@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ class Repo:
131131git_dir :PathLike
132132"""The ``.git`` repository directory."""
133133
134+ safe :None
135+ """Whether this is operating using restricted protocol and execution access."""
136+
134137_common_dir :PathLike = ""
135138
136139# Precompiled regex
@@ -175,6 +178,7 @@ def __init__(
175178odbt :Type [LooseObjectDB ]= GitCmdObjectDB ,
176179search_parent_directories :bool = False ,
177180expand_vars :bool = True ,
181+ safe :bool = False ,
178182 )-> None :
179183R"""Create a new :class:`Repo` instance.
180184
@@ -204,6 +208,44 @@ def __init__(
204208 Please note that this was the default behaviour in older versions of
205209 GitPython, which is considered a bug though.
206210
211+ :param safe:
212+ Lock down the configuration to make it as safe as possible
213+ when working with publicly accessible, untrusted
214+ repositories. This disables all known options that can run
215+ external programs and limits networking to the HTTP protocol
216+ via ``https://`` URLs. This might not cover Git config
217+ options that were added since this was implemented, or
218+ options that have unknown exploit vectors. It is a best
219+ effort defense rather than an exhaustive protection measure.
220+
221+ In order to make this more likely to work with submodules,
222+ some attempts are made to rewrite remote URLs to ``https://``
223+ using `insteadOf` in the config. This might not work on all
224+ projects, so submodules should always use ``https://`` URLs.
225+
226+ :envvar:`GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT` is set to `false` and these
227+ environment variables are forced to `/bin/true`:
228+ :envvar:`GIT_ASKPASS`, :envvar:`GIT_EDITOR`,
229+ :envvar:`GIT_PAGER`, :envvar:`GIT_SSH`,
230+ :envvar:`GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, and :envvar:`SSH_ASKPASS`.
231+
232+ Git config options are supplied via the command line to set
233+ up key parts of safe mode.
234+
235+ - Direct options for executing external commands are set to ``/bin/true``:
236+ ``core.askpass``, ``core.sshCommand`` and ``credential.helper``.
237+
238+ - External password prompts are disabled by skipping authentication using
239+ ``http.emptyAuth=true``.
240+
241+ - Any use of an fsmonitor daemon is disabled using ``core.fsmonitor=false``.
242+
243+ - Hook scripts are disabled using ``core.hooksPath=/dev/null``.
244+
245+ It was not possible to cover all config items that might execute an external
246+ command, for example, ``receive.procReceiveRefs``,
247+ ``uploadpack.packObjectsHook`` and ``remote.<name>.vcs``.
248+
207249 :raise git.exc.InvalidGitRepositoryError:
208250
209251 :raise git.exc.NoSuchPathError:
@@ -235,6 +277,8 @@ def __init__(
235277if not os .path .exists (epath ):
236278raise NoSuchPathError (epath )
237279
280+ self .safe = safe
281+
238282# Walk up the path to find the `.git` dir.
239283curpath = epath
240284git_dir = None
@@ -309,7 +353,7 @@ def __init__(
309353# END working dir handling
310354
311355self .working_dir :PathLike = self ._working_tree_dir or self .common_dir
312- self .git = self .GitCommandWrapperType (self .working_dir )
356+ self .git = self .GitCommandWrapperType (self .working_dir , safe )
313357
314358# Special handling, in special times.
315359rootpath = osp .join (self .common_dir ,"objects" )
@@ -1305,6 +1349,7 @@ def init(
13051349mkdir :bool = True ,
13061350odbt :Type [GitCmdObjectDB ]= GitCmdObjectDB ,
13071351expand_vars :bool = True ,
1352+ safe :bool = False ,
13081353** kwargs :Any ,
13091354 )-> "Repo" :
13101355"""Initialize a git repository at the given path if specified.
@@ -1329,6 +1374,44 @@ def init(
13291374 information disclosure, allowing attackers to access the contents of
13301375 environment variables.
13311376
1377+ :param safe:
1378+ Lock down the configuration to make it as safe as possible
1379+ when working with publicly accessible, untrusted
1380+ repositories. This disables all known options that can run
1381+ external programs and limits networking to the HTTP protocol
1382+ via ``https://`` URLs. This might not cover Git config
1383+ options that were added since this was implemented, or
1384+ options that have unknown exploit vectors. It is a best
1385+ effort defense rather than an exhaustive protection measure.
1386+
1387+ In order to make this more likely to work with submodules,
1388+ some attempts are made to rewrite remote URLs to ``https://``
1389+ using `insteadOf` in the config. This might not work on all
1390+ projects, so submodules should always use ``https://`` URLs.
1391+
1392+ :envvar:`GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT` is set to `false` and these
1393+ environment variables are forced to `/bin/true`:
1394+ :envvar:`GIT_ASKPASS`, :envvar:`GIT_EDITOR`,
1395+ :envvar:`GIT_PAGER`, :envvar:`GIT_SSH`,
1396+ :envvar:`GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, and :envvar:`SSH_ASKPASS`.
1397+
1398+ Git config options are supplied via the command line to set
1399+ up key parts of safe mode.
1400+
1401+ - Direct options for executing external commands are set to ``/bin/true``:
1402+ ``core.askpass``, ``core.sshCommand`` and ``credential.helper``.
1403+
1404+ - External password prompts are disabled by skipping authentication using
1405+ ``http.emptyAuth=true``.
1406+
1407+ - Any use of an fsmonitor daemon is disabled using ``core.fsmonitor=false``.
1408+
1409+ - Hook scripts are disabled using ``core.hooksPath=/dev/null``.
1410+
1411+ It was not possible to cover all config items that might execute an external
1412+ command, for example, ``receive.procReceiveRefs``,
1413+ ``uploadpack.packObjectsHook`` and ``remote.<name>.vcs``.
1414+
13321415 :param kwargs:
13331416 Keyword arguments serving as additional options to the
13341417 :manpage:`git-init(1)` command.
@@ -1342,9 +1425,9 @@ def init(
13421425os .makedirs (path ,0o755 )
13431426
13441427# git command automatically chdir into the directory
1345- git = cls .GitCommandWrapperType (path )
1428+ git = cls .GitCommandWrapperType (path , safe )
13461429git .init (** kwargs )
1347- return cls (path ,odbt = odbt )
1430+ return cls (path ,odbt = odbt , safe = safe )
13481431
13491432@classmethod
13501433def _clone (
@@ -1357,6 +1440,7 @@ def _clone(
13571440multi_options :Optional [List [str ]]= None ,
13581441allow_unsafe_protocols :bool = False ,
13591442allow_unsafe_options :bool = False ,
1443+ safe :Union [bool ,None ]= None ,
13601444** kwargs :Any ,
13611445 )-> "Repo" :
13621446odbt = kwargs .pop ("odbt" ,odb_default_type )
@@ -1418,7 +1502,11 @@ def _clone(
14181502if not osp .isabs (path ):
14191503path = osp .join (git ._working_dir ,path )if git ._working_dir is not None else path
14201504
1421- repo = cls (path ,odbt = odbt )
1505+ # if safe is not explicitly defined, then the new Repo instance should inherit the safe value
1506+ if safe is None :
1507+ safe = git ._safe
1508+
1509+ repo = cls (path ,odbt = odbt ,safe = safe )
14221510
14231511# Retain env values that were passed to _clone().
14241512repo .git .update_environment (** git .environment ())
@@ -1501,6 +1589,7 @@ def clone_from(
15011589multi_options :Optional [List [str ]]= None ,
15021590allow_unsafe_protocols :bool = False ,
15031591allow_unsafe_options :bool = False ,
1592+ safe :bool = False ,
15041593** kwargs :Any ,
15051594 )-> "Repo" :
15061595"""Create a clone from the given URL.
@@ -1531,13 +1620,52 @@ def clone_from(
15311620 :param allow_unsafe_options:
15321621 Allow unsafe options to be used, like ``--upload-pack``.
15331622
1623+ :param safe:
1624+ Lock down the configuration to make it as safe as possible
1625+ when working with publicly accessible, untrusted
1626+ repositories. This disables all known options that can run
1627+ external programs and limits networking to the HTTP protocol
1628+ via ``https://`` URLs. This might not cover Git config
1629+ options that were added since this was implemented, or
1630+ options that have unknown exploit vectors. It is a best
1631+ effort defense rather than an exhaustive protection measure.
1632+
1633+ In order to make this more likely to work with submodules,
1634+ some attempts are made to rewrite remote URLs to ``https://``
1635+ using `insteadOf` in the config. This might not work on all
1636+ projects, so submodules should always use ``https://`` URLs.
1637+
1638+ :envvar:`GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT` is set to `false` and these
1639+ environment variables are forced to `/bin/true`:
1640+ :envvar:`GIT_ASKPASS`, :envvar:`GIT_EDITOR`,
1641+ :envvar:`GIT_PAGER`, :envvar:`GIT_SSH`,
1642+ :envvar:`GIT_SSH_COMMAND`, and :envvar:`SSH_ASKPASS`.
1643+
1644+ Git config options are supplied via the command line to set
1645+ up key parts of safe mode.
1646+
1647+ - Direct options for executing external commands are set to ``/bin/true``:
1648+ ``core.askpass``, ``core.sshCommand`` and ``credential.helper``.
1649+
1650+ - External password prompts are disabled by skipping authentication using
1651+ ``http.emptyAuth=true``.
1652+
1653+ - Any use of an fsmonitor daemon is disabled using ``core.fsmonitor=false``.
1654+
1655+ - Hook scripts are disabled using ``core.hooksPath=/dev/null``.
1656+
1657+ It was not possible to cover all config items that might execute an external
1658+ command, for example, ``receive.procReceiveRefs``,
1659+ ``uploadpack.packObjectsHook`` and ``remote.<name>.vcs``.
1660+
15341661 :param kwargs:
15351662 See the :meth:`clone` method.
15361663
15371664 :return:
15381665 :class:`Repo` instance pointing to the cloned directory.
1666+
15391667 """
1540- git = cls .GitCommandWrapperType (os .getcwd ())
1668+ git = cls .GitCommandWrapperType (os .getcwd (), safe )
15411669if env is not None :
15421670git .update_environment (** env )
15431671return cls ._clone (
@@ -1549,6 +1677,7 @@ def clone_from(
15491677multi_options ,
15501678allow_unsafe_protocols = allow_unsafe_protocols ,
15511679allow_unsafe_options = allow_unsafe_options ,
1680+ safe = safe ,
15521681** kwargs ,
15531682 )
15541683