William Perry | |
|---|---|
.jpg) Official portrait, 1994 | |
| 19thUnited States Secretary of Defense | |
| In office February 3, 1994 – January 23, 1997 | |
| President | Bill Clinton |
| Deputy | John M. Deutch John P. White |
| Preceded by | Les Aspin |
| Succeeded by | William Cohen |
| 23rdUnited States Deputy Secretary of Defense | |
| In office March 5, 1993 – February 3, 1994 | |
| President | Bill Clinton |
| Preceded by | Donald J. Atwood Jr. |
| Succeeded by | John M. Deutch |
| Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering | |
| In office April 11, 1977 – January 20, 1981 | |
| President | Jimmy Carter |
| Preceded by | Malcolm R. Currie |
| Succeeded by | Richard DeLauer |
| Personal details | |
| Born | William James Perry (1927-10-11)October 11, 1927 (age 98) |
| Political party | Democratic[1] |
| Spouse | Leonilla Green (died 2017) |
| Children | 5 |
| Education | Stanford University (BA,MA) Pennsylvania State University (PhD) |
| Military service | |
| Branch/service | United States Army |
| Years of service | 1945–1947 (active) 1950–1955 (reserve) |
| Rank | Second Lieutenant (reserve) |
| Unit | United States Army Corps of Engineers United States Army Reserve |
William James Perry (born October 11, 1927) is an American mathematician, engineer, businessman, and civil servant who was theUnited States Secretary of Defense from February 3, 1994, to January 23, 1997, under PresidentBill Clinton.[2] He also served asDeputy Secretary of Defense (1993–1994)[3] andUnder Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (1977–1981).
Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) atStanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering.[4] He is also a senior fellow atStanford University'sHoover Institution. He is the co-founder of the Palo Alto Unitarian Church[5] and serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project.[6] He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. In 2013 he founded the William J. Perry Project, a non-profit effort to educate the public on the current dangers of nuclear weapons.[7]
Perry also has extensive business experience and serves on the boards of several high-tech companies. He was elected a member of theNational Academy of Engineering in 1970 for contributions to communications theory, radio propagation theory, and computer technology in the design of advanced systems. He is also a fellow of theAmerican Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among Perry's numerous awards are thePresidential Medal of Freedom (1997) and theGrand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (2002), awarded byJapan.
Born inVandergrift, Pennsylvania, Perry attended, but did not graduate fromCulver Military Academy. He graduated fromButler Senior High School in 1945 and served in theUnited States Army as an enlisted man from 1946 to 1947, including service in theOccupation of Japan.[8][9] Perry later received a commission in theUnited States Army Reserve throughROTC, serving from 1950 to 1955.
Perry received hisB.S. (1949) andM.A. (1950) degrees fromStanford University and aPh.D. inmathematics fromPennsylvania State University in 1957.[10][11]
From 1954 to 1964 Perry was director of theElectronic Defense Laboratories ofSylvania/GTE inCalifornia, and from 1964 to 1977 president ofElectromagnetic Systems Laboratory (ESL), Incorporated, an electronics firm that he founded.[12] He was instrumental in demonstrating the technical feasibility of extractingSignals intelligence on the Soviet Union from the overallRf background with the then proposedRhyolite/Aquacade surveillance program.[13] In 1967 he was hired as a technical consultant to theDepartment of Defense.
From 1977 to 1981, during theJimmy Carter administration, Perry served asUndersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, where he had responsibility for weapon systems procurement andresearch and development.[14] Among other achievements, he had an influence on the development of theAirLand Battle doctrine,[15] and was instrumental in the development ofstealth aircraft technology, specifically theLockheed F-117 Nighthawk.
On leavingthe Pentagon in 1981, Perry became managing director until 1985 ofHambrecht & Quist, aSan Franciscoinvestment banking firm "specializing in high-tech and defense companies."[16]
He was appointed by PresidentRonald Reagan in 1983 to serve on the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.[17] He was also a member of thePackard Commission.[18]
Later in the 1980s he held positions as founder and chairman of Technology Strategies Alliances, professor in the School of Engineering atStanford University, and served as a co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at theStanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation.[19]
Perry returned to the Pentagon asUnder Secretary of Defense after being nominated byBill Clinton on February 3, 1993,[20]
The "frenzy" of defense industry mergers that the US experienced after 1986 was encouraged when in autumn 1993, Perry and his bossLes Aspin invited two dozen industry executives to a dinner "in the secretary's dining room next to his office". The two Secretaries urged their guests to combine into a few, larger companies because Pentagon budget cuts would endanger at least half of the contractors represented there. The event would come to be known as the"Last Supper".[21][22][23][24]
Perry's boss as Undersecretary,Les Aspin, was not a good fit for the job and within a year tendered his resignation. Perry succeeded him after a two-month search.[25] The same day of his confirmation hearing, Perry was confirmed by a unanimous (97-0) vote to become Defense Secretary.[25]
He entered office with broadnational security experience, both in industry and government and with an understanding of the challenges that he faced. A hands-on manager, he paid attention both to internal operations in the Pentagon and to international security issues. He worked closely with his deputy secretaries (John M. Deutch, 1994–95, andJohn P. White, 1995–97), and he met regularly with the service secretaries, keeping them informed and seeking their advice on issues. He described his style as "management by walking around."[2][26][27]
Perry adopted "preventive defense" as his guide to national security policy in thepost-Cold War world.[9][28][29] During theCold War the United States had relied on deterrence rather than prevention as the central principle of its security strategy. Perry outlined three basic tenets of a preventive strategy: keep threats from emerging; deter those that actually emerged; and if prevention and deterrence failed, defeat the threat with military force.[30] In practical terms this strategy relied on threat reduction programs (reducing the nuclear complex of the formerSoviet Union),counter-proliferation efforts, theNATOPartnership for Peace and expansion of the alliance, and the maintenance of military forces and weapon systems ready to fight if necessary. To carry out this strategy, Perry thought it necessary to maintain a modern, ready military force, capable of fighting two major regional wars at the same time.[2][31]
The formulation of theDefense budget and shepherding it through Congress was one of Perry's most important duties. The problem of how to deal with a large projected Defense budget shortfall from 1995 to 2000, an issue that weakened Perry's predecessorLes Aspin and contributed to his resignation, persisted when Perry took office.[32] Immediately on presenting his 1995 budget request, which he termed "a post-Cold War budget," Perry stated that Defense required a few more years of downsizing and that its infrastructure needed streamlining as well. The proposal, he said, maintained a ready-to-fight force, redirected a modernization program (including a strong research and development program), initiated a program to do business differently (acquisition reform), and reinvested defense dollars in the economy.[2]
Perry asked for $252.2 billion forFY 1995, including funds for numerous weapon systems, such as a newaircraft carrier, threeAegis cruisers, and sixC-17 cargo aircraft.[33] The budget projected a further cut of 85,500 in active duty military personnel, leaving a force of 1.52 million.[34] Ultimately Congress provided $253.9 billion TOA, about $2 billion more than in FY 1994, but actually a 1.2% cut in inflation-adjusted growth.[2]
In February 1995, Perry asked for $246 billion for theDepartment of Defense for FY 1996.[35] This proposal became entangled in the controversy during 1995 over the House Republicans'Contract with America, their efforts to spend more on defense than the administration wanted, and the continuing need for deficit reduction.[36][37]
Perry cautioned Congress in September of the possibility that President Clinton wouldveto the FY 1996 Defense budget bill because Congress had added $7 billion in overall spending, mainly for weapon systems that the Defense Department did not want, and because of restrictions on contingency operations Congress had put in the bill. Three months later he recommended that the president veto the bill. When Congress and the administration finally settled on a budget compromise midway through FY 1996, DoD received $254.4 billion TOA, slightly more than in FY 1995, but in terms of real growth a 2% cut.[2]
The question of anational missile defense system figured prominently in the budget struggles Perry experienced. Aspin had declared an end to theStrategic Defense Initiative program, but long-standing supporters both inside and outside of Congress called for its resurrection, especially when the Defense budget came up. Perry rejected calls for revival of SDI, arguing that the money would be better spent on battlefield antimissile defenses and force modernization, that the United States at the moment did not face a real threat, and that if the system were built and deployed it would endanger theStrategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Russians. The secretary was willing to continue funding development work on a national system, so that if a need emerged the United States could build and deploy it in three years. President Clinton signed the FY 1996 Defense bill early in 1996 only after Congress agreed to delete funding for a national missile defense system.[2]
Shortly before he introduced his FY 1997 budget request in March 1996, Perry warned that the United States might have to give up the strategy of preparing for two major regional conflicts if the armed forces suffered further reductions. The Five-Year Modernization Plan Perry introduced in March 1996 reflected his basic assumptions that the Defense budget would not decline in FY 1997 and would grow thereafter; that DoD would realize significant savings from infrastructure cuts, most importantly base closings; and that other savings would come by contracting out many support activities and reforming the defense acquisition system.[2]
For FY 1997 the Clinton administration requested a DoD appropriation of $242.6 billion, about 6% less in inflation-adjusted dollars than the FY 1996 budget. The budget proposal delayed modernization for another year, even though the administration earlier had said it would recommend increased funding for new weapons and equipment for FY 1997. The proposal included advance funding for contingency military operations, which had been financed in previous years through supplemental appropriations. Modest real growth in the Defense budget would not begin until FY 2000 under DoD's six-year projections. The procurement budget would increase during the period from $38.9 billion (FY 1997) to $60.1 billion (FY 2001). For FY 1997 Congress eventually provided $244 billion TOA, including funds for some weapon systems not wanted by the Clinton administration.[2]
Although he had not thought so earlier, by the end of his tenure in early 1997 Perry believed it possible to modernize theU.S. armed forces within a balanced federal budget. Perry argued for the current force level of just under 1.5 million as the minimum needed by the United States to maintain its global role. Further reductions in the Defense budget after 1997 would require cuts in the force structure and make it impossible for the United States to remain a global power.[2]
Perry devoted much time to restructuring defense acquisition policy and procedure, pursuing measures on acquisition reform begun when he was deputy secretary. Six days after he became secretary Perry released a document that laid out a variety of proposed acquisition procedure changes, including simplification of purchases under $100,000; maximum reliance on existing commercial products; conforming military contracts, bidding, accounting, and other business procedures to commercial practices when possible; eliminating outdated regulations that delayed purchases; and announcing military purchase requirements on data interchanges normally used by private business to increase vendor competition.
In June 1994 the secretary signed a directive ordering the armed forces to buy products and components to the extent possible fromcommercial off-the-shelf sources (his phrase was "commercial state-of-the-art technology"),[38] rather than from defense contractors, signaling a major departure from the traditional "milspec" over 30,000 military specifications and standards that actually inflated the cost of military items.[2]
In March 1996 Perry approved a new DoD comprehensive acquisition policy that emphasized commercial practices and products. Program managers and other acquisition officials would have the power to use their professional judgment in purchasing. The plan canceled more than 30 separate acquisition policy memoranda and report formats and replaced existing policy documents with new ones that were about 90% shorter. Perry considered these reforms one of his most important accomplishments, and saw savings generated by the new practices as part of the key to adequate funding of the military in an era of continuing tight budgets.
A token of the Perry agenda's power is the 1995 merger betweenLockheed Corporation andMartin Marietta. The resulting company,Lockheed Martin, is still as of 2024 the largest defense contractor on the planet. Another token is the third-rankedNorthrop Grumman company, which was formed in 1994 whenNorthrop Corporation purchasedGrumman Corporation.[39]
In a further effort to save money Perry resorted to base closures and realignments. In May 1994 he and GeneralJohn M. Shalikashvili, chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, announced that Defense would go forward, as required by law, with a 1995 round of base closings. In doing so Defense would consider the economic impact on the affected communities and the capacity to manage the reuse of closed facilities,[2] and in March 1995 Perry released DoD's 1995base realignment and closure (BRAC) plan, recommending 146 actions. He estimated that implementing BRAC 95 would bring one-time costs of $3.8 billion and net savings of $4 billion within a six-year period.[2]
At the time of his appointment it was not expected that Perry would involve himself aggressively inforeign policy. He quickly belied this impression. Within days of taking office he leftWashington on his first trip abroad to confer with European defense ministers. In April 1994 theEconomist, in an article entitled "Perrypatetic," observed: "The man who has started to sound like asecretary of state is in fact the defense secretary, William Perry. ... He is popping up in public all over the place and moving into the strategy business in a big way." In fact, Perry traveled abroad in his three-year tenure more than any previous secretary. Unlike most of his predecessors, Perry paid attention to the other nations in theAmericas, hosting the first Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas atWilliamsburg, Virginia, in 1995 and attending the second conference in 1996 inArgentina. His extensive travel matched his direct style. In his travels, he emphasized personal contact with rank and file members of the armed forces. His frequent trips also reflected the demands of the large number of foreign crises that occurred during his term, including several requiring the deployment of U.S. forces.[2]
Perry strongly supported theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization. He made major efforts to promote itsPartnership for Peace Program, which the Clinton administration saw as a way to link NATO with the newEastern Europeandemocracies, including Russia, and as a compromise between the wishes of many of the Eastern European countries to become full NATO members and Russia's determined opposition. Individual nations could join the Partnership for Peace under separate agreements with NATO, and many did so, enabling them to participate in NATO joint training and military exercises without becoming formal members of the alliance. Perry conferred several times with Russian Defense MinisterPavel Grachev in an effort to allay Russia's worries about and secure its membership in the Partnership for Peace. The issue remained outstanding when Perry left office in early 1997, by which time NATO had developed tentative plans to admit a few formerWarsaw Pact members during the summer of 1997.[2]
Although he recognized that the reform movement in Russia might not succeed, Perry did everything he could to improve relations withMoscow. He stressed the need for continuing military cooperation with and aid to the states of the former Soviet Union to facilitate destruction of theirnuclear weapons. He used theCooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1992 (the Nunn-Lugar program), which provided funds for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in Russia,Ukraine,Belarus, andKazakhstan, to diminish the nuclear threat. He urged Congress to continue the threat reduction program, defending it against claims that in reality it provided foreign aid to theRussian Armed Forces. By June 1996 when Perry traveled to Ukraine to observe the completion of that country's transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia under theBudapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, the only former Soviet missiles still outside ofRussia were in Belarus. Perry testified in favor of U.S. ratification of theSTART II treaty, completed in 1996; in October 1996 he spoke to a session of the RussianState Duma in Moscow, urging its members to ratify the treaty.[2]
InAsia, like former defense secretaryCaspar Weinberger a decade earlier, Perry endeavored to improve relations with both thePeople's Republic of China andJapan. He was the first secretary of defense to visit China after theTiananmen Square protests of 1989, when PRC authorities forcibly crushed a dissident movement. While not ignoring long-standing problems such as the PRC's weapons sales abroad and itshuman rights abuses, he believed that the U.S. and the PRC should cooperate militarily. He made some progress, although when Chinathreatened Taiwan just before the latter'spresidential election in March 1996, the United States sent two aircraft carrier task forces to the area to counter the Chinese.[2]
In 1995 a young girl was raped by three U.S. servicemen stationed inOkinawa, Japan. The crime led to demands that the United States diminish its military presence on the island. Late in 1996, the United States agreed to vacate 20% of the land it used on Okinawa and to close some military facilities, includingMarine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Japanese agreed that the 28,000United States Forces Japan troops stationed on Okinawa could remain.[2]
A serious ongoing international crisis was inBosnia. When Perry took over in 1994, theBosnian SerbArmy of Republika Srpska werebesieging Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, but the Serbs were forced to draw back in face of aUN ultimatum and warning of airstrikes. Shortly thereafter the Serbs threatened to overrun theBosnian Muslim city ofGoražde in eastern Bosnia. Perry at first ruled out U.S. military action, but in April 1994 U.S. fighter planes participated in UN airstrikes at Goražde, causing the Bosnian Serbs to retreat.[2]
In a major statement on Bosnia in June 1994, Perry attempted to clarify U.S. policy there, declaring that the conflict did involve U.S. national interests, humanitarian and otherwise, but not "supreme" interests. To limit the spread of violence in Bosnia, the United States had committed air power under NATO to stop the bombardment of Bosnian cities, provide air support for UN troops, and carry out humanitarian missions. Perry and theWhite House resisted congressional pressures to lift an arms embargo imposed earlier by the United Nations on all sides in theBosnian War. During 1994–95 some senators, including Republican leaderBob Dole, wanted the embargo against theRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina lifted to enable them to resist theRepublika Srpska more effectively. Perry thought this might provoke Serb attacks and perhaps force the commitment of U.S. ground troops. In August 1995 Clinton vetoed legislation to lift the arms embargo. (In fact, the Bosnian Muslims had been receiving arms from outside sources.) Meanwhile, although it had stated consistently that it would not send U.S. ground forces to Bosnia, in December 1994 the Clinton administration expressed willingness to commit troops to help rescue UN peacekeepers in Bosnia if they were withdrawn. In May 1995, after the Bosnian Serbs had taken about 3,000 peacekeepers hostage, theUnited States,France,Germany, andRussia resolved to provide a larger and better-equipped UN force.[2]
Applying strong pressure, in November 1995 the United States persuaded the presidents ofSerbia and Montenegro, Bosnia, andCroatia to attend a conference inDayton, Ohio, that after much contention produced a peace agreement, formally signed inParis in mid-December. It provided for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of the combatants to specified lines, creation of a separation zone, and the stationing in Bosnia of aPeace Implementation Force (IFOR). TheNorth Atlantic Council, with Perry participating, had decided in September 1995 to develop a NATO-led force to implement any peace agreement for Bosnia, setting the force size at 60,000 troops, including 20,000 from the United States. In congressional testimony in November, Perry explained why U.S. troops should go to Bosnia: The war threatened vital U.S. political, economic, and security interests in Europe; there was a real opportunity to stop the bloodshed; the United States was the only nation that could lead a NATO force to implement the peace, and the risks to the United States of allowing the war to continue were greater than the risks of the planned military operation.[2]
The first U.S. troops moved into Bosnia in early December 1995, and by late January 1996, the full complement of 20,000 had been deployed. Although Perry had said earlier that they would leave Bosnia within a year, in June 1996 he hinted at a longer stay if NATO decided the peace in Bosnia would not hold without them. The secretary agreed to a study proposed in September 1996 by NATO defense ministers for a follow-on force to replace IFOR. Finally in November 1996, after thepresidential election, Clinton announced, with Perry's support, that the United States would provide 8,500 troops to a NATO follow-on force. The U.S. force would be gradually reduced in 1997 and 1998 and completely withdrawn by June 1998.[2]
Perry also inherited from Aspin the problem of what to do aboutHaïti, where a militaryjunta continued to refuse to reinstate the deposed president,Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In the spring of 1994, debate persisted in theUnited States Congress on whether to intervene militarily to oustRaoul Cédras, the military leader, and restore Aristide to power. President Clinton said that the United States would not rule out the use of military force and also suggested that military teams to train local security and police forces might be sent to Haïti. In the meantime, large numbers ofrefugees fled from Haïti in boats, hoping to gain admittance to the United States. U.S. vessels intercepted most of them at sea and took them to theGuantanamo Bay Naval Base inCuba.[2]
In spite of continuing pressure and obvious preparations in the United States for an invasion of Haïti, the junta refused to yield. On September 19, 1994, just after former PresidentJimmy Carter negotiated an agreement, the United States sent in military forces with UN approval. Haïti'sde facto leaders, including Cédras, agreed to step down by October 15 so that Aristide could return to the presidency. By the end of September, 19,600 U.S. troops were in Haïti as part ofOperation Uphold Democracy. At the end of March 1995, a UN commander took over, and the United States provided 2,400 of the 6,000-man UN force that would remain in Haïti until February 1996. Given the opposition to the mission when it began, the primary U.S. concern was to do its limited job and avoid casualties among its forces. With the final withdrawal of U.S. troops, and Aristide's duly elected successor installed in office in February 1996, the Pentagon and the Clinton administration could label the Haitian operation a success up to that point.[2]
North Korea posed another serious problem for Perry, who backed the administration's policy of pressuringKim Il Sung's Communist regime to allow monitoring of its nuclear facilities by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Between February and October 1994 the United States increased its pressures on North Korea. Perry warned in March that the United States would not permit the development of an arsenal of nuclear weapons. War was not imminent, he said, but he indicated that he had ordered military preparations for a possible conflict. Soon thereafter Perry stated that the United States would propose UN economic sanctions if North Korea did not allow international inspection of its planned withdrawal of spent fuel from a nuclear reactor fuel containing sufficient plutonium to produce four or five nuclear weapons. North Korea began removing the nuclear fuel from theYongbyon nuclear facility in May 1994 without granting the IAEA inspection privileges, and later said it withdraw from the IAEA and theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[2] Perry offered three options to Clinton:sanctions against North Korea through the United Nations, a limitedF-117 air strike on the Yongbyon facility, or a massive military buildup in preparation for full-scale war with North Korea. Under the belief that all three options would lead to war, Clinton leaned towards the military buildup option before negotiations between former US PresidentJimmy Carter and Kim mediated the situation.[40]
On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea signed theAgreed Framework after lengthy negotiations inGeneva, Switzerland, assisted again by former President Carter. The United States, Japan,South Korea, and other regional allies promised to provide North Korea with twolight water nuclear reactors, at an eventual cost of $4 billion, to replace existing or partially constructed facilities that could produceplutonium for nuclear weapons. North Korea then agreed to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection, and the United States pledged to lift trade restrictions and provideheavy fuel oil forelectric power generation. Perry considered this agreement better than risking a war in Korea and a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program. He promised that he would ask Congress for money to build upU.S. forces in South Korea if the agreement broke down. Again a critical situation had moderated, but implementing the agreement proved difficult. By the end of Perry's term, some issues remained outstanding, and tension between the two Koreas flared up from time to time.[2] After his tenure, Clinton appointed Perry as North Korean policy coordinator in 1998, where he recommended continued diplomatic engagement withKim Jong Il's government.[41]
In thePersian Gulf area,Ba'athist Iraq continued to have conflict, with periodic provocative moves bySaddam Hussein triggering U.S. military action. After the 1991Gulf War, acting in accord withUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 688, the United States organized a coalition to enforceno-fly zones in Iraq, north of36° and south of32°. Ina tragic accident in April 1994 two U.S. Air ForceF-15 aircraft, operating in the no-fly zone north of the36th parallel in Iraq, shot down two U.S. ArmyUH-60 Black Hawk helicopters after misidentifying them as Iraqi. This incident, with its high death toll, highlighted dramatically the complexities in dealing with Iraq in theaftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Further, in October 1994, when several eliteIraqi Armed Forces divisions began to move toward theIraq–Kuwait border, the United States mobilized ground, air, and naval forces in the area to counter the threat. Perry warned Iraq that the U.S. forces would take action if it did not move itsRepublican Guard units north of the 32nd parallel. Subsequently, the UN Security Council passed a resolution requiring Iraq to pull its troops back at least 150 miles from Kuwait's border.[2]
Iran, too, behaved aggressively, placing at least 6,000 troops in March 1995 on three islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf claimed by both Iran and theUnited Arab Emirates. Perry stated that the Iranian moves threatened shipping in theStrait of Hormuz, a waterway on which moved a significant part of the world's oil production. The United States worked with its allies in the Persian Gulf area to bolster their capacity to defend themselves and to use their collective strength through theGulf Cooperation Council. Most important, in Perry's judgment, was the determination of the United States to maintain a strong regional defense capability with aircraft and naval ships in the area, prepositioned equipment, standing operational plans, and access agreements with the Persian Gulf partners.[2]
Provocative moves again by Iraq forced the United States to take strong action. When Saddam Hussein intervened in September 1996 by sending some 40,000 troops to assist one side in a dispute between twoKurdish factions in northern Iraq, he demonstrated that he was not deterred by a U.S. warning against using military force. Perry made clear that while no significant U.S. interests were involved in the factional conflict, maintaining stability in the region as a whole was vital to U.S. security and there would be a U.S. reaction. On both September 2 and 3, U.S. aircraft attacked Iraqi fixedsurface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and air defense control facilities in the south, because, Perry explained, the United States saw the principal threat from Iraq to be against Kuwait.[2]
Another tragic incident on June 25, 1996, revealed the continuing tension in the Middle East and the dangers involved in the U.S. military presence. Terrorists exploded atruck bomb at theKhobar Towers apartment complex housingU.S. Air Force personnel inDhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and wounding 500. In September 1996 an investigative panel set up by Perry recommended vigorous measures to deter, prevent, or mitigate the effects of future terrorist acts against U.S. personnel overseas, and further, that a solitary DoD element have responsibility for force protection. The panel found that the unit attacked at Dhahran had not taken every precaution it might have to protect the forces at Khobar Towers. Eventually, the Defense Department moved units from Dhahran to more remote areas in Saudi Arabia to provide better protection.[2]
U.S. involvement in Somalia, a problem during Aspin's tenure, ended in 1994. Under the protection ofU.S. Marines on ships offshore, the last U.S. forces left Somalia before the end of March, meeting a deadline set earlier by President Clinton. Later, in February 1995, more than 7,000 U.S. troops assisted in removing the remaining UN peacekeepers and weapons from Somalia in a markedly successful operation.[2]
In another mission inAfrica in 1994, the United States became involved in humanitarian efforts inRwanda. Acivil war between two rival ethnic groups, theHutu andTutsi, resulted in widespread death and destruction and the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rwanda into neighboring countries, includingZaire. Although not part of theUN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, the United States provided humanitarian aid in the form of purified water, medicine, site sanitation, and other means. In July the Pentagon sent in aircraft and about 3,000 troops, most of them to Zaire. The U.S. forces also took control of and rebuilt the airport atKigali, Rwanda's capital, to aid in the distribution of food, medicine, and other supplies. The lack of a U.S. response to theRwandan genocide was later considered a majorforeign policy failure of theBill Clinton administration by President Clinton[42] and was due to fear of repeating theBattle of Mogadishu.[2][43]
In January 1996, Perry talked about experiences over the past year in which he never thought a Secretary of Defense would be involved. At the top of the list was witnessing participation of aRussian Ground Forces brigade in aU.S. Army division in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation. The others—Dayton, Ohio, becoming synonymous with peace in the Balkans; helping the Russian defense minister blow up aMinuteman missile silo inMissouri; watching United States and Russian troops training together inKansas; welcoming former Warsaw Pact troops inLouisiana; operating a school atGarmisch, Germany, to teach former Soviet and East European military officers about democracy, budgeting, and testifying to aparliament; dismantling the military specifications system for acquisition; cutting the ear off a pig in Kazakhstan, and eating renderedManchurian toad fat in China. These things, Perry said, demonstrate "just how much the world has changed, just how much our security has changed, just how much the Department of Defense has changed, and just how much my job has changed."[2]
Shortly afterPresident Clinton's reelection in November 1996, Perry made known his decision to step down as secretary. He spoke of his growing frustration over working with a Congress sopartisan that it was harming the military establishment, and said that he did not think the results of the 1996 congressional election would decrease the partisanship. He later explained that his decision to retire was "largely due to the constant strain of sending U.S. military personnel on life-threatening missions."[2][44]
As he left the Pentagon, Perry listed what he thought were his most important accomplishments: establishing effective working relationships with U.S. military leaders; improving the lot of the military, especially enlisted men and women; managing the military drawdown; instituting important acquisition reforms; developing close relationships with many foreign defense ministers; effectively employing military strength and resources in Bosnia, Haiti, Korea, and the Persian Gulf area; dramatically reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War; and promoting the Partnership for Peace within NATO. His disappointments included failure to obtain Russian ratification of theSTART II treaty; slowness in securing increases in the budget for weapon systems modernization; and the faulty perceptions of theGulf War illness syndrome held by some of the media and much of the public. At a ceremony for Perry in January 1997 General Shalikashvili noted the departing secretary's relationship with the troops. "Surely," Shalikashvili said, "Bill Perry has been the GI's secretary of defense. When asked his greatest accomplishment as secretary, Bill Perry didn't name an operation or a weapons system. He said that his greatest accomplishment was his very strong bond with our men and women in uniform."[2]
Perry's career in the Department of Defense actually spanned eight years of profound changes—four years as Undersecretary for Research and Engineering in 1977 to 1981, a year as Deputy Secretary from 1993 to 1994, and three years as Secretary.[2]
After he left the Pentagon, Perry returned toSan Francisco to join the board of Hambrecht and Quist as a senior adviser.[45]
Perry rejoined the faculty at Stanford University, becoming a professor at theFreeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at theStanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, and the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) atStanford's School of Engineering.[46][47]
In 1999, Perry was awarded theJames A. Van Fleet Award byThe Korea Society.[48]
Perry sits on the advisory board of theCommonwealth Club of California. Perry currently sits on the board of directors forXyleco.[49] Perry joined the financial board of the Thailand-based manufacturing company, Fabrinet in 2008. He was a board member ofTheranos, a Silicon Valley biotech company which defrauded more than $700 million from its investors before it collapsed.[50][51]
On June 17, 2006, Perry gave the featured commencement speech to engineering and science graduates at theUniversity of California, Santa Barbara.[52]
William Perry appeared as an important and influential person in the development of Silicon Valley, in the PBS documentary,Silicon Valley: 100 Year Renaissance (1998).[53]
On October 16, 2008, Perry was awarded theSylvanus Thayer Award by theUnited States Military Academy.[54]
Perry is a founding board member of theNuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to reduce the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. He currently has an emeritus status on the board. Perry is an advisory board member for thePartnership for a Secure America, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to recreating the bipartisan center in American national security and foreign policy. Perry is currently chair of the Board of Sponsors for theBulletin of the Atomic Scientists and frequently speaks atBulletin events. He is a Member of the Supervisory Council of theInternational Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe. Perry is also a member of the board of directors of theCenter for a New American Security, a Washington, DC–based think tank that specializes in U.S. national security issues. Perry is also on the advisory board of theTruman National Security Project, a progressive leadership institute that trains the next generation of foreign policy and national security leaders.
In March 2006, he was appointed to theIraq Study Group, a group formed to give advice on the U.S. government's Iraq policy.
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In 2007, Secretary Perry joined three other eminent statesmen, former Secretaries of StateGeorge P. Shultz andHenry Kissinger, and former SenatorSam Nunn in calling for the United States to take the lead in reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. Their op-ed, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons", published in theWall Street Journal, reverberated throughout the world, and is one of the key factors that has convinced political leaders and experts internationally that the conditions are in place to achieve that goal.[citation needed] The four men published four subsequent op-eds in theWall Street Journal, including one on March 5, 2013: "Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Non-Proliferation Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat". They subsequently created the Nuclear Security Project to galvanize global action to reduce urgent nuclear dangers and build support for their vision and the steps to achieve them. TheNuclear Threat Initiative serves as coordinator of the NSP, in conjunction with Stanford University's Hoover Institution. In 2010, the four produced the documentaryNuclear Tipping Point. The film is introduced by GeneralColin Powell, narrated byMichael Douglas and includes interviews with California GovernorArnold Schwarzenegger and former Soviet PresidentMikhail Gorbachev.
In 2011, Perry joined a team of former government officials from various countries, formed under the auspices of the Governor of Hiroshima PrefectureHidehiko Yuzaki to prepare a plan for the totalabolition of nuclear weapons. This project is titledHiroshima for Global Peace.[55][56]
In 2013, Perry founded the William J. Perry Project[57] to seek to promote greater public awareness about nuclear weapons and engage more people in acting to mitigate the growing threat they pose to humanity. The Project is a nonprofit venture supported with funds raised from private individuals and is sponsored by theNuclear Threat Initiative.[7]
In 2015, Perry published a memoir,My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, (Stanford Univ. Press), with a foreword byGeorge P. Shultz. The memoir describes coming of age at the dawn of the nuclear age, and his later roles in managing the nuclear threat.[58] He warned that: "Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.”[59]
On September 30, 2016, theNew York Times published a Perry opinion editorial advocating, " ... the United States can safely phase out its land-basedintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force ... ".[60] Perry believes that ICBM's are turning more into liabilities than assets. Perry says it would save "considerable cost" and would preventaccidental nuclear war.[61] With regards to an accidental nuclear war, Perry has experienced a false alarm for an incoming missile which later turned out to be a computer error. Perry's experience was 40 years ago but our technology is still not perfect with the recent false alarm in2018 Hawaii false missile alert. Perry says the major problem with ICBM's are the "non-recall" ability which if these missiles are sent and it turns out to be a false alarm then there's no turning back.
Perry is cited by the website of Los Angeles CongressmanTed Lieu for supporting legislation proposed by Lieu and U.S. SenatorEd Markey, Democrat from Massachusetts, that would limit PresidentDonald Trump and future presidents' authority to launch a nuclear first strike against another country by requiring them to first get approval from Congress. The following quotation is attributed to Perry in Congressman Lieu's website: "During my period as Secretary of Defense, I never confronted a situation, or could even imagine a situation, in which I would recommend that the President make a first strike with nuclear weapons—understanding that such an action, whatever the provocation, would likely bring about the end of civilization. I believe that the legislation proposed by Congressman Lieu and Senator Markey recognizes that terrible reality. Certainly, a decision that momentous for all of civilization should have the kind of checks and balances on Executive powers called for by our Constitution."[62]
Perry was profiled in theRadiolab episodeNukes in 2017. He argued for the need for checks and balances for a nuclear strike by the U.S.[63]
On April 2, 2013, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) was officially renamed theWilliam J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (The Perry Center) in recognition of its founder, the 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr. William J. Perry. This change honored his role in establishing the center, which originated from the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas in 1995, when Perry promoted regional defense cooperation and the training of civilians in security matters.[64]
With Tom Collina of thePloughshares Fund, Perry wrote the bookThe Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump.[65] This book concludes with a ten-point plan for nuclear weapons safety:
Perry, along with all other living former secretaries of defense, ten in total, published aWashington Post op-ed piece in January 2021 telling President Donald Trump not to involve the military in determining the outcome of the 2020 elections.[76]
United States:Presidential Medal of Freedom, with Distinction, 1997.[77]
Poland:Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland, 1996Postanowienie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 13 grudnia 1996 r. o nadaniu orderu..
Croatia:Grand Order of King Dmitar Zvonimir 1998.[78]
United Kingdom:Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1998.[77]
Japan:Grand Cordon, Order of the Rising Sun, 2002.[77]
France:Ordre National du Merite.[79]
This article incorporatespublic domain material from this U.S government document.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) This article incorporatespublic domain material fromWilliam J. Perry.Office of the Secretary of Defense.
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| Preceded by | Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 1977–1981 | Succeeded by Richard DeLauer |
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| Preceded by | United States Deputy Secretary of Defense 1993–1994 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | United States Secretary of Defense 1994–1997 | Succeeded by |
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| Preceded byas Former U.S. Cabinet Member | Order of precedence of the United States as Former U.S. Cabinet Member | Succeeded byas Former U.S. Cabinet Member |
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