Convoy HX 229 (plus delayed 229A) /SC 122 | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Part ofWorld War II | |||||||
| |||||||
Belligerents | |||||||
![]() | ![]() ![]() ![]() | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
AdmiralKarl Dönitz | B4 Group: GJ Luther; later EC Day B5 Group: RC Boyle | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
Raubgraf 10 U-boats | HX229: 50 ships, 5 escorts SC122: 60 ships, 8 escorts plus reinforcements | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
1 U-Boat destroyed 7 damaged 49 killed | HX229: 13 ships (93,502GRT) 249 killed SC122: 9 ships (53,694GRT) 112 killed |
During theBattle of the Atlantic, British merchant shipping was formed intoconvoys for protection against German submarine attack.[1] In March 1943 convoysHX 229 andSC 122 were the focus of the largest convoy battle ofthe war.[2]Kriegsmarine tactics against convoys employed multiple-submarinewolfpack tactics in nearly simultaneous surface attacks at night. Patrolling aircraft restricted the ability of submarines to converge on convoys during daylight. The North Atlantic winters offered the longest periods of darkness to conceal surfaced submarine operations. The winter of 1942–43 saw the largest number of submarines deployed to the mid-Atlantic before comprehensive anti-submarine aircraft patrols could be extended into that area.
During March, there was a series of fierce convoy battles which became, for the Allies, the crisis point of the whole campaign.[3] One hundred merchant ships in trade convoys HX 229 and SC 122 encountered three wolfpacks of 38 submarines in a single sprawling action, which German radio reported as "the greatest convoy battle of all time" (Die grösste Geleitzugschlacht aller Zeiten).[4] ARoyal Navy report later concluded "The Germans never came so near to disrupting communications between the New World and the Old as in the first 20 days of March 1943".[5]
SC 122 was a slow eastbound convoy of 60 ships, routed fromNew York toLiverpool. (This was during the period when SC convoys were switched fromSydney,Cape Breton, to New York; this was reversed later due to congestion problems there.) It sailed on 5 March 1943, protected at first by onedestroyer and fivecorvettes of theWestern Local Escort Force. On 6 March, offCape Cod, two ships put back to New York due to heavy weather, and on 8 March, another six abandoned the crossing, and put intoHalifax.
The convoy pressed on, changing escorts on 13 March offCape Race. The western local group left, after theMid-Ocean Escort Force B5Escort Group joined fromSt John's. B5 Escort Group consisted of eight warships, led by Commander RC Boyle in the destroyerHMS Havelock, the destroyerUSS Upshur, theRiver-classfrigateHMS Swale, theFlower-classcorvettesButtercup,Godetia,Lavender,Pimpernel andSaxifrage, and atrawler as rescue vessel.
HX 229 was also eastbound and sailed from New York on 8 March, with 40 ships and the local escort. A further 34 ships which should have been included were delayed due to congestion at New York; they sailed the following day as HX 229A. The first few days of the convoy were uneventful; HX 229 met itsMid-Ocean Escort Force on 14 March and the local escort departed. The ocean escort was B4 Escort Group fromSt John's, of four destroyers and a corvette. It was led on this occasion by Lieutenant Commander Gordon John Luther ofHMS Volunteer, as its regular leader was in dock for repairs. Luther, although an ASW specialist, had recently joined the group and this was only his second crossing. The other ships of B4 were the destroyersHMSBeverley,Mansfield andWitherington and the corvetteAnemone, althoughWitherington had to detach on 15 March, to be replaced by the corvettePennywort for the crossing.
HX 229A sailed on 9 March, meeting its ocean escort, 40 Escort Group, on 15 March. This comprised six sloop-type warships under Cdr. J Dalison inHMSAberdeen. Taking a more northerly route than HX 229, the convoy remained undetected by German patrol lines and made a safe and timely landfall on 26 March. The voyage was not without its perils though. The more northerly route took it into an icefield and two ships were damaged by icebergs, rerouting to Iceland. The convoy vice-commodore's vessel the Svend Foyn was also damaged and ultimately sank on March 19, 1943.[6]
Arrayed against them were three patrol lines (rakes) of U-boats:[7]
The GermanB-Dienst signals intelligence group, had given notice of an east-bound convoy and by 8pm on 13 March had a location for SC 122. AdmiralKarl Dönitz, commanding the U-boat fleet, directedRaubgraf to intercept, forming a new rake to the west. A westerly gale gave speed to SC 122, which passed throughRaubgrafs patrol area on the morning of 15 March just 24 hours before the patrol line was formed.
The AlliedUltra intelligence, which decrypted German messages enciphered using theEnigma machine and which had helped the Admiralty to divert convoys away from wolf packs, had been "blinded" on 10 March 1943 as the result of the Germans bringing in a new short weather report. This resulted in the British code breakers being starved of the cribs necessary to break "Shark", the cipher used by the German U-boats. The U-boat tracking room at the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre was therefore unable to divert convoys around the U-boat packs. A message from a U-boat gave away its position once that position had been fixed byDF and the convoy SC 122 was diverted around the estimated danger area.
The Allied Cipher Number 3 used by the convoy escortshad been broken by the Germans. This allowed them to position wolf packs in the way of HX 229, which was following a similar course. It passed throughRaubgraf's rake in the night of15/16 March without being sighted because of bad weather. On the morning of 16 MarchU-653, which had detached fromRaubgraf to return to base with mechanical problems, sighted HX 229 heading east and sent a sighting report. Dönitz immediately orderedRaubgraf to pursue and intercept, whileStürmer andDränger were ordered west to form a line ahead of the convoy. He saw in this an opportunity to attack an east-bound convoy, full of war materials bound for Europe, with the full width of theAir Gap to cross.
Raubgraf caught up with HX 229 on the evening of 16 March and mounted an attack that night. Three ships were sunk and another five on the morning of 17 March, a total of eight in just 8 hours. The escort was reported to be weak, as 2 ships had dropped out to pick up survivors. The escorts chased 3 contacts during the night but with no result. During the rest of the day, boats fromStürmer began to arrive. One of these was attacked by a destroyer but again without success.
At the north-eastern end ofStürmer's rake,German submarine U-338 had sighted SC 122 heading east, about 120 miles from HX 229's position. After sending a sighting report she attacked, sinking four ships in quick succession. A fifth,Fort Cedar Lake, was damaged, to be sunk later in the day. Two more ships from HX 229 were lost during the day. Two boats fromStürmer were able to penetrate the defences about midday on 17 March but the escorts were able to fend off any further attacks, assisted by brief visits from Very Long Range (VLR) aircraft flying at extreme range. SC 122 was also able to resist further attacks until evening.
During the night of17/18 March the attack on both convoys, now just 70 miles apart, continued.U-338 sank the freighterGranville, of SC 122 in the evening, surviving a fierce counter-attack by escorts, and after midnightU-305 sank two more ships (Port Auckland andZouave).
HX 229's escort suffered a blow as HMSMansfield was forced to detach during the night of17/18 March. Help was on its way in the form of the destroyerHMS Highlander, under Commander ECL Day. Arriving on 18 March, Day, as a senior and more experienced officer, took command of B4 Group for the rest of the engagement. Also en route fromHvalfjord, inIceland, were the destroyersHMS Vimy andUSS Babbitt, for HX 229, and the US Coast Guard cutterUSCGC Ingham for SC 122. These were dispatched on the morning of 18 March, and arrived the following day.
On the afternoon of 18 March,U-221 succeeded in sinking two ships of HX 229 but further losses were avoided. HMSHighlander joined that afternoon, a welcome addition as B4 was by this time reduced to five ships.
During the night of18/19 March the two convoys were running in tandem, though sailing independently. All attacks on both convoys were repelled this night, and six firm contacts were attacked but little damage was inflicted. One ship from HX 229 was lost, a romper which broke away to proceed independently; this ship,Matthew Luckenbach, ran into the melée around SC 122 and was torpedoed, to be sunk later on 19 March. A straggler from SC 122,Clarissa Radcliffe, was also sunk with all hands by U-663.
On 19 March the escorts were reinforced by the arrival ofVimy andBabitt, for HX 229, andIngham for SC 122. HX 229 was also joined by the corvetteHMS Abelia, detached from another convoy. Also on 19 MarchU-384 was attacked by air patrol to the north of SC 122 and sunk. There were no further losses to the convoys that day; faced with stiffening resistance and sensing nothing further would be achieved without disproportionate losses, Dönitz called off the assault.
The convoys continued east. Further changes to the escort occurred on 20 March as reinforcement arrived in the form of the corvetteHMCS Sherbrooke, whileUpshur andIngham were detached. The local escort groups met on 23 March, and HX 229, with 27 ships surviving, arrived atLiverpool on 23 March. SC 122, with 42 remaining ships, arrived later the same day.
The double battle had involved 90 merchant ships and 16 escort ships (though not all were present at the same time). 22 merchant ships were sunk (13 from HX 229 and 9 from SC 122), a loss of 146,000 tons. More than 300 merchant seamen died. In total, 38 U-boats had taken part (though throughout the battle not all had been in contact). One U-boat had been lost with all hands, though a number had been damaged.The battle was undoubtedly a success for the Germans. However, they had failed to interrupt the North Atlantic convoy route to any extent; 68 ships (two-thirds of those involved) made a safe and timely arrival, and the 38 ships of HX 229A, which had been detached at New York to cross separately, arrived unscathed.
This was the largest convoy battle of the Atlantic campaign. A Royal Navy report later concluded "It appeared possible that we should not be able to regard convoy as an effective system of defence".[5]
March 1943 marked the low point of Allied fortunes in the Atlantic campaign. The month saw four home-bound convoys attacked, and a total of 39 ships sunk; yet of those four convoys over 200 arrived safely, while four other eastbound convoys were unharmed. None of the eight westbound convoys in March were attacked.[8] Also during March nine U-boats were destroyed in the Atlantic, and more were damaged, leading to a hiatus in U-boat operations during April. When the offensive renewed in May, it sawa major defeat for the U-boat Arm, and the turning point of the campaign.
HX 229
Date | Name | Flag | Casualties | Tonnage(GRT) | Sunk by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
16 March 1943 | Elin K | ![]() | 0 | 5,214 | U-603 |
16/17 March 1943 | Zaanland | ![]() | 0 | 6,513 | U-758 |
16/17 March 1943 | Southern Princess | ![]() | 4 | 12,156 | U-600 |
16/17 March 1943 | Harry Luckenbach | ![]() | 80 | 6,366 | U-91 |
16/17 March 1943 | Coracero | ![]() | 5 | 7,252 | U-384 |
16/17 March 1943 | Terkoeli | ![]() | 36 | 5,158 | U-631,U-384? |
17 March 1943 | James Oglethorpe | ![]() | 44 | 7,176 | U-758,U-91 |
17 March 1943 | William Eustis | ![]() | 0 | 7,196 | U-435,U-91 |
17 March 1943 | Nariva | ![]() | 0 | 8,714 | U-600,U-91 |
17 March 1943 | Irenee du Pont | ![]() | 24 | 6,125 | U-600,U-91 |
18 March 1943 | William Q Gresham | ![]() | 27 | 7,191 | U-221 |
18 March 1943 | Canadian Star | ![]() | 29 | 8,293 | U-221 |
19 March 1943 | Matthew Luckenbach | ![]() | ? | 5,848 | U-523,U-527 |
SC 122
Date | Name | Flag | Casualties | Tonnage(GRT) | Sunk by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
16/17 March 1943 | Kingsbury | ![]() | 4 | 4,898 | U-338 |
16/17 March 1943 | King Gruffydd | ![]() | 22 | 5,072 | U-338 |
16/17 March 1943 | Alderamin | ![]() | 0 | 7,886 | U-338 |
17 March 1943 | Fort Cedar Lake | ![]() | 0 | 7,134 | U-338,U-665 |
17 March 1943 | Port Auckland | ![]() | 8 | 8,789 | U-305 |
18 March 1943 | Zouave | ![]() | 13 | 4,256 | U-305 |
18 March 1943 | Granville | ![]() | 12 | 4,071 | U-338 |
18/19 March 1943 | Carras | ![]() | 0 | 5,234 | U-333,U-666 |
19 March 1943 | Clarissa Radcliffe[9] | ![]() | 53 | 5,754 | U-663 |
Date | Number | Type | U-boat group | Casualties | Sunk by |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
19 March 1943 | U-384 | VIIC | Sturmer | 49 | RAFB-17 Flying Fortress of206 Squadron |
Date | Number | Type | U-boat group | Convoy attacked | Notes[10] |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
19 Mar 1943 | U-134 | VIIC | Sturmer | HX 229 | d/c, damaged byAnemone,Volunteer |
18 Mar 1943 | U-305 | VIIC | Sturmer | SC 122 | d/c by aircraft x4; forced to break off and return to base |
19 Mar 1943 | U-338 | VIIC | Sturmer | SC 122 | d/c byLavender,Upshur (17th): d/c, s damaged by Sunderland /423 Sqdn |
19 Mar 1943 | U-439 | VIIC | Sturmer | HX 229 | d/c Liberator /86 Sqdn (17th); dc, damage byHighlander |
17 Mar 1943 | U-530 | VIIC | Sturmer | HX 229 | dc, damage byBeverley |
20 Mar 1943 | U-598 | VIIC | Sturmer | SC 122, HX 229 | d/c, damage by Sund. /201 Sqdn |
20 Mar 1943 | U-631 | VIIC | Sturmer | HX 229 | d/c, damage by Sund. /201 Sqdn |
19 Mar 1943 | U-666 | VIIC | Sturmer | SC 122 | d/c by Lib /86 Sqdn,Godetia,Upshur (17th); dc, damage by Fortress /220 Sqdn |
50°38′00″N34°46′00″W / 50.6333°N 34.7667°W /50.6333; -34.7667