ancre. The tenacityof the Australian infantry in the face of incessant attacks was most admirable,and their artillery, ranging upon the enemy at 1500 yards, as they came overthe higher ground behind Denancourt, inflicted very heavy losses. One gun fired1250 rounds without a stop.
The village of Hangard and Hangard Wood were at that time the points ofjunction between the French and British armies. The extreme right unit of theBritish was Smith's 5th Brigade of the Second Australian Division (Rosenthal).The 20th Battalion on the southern flank was involved on this and the followingdays in a very severe and fluctuating fight in which Hangard Wood was taken andlost several times. Colonel Bennett, an Australian veteran whose imperialservices go back as far as the Suakin expedition, had to cover 3500 yards with600 men, knowing well that there were no reserves behind him and that the pointwas vital. With heavy losses he managed, with the 19th Battalion beside him, todam the German flood until help could arrive. So fierce was the fighting that750 dead Germans were picked up in the Hangard Wood. On April 7 the wood wasabandoned, but under no compulsion and in accordance with the general movementof the line.
About 10 A.M. on April 6 the enemy renewed his attack upon the junctionbetween the Forty-seventh and Sixty-third Divisions, but it was the Britishturn to mow down advancing lines with machine-gun fire. No progress was made,and there were such signs of German weakening that the British made a suddenlocal advance, capturing two machine-guns and some prisoners. In this affair itis characteristic of the spirit which still remained in the weary Britishtroops, that Corporal March of the 24th London went forward and shot theopposing German officer, bringing back his maps and papers.
The German commanders were well aware that if the line was to be broken itmust be soon, and all these operations were in the hope of finding a fatalflaw. Hence it was that the attacks which began and failed upon April 4extended all along the northern line on April 5. Thus the New Zealand Divisionon the left of the points already mentioned was involved in the fighting, theright brigade, consisting of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, being fiercelyattacked by some 2000 storm troops who advanced with great hardihood, and atthe second attempt recaptured the farm of La Signy. The German officers seemupon this occasion to have given an example to their men which has often beenconspicuously lacking. "A tall Wurtemburger," says the New Zealand recorder,"ran towards our line with nine of his men. In one hand he carried a cane, andover his arm a light waterproof coat. He was a fine big fellow over six feethigh.... Just at the critical moment some Lewis-gunners took a hand in thebusiness, the officer was shot dead, and most of the others were killed orwounded."
On the left of the New Zealanders the attack was extended to the roadbetween Ayette and Bucquoy. Here a brigade of the Thirty-seventh Division inthe south and of the Forty-second in the north were heavily attacked andBucquoy was taken, but before the evening the defenders returned and most ofthe lost ground was regained. The right of the Thirty-seventh Division hadadvanced in the morning upon Rossignol Wood, that old bone of contention, andhad in a long day's struggle got possession of most of it. Three machine-gunsand 130 men were the spoils.
From this time onwards there were no very notable events for some weeks inthe Somme line, save for some sharp fighting in the Aveluy Wood sector on April21 and 22, in which the Seventeenth, Thirty-fifth, and Thirty-eighth Divisionswere all involved. The enemy tried hard to improve his position and did succeedin gaining some ground. The attacks were costly to both sides but the resultswere futile. The British outposts, and particularly those of the Australians,maintained an aggressive attitude throughout, and it was more and moreimpressed upon the German mind that in spite of his considerable advance andlarge captures, it was an unbeaten army which lay before him.
On the morning of April 24 a very determined attack was made by the Germansupon the front of Butler's Third Corps in the area of Villers-Bretonneux. Thissmall town is of great importance, as it stands on a curve of the rolling downsfrom which a very commanding view of Amiens is obtained, the cathedralespecially standing out with great clearness. Already the city had sufferedgreat damage, but the permanent loss of Villers-Bretonneux would mean itscertain destruction. The attack was urged by four German divisions and wassupported by tanks which did good service to the enemy and broke in the Britishline, held mainly at this point by Heneker's Eighth Division which had hardlyrecovered from its heroic services upon the Somme.
It is suggestive of the value of the tanks whether in German or in Britishhands that where the attack was unsupported by these machines it broke downunder the British fire, as on the right of Gator's Fifty-eighth Division to thesouth and on the left of the Eighth Division. There were fifteen German tanksin all, so their array was a formidable one, the more so in a mist which wasimpenetrable at fifty yards. It was for the British now to experience thethrill of helpless horror which these things can cause even in brave heartswhen they loom up out of the haze in all their hideous power. The 2/4th Londonson the south of the village were driven back to the line Cachy— HangardWood, so that their neighbours of the 2/2nd London had to conform. The 2/ 10thLondon counter-attacked at once, however, and penetrated Hangard Wood, doingsomething to ease the situation. The 2nd Middlesex and 2nd West Yorks wereoverrun by the tanks, much as the Roman legionaries were by the elephants ofPyrrhus, and even the historical and self-immolating stab in the belly wasuseless against these monsters. The 2nd Rifle Brigade were also dislodged fromtheir position and had to close up on the 2nd Berkshires on their left. The 2ndEast Lancashires had also to fall back, but coming in touch with a section ofthe 20th Battery April 24. of divisional artillery they were able to rally andhold their ground all day with the backing of the guns.
The 2nd Devons in reserve upon the right were also attacked by tanks, thefirst of 'which appeared suddenly before Battalion Headquarters and blew awaythe parapet. Others attacked the battalion, which was forced to move into theBois d'Aquenne. There chanced to be three heavy British tanks, in this quarter,and they were at once ordered forward to restore the situation. Seven lightwhippet tanks were also given to the Fifty-eighth Division. These tanks thenengaged the enemy's fleet, and though two of the heavier and four of the lightwere put out of action they silenced the Germans and drove them back. Withthese powerful allies the infantry began to move forward again, and the 1stSherwood Foresters carried out a particularly valuable advance.
Shortly after noon the 173rd Brigade of the Fifty-eighth Division saw theGermans massing behind tanks about 500 yards east of Cachy, with a view toattacking. There were three whippets still available, and they rushed out anddid great work, catching two German battalions as they deployed.
The Fifty-eighth had good neighbours upon their right in the shape of theMoroccan corps, a unit which is second to none in the French Army for attack.These were not engaged, but under the orders of General Debeney they closed upon the left so as to shorten the front of General Gator's division, a greatassistance with ranks so depleted. His troops were largely lads of eighteensent out to fill the gaps made in the great battle, but nothing could exceedtheir spirit, though their endurance was not equal to their courage.
On the evening of April 24 General Butler could say with Desaix, "The battleis lost. There is time to win another one." The Germans not only heldVillers-Bretonneux, but they had taken Hangard from the French, and held allbut the western edge of Hangard Wood. The farthest western point ever reachedby the Germans on the Somme was on this day when they occupied for a time theBois l'Abbé, from which they were driven in the afternoon by the 1stSherwoods and 2nd West Yorks. They had not attained Cachy, which was theirfinal objective, but none the less it was very necessary thatVillers-Bretonneux and the ground around it should be regained instantly beforethe Germans took root.
For this purpose a night attack was planned on the evening of April 24, andwas carried out with great success. The operation was important in itself, buteven more so as the first sign of the turn of the tide which had run so longfrom east to west, and was soon to return with such resistless force from westto east.
For the purposes of the attack the fresh 13th Australian Brigade (Glasgow)was placed under the General of the Eighth Division, and was ordered to attackto the south of Villers, while the 15th Australian Brigade made a similaradvance upon the north. Each of these was directed to pass beyond the littletown, which was to be cleared by an independent force. On the right of theAustralians was the balance of the Eighth Division, which had to clear up theBois d'Aquenne.
Rough sketch of the general position of troops at
the Battle of Villers-Bretonneux, April 24-25, 1918.
The attack was carried out at 10 P.M., the infantry having white arm-bandsfor identification in the darkness. There was no artillery preparation, and theadvance was across unknown country, so that it may be placed among the mosthazardous operations in the war. In the case of the 13th Australian Brigade,the 52nd Battalion was on the right in touch with the British, while the 51stwas on the left, with the 50th in support. From the onset the machine-gun firewas very severe, especially against the 51st Regiment, but the admirableindividuality of the Australian soldiers was of great service to them, everyman getting forward through the darkness as best he could. The weather wasideal, for there was sufficient moon to give direction, but not enough toexpose the troops to distant fire. The German flares were rather a help to theattack by defining the position. The Australian front got as far forward asMonument Wood, level with the village, but the 173rd Brigade on their right wasin some difficulty, and they themselves were badly enfiladed from the town, sothey could not maintain their more advanced position. The 2nd Northamptons,attached to the 13th Australian Brigade, had been told off to take the townitself, but both their colonel and their adjutant were killed during theassembly, and some confusion of orders caused the plans to miscarry. On thenorth of the town the 15th Australian Brigade, with the 22nd Durhams attached,had been an hour late in starting, but the 60th and 59th Regiments got up,after some confused fighting, to a point north of the town, which was enteredafter dawn and cleared up by the 2nd Berkshires, aided by a company of theAustralian 58th Battalion. The The German tanks had done good work in theattack, and some of the British tanks were very useful in the counter-attacks,especially three which operated in the Bois d'Aquenne and broke down theobstinate German resistance in front of the Eighth Division. Daylight on April25 found the British and Australian lines well up to the village on both sides,and a good deal of hard fighting, in which the troops got considerably mixed,took place. One unusual incident occurred as two blindfolded Germans under aflag of truce appeared in the British line, and were brought to Colonel Whithamof the 52nd Australian Regiment. They carried a note which ran: "My CommandingOfficer has sent me to tell you that you are confronted by superior forces andsurrounded on three sides. He desires to know whether you will surrender andavoid loss of life. If you do not he will blow you to pieces by turning hisheavy artillery on to your trenches." No answer was returned to this barefacedbluff, but the messengers were detained, as there was considerable doubt as tothe efficiency of the bandages which covered their eyes.
By 4 P.M. on April 25 the village had been cleared, and the troops wereapproximately in the old front line. The 22nd Durham Light Infantry had moppedup the south side of the village. About a thousand prisoners had been secured.The 54th Brigade of Lee's Eighteenth Division, which had been in support,joined in the fighting during the day, and helped to push the line forward,winning their way almost to their final objective south of the village and thenhaving to yield 200 yards to a counter-attack. The fast whippet tanks were usedduring this action, and justified themselves well, though, as in the case ofall tanks, the value of the instrument depends mainly upon the courage of thecrew who handle it. One British tank, under the command of a leader namedCraig, seems to have been all over the field wherever it was most needed, sothat some weeks after the fight the present chronicler in visiting the field ofbattle still heard the legend of his prowess. As to the German resistance askilled observer remarks: "The enemy handled his machine-guns with greatboldness. The manner in which he pushes forward numbers of guns, relying uponthe daring and initiative of the crews to use them to best advantage, may leadto a greater number being lost, but he certainly inflicts enormous casualtiesin this way."
There was an aftermath of the battle on April 26 which led to some verybarren and sanguinary fighting in which the losses were mainly incurred by ourgallant Allies upon the right. There was a position called The Monument,immediately south of Villers, which had not yet been made good. The MoroccanDivision had been slipped in on the British right, and their task was toassault the German line from this point to the north edge of Hangard Wood. Partof the Fifty-eighth Division was to attack the wood itself, while on the leftthe Eighth Division was to complete the clearance of Villers and to join upwith the left of the Moroccans. The Eighth Division had already broken up threestrong counter-attacks on the evening of April 25, and by the morning of April26 their part of the programme was complete. The only six tanks available weregiven to the Moroccans. At 5:15 on the morning of April 26 the attack opened.It progressed well near the town, but on the right the Foreign Legion, the verycream of the fighting men of the French Army, were held by the murderous firefrom the north edge of Hangard Wood. The 10th Essex and 7th West Kents, who hadbeen lent to the Fifty-eighth Division' by the 53rd Brigade, were held by thesame fire, and were all mixed up with the adventurers of the Legion, the lossesof both battalions, especially the West Kents, being terribly heavy. TheMoroccan Tirailleurs in the centre were driven back by a German counter-attack,but were reinforced and came on again. Hangard village, however, held up theflank of the French. In the evening about half the wood was in the hands of theAllies, but it was an inconclusive and very expensive day.
The battle of Villers-Bretonneux was a very important engagement, as itclearly defined thene plus ultra of the German advance in the Sommevalley, and marked a stable equilibrium which was soon to turn into an eastwardmovement. It was in itself a most interesting fight, as the numbers were notvery unequal. The Germans had five divisions engaged, the Fourth Guards, Twohundred and twenty-eighth. Two hundred and forty-third. Seventy-seventhReserve, and Two hundred and eighth. The British had the Eighth, Fifty-eighth,Eighteenth, and Fifth Australian, all of them very worn, but the Germans mayalso have been below strength. The tanks were equally divided. The result wasnot a decided success for any one, since the line ended much as it had begun,but it showed the Germans that, putting out all their effort, they could get nofarther. How desperate was the fight may be judged by the losses which, apartfrom the Australians, amounted to more than 9000 men in the three Britishdivisions, the Fifty-eighth and Eighth being the chief sufferers.
As this was the first occasion upon which the Germans seem to have broughttheir tanks into the line of battle, some remarks as to the progress of thisBritish innovation may not be out of place—the more so as it became moreand more one of the deciding factors in the war. On this particular date theGerman tanks were found to be slow and cumbrous, but were heavily armed andseemed to possess novel features, as one of them advanced in the originalattack upon April 24 squirting out jets of lachrymatory gas on each side. Theresult of the fighting next day was that two weak (female) British tanks wereknocked out by the Germans while one German tank was destroyed and threescattered by a male British tank. The swift British whippet tanks were used forthe first time upon April 24, and seem to have acted much like Boadicea'schariots, cutting a swathe in the enemy ranks and returning crimson withblood.
Treating the subject more generally, it may be said that the limited success.attained by tanks in the shell-pocked ground of the Somme and the mud ofFlanders had caused the Germans and also some of our own high authorities tounderrate their power and their possibilities of development. All this wassuddenly changed by the battle of Cambrai, when the Germans were terrified atthe easy conquest of the Hindenburg Line. They then began to build. It may besaid, however, that they never really gauged the value of the idea, beingobsessed by the thought that no good military thing could come out of England.Thus when in the great final advance the tanks began to play an absolutelyvital part they paid the usual price of blindness and arrogance, finding aweapon turned upon them for which they had no adequate shield. If anyparticular set of men can be said more than another to have ruined the GermanEmpire and changed the history of the world, it is those who perfected the tankin England, and also those at the German headquarters who lacked theimagination to see its possibilities. So terrified were the Germans of tanks atthe end of the war that their whole artillery was directed to knocking themout, to the very great relief of the long-suffering infantry.
From this time onwards this front was the scene of continuous aggressiveaction on the part of the Australians, which gradually nibbled away portions ofthe German line, until the day came for the grand advance of August 8. One ofthe most successful of these was on May 19, when the village of Ville-sur-Ancrewas taken by a sudden assault with 20 machine-guns and 360 prisoners. A secondvery sharp fight, which may be mentioned here, though it is just beyond thescope of this volume, was on July 1 and following days in the Aveluy sector,near the Ancre, where the Twelfth and Eighteenth Divisions had three bouts ofattack and counter-attack, in which the 37th and o4th Brigades were heavilyengaged, the honours of the action being about equally divided between theBritish and the Germans.
The Flanders front—Great Germanonslaught—Disaster of the Portuguese—Splendid stand at Givenchy ofthe Fifty-fifth Division—Hard fight of the Fortieth Division—Lossof the Lys—Desperate resistance of the FiftiethDivision—Thirty-fourth Division is drawn into the Battle—Attack inthe north upon the Ninth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fifth Divisions—Britishretreat—General survey of the situation
NEARLY a hundred German divisions had been used against theBritish alone in the great Somme offensive which began on March 21 and ended inthe first week of April. At this time the British forces in France, includingPortuguese and Overseas divisions, numbered sixty in all. Of these no less thanforty-four had been engaged in the great battle, and all of these were eitherstill in the line, tied to the Amiens front, or else had been drawn out in ashattered and disorganised condition, having lost on an average not less thanfrom 4000 to 5000 men each. It will be seen that there was only a very smallmargin over, and that if the Germans by a supreme effort had burst the line andreached the estuary of the Somme, it would have been possible to have caused agreat military disaster. Especially would this have been the case if thenorthern flank of the British could have been driven in as well as thesouthern, for then the mutilated and shaken army would have been hurled in uponitself and would have found itself crowded down upon a sea-coast which wouldhave given few facilities for embarkation. In the hopes of a debacle in thesouth the Germans had prepared out of their huge reserves a considerable forcein the north which would have formed the second claw of their deadlyembrace.
When the first claw missed its grip and could get no farther it wasdetermined that the other should at least go forward and endeavour to reach theChannel ports. Although the Somme estuary had not been attained, none the lessthe Germans knew well that three-quarters of the whole British force had beenengaged, and that most of it was not fit to take its place in a renewed battle.Therefore they had reason to hope for great results from their new offensive inFlanders, and they entered upon it with a good heart.
The omens were certainly propitious, but there were two factors which werein favour of the British — factors which could not yet have beenadequately appreciated by the Germans. The first was the new unity of commandunder General Foch, a soldier famous for his writings in peace and for hisdeeds in war. This great leader, who had distinguished himself again and againsince the first month of the war, when he had played a vital part in checkingthe German rush for Paris, was selected with the cordial consent of every oneconcerned, and especially of Sir Douglas Haig, as Generalissimo of the Alliedforces. Therefore a common control and a common policy were ensured, so thatthe German chiefs could not turn their whole force upon half of the Allies withthe assurance that the other half would find the operations outside their warmap. Hence the British in Flanders, though they would have to fight their ownbattle for a week or two, could count confidently upon receiving help at theend of that time.
The second and more immediate factor, was that by a fine national effort asplendid stream of efficient drafts had been despatched from England during thegreat battle—young soldiers it is true, but full of spirit and most eagerto meet the Germans and to emulate the great deeds of their elders. Theirtraining had been short, but it had been intense and practical, with soexcellent a result that one could but marvel at the old pre-war pundits whoinsisted that no soldier could be made under two years. These high-spiritedlads flocked into the depleted battalions, which had often to be reformed fromthe beginning, with a skeleton framework of officers and N.C.O.'s upon which tobuild. It was of course impossible to assimilate these drafts in the few daysat the disposal of the divisional generals, but at least they had adequatenumbers once more, and they must be taught to be battle-worthy by being throwninto the battle, as Spartan fathers have taught their boys to swim.
One more sign of the times was the quick appreciation by the Americanauthorities of the desperate nature of the crisis all along the Allied line.With magnanimous public spirit they at once gave directions that such Americantroops as were available and had not yet been formed into special Americandivisions should be placed under British or French command and fittedtemporarily into their organisation. The few complete organised Americandivisions in France had been on the Alsace line, but some of these were nowbrought round to thicken the French army on the Oise. But most important of allwas the effect upon the shipment of American troops, which had averaged about50,000 a month and now rose at a bound to 250,000, a number which was sustainedor increased for several months in succession. This result was helped by thewhole-hearted co-operation of the British mercantile marine, which wasdeflected from its other very pressing tasks, including the feeding of thecountry, in order to carry these troops, and actually handled about two-thirdsof them whilst the British Navy helped to find the escorts. So efficiently werethe transport arrangements carried out both by British and Americans, that whena million men had been conveyed they were still able to announce that thelosses upon the voyage were practically nil. Even the lie-fed bemused Germanpublic began to realise in the face of this fact that their much boomedsubmarines were only one more of their colossal failures.
The German attack upon the British lines by the army of General von Quast inFlanders broke on the morning of April 9. There had been considerable shellingon the day before along the whole line, but as the hour approached thisconcentrated with most extreme violence on the nine-mile stretch from thevillage of Givenchy in the south to Fleurbaix, which is just south ofArmentières in the north. This proved to be the area of the actualattack, and against this front some eight German divisions advanced about 6o'clock of a misty morning. So shattering had been their bombardment and soactive their wire-cutters, who were covered by the fog, that the advancedpositions could hardly be said to exist, and they were able to storm their wayat once into the main defences.
The point upon which this attack fell was held the by four divisions, all ofwhich formed part of Horne's First Army. The general distribution of the troopsat that time was that the Second Army stretched from the junction with theBelgians near Houthulst Forest down to the Messines district where it joinedthe First Army. The First Army had weakened itself by an extension to thesouth, and Plumer's force was about to extend also, and take over the Laventiedistrict, when the storm suddenly burst upon the very point which was to bechanged.
Two corps were involved in the attack, the Fifteenth (De Lisle) in theArmentières region, and the Eleventh (Haking) in the region of Givenchy.The latter had two divisions in the line, Jeudwine's Fifty-fifth WestLancashire Territorials defending the village and adjacent lines, while thePortuguese Second Division (Da Costa) covered the sector upon their left. Thedepleted Fiftieth Division (Jackson) was in immediate reserve. On the left ofthe Portuguese was Ponsonby's Fortieth Division which had lost five thousandmen in the Somme battle only a fortnight before, and now found itself plungedonce more into one of the fiercest engagements of the war, where it was exposedagain to very heavy losses.
The main force of the German attack fell upon the Portuguese fine, and itwas of such strength that no blame can be attached to inexperienced troops whogave way before so terrific a blow, which would have been formidable to anysoldiers in the world. The division held the line from 2000 yards south ofRichebourg l'Avoué to the east of Picantin, a frontage of 9350 yards, ormore than half of the total front of the assault. The division had all threebrigades in the line, and even so was very extended to meet a serious assault.The 3rd Brigade from the First Portuguese Division was in immediate support.The 5th Brigade was on the right, covering Le Touret, the 6th in the middle,and the 4th on the left, covering Laventie. Behind the whole position lay thecurve of the River Lys, a sluggish stream which moves slowly through thisdesolate plain, the Golgotha where so many men have died, Indians, French,British, and German, since the first months of the war. In all that huge flatcanalised space it was only at Givenchy that some small ridge showed above thedreary expanse.
The Portuguese had been in the line for some months, but had neverexperienced anything to approach the severity of the shattering bombardmentwhich poured upon them from four in the morning. When an hour or two later thestorming columns of the German infantry loomed through the thick curtain ofmist, the survivors were in no condition to stand such an attack. All telephoneand telegraph wires had been cut within the first half-hour, and it wasimpossible to direct any protective barrage. The artillery in the rear, bothBritish and Portuguese, had been much weakened by a concentration of gas-shellsextending as far as Merville, so that the infantry were left with insufficientsupport. The gunners stood to their work like men, and groups of them continuedto fire their guns after the infantry had left them exposed. These brave menwere killed or captured by the enemy, and their batteries were taken. In therear the roads had been so shattered by the German fire that it was impossibleto get a tractor or lorry up to the heavy guns, and there was no way ofremoving them. All observers agree that the crews or the heavy guns didexcellently the Lys. well. The whole front had fallen in, however, and in spiteof scattered groups of infantry who showed the traditional Portuguesecourage—that courage which had caused the great Duke to place themamongst his best soldiers—the position was in the hands of the enemy. Bymid-day they were at Le Touret upon the right, and the guns there were blown upand abandoned. About the same time they had reached Estaires upon the left andBout Deville in the centre. Before evening the German line was four miles fromits starting-point, and had reached the River Lawe, a small affluent of theLys. From this time onwards the Fiftieth Division, coming up from the rear, hadtaken over the front, and the Portuguese were out of the battle. The Germans intheir day's work had taken 6000 prisoners and 100 guns, many of them in ruins.It should be mentioned that the Portuguese ordeal was the more severe, asbreast-works had taken the place of trenches in this sector. All were agreedthat General da Costa did what was possible. "He is a fine man, who does notknow what fear is," said a British officer who was with him on the day of thebattle.
The caving in of the front of the line had a most serious effect upon thetwo British divisions, the Fifty-fifth and the Fortieth, who were respectivelyupon the right and the left of the Portuguese. Each was attacked in front, andeach was turned upon the flank and rear. We shall first consider the case ofthe Fifty-fifth Division which defended the lines of Givenchy with an energyand success which makes this feat one of the outstanding incidents of thecampaign. This fine division of West Lancashire Territorials, containingseveral battalions from Liverpool, had some scores to settle with the Germans,by whom they had been overrun in the surprise at Cambrai at the end of the lastNovember. At Givenchy they had their glorious revenge.
The position of the Fifty-fifth Division was a strong one, extending forsome thousands of yards from the hamlet of Le Plantin in the south to Caillouxin the north, with a section of the old British line a thousand yards in front,a deserted trench half full of water and festooned with rusty wire. There wereoutpost companies along the scattered line of ruined houses, and a few postswere thrown far out near the old trench. The village line consisted of a seriesof well-concealed breast-works and loopholed walls without any continuoustrench, the whole so cunningly arranged that it was difficult to get the planof it from in front. Each post or small fort had its own independent scheme ofdefence, with good enfilade fire, concrete emplacements, belts of wire, anddeep ditches. Very early in the day the left flank of the position had beenentirely exposed by the retirement of the Portuguese, so that during the wholelong and desperate struggle the general formation of the division was in theshape of an L, the shorter arm being their proper front, and the longer onefacing north and holding up the German attack from inside the old lines. Thenorthern defensive flank does not seem to have been entirely improvised, assome precautions of this nature had already been taken. The new front extendedfrom the hamlet of Loisne upon the stream of that name, through a second hamletcalled Le Plant in, and so down to the canal. The first strain of the fightingfell chiefly upon the 165th Brigade (Boyd-Moss), consisting of three battalionsof the famous King's Liverpool Regiment. The 6th and 7th Battalions were in theline with the 5th in support at Gorre, but as the day wore on and the pressureincreased, units from both the other brigades were drawn into the fight, sothat all participated in the glory of the victory. By 8:30 the flank wasentirely naked, and the Germans in small but audacious bodies, with a constantrattle of rifle and machine-gun fire, were pushing in between the outer postsof the British division, overwhelming and obliterating some of them by aconcentrated fire of trench mortars. Some of these isolated garrisons held outin the most desperate fashion, and helped to take the pressure off the mainvillage line. One particularly brilliant example was that of Captain Armstrongof the l/4th South Lancashires, who with A Company of that battalion defended amoated farm, literally to the death, having been warned that it was a keyposition. About mid-day the German attack was still creeping in, and had gainedone important outpost called Princes' Island. The 10th Liverpool Scots from the166th Brigade, a battalion which has a great record for the war, had come up tothicken the line of defenders. Amid the crash and roar of constant shells, anda storm of bullets which beat like hail upon every wall and buzzed throughevery crevice, the stubborn infantry endured their losses with stoic patience,firing steadily through their shattered loopholes at any mark they could see.At 1 o'clock some audacious stormers had got so far forward on the left thatthey were in the rear of the Brigade Headquarters, and were only held there byspare men from the transport lines who chanced to be available. The attack wasdrifting down more and more from the new ground, so about this hour the 5thSouth Lancashires, also of the 166th Brigade, were sent across to the north ofLoisne to hold the stream. Each flank was attempted in turn by the wilyassailants, so that when the left proved impervious they charged in upon theright, and captured Windy Corner, which is near the canal upon that side,continuing their advance by attacking Le Plantin South from the rear and theflank, so that the defenders were in an impossible position. Having taken thispoint it seemed as if the Germans would roll up the whole long thin line fromthe end, and they actually did so, as far as Le Plantin North. Here the Britishrallied, and the survivors of the 6th and 7th King's made a furious advance,pushed the Germans back, retook Le Plantin South, and captured a number ofprisoners. The position was still serious, however, as the Germans held WindyCorner, and had penetrated between the British right and the canal, so as toget into the rear of the position. A great effort was called for, and the menresponded like heroes. The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers from the 164th Brigade(Stockwell) had come up, and these fine soldiers, with the weary remains of thetwo King's Liverpool battalions, rushed the whole German position, draggingthem out from the pockets and ruins amid which they lurked. In this splendidcounter-attack more than 700 prisoners were taken in all, with a number ofmachine-guns. At the end of it the British right was absolutely intact.
Whilst these stirring events had taken place on the right flank, there hadbeen heavy fighting also on the left. Here the British defence had been basedupon two small but strong forts, called Cailloux North and Route A Keep. Thelatter fell early in the action, the German infantry coming upon it sounexpectedly in the fog that the machine-guns were at the moment mounted uponthe parapet and elevated for indirect fire. They were put out of action, andthe place was surrounded and taken. This greatly weakened the left wing of thedefence. Farther still to the left the Germans were pushing through Loisne, andthe fort called Loisne Central was heavily engaged. This portion of the linewas held by the 166th Brigade. Once the German wave actually lapped over intothe little fort, but the place was not taken, and its machine-guns stillclattered and flashed. All day the Germans were held at this point though thepressure was great. During the night the 13th King's Liverpools from the 9thBrigade were sent as a reserve to the weary line. At 7.40 on the morning ofApril 10 the enemy, under cover of a murderous barrage, attacked Loisne oncemore, striving hard to break in the left of the British defence. The garrisonsuffered terribly, but none the less the stormers were shot back into theirshell-holes and lurking-places. Two successive attacks on the forts of Caillouxand Festubert had no better success and were less strongly urged. At seven inthe evening they again, with a sudden rush, got a footing in the fort ofLoisnes, and again were driven out, save for twenty-one who remained asprisoners. Another day had passed, and still Lancashire stood fast and thelines were safe. On April 11 the whole position was swept by a heavyshell-storm, and the German infantry clustered thickly in front of thecrumbling The barricades. The guns both of the Fifty-fifth and of the EleventhDivision played havoc with them April 9-1 2. as they assembled, so that theattack was paralysed on the right, but on the left the two little forts ofFestubert East and Cailloux were both overwhelmed. The former, however, was atonce retaken by a mixed storming party from the 5th and 13th King's Liverpools.Late in the evening Cailloux Keep was also stormed, and once more the positionwas intact.
There was now only Route A Keep in possession of the enemy, and it wasdetermined to regain it. The guns had quickly registered upon it during theday, and at midnight they all burst into a concentrated bombardment which wasfollowed by a rush of two companies, one drawn from the Liverpool Scots and theother from the 13th King's Liverpools. The place was carried by assault, andthe garrison held it strongly on the 12th and 13th against a series of attacks.It was a most murderous business, and the brave little garrisons were sadly cutabout, but they held on with the utmost determination, having vowed to dierather than give the fort up. The survivors were still there, crouching amongthe ruins and exposed to constant heavy shelling, when on April 15 the old epicwas ended and a new one was begun by the relief of the Fifty-fifth Division byStrickland's First Division. The episode will live in history, and may match intenacity and heroism the famous defence of Ovillers by the German Guards. Thecasualties were heavy, but it may be safely said that they were small comparedwith those of the attacking battalions.
The story has been carried forward in this quarter for the sake of connectednarrative, but we must now return to the events of April 9, and especially tothe effect produced upon the Fortieth Division the Lys. by the exposure oftheir southern flank. This fine unit, with its terrible wounds only halfhealed, was exposed all day to a desperate attack coming mainly from the south,but involving the whole of their line from Laventie to Armentières. Thedivision, which is predominantly English, but contains one brigade of Highlandtroops, fought most valiantly through the long and trying day, enduring heavylosses, and only yielding ground in the evening, when they were attacked in therear as well as in front and flank.
In the morning the Fortieth Division had the 119th Brigade (18th Welsh, 21stMiddlesex, and 13th East Surrey) on the right, while the 121st Brigade (20thMiddlesex, 12th Suffolks, and 13th Yorks) was on the left, joining up withNicholson's Thirty-fourth Division which held the Armentières front. Theright of the Fortieth was involved in the heavy initial bombardment and also inthe subsequent infantry advance, which established a footing in the fronttrenches of the 119th Brigade. Whilst a counter-attack was being organised todrive the stormers out, it was found that the right and the rear of theposition were threatened by the advance through the Portuguese. The 120thScottish Brigade in reserve was ordered to form a defensive flank, but the 10/11th Highland Light Infantry, the nearest unit, found itself almost overlapped,and the brigade had to fall back upon the bridges at Nouveau Monde in order toprotect the river crossings. The 2nd Scots Fusiliers covered the bridge-head,while the whole of the 119th Brigade fell back to the line of the Lys, saveonly the garrison of Fleurbaix. The 121st Brigade was still holding its line inthe Bois Grenier sector. By 1 o'clock the bulk of the Fortieth Division wasacross the Lys, the bridges being destroyed one by one as the day advanced.
The destruction was not in all cases complete, and in that of the Pont Levisat Estaires was absolutely checked by a chance shell which destroyed the leads,and prevented the explosion. The enemy, under cover of machine-guns mounted inthe houses of Bac St. Maur, were able to cross the river here and get a footingupon the northern bank. The 74th Brigade from the Twenty-fifth Division and the150th from the Fiftieth were coming up, however, and it was still hoped thatthe German advance might be checked. So severe had the fighting been that the18th Welsh had only 5 officers and 120 men standing in the evening.
The 121st Brigade were in the meanwhile endeavouring to hold the Fleurbaixdefences on the left of the line. At 11:30 A.M. the Germans were in the east ofthe village, but the 12th Suffolks, who formed the garrison, put up a mostdetermined resistance, in which they were aided by a company of the 12thYorkshires Pioneer Battalion. It was not till 5:30 that the village was nearlyenveloped, and the troops had to make their way as best they could to the northbank of the Lys. The 20th Middlesex and 13th Yorkshires, with their flank badlycompromised, still held on to the Bois Grenier sector. These battalions on theleft were taken over by the Thirty-fourth Division, with whom they were now inclose liaison.
On the morning of April 10 the two brigades which had crossed the river werein very evil case, having sustained heavy losses. They were concentrated aboutLe Mortier. The 74th Brigade was in the Lys. position south of Croix du Bac intouch on the right with the 150th Yorkshire Territorials. All day the enemywere pushing west and north, but meeting a strong resistance from the Britishwho had an excellent trench, the Steenwerck switch, to help them. Some groundwas lost, but much of it was regained in the evening by a spiritedcounter-attack of the 14th and lO/llth Highland Light Infantry, the 2nd ScotsFusiliers, and the 21st Middlesex, which advanced over 600 yards. The pressurewas great and unceasing, however, so that the morning of April 11 found theline farther back again. The two brigades were reduced to about 1000 men, whowere concentrated at Strazeele, while the 92nd and 93rd Brigades of theThirty-first Division came up in their place. A brave counter-attack by the93rd Brigade at Le Verrier gained its objective, but created a dangerous gapbetween it and the 92nd Brigade on its right, which was filled, however, by the11th East Yorkshires. On the 12th the remains of all three brigades were strungout to cover Strazeele and Hazebrouck from the east and south-east, but nextday they were relieved by the welcome appearance of the First AustralianDivision, whose advent will afterwards be explained. It had been a verydesperate term of service, in which for three days the sappers of the 224th,229th, and 231st Field Companies Royal Engineers had to fight as hard as theinfantry. The Fortieth, like the other divisions described, were driven back,but only as the buffer is driven back, with the ultimate result of stopping theforce which drove it. They were much aided by the guns of the Fifty-seventhDivision under General Wray. The losses of the division were 185 officers and4307 other ranks. When one reflects that the losses on the three weeks beforehad been equally heavy, one can but marvel.
We shall now follow the fortunes of the Thirty-fourth Division (Nicholson),which was on the immediate left of the Fortieth, covering a sector of 8000yards, including the town of Armentières. On the north, nearFrelinghien, it joined the right of the Twenty-fifth Division. On the night ofApril 7 the enemy fired an enormous number, 30,000 or 40,000, of gas-shellsinto Armentières, and soaked it to such an extent with mephitic vapoursthat it became uninhabitable. Otherwise there was no warning of an impendingattack, which came indeed as a surprise to all the forces engaged.
On April 9 the division lay with the 103rd Brigade upon the right sectionand the 102nd upon the left, with the guns of the Thirty-eighth Division behindthem. The main attack on this day was entirely upon the two divisions, thePortuguese and the Fortieth, to the south. There was heavy shelling, however,of the back areas, especially Armentières and Erquinghem. When as theday advanced everything on the right had given way or weakened, the 103rdBrigade threw back a long thin defensive line, facing south, which ended in thedirection of Fleurbaix. At the same time the reserve 101st Brigade was orderedup to cover Bac St. Maur Bridge. One battalion of the Reserve Brigade, the 11thSuffolks, got into Fleurbaix, when by a happy chance they were able toreinforce their own comrades of the 12th Battalion. These two sturdy EastAnglian units held the village in a very desperate fight for many hours. The15th and 16th Royal Scots of the same brigade had some hard fighting also asthey continued the defensive line formed by the 103rd Brigade, and tried toprevent the victorious Germans from swarming round and behind the Thirty-fourthDivision. Some idea of the danger may be gathered from the fact that of twobrigades of artillery engaged one was firing south-west and the other due east.The original front was never in danger, but it was a desperate conflict uponthe refused flank.
During the afternoon the Germans crossed the Lys at Sailly and Bac St. Maur,though the bridge at the latter place had been destroyed. Their progress,however, had slowed down and become uncertain. The 74th Brigade of theTwenty-fifth Division had come under the orders of General Nicholson, and wasat once directed against the village of Croix du Bac, with the ultimate designof recovering the Bac St. Maur crossing. The 74th Brigade succeeded in clearingCroix du Bac of the enemy, but night fell before they could get farther. Themorning found this brigade sandwiched in between the Fortieth and Thirty-fourthDivisions, while the 147th Brigade had also moved up in support. It was soonfound, however, that the enemy had got so far west in the south that theyoutflanked the 74th Brigade, who had to retire on April 10 through Croix du Bacand Steenwerck. On the same morning the Twenty-fifth Division had been attackednear Frelinghien, and the Germans penetrated as far as the northern bend of theLys, north of Armentières.
The left of the Thirty-fourth Division was now entirely in the air. It wasclear, therefore, that a retirement north of the Lys was necessary, and about 3P.M. in a sedate and orderly fashion it was started and carried through,covered by the fire of the 147th Brigade. The Thirty-fourth drew off in fineorder, the rearguards stopping from time to time, especially in the streets ofArmentières, for the purpose of beating back the advancing Germanpatrols. All bridges were destroyed, and no unwounded prisoners were left. Themen of the Thirty-fourth were loud in praise of the way in which the YorkshireTerritorials of the 147th Brigade covered their right flank during thisdifficult and dangerous extrication. We will now, having traced the effectsupon the Fifty-fifth to the south, and upon the Fortieth and Thirty-fourthDivisions to the north, return to the situation created on April 9 by thebreaking of the Portuguese.
Jackson's Fiftieth Division, without its artillery, had only arrived fromthe Somme on April 8, having lost half its old soldiers, so that 50 per cent ofthe personnel were drafts. It had also suffered severely in officers, and wasvery battle-weary and exhausted. It was placed in billets at Merville, with twobattalions of the 151st Brigade holding redoubts at Lestrem south of the Lysclose to Estaires.
As soon as it was seen that the situation was serious, about 8 o'clock inthe morning, the division was put in motion. The 151st Brigade was ordered toextend its left into Estaires, while the 150th prolonged the line north ofEstaires. The 149th was held in reserve, though one of its battalions, the 4thNorthumberland Fusiliers, was sent in to strengthen the right. The intentionwas that the Fiftieth Division should hold the line until the reserves could bebrought to the point of danger.
By two in the afternoon the Germans could be seen all along the front, andsome of the Portuguese had made their way through and between the ranks. A veryheavy fire was opened by both lines of infantry, and the Germans advancing byshort rushes made continuous progress towards the eastern bank of the stream.Yorkshire and Durham stood solid upon the farther side, however, and 5000recruits endured a long and terrible baptism of fire from the afternoon to theevening of that spring day. It was on the right at Lestrem, where the Britishwere to the east of the Lys, that the pressure was most severe, and eventuallythe 151st Brigade found it impossible to hold this point, while farther to thenorth, upon the left of the Yorkshire men, the German infantry of the 370thRegiment had won a footing upon the western bank of the Lys at Sailly and BacSt. Maur. The British guns were beginning to concentrate, however, andinvaluable time had been gained by the resistance of the Fiftieth Division. Asnight fell the 5th Durhams were still holding Estaires, while the 5th and 6thNorthumberland Fusiliers from the reserve were standing firm along the stretchnorth and east of Estaires. Farther north still were the 4th East Yorks, 4thYorks, and 5th Yorks in that order from the south, all very weary, but allholding tenaciously to their appointed line. During the night the Fifty-firstHighland Division (Carter-Campbell) came up on the right of the 151st Brigadeto cover the weak point at Lestrem and all the line to the south of it. Abrigade of the Twenty-fifth Division also came up to Steenwerck north of wherethe river line had been broken, but it was too late for an effectivecounter-attack, as considerable forces were already across, which werespreading out north and south on the western bank.
The fall of night made no change in the battle, and the darkness was lit upby the red glare of the incessant fire. For many hours the line was held,though the Germans had brought up fresh divisions for their attack. Early inthe morning of April 10, however, they won a footing in Estaires, which wasdesperately defended by the 5th Durhams. By 8:45, after long-continued streetfighting, the Germans held the whole town, with the exception of the south-western extremity. The fight raged all day backwards and forwards through thislittle straggling place, the infantry upon either side showing the mostdetermined valour. About 9:30 the 6th Northumberland Fusiliers, under ColonelTemperley, made a brilliant counter-attack, crossing 1500 yards of open countrywith only three batteries to cover the movement. Before 10 o'clock they wereinto Estaires and had cleared the main street, rushing house after house anddriving the Germans down to the river edge, where they rallied and remained.The 149th Brigade had promptly sent forward its machine-guns, and these weremounted on the highest houses at the south end of the town, to fife on anyenemy reserves coming up south of the Lys. They raked the Germans on thefarther bank and caused heavy losses. All day the remains of the 6th Durhamsand 6th Northumberlands fought desperately in Estaires, and held nearly all ofit in the evening, which was in a way a misfortune, since it allowed theGermans to concentrate their heavies upon it during the night in awhole-hearted fashion which rendered it absolutely untenable. The morning ofApril 11 found Estaires a No Man's Land between the lines of the infantry. Inspite of a fresh advance by the 4th and 5th Northumberland Fusiliers, it wasfound impossible to regain the place, while the Germans gradually extendedtheir line from the river crossings which they had retained all through. Bymid-day on April 11, the British line was 500 yards west of the town.
In the southern portion of the line the 151st Brigade of Durhams had beenslowly forced back from the Lestrem sector until they were on the line of theLys, which they reached in the evening of April 10. At that date the 150thYorkshire Brigade was still firm upon the river, but the left-hand battalion ,the 5th Yorks, had thrown back its flank, since the enemy, brushing aside theright wing of the Fortieth Division, had crossed the stream and turned theFiftieth from .the north. The Fortieth was still fighting hard, as alreadydescribed, and endeavouring to hold back the attack, so that the German advancewas slow. Early in the morning of April 11 the attack became very severe, andbroke through to the west of Estaires—the river at this point runs fromwest to east—driving back the Durham Brigade, which was absolutelyexhausted after forty-eight hours of ceaseless fighting without assistance.Their resistance had been an extraordinarily fine one, but there comes a limitto human powers. The whole division was at the last extremity, but fortunatelyat 12 o'clock on the 11th, two brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division (Cayley)came up in relief.
So close was the fighting, however, and so desperate the situation, thatGeneral Riddell of the 149th Northumberland Fusiliers Brigade refused todisengage his men from the battle, since the confusion of a relief might haveled to disaster. He was at the time holding the line astride the MeterenBecque, north of Estaires, covering about 1000 yards of vital ground. Here theGermans attacked all day, making prodigious efforts to push the 4th and 5thNorthumberland Fusilliers out of Trou Bayard. The ground between this point andPont Levis, the bridge at the east end of Estaires, was dead flat, and affordedno particle of cover. Fifteen British machine-guns stationed beside theinfantry swept all this expanse, and cut down each wave of attack. Four timesthe place was supposed to have fallen, and four times the Germans fell back,leaving long grey swathes of their dead. It was not until 3 P.M. that thestubborn Northumbrians found that their right was completely exposed, and wereforced to retire from a position which they had sold at a terrible price.
Instead of dying down the German advance was attaining a greater proportionwith every day that passed, for it seemed to their commanders that with sofavourable an opening some very great success lay within their power. In spiteof the arrival of the Fifty-first and Twenty-ninth Divisions the battle ragedmost furiously, and the weight of the attack was more than the thin line couldsustain. The Germans had rapidly followed up the 151st Brigade as it drew out,and there was a fierce action round Merville and Robermetz in the earlyafternoon of April 11. The exhausted Durhams turned furiously upon theirpursuers, and there was fierce hand-to-hand work in which even General Martinand his Headquarters Staff found themselves handling rifles and revolvers. TheThirty-first Division (Bridgford) had come up and taken position in the rear ofthe Twenty-ninth, with their left flank facing east to hold off the enemy, whowere now close to Steenwerck in the north. By nightfall Merville had gone, andso had Neuf Berquin, which lay between the 151st and the 149th Brigade, ratherin the rear of the latter' s right. At this period the Twenty-ninth Division,with the Thirty-first behind it, was on the left or north of the 149th Brigade,covering the ground between Neuf Berquin and Steenwerck. The enemy had turnedthe right of this line as already described, and now through the events in thenorth, which will soon be narrated, the left of the Twenty-ninth Division wasalso turned, and the situation became most dangerous, for the enemy was ingreat force in front. A consultation was held by the various general officersaffected, and it was decided to make a side slip under the cover of darkness tothe line of Vierhouck—Meteren Becque. The British had to fight, however,to gain this position, so far had the enemy outflanked them, and when the 149thBrigade, with their indomitable Northumbrians, now reduced to a few hundredmen, had cut their way through to Vierhouck it was only to find it empty andthe British line about 1000 yards to the west of it, where the 4th GuardsBrigade of the Thirty-first Division had just begun to arrive. TheNorthumbrians held on to Vierhouck none the less on the morning of April 12,and the Guards Brigade came forward.
Whilst this stern fighting had been in progress, and while the Fifty-fifthkept its iron grip upon Givenchy and Festubert, the Fifty-first HighlandDivision to its north, along the line of the Lawe Canal, had been very hardpressed. All three brigades had been engaged in most desperate defence andcounter-attack, the fighting being so close that two at least of the Brigadiershad been compelled to drop maps and binoculars, while they seized rifles fromtheir oderlies. The canal was half dry and offered a poor front, but it wassustained until the Germans got across in the north where the left flank of the153rd Brigade was turned and had to fall back. The Gordons and Black Watch ofthis unit fought most fiercely in the neighbourhood of Vieille Chapelle, andthe Germans will long remember their meeting with the clansmen. Finally theirline swung back west of Lestrem, keeping in touch with the right flank of theFiftieth Division.
At this period the 184th Brigade was the only one in the Highland Divisionwhich was still capable of service, for the others had lost so heavily and wereso wearied that rest was absolutely necessary. The Sixty-first Division (ColinMackenzie), still very weak after its service on the Somme, came up in theRobecq sector, and, with the aid of the surviving Highland Brigade, formed abarrier to the terrific German pressure, the whole coming under GeneralMackenzie. This line was held by these troops up to the 23rd of April.
Meanwhile, to revert to the early days of the battle, the German attack wasraging with great fury upon the centre and left of this line, and finding a gapbetween the Twenty-ninth Division and the 149th Brigade it poured through itwith most menacing results, but the 4th Guards Brigade counter-attacked andretrieved the situation west of the Vieux Berquin-Neuf Berquin road, as will betold in detail in the next chapter. Farther north, however, the German attackmade more progress and rolled forward to the south of the village of Merris.The 6th Northumbrians with only two officers left standing—one of themtheir gallant Colonel, Temperley,—still held on to their old stance atVierhouck, though reduced to the strength of a company, and in such a state ofphysical exhaustion that the men fell to the ground fast asleep between theattacks. One young soldier woke up during his nap to find the Germans amongthem, on which he sprang up, shot the German officer, and organised a chargewhich re-established the line. As darkness fell on the evening of April 12 thesurvivors of the Fiftieth Division were drawn from the line, though some wereso entangled with other units that they stayed and shared in the severefighting of April 13.
As already shown the Givenchy bastion was held firm, which meant that theFifty-first Division was also to some extent helped to resist attack, since anenfilade fire from the Fifty-fifth would beat upon any advance against them.Such advances were repeatedly made upon April 11 and were splendidly countered.North of this point the Fiftieth, Twenty-ninth, and Thirty-first Divisions hadall suffered heavily, while the line had been bent back in a curve from the LaBassé Canal to a maximum depth of ten miles, ending on the night ofApril 12 in a position from west of Merville through the two Berquins toMerris. The Twenty-ninth Division, which is a particularly good comrade in atight place, had been very hard pressed, with its brigades sent hither andthither wherever a leak was to be stopped.
It was in this action that Colonel Forbes Robertson, one of the heroes ofCambrai, earned the coveted Cross by fighting on horseback at the head of hismen like some knight of old, and repeatedly restoring the line when it wasbroken. In spite of all valour, however, the general movement was westwards.Whilst these misfortunes had occurred in the southern sector, others not lessserious had occurred in the north, owing to the great extension of the Germanattack. It is to these that we must now turn.
The enemy had achieved a considerable success upon April 9 when theysucceeded in establishing themselves across the Lys at Sailly and Bac St. Maur,because by doing so they had got to the south-west of Armentières. Theyhad prepared another attack in the north, and it was evident that if it had anysuccess the Armentières position would be impossible. Early in themorning of April 10 the usual shattering and pulverising bombardment whichpreceded a full-dress German attack broke out upon the right of the SecondArmy, involving the front from the Ypres—Comines Canal in the north downto the Lys River at Armentières, thus joining up with the battle ofyesterday, and turning the ten-mile front into one of twenty. The chief pointsin this line are Hollebeke in the north, Wytschaete in the centre, and Messinesin the south, with Ploegsteert Wood and village and Nieppe as the finalconnecting links with Armentières. It was all classic and sacred grounddrenched with the blood of our bravest. There can be few regiments in theBritish Army which have not at one time or another left their dead upon thisshell-pitted slope, or upon the levels which face it.
The order of the Second Army from the north at this time was Twenty-second,Eighth, Second, and Ninth Corps. It was the Ninth Corps (Hamilton-Gordon) whichwas now attacked. The order of the divisions upon this front was Campbell'sTwenty-first Division astride the Ypres-Menin road, the Ninth (Tudor) in theHollebeke district, the Nineteenth (Jeffreys) covering 6000 yards east ofMessines and Wytschaete from Ravine Wood in the north to the Douve in thesouth, and finally the Twenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the right, whichwas already in a most unfavourable position, as its right flank was menaced bythe driving in of the Fortieth and threat to the Thirty-fourth on the precedingday, while one of its brigades, the 74th, had been taken away to coverSteenwerck from the German advance at Bac St. Maur. It was upon thesedivisions, and, in the first instance, upon the two southern ones that the newGerman attack from the Fourth Army of our old enemy General von Armin broke onApril 10. It should be remembered that, like so many of their fellow-units,both of these divisions had been very heavily engaged in the south, and thattheir losses within the last two weeks had been very great. Verily we havetravelled far from the day when it was laid down as an axiom that a corps whichhad lost a quarter of its numbers would not stand to its work until time hadeffaced the shock.
Since the main assault on April 10 fell upon the Nineteenth Division thestory can be most plainly told from their central point of view. The left oftheir line was held by the 58th Brigade (Glasgow), consisting of the 6th Welshand 9th Welsh Fusiliers, The right was held by the 57th Brigade (Cubitt) whichcontained the 10th Warwick, 8th Gloucester, and 10th Worcesters. The 56th(Heath) was in reserve. It was upon these troops that there fell the strain ofan attack which can seldom have been exceeded in severity. The total Germanforce on the corps front was eleven divisions, and of these no less than fivewere directed on the morning of April 10 upon the depleted ranks of GeneralJeffreys' unit. A very thick mist prevailed, and through this protective screenthe German infantry advanced about 6 o'clock, driving swiftly through all theforward posts, and putting them out of action in exactly the same fashion as onMarch 21. The enemy were in great numbers, and their advance was swift andresolute. Within half an hour of the first alarm they had made a lodgment inthe main position of the 57th Brigade, and had also broken in the face of theleft wing of the Twenty-fifth Division to the south. The garrisons of theoutlying posts were never seen again, and it was observed that they weregreatly hampered by their camouflage screens which they had no time to tearaway in the face of so rapid and overwhelming an attack. At 6.40 the enemy weredeep in the position of the 57th Brigade, especially near Gapard Spur, whichmarked the centre of that unit. At 7:30 the whole brigade was in difficulties,which was more marked in the centre than on either flank, but was serious atevery point of the fine. The 8th North Staffords of the Reserve Brigade werebrought up at this hour to help in the defence of this weakening sector. Beforethey could arrive upon the scene the enemy had made such progress that he hadreached the crest of the ridge and had occupied the village of Messines. The68th Brigade in the north had not yet been attacked, but General Glasgow seeinghis right flank entirely exposed had thrown back a defensive line. Close tothis line was a post named Pick House, and upon this the mixed elements on theleft of the 67th Brigade, chiefly men of the 10th Warwicks, now rallied andformed a strong centre of resistance. The Twenty-fifth Division to the southhad been also very hard pressed, and was in immediate danger of losing theimportant knoll, Hill 63, so that the reserve brigade of the NineteenthDivision had to send the two remaining battalions, the 4th Shropshires and 9thCheshires, to strengthen their defence. There was thus no longer any supportfor the Nineteenth Divisional fighting line in their great need, save for the5th South Wales Borderers, their pioneer battalion, and the 81st Field CompanyR.E., both of whom were thrown into the battle, the pioneers pushing bravelyforward and connecting up with the 10th Warwicks at Pick House. Meanwhile the8th North Stafford s had made a fine attempt to retake Messines, and hadactually reached the western edge of the village, but were unable to gain apermanent footing. Their right was in touch with the 8th Gloucesters, and somesort of stable line began to build itself up before the Germans. They had beenunable to occupy Messines in force, owing to the rifle-fire which became moredeadly with the rising of the mist. The scattered groups of infantry lying uponthe ridge on either side of Messines were greatly heartened by the splendidwork of A Battery, 88th R.F.A., under Captain Dougall, which remained amongthem, firing over open sights at the advancing Germans. "So long as you stickit I will keep my guns here!" he shouted, and the crouching men cheered him inreturn. He was as good as his word, and only withdrew what was left of hisbattery, manhandling it across almost impossible ground, when he had not ashell in his limbers. This brave officer received the Victoria Cross, butunhappily never lived to wear it.
The 8th North Staffords, still lying opposite Messines, extended their leftdown the Messines-Wytschaete road in an endeavour to join up with the men atPick House. Thus a frail curtain of defence was raised in this direction also.Shortly after mid-day things began to look better, for the gallant SouthAfrican Brigade (Tanner) of the Ninth Division was despatched to the rescue. Sosevere had been its losses, however, that it numbered only 1600 bayonets, andhad hardly been re-organised into battalions. Late in the afternoon itadvanced, the 1st Battalion on the left, 2nd on the right, and though it hadnot the weight to make any definite impression upon the German front itentirely re-established the line of the road from Messines to Wytschaete, andreinforced the thin fragments of battalions who were holding this precariousfront. The South Africans incurred heavy losses from machine-gun fire in thisvery gallant attack.
The Ninth Division had hardly relinquished its Reserve Brigade when it foundthat it was itself in urgent need of support, for about 2 o'clock on August 10the attack spread suddenly to the northern end of the line, involving the 25th,26th, and 58th Brigades, all under General Tudor, who was now responsible forthe Wytschaete front. So infernal was the barrage which preceded the attack,that the right of the Ninth Division in the vicinity of Charity Farm was drivenin, and the 58th Brigade, with both flanks in the air and smothered under arain of shells, was compelled also to fall back upon its support line.
About 4 P.M. the 58th Brigade was broken near Torreken Farm, and the 6thWiltshires, who were the flank battalion on the right, were cut off and lostheavily. The enemy were driving hard at this period towards Wytschaete, but the9th Welsh stood fast in a cutting to the south of the village, and held theGermans off with their rifle-fire. So ended a most trying and unfortunate day,where the overborne troops had done all that men could do to hold their ground,fighting often against five times their own number. The prospects for themorrow looked very black, and the only gleam of light came with the advent,about midnight, of the 108th Brigade (Griffiths) from the Ulster Division, withorders to fight alongside the exhausted 57th, whose commander, General Cubitt,was now directing the local operations to the west of Messines. The Wytschaetefront was also strengthened by the inclusion in the Ninth Division of the 62ncland later of the 64th Brigade of the Twenty-first Division. Farther south the75th Brigade north of Armentières had been driven back by the enemy'sattack, and the 7th Brigade on its left, finding its flank uncovered, hadhinged back upon Ploegsteert Wood, where it held its line as best it might.Thus on the left, the centre, and the right there had been the same story ofunavailing resistance and loss of valuable, dearly-bought ground . Even moreserious, however, than the local loss was the strategical situation which hadbeen created by the German advance in the lower sector, by their crossing theLys, and by the fact that on the night of April 10 they were closing in uponSteenwerck and La Crèche far to the right rear of the defenders of theMessines line. It was a situation which called for the highest qualities ofgenerals as of soldiers.
By the morning of April 11 General Plumer, dealing out his reservesgrudgingly from his fast diminishing supply, placed the 147th Brigade of theForty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division (Cameron) behind the Twenty-fifthDivision in the Ploegsteert region, and a brigade of the Twenty-ninth Divisionto the north of it. Such succours were small indeed in the face of what wasevidently a very great and well-prepared attack which had already shaken thewhole northern front to its foundations. The Higher Command had, however, somepoints of consolation. If the vital sectors could be held there was thecertainty that strong reinforcements would arrive within a few days from thesouth. The Amiens line was now certainly stabilised, and if once again anequilibrium could be secured then the last convulsive efforts of this titanicangel of darkness would have been held With no illusions, but with a dourdetermination to do or die, the British line faced to the east.
The immediate danger was that a gap had opened between Messines andWytschaete, while another was threatened farther south between Ploegsteert andthe Nieppe-Armentières road. The pressure upon the Damstrasse was alsovery great in the region of the Ninth Division. The first disposition in theMessines area was to strengthen the line of resistance by pushing up the threebattalions of the 108th Brigade, the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the left near PickHouse, the 9th Irish Fusiliers west of Messines, and the 12th Irish Rifles inthe Wulverghem line. The attack on the morning of April 11 was not heavy inthis direction, but was rather directed against the Twenty-fifth Division inthe Ploegsteert district, where it came omniously close to Hill 63, acommanding point from which, the Messines position of the British would betaken in reverse. General Jeffreys of the Nineteenth Division determined nonethe less to stand his ground, but he threw out a defensive flank along theMessines-Wulverghem road, and mounted machine-guns to hold any attack from thesouth. Meanwhile the 67th, South African, and 108th Brigades, in spite of thismenace to their right rear continued to hold the Messines front. There wassevere fighting on this sector during the afternoon in which the remains of the2nd and 4th (Transvaal Scots) Battalions were pushed back for some distance,but counter-attacked under the lead of Captain Green, regaining most of theground that they had lost, and connecting up with the 6th South WalesBorderers, who were still holding fast near Pick House. This line wasmaintained until the general withdrawal. It was further strengthened by the146th Brigade, one of the three units of the Forty-ninth Division, which wereall engaged at different points. One battalion, the 7th West Yorkshires, calledon suddenly to fill a gap, made a very fine advance under heavy fire, andrestored the situation. It remained in the line until, on April 16, it wasalmost annihilated by a terrific German attack upon it.
But the situation on the right rear was getting worse and worse. In theevening it was definitely known that Hill 63 had at last fallen after a longand obstinate struggle. The Twenty-fifth, and later the Thirty-fourth Divisionshad held up against great odds, but the main force of the enemy was nowstriking upon that line, and the British were forced to withdraw from Le Bizettowards Nieppe. These April 9-12. (German gains enforced a completely newre-arrangement of the forces in the north if they were to avoid being taken inthe rear. This change of a wide and far-reaching character was quickly andsafely effected during the night of April 11 and 12. It involved moving backthe three northern corps into their battle zones, leaving only outposts inadvance. They still covered Ypres, but the retirement meant that all that hadbeen won in the mud-and-blood struggle of 1917 had passed into German keeping,and coupled with the loss of Messines it seemed to threaten that the oldsalient might be renewed in as disastrous a fashion as ever. This retirementwas rather in the nature of a precaution against the possibilities of thefuture. What was of most immediate importance was the withdrawal of the lineswhich were at such close grips with the enemy to the west of Messines. By themorning of April 12 the general line of the Nineteenth Corps was SteeuwerckStation, Pont-d'Achelles, Neuve Église, Wulverghem, Wytschaete. Noimmediate German attack followed on the withdrawal. This abstention on the partof the enemy was due in part to the wonderful work done by a small nest of fourmachine-guns on the Messines-Wulverghem road under the command of LieutenantHodgson. This small unit had already fought for forty-eight hours, but on thisthird day of the battle their services were invaluable, for they shot downhundreds of Germans as they endeavoured to debouch from Messines and descendthe slope. Save for two wounded men none of this band of heroes ever returned.Among other detachments who behaved with great heroism were a few men of the5th South Wales Borderers, B Company, under Captain Evans, who maintainedthemselves at Pick House, north and east of Messines, for three days, untilthey were at last rescued by the 58th Brigade from the north.
Whilst these fresh dispositions and general retrogressions had been made onthis front the Thirty-fourth Division to the south had also been compelled torearrange its positions. It has already been described how, under cover of the147th Brigade, they withdrew in absolute order across the Lys. April 11 sawsuch continued pressure, however on the right of the Twenty-fifth and the wholeof the Thirty-fourth Divisions that it became clear early in the afternoon ofApril 11 that further retirement was imperative. This began at dusk, the threebrigades retiring by the Armentières-Bailleul road, while the 147thstill acted as rearguard. They retired through the 74th and 88th Brigades nearBailleul Station, fighting back all the way and considerably harassed by theGerman guns. On the morning of the 12th the general line wasSteam-mill—Bailleul Station—southern border of La Crèche toa point about 500 yards north-east of Pont d'Achelles on the Bailleul road.Along this line the order of battle from the south was the 147th, 75th, 101st,74th, 102nd, and 88th Brigades. Nieppe, which had been evacuated, was occupiedby the enemy later in the day, and on the evening of April 12 the line waspushed a little farther back to De Seule.
There was no fighting on the new line opposite Messines on April 12, but thebattle was, as has been shown, raging furiously elsewhere, and the Thesituation in the south, where the enemy was making progress, must deeply affectthat in the north. Had an aviator taken a swift flight from Hollebeke toGivenchy on this day, following the deep curve which had formed in the Britishline, his observations would have been roughly as follows: in the Hollebekedistrict he would have found no extreme pressure, and that the Ninth Division,reinforced by the 58th Brigade, was holding the line not far westward of theiroriginal position. From there onwards he would have skirted the new line of theNinth Corps, as already indicated, and would have seen the remains of theNineteenth Division covering the north of it, the Twenty-fifth Division, alsoin fragments, about Neuve Église, and the Thirty-fourth Division nearSteenwerck. He would next observe with consternation or joy according to hiscolours, that there was a considerable gap before Bailleul. At the other sideof this gap he would come upon elements of the Thirty-first and Twenty-ninthDivisions, hard-pressed and worried by the advance which the enemy had madethrough Merville on their right. He would catch a glimpse also of some thinlines of resistance, still farther south, which represented all that was leftof the Fiftieth Division. Finally, he would see the Fifty-first and theFifty-fifth on the extreme south, both of them standing firm in theirpositions. Looking eastwards he would see pouring across the Lys the legions ofPrince Rupprecht of Bavaria, hurrying to improve their blow, while behind theBritish lines he would see new divisions, the Fifty-ninth Midlanders atWulverghem, the Thirty-third near Bailleul, the Sixty-first near Robecq, the4th Guards Brigade followed by the First Australians near Hazebrouck, allhastening with heavy hearts but the most grim determination to throw themselvesacross the path of this German invasion which already threatened the most vitalpoints in Flanders. Far to the south also our aviator would perhaps have seenthe smoke of many trains, and out at sea might have made out the little dotswhich marked in the one case French, in the other British, reinforcements. Suchwas the general panorama upon the Flanders front on the evening of April12.
Desperate situation—Sir Douglas Haig's "Win or Die"message—Epic of the 4th Guards Brigade at Hazebrouck—Arrival ofFirst Australian Division—Splendid services of Thirty-thirdDivision—Loss of Armentières, Bailleul, and NeuveÉglise—The First Division at Givenchy—Fall ofKemmel—Battle of Ridge Wood—Great loss ofground—Equilibrium
UP to April 13 twenty-eight German divisions had been tracedin the battle of Flanders. Since the whole British Army consisted of sixtydivisions, and only thirteen had been engaged in Flanders, one can gather howterrible had been their task.
By the fourth day of the battle the purpose of the enemy became more clear.It was evident now that his attack consisted really of three movements. Thenorthern of these, consisting of about six divisions, had for its task to drivethrough Wytschaete and Messines to Bailleul. At present it was held up in thenorth by the Ninth Division, but had made its' way in the south until NeuveÉglise was the only village which intervened between it and Bailleul.The central attack, consisting of the main force, had taken Armentièresand penetrated ten miles deep, capturing Merville, reaching the Clarence River,touching Robecq, and threatening St. Venant. This deep penetration reacted uponthe British flanks to north and south of it. Finally, there was an advance byseven or eight divisions in the south, which had been held at Givenchy, but hadbent the line back from that point, Bethune being the immediate objective. Thehammering of the Germans was remorseless and terrific. All that the Britishneeded was a little time, but it seemed as if it would be denied them. Help wascoming, but it did not arrive so quickly as the new divisions which Von Arminand Von Quast were pouring over the Messines Ridge and across the plain of theLys.
The position was very menacing, as was shown by an order of the day from theBritish Commander-in-Chief which is unique perhaps in our militaryannals— a stern call to duty and to death, pitched on the very note whichwould arouse the historic tenacity of the British soldier. Documents have beenavoided in this chronicle, but this one at least must be quoted in full. It wasaddressed to all ranks of the British Army under his command.
"Three weeks ago to-day," said Sir Douglas Haig, "the enemy began histerrific attacks against us on a fifty-mile front. His objects are to separateus from the French, to take the Channel ports, and destroy the BritishArmy.
In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle, and enduring themost reckless sacrifice of human life, he has, as yet, made little progresstowards his goals. We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice ofour troops.
"Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendidresistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most tryingcircumstances.
"Many amongst us now are tired. To these I would say that victory willbelong to the side which holds out the longest.
"The French Army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support.
"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every positionmust be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs tothe wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fightto the end.
"The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon theconduct of each one of us at this critical moment."
No words can describe the danger of the crisis more clearly than this clearcall from a leader remarkable for his judgment and restraint, exhorting his mento fight to the death with their faces to the raging German line, and theirbacks to those all-important harbours on which the fate of the world was nowdepending. The German vanguard was forty miles from Calais on the day that theappeal was made, and there was no strong line to be forced, save that strongestof all lines which was formed by Sir Herbert Plumer and his men.
A new unit had come into line on April 13. This was the Thirty-thirdDivision under General Pinney. It was at once thrust in to fill the gap infront of Bailleul, where it found itself involved from that date onwards inmost desperate fighting, in which it was associated with the Thirty-firstDivision. The narrative of the services and trials, both of them very great,which were rendered and endured by these divisions may be best told inconsecutive form, as a too strict adhesion to the order of dates produces aneffect which makes it difficult to follow the actual happenings. We shall firstconsider the operations at Hazebrouck and Meteren, where these two divisionsand the First Australian Division were chiefly concerned, and we shallafterwards return to the north and follow the fortunes of the Nineteenth,Twenty-fifth, Forty-ninth, Thirty-fourth, and other divisions which wereholding the northern curve.
The line was very weak on April 12 in front of Hazebrouck, and yet it wasabsolutely vital that this important railway junction should not fall intoGerman hands. The need was pressing and desperate, for the German attack wasfurious and unremitting, while the British line was so thin, and composed ofsuch weary units, that it seemed impossible that it could hold. The exhaustedremains of the Fiftieth Division, who had been at it continually ever since thebreaking of the Portuguese front, were hardly capable now of covering ordefending any serious front. Yet if the ground could be held, the FirstAustralian Division, brought hurriedly back from the Somme and in the act ofdetraining, would be in the line within twenty-four hours. There have been fewmoments more heavy with fate during the whole of the campaign. Everythingdepended for the moment upon Finney's Thirty-third Division, upon the wornremnants of the Twenty-ninth Division, upon the 92nd and 93rd Brigades, andupon the 4th Guards Brigade of the Thirty-first Division who were brought upfrom Pradelles, and thrown hurriedly across the path of the advancing Germans.Of the Thirty-first Division the 92nd and 93rd Brigades had already beenheavily engaged on April II as already recorded. The Guards Brigade had beendelayed in its journey and was still fresh. General Reedman of the 92nd Brigadewas in local command, and the situation was a particularly difficult one. Atall costs Hazebrouck must be covered until reinforcements could arrive, for ifthe line were cut there was no end to the possible evils. When Merris fellGeneral Reedman still held the heights west of Merris with the 10th EastYorkshires, while the 11th East Lancashires were to the south, and the remnantsof the 86th and 87th Brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division held on to VieuxBerquin. This line held until 5 P.M. on April 13 in spite of very stormyattacks and very little help from the guns. About that hour the right of theline gave way under severe pressure, and Vieux Berquin was taken, but theGermans were bottled up in it and were unable to get forward. There theyremained until the great turn of the tide. We must now, however, turn our gazeto the immediate south and follow the phases of the wonderful stand made by theremaining brigade of the Thirty-first Division, the 4th Guards Brigade, whofound themselves involved in a desperate battle in front of Hazebrouck.
Without enumerating a number of obscure hamlets which are rather confusingthan helpful, it may be said that the brigade under General Leslie Butlercovered the north of the main road from Merville to Hazebrouck, with theirright resting upon the Bourre, a small sluggish stream. Vierhouck representedroughly the centre of their line. It was a country of flat cultivated fields,with many roads and water-courses lined with willows, which cut the view. Therewere untouched farms with their human and animal occupants on every side. Tothe west lay the great forest of Nieppe. On the right were the 3rd Coldstream,on the left the 4th Grenadiers, with the 2nd Irish in close support. They werein position on the morning of April 12, and at once found the enemy in front ofthem, who after a strong preliminary bombardment advanced in great numbersalong the whole line. The rifle-fire of the Guardsmen was too deadly, however,and the attack dissolved before it. The German machine-gunners were exceedinglyaggressive, "not to say impudent," as a Guards officer explained it, and manylosses were sustained from their fashion of pushing forward upon the flanks,and worming their way into every unoccupied crevice. Nothing could exceed boththe gallantry and the intelligence of these men. Having cleared their front theGuards endeavoured to advance, but the Coldstream on the right met withmurderous fire from the village of Pures Becques, and the movement could get nofarther, nor were the Grenadiers much more fortunate on the left, thoughCaptain Pryce with his company broke into some outlying houses, killing anumber of Germans, seven of whom fell to that officer's own automatic. Thiswhole gallant episode occurred under the very muzzles of a German battery,firing with open sights at a range of 300 yards.
At this period the brigade seems to have got ahead of the general Britishline, and to have had both flanks entirely exposed to every sort of enfiladefire. About four in the afternoon the right company of the Coldstream,numbering only forty men, had to turn south to face the enemy. The Germans hadthrust into the centre of the Coldstream also, but No. 2 Company of thesupporting Irish, acting without orders upon the impulse of the moment, andaided by the surviving Coldstream, completely re-established the line. TheIrish, who were led by Captain Bambridge, were almost annihilated in theirdashing effort to ease the pressure upon their English comrades. Their leaderwas wounded. Lieutenant Dent was killed, and only eleven men of the companywere left standing. On the left the Germans were 500 yards in the rear, andhere a rearrangement was called for and steadily carried out. An hour lateranother violent attack was made at the junction of the two battalions, but italso was driven back in disorder.
Rough Sketch of Guards' Position, April 13
The Germans had brought their guns well forward and into the open, but theymet their match in Lieutenant Lewis of the 152nd Brigade Royal Field Artillery,who directed the scanty British artillery, and handled his pieces in a waywhich was much appreciated by the weary Guardsmen.
The readjustment of the line enabled the 4th Guards Brigade to link up withthe 12th Yorkshire Light Infantry, pioneer battalion of their own division,which was holding the line at La Couronne, and fought that day with the utmosttenacity and resolution. On the left flank of the Yorkshiremen, near VieuxBerquin, were the worn remains of the Twenty-ninth Division.
Night fell upon a sorely-tried but unconquered line. The two frontbattalions had lost at least a third of their effectives. Under the screen ofdarkness the position was re-organised, and it was hoped that the FifthDivision, drawn back from Italy, would be able to effect a relief. This couldnot be fully accomplished, however, and at best only a small contraction of thefront could be effected, so that the morning of April 13 found the exhaustedColdstream and Grenadiers still facing the German attack. Their line had beenstrengthened by the 210th Field Co. of the Royal Engineers. The front to beheld was A still very wide for so weakened a force.
It had been a hard day, but it was only the prelude of a harder one. OnApril 13 the morning began with thick mist, of which the Germans took advantageto rush their machine-guns to very close quarters. At early dawn the Coldstreamfound themselves once more heavily attacked, while an armoured car came downthe road and machine-gunned the outposts at a range of ten yards. After severemixed fighting the attack was driven back. At 9:15 it was renewed with greaterstrength, but again it made no progress. It is typical of the truly desperatespirit of the men, that when every man save one in an outpost had been killedor wounded, the survivor. Private Jacotin of the Coldstream, carried on thefight alone for twenty minutes before he was blown to pieces with a grenade.The left flank of this battalion had also been heavily attacked, the enemy,with their usual diabolical ingenuity, shouting as they advanced through thefog that they were the King's Company of the Grenadier Guards. They were blownback none the less into the mist from which they had emerged. The 12thYorkshire Light Infantry was also four separate times attacked, but held to itsappointed line. This gallant unit fairly earned the title of the "YorkshireGuards " that day, for they were the peers of their comrades. Meanwhile,however, outside the area of this grim fight the Germans had taken VieuxBerquin, pushing back the scanty line of defence at that point, so that theywere able to bring up trench-mortars and guns to blast the Yorkshire battalionat La Couronne out of its shallow trenches. Captain Pryce, on the extreme leftof the Guards, found the Germans all round him, and his Grenadiers werestanding back to back and firing east and west. The company was doomed, and inspite of the gallant effort of a party of Irish Guards, who lost very heavilyin the venture, the whole of them perished, save for Sergeant Weedon and sixmen who reported the manner in which their comrades had met their end. CaptainPryce had led two bayonet charges, first with eighteen men, which was entirelysuccessful, and later with fourteen men, who buried themselves in the grey ofthe German ranks, and there remained. Such was the end of No. 2 Company of the4th Grenadiers, and of its commander. This brave man received a posthumous V.C.in the record of which it is stated that with forty men he had held up a Germanbattalion for ten hours and so saved a break through.
Apart from this flank company the centre company of the Grenadiers at thisperiod consisted of six unwounded men, while the right company was twentystrong. All the officers were down. They were hemmed in on two sides by theenemy, but they were still resisting as the shades of night fell upon them. Bydawn the Grenadier battalion had ceased to exist.
The 3rd Coldstream on the right were hardly in better case. The rightcompany was surrounded, and fought until there was only a handful left. A fewsurvivors fell back upon the Fifth Division and the Australians who were nowwell up to the line. The orders to the Guards had been to keep the Germans outuntil the Australians could arrive. They had been faithfully obeyed. The totalcasualties had been 39 officers and 1244 rank and file, the greater part fromtwo weak battalions; 17 per cent of the brigade mustered after the action.Soldiers will appreciate the last words of the official report which are: "Nostragglers were reported by the A.P.M." It is an episode which needs nocomment. Its grandeur lies in the facts. Well might General de Lisle say: "Thehistory of the British Army can record nothing finer than the story of theaction of the 4th Guards Brigade on April 12 and 13."
Whilst the Guards had made their fine stand to the east of Hazebrouck, therest of the Thirty-first Division, covering a front of 9000 yards, had a mostdesperate battle with the German stormers. The fine north country materialwhich makes up the 92nd and 93rd Brigades had never been more highly tried, forthey were little more than a long line of skirmishers with an occasional post.In some parts of the line they were absolutely exterminated, but like theircomrades of the Guards, they managed somehow or other to retain the positionsand prevent a penetration until reinforcements arrived. The remains of theTwenty-ninth Division on the left had also fought with the utmost devotion andheld the line at the price of a heavy drain upon their weakened ranks. It hasbeen calculated that the line held by the 31st Division upon these days was 5|miles long, and that it was attacked by the 35th and 42nd German divisions, the1st Bavarian Reserve, and 10th, 11th, and 81st Reserve divisions. It would bewell to continue the action upon the Hazebrouck front by giving at once anaccount of the operations of the First Australian Division under General SirHarold Walker, which had the remarkable experience of being sent from Flandersto the Amiens front, being engaged there, and now being back in the Flandersfront once more, all in little over a week. They detrained on April 12, and onthe 13th their 2nd Brigade (Heane) found themselves in front of Hazebrouck withthe remains of the 92nd British Brigade on their left and with the hard-pressed4th Guards Brigade in front of them. In the evening the remains of the Guardswere withdrawn through their line, and they were facing the pursuing Germans.On their left the Australians were in touch with the 1st Cameronians of the19th Brigade in the Meteren area.
This fierce fighting was going on in a country which was new to war, withunbroken soil, whole cottages, and numerous refugees, who by their flightbefore the German vanguard complicated a situation which was already so chaoticthat it was very difficult for the generals on the spot to grasp the relativepositions of the attack and the defence.
On April 14 the Germans, advancing behind a deadly barrage, came forwardthrough Merris and Vieux Berquin. They soon found, however, that they hadbefore them fresh and steady troops who were not to be driven. The immediateGerman objective was the high ground from Mont de Merris to Strazeele. The 2ndAustralian Brigade was on the right and the 1st (Leslie) on the left. Both wereequally attacked, and both met their assailants with a shattering fire whichpiled the level plain with their bodies. Three lines swept forward, but nonereached the shallow trenches of the "digger" infantry. The 3rd and 4thBattalions held the line to the north where the pressure was greatest. The Onehundred and twenty-third French Division was in support, but there was neverany need to call for their co-operation. Strazeele, however, was blown topieces by the German guns.
April 15 and 16 were comparatively quiet, and the Australians busilystrengthened their lines. On the 17th sharp attack was made upon the 1st and4th Battalions on the left and centre of the 1st Australian Brigade, theadvance coming up the valley between Merris and Meteren. This also was cut topieces by rifle and gun-fire, so that it made no progress whatever.
The 3rd Australian Brigade (Bennett) had been in reserve, but it wasdestined for severe service after Meteren had passed out of the hands of theThirty-third Division in the manner elsewhere described. They had actuallyrelieved some of the worn elements of the British Thirty-third and of theFrench One hundred and thirty-third Divisions to the west of Meteren, and onApril 22 and 23 they endeavoured by two separate movements upon either flank tofight their way back into the little town. The first operations carried out bythe 11th and 12th Battalions were successful, but the final push into the townby the 9th and 10th met with heavy opposition, and the casualties were so greatthat the attempt had to be abandoned. The three Australian brigades wereshortly relieved, after their very valuable spell in the line. They weredestined soon to find themselves with their comrades on the Somme onceagain.
Whilst the 1st Brigade had won a complete defensive victory in the north ofthe line, the 2nd Brigade had done equally well in the south. The 7th and 8thBattalions were in the line, and both were heavily engaged, especially thelatter, which faced Vieux Berquin. The German attack was once again a completefailure, and it was clear that the Australians had the historical honour inFlanders as well as on the Somme, of saying, "Thus far and no farther," Area.upon the sector which they manned.
We pass on to the movements of the Thirty-third Division, which arrived uponthe scene of action on April 11, and from that time onwards played an everincreasing part in this great world crisis. General Pinney had the experienceof first being denuded of large part of his own proper force, which was givenaway, brigade by brigade, to points of danger, and afterwards of not onlyseeing them reunited under his hand, but of having the remains of fourdivisions and a great number of details under him, and so being in actualcommand of the whole operations to the south and west of Bailleul. To hiscoolness, firmness, and well-tried fortitude, the nation owed much during thosefew desperate days.
The 100th Brigade (Baird) was moved forward at once to come under the ordersof General Bainbridge, who, with his Twenty-fifth Division, had endured so muchin the Ploegsteert district and was in urgent need of help. We shall followthem from the date of their detachment to that of their return to their ownunit. On April 11, after dusk, they took their position, covering NeuveÉglise, the 16th King's Royal Rifles on the right of the line, the 2ndWorcesters in the centre, and the 9th Highland Light Infantry in reserve, the148th Brigade being on the left, and the 75th Brigade on their right, thelatter much exhausted by two days of battle. Immediately to the north lay themuch-enduring battle line of the Nineteenth Division, which has already beenfully described. Two points can hardly be described simultaneously, but thesefacts are to be read in conjunctiou with those already given in the lastchapter, and it is to be understood that the whole situation at NeuveÉglise reacted from hour to hour upon that farther north, since a Germancapture of the town would place the enemy in the rear of General Jeffreys andhis men.
On April 12 there was no direct attack upon this area, but about 4 P.M. the75th Brigade on the right, which was much worn, was driven back and a gapcreated, which was filled in by such reserves as could be got together at theshortest notice. In the morning of April 13 it was found that this flank wasstill very open, the nearest organised unit being the 88th Brigade of theTwenty-ninth Division, which was also stretching out its left in the hope ofmaking connection. The enemy, however, pushed through early on April 13,getting to the rear of the 100th Brigade, and swinging north into NeuveÈglise which they captured. The Glasgow Highlanders, the only battalionof the Highland Light Infantry which wears Highland costume, attacked at oncewith all the vigour of fresh troops, and cleared the Germans out of the town atthe point of the bayonet. The enemy had filtered into the brigade line,however, and parties of them were in the rear of the Worcesters. The hardestpart of all was borne by the 16th King's Royal Rifles, who, being the flankbattalion, bore all the weight of an advance which had enveloped them uponthree sides, front, flank, and rear. Of this gallant battalion there werehardly any survivors. The Worcesters threw back their right flank, therefore,in order to cover Neuve Église upon the south and south-east, while theTwenty-fifth Division were on the north and north-east.
The mishaps of a dark day were still not over, for the enemy about 4:30 madea determined attack and again punctured the over-stretched line. Some of themdrove their way once more into Neuve Église, brushing aside orscattering the thin line of defence. Another strong force broke into the frontof the 100th Brigade and drove a wedge between the Glasgow Highlanders and theWorcesters. The headquarters of the latter battalion was in the MunicipalBuilding of Neuve Église, and put up a desperate, isolated resistancefor many hours. Colonel Stoney and his staff finally making their way back totheir comrades. In this defence the Chaplain, the Rev. Tanner, greatlydistinguished, himself. The survivors of the 2nd Worcesters had also maintainedthemselves in Neuve Église as house neighbours to the German stormers,but after mid-day on April 14, finding themselves entirely cut off, they foughttheir way out, leaving the Square round the Church and Mairie piled withcorpses. The town was now entirely German, with results already described uponthe northern section of the outflanked line. Once more the Worcesters, theheroes of the old Gheluvelt battle, had placed fresh laurels upon their fadedand battle-stained colours. The remains of the 100th Brigade were nowreassembled on the Ravelsberg ridge, west of Neuve Église, where theyfaced their enemy once more. So worn was it that the survivors of the Riflesand of the Highlanders were clubbed together to form one very weak compositebattalion. On their right now was a collection of odds-and-ends under GeneralWyatt about a thousand strong, while on their left was the 103rd Brigade of theThirty-fourth Division, in support.
This latter brigade had aided in the defence of Neuve Église, anddone very severe service, two of the battalions, the 4th Yorkshire LightInfantry and the 4th York and Lancasters, having sustained heavy losses. Duringthe two days in which the fate of the village hung in the balance thesebattalions were engaged in constant defence and counter-attack, especially onApril 13, when in one desperate sally they captured a German colonel and nearlya hundred of his men. When the village fell on April 14 the gallantYorkshiremen still held on close to it and gave no ground until they wereordered that night into reserve. The other battalion of the brigade, the 5thYork and Lancaster, had been ordered to Steenwerck, where also it had borne adistinguished part in the fight.
The Germans were now nursing their wounds and also digesting their gains, sothat there was a very welcome pause which was mainly in favour of the defence,who had good hope of reinforcement. A number of French batteries appeared asthe forerunners of relief, and helped to break up an advance upon theRavelsberg on the morning of April 16. A second attack had no better luck. Someposts were taken but were won back again with the help of the 9thNorthumberland Fusiliers of the 103rd Brigade.
April 17 saw a fresh attack which was preceded by a barrage which tore gapsin the thin line of the Highlanders. It developed into an infantry attack,which gave the enemy possession of an orchard near the line. The Highlanders,aided by some of the 6/7th Scots Fusiliers of the 177th Brigade, tried hard towin it back, but could at best only block the exits. After dark that night thebrigade was relieved by the 148th Brigade, and staggered out of the line withonly 800 men unscathed. General Baird's infantry had endured an ordeal whichexceeded what the most disciplined troops could be expected to survive: 58officers and 1424 men had fallen in their splendid defence of NeuveÉglise.
The other brigades of the Thirty-third Division had meanwhile been involvedin situations hardly less critical than those which had faced Baird's Brigadeat Neuve Église. Maitland's 98th Brigade, which found itself on April 12in the Ravelsberg area, was placed to the north of Bailleul as a support tothat place, and the narrative of its doings will be found in the subsequentaccount of the defence of Meteren.
The 19th Brigade (Mayne) of the Thirty-third Division had been detailed tocover Meteren to the west of Bailleul against the northward sweep of theGermans. At 9.40 on April 12 it was known that the enemy had got through atMerville, that their cavalry had been seen at Neuf Berquin, and by noon thatthis swiftly advancing tide was submerging Merris only three miles south ofMeteren. General Pinney, deprived of two of his brigades, had only under hishand the 19th Brigade, with the 18th Middlesex Pioneers, 11th and 222nd FieldCompanies Royal Engineers, and the 33rd British Machine-gun Corps under ColonelHutchinson, an officer who until he was gassed, was a tower of strength to thedefence. At mid-day the place was under heavy shell-fire. There is a windmillin a prominent position south of the town overlooking the dead flats ofFlanders. In and around this was stationed the 1st Queen's West Surrey. East ofthe town, facing Bailleul, was the 5th Scottish Rifles, while the 1st ScottishRifles (The Cameronians) were in reserve. The whole situation was under thedirect control of General Pinney, and he was reinforced in the course of theday by several very welcome units—9th Corps Cyclists, 22nd New ZealandEntrenching Battalion, and others. Strazeele was included in the line ofdefence, which joined up in the night with the hard-worked Twenty-ninthDivision.
The situation on April 12 in this quarter of the field was most alarming.Everything in the south seemed to be in a state of chaos, and the line was forthe moment absolutely fluid. The fall of Merville and of Estaires had beenexploited with extraordinary energy by the Germans, who were rushing on at thevery heels of the retiring and often disorganised troops, who were dead-beatafter two days and nights of constant exertion. It was all important to buildup some sort of line south of Meteren, but events were moving so fast that itwas doubtful if it could be done. It was here that the value of the newmachine-gun organisation, perfected during the winter, was brilliantlyexemplified. Colonel Hutchinson was able to throw forward the whole of his gunsto make up for the local weakness of the infantry, and he ran great risks indoing so, since he had only broken men and stragglers to man the gaps betweenhis gun positions. The crisis was such, however, that any risk had to be taken,and the 33rd Battalion of the Machine-gun Corps saved the situation. On theother hand it is not too much to say that a humble hero, Driver Sharpies, whosemotor-lorry was handy, saved the 33rd Battalion, for he not only rushed upeight guns under heavy fire, with their crews, but he brought up afterwards onhis own initiative the wire and other essentials which enabled them to holdtheir position. It was a supreme example of what can be done by one brave,clear-headed man. The German tide was flowing at a rate which was measured as1½ miles in forty minutes, but now it was to reach its limit, when itcame under the fire of these eight guns upon Windmill Hill. The advance was notonly from Merris in the south but even more along the Bailleul-Meteren road,which was crowded with their troops. By dusk the infantry of the 19th Brigadehad taken the place of the weary fragments who lined the front, and theimmediate danger of a complete rupture of the line was over.
At 5:30 A.M. on April 13 the attack upon Meteren April 13. commenced with astrong advance against the 1st Queen's at the Windmill, and gained some groundin the centre. The usual tactics of rushing up machine-guns was tried, but inspite of the mist they had very limited success. The 98th Brigade was now insupport, and the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were ordered forward tocover Meule Houck Hill on that side. At 10:30 the Queen's were again fiercelyattacked, and after changing hands three times the windmill in their positionremained with the stormers. At noon a well-knit line had been formed in frontof Meteren, with the Yorkshiremen of the 92nd Brigade in touch on the right,while their brother Yorkshiremen of the 147th Brigade were on the left, drawnrespectively from the Thirty-first and the Forty-ninth Divisions. There werecheering rumours that the First Australians and the One hundred andthirty-third French were both speeding upon their way, but the need of thepresent was very great, for the German guns were many, while there was hardlyone to aid in the defence.
At 4 P.M. the Germans were beating once more along the whole front of thedivision, but by 5:30 were back in their own line, what was left of them, muchthe worse for the venture. News came, however, that Vieux Berquin had fallen,and that Meteren was to be taken next day at all costs. Meanwhile, in spite ofthe severe fighting, the losses had not been heavy, save in the 1st Queen's,which had borne all the brunt of three separate attacks. Colonel Kemp-Welch andhis men had a very severe ordeal that day. Cavalry appeared more than once infront of the position, and one body, 200 strong, were cut to pieces by a suddenconcentration of machine-guns. The splendid machine- guns still played aprominent part in the battle. One of them having been submerged by a rush ofthe enemy. Corporal Hurd returned single-handed, advancing 200 yards beyond theline, and brought it back upon his shoulder. At one time the supplies of beltsran short, but they were brought up in most dashing fashion. "At noon," says anofficer, "the fighting limbers with belt-boxes, barrels, and S.A.A. weregalloped through a hail of shell to our gun positions in a style reminiscent ofthe Royal Horse Artillery upon an Aldershot field-day." The result was great."Gunners and gun-commanders report having piled the dead enemy before theirguns."
Shortly after dawn on April 14 the 1st Queen's was in the wars once more,and from six to eight there were constant attacks along the whole line fromStrazeele on the right to Bailleul Station on the left, the latter forming thefront of the Thirty-fourth Division. The 1st Cameronians, those sterndescendants of the Covenanters, beat the enemy away from Strazeele about noon.At one time there were renewed attacks upon both the Queen's and theCameronians. It is difficult to know which was the more admirable, theperseverance of the attacks or the tenacity of the defence. About five in theevening another fierce wave of storm-troops swept up from the south; and forone critical moment found a gap in the line. Two companies of the stalwartlabourers of the 2nd New Zealand Entrenching Battalion threw themselves intothe breach, and the position was restored. When night fell, the whole line,though shaken, was still intact, and the assault had been a complete and acostly failure. Such operations, which littered the fields of Flanders withtheir dead, go far to explain the German weakness in the latter part of thiscampaign of 1918.
April 15 was quiet in the morning on the front April i5. of Meteren, but theafternoon proved to be disastrous at Bailleul, since Ravelsberg and Mont deLille were stormed by the Germans, with the result that the town had to bevacated. The Thirty-fourth Division had been withdrawn from this position, andthe Fifty-ninth North Midlanders (Romer) had taken their place, but thisdivision had, as already described, suffered extraordinary losses on the Sommefront, and was in no condition to undertake another considerable operation. Ithad already been partly engaged in Flanders, and its losses had beenincreased.
Under these conditions it is not surprising that the determined assault ofthe Germans should have forced the line. It would appear upon the map that thisGerman success entirely outflanked the position of the Thirty-third Division,but fortunately a switch line had been constructed which was now manned by theremains of the Thirty-fourth Division, while the Fifty-ninth passed through itand concentrated in the rear. In this way an extension of the German successwas prevented, in spite of great energy upon the part of the enemy, who had hispatrols a kilometre to the west of the town before night. The 98th Brigade hadnow taken the place of the 19th in the line, the 4th King's Liverpoolsrelieving the Queen's at the Windmill, while the 5th Scottish Rifles relievedthe Cameronians near Strazeele.
In the efforts to stop the German advance from Bailleul the 147th Brigade ofCameron's Forty-ninth Yorkshire Division played an important part. This unit,containing the 4th, 6th, and 7th Battalions of the West Riding Regiment foundthemselves in the front line on the evening of April 15, and held hard to adefensive position north-west of Bailleul. For two more days, April 16 and 17,they maintained the fight, inflicting and receiving heavy losses, but with thebalance well in their favour. The dour Yorkshiremen made it clear at last totheir equally dour assailants, that there was no road through their ranks,however they might thin them.
In the early morning of April 16 the enemy by a very sudden and violentattack broke through the switch line and made a lodgment in the easternoutskirts of Meteren. In spite of determined counter-attacks made during themorning by the 1st Middlesex, the 4th King's, and the gallant New ZealandTrench Battalion, it was not possible to clear these houses to which the enemys machine-gun parties clung with great bravery. Evening found them still inpossession, but all efforts to debouch to the north and west had been stopped.The Australians were coming up on the right, so that the Thirty-third were ableto shorten their line.
One farm west of Meteren was penetrated by a pushful party of Germans, butthey were beaten out of it and destroyed by the 11th Field Company of sappers,who took a number of prisoners.
On April 17 the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had come into theline, relieving the 18th Middlesex Pioneers. About 10 A.M. this battalion wasviolently attacked, but drove back its assailants, as did the Thirty-fourthDivision on the left at about the same hour. At six in the evening another verysevere attack developed upon the front of the 4th King's. For a time the lineappeared to be penetrated, but the 1st Middlesex and units of the One hundredand thirty-third French Division, which had newly arrived, made a briskcounter-attack, and the situation was completely restored. It must indeed havebeen discomposing to the enemy to find that each success which he won, whetherit was the taking of Neuve Église, of Bailleul, or later of MountKemmel, instead of being an opening which led to victory, was . only a passageto further trials and further losses in an unending vista. The edge of theattack had now been completely blunted in this quarter. April 18 was quiet, andon the 19th, as the Australians and French were up, arrangements were made fordrawing the Thirty-third out of the line which they had so splendidly madegood. Their losses in the six days amounted to 145 officers and 3302 men. A fewdays later Monsieur Clemenceau arrived to convey to General Pinney and hisbattle-worn men the thanks of the French Republic for their iron defence of anessential line.
The Thirty-fourth Division was last mentioned in this narrative when it fellback from Nieppe on April 12, and was afterwards compelled to take position onthe right of the Twenty-fifth Division in the De Seule neighbourhood. Amongother losses during the retreat was a tried soldier, General Gore of the 101stBrigade.
On the 13th the enemy made several tentative attacks, but had no success.Late in the afternoon, however, he had succeeded in penetrating the line of theTwenty-fifth Division between Neuve Église and De Seule. This successleft the left flank of the Thirty-fourth in the air. The 103rd Brigade hadmoved to the Ravelsberg Ridge, however, and so gave a definite line upon whichto withdraw, extending from Bailleul Station to Crucifix Corner, which was avery important position. The 103rd Brigade was now on the left of the line, andthe 102nd on the right. There followed, on April 15, a day of very severefighting, the enemy making continual and very fiery attacks along the wholeline, especially upon the three points. Steam Mill, Mont de Lille, and CrucifixCorner. The latter was carried by the enemy and then was retaken by the 9thNorthumberland Fusiliers. Mont de Lille was held by the 74th Brigade, and SteamMill by the 147th, each the centre of a very deadly combat. Steam Mill was lostand yet again retaken by the Yorkshire Territorials who were aided by the 1stMiddlesex from the Thirty-third Division. It was a long and arduous day ofbattle, inexpressibly trying to the wearied troops engaged. General Nicholsonhad under his hand six brigades that day, and senior officers upon the spothave testified to the masterly use which he made of them.
That night the Fifty-ninth came up into the front line and relieved theexhausted infantry. The relief, however, was but a momentary one, for on theafternoon of April 15 the Germans delivered yet another strong attack upon theRavelsberg line, now held by the Forty-ninth, Fifty-ninth, and Thirty-thirdDivisions. The Fifty-ninth, as already described, fell back through theThirty-fourth Division, which again found itself in the front line. The twoflank divisions both fell back to conform, and lined up with the remains of theThirty-fourth on the new line near St. Jans Cappel, which held firm from April16.
On April 17 there was yet another day of heavy fighting upon this line, bothflanks and the Meule Hook being strongly attacked, but the position wassuccessfully held, and one more limit seemed to have been reached in theadvance. The same six brigades under General Nicholson, reduced now to thestrength of battalions, were still throwing an iron, bar across the Germanpath. From the right the 147th, 74th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, and 88th, all ofthem with set teeth, held on to the appointed line which receded under pressureand was yet again re-established. The 88th, under that remarkable youngsoldier, General Freyberg, had some especially hard work to do. Late on April20 this goodly fellowship in arms was dissolved, the three separate brigadesreturned to heir divisions, and the Thirty-fourth was relieved by the French.The artillery of the Thirty-eighth Area. Welsh Division fought throughout theseawful days onwards, at the back of the infantry, who could not say too much forthese guns or for General Topping who commanded them. Save two howitzers hit onApril 9, no gun of this division was lost during all this close and severefighting. South of the Lys many of the Royal Army Medical Corps remained withtheir wounded, and were taken prisoners, sharing with their charges thewretched treatment which was still meted out to British captives, especiallybehind the lines and before reaching the camps in Germany.
It should be added that the sappers of the 207th, 208th, 209th FieldCompanies and the 18th Northumberland Fusiliers Pioneers fought like ordinaryinfantry, and did splendid and essential service in holding the line.
We shall now turn to Jeffreys' Nineteenth Division which we left on the 12thof April, holding on to the Wulverghem—Wytschaete front, with formidableenemies in front of them, but an even more formidable menace upon their rightflank, whence came constant rumours that the enemy had at last penetrated thehard-pressed Twenty-fifth Division, had occupied Neuve Église, and waspushing up along the lines of the northward roads which would turn the whole ofthe position. Late at night on April 12 it had been ascertained that thesereports were premature.
The units of the 108th Ulster Brigade on the right of the line andconnecting with the Twenty-fifth Division had been penetrated and driven back,but were strengthened and stayed by the advent of the 8th Gloucesters. Thesituation was obscure on the right, and there was a dangerous gap which wasfilled early in the morning of April 13 by the energy and initiative of CaptainMacintosh of the 94th Field Company Royal Engineers, who with a handful of the10th Worcesters pushed his way in, and showed a bold front to the enemy.
The 2/5th Sherwood Foresters from the 178th Brigade (Stansfeld) of theFifty-ninth North Midland Division had also been ordered to face south and withthe help of some machine-guns to hold off the turning movement from thatquarter. All these movements were carried out in pitch darkness and amid asituation so confused that it was impossible to define which was the attackingline and which the line of defence. The general scheme of the battle in thisarea on the morning of April 13 was that the Twenty-fifth Division, with thehelp of the 148th Brigade of Yorkshire Territorials, was fighting desperatelyin and around Neuve Église to the north of those units of the 100thBrigade, whose defence of the town has already been described. Next to them onthe north lay the remains of the 108th Brigade, then the battalion of SherwoodForesters, and then the 57th Brigade with the 8th Gloucesters on the southernflank. All the morning the roar of battle rose from Neuve Église wherethe German stormers fought hand to hand with the British infantry, who had beenstrengthened by the addition of that fine battalion, the 4th Shropshires fromthe Nineteenth Division. The contest swung and swayed as fresh German troopswere thrown into the struggle, but at last about half-past ten in the morningthe attack was defeated, the German infantry fell back in sullen groups underthe constant fire of the defenders, and the British line was pushed forward tothe south of the village.
During the day, which was spent under heavy fire of artillery and theimminent menace of attack from the grey clouds seen gathering upon the MessinesRidge, the remaining battalions of the 178th Brigade, the 2/6th and the 7thSherwood Foresters, were pushed into the line to relieve the exhausted 108thBrigade. It was clear that great German concentrations were being made uponNeuve Église, and that the village was in danger, so every arrangementwas made to accommodate the line to the situation which would arise if thatimportant point were taken, and the Wulverghem position became in consequenceuntenable. This new line would run from Meteren through Kemmel and Spy Farm toSpanbrockmolen. The night of April 13 would have been quiet upon the front ofthe Nineteenth Division had it not been for the constant pre-occupation andalarm caused by the varying fortunes of the fighting at Neuve Église, inwhich they were well aware that their own fate was concerned. The attack hadbeen renewed with fresh forces, and the Twenty-fifth Division was extremelyexhausted and could only be helped by other units which were in no better case.Again and again the Germans were deep in the village. Again and again they wereevicted. It seemed to be the beginning of the end, however, when it wasannounced towards morning that the Twenty-fifth Division was out of touch withthe British troops upon its south flank, and that the Germans filtering throughthis gap had got to Nordhoek, west of Neuve Èglise, and were pushing tothe north in the rear of the British position. By morning of April 14 NeuveÉglise had been abandoned, though it does not appear to have beensolidly occupied by the enemy until mid-day, and snipers of both armiesinfested the ruins.
The loss of the village and of the low ridge which adjoined it had a mostsinister effect upon the general strategic position to the north, and it wasindeed fortunate that measures had been taken in advance to deal with the newsituation. The Nineteenth Division on April 14 found itself shelled heavily allday, while it was machine-gunned and trench-mortared from the right where itsflank was now in the air. The position of the right-hand unit, the 4thShropshires, south of the Neuve Église-Wulverghem road, becameimpossible, as the Germans were in the rear, and indeed upon three sides ofthem.
Major Wingrove stuck to his position till mid-day, and no battalion couldhave given a more cogent example of steadiness and fortitude in adversity.About 2 P.M. the Germans began to emerge in force from the villages, beating upagainst the gallant Shropshires, who retired slowly and steadily, taking tollof their assailants, while the Sherwood Foresters of the 178th Brigade helpedthem to hold the enemy at arm's length.
As the day wore on the pressure became more insistent, until about seven inthe evening Major Wingrove, of whom it has been stated by his General that "histenacity, gallantry, and determination had held the much-tried and isolatedline up to this time," was severely wounded. When his inspiring presence wasremoved there was a break to the north of Neuve Église and theTwenty-fifth Division, now reduced to a handful, were retreating westwards,while the Nineteenth was being rolled up from the south.
General Jeffreys' force was now in so dangerous a position that it hadactually to form a front to the west as well as to the east, a difficultmanoeuvre which was carried out with great coolness and skill by Colonel Soleof the 10th Worcesters, who was in charge of the new line, aided by MajorParkes of the 8th Gloucesters. The men were rallied, led into their newpositions, and a dangerous penetration was narrowly averted. Later a new linewas built up with the Forty-ninth Yorkshire Territorial Division in the placeof the Twenty-fifth Division on the right, reinforced by the 71st Brigade fromthe Sixth Division. Next to them on the left was the 178th Sherwood ForestersBrigade, then the 108th Brigade, and finally the 58th Brigade, standing, justin their old positions. The changes in the British line were such that whereasit used to face east, it now faced almost south from near Meteren to Kemmel andSpanbrockmolen. The latter marked the point of junction upon the left with theright of the Ninth Division. This line was not fully occupied till April16.
On April 15 the intermediate positions were attacked, the 9th WelshFusiliers, on the extreme left of the line, and the remains of the 6thWiltshires being heavily engaged. No impression was made. At a different pointthe Germans had better results to show with the 108th Brigade, and made someprogress, but the Sherwood Foresters once more mended the line. In the eveningit was reported that the enemy had taken Crucifix Corner and were movingwestwards. The strength of all battalions had now fallen to such a point, owingto constant shelling and incessant attacks, that it was very difficult to formmore than a line of outposts. By evening of April 15 all the troops concerned,the remains of the Twenty-fifth, the Forty-ninth, and the Nineteenth Divisionswere on the general line Meteren—Kemmel, facing south to the Germanadvance, but also threatening the German right flank if they should press toofar to the west. The remnant of the 108th Ulsters was relieved that night.
A heavy attack was made at 6 A.M. on the morning of April 16 upon the frontof the Ninth Division, which had withdrawn in conformity with the new northernline. The 62nd Brigade of the Twenty-first Division had, as already stated,been put under the orders of General Tudor of the Ninth Division, for his unithad been greatly weakened by the terrible losses of the South Africans. TheNorth Countrymen of the 62nd fought desperately against great odds, but theywere pushed out of Spanbrockmolen, and later out of Wytschaete.
They found a new line to the north, however, and the Germans tried in vainto bend it. The 58th Brigade had thrown back its own line to correspond, andjoined up with the 62nd at Lacache Farm. Late that evening the worn and wearytroops were deeply comforted by the sight of a small group of blue-clad menwith classical helmets surveying the German lines through their glasses. It wasthe vanguard and the observers of the Twenty-eighth and One hundred andthirty-third French Divisions which were coming up to the aid of the Ninth. Itwas clear that the commanding position of Kemmel, a hill which overlooks a widerange of country, was the immediate objective of the enemy in this quarter.About 10 A.M. on April 17 they put down a heavy barrage, and then pushed on inforce with the intention of breaking in the British line and capturing thehill. The battalions attacked were the three Sherwood Foresters units, with the8th North Staffords and 10th Warwicks of the 57th Brigade. This attack was acomplete failure. Weary as they were the sturdy Englishmen stood fast to theirlines, and beat their assailants back in blood and ruin. Machine-gun fire fromthe crest of the hill contributed to the result, and the guns also did theirshare. The only German gain was a post called Donegal Farm between theNineteenth and the Forty-ninth Divisions. A fresh attack was made upon the 10thWarwicks in the evening, but this also was thrown back with heavy loss.
Meanwhile, on the northern sector, the Ninth Division endeavoured to regainthe ground which they had lost the day before, but their efforts had no greatsuccess, save that the 7th Seaforths of the 26th Brigade in a very brilliantadvance fought their way into Wytschaete once more, and took possession of thevillage which they held until the following day, when the general positionforced them to abandon it. On April 18 the fighting died down upon this front,and in the evening the gallant Nineteenth Division, after most gloriousservice, was relieved by the French Twenty-eighth Division, which took over thedefence of Kemmel Hill. The total losses of this division had been nearly 4000men, which, coming on the top of the heavy losses on the Somme in the previousfortnight, formed such a record as had seldom been equalled. Nor was theirordeal yet at an end, and many a stout battle was still to be fought before arest should come.
All these stirring episodes, including the glorious destruction of the 4thBrigade of Guards, the formation of a permanent line by the Australians, thedefence of Meteren and Bailleul by the Thirty-third and other divisions, thefighting at Neuve Église, and the defence of the Wytschaete and Messinesfronts by the Nineteenth and Ninth Divisions with odd brigades to help them,all came within the area of Plumer's Second Army, which still consisted of theNinth and Fifteenth Corps in the line. It should be mentioned that of fourteendivisions contained in this army on March 21 no less than twelve had been sentdown to the Somme, while the remaining two, the Forty-ninth and Twenty-ninth,were under orders to go at the moment when the great battle in Flanders brokeout.
We shall now for a moment turn to the left flank of the First Army in thesouth which had so far, in spite of heavy attacks, lost very little ground. Ithas already been described how the Fifty-fifth Lancashire Division stood like arock at Givenchy and Festubert, while the Fifty-first and afterwards the FourthDivision struggled desperately to hold back the attack on their left. Theformer had been relieved on April 16 by Strickland's First Division, while theHighlanders and April le. Fourth Division also had been drawn out, and gaveplace to Deverell's Third Division, which had done so splendidly and lost soheavily upon the Somme. After the repulse from the Fifty-fifth Division, theGermans had contented themselves with shelling but they had pushed on, asalready narrated, to the north of the position, and had got as far as Locon.The result was that the First Southern Division had a long frontage which faceddue north and a shorter frontage to the east.
The Fourth Division held the front at this period to the east of Robecq,being on the right of the Sixty-first, with the 184th Brigade between them. Itwas used on April 14 for a counter-attack which was carried out at night, andwhich achieved a local success by the recapture of the village of Riez, with150 prisoners. This operation was carried out by the 11th Brigade, with the 1stHants and 1st Somersets in the lead, and was a very workmanlike little actionwhich was the more valuable when coming at a period of general recoil.
On April 18 the new German attack upon the First Division at Givenchy began,with a bombardment of great violence. Their plan upon this day was to carryGivenchy and Festubert by storm, and to win the line of the canal as far westas Gorre. They would then capture the high ground at Hinges, and so command thecanal right up to Robecq. No doubt they calculated, and with justice, that ifthey could overcome the men on the spot they would find that the reserves hadall been drawn away to the north. Their plan was wrecked, however, by the factthat the men on the spot were not to be overcome. Eighteen German battalionsmoved forward to the attack, and all of them suffered, heavily without gainingany appreciable advantage. So heavy was the slaughter that many Germancompanies were reduced before evening to twenty or thirty effectives, while thethree battalions of one regiment were left under the respective command of onelieutenant and two sub-lieutenants. There have been few more costly failures,considering the scale of the operations, in the whole campaign.
The infantry attack was on the two flanks of the British line which lookednorthwards, the one attack being in front of Hinges and the other covering thespace from Loisne to the south of Givenchy, including Festubert. Three Germanregiments, the 98th, 361st, and 202nd Reserve, advanced in this quarter. Theyhad constructed two bridges during the night to cross a broad ditch in front ofthe British line, but machine-guns were trained upon them, and the troops whichtried to cross were exposed to heavy losses, which left both the bridges andthe banks heaped with bodies. The mist, the smoke, and the dust from the shellswere so thick, however, that a hundred yards was the limit of visibility. TheGerman shell-storm continued to be very heavy, but the British were snuglyensconced in trenches with a parapet and parados, both of which were severalfeet thick, so that no very great harm was done. The worst losses were at theadvanced keep at Festubert, which was blown to bits, only eight men of thegarrison surviving.
Defence of Givenchy by the First Division, April 18,1918.
(This rough plan was drawn by an officer engaged in the action.)
The First Division had two brigades in the line, the 1st on the rightholding from Givenchy to Le Plantin, and the 3rd to the left from Le Plantin toFestubert. The fighting was particularly severe in the latter sector of theline. As the garrison looked north they saw through the rising mist about 8:15in the morning the enemy advancing in small groups of light machine-guns,coming over a slight rise some 900 yards east of Festubert. These troops pushedbravely on, though they had no cover but shell-holes and they suffered veryseverely. The 1st Gloucesters, under Colonel Tweedie, on the right and the 1stSouth Wales Borderers on the left, battalions with the halo of the first Ypresbattle round their heads, held the line and littered the open ground with theirsteady rifle-fire. There was a gap in the defences at a point called WillowRoad, and into this the enemy poured more quickly than they could be shotdown.
Their rush carried them through, and into the houses and gardens of LePlantin. A company of the Gloucesters under Captain Handford was cut in two,but both sections stood fast, Lieutenant Hall on one side, end the companycommander on the other, closing in on the centre and preventing reinforcement,while Lieutenant Gosling attacked with the reserve company. The Germans ranfield-guns right up, but the crews were shot down. So matters remained untilthe afternoon, the stormers being in the British position, but so pinned downby rifle-fire that they could not raise their heads. On the other hand, Germansnipers in the houses and trees were very deadly to any runners or otherexposed defenders. Whilst matters were in this stage in the Le Plantin area,they were even more critical at Festubert. The enemy, moving up behind a goodbarrage, overran a part of the South Wales Borderers and forced their way intoan orchard just south of the keep known as Route A. Thence they tried to getinto the rear of the defence. About eleven Sergeant-Major Biddle of D Companyran the gauntlet to Brigade Headquarters to explain the situation and ask forhelp. Captain Smith got together a party of odds and ends, under twenty innumber, who made their way up the west side of Festubert and prevented theextension of this dangerous German movement.
By two o'clock the attack was definitely defeated, and by three the Germanswere retiring along the whole line. They found it, however, very difficult todisengage themselves from their advance positions. They tried to crawl backfrom shell-hole to shell-hole, while the British stood up all along theparapets and shot them in scores. Absolutely demoralised, many of the Germansthrew away their arms. Their retirement probably cost as much as their advance.Those who had got into Le Plantin had to run the gauntlet between two halves ofthe Gloucesters in getting out, and few of them escaped. The performance of the1st Gloucesters was remarkable, for they were at one time attacked front,flank, and rear by a force estimated at four battalions. It is recorded thatthe barrels of their new Lewis guns were worn smooth by the intensity of oneday of battle. The 1st Brigade on the right of the defence from the canal to LePlantin was also heavily attacked, though their ordeal was not so long orsevere as that of their comrades on the left. The 1st Black Watch, the flankbattalion next to the Gloucesters, had some especially heavy fighting, but kepttheir ground intact, and did their full share towards the victorious result.The whole affair was a fine feat of arms, for the German gun power had greatlyincreased since April 9, while the repulse was even more decisive. It proved tobe a final one, as the Germans made no further attempt to force their passageto Bethune. During all this long fight the Third Division beyond Loisne on theleft was holding the line firmly against all German pressure. So ended April18. Before the evening of the 20th all outlying posts had been cleared of theGermans. On this same date, April 18, there was a sharp action to the immediateleft of this Givenchy fighting, when the Fourth Division held up a Germanattack, and afterwards countered, capturing the Bois Paquan in the Robecqsector. Two hundred prisoners were the fruits of this action, but they weredearly bought, for many officers and men were killed or wounded. Among theformer were two grand soldiers. Colonel Armitage of the 1st Hants andBrigade-Major Harston of the 11th Brigade. This forward movement was continuedlater by the Sixty-first Division, who did very good work on April 23, GeneralPagan of the 184th Brigade being a leader in the advance, which was notable fora fine attack by the 2/5th Gloucesters under Colonel Lawson. Shortly afterwardsGeneral Colin Mackenzie of this division, who had done splendid work from thefirst days of the war, was wounded while reconnoitring in front of his line andhad to return to England.
There now followed a short pause in the German attack, and we may lookaround and follow the general line of the defence at this period before theaction was renewed. On the extreme north of the Second Army the Belgians hadrelieved the Thirtieth Division, and thus shortened the British line. Then camethe Ninth and Twenty-first British Divisions near Wytschaete. South and west ofthis point the front line had been taken over by General de Mitry with theThirty-sixth French Corps, which now succeeded the Ninth British Corps in thissector. The Thirty-fourth and One hundred and thirty-third French Divisionswere in the line, with the Second French Cavalry Corps in co-operation. Thismost welcome and indeed vital reinforcement had taken over Kemmel, Mont Rouge,Mont Noir, Mont Vidaigne, and Mont des Cats, the range of kopjes which screenthe Ypres plain from the south. On the right of the French was the wearyFifteenth Corps, with the First Australian Division as the flank unit nearMeteren. The British divisions in the north were in close support to theFrench, the Nineteenth and Thirty-fourth being near Poperinghe, and theTwenty-fifth behind Kemmel. Such was the general position in that northernsector, to which the battle was now more and more confined. Before followingthe further events it should be mentioned that on April 17 the Belgians in theneighbourhood of Bixschoote had been exposed to a very severe attack from fourGerman divisions, which would have shaken the whole line of defence had itsucceeded. It was met, however, with very great courage, and the Belgiansproved themselves to be valiant soldiers, well worthy to be admitted uponentirely equal terms into the battle-line of the larger nations. They foughtthe action with heroic gallantry, and gave the Germans a severe check, killingsome 2000 of them, and taking 700 prisoners with several guns. It was a notableperformance, and the more welcome in a period of such stress.
Position of the Line in Flanders, April 9
On April 25, at an early hour of the morning, the Germans made an attackupon the northern line from a point north of Bailleul to the east ofWytschaete, a distance of about ten miles. The whole of this front, save theextreme eastern portion, was held by the French, who made a very gallantresistance to as fierce an assault as the war has seen. The main Germanobjective was the very important height of Mount Kemmel, a bluff five hundredfeet high, wooded upon the sides. This was held by the Twenty-eighth FrenchDivision, who fought most gallantly, but were finally overpowered by the fourGerman divisions which were brought against it, including a division of Alpinetroops, especially trained for hill fighting.
The Allied line was pushed back along its whole front, Dranoutre and St.Eloi falling into the hands of the Germans, together with 6000 prisoners. Itwas the darkest hour of the Flemish battle, and was the more depressing as itcame after a week of equilibrium in which the tide of invasion seemed to havebeen finally dammed. The German infantry had penetrated through the joiningpoint of the French and British near Wytschaete, and at the same time throughthe French at Dranoutre, so that they were able to assail Kemmel Hill from bothsides. It had fallen by nine o'clock. The Ninth Division in the north wasforced to fall back upon the line of La Clytte, after enduring heavy losses ina combat lasting nine hours, during which they fought with their usual.tenacity, as did the 64th and 146th Brigades, who fought beside them. TheGermans, having got through the French upon the right flank, had got round tothe rear of the 27th Brigade, with the result that the 12th Royal Scots werealmost entirely destroyed, and the Scottish Borderers were also very hard hit.None the less, with the enemy in front and rear, the Lowland infantry held out,finally making their way back in orderly fashion during the night. Farthernorth the line of the 64th and the 146th Brigades was broken and the remnantsreformed in Cheapside, where their reserve battalions thickened their array.The 26th Highland Brigade threw back all attacks in front, and formed adefensive flank to the south, withdrawing at leisure and in order afterdark.
Even the Ninth Division has seldom had a harder day, or a more honourableone. On the 26th General Cameron of the Forty-ninth Division took over thissector, and the Ninth went out of the line with very special messages of thanksfrom both the British and French marshals.
Some small British units were involved in the disaster of Mount Kemmel asthey were on the hill helping in the defence. Among these were the 19thLancashire Fusiliers (Pioneers), the 456th Field Company R.E., and part of the49th Battalion Machine-gun Corps, all drawn from the Forty-ninth Division.
A determined effort was at once made to retrieve the situation, and acounter-attack upon the new German line was ordered for 3 A.M. on April 26. Itwas carried out by the Thirty-ninth French Division on the right, and by theTwenty-fifth Division (Bainbridge) on the left. The French advance was held bysevere machine-gun fire on the line of the Kemmel Brook. The British advancingfrom La Clytte had more success, but were unable to maintain the ground whichthey had won. They went forward with Griffin's 7th Brigade on the left andBethell's 74th on the right. The water was up to the men's waists as in thecold of the early morning they splashed their way across the Kemmel Brook. Itwas dismal and desperate work, but the spirit of the men, in spite of all thatthis division had endured, was still high, and they beat down all obstaclesuntil they had forced their way into the village of Kemmel, where they secured200 prisoners. Their own losses were heavy, however, including Colonel Cade ofthe 1st Wilts, Colonel Stewart of the 4th South Staffords, Colonel Reade of the10th Chesters, and several other senior officers. It was now found that theflanks of both brigades were in the air, and as the losses were increasingthrough the enfilade fire, they were ordered to withdraw. It was still early,and the morning mist Northern screened what would otherwise have been a verymurderous operation. The final line held by the Twenty-fifth Division was about1000 yards in advance of the starting-point.
It should be remembered that in this difficult and gallant night attackagainst a victorious enemy the young 19-year-old recruits, who now made up aconsiderable proportion of the decimated division, showed a very fine spiritand kept up with the veterans beside them.
Having repulsed the counter-attack of the French and of the Twenty-fifthDivision, the enemy tried with great energy to improve his advantage, and VonArmin thundered during the whole of April 26 against the Allied line, tryingespecially to drive in the northern sector at Wytschaete and Eloi. The fightingon this line was very desperate during the day, and in spite of every effortthe troops were pushed back from their forward positions. The strain fellchiefly upon the remains of the 26th Brigade of the Ninth Division, theTwenty-first Division, the 21st Brigade of the Thirtieth Division, and theThirty-ninth Division. The 21st Brigade defended the northern portion of theline, and one of the outstanding feats of the day was the defence of the OldBluff from morning to dusk by that grand battalion, the 2nd Bedfords. Farthersouth the two points called the Brasserie and the Spoil-Bank were eventuallywon by the Germans, but they were defended with great determination by units ofthe Thirty-ninth Division, the 1st Herts, the Cambridgeshires, and the Sussexbattalions. It was a day of struggle, and the most that the Allies could saywas that they had North prevented a break in their line. That night there wasanother general withdrawal along the front which brought the Allied positioninto very much the same trenches as had been occupied in the autumn of 1914.Such a result of four years' fighting might well have caused depression, andyet these brave hearts never for one instant relinquished their high hopes ofthe victory to come.
The enemy had gained a spectacular advantage at Kemmel, and high hopes wereraised in Germany that some great ulterior result would come of it, but inspite of strong efforts it was not destined that there should be any particularconsequences from their victory. Observation can be obtained from a balloon aseasily as from a hill, and the space upon the summit was so limited that theAllied guns could make it almost untenable. Strong efforts were at once made topush on upon the line Locre—La Clytte, which was held by the French. Theyrepulsed three strong attacks on April 27, and though in the evening theGermans got into Locre, they were thrown out again by our tenacious Allies.Again on the morning of April 29 the enemy attacked along the whole line fromMont Vidaigne to Zillebeke Lake. This attack was repulsed with severe loss tothe enemy, and must have gone far to convince him that he was not destined todevelop his Kemmel success. The battle involved not only the front of theThirty-sixth French Corps, but also that of the Twenty-fifth, Forty-ninth, andTwenty-first Divisions, all of which stood like a wall and beat off everyassault. These attacks extended from north of Kemmel to Voormezeele. TheTwenty-fifth Division was next to the French on the right of the line, in theBritish centre was the Forty-ninth, while on the left the Twenty-first Divisionconnected up with the Ninth, which was out of the direct line of attack.
The 75th Brigade formed the fighting line of the Twenty-fifth Division onthis day of battle. They found themselves on the western side of the KemmelBrook, while the 3rd Prussian Guards lay on the farther side and advanced tothe attack. To do this they had to pass over the smooth slope which led down tothe stream, and they fell in heaps in the attempt. They huddled for shelterbehind a group of huts, but the guns got on to them and blew them to pieces.Four distinct attacks were all equally murderous and unsuccessful. The 8thBorder Battalion was particularly conspicuous in the defence. Next to them,near Ridge Wood, were the well-tried Yorkshiremen of the Forty-ninth. For somereason the Germans at this point advanced in close formation with bayonetsfixed. Such tactics received the slating which they deserved. Both the WestRiding Battalions of the 147th Brigade and the York and Lancasters of the 148thwere in the firing-line, and they amply repaid themselves for many adistressful hour. Once for three minutes the Germans made a lodgment, but atthe end of that time a rush of bayonet-men pitchforked them out of their onlygain. The Twenty-first Division held the line above Ridge Wood and on towardsVoormezeele. Upon them came the heaviest attack of all, and the slaughterChapter of the Germans, coming on at a range of 400 yards under machine-gun andrifle-fire, was very murderous.
The Leicester Brigade did particularly well this day, and so did the worn89th Brigade of the Thirtieth Division, which had come under the orders ofGeneral Campbell of the Twenty-first Division. The German attack struck veryhard against the front of this unit near the Brasserie on theVierstraat—Ypres Road, and all three battalions, the 17th, 18th, 19thKing's Liverpools, had desperate fighting, the 17th coming in for particularlyrough treatment. It had each flank penetrated and one company surrounded, butstill managed to shake itself clear.
The Belgians were also involved in this widespread attack, and both theirlines in the north and those of the French round the Sharpenberg and Mont Rougewere held intact. This severe check, inflicted upon a force which was not lessthan twelve divisions, marked the beginning of the collapse of the great Germanoffensive in Flanders, which had now lasted for twenty days of constantbattle.
Early in May the Franco-British line still lay from Kemmel village in thesouth to Ypres in the north, taking Voormezeele upon the way. If the Germanscould succeed in bursting through here they would partly encircle Ypres, andwould probably cause an evacuation, an event which might be of no greatmilitary importance, but could not fail to have a moral and politicalrepercussion. Ypres stood like an oriflamme of war amid the ranks of theBritish Army. Here it was that in October 1914 they had said to the Germans,"Thus far and no farther!" Now in the fourth year the words still held good. Ifafter all the efforts, all the self-sacrifice, all the good blood so cheerfullyshed, it was now to pass from their hands, no consoling lectures upon strategycould soften the heavy blow which it would be to those who relaxed the gripwhich their comrades had held so firmly. Yet it was this and no less which wasat stake in these early days of May. A crushing German victory with the captureof the coast was no longer to be feared. But an important local success, whichwould reverberate through the world, was still well within their hopes andtheir power.
At the moment of this important attack the southern sector of this line washeld by the One hundred and twenty-ninth and Thirty-second French Divisions,the latter being next to the British just to the south of Vierstraat. To thenorth of the French lay the 30th Composite Brigade (Currie), which had beenformed by telescoping the remains of the Thirtieth Division into a single unit.It had two splendid though attenuated Regular battalions, the 2nd Bedfords and2nd Yorkshires in the line with the 17th King's Liverpools in immediatesupport. Still farther to the north lay Finney's well-tried Thirty-thirdDivision with the 98th Brigade (Maitland) in front. Their battle line consistedof the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,, the 4th King's Liverpools, andthe 1st Middlesex, from south to north. Farther north still from theVoormezeele region to the southern suburbs of ruined Ypres lay Marden's SixthDivision which was not involved to any great degree in the fighting.
In the centre of the position was a well-marked line of trees forming theedge of Ridge Wood. Behind the British line was the village of Dickebush withthe Dickebush Lake. These two points were the first objectives of the Germanattack, which broke with great violence at 7:30 in the morning of May 8. It waspreceded by a lavish use of mustard gas shells, a hellish device which was usedmore and more from this time forward. This poison may be kept out of lungs by amask, but cannot be kept from the body, where it raises such blisters andirritation as may prove fatal in the same fashion as a bad burn. When enoughhas been poured into any position it can be made untenable by troops, since inheavy weather it hangs about for days, and has the unpleasant property ofappearing to have vanished and yet becoming active again when exposed tomoisture. Many a battalion which has crossed a dew-moistened field within thebattle area has had reason afterwards to regret it.
Coming after so deadly a preparation the first rush of the Germans met withsuccess, and they penetrated the line, both of the Thirty-second FrenchDivision and of the 30th Composite Brigade. Their advance brought them roughlyto the south end of Dickebush Lake, whereupon the 98th Brigade threw back aflank from Ridge Wood to the lake, so as to cover themselves from a southernattack.
At seven in the evening a strong attempt was made to re-establish the line,the 19th Brigade (Mayne) being thrown into the battle. The counter-attack wasmade by the 1st Cameronians, advancing across the Hallebast-La Clytte road, butthey were in full view of the enemy whose machine-gun fire was sweeping thevery grass from the ground in front of their feet. They could not get forward,and many of them never got back. A fine advance was made, however, by thecomposite King's Liverpools with the help of some of the Bedfords. It actuallyreached the old front line, but had lost so heavily that it was unable toretain it in the face of a renewed German assault, but stuck on as near as itcould.
It should be explained that this King's Liverpool unit was really the old89th Brigade which had been worn down to such an extent that the 17th, 18th,and 19th King's were now compressed into one battalion, 750 strong. Their heavylosses upon the Somme had been greatly increased in Flanders, and includedColonel Watson, the gallant and veteran leader of the 17th Battalion. Now underColonel Rollo their sentiment was that of one of their officers who wrote, Weare still the 89th Brigade, call us what they <2ike and put us in whatdivision they please. The old spirit remains as ever." This was the unit whoseswan song is here recorded. Next day the survivors made good their line, andhanded it over intact to their relief.
To the north of this composite battalion (which was independent of the 30thDivisional Brigade already mentioned) the counter-attack was made by the 5thScottish Rifles near Dickebush Lake, and by the 2nd Argyll and SutherlandHighlanders at Ridge Wood. Both of these battalions won home and gained theirfull objectives. The great German local effort, urged by four strong divisions,the Fifty-second and Fifty-sixth in front, the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first insupport, had been held. Each of these convulsive efforts of Von Armin's tiredarmy brought the final equilibrium and ultimate retirement more close.
The fighting died down entirely in this quarter, and the Fourteenth FrenchDivision took it over from the British. Indeed this day of strenuous battle maybe said to have marked the end of the great Battle of the Lys, which had ragedever since April 9. The Germans had been fought to a standstill. They had inthe course of a month's fighting won ground, prisoners, and guns, but it ispossible in winning a battle to lose a war, and this is exactly what they hadaccomplished. An expensive and barren success had been achieved by a lavish useof their reserves, and on the day when those reserves were vitally needed, theyhad been wastefully strewn over the plains of the Somme and of Flanders. Neverhad the British Army been more severely tried than at this time when theirGeneral issued his famous "back to the wall" appeal, and never had theindividual soldier risen to a greater height. "The British Army," says anItalian observer who was present throughout the crisis, "impresses one with itsinherent moral soundness. The German," he adds, "uses almost exclusivelymachine-guns and bombs, but the Englishman loves his rifle, and knows muchbetter how to use it. He is a better marksman, he is more contemptuous ofdanger, and he is calmer, steadier, and feels himself individually superior tohis enemy. The cheerfulness of the men is due in great measure to the noble,dignified, serene example of their officers, so simple in their gentlemanlybearing, so conscious of the reasons and the end of the war, so proud of theircountry and of its unshakeable prestige." It is a noble tribute, but none whoknow the men could say that it was a strained one.
No account of the battle of the Lys can close without a word as to thesplendid work done by General Plumer, never wearied, never flurried, duringthose fateful days. Hardly less arduous was the experience of General Horne inthe southern sector. The three corps commanders, too, who bore the brunt andvery especially General de Lisle, who only took over his command on the secondday of the battle, will always be associated with one of the most desperateincidents of the war. But above and behind all is the commanding and heroicfigure of Douglas Haig, impassive, serene, still working as he had worked fouryears before, at the mending of broken lines and the bracing of weak ones,until the hour should strike for his tremendous revenge.
The rest cure of the Aisne—Attack upon the FiftiethDivision—Upon the Twenty-first— Fifth Battery R.F.A.—GloriousDevons—Adventure of General Rees—Retreat across theAisne—Over the Vesle—Arrival of Nineteenth Division—Desperatefighting—Success of 4th Shropshires—General Pelle'stribute—General prospect of the Allies midway through 1918
IT had been determined to rest four of the crippled Britishdivisions which had been heavily engaged first on the Somme and then in thebattle of the Lys. These divisions were the Twenty-fifth (Bainbridge),Twenty-first (Campbell), Eighth (Heneker), and Fiftieth (Jackson), all formingthe Ninth Corps (Hamilton-Gordon). Each of them had been cut to pieces twice inthe course of little more than a month, and should by every pre-war precepthave been incapable of exertion for a long time to come. They werereconstituted with numbers of recruits under fresh officers, both leaders andmen with slight experience of actual warfare. They were then sent, via theoutskirts of Paris, the direct route being under fire from the German guns infront of Amiens, and they were thrust into the French line just north of theAisne in the region of the Chemin des Dames. The intention was to give themrepose, but the change was looked upon with misgiving by the divisionalgenerals, one of whom wrote to the present chronicler at the time saying, "Theythink it will be a rest cure, but to my mind it is more likely to be a freshcentre of storm.
As a matter of fact the Germans, who had now made two colossal thrusts, theone on March 21 on the Somme, the other at the Lys on April 9, were planning athird desperate attack at this very point. The competent military historian ofthe future with all the records before him will no doubt be able to pronouncehow far it was wise for the German high command to leave two unfinished tasksin order to undertake a third one. On the face of it, it seemed an unlikelything to do, and that perhaps is why they did it. The line at this position hadfew natural advantages and was not strongly held. In the opinion of Britishgenerals it would have been wise if it could have been drawn south of theAisne, since a broad river is a good friend in one's front, but a treacherousenemy in one's rear. There were reasons, however, why it was not easy for theFrench to abandon the north bank, for they had spent much time, labour, andhuman life in capturing Craonne, the California Plateau, and other positionswithin that area, and it was a dreadful thing to give them up unless they werebeaten out of them. They held on, therefore—and the British divisions,now acting as part of the French army, were compelled to hold on as well. TheFiftieth Northern Territorial Division had a frontage of 7000 yards from nearCraonne to Ville-aux-Bois, including the famous California Plateau; on theirimmediate right was the Regular Eighth Division, and to the right of that inthe Berry-au-Bac sector, where the lines cross the Aisne, was the Twenty-firstDivision, this British contingent forming the Ninth Corps, and having Frenchtroops upon either side of them. The Twenty-fifth Division was in reserve atFismes to the south of the river. The total attack from Crecy-au-Mont to Berrywas about thirty miles, a quarter of which—the eastern quarter—washeld by the British.
Confining our attention to the experience of the British troops, which isthe theme of these volumes, we shall take the northern unit and follow itsfortunes on the first day with some detail, remarking in advance that thedifficulties and the results were much the same in. the case of each of thethree front divisions, so that a fuller account of one may justify a morecondensed one of the others. The position along the whole line consisted ofrolling grass plains where the white gashes in the chalk showed out the systemsof defence. The Germans, on the other hand, were shrouded to some extent inwoodland, which aided them in the concentration of their troops. The defencesof the British were of course inherited, not made, but possessed some elementsof strength, especially in the profusion of the barbed wire. On the other hand,there were more trenches than could possibly be occupied, which is a seriousdanger when the enemy comes to close grips. The main position ran about 5000yards north of the Aisne, and was divided into an outpost line, a main line ofbattle, and a weak system of supports. The artillery was not strong, consistingof the divisional guns with some backing of French 75's and heavies.
The Fiftieth Division, like the others, had all three brigades in the line.To the north the 150th Brigade (Rees) defended Craonne and the slab-sidedCalifornia Plateau. On their right, stretching across a flat treeless plain,lay the 151st Brigade (Martin). To the right of them again was the 149thBrigade (Riddell), which joined on near Ville-aux-Bois to the 24th Brigade(Grogan) of the Eighth Division. It may give some idea of the severity withwhich the storm broke upon the Fiftieth Division, when it is stated that of thethree brigadiers mentioned one was killed, one was desperately wounded, and athird was taken before ten o'clock on the first morning of the attack.
The German onslaught, though very cleverly carried out, was not a completesurprise, for the experienced soldiers in the British lines, having already hadtwo experiences of the new methods, saw many danger signals in the week beforethe battle. There was abnormal aircraft activity, abnormal efforts also toblind our own air service, occasional registering of guns upon wire, andsuspicious movements on the roads. Finally with the capture of prisoners in araid the suspicions became certainties, especially when on the evening of May26 the Germans were seen pouring down to their front lines. No help arrived,however, for none seems to have been immediately available. The thin line facedits doom with a courage which was already tinged with despair. Each Britishbrigade brought its reserve battalion to the north bank of the Aisne, and eachfront division had the call upon one brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division.Otherwise no help was in sight.
The bombardment began early in the morning of May 27, and was said by theBritish veterans to be the heaviest of the war. Such an opinion meantsomething, coming from such men. The whole area from Soissons to Rheims wassoaked with gas and shattered with high explosives, so that masks had to beworn ten kilometres behind the lines. A German officer declared that 6000 gunswere employed. Life was absolutely impossible in large areas. The wire wasblown to shreds, and the trenches levelled. The men stuck it, however, withgreat fortitude, and the counter-barrage was sufficiently good to hold up theearly attempts at an infantry advance. The experiences of the 149th InfantryBrigade may be taken as typical. The front battalion was the 4th NorthumberlandFusiliers under Colonel Gibson. Twice the enemy was driven back in his attemptto cross the shattered wire. At 4 A.M. he won his way into the line ofoutposts, and by 4:30 was heavily pressing the battle line. His tactics weregood, his courage high, and his numbers great. The 6th NorthumberlandFusiliers, under Colonel Temperley, held the main line, and with the remains ofthe 4th made a heroic resistance. At this hour the Germans had reached the mainlines both of the 151st Brigade on the left and of the 24th on the right. Aboutfive o'clock the German tanks were reported to have got through on the front ofthe Eighth Division and to be working round the rear of the 149th Brigade. Onceagain we were destined to suffer from the terror which we had ourselvesevolved. The main line was now in great confusion and breaking fast. The 5thNorthumberland Fusiliers were pushed up as the last reserve. There was deepshadow everywhere save on the California Plateau, where General Rees, with histhree Yorkshire battalions, had repulsed repeated assaults. The French line hadgone upon his left, however, and the tanks, with German infantry behind them,had swarmed round to his rear, so that in the end he and his men were alleither casualties or captives.
Colonel Gibson meanwhile had held on most tenaciously with a nucleus of hisFusiliers at a post called Centre Marceau. The telephone was still intact, andhe notified at 5:45 that he was surrounded. He beat off a succession of attackswith heavy loss to the stormers, while Temperley was also putting up a hopelessbut desperate fight. Every man available was pushed up to their help, and theywere ordered to hold on. A senior officer reporting from Brigade Headquarterssays: "I could hear Gibson's brave, firm voice say in reply to my injunctionsto fight it out, 'Very good, sir. Good-bye!'" Shortly afterwards this gallantman was shot through the head while cheering his men to a final effort.
The experience of the Durhams of the 151st had been exactly the same as thatof the Northumberlands of the 149th. Now the enemy were almost up to the lastline. The two brigadiers, Generals Martin and Riddell, together with MajorTweedy of the reserve battalion, rushed out to organise a local defence,drawing in a few scattered platoons for the purpose. As they did so they couldsee the grey figures of the Germans all round them. It was now past sixo'clock, and a clear, sunny morning. As these officers ran forward, a shellburst over them, and General Martin fell dead, while Riddell received aterrible wound in the face. In spite of this, he most heroically continued torally the men and form a centre of resistance so as to cover Pontavert as longas possible. The 5th Northumberland Fusiliers with a splendid counter-attackhad regained the position of Centre d'Evreux, and for the moment the pressurewas relieved. It was clear, however, both to General Jackson and to GeneralHeneker that both flanks were exposed, and that their general position was anacute salient far ahead of the Allied line. The Twenty-first Division was lessaffected, since it already lay astride of the river, but the French line on theleft was back before mid-day as far as Fismes, so that it was absolutelynecessary if a man were to be saved to get the remains of the two Britishdivisions across the Aisne at once. Pontavert, with its bridges over river andcanal, was in the hands of the Germans about 7 A.M., but the bridge-heads atConcevreux and other places were firmly held, and as the men got across,sometimes as small organised units, sometimes as a drove of stragglers, theywere rallied and lined up on the south bank. The field-guns had all been lostbut the heavies and machine-guns were still available to hold the new line.Some of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers were entirely cut off, but foughttheir way through the Germans, and eventually under Major Leatheart reportedthemselves at the bridges. So rapid had been the hostile advance that thedressing-stations were captured, and many of our doctors and wounded fell intothe hands of the Germans to endure the hard fate which these savages so oftenreserved for the brave but helpless men who fell into their power. It is aterrible fact which should not be forgotten, that among these torturers thenurses and the doctors held in many cases a prominent position. The 150thBrigade, under General Rees, which was defending the Craonne position, hadendured an even heavier ordeal than the others. It was. on the extreme left ofthe British line, on the right of the French 118th Regiment. This latter seemsto have been entirely destroyed or taken early in the attack.
The British brigade lay in front of Craonne upon the edge of the CaliforniaPlateau, with the 5th Yorks on the right and the 4th East Yorks on the left.The 4th Yorks were in brigade reserve in Craonelle, immediately behind thefighting line. The Germans got through the French on the left, also through agap down the Corbeny railroad on the right of the 150th and left of the 151stBrigade. Colonel Thomson of the 5th Yorks, a very brave and experienced soldierwho was said by those who knew him best to be worth half a battalion in his ownperson upon the day of battle, was in charge on the right, and hung on withtooth and claw to every inch of ground, but his little force, already greatlyweakened by the cannonade, was unable to resist the terrible onslaught of theGerman infantry. Two counter-attacks were attempted by reserve companies, buteach was swept away. The Germans were on the flank in Craonne and enfiladed theline with a machine-gun. Colonel Thomson's last words over the telephone toHeadquarters were, "Good-bye, General, I'm afraid I shall not see you again."He was killed shortly afterwards. Major Haslett of the East Yorks made anequally desperate resistance on the other flank, and finally he and a woundedsergeant-major were captured with their empty pistols in their hands. Meanwhilethe Brigade Headquarters at La Hutte were practically surrounded and under aterrible fire. General Kees endeavoured to get into touch with his onlyremaining battalion, the 4th Yorks, but they had already been overrun by theenemy. Colonel Kent, with sixteen men, had thrown himself into a house inCraonelle, and had fought until the whole party were killed or wounded. Theenemy was now several miles to the rear of the few survivors of the 150thBrigade, who endeavoured to make their way back as best they might. It givessome idea of how completely they were cut off that General Rees, after manyadventures and escapes, was finally stopped and taken by encountering the mainline of the German traffic coming down the road which he had to cross. This waslate in the day of May 27, when the enemy was well across the Aisne. It may beof interest to add that General Rees was taken before the Kaiser next morning,whom he found upon the California Plateau. The emperor behaved with courtesy tohis prisoner, though he could not refrain from delivering a monologue of theusual type upon the causes of the war and the iniquity of Great Britain infulfilling her treaty obligations. Some account must now be given of theexperiences of Heneker's Eighth Division which occupied the centre of theBritish line. This division, like the others, had been sent to the Aisne for arest cure after its terrific exertions upon the Somme. Full of raw soldiers andinexperienced officers it would have seemed to be entirely unfit for battle,but it had the two solid assets of experienced leading in the senior officersand great regimental traditions, that ever present stand-by of the BritishArmy. Young as were the troops they took General Heneker's orders literallywhen he issued the command that the posts were to be held at all costs, and, asa consequence. hardly a single battalion existed as a fighting unit after theengagement.
The British field-batteries were mostly to the north the river, and weregreatly damaged by the preliminary German fire. They were accurately located bythe enemy, and were smothered in poison and steel. So were the Gernicourtdefences, which formed an important tactical position with a permanent garrisonon the right of the division. All three brigades were in the line, the 25th onthe right, the 24th in the centre, and the 23rd on the left. The outpost linewas utterly overwhelmed in the first rush, the experience being much the sameas on March 21, for each small body of men found itself isolated, and couldonly do its best to hold its own patch of ground. Thus at 5:15 A.M. a pigeonmessage was sent, "H.Q. 2nd Berks, consisting of Colonel Griffin, CaptainClare, and staff, are surrounded. Germans threw bombs down dug-out and passedon. Appeared to approach from right rear in considerable strength. No idea whathas happened elsewhere. Holding on in hopes of relief." Their position wastypical of many similar groups along the front, marooned in the fog, and soonburied in the heart of the advancing German army. The right of the 25th Brigadehad been thrust back, but on the left the 2nd Berkshires made a desperateresistance. The whole front was intersected by a maze of abandoned trenches,and it was along these that the enemy, shrouded in the mist, first gained theirfatal footing upon the flank. The 2nd East Lancashires were brought up insupport, and a determined resistance was made by the whole brigade within themain zone of battle. The German tanks were up, however, and they proved asformidable in their hands as they have often done in our own. Theirconstruction was cumbrous and their pace slow, but they were heavily armed andvery dangerous when once in action. Eight of them, however, were destroyed bythe French anti-tank artillery. At 6:30 the 25th Brigade, in shatteredremnants, was back on the river at Gernicourt.
The attack on this front was developing from the right, so that it came uponthe 24th Brigade an hour later than upon its eastern neighbour. The 2ndNorthamptons were in front, and they were driven in, but rallied on the battlezone and made a very fine fight, until the German turning movement from thesouth-east, which crossed the Miette south of the battle zone, took the line inflank and rear. In the end hardly a man of the two battalions engaged got away,and Haig, the brigadier, with his staff, had to cut their way out at the muzzleof their revolvers, shooting many Germans who tried to intercept them. The 23rdBrigade was attacked at about the same time, and the 2nd West Yorkshiresmanaged to hold even the outpost line for a time. Then falling back on thebattle position this battalion, with the 2nd Devons and 2nd Middlesex near theBois des Buttes, beat off every attack for a long time. The fatal turningmovement threatened to cut them off entirely, but about 7:30 General Grogan,who had set his men a grand example of valour, threw out a defensive flank. Hefell back eventually across the Aisne south of Pontavert, while the enemy,following closely upon his heels, occupied that place.
Many outstanding deeds of valour are recorded in all the British divisionsduring this truly terrible experience, but two have been immortalised by theirinclusion in the orders of the day of General Berthelot, the French general incommand. The first concerned the magnificent conduct of the 5th Battery R.F.A.,which, under its commander, Captain Massey, stuck to its work while piece afterpiece was knocked out by an overwhelming shower of German shells. When all theguns were gone Captain Massey, with Lieutenants Large and Bution and a handfulof survivors, fought literally to the death with Lewis guns and rifles. One manwith a rifle, who fought his way back, and three unarmed gunners who wereordered to retire, were all who escaped to tell the heroic tale. The otherrecord was that of the 2nd Devons, who went on fighting when all resistanceround them was over, and were only anxious, under their gallant ColonelAnderson-Morshead, to sell their lives at the price of covering the retreat oftheir comrades. Their final stand was on a small hill which covered the rivercrossing, and while they remained and died themselves they entreated theirretiring comrades to hurry through their ranks. Machine-guns ringed them roundand shot them to pieces, but they fought while a cartridge was left, and thenwent down stabbing to the last. They were well avenged, however, by one post ofthe Devons which was south of the river and included many Lewis guns underMajor Cope. These men killed great numbers of Germans crossing the stream, andeventually made good their own retreat. The main body of the battalion wasdestroyed, however, and the episode was heroic. In the words of the Frenchdocument: "The whole battalion, Colonel, 38 officers, and 552 in the ranks,offered their lives in ungrudging sacrifice to the sacred cause of the Allies."A word as to the valour of the enemy would also seem to be called for. Theycame on with great fire and ardour. "The Germans seemed mad," says onespectator, "they came rushing over the ground with leaps and bounds. Theslaughter was frightful. We could not help shooting them down."
Whilst this smashing attack had been delivered upon the Fiftieth and EighthDivisions, Campbell's Twenty-first Division on the extreme right of the Britishline had also endured a hard day of battle. They covered a position from Loivreto Berry-au-Bac, and had all three brigades in action, six battalions in theline, and three in reserve. Their experience was much the same as that of theother divisions, save that they were on the edge of the storm and escaped itsfull fury. The greatest pressure in the morning was upon the 62nd Brigade onthe left, which was in close liaison with the 25th Brigade of the EighthDivision. By eight o'clock the posts at Moscou and the Massif de la Marine hadbeen overrun by the overpowering advance of the enemy. About nine o'clock the7th Brigade from the Twenty-fifth Division came up to the St. Auboeuf Woodwithin the divisional area and supported the weakening line, which had lostsome of the outer posts and was holding on staunchly to others. The Germanswere driving down upon the west and getting behind the position of theTwenty-first Division, for by one o'clock they had pushed the 1st SherwoodForesters of the Eighth Division, still fighting most manfully, out of theGernicourt Wood, so that the remains of this division with the 75th Brigadewere on a line west of Bouffignereux. This involved the whole left of theTwenty-first Division, which had to swing back the 62nd Brigade from a pointsouth of Cormicy, keeping in touch with the 7th Brigade which formed theconnecting link. At 3:20 Cormicy had been almost surrounded and the garrisondriven out, while the 64th Brigade on the extreme right was closely pressed atCauroy. At six in the evening the 7th Brigade had been driven in atBouffignereux, and the German infantry, beneath a line of balloons andaeroplanes, was swarming up the valley between Guyencourt and Chalons leVergeur, which latter village they reached about eight, thus placing themselveson the left rear of the Twenty-first Division. Night fell upon as anxious asituation as ever a harassed general and weary troops were called upon to face.The Twenty-first had lost few prisoners and only six guns during the long dayof battle, but its left had been continually turned, its position wasstrategically impossible, and its losses in casualties were- very heavy. It wasidle to deny that the army of General von Boehm had made a very brilliantattack and gained a complete victory with, in the end, such solid trophies as45,000 Allied prisoners and at least 400 guns. It was the third great blow ofthe kind within nine weeks, and Foch showed himself to be a man of iron inbeing able to face it, and not disclose those hidden resources which could notyet be used to the full advantage.
The capture of Pontavert might have been a shattering blow to the retreatingforce, but it would seem that the Germans who had pushed through so rapidlywere strong enough to hold it but not, in the first instance, strong enough toextend their operations. By the afternoon of May 27 they were over at Maizyalso, and the force at Concevreux, which consisted of the remains of theFiftieth and part of the Eighth and Twenty-fifty Divisions, was in danger ofcapture. At 2 P.M. the Germans had Muscourt. The mixed and disorganised Britishforce then fell back to near Ventclay, where they fought back once more at theGerman advance, the Fiftieth Division being in the centre, with the 75th and7th Brigades on its right. This latter brigade had been under the orders of theTwenty-first Division and had helped to hold the extreme right of the position,but was now involved in the general retreat. Already, however, news came fromthe west that the Germans had not got merely to the Aisne but to the Vesle, andthe left flank and rear of the Ninth Corps was hopelessly compromised. Undercontinuous pressure, turning ever to hold up their pursuers, the remains of thethree divisions, with hardly any artillery support, fell back to the south. Onthe western wing of the battle Soissons had fallen, and Rheims was in a mostperilous position, though by some miracle she succeeded in preserving hershattered streets and desecrated cathedral from the presence of theinvaders.
The Eighth Division had withdrawn during the night to Montigny, and, inconsequence, the Twenty-first Division took the general line, Hermonville— Montigny Ridge, the 64th Brigade on the right, with the 62nd and 7th insuccession on the left. Every position was outflanked, however, touch was lostwith the Eighth on the left, and the attack increased continually in its fury.Pronilly fell, and the orders arrived that the next line would be the RiverVesle, Jonchery marking the left of the Eighth Division. On the right theTwenty-first continued to be in close touch with the French Forty-fifthDivision. All units were by this time very intermingled, tired, anddisorganised. The 15th Durhams, who had fought a desperate rearguard action allmorning upon the ridge north of Hervelon Château, had almost ceased toexist. The one gleam of light was the rumoured approach of the One hundred andthirty-fourth French Division from the south. It had been hoped to hold theline of the River Vesle, but by the evening of May 28 it was known that theGermans had forced a passage at Jonchery, where the bridge would have beendestroyed but for the wounding of the sapper officer and the explosion of thewagon containing the charges. On the other hand, the Forty-fifth FrenchDivision on the right was fighting splendidly, and completely repulsed a heavyGerman attack. When night fell the British were still for the most part alongthe line of the Vesle, but it was clear that it was already turned upon thewest. Some idea of the truly frightful losses incurred by the troops in theseoperations may be formed from the fact that the Eighth Division alone had lost7000 men out of a total force of about 9000 infantry. About eight in themorning of May 29 the enemy renewed his attack, pushing in here and there alongthe line in search of a gap. One attempt was made upon the Twenty-firstDivision, from Branscourt to Sapicourt, which was met and defeated by the 1stLincolns and 6th Leicesters. Great activity and movement could be seen amongthe German troops north of the river, but the country is wooded and hilly, sothat observation is difficult. Towards evening, the right flank of the fightingline was greatly comforted by the arrival of the French Division alreadymentioned, and the hearts of the British were warmed by the news that one oftheir own divisions had come within the zone of battle, as will now bedescribed.
When the Ninth Corps was sent to the Aisne, another very weary Britishdivision, the Nineteenth and of the (Jeffreys), had also been told off for theFrench front with the same object of rest, and the same actual result ofdesperate service. So strenuous had the work of this division been upon theSomme and in Flanders, that the ranks were almost entirely composed of newdrafts from England and Wales. Their destination was the Chalons front, wherethey remained for exactly twelve days before the urgent summons arrived fromthe breaking line on the Aisne, and they were hurried westwards to endeavour toretrieve or at least to minimise the disaster. They arrived on the morning ofMay 29, and found things in a most critical condition. The Germans had pushedfar south of the Aisne, despite the continued resistance of the survivors ofthe Eighth, Twenty-fifth, and Fiftieth British Divisions, and of several Frenchdivisions, these debris of units being mixed up and confused, with a good dealof mutual recrimination, as is natural enough when men in overwroughtconditions meet with misfortunes, the origin of which they cannot understand.When troops are actually mixed in this fashion, the difference in languagebecomes a very serious matter. Already the Allied line had been pushed farsouth of Fismes, and the position of the units engaged was very obscure to theHigher Command, but the British line, such as it was, was north of Savigny onthe evening of May 28. Soissons had fallen, Rheims was in danger, and it wasdoubtful whether even the line of the Marne could be held. Amid much chaos itmust, indeed, have been with a sense of relief that the Allied generals found adisciplined and complete division come into the front, however young thematerial of which it was composed.
A gap had opened in the line between the Thirteenth French Division at Lheryand the One hundred and fifty-fourth near Faverolles, and into this the 57thand 58th Brigades were thrust. The artillery had not yet come up, and the restof the Allied artillery was already either lost or destroyed, so there waslittle support from the guns. It was a tough ordeal for boys fresh from theEnglish and Welsh training camps. On the left were the 10th Worcesters and 8thGloucesters. On the right the 9th Welsh Fusiliers and 9th Welsh. It was hopedto occupy Savigny and Brouillet, but both villages were found to be swarmingwith the enemy. Remains of the Eighth and Twenty-fifth Divisions were still,after three days of battle, with their faces to the foe on the right of theNineteenth Division. They were very weary, however, and the 2nd Wiltshires werebrought up to thicken the line and cover the divisional flank north ofBouleuse. This was the situation at 2 P.M. of May 29.
The tide of battle was still rolling to the south, and first Savigny andthen Faverolles were announced as being in German hands. A mixed force of oddunits had been formed and placed under General Craigie-Hackett, but this nowcame back through the ranks of the Nineteenth Division. On the right also thehard-pressed and exhausted troops in front, both French and British, passedthrough the 2nd Wiltshires, and endeavoured to reform behind them. TheNineteenth Division from flank to flank became the fighting front, and theGermans were seen pouring down in extended order from the high ground north ofLhery and of Treslon. On the right the remains of the of the Eighth Divisionhad rallied, and it was now reinforced by the 2nd Wilts, the 4th ShropshireLight Infantry, and the 8th Staffords, the latter battalions from the 56thBrigade. With this welcome addition General Heneker, who had fought such a longuphill fight, was able in the evening of May 29 to form a stable line on theBouleuse Ridge. By this time the guns of the Nineteenth Division, the 87th and88th Brigades Royal Field Artillery, had roared into action—a welcomesound to the hard-pressed infantry in front. There was a solid British line nowfrom Lhery on the left to the eastern end of the Bouleuse Ridge, save that onebattalion of Senegal Tirailleurs was sandwiched in near Faverolles. Liaison hadbeen established with the Thirteenth and One hundred and fifty-fourth FrenchDivisions to left and right.
The general positions of the British Divisions during thebattles of the Chemin des Dames and the Ardre, May 27-June 3.
The early morning of May 30 witnessed a very violent attack along all thisportion of the line. By 6 A.M. the enemy had worked round the left flank of.the 10th Worcesters at Lhery, driving before them some of the troops, Frenchand British, who were exhausted from the long battle. It is difficult foreither writer or reader to imagine the condition of men who have fought alosing battle for three days without cessation. If Foch saved up his reservesduring these weeks of agony, it was surely at a precious cost to the men whobore the weight. The left company of the 10th Worcesters lost all its officersand 60 per cent of its men, and Lhery had to be left to the enemy. Meanwhile,the Senegalese, who, like all tropical troops, are more formidable in attackthan in defence, were driven in near Faverolles, the Germans making a frontalattack in eight lines. They pushed through the gap, outflanked the 9th WelshFusiliers on the left and the 2nd Wiltshires on the right, cutting off aplatoon of the former battalion. Both these battalions suffered very heavily,the Welsh Fusiliers especially being cut to pieces. At both ends of the linethe remains of the front battalions had to fall back upon their supports. The74th Composite Brigade, already referred to as being under GeneralCraigie-Hackett, fought on the left of the Nineteenth Division, and was orderedto hold the Lhery-Rohigny road. The pressure, however, upon these tired troopsand upon the remains of the 10th Worcesters continued to be very great, and by11 A.M. the situation was critical on the left of the line, the flank havingbeen driven in, and the 8th Gloucesters enfiladed so that the D'Aulnay Woodcould no longer be held. These changes enabled the Germans to close in upon the9th Welsh and the remains of the 9th Welsh Fusiliers, attacking them in frontand flank. The troops on their right gave way, and the assailants were thenable to get round the other flank of these two devoted battalions, andpractically to surround them, so that very few won their way back. The wholefront line had gone with the exception of the 10th Warwicks on the left. For atime it seemed as if there was nothing to limit this powerful thrust of theenemy, but in the usual miraculous fashion a composite party of odds and ends,drawn from stragglers and details, hastily swept together by General Jeffreys,were hurried up to the high ground south of Ville-en-Tardenois. With the aid offour machine-guns from the Nineteenth Division this force held the victoriousenemy from coming further, covered the left flank of the 10th Warwicks, andformed a bastion from which a new wall could be built. A second bastion hadbeen made by the 5th South Wales Borderers, pioneers of the NineteenthDivision, who had dug in south of Rohigny and absolutely refused to shift. Upto 2 P.M. the 2nd Wilts also held their ground north of Bouleuse. Between thesefixed points the 57th and 58th Brigades were able to reorganise, the 15thWarwicks and 9th Cheshires covering the respective fronts. On the right theTwenty-eighth French Division had relieved the One hundred and fifty-fourth,while the 4th Shropshires and 8th North Staffords, both still intact, formed alink between the two Allies. Touch had been lost on the left, and patrols weresent out to endeavour to bridge the gap. At this period General Jeffreys of theNineteenth Division commanded the whole British line. A serious loss had beencaused by the wounding of General Glasgow, the experienced leader of the 58thBrigade. General Heath of the 56th Brigade took over the command of bothunits.
The Germans had reached their limit for the day, though some attempt at anattack was made in the afternoon from the wood of Aulnay, which was beaten backby the British fire. It was rumoured, however, that on the left, outside theBritish area, he was making progress south of Rohigny, which made GeneralJeffreys uneasy for his left wing. Up to now the British had been under thegeneral command of the Ninth British Corps, but this was now withdrawn from theline, and the Nineteenth Division passed to the Fifth French Corps underGeneral Pelle, an officer who left a most pleasant impression upon the minds ofall who had to deal with him. On May 31 the front consisted of the FrenchFortieth on the left, the French Twenty-eighth on the right, and the BritishNineteenth between them, the latter covering 12,000 yards. The weary men of theoriginal divisions were drawn out into reserve after as severe an ordeal as anyhave endured during the whole war. The 74th Composite Brigade was alsorelieved. Some idea of the losses on the day before may be gathered from thefact that the two Welsh battalions were now formed into a single compositecompany, which was added to the 9th Cheshires.
The morning of the 31st was occupied in a severe duel of artillery, in whichserious losses were sustained from the German fire, but upon the other hand athreatened attack to the south-west of Ville-en-Tardenois was dispersed by theBritish guns. About two o'clock the enemy closed once more upon the left,striking hard at the 6th Cheshires, who had been left behind in this quarterwhen the rest of the 74th Composite Brigade had been relieved. The 10thWarwicks were also attacked, and the whole wing was pushed back, the enemyentering the village of Ville-en-Tardenois. The Warwicks formed up again onhigh ground south-east of the village, the line being continued by the remainsof the 10th Worcesters and 8th Gloucesters. Whilst the left wing was driven in,the right was also fiercely attacked, the enemy swarming down in great numbersupon the French, and the 9th Cheshires. The former were driven off the AubillyRidge, and the latter had to give ground before the rush.
General Jeffreys, who was on the spot, ordered an immediate counter-attackof the 2nd Wilts to retrieve the situation. Before it could develop, however,the French were again advancing on the right, together with the 4thShropshires. A local counter-attack had also been delivered by the 9thCheshires, led on horseback with extreme gallantry by Colonel Cunninghame. Hishorse was shot under him, but he continued to lead the troops on foot, and hisCheshire infantry followed him with grim determination into their oldpositions. The ground was regained though the losses were heavy, ColonelCunninghame being among the wounded.
The attack of the 2nd Wiltshires had meanwhile been developed, and waslaunched under heavy fire about seven in the evening, moving up to the north ofChambrecy. The position was gained, the Wiltshires connecting up with theCheshires on their right and the Gloucesters on their left. Meanwhile, advancesof the enemy on the flank were broken up by artillery fire, the 87th and 88thBrigades of guns doing splendid work, and sweeping the heads of every advancefrom the Tardenois-Chambrecy road. So ended another very severe day of battle.The buffer was acting and the advance was slowing. Already its limit seemed tobe marked.
On the morning of May 31 the British position extended from a line on theleft connecting Ville-en-Tardenois and Champlat. Thence the 57th Brigadecovered the ground up to the stream which runs from Sarcy to Chambrecy. Thenthe 56th Brigade began, and carried on to 1000 yards east of the river Ardres.The line of battalions (pitiful remnants for the most part) was from the left,10th Warwicks, 10th Worcesters, 8th Gloucesters, 2nd Wilts, 9th Cheshires, 8thStaffords, and 4th Shropshires. Neither brigade could muster 1000 rifles, whilethe 58th Brigade in reserve was reduced to three sapper field companies, thepersonnel of the trench-mortar batteries, and every straggler who could bescraped up was thrust forward to thicken the line.
The German attack was launched once more at 4 P.M. on June 1, striking upagainst the Fortieth French Division and the left of the British line. Underthe weight of the assault the French were pushed back, and the enemy penetratedthe Bonval Wood, crossed the Tardenois-Jonchery road, and thrust their way intothe woods of Courmont and La Cohette. Here, however, the attack was held, andthe junction between the French and the Warwicks remained firm. The front ofthe 57th Brigade was attacked at the same time, the 8th Gloucesters and the 2ndWilts on their right being very hard pressed. The enemy had got Sarcy village,which enabled them to get on the flank of the Gloucesters, and to penetratebetween them and the Wiltshires. It was a very critical situation. The rightcompany of the Gloucesters was enfiladed and rolled up, while the centre was indeadly danger. The left flank and the Worcesters held tight, but the rest ofthe line was being driven down the hill towards Chambrecy. A splendid rally waseffected, however, by Captain Pope of B Company, who led his west countrymen upthe hill once more, driving the enemy back to his original line. For this feathe received the D.S.O. At this most critical period of the action, great helpwas given to the British by the 2nd Battalion of the 22nd French Regiment, ledin person by Commandant de Lasbourde, which joined in Pope's counter-attack,afterwards relieving the remains of the Gloucesters. Lasbourde also receivedthe D.S.O.
The success of the attack was due partly to the steadiness of the of the10th Worcesters on the left, who faced right and poured a cross-fire into theGerman stormers. It was a complete, dramatic little victory, by which the highground north of Chambrecy was completely regained. A withdrawal of the wholeline was, however, necessary on account of the German penetration into theleft, which had brought them complete possession of the Wood of Courmont on theBritish left rear. The movement was commenced at seven in the evening, and wascompleted in most excellent order before midnight. This new line, stretchingfrom Quisles to Eligny, included one very important position, the hill ofEligny, which was a prominence from which the enemy could gain observation andcommand over the whole valley of the Ardres, making all communications andbattery positions precarious. The general order of units in the line on June 2was much the same as before, the 5th South Wales Borderers being held inreserve on the left, and the 2/22nd French on the right of the NineteenthDivision. These positions were held unbroken from this date for a fortnight,when the division was eventually relieved after its most glorious term ofservice. The British Ninth Corps was busily engaged during this time inreorganising into composite battalions the worn and mixed fragments of theEighth, Twenty-fifth, and Fiftieth Divisions, which were dribbled up asoccasion served to the new battle-line. A composite machine-gun company wasalso organised and sent up.
Several days of comparative quiet followed, during which the sappers werestrengthening the new positions, and the Germans were gathering fresh forcesfor a renewed attack. Congratulatory messages from General Franchet d'Esperey,the French Army Commander, and from their own Corps General put fresh heartinto the overtaxed men. There was no fresh attack until June 6. On that datethe line of defence from the left consisted of the Fortieth French Division,the Eighth Division Composite Battalion (could a phrase mean more than that?),the 10th Warwicks, 10th Worcesters, 8th Gloucesters, 58th Brigade CompositeBattalion, 9th Cheshires, 8th North Staffords, 4th Shropshires, andTwenty-eighth French Division. At 3 A.M. there began a tremendous bombardment,mostly of gas-shell, which gave way to the infantry advance at 4 A.M., theattack striking the right and centre of the British line, in the section of theall-important Bligny Hill. As the enemy advanced upon the front of the 58thComposite Battalion, the men who were the survivors of the 2nd Wilts, 9th WelshFusiliers, and 9th Welsh, fired a volley, and then, in a fashion which wouldhave delighted the old Duke, sprang from their cover and charged with thebayonet, hurling the Germans down the slope. It was a complete repulse, as wasa second attack upon the front of the Gloucesters and Worcesters who, with asimilar suggestion of the legendary Peninsula tactics, waited till they couldsee their foemen's eyes before firing, with the result that the storming columnsimply vanished, flinging itself down in the long grass and hiding there tillnightfall. There was no attack on the left of the line, but the 9th Cheshiresand the North Staffords both had their share in the victory. The Twenty-eighthFrench Division on the right had given a little before the storm, and theBritish line was bent back to keep touch. Otherwise it was absolutely intact,and the whole terrain in front of it was covered with German dead.
The German is a determined fighter, however, and his generals well knew thatwithout the command of Bligny Hill no further progress was possible for him inthe general advance. Therefore they drew together all their strength andrenewed the attack at 11 A.M. with such energy and determination that theygained the summit. An immediate counter by the 9th Cheshires, though mostgallantly urged, was unable to restore the situation, but fortunately abattalion was at hand which had not lost so grievously in the previousfighting. This was the 4th Shropshires, which now charged up the hill,accompanied by the remains of the undefeated 9th Cheshires. The attack wasdelivered with magnificent dash and spirit, and it ended by the completereconquest of the hill. For this feat the 4th Shropshires received as abattalion the rare and coveted distinction of the Croix de Guerre with thepalm. This local success strengthened the hands of the French on the right, whowere able in the late afternoon to come forward and to retake the village ofBligny. June 6 was a most successful day, and gave fresh assurance that theGerman advance was spent.
There was no further close fighting in this neighbourhood up to June 19,when the young soldiers of the Nineteenth and other divisions were withdrawnafter a sustained effort which no veterans could have beaten. In the officialreport of General Pelle to his own Higher Command, there occurs the generoussentence:"L'impression produite sur le moral des troupes françaisespar la belle attitude de leurs alliés a été trèsbonne." Both Allies experienced the difficulty of harmonising troops whoact under different traditions and by different methods. At first thesehindrances were very great, but with fuller knowledge they tended to disappear,and ended in complete mutual confidence, founded upon a long experience ofloyalty and devotion to the common end.
From this date until the end of June no event of importance affecting theBritish forces occurred upon the Western front. The German attack extendedgradually in the Aisne district, until it had reached Montdidier, and itpenetrated upon the front as far south as the forest of Villers-Cotteret, whereit threatened the town of Compiègne. In the middle of June the Germanfront was within forty miles of Paris, and a great gun specially constructedfor the diabolical work was tossing huge shells at regular intervals into thecrowded city. The bursting of one of these projectiles amidst the congregationof a church on a Sunday, with an appalling result in killed and wounded, wasone of those incidents which Germans of the future will, we hope, regard withthe same horror as the rest of the world did at the time.
The cause of the Allies seemed at this hour to be at the very lowest. Theyhad received severe if glorious defeats on the Somme, in Flanders, and on theAisne. Their only success lay in putting limits to German victories. And yetwith that deep prophetic instinct which is latent in the human mind, there wasnever a moment when they felt more assured of the ultimate victory, nor whenthe language of their leaders was prouder and more firm. This generalconfidence was all the stranger, since we can see as we look back that thesituation was on the face of it most desperate, and that those factors whichwere to alter it—the genius of Foch, the strength of his and of thereserves, and the numbers and power of the American Army—were largelyconcealed from the public. In the midst of the gloom the one bright light shonefrom Italy, where, on June 17, a strong attack of the Austrians across thePiave was first held and then thrown back to the other bank. In this mosttimely victory Lord Cavan's force, which now consisted of three BritishDivisions, the Seventh, Twenty-third, and Forty-eighth, played a glorious part.So, at the close of the half year Fate's curtain rang down, to rise again uponthe most dramatic change in history.
Map to illustrate the British Campaign in France andFlanders
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