| Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued October 8, 2008 Decided November 12, 2008 | |
| Full case name | Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, et al., Petitioners v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. |
| Docket no. | 07-1239 |
| Citations | 555U.S.7 (more) 129 S. Ct. 365; 172L. Ed. 2d 249; 2008U.S. LEXIS 8343 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 530F. Supp. 2d1110 (C.D. Cal. 2008); affirmed, 518F.3d658 (9th Cir. 2008);cert. granted,554 U.S. 916 (2008). |
| Holding | |
| Military preparedness outweighs environmental concerns, as Navy needs to train its crews to detect modern, silent submarines, and it cannot be forced to turn off its sonar when whales are spotted nearby. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Roberts, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito |
| Concur/dissent | Breyer, joined by Stevens (Part I) |
| Dissent | Ginsburg, joined by Souter |
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), was a decision by theUnited States Supreme Court concerning whether federal law restricted theUnited States Navy's ability to usesonar during drills given the possibility of a harmful effect onmarine mammals such aswhales.[1][2]
In balancingmilitary preparedness against environmental concerns, the majority came down solidly on the side ofnational security. Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his opinion, "the most serious possible injury would be harm to an unknown number of marine mammals that they study and observe". By contrast, he continued, "forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet".[3]
TheU.S. Navy had scheduled 14 training exercises through January 2009 off the coast ofSouthern California involving the use of "mid-frequency active sonar" to detect enemy submarines. Environmentalists argued that the sonar's highdecibel levels may have a deafening effect on whales. They said studies conducted around the world have shown the piercing underwater sounds cause whales to flee in panic or to dive too deeply. Whales have been foundbeached inGreece, theCanary Islands, and in theBahamas after sonar was used in the area, andnecropsies showed signs of internal bleeding near the ears.[4]
In February 2007, however, the U.S. Navy published anenvironmental impact assessment under theNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that found that the use of mid-frequency active sonar would cause minimal harm to marine mammals.[5] The Navy, represented bySolicitor GeneralGregory G. Garre, "highlight[ed] that there was an 'absence' of injury to marine mammals in Southern California despite forty years of Navy training in the area".[6]
The petitioners were mostly environmental groups, includingNatural Resources Defense Council andJean-Michel Cousteau's Ocean Futures Society, among others. They soughtdeclaratory andinjunctive relief against the exercises on the ground that they violated NEPA and other environmental laws.
TheU.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted a preliminary injunction barring conduct of the exercises. Onremand from theCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the district court modified thepreliminary injunction to allow the Navy to use sonar if it used mitigation measures.[7] On the Navy's second appeal, challenging two of the mitigation measures, the Ninth Circuit—"widely regarded as an environmentally friendly"[8]—affirmed the modified injunction,[9] noting that the plaintiffs (petitioners in the Supreme Court) had carried their burden of showing a "possibility" ofirreparable injury and that the balance of hardships weighed in favor of plaintiffs.
Themajority opinion held that as an initial matter the Ninth Circuit's "possibility" test for issuance of apreliminary injunction is too lenient; plaintiffs must show that irreparable injury is "likely" in the absence of an injunction. However, the Court continued, even if plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury (and, too, likelihood of success on the merits), it is "plainly outweighed" by the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. That factor alone requires denial of the requested injunctive relief. For the plaintiffs, the most serious possible injury would be the loss of ability to observe an unknown number of marine mammals. In light of the foregoing, the Court reversed the decision below andvacated the preliminary injunction. The Court technically did not address the merits of the lawsuit—that is, whether the training exercises had violatedNEPA or the other federalenvironmental laws.
JusticeRuth Bader Ginsburg, joined by JusticeDavid Souter, wrote a dissenting opinion which sided with the Ninth Circuit. She found that despite the importance of the U.S. Navy's training exercises, they did not outweigh the considerations of environmental harm mandated by NEPA.[10]
A report published in 2009 by theCongressional Research Service noted that the Supreme Court accepted the case "as a challenge to apreliminary injunction, rather than to the merits of petitioners' statutory claims". However, the report observed that "the Court made clear, however, that its perception of an overridingnational security interest in the challenged training exercises should lead the district court to reject a final injunction as well, in the event the military is found to have violated an environmental statute".[8]
This was the first time the United States successfully got the judiciary to reject the Ninth Circuit's "mere possibility" test for issuing injunctions.
Other commentators called it "a dangerous precedent" and "a troubling example of unquestioned deference to an invocation of military necessity at the expense of the environment" and said that it "signal[ed] a marked shift from lower courts' treatment of NEPA injunctions, raising questions about the availability of restraining orders forNEPA violations in the future".[11]
This article incorporatespublic domain material from this U.S government document.