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United Front Work Department

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Intelligence organization of China
Not to be confused withUnited Front Department of the Workers' Party of Korea.
United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
中国共产党中央委员会统一战线工作部
UFWD headquarters
Formation1942; 83 years ago (1942)
TypeDepartment directly reporting to theCentral Committee
Ministerial level agency
Headquarters135 Fuyou Street,Xicheng District, Beijing
Li Ganjie
Executive deputy head
Shen Ying
Deputy heads
Chen Xu
Chen Ruifeng
Lin Rui
Wang Ruijun
Duan Yijun
Ma Lihuai
Discipline Secretary
Liu Junchuan
Parent organization
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
SubsidiariesNational Ethnic Affairs Commission
Huaqiao University
Jinan University
Budget$2.6 billionUSD(estimated in 2019)[1]
Websitewww.zytzb.gov.cnEdit this at Wikidata
*Minister-level rank
United Front Work Department
Simplified Chinese中共中央统一战线工作部
Traditional Chinese中共中央統一戰線工作部
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhōnggòng Zhōngyāng Tǒngyī Zhànxiàn Gōngzuò Bù




History
Military organ










flagChina portal

TheUnited Front Work Department (UFWD) is an organ of theCentral Committee of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) responsible for conducting "united front work." It gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to gaininfluence over elite individuals and organizations inside and outsidemainland China, including inHong Kong,Taiwan, and in other countries.

The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the CCP, especially in theoverseas Chinese diaspora, who hold political, commercial, religious, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.[2] Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to CCP interests and that potential critics remain divided.[3][4][5]

History

[edit]

The United Front Work Department was created during theChinese Civil War, and was reestablished in 1979 underparamount leaderDeng Xiaoping. Since 2012, the role and scope of the UFWD has expanded and intensified under CCPgeneral secretaryXi Jinping.[6][7][8][9]

Civil war and gaining power

[edit]
See also:First United Front andSecond United Front

United front policies were most used in two periods before theChinese Communist Revolution, namely from 1924 to 1927, and from 1936 to 1945, when the CCP cooperated with the Nationalist Party ostensibly to defeat the Japanese.[10] The simplest formulation of united front work in the period was to "rally as many allies as possible in order to...defeat a common enemy."[10] According toMareike Ohlberg, its stated goal was to "build the broadest possible coalition with all social forces that are relevant".[11]

In the early years, the CCP also used united front policies to cooperate with "disaffected warlords, religious believers, ethnic minorities, overseas Chinese, and minor parties and groups," in order for the CCP to appear democratic and to persuade key groups that the Nationalists were "illegitimate and repressive while the CCP embodied progress, unity, and democracy."[10]

Li Weihan was director of the UFWD from 1944 to 1964.[12]: 11  Regarding religious policy, Li's view was that there were few counterrevolutionaries among religious believers, and that the majority were "patriotic".[12]: 11  He believed that the CCP should be patient with most religious believers and work to increase their political consciousness.[12]: 11  Li contended that the CCP should avoid harsh stances on religion, deeming harsh measures as counterproductive and damaging to the Party's credibility.[12]: 11 

After seizing power, the CCP continued to deploy united front strategies to train intellectuals, "and, using thought reform based on criticism, began the transformation of the old society intellectuals." This involved violent elimination of what were termed "bourgeois and idealistic political beliefs," to instill faith in "class struggle and revolutionary change."[10]

Cultural Revolution

[edit]

During theCultural Revolution, the UFWD was accused of being "capitulationist" and forced to shut down.[13]

Reform and opening up

[edit]

In 1977,Ulanhu became head of the UFWD.[12]: 11  In this role, he contributed to the political rehabilitation of those related to pre-Cultural Revolution policies of the UFWD, such as Li Weihan.[12]: 11 

In the late 1970s the policy was used for the common cause of economic reform. From there the CCP expanded the scope of its work internationally during the reform era, and again following the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The department includes a bureau tasked with handlingHong Kong,Macau,Taiwan, and overseas affairs, and articulates the importance of using overseas Chinese populations to promoteunification.[14]

In 1980, the CCPCentral Committee approved a request by the UFWD to create a national conference for religious groups.[15]: 126–127  The participating religious groups were theChinese Catholic Patriotic Association, theIslamic Association of China, theChinese Taoist Association, theThree-Self Patriotic Movement, and theBuddhist Association of China.[15]: 127 

It played an important role in building support for "One country, two systems" in Hong Kong during the 1980s and 1990s,[16] operating under the name of the "Coordination Department."[17] The UFWD has been critically described as serving to co-opt non-Communist community leaders outside China, and "using them to neutralize Party critics," sometimes coercively.[18]

Scholar of Chinese political history John P. Burns presents in his bookThe Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System excerpts from internal party documents demonstrating the role of the UFWD. The UFWD is to "implement better the party's united front policy and to assess and understand patriotic personages in different fields... so that we can arrange for correct placements for them and fully mobilize and bring into play their positive role in theFour Modernizations and to accomplish the return of Taiwan to the motherland so as to fulfill the cause of uniting the whole country, and to carry forward and solidify the revolutionary, patriotic united front."[19]

The UFWD was used in the early years of PRC rule "to guarantee CCP oversight" over groups that were not directly associated with the Party and government. Those groups, including NGOs, were brought under the authority of the UFWD, whose job it was to “continuing to play its part in mobilizing and rallying the whole people in common struggle” after the Liberation in 1949. When the CCP "shifted its focus from the 'mass line' to 'class struggle', the real united front disappeared. While the United Front Department still existed, its duties of uniting with all forces for the 'common struggle' shifted mainly to serving the Party's leadership and 'consolidating the proletarian dictatorship'," according toBrookings Institution visiting fellow Zhang Ye.[20] According toRoger Faligot, the aftermath of the1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre led to the "growing use of party organizations, such as the United Front Work Department and friendship associations, as fronts for intelligence operations."[21]: 182  Based on their actions in Taiwan and elsewhere the United Front Work Department appears to be used as a cover to conduct intelligence operations against targets of interest to the CCP.[22]

Xi administration

[edit]

In 2018, the United Front Work Department went through a reorganization as part of thedeepening the reform of the Party and state institutions in which it absorbed theState Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) and theOverseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) to become two internal bureaus.[9][23][24] As part of the "one institution with two names" system, the UFWD retains OCAO and SARA (also called National Religious Affairs Administration) as external nameplates.[25] The UFWD also assumed direct control of theNational Ethnic Affairs Commission.[26][27] With the reorganization, the UFWD effectively became China's main agency overseeing and managing ethnic, religious and overseas Chinese affairs.[28][26] The State Religious Affairs Commission and the State Council Overseas Chinese Office were also merged within the United Front Work Department.[29]: 77 

Structure

[edit]
See also:Head of the United Front Work Department

The UFWD is reported to have over 40,000 personnel and does not disclose its budget.[30][31] However, it was estimated to have a budget of at least US$2.6 billion in 2019.[1] It oversees and directs eight minor and subordinateparties and theAll-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.[32]Huaqiao University andJinan University are directly managed by the UFWD.[33][34]

Internal organization

[edit]

Between 2015 and 2018, the UFWD grew to 12 bureaus:[35][36]

  • General Office (办公厅): Oversees the functioning of the department, including its finances, security, assets, and work with other government and Party bodies.
  • Policy and Theory Research Office (政策理论研究室): Handles ideological and policy research,internal propaganda, and the drafting of important documents. Works with other government agencies to develop propaganda efforts abroad.
  • First Bureau—Party Work Bureau (一局,党派工作局): Governs affairs related to theeight minor political parties legally allowed to operate in China.
  • Second Bureau—Minority and Religious Work Bureau (二局,民族工作局): Researches and recommends policy on minorities in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work. Also supervises religious work.
  • Third Bureau—Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan United Front Work Bureau (三局,港澳台统战工作局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
  • Fourth Bureau—Non-public Economic Work Bureau (四局,非公有制经济工作局): Coordinates with figures from the private sector.
  • Fifth Bureau—Independent and Non-Party Intellectuals Work Bureau (五局,无党派、党外知识分子工作局): Liaises withnon-Party intellectuals.
  • Sixth Bureau—New Social Class Representatives Work Bureau (六局,新的社会阶层人士工作局): Focuses on the "new social class", i.e., the rising Chinese middle class.
  • Seventh Bureau (七局): Responsible for ethnic minority and religious work, particularly as it relates to Tibet.
  • Eighth Bureau (八局): Responsible for ethnic minority and religious work, particularly as it relates to Xinjiang.
  • Ninth Bureau—Overseas Chinese Affairs General Bureau (九局,侨务综合局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in overseas Chinese affairs. It runs the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA),[37][38] which merged with the China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA) in 2019.[39]
  • Tenth Bureau—Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (十局,侨务事务局): Coordinates and communicates with friendly figures in overseas Chinese affairs.
  • Eleventh Bureau—Religious Work General Bureau (十一局,宗教综合局): Researches and recommends policy on religious affairs in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work.
  • Twelfth Bureau—Religious Work Bureau (十二局,宗教业务局): Researches and recommends policy on religious affairs in the country, and liaises with other government agencies in their related work.
  • Department Party Committee (机关党委)
  • Retired Cadre Office (离退休干部办公室): responsible for the welfare of retired employees of the department.

Directly-affiliated institutions

[edit]

The UFWD manages the following directly affiliated institutions:[40][41]

Directly-affiliated enterprises

[edit]

Functions

[edit]

The UFWD is tasked with expanding and exerting CCP influence over groups and prominent individuals which have no direct affiliation with the CCP. It engages in a diverse array of social groups including theeight minor political parties legally allowed to operate,ethnic minorities, religious groups,overseas Chinese, private entrepreneurs, professionals in emerging sectors such as social media influencers, and residents of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. It works to maintain communication and provide guidance with these groups, and often rewards the individuals within these groups that are friendly to the CCP. With these methods, the UFWD ensures their alignment with the CCP and additionally gathers policy recommendations and political intelligence.[43]

According to Neil Thomas ofAsia Society, UFWD's work is primarily domestic, calling it a "domestic apparatus whose tentacles extend beyond China’s borders".[36]Alex Joske has noted that there is no clear distinction between domestic and overseas UFWD activity and often overlap between the two.[35] Scholar Martin Thorley has described the UFWD as being able to call upon a "latent network" of civic, educational, and non-governmental groups and affiliated individuals internally and abroad for its political purposes, especially in times of crisis.[44] For instance, the UFWD uses members of theChinese People's Political Consultative Conference and other organizations to carry out influence-building activities, often covertly.[45][46] Researchers fromStanford University's Internet Observatory and theHoover Institution describe the United Front as "cultivat[ing] pro-Beijing perspectives in the Chinese diaspora and the wider world by rewarding those it deems friendly with accolades and lucrative opportunities, while orchestrating social and economic pressure against critics. This pressure is often intense but indirect, and clear attribution is therefore difficult."[47]

Operations

[edit]
See also:Chinese intelligence activity abroad,Chinese information operations and information warfare, andPolitical warfare

The UFWD gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to gaininfluence over elite individuals and organizations inside and outsidemainland China, including inHong Kong,Taiwan, and in other countries.[48] It uses several methods in pursuit of its goals to appeal to its targets. Its primary method involves outreach, including holding events, trainings, media tours and other similar activities. This includes examples such as inviting members of the "new social class" to attend the "large-scale celebration to commemorate theShenzhen Special Economic Zone’s 40th anniversary" or inviting members of the private sector to attend a multi-week training course. Another method it uses is to providing good and services, including issuing tenders for infrastructure and development projects, from road improvements to increasing access to drinking water.[36]

The UFWD also plays an active role in thesinicization of non-Han ethnic and religious minorities, particularly inTibet,Inner Mongolia and of the Uyghurs through theXinjiang internment camps.[49][50][27] In 2020, shortly after the commencement of the2020 Inner Mongolia protests, the UFWD issued a communique that stressed the need for allethnic minorities in China to useStandard Chinese.[51] The UFWD has also taken a leading role inantireligious campaigns under the official pretense of "sinicizing religions."[25] Bureaus of the SARA, absorbed into the UFWD in 2018, in some areas of Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan have brought PRC flags and flagpoles to install in mosques or temples.[36]

The UFWD and its affiliatedfront organizations have also served as cover for intelligence agents of theMinistry of State Security.[35][52] Multiple national intelligence agencies have expressed concern that the mandate and operations of the UFWD can constitute undue interference in other nations' internal affairs.[53][18] In their bookNest of Spies, de Pierrebourg andJuneau-Katsuya allege that the United Front Work Department "manages important dossiers concerning foreign countries. These include propaganda, the control of Chinese students abroad, the recruiting of agents among the Chinese diaspora (and among sympathetic foreigners), and long-term clandestine operations."[54]

TheChinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries has been described as the "public face" of the UFWD.[55] Scholar Jichang Lulu noted that the UFWD and its proxy organizations "re-purpose democratic governance structures to serve as tools of extraterritorial influence."[56] AnAtlantic writer stated China runs thousands of linked and subsidized pro-government groups across Europe, to "ensure that its overseas citizens, and others of ethnic Chinese descent, are loyal", to "shape the conversation about China in Europe", and to "bring back technology and expertise", and that the UFWD plays a "crucial" role in this project.[57] Scholar Jeffrey Stoff has argued that the CCP's United Front "influence apparatus intersects with or directly supports its globaltechnology transfer apparatus."[58][59]

In March 2018, it was announced that the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office would be absorbed into the United Front Work Department.[24][60] With the absorption of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the UFWD gained full control of the country's second largest state-run media apparatus, theChina News Service.[24] In 2019, the UFWD partnered with theCyberspace Administration of China to promote united front work with social media influencers.[35]

In January 2020, UFWD-linked organizations in Canada and other countries were activated to purchase, stockpile, and exportpersonal protective equipment in response to theCOVID-19 pandemic in mainland China.[61][62] UFWD-affiliated groups have also been linked toorganized crime in several countries.[63][64]

In October 2024, Swedish reporters working as part of an international consortium of journalists identified 233 individuals across Europe connected to the united front system.[65] According to theJamestown Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, its research has uncovered 103 united front-linked groups in Sweden spanning all areas of society, including culture, business, politics, and media.[65]

Taiwan

[edit]
Main article:United front in Taiwan

The UFWD sponsors paid trips and summer camps to mainland China for Taiwanese youth. The trips are reported to promote pro-Chinese unification sentiment.[66]

In August 2025, Taiwan's Ministry of Education banned academic cooperation with three mainland Chinese universities—Jinan University, Huaqiao University, and Beijing Chinese Language and Culture College—due to their affiliation with the UFWD.[67] The government also announced it would no longer recognize degrees from these institutions, citing concerns over political influence rather than academic independence.[68]

Foreign electoral interference allegations

[edit]
Further information:Foreign electoral intervention andTransnational repression by China

The UFWD has also allegedly interfered in foreign elections, including the2019 Canadian federal election.[69] Following the2019 Canadian Parliament infiltration plot, thePrivy Council Office warned that election interference by China was "likely to be more persistent and pervasive in future elections" and that "the UFWD’s extensive network of quasi-official and local community and interest groups, allow it to obfuscate communication and the flow of funds between Canadian targets and Chinese officials."[70]

Reaction

[edit]

A 2018 report by theUnited States–China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that the UFWD regularly attempts to suppress overseas protests and acts of expression critical of the CCP are aconspiracy against rights.[45] In May 2020, the White House released a report titled "U.S. Strategic Approach to the People's Republic of China".[71] That report stated that "CCP United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external influence inside the PRC."[72][73] In June 2020, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute issued a report advocating a multi-dimensional response involving law enforcement as well as legislative reform for greater transparency of foreign influence operations.[35] The same month theRepublican Study Committee in the United States called for sanctions on the UFWD and its top leadership.[74]

In January 2022,MI5 issued an "interference alert" for a solicitor in the UK named Christine Lee suspected of political interference on behalf of the UFWD.[75][76] In a February 2022 ruling, a Canadian court stated that the UFWD's Overseas Chinese Affairs Office "engages in covert and surreptitious intelligence gathering”.[77] In July 2023, a group of U.S. senators asked theUnited States Department of Justice to investigate "Overseas Chinese Service Centers" with alleged ties to the UFWD that are operating in seven U.S. cities.[78][79]

U.S. sanctions and prosecution

[edit]
Further information:United States sanctions against China

In December 2020, theUnited States Department of State imposed visa restrictions on "individuals active in United Front Work Department activities, who have engaged in the use or threat of physical violence, theft and release of private information, espionage, sabotage, or malicious interference in domestic political affairs, academic freedom, personal privacy, or business activity."[80][81] In January 2021, the head of the UFWD, You Quan, was sanctioned pursuant toExecutive Order 13936 as aSpecially Designated National byUnited States Department of the Treasury'sOffice of Foreign Assets Control.[82][83]

In May 2023, a U.S. man, Liang Litang, was indicted for acting as an illegal agent of the Chinese government and for surveilling and harassingChinese dissidents. Liang allegedly passed information to officials of the UFWD andMinistry of Public Security.[84][85]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
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