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Paper 2013/448

Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack

Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner

Abstract

Sharing memory pages between non-trusting processesis a common method of reducing the memory footprintof multi-tenanted systems. In this paper we demonstratethat, due to a weakness in the Intel X86 processors,page sharing exposes processes to information leaks. Wepresent FLUSH+RELOAD, a cache side-channel attacktechnique that exploits this weakness to monitor accessto memory lines in shared pages. Unlike previous cacheside-channel attacks, FLUSH+RELOAD targets the Last-Level Cache (i.e. L3 on processors with three cache levels).Consequently, the attack program and the victim donot need to share the execution core.We demonstrate the efficacy of the FLUSH+RELOADattack by using it to extract the private encryption keysfrom a victim program running GnuPG 1.4.13. We testedthe attack both between two unrelated processes in a singleoperating system and between processes running inseparate virtual machines. On average, the attack is ableto recover 96.7% of the bits of the secret key by observinga single signature or decryption round.

Metadata

Available format(s)

PDF

Publication info

Published elsewhere. USENIX Security 2014

Keywords

Side Channel AttackCacheRSAExponentiation

Contact author(s)

yval @cs adelaide edu au

History

2014-07-05: revised

2013-07-22: received

See all versions

Short URL

https://ia.cr/2013/448

License

CC BY