TheThird Washington Conference (codenamed Trident[2]) was held inWashington, D.C from May 12 to May 25, 1943. It was aWorld War IIstrategic meeting between the heads of government of theUnited Kingdom and theUnited States. It was the third conference of the 20th century (1941,1942,1943), but the second conference that took place during the US involvement in the Second World War. The delegations were headed byWinston Churchill andFranklin D. Roosevelt, respectively.[3]
The plans for theAllied invasion of Sicily, extent of military force, the date for invading Normandy, and the progress of thePacific War were discussed.
Churchill and Roosevelt met every two days in the White House, and the British and American military leaders met almost daily in the Board of Governors Room at theFederal Reserve Building.[4]
Churchill opened the discussion with ideas, which were discussed in an open manner between the two countries. The main topics that were discussed were theItalian Campaign, the amount of military force that should be used, theNormandy landings, and how to help China in thePacific War. Churchill felt that the extent of the operations and their priority could be solved by mutual agreement,[5] and consensus was reached on all issues.[6]
The first topic discussed was the war in Italy. Churchill persuaded the American leaders to endorse theAllied invasion of Sicily.[7] He believed that the fighting in Italy would distract the German troops from the Eastern Front so that Russia would be given breathing room since the Germans would need to send a large number of troops to the Balkans.[5] This would get rid of the Allies' debt to Russia fromRussia's heavy engagement of German forces in Stalingrad.[5]
Getting Italy out of the war would also help the Allies' relationship with Turkey. Turkey could no longer compete with Italy in the Mediterranean. Churchill believed that they could ask Turkey for use of their bases for future defense.[5]
The next objective discussed was the extent of the military force that the Allies should use. Both countries agreed that they should use the greatest amount of military force against the enemy, including armies, air forces and munitions.Unconditional surrender, first mentioned at theCasablanca Conference, was debated again at Trident. Both Trident and Casablanca had competitive atmospheres due to the differing views on unconditional surrender. Roosevelt was persistent against American GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower and British GeneralHenry Maitland Wilson's anti-unconditional views of surrender.[8]
Despite these opposing views, after much consideration, the Allies agreed that they wanted to carry the war to Japan. They believed that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, so they would need to concentrate on defeating Japan in 1945.[5] The best solution would be involving Russia in the fight against Japan because Stalin had indicated his interest in taking part in Japan's defeat.[5]
TheNormandy landings were postponed for 12 months to May 1944. This was because the US and the UK speculated that they could build up troop strength, produce more landing craft and supplies, and thus ensure complete command of air and sea by doing so.[9] They discussed the difficult beaches with large tides, the large German enemy defenses, the optimal timing to attack, and relevant weather conditions.
The main reason why the Allies wanted to postpone the landings was because of their lack of supplies in 1943. All the British landing craft had been deployed toOperation Husky, and only one US division was available due to a higher priority ofOperation Sickle in the war.[5]
Lastly, the US and the UK decided what to do in thePacific War. BritishField Marshal Wavell visitedBurma and helped brace the Allies for the many obstacles they would face, including:
Other than air support, there were few alternatives to help China, so efficient planning was necessary. The countries agreed it would be better to by-pass a ground attack in Burma and instead use the element of surprise by air attack, as inOperation Torch.[5] The fleet from Italy was to cover this operation in March 1944.[5]
The Trident Conference shows a change in domination over world leadership, as the Americans were influential over other countries. American initiatives received twice the amount of Allied military resources, while Britain had to compromise on several of their requests.[4] In particular, US Army Chief of Staff GeneralGeorge Marshall led this change to increase the role of the Americans in the war effort, which had been previously dominated by Britain.[10]
However, the actions after Sicily still remained unsettled. Churchill wanted anItalian Campaign to follow, but Roosevelt worried that the campaign might delay the strategic plans for recapturing France that had been planned for the following year.[10] According toMax Hastings,Alan Brooke's reputation as a strategist was "significantly damaged" by his remarks at the Trident Conference, where he claimed that no major operations on the continent would be possible until 1945 or 1946.[11] Brooke's diary says that he wanted "operations in the Mediterranean to force a dispersal of German forces, help Russia, and thus eventually produce a situation where cross Channel operations are possible" but that Churchill entirely repudiated (or half repudiated) the paper the CCOS had agreed on;Harry Hopkins got him to withdraw his proposed amendments.[12]
