Virtue ethics (alsoaretaic ethics,[a][1] fromGreekἀρετή [aretḗ]) is a philosophical approach that treatsvirtue andcharacter as the primary subjects ofethics, in contrast to other ethical systems that put consequences of voluntary acts, principles or rules of conduct, or obedience to divine authority in the primary role.[2]
Virtue ethics is usually contrasted with two other major approaches in ethics,consequentialism anddeontology, which make the goodness of outcomes of an action (consequentialism) and the concept of moral duty (deontology) central. While virtue ethics does not necessarily deny the importance to ethics of goodness of states of affairs or of moral duties, it emphasizes virtue and sometimes other concepts, likeeudaimonia, to an extent that other ethics theories do not.[citation needed]
In virtue ethics, avirtue is a characteristic disposition to think, feel, and act well in some domain of life.[3] In contrast, avice is a characteristic disposition to think, feel, and act poorly in some domain of life. Virtues are not everyday habits; they arecharacter traits, in the sense that they are central to someone’spersonality and what they are like as a person.
In early versions and some modern versions of virtue ethics, a virtue is defined as a character trait that promotes or exhibits human "flourishing and well being" in the person who exhibits it.[4] Some modern versions of virtue ethics do not define virtues in terms of well being or flourishing, and some go so far as to define virtues as traits that tend to promote some other good that is defined independently of the virtues, thereby subsuming virtue ethics under (or somehow merging it with) consequentialist ethics.[5]
ToAristotle, a virtue was not a skill that made you better able to achieveeudaimonia but was itself an expression ofeudaimonia.[6]
Inancient Greek and modern eudaimonic virtue ethics, virtues and vices are complex dispositions that involve bothaffective and intellectual components.[7] That is, they are dispositions that involve both being able to reason well about the right thing to do (see below onphronesis), and also to engage emotions and feelings correctly.
For example, a generous person can reason well about when and how to help people, and such a person also helps people with pleasure and without conflict. In this, virtuous people are contrasted not only with vicious people (who reason poorly about what to do and are emotionally attached to the wrong things) and with theincontinent (who are tempted by their feelings into doing the wrong thing even though they know what is right), but also with the merely continent (whose emotions tempt them toward doing the wrong thing but whose strength of will lets them do what they know is right).
According toRosalind Hursthouse, in Aristotelian virtue ethics, the emotions have moral significance because "virtues (and vices) are all dispositions not only to act, but to feel emotions, as reactions as well as impulses to action... [and] In the person with the virtues, these emotions will be felt on theright occasions, toward theright people or objects, for theright reasons, where 'right' means 'correct'..."[8]
Phronesis (φρόνησις; prudence, practical virtue, or practical wisdom) is an acquired trait that enables its possessor to identify the best thing to do in any given situation.[9] Unlike theoretical wisdom, practical reason results in action or decision.[10] As John McDowell puts it, practical wisdom involves a "perceptual sensitivity" to what a situation requires.[11]
Eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία) is a state variously translated from Greek as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'blessedness', and in the context of virtue ethics, 'human flourishing'.[12]Eudaimonia in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective, state.[citation needed] It characterizes the well-lived life.
According toAristotle, the most prominent exponent ofeudaimonia in the Western philosophical tradition,eudaimonia defines the goal of human life. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality—reason—as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. In hisNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit ofeudaimonia is an "activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue",[13]: I which further could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community—thepolis orcity-state.[14]
Althougheudaimonia was first popularized byAristotle, it now belongs to the tradition of virtue theories generally.[15] For the virtue theorist,eudaimonia describes that state achieved by the person who lives the proper human life, an outcome that can be reached by practicing the virtues. A virtue is a habit or quality that allows the bearer to succeed at his, her, or its purpose. The virtue of a knife, for example, is sharpness; among the virtues of a racehorse is speed. Thus, to identify the virtues for human beings, one must have an account of what is the human purpose.
Not all modern virtue ethics theories are eudaimonic; some propose another end in place ofeudaimonia, while others are non-teleological: that is, they do not account for virtues in terms of the results that the practice of the virtues produce or tend to produce.[16]
Like much of the Western tradition, virtue theory originated in ancientGreek philosophy.
Virtue ethics began withSocrates, and was subsequently developed further byPlato,Aristotle, and theStoics.[17] Virtue ethics concentrates on the character of the individual, rather than the acts (or consequences thereof) of the individual. There is debate among adherents of virtue ethics concerning what specific virtues are praiseworthy. However, most theorists agree that ethics is demonstrated by the practice of virtues.
Plato and Aristotle's treatments of virtues are not the same. Plato believes virtue is effectively an end to be sought, for which a friend might be a useful means. Aristotle states that the virtues function more as means to safeguard human relations, particularly authentic friendship, without which one's quest for happiness is frustrated.
Discussion of what were known as the fourcardinal virtues—wisdom,justice,fortitude, andtemperance—can be found in Plato'sRepublic. The virtues also figure prominently in Aristotle's ethical theory found inNicomachean Ethics.[13]
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Virtue theory was inserted into the study ofhistory by moralistic historians such asLivy,Plutarch, andTacitus. The Greek idea of the virtues was passed on in Roman philosophy throughCicero and later incorporated intoChristian moral theology byAmbrose of Milan. During thescholastic period, the most comprehensive consideration of the virtues from a theological perspective was provided byThomas Aquinas in hisSumma Theologiae and hisCommentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.[18]
After the Reformation, Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethics continued to be the main authority for the discipline of ethics at Protestant universities until the late seventeenth century, with over fifty Protestant commentaries published on theNicomachean Ethics before 1682.[19]
Though the tradition receded into the background of European philosophical thought in the next few centuries, the term "virtue" remained current during this period, and in fact appears prominently in the tradition ofclassical republicanism orclassical liberalism. This tradition was prominent in the intellectual life of 16th-century Italy, as well as 17th- and 18th-century Britain and America. The term "virtue" appears frequently in the work ofTomás Fernández de Medrano,Niccolò Machiavelli,David Hume, the republicans of theEnglish Civil War period, the 18th-century EnglishWhigs, and the prominent figures among theScottish Enlightenment and theAmerican Founding Fathers.
Although someEnlightenment philosophers (e.g.Hume) continued to emphasise the virtues, with the ascendancy ofutilitarianism anddeontological ethics, virtue theory moved to the margins of Westernphilosophy. The contemporary revival of virtue theory is frequently traced to the philosopherElizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy".[20] Following this:
Thearetaic turn in moral philosophy is paralleled by analogous developments in other philosophical disciplines. One of these isepistemology, where a distinctivevirtue epistemology was developed byLinda Zagzebski and others. In political theory, there has been discussion of "virtue politics", and in legal theory, there is a small but growing body of literature onvirtue jurisprudence. The aretaic turn also exists inAmericanconstitutional theory, where proponents argue for an emphasison virtue and vice of constitutionaladjudicators[clarification needed].[citation needed]
Aretaic approaches to morality, epistemology, and jurisprudence have been the subject of intense debates. One criticism focuses on the problem of guidance; one opponent, Robert Louden in his article "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics", questions whether the idea of a virtuous moral actor, believer, or judge can provide the guidance necessary for action, belief formation, or the resolution of legal disputes.[32]
There are several lists of virtues. Socrates argued that virtue is knowledge, which suggests that there is really only one virtue.[33] The Stoics identified fourcardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. Wisdom is subdivided into good sense, good calculation, quick-wittedness, discretion, and resourcefulness. Justice is subdivided into piety, honesty, equity, and fair dealing. Courage is subdivided into endurance, confidence, high-mindedness, cheerfulness, and industriousness. Temperance or moderation is subdivided into good discipline, seemliness, modesty, and self-control.[34]
John McDowell argues that virtue is a "perceptual capacity" to identify how one ought to act, and that all particular virtues are merely "specialized sensitivities" to a range of reasons for acting.[35]
Aristotle identifies 12 virtues that demonstrate a person is performing their human function well.[13] He distinguished virtues pertaining to emotion and desire from those relating to the mind.[13]: II The first he calls moral virtues, and the second intellectual virtues (though both are "moral" in the modern sense of the word).
Aristotle suggested that each moral virtue was agolden mean between two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. Each intellectual virtue is a mental skill or habit by which the mind arrives at truth, affirming what is or denying what is not.[13]: VI In theNicomachean Ethics. he discusses 11 moral virtues:
| Dimension | Excess | Golden mean | Deficiency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fear and confidence | Rashness | Courage in the face of fear[13]: III.6–9 | Cowardice |
| Pleasure and pain | Self-indulgence | Temperance in the face of pleasure and pain[13]: III.10–12 | Insensibility |
| Getting and spending (minor) | Prodigality | Liberality with wealth and possessions[13]: IV.1 | Illiberality |
| Getting and spending (major) | Vulgarity | Magnificence with great wealth and possessions[13]: IV.2 | Pettiness |
| Honor and dishonor (major) | Vanity | Magnanimity with great honors[13]: IV.3 | Pusillanimity |
| Honor and dishonor (minor) | Empty vanity | Proper ambition with normal honors[13]: IV.4 | Unambitiousness |
| Anger | Irascibility | Patience[13]: IV.5 | Lack of spirit |
| Self-expression | Boastfulness | Honesty with self-expression[13]: IV.7 | False modesty |
| Conversation | Buffoonery | Wittiness in conversation[13]: IV.8 | Boorishness |
| Social conduct | Obsequiousness | Friendliness in social conduct[13]: IV.6 | Cantankerousness |
| Indignation | Envy | Justice and righteous indignation in the face of injury[13]: IV.5 | Spitefulness |
Aristotle also mentions several other traits:
Aristotle's list is not the only list, however. AsAlasdair MacIntyre observed inAfter Virtue, thinkers as diverse asHomer, the authors of theNew Testament,Thomas Aquinas, andBenjamin Franklin have all proposed lists.[36]Walter Kaufmann proposed as the four cardinal virtues: ambition/humility ("humbition"), love, courage, and honesty.[37]
Martha Nussbaum suggested that while virtue ethics is often considered to be anti-Enlightenment, "suspicious of theory and respectful of the wisdom embodied in local practices",[38] it is actually neither fundamentally distinct from, nor does it qualify as a rival approach to deontology and utilitarianism. She argues that philosophers from these two Enlightenment traditions often include theories of virtue. She pointed out thatKant's "Doctrine of Virtue" (inThe Metaphysics of Morals) "covers most of the same topics as do classical Greek theories", "that he offers a general account of virtue, in terms of the strength of the will in overcoming wayward and selfish inclinations; that he offers detailed analyses of standard virtues such as courage and self-control, and of vices, such as avarice, mendacity, servility, and pride; that, although in general, he portrays inclination as inimical to virtue, he also recognizes that sympathetic inclinations offer crucial support to virtue, and urges their deliberate cultivation."[38]
Nussbaum also points to considerations of virtue by utilitarians such asHenry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics),Jeremy Bentham (The Principles of Morals and Legislation), andJohn Stuart Mill, who writes of moral development as part of an argument for the moral equality of women (The Subjection of Women). She argues that contemporary virtue ethicists such as Alasdair MacIntyre,Bernard Williams,Philippa Foot, andJohn McDowell have few points of agreement and that the common core of their work does not represent a break from Kant.
Immanuel Kant's position on virtue ethics is contested. Those who argue that Kantian deontology conflicts with virtue ethics include Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, and Bernard Williams.[39] In theGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and theCritique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant offers many different criticisms of ethical frameworks and against moral theories before him.[citation needed] Kant rarely mentioned Aristotle by name but did not exclude his moral philosophy of virtue ethics from his critique. Many Kantian arguments against virtue ethics claim that virtue ethics is inconsistent, or sometimes that it is not a real moral theory at all.[40]
In "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?",[41] Gregory Velazco y Trianosky identified the key points of divergence between virtue ethicists and what he called "neo-Kantianism", in the form these nine neo-Kantian moral assertions:
Trianosky says that modern sympathizers with virtue ethics almost all reject neo-Kantian claim #1, and many of them also reject certain of the other claims.
Robert B. Louden criticizes virtue ethics on the basis that it promotes a form of unsustainableutopianism. Trying to arrive at a single set of virtues is immensely difficult in contemporary societies as, according to Louden, they contain "more ethnic, religious, and class groups than did the moral community which Aristotle theorized about" with each of these groups having "not only its own interests but its own set of virtues as well". Louden notes in passing that MacIntyre, a supporter of virtue-based ethics, has grappled with this inAfter Virtue but that ethics cannot dispense with building rules around acts and rely only on discussing themoral character of persons.[42]
Virtue contrasts withdeontological and consequentialist ethics; the three are the most predominant contemporary normative-ethical theories.Deontological ethics, sometimes referred to as duty ethics, emphasizes adherence to ethical principles or duties. How these duties are defined, however, is often a subject of debate. One rule scheme used by deontologists isdivine command theory. Deontology also depends upon meta-ethicalrealism in postulating the existence ofmoral absolutes, regardless of circumstances.Immanuel Kant is considered a foremost theorist of deontological ethics.
The next predominant school of thought innormative ethics isconsequentialism. While deontology emphasizes doing one's duty, consequentialism bases the morality of an action on its outcome. Instead of saying that one has a moral duty to abstain from murder, a consequentialist would say that we should abstain from murder because it has undesirable effects. The main contention is what outcomes should (or can) be identified as objectively desirable.
John Stuart Mill's greatest happiness principle is a commonly-adopted criterion of what is objectively desirable. Mill asserts that the desirability of an action is the net amount of happiness it brings, the number of people it brings happiness to, and the duration of that happiness. He tries to delineate classes of happiness, some preferable to others, but classifying such a concept is difficult.
A virtue ethicist identifies virtues (also known as desirable characteristics) that a good person embodies. Exhibiting these virtues is the aim of ethics, and one's actions are a reflection of one's virtues. To the virtue philosopher, action cannot be used as a demarcation of morality because a virtue encompasses more than a selection of an action; it is a way of being that leads the person exhibiting the virtue to consistently make certain types of choices. There is disagreement in virtue ethics about what are, and what are not, virtues. There are also difficulties in identifying the "virtuous" action to take in all circumstances, and how to define a virtue.
Consequentialist and deontological theories often still employ the termvirtue in a restricted sense: as a tendency (or disposition) to adhere to the system's principles or rules. In those theories, virtue is secondary and the principles (or rules) are primary. These differing senses of what constitutes virtue are a potential source of confusion.[43]Dogmatic claims about the purpose of human life, or about what a good life is for human beings, are typically controversial.
Virtue theory emphasizes Aristotle's belief in thepolis as the acme of political organization,[citation needed] and the role of the virtues in enabling human beings to flourish in that environment. In contrast, classical republicanism emphasizesTacitus's concern that power and luxury can corrupt individuals and destroy liberty, as Tacitus perceived in the transformation of theRoman Republic into theRoman Empire. Virtue for classical republicans is a shield against this sort of corruption and a means to preserve the good life one has, rather than a means by which to achieve the good life one does not yet have. Another way to put the distinction between the two traditions is that virtue ethics relies on Aristotle's fundamental distinction between the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-should-be, while classical republicanism relies on the Tacitean distinction of the risk-of-becoming.[44]
Virtue ethics has a number of contemporary applications:
Within the field of social ethics,Deirdre McCloskey argues that virtue ethics can provide a basis for a balanced approach to understanding capitalism and capitalist societies.[45][46]
Within the field ofphilosophy of education,James Page argues that virtue ethics can provide a rationale and foundation forpeace education.[47]
Thomas Alured Faunce argued that whistleblowing in healthcare settings would be more respected within clinical governance pathways if it had a firmer academic foundation in virtue ethics.[48] He called for whistleblowing to be expressly supported in theUNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.[49] Barry Schwartz argues that "practical wisdom" is an antidote to much of the inefficient and inhumane bureaucracy of modern health care systems.[50]
In her bookTechnology and the Virtues,[51]Shannon Vallor proposed a series of "technomoral" virtues that people need to cultivate in order to flourish in our socio-technological world: honesty (respecting truth), self-control (becoming the author of our desires), humility (knowing what we do not know), justice (upholding rightness), courage (intelligent fear and hope), empathy (compassionate concern for others), care (loving service to others), civility (making common cause), flexibility (skillful adaptation to change), perspective (holding on to the moral whole), and magnanimity (moral leadership and nobility of spirit).
[Virtue Ethics] refers to a rather new (or renewed) approach to ethics, according to which the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character.
Virtues are viewed as necessary conditions for, or as constitutive elements of, human flourishing and wellbeing.
What is surprising today is how many of the most influential writers on the virtues today in fact defend some sort of teleological if not specifically utilitarian answer.
[Aristotle regards virtue as] a constitutive element of the human good rather than merely a means to its attainment.
Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a 'neo-Aristotelian' or eudaimonist form..., almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These arearête (excellence or virtue),phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) andeudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing).
[I]t is important to notice (1.) that virtue ethics is not necessarily tied to the notion of wellbeing; and (2.) that according to some philosophers, virtue ethics is necessarily, or at least typically, of anon-teleological nature.
[A] view shared by both deontologists and utilitarians... [is that] the value of character traits is dependent on the value of the conduct that these traits tend to produce, and it is the concept of right behavior that it theoretically prior, not that of virtue. In reversing the order of justification, virtue ethics is calling for a real revolution in ethical thought...