| War in Dagestan | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the spillover of theSecond Chechen War | |||||||
.svg) Location of the Republic of Dagestan (red)within European Russia | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 Shamil BasayevRamzan AkhmadovDokka UmarovMovladi UdugovIbn al-KhattabAbu Zarr Shishani (Gerat) Arbi BarayevMovsar Suleimanov Abdul-Malik Mezhidov Abdul-Vahhab Shishani Ismail Razakov (Bagram)Khunkar-Pasha IsrapilovShirvani BasaevAbu al-Walid Hakim al-Medani † Yaqub al-Ghamidi Abu Jafar al-YemeniRappani Khalilov Abdurrahman az-Zarki (Chechen from Jordan)Magomed TsagarayevRuslan Haihoroev †Huta Ahmadov (Abdurrahman) † Garib ShishaniBaudi Bakuyev Umar Edilsultanov Isa UmarovAdallo AlievSirazhudin RamazanovBagaudin KebedovMagomed Tagaev |  Boris YeltsinSergei StepashinVladimir PutinViktor KazantsevGennady TroshevAlexander BaranovAdilgerei MagomedtagirovMagomed OmarovMagomedali MagomedovSaid Amirov | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| Up to 1,500–2,000 fighters in early August, more than 10,000 militants by the end of September[3] | 17,000 soldiers, thousands of policemen and volunteers | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Russian claim: 2,500 militants killed[4] | 275 servicemen killed, 15 missing and 937 wounded (per Russia)[1] Significant losses to local Dagestani police and militias[1] | ||||||
A Russian marine from the search and rescue team launched to retrieve the two airmen was also killed when a rescue helicopter was targeted by the rebels  /  | |||||||
The1999 war in Dagestan, also known as theDagestan incursions[5] (Russian:Война в Дагестане), was an armed conflict that began when theChechen-basedIslamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), anIslamist group led byShamil Basayev,Ibn al-Khattab,Ramzan Akhmadov andArbi Barayev, invaded the neighboring Russian republic ofDagestan on 7 August 1999, in support of theShura of Dagestanseparatist rebels. The war ended with a major victory for theRussian Federation andRepublic of Dagestan and the retreat of the IIPB. The invasion of Dagestan alongsidea series of apartment bombings in September 1999 served as the maincasus belli for theSecond Chechen War.
During the inter-war period of 1996 to 1999, a war-ravaged Chechnya descended into chaos and economic collapse.Aslan Maskhadov's government was unable to rebuild the region or to prevent a number of warlords from taking effective control. The relationship between the government and radicals deteriorated. In March 1999, Maskhadov closed down theChechen parliament and introduced aspects ofSharia. Despite this concession, extremists such asShamil Basayev and theSaudi-born IslamistIbn Al-Khattab continued to undermine the Maskhadov government. In April 1998, the group publicly declared that its long-term aim was the creation of a union ofChechnya andDagestan underIslamic rule and the expulsion ofRussians from the entireCaucasian Region.[6]
In late 1997,Bagaudtin Kebedov (also known as Bagaudtin Magomedov), the ethnicAvar leader of the radical wing of the DagestaniWahhabis (Salafists), fled with his followers to Chechnya. There he established close ties with Ibn Al-Khattab and other leaders of Chechnya's Wahhabi community. In January 1999, Khattab began the formation of an "Islamic Legion" with foreignMuslim volunteers. At the same time, he commanded the "peacemaking unit of the Majlis (Parliament) of Ichkeria and Dagestan".[7] A series of invasions of Dagestan from Chechnya took place during the inter-war period, culminating in the 1997 attack on a federal military garrison of the 136th Motorized Rifle Regiment near the Dagestani town ofBuinaksk. Other attacks targeted civilians and Dagestani police on a regular basis.[8]
In April 1999, Kebedov, the "Emir of theIslamic Djamaat of Dagestan," made an appeal to the "Islamic patriots of theCaucasus" to "take part in thejihad" and participate in "liberating Dagestan and the Caucasus from the Russian colonial yoke." According to this "prominent" Wahhabi's vision, proponents of the idea of a free Islamic Dagestan were to enlist in the "Islamic Army of the Caucasus" that he founded, and report to the army's headquarters in the village ofKaramakhi for military duty. Chechen separatist government officialTurpal-Ali Atgeriyev claimed that he alerted theFederal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) DirectorVladimir Putin, in the summer of 1999, of the imminent invasion of Dagestan.[9]
On 4 August 1999, severalRussian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) servicemen were killed in a border clash with a group of Kebedov's fighters. On 7 AugustShamil Basayev andIbn al-Khattab officially launched an invasion into Dagestan with a group of roughly 1,500–2,000 armed militants consisting ofIslamic radicals fromChechnya, including other internationalIslamists.[10][page needed]
Khattab described himself as the "military commander of the operation", while Basayev was the "overall commander in the battlefield".[10][page needed] They seized villages in the districts ofTsumadi[11] (Echeda, Gakko,Kedy, Kvanada, Gadiri and Gigatl) andBotlikh[12] (Godoberi,Miarso,Shodroda,Ansalta,Rakhata and Inkhelo).[1] On 10 August, they announced the birth of the "independentIslamic State of Dagestan" and declared war on "the traitorous Dagestani government" and "Russia's occupation units".[7][8][13]
The federal military response to the invasion was slow, and the efforts were initially fumbling and disorganized. As a result, all of the early resistance, and much of the later resistance, was undertaken by Dagestani police, spontaneously organized citizen militias, and individual Dagestani villagers.[8] Basayev and Khattab were not welcomed as "liberators" as they had expected; the Dagestani villagers considered the invaders as unwelcome religious fanatics. Instead of an anti-Russian uprising, a mass mobilization of volunteers formed in the border areas against the invading army.[7][10][page needed]
As resistance to the invaders stiffened, Russianartillery andairstrikes came into action. The first use of aerially deliveredfuel-air explosives (FAEs) against populated areas occurred in this conflict, notably on the village ofTando by the federal forces.[14][15] The rebels were stalled by the ferocity of the bombardments: their supply lines were cut and scattered with remotely detonatingmines. This gaveMoscow time to assemble acounter-attack underColonel-GeneralViktor Kazantsev, commander of theNorth Caucasus Military District. On 23 August, Basayev and Khattab announced they were withdrawing fromBotlikhsky District to "redeploy" and begin a "new phase" in their operations.[16] The war also saw the first use of theT-90 tank. In theKadar zone, a group of 8 to 12 T-90S tanks pushed through stubborn resistance. One of the tanks was hit by sevenrocket-propelled grenades and remained in action.[17]
On the night of 4 September, as the federal forces were wiping out the last bastions of resistance in theKadar region, acar bomb destroyed a military housing building in the Dagestani town ofBuynaksk, killing 64 people, the first in a wave ofRussian apartment bombings. On the morning of 5 September,Chechen rebels launched a second invasion into the lowlandNovolaksky region of Dagestan,seizing the border village of Tukhchar, this time with a larger force numbering 200 fighters led byUmar Edilsultanov. Several Russian and Dagestani troops were executed on the way as they captured the village. The rebels came within a mere five kilometers of the major city ofKhasavyurt. The second invasion at the height of the hostilities in theKaramakhi zone on 5 September came as an unpleasant surprise toMoscow andMakhachkala. According to Basayev, the purpose of the second invasion was to distract federal forces attackingKaramakhi andChabanmakhi. Intensive fighting continued until 12 September, when federal forces supported by local volunteers finally forced theIslamists back toChechnya, even though sporadic armed clashes continued for some time.[17][18][19][20][21]
By 13 September, all the villages had been recaptured, and the militants were routed and pushed back fully into Chechnya the following day. Meanwhile, theRussian Air Force had already begun bombing targets inside Chechnya. The federal side announced that they suffered 275 dead, 15 missing and approximately 937 wounded. The number of civilians killed were never compiled.
Russia followed up with a bombing campaign of southeasternChechnya; on 23 September, Russianfighter jets bombed targets in and around the Chechen capitalGrozny.Aslan Maskhadov, the president of theChechen republic of Ichkeria, opposed the invasion ofDagestan, and offered a crackdown on the renegade warlords.[citation needed] This offer was refused by the Russian government.[citation needed] In October 1999, after a string offour apartment bombings for which Russia blamed the Chechens, Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya, starting theSecond Chechen War. After the Russian victory, Dagestan has been a site of an ongoing, low-levelinsurgency, which became part of the wholeinsurgency in the North Caucasus. This conflict between the government and the armedIslamist underground in Dagestan (in particular theShariat Jamaat group) was aided by the Chechen guerrillas. It claimed the lives of hundreds of people, mostly civilians.
The invasion of Dagestan resulted in the displacement of 32,000 Dagestani civilians. According to researcherRobert Bruce Ware,Basayev andKhattab's invasions were potentiallygenocidal, in that they attacked mountain villages and destroyed entire populations of small ethno-linguistic groups. Furthermore, Ware asserts that the invasions are properly described as terrorist attacks because they initially involved attacks against Dagestani civilians and police officers.[8]
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Despite the initial poor showing of the government forces (for example, military helicopters were hit byanti-tank guided missiles during a rebel raid on theBotlikh airfield),Moscow andMakhachkala were able to put together an impressive fighting force. For instance, the light infantry units were partially drawn from theSpetsnaz,paratroopers andnaval infantry, crucial tomountain andcounter-insurgencywarfare.
The government forces consisted of three main elements:light andair mobile infantry units able to operate in the mountains and in small ambush and assault forces; larger mechanized units to seal areas off and maintain area security; and artillery with air support elements that were able to interdict supply lines and box in the rebels. Most of the 'teeth' were drawn from regular army units, with the exception of the MVD'sInternal Troops' 102nd Brigade, theRuscommando force and the local DagestaniOMON. Makhachala long expected an incident of this sort, and since its OMON troops proved ineffectual in 1996 whenChechen rebelsseized hostages in the Dagestani city ofKizlyar, it placed a part of its scarce resources into turning this force into a small local army. The Dagestani OMON force numbered almost 1,000 men and, bar the absence of heavy armored vehicles and artillery, they were equipped asmotorised infantry; the force even had a number of antiquatedBTR-60 andBTR-70armoured personnel carriers, as well as heavy support weapons.
At the end of 1997 the republic also began raising volunteer territorialmilitia. During the emergency, its ranks of reservists and volunteers almost reached 5,000. Their training and equipment were minimal, making them little more than a home guard force. However, their motivation to defend and recapture their homes as well as intimate knowledge of the terrain made them a reliable garrison force.
The insurgents proved to be a collection ofChechen,Dagestani andArab guerrillas. Estimates of the insurgent forces' strength has been estimated of being 1,500-2,000 men. While mostly experienced veterans of theChechen Wars and other wars, they were lightly equipped. They possessed ample supplies of small arms, support weapons, several9M111 FagotATGMs,mortars and ample ammunition but they appeared to have only twoBTR-60s, possibly captured from government forces in the first days of the attack, a singleT-12 antitank gun and a few truck-mountedZU-23anti-aircraft guns to use as fire support.
Their first-among-equals leader wasShamil Basayev, Chechen rebel leader, erstwhile prime minister. Basayev's position was in many ways an ambiguous one. He was a staunchMuslim but didn't share the extremeWahhabism of many of his allies; however, he strongly believed thatDagestan andChechnya should be one state. Although a seasoned and wily guerrilla commander, this war saw him used as a political figurehead. His CPCD was officially charged with forming new "structures of Islamic self-government" in rebel-held areas. The brevity of the occupation and the opposition of many locals to their "liberation" meant that this was never a serious process.
Ibn al-Khattab'sIslamic International Peacekeeping Brigade formed the core of the insurgent forces, accounting for perhaps half of the rebel fighters. Having fought against theRussians during theFirst Chechen War, he went on to wage an open campaign against PresidentMaskhadov, whom he regarded as too close toMoscow. Khattab concluded a marriage of political convenience with Basayev, but in effect retained operational command and a veto on political direction.
The third element in the loose rebeltriumvirate were the Dagestani Islamic militants. BesidesBagauddin Kebedov, the two key figures wereNadir Khachilayev andSiradjin Ramazanov. An ethnicLak and former leader of the Union of Muslims in Russia, Khachilayev had a long pedigree of opposition to the local regime ofMagomedali Magomedov. In 1998 he launched an abortive attempt to storm the government buildings in the Dagestani capital,Makhachkala. Khachilayev escaped toChechnya where he found sanctuary with Islamist guerrilla movements, eventually forging an alliance with Khattab. Despite their Dagestani origins, he and the self-styled prime minister of 'Islamic Dagestan', Ramazanov, proved marginal, reflecting their failure to bring recruits to their side after they launched the operation. The self-proclaimedShura of Dagestan welcomed the "liberation" and declared an Islamic state, but proved to have relatively little authority.
The invasion ofDagestan leading to the start of theSecond Chechen War was regarded by theRussian journalistAnna Politkovskaya as a provocation initiated fromMoscow to start war inChechnya, because Russian forces provided safe passage forIslamic fighters back to Chechnya.[22]
According toBoris Berezovsky, the war was planned for six months before the Dagestan events, over his objections.[23] Berezovsky confirmed thatMovladi Udugov came to see him, but denied that he conspired with Udugov. However, according to Berezovsky "Udugov andBasayev conspired withStepashin andPutin to provoke a war to toppleMaskhadov..., but the Chechen condition was for the Russian army to stop at theTerek River. Instead, Putin double-crossed the Chechens and started an all-out war."[23] In September 1999, transcripts of a number of alleged phone conversations conducted byBoris Berezovsky withMovladi Udugov,Gaji Makhachev and other radicalChechens in June and July 1999 were published byMoskovskij Komsomolets newspaper.[24]
It has also been reported that the head of the Russian presidential administration of theBoris Yeltsin,Alexander Voloshin, administration paid money to Shamil Basayev to stage this military operation.[25][26] In early August 1999, the investigative Russian journalVersiya published a report that Voloshin had met secretly with Basayev on 4 July 1999. The meeting was arranged by a retired officer of theGRU, Anton Surikov, and took place at a villa owned by the arms dealerAdnan Khashoggi betweenNice andMonaco. Many of the participants of the meeting had fought on the same side during theAbkhazia-Georgia conflict during the early 1990s. According toBoris Kagarlitsky, those who arranged the meeting made one mistake; the security system blocked monitoring from the outside but provided perfect conditions for monitoring from the inside.French intelligence was able to listen in on everything that transpired.[27] However,Ilyas Akhmadov believed that Basayev hadn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shorts[28] while Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously were that Basayev had been a participant of a rally inGrozny on 3 July 1999, and that Akhmadov didn't know an instance when Basayev left theNorth Caucasus in the years after theFirst Chechen War.[29] According to a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research, speakers at the rally in Grozny on 3 July 1999 included Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev, andRuslan Gelayev; these men and others called for reconciliation and unity.[30]
Shamil Basayev allegedly worked for Russian GRU, at least prior to the Second Chechen War.[31][32][33] According toIlyas Akhmadov, who worked for Basayev's1997 election campaign and accepted a Foreign Minister position in Maskhadov's government in 1999, allegations that Shamil Basayev was working for Russians should be viewed as an element of the political strife among Chechen leaders, as he criticized what he called "tangents about how Shamil was Russia's agent", noting that "Shamil equally strongly believed that Maskhadov's various calls for peace benefited only Russia".[34]
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