Thisbiography of a living personneeds additionalcitations forverification. Please help by addingreliable sources.Contentious material about living persons that is unsourced orpoorly sourcedmust be removed immediately from the article and its talk page, especially if potentiallylibelous. Find sources: "Will Kymlicka" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Will Kymlicka | |
|---|---|
Kymlicka in 2008 | |
| Born | 1962 (age 62–63) |
| Spouse | Sue Donaldson |
| Awards | Officer of the Order of Canada (2023) Killam Prize (2004) Pierre Chauveau Medal (2001) |
| Education | |
| Education | |
| Thesis | Liberal equality and cultural community (1987) |
| Doctoral advisor | G. A. Cohen |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | Contemporary philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| School | Modern liberalism |
| Institutions | |
| Doctoral students | Omid Payrow Shabani |
| Main interests | |
| Notable works | Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (co-authored withSue Donaldson, 2013) |
| Notable ideas |
|
| Website | www |
William KymlickaOC FRSC (/ˈkɪmlɪkə/KIM-lih-kə; born 1962)[1] is a Canadianpolitical philosopher best known for his work onmulticulturalism andanimal ethics. He is currentlyProfessor of Philosophy andCanada Research Chair in Political Philosophy atQueen's University at Kingston, and Recurrent Visiting professor in the Nationalism Studies program at theCentral European University inBudapest, Hungary. For over 20 years, he has lived avegan lifestyle, and he is married to the Canadian author andanimal rights activistSue Donaldson.[2][3]
Kymlicka received hisB.A. (Honours) inphilosophy andpolitical studies fromQueen's University in 1984, and hisD.Phil. in philosophy fromOxford University in 1987, under the direction ofG. A. Cohen. He has written extensively on multiculturalism and political philosophy, and several of his books have been translated into other languages. Kymlicka has held professorships at a variety of different universities in Canada and abroad, and has also worked as an advisor to theGovernment of Canada.[4]
This sectionpossibly containsoriginal research. Pleaseimprove it byverifying the claims made and addinginline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed.(June 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
One of his main concerns throughout his work is providing aliberal framework for the just treatment of minority groups, which he divides into two basic categories:polyethnic or immigrant groups, and national minorities (such as the CanadianQuébécois, or theMāori ofNew Zealand). He lists criteria for national minorities or "minority nations":present at founding;
By these criteria, the two "minority nations" in Canada are theIndigenous peoples in Canada and the Québécois. Kymlicka argues that such minority groups deserve unique rights from the state by the nature of their unique role and history within the national population.
Polyethnic groups are less deserving of such rights since they come to the state voluntarily and thus have some degree of responsibility tointegrate to the norms of their new nation. This does not mean that they are not entitled to any rights as Kymlicka argues that all cultural minorities have a right to choose their own lives, but it does mean that they are not entitled to the same level of group rights which minority nations would be entitled to. Kymlicka makes various exceptions such as the problems faced by refugees, whether from conflict or poverty, and by such minority groups such as African-Americans (whose heritage in America clearly did not begin voluntarily) and argues that their needs with regards to cultural group-specific rights should be considered on a special basis.
InMulticultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka argues that group-specific rights are consistent with liberalism, and are particularly appropriate, if not outright demanded, in certain situations. He defines three such group-specific rights: special group representation rights (such as affirmative action policies in politics); self-government rights; and polyethnic rights (such as the policy exemptingSikhs from having to wear motorcycle helmets).
A distinction that Kymlicka draws, which is crucial to his liberal defence of group-specific rights for minorities, is between external protection and internal restrictions. Kymlicka argues that external protections between groups may be justified in order to promote equality (but they must not allow for oppression or exploitation, as inapartheid in South Africa). Internal restrictions, however, cannot be justified from a liberal perspective, insofar as they restrict a person's autonomy, though they may be granted in certain cases to national minorities.
Brian Barry argues that Kymlicka's views are not liberal at all, in the sense that they are not universalist in nature and that they allow for cultural relativism. Barry further accuses Kymlicka of posing a false choice between liberalism as autonomy and liberalism as tolerance, further asserting that claims for cultural rights and for equality of treatment are incompatible.[5] Young Kim provides an interesting comparison of their two views on multiculturalism and the limits of liberalism.[6]
For Kymlicka, the standard liberal criticism, which states that group rights are problematic because they often treat individuals as mere carriers of group identities, rather than autonomous social agents, is overstated or oversimplified. The actual problem of minorities and how they should be viewed in liberal democracies is much more complex. There is a distinction between good group rights, bad group rights, and intolerable group rights.
The bookZoopolis, bySue Donaldson and co-authored with Kymlicka, explores the state ofanimal rights for different categories of animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka believe thatabolitionism is an inadequate response to both the ethical and practical challenges of living fairly and constructively with other animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka suggest that animals should be characterized through three categories, serving to determine the nature of the laws and politics that should protect those animals.Domesticated animals should be given a kind of adjusted co-citizenship in which their best interest and preferences would be taken into account. Donaldson and Kymlicka defend the end of their use, advocating for avegan position, but they reject extinctionism with regards to those animals that are currently bred by humans. Wild animals should be granted sovereignty on their land enough so that they can sustain their way of living and prosper. Donaldson and Kymlicka support some moderate forms of intervention to reducewild animal suffering, and they claim that more significant courses of action should be aiming at keeping wild animals able to lead their lives. "Liminal" animals, those that are not domesticated but live in urban, suburban, or industrial areas (such as mice, pigeons and insects), should be treated as denizens of human communities.[7]