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 President Richard Nixon shaking hands with armed forces in South Vietnam, July 30, 1969 | |||||||
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Vietnamization was a failedforeign policy of theRichard Nixon administration to endU.S. involvement in the Vietnam War through a program to "expand, equip, and trainSouth Vietnamese forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S.combat troops".[1] Furthermore the policy also sought to prolong both the war and American domestic support for it.[2] Brought on by the communistNorth Vietnam'sTet Offensive, the policy referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in theground combat role, but did not reject combat by theU.S. Air Force, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies ofU.S. foreign military assistance organizations. U.S. citizens' mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiersmassacring civilians at My Lai (1968), theinvasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of thePentagon Papers.At a January 28, 1969, meeting of theNational Security Council, GeneralAndrew Goodpaster, deputy to GeneralCreighton Abrams and commander of theMilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam, stated that theArmy of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam; ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close.Secretary of DefenseMelvin Laird agreed with the point, but not with the language: "What we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues."[3] Nixon immediately liked Laird's word.[4]
Vietnamization fit into the broaderdétente policy of the Nixon administration, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as thecontainment of communism but as a cooperativeworld order, in which Nixon and his chief adviserHenry Kissinger were focused on the otherworld powers.[5] Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate diplomatic policies with Soviet statesmanAnatoly Dobrynin. Nixon also opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with theSoviet Union andChina were of higher priority thanSouth Vietnam. The policy of Vietnamization, despite its successful execution, was ultimately a failure as the improved ARVN forces and the reduced American and Allied component were unable to prevent thefall of Saigon and the subsequent merger of the north and south undercommunism, to form theSocialist Republic of Vietnam.
Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills", while the second was "the extension of the pacification program [i.e. military aid to civilians] in South Vietnam". To achieve the first goal, U.S. helicopters would fly in support; however, helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel.[6] Thus, ARVN candidates were enrolled in U.S. helicopter schools to take over the operations. As observed byLieutenant General Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed to learn English; this, in addition to the months-long training and practice in the field, made adding new capabilities to the ARVN take at least two years.[7] Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. However: "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge ... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active ... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."
From 1950, after several years of theFirst Indochina War, French commanders adopted a policy they called "yellowing" (jaunissement), expressly to minimizeWhite casualties.[8] This change, at the time, was mostly due to a deficit of troops in the FTEO, the Far-East segment of theFrench army. Vietnamese soldiers were progressively integrated in battalions.[9] As part ofdecolonization process, after recognizing Vietnamese independence within theFrench Union in 1949, France allowed Vietnam to establish its own army (Vietnamese National Army) on 8 December 1950, this army then worked side by side with theFrench army (French Union Army) to fight against the communistViet Minh rebels.[10] U.S. critics of the war compared Vietnamization tojaunissement.[11] This Vietnamese army would become the ARVN.
Lyndon Johnson's major political interests were domestic; the war interfered with his domestic focus, and he was eager to end the war in a way that he considered politically acceptable. In 1967, Kissinger attended aPugwash Conference of scientists interested innuclear disarmament. This was the first contact betweenHo Chi Minh and Kissinger, who was then an adviser toNelson Rockefeller, the governor of New York and a presidential candidate.[12] Two participants approached Kissinger and offered adisavowable means of communication between the U.S. and the communist leadership. In particular,Raymond Aubrac, an official of theWorld Health Organization, knew Ho Chi Minh and agreed to carry a message.
After discussing the matter with Assistant Secretary of StateWilliam Bundy and Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara, a message was sent. Ho said he would be willing to negotiate if the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam underOperation Rolling Thunder ceased. Mai Van Bo, Hanoi's diplomatic representative in Paris, was named a point of contact. Since Hanoi would not communicate with an American official without a bombing halt, Kissinger served as an intermediary. Johnson made a speech in San Antonio on September 29, offering the possibility of talks. They were rejected, although brought up again in 1967.[13]
The departure ofLyndon B. Johnson did not end the war; rather, it spread throughoutSoutheast Asia. TheTet Offensive (1968) was a political and media disaster. NewsmanWalter Cronkite announced that he saw a stalemate as the best case scenario for the Tet Offensive. Other members of the press added to the call toretrench (reduce costs and spending).[citation needed] President Johnson's popularity plummeted and he announced a bombing halt on March 31, simultaneously announcing he would not run for re-election.[14] Though he had low expectations, on May 10, 1968, Johnson began peace talks between U.S. and North Vietnamese inParis. The war, however, continued.
Under theNixon administration,Henry Kissinger, Nixon's chief adviser, asked theRand Corporation to provide a list of policy options, prepared byDaniel Ellsberg. On receiving the report, Kissinger and Schelling asked Ellsberg about the apparent absence of a victory option; Ellsberg said "I don't believe there is a win option in Vietnam." While Ellsberg eventually did send a withdrawal option, Kissinger would not circulate something that could be perceived as defeat, though privately, he realized the United States was in a difficult position and priorities needed to be set.[15][16]
According to a record, prepared by Soviet Ambassador to the United StatesAnatoliy Dobrynin, of discussions between Dobrynin and Kissinger, the crux of the U.S. position, was progress still must be made at the Paris talks and, for domestic political reasons, Nixon "simply cannot wait a year for Hanoi to decide to take some new step and take a more flexible position". Dobrynin expressed the Soviet position that the U.S. needed to stop trying to divide theParis Peace Talks into two parts:
Dobrynin, however, misunderstood the extent to which the U.S. was willing to apply military force not involving ground troops, culminating inOperation Linebacker II.[5]
The process of Vietnamization was partly influenced by Nixon’s delicate political position on a domestic level. He had been elected with43.4% of the votes, and Laird was concerned with his support at home. Indeed, he could sense the impatience of the American public regarding the war.[16] Nixon himself believed American casualties reduced the support for the war. For members of his administration, a campaign of attrition was useless against an Asian power, because they were able to tolerate a greater number of casualties compared to a Western power.[18]
On the left,Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, feared Vietnamization would not be enough to reduce the numbers of casualties:
My fear is that the current policy will keep the US bogged down in Vietnam – with the killing and cost continuing indefinitely.[19]
Nixon directed theJoint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a six-step withdrawal plan. TheCommandant of the Marine Corps GeneralLeonard F. Chapman Jr. remembered, "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam." Leading the ground force withdrawals,Marine redeployments started in mid-1969, and by the end of the year the entire 3rd Marine Division had departed.[20]
In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive,ARVN units were able to take control of areas held by theViet Cong. GeneralTran Van Tra of the Viet Cong forces in the South stated:
We suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970.[21]
Some ARVN units, especially that had been operating closely with U.S. troops or using facilities, could quickly move into a dominant role in their areas.
Other ARVN units faced more of a challenge. For example, the ARVN 5th Division was directed to move from its existing base camp, Phu Cuong, to that of the U.S.1st Infantry Division inLai Khê, while the U.S. division moved southeast toDĩ An. The ARVN unit had to retain its previous operational responsibility, while replacing a division that was far better equipped with helicopters than a standard U.S. division.[22] At Phu Cong, Major GeneralNguyen Van Hieu, the 5th Division commander, was able to use a localPopular Force battalion for base security. The Popular Force battalions, however, did not move away from the area in which they were formed.[clarification needed]
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In 1969, Nixon orderedB-52 strikes against thePeople's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) bases and supply routes inCambodia, which had been used as a sanctuary by North Vietnam forces. The orders for U.S. bombing of Cambodia were classified, and thus kept from the U.S. media and Congress. In a given strike, each B-52 normally dropped 42,000 lb (19,000 kg) of bombs, and each strike consisted of three or six bombers.
Much of North Vietnamese infiltration went through Cambodia. Nixon authorized unacknowledged bombing in Cambodia while U.S. ground troops were in South Vietnam. GeneralLon Nol had overthrown PrinceNorodom Sihanouk in March 1970, who had presented himself as a neutralist while aware of the PAVN use of his country.
In June 1969, the Viet Cong and its allied organizations formed theProvisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), recognized byHanoi as the legal government of South Vietnam. At that time, communist losses dating from the Tet Offensive numbered 75,000, and morale was faltering, even among the party leadership.
On April 30, 1970, responding to a Communist attempt to take Cambodia, Nixon announced a large scale U.S.–ARVNincursion into Cambodia to directly hit the PAVN headquarters andsupply dumps; the area bordered ARVNIII Corps tactical zone.[23][24]
The campaign began on May 1. The U.S. Task Force Shoemaker, of the1st Cavalry Divisions, carried out B-52 strikes in theFishhook area of Cambodia. T.F. Shoemaker operated with the ARVN Airborne Brigade. Separate ARVN operations took place in theParrot's Beak area.[25]III Corps tactical zone commanderDo Cao Tri, the most visible ARVN leader,[26] encouraged the deepest ARVN penetrations.[27]
The incursion prevented the immediate takeover of Cambodia byPol Pot and hisKhmer Rouge, and cost the PAVN the supply line from the port of Sihanoukville. The Khmer Rouge broke with its North Vietnamese sponsors, and aligned with China. This made American involvement visible to the U.S. population, and there were intense protests, includingdeaths in a confrontation between rock-throwing protesters and National Guardsmen at Kent State University.
The U.S. intelligence collection systems, a significant amount of which (especially the techniques) were not shared with the ARVN, and, while not fully declassified, examples have been mentioned earlier in this article. The Communist side's intelligence operations, beyond the spies that were discovered, are much less known.
While there had been many assumptions that the South Vietnamese government was penetrated by many spies, and there indeed were many, a December 1969 capture of a Viet Congcommunications intelligence center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people, as well as sloppy U.S. communications security.[28] This specific discovery was made by U.S. Army infantry, with interpretation by regular communications officers; the matter infuriated General Abrams in regards to the communications specialists. Before and after, there had been a much more highly classified, and only now available in heavily censored form,National Security Agency analysis of how the Communists were getting their information, which has led to a good deal of moderncounterintelligence andoperations security.[29]
Some of the material from Touchdown also gave insight into the North Vietnamese intelligence system. For example, the NVA equivalent of theDefense Intelligence Agency was the Central Research Directorate (CRD) in Hanoi. COSVN intelligence staff, however, disseminated the tactically useful material.[30] Their espionage was under the control of the Military Intelligence Sections (MIS), which were directed by the Strategic Intelligence Section (SIS) of CRD.
Henry Kissinger began secret talks with the North Vietnamese official,Lê Đức Thọ, in February 1970.[31]
Subsequent congressional action banned further U.S. ground intervention outside the boundaries of South Vietnam, so the next major drive,Operation Lam Son 719, would have to be based on ARVN ground forces, U.S. air and artillery support, and U.S. advisory and logistical assistance.
The Vietnamization policy achieved limited rollback of Communist gains inside South Vietnam only, and was primarily aimed at providing the arms, training and funding for the South to fight and win its own war, if it had the courage and commitment to do so. By 1971, the Communists lost control of most, but not all, of the areas they had controlled in the South in 1967. The Communists still controlled many remote jungle and mountain districts, especially areas that protected theHo Chi Minh trail.
Commanded byHoang Xuan Lam, known more for loyalty toNguyen Van Thieu than for military talent, Saigon's effort to strike against one of these strongholds,Operation Lam Son 719, failed in 1971. The SVN forces, with some U.S. air support, were unable to defeat PAVN regulars. While the operation is detailed in a separate sub-article, the key issues were that the ARVN were inexperienced in executing large operations. They underestimated the needed forces, and the senior officers had developed in a context that rewarded loyalty rather than competence. Let there be no doubt that there were individual ARVN commanders who would be credit to any military, but, Thieu, like those RVN leaders before him, was constantly concerned at preventing a military coup. "Promotions were won in Saigon, not in battle. And vital to advancement was the avoidance of risk, even at the price of defeat."[32]
Thieu relieved the operational commander, head ofI Corps tactical zone commanderHoang Xuan Lam with the most respected combat commander in the ARVN,Do Cao Tri. Tri died 2.5 hours later in his first helicopter crash of inspection. It is known the crash was at low altitude; it has been argued it had crashed due to mechanical failure or enemy fire. Certainly, mechanical failure was less demoralizing.[26]
The 25,000-man ARVN force, which U.S. planners had considered half the necessary size,[33] took admitted 25% casualties, which some estimates put as high as 50%.[34]
By the beginning of 1972, over 400,000 U.S. personnel had been withdrawn, most of whom were combat troops. Politically, this allowed Nixon to negotiate with China and the Soviet Union without suggesting that he was compromising U.S. soldiers in the field.[35]
North Vietnam made amajor conventional attack on the South, for which the U.S. provided major air support underOperation Linebacker I, which enabled the ARVN to regain substantial control. InAn Lộc, South Vietnamese forces halted the North Vietnamese advance towardsSaigon capital. When North Vietnam, late in the year, left the negotiating table, Nixon authorized the destructiveOperation Linebacker II campaign, which forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate; a peace treaty was signed and all U.S. combat forces were withdrawn.
The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam had some excellent ground combat units, but still had very serious problems of command, control, and communications at division level and above.
Many units had become overdependent on American air support, and, while the RVN Air Force had not developed large-scale interdiction capability, they were also of varied quality forclose air support. Beyond the issue that the Air Force was always fragmented to the corps commanders, they also did not receive various expected equipment upgrades. Photoreconnaissance was extremely limited.[36]
Armored units had developed the greatest confidence in their ability to fight without U.S. air support. Ground commanders also learned that armored units were not for infantry support and static defenses, but needed to be used as mobile reserves.[37] Neither North nor South Vietnam, however, had really mastered large-scalecombined arms methods, compared to aNATO orWarsaw Pact level of proficiency.
In a postwar interview with theRAND Corporation,Nguyễn Bá Cẩn said: "Vietnamese officials called Vietnamization the U.S. Dollar and Vietnam Blood Sharing Plan."[38]
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