TheUkrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainian:Українська повстанська армія, УПА,romanized: Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia, abbreviatedUPA) was aUkrainian nationalistpartisan formation founded by theOrganisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) on 14 October 1942.[8] The UPA launchedguerrilla warfare againstNazi Germany, theSoviet Union,[9] and both thePolish Underground State andPolish Communists.[10] The UPA carried outmassacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia,[11][12][13] which are recognized byPoland as agenocide.[14] The goal of the OUN was to establish an independent Ukrainian state. This goal, according to the OUN founding declaration, "was to be achieved by a national revolution led by a dictatorship" that would drive out occupying powers and then establish a "government representing all regions and social groups"; OUN accepted violence as a political tool against enemies of their cause.[15][16] In order to achieve this goal, a number of partisan units were formed, merged into a single structure in the form of the UPA, which was created on 14 October 1942. From February 1943, the organization fought against the Germans inVolhynia andPolesia.[17] At the same time, its forces fought against thePolish resistance,[18] during which the UPA carried outmassacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia,[19] resulting in the deaths of up to 100,000 Polish civilians.[20][21][22][23][24][25] In 1944, as the German army was retreating, the UPA continued its war against them by attacking its rear and seizing its equipment, but at the end of July 1944 the UPA formed a united front with Nazi Germany, ceasing attacks on the withdrawing Wehrmacht and defending against the Soviets in exchange for military aid.[26] SovietNKVD units fought against the UPA, which engaged in armed resistance against Soviets until 1949. On the territory ofCommunist Poland, the UPA tried to prevent theforced deportation of Ukrainians from western Galicia to the Soviet Union until 1947.[18]
The UPA was a decentralized movement widespread throughout Ukraine, divided into three operational regions; each region followed a somewhat different agenda, given the circumstances of a constantly moving front line and a double threat from both Soviet and Nazi forces.[27] Not all UPA soldiers were members of the OUN or shared OUN's ideology.[28]
The UPA was formally disbanded in early September 1949, but some of its units continued operations until late 1956. Officially, the UPA's last military engagement occurred in October 1956, when remnants of the group fought on the Hungarian border region in support ofthat country's revolution.[29] In March 2019, surviving UPA members were officially granted the status of veterans by thegovernment of Ukraine.[30]
The UPA has a mixed legacy, both in Ukraine and abroad. While commemorated by many Ukrainians as heroes of their nation, someSoviet Army veterans oppose their positive remembrance[31] and only some UPA veterans have received official veteran status in March 2019,[30] despite receiving other forms of commemoration along with monuments and memorials.[32][33] Some UPA veterans have responded to Polish grievances over their past misdeeds by meeting with Polish veterans and apologizing.[34] Despite controversies over the exhumation of UPA victims in Volhynia,[35][36] Ukrainian and Polish historians have also collaborated on a multi-volume history of the two nations, including the fraught history during the UPA's era.[37]
Organization
A UPApropaganda poster. The OUN/UPA's formal greeting is written in Ukrainian on two of horizontal linesGlory to Ukraine – Glory to (her) Heroes. The soldier is standing on the banners of theSoviet Union andNazi Germany.
The UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN-B (the more radical faction of the OUN after it split in 1940); local OUN and UPA leaders were frequently the same person.[38] The OUN's military referents were the superiors of UPA unit commanders.[39] The UPA was established in Volhynia and initially limited its activities to this region. Its first commander was the OUN military referent for Volhynia and Polesia, Vasyl Ivakhiv. In July, the UPA Supreme Command was organized withDmytro Klyachkivsky at its head.[40]
In November 1943, the UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and the General Staff.Roman Shukhevych headed the HQ, whileDmytro Hrytsai became chief of staff.[43] The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel, training, political education, and military inspectors departments.[44] In addition to the three regions named above, there was also an attempt to create an Eastern Operational Group, including Kyiv and Zhytomyr oblasts, but the project never came to fruition. Similarly, the UPA-South region ceased to exist in the summer of 1944, but continued to appear in documents.[44] Three military schools for low-level command staff were also established.[citation needed]
The UPA's largest unit type, thekurin, consisting of 500–700 soldiers,[45] was equivalent to abattalion, and its smallest unit, therii (literally bee swarm), with eight to ten soldiers,[45] equivalent to asquad.[46] Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more kurins would unite and form azahin orbrigade.[45] Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from the German, Polish and Soviet military, while UPA units based their training on a modifiedRed Army field unit manual.[38]
In terms of UPA soldiers' social background, 60 percent were peasants of low to moderate means, 20 to 25 percent were from the working class (primarily from the rural lumber and food industries), and 15 percent were members of theintelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of the UPA's military trainers and officer corps.[47] The number of UPA fighters varied: a GermanAbwehr report from November 1943 estimated that the UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000.[48] By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25,000 to 30,000 fighters,[49] up to 100,000,[48][50][51] or even 200,000 soldiers.[52]
Structure
The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was structured into three units:[41]
Military District "Cholodnyj Jar" Commander – Kost'. Kurins: Kurin of Sabljuk, Kurin of Dovbush.
Military District "Umanj" Commander – Ostap. Kurins: Kurin of Dovbenko, Kurin of Buvalyj, Kurin of Andrij-Shum.
Military District "Vinnytsja" Commander – Jasen. Kurins: Kurin of Storchan, Kurin of Mamaj, Kurin of Burevij.
The fourth region, UPA-East, was planned, but never created.[44]
Anthem
The anthem of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was called theMarch of Ukrainian Nationalists, also known asWe were born in a great hour (Ukrainian:Зродились ми великої години). The song, written by Oles Babiy, was officially adopted by the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1932.[53] The organization was a successor of theUkrainian Sich Riflemen, whose anthem was "Chervona Kalyna". Leaders of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen,Yevhen Konovalets andAndriy Melnyk, were founding members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. For this reason, "Chervona Kalyna" was also used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.[54][better source needed]
Flag
The flag of the UPA was a red-and-black banner,[55] which continues to be a symbol of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The colors of the flag symbolize "red Ukrainian blood spilled on the black Ukrainian earth.[56] Use of the flag is also a "sign of the stubborn endurance of the Ukrainian national idea even under the grimmest conditions."[55]
The UPA made use of a dual rank system that included functional command position designations and traditionalmilitary ranks. The functional system was developed due to an acute shortage of qualified and politically reliable officers during the early stages of organization.[57]
Supreme commander
Regional commander
Division (military district) commander
Brigade (tactical sector) commander
Battalion commander
Company commander
Platoon leader
Squad leader
UPA rank structure consisted of at least seven commissioned officer ranks, four non-commissioned officer ranks, and two soldier ranks. The hierarchical order of known ranks and their approximate U.S. Army equivalent is as follows:[58]
UPA RANKS
US ARMY EQUIVALENTS
Heneral-Khorunzhyj
Brigadier General
Polkovnyk
Colonel
Pidpolkovnyk
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Major
Sotnyk
Captain
Poruchnyk
First Lieutenant
Khorunzhyj
Second Lieutenant
Starshyj Bulavnyj
Master Sergeant
Bulavnyj
Sergeant First Class
Starshyj Vistun
Staff Sergeant
Vistun
Sergeant
Starshyj Strilets
Private First Class
Strilets
Private
The rank scheme provided for three more higher general officer ranks:Heneral-Poruchnyk (Major General),Heneral-Polkovnyk (Lieutenant General), andHeneral-Pikhoty (General with Four Stars).[59]
Armaments
Initially, the UPA used weapons collected from the battlefields of 1939 and 1941.[citation needed] Later, they bought weapons from peasants and individual soldiers or captured them in combat. Some light weapons were also brought by desertingUkrainian auxiliary policemen. For the most part, the UPA used light infantry weapons of Soviet and, to a lesser extent, German origin (for which ammunition was less readily obtainable). In 1944, German units armed the UPA directly with captured Soviet arms. Manykurins were equipped with light51 mm and82 mmmortars. During large-scale operations in 1943–1944, insurgent forces also used artillery (45 mm and76.2 mm).[60] In 1943 a light Hungarian tank was used in Volhynia.[60][61]
In 1944, the Soviets captured aPolikarpov Po-2 aircraft and one armored car and one personnel carrier from the UPA; however, it was not stated that they were in operable condition, while no OUN/UPA documents noted the usage of such equipment.[62] By theend of World War II in Europe, theNKVD had captured 45 artillery pieces (45 and 76.2 mm calibres) and 423mortars from the UPA. In attacks against Polish civilians, axes and pikes were used.[60] However, the light infantry weapon was the basic weapon used by the UPA.[63]
History
Formation
1941
Taras Bulba-Borovets with his staff at a pro-German demonstration in the district ofSarny, September 1941
The first armed group to bear the name "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" was thePolissian Sich, formed byotamanTaras Bulba-Borovets in the vicinity ofOlevsk inVolhynia soon after the beginning of theGerman-Soviet War. The initial goal of Borovets' force was to fight against theBolsheviks, and it acted independently of German forces, operating against the remains of Soviet units in the area. However, in late 1941 the German command demanded from Borovets to dissolve his unit, after which the Polissian Sich moved into the underground. After its dissoulution as a regular force, Polissian Sich became known as Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army and fought against both Germans and Sovietpartisans. During that period Borovets established ties with parts ofOUN-M, which were active in the regions ofKremenets andVolodymyr.[64]
In a memorandum from 14 August 1941, the OUN-B petitioned the Germans to create a Ukrainian Army "which [would] unite with the German Army... until [our] final victory", in exchange for German recognition of an allied, independent Ukrainian state.[65] At the beginning of October 1941, during the first OUN-B Conference, the OUN-B formulated its future strategy. It called for transferring part of its organizational structure underground, in order to avoid conflict with the Germans. It also refrained from open anti-German propaganda activities.[66] A captured German document of 25 November 1941 (Nuremberg Trial O14-USSR) ordered:
"It has been ascertained that the Bandera Movement [OUN-B] is preparing a revolt in theReichskommissariat which has as its ultimate aim the establishment of an independent Ukraine. All functionaries of the Bandera Movement must be arrested at once and, after thorough interrogation, are to be liquidated..."[67]
UPA Commanders left to right: Oleksander Stepchuk, Ivan Klimchak, Nikon Semeniuk 1941–1942
1942
At the Second Conference of the OUN-B, held in April 1942, the policies for the "creation, build-up and development of Ukrainian political and future military forces" and "action against partisan activity supported by Moscow" were adopted. Although German policies were criticized, theSoviet partisans were identified as the primary enemy of the OUN (B) and its future armed wing.[68] The Military Conference of the OUN (B) met in December 1942 nearLviv. The conference resulted in the adoption of a policy of building up the OUN-B's military forces. The conference emphasized that "the entire combat capable population must support, under the OUN banner, the struggle against the Bolshevik enemy". On 30 May 1947, the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of 14 October 1942—the feast of theIntercession of the Theotokos, and Ukrainian Cossacks' Day—as the official anniversary of the UPA.[69][better source needed]
Starting from autumn 1942, armed units established by OUN-B in Volhynia and Polesia adopted the name of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[64]
1943
On 18 August 1943 forces loyal to Bandera disarmed the Polissian Sich, with many members of Borovets' force entering the newly created army. UPA soon increased the scope of its activities, relying on the secret network established by the OUN-B in Northwestern Ukraine. The first commander of the UPA wasDmytro Kliachkivsky (alias Klym Savur), and its staff was headed by former colonel of theUkrainian People's RepublicLeonid Stupnytskyi. During its initial period the army was based in the region ofKostopil. Many former members of theUkrainian Auxiliary Police, as well as numerous prisoners from theRed Army, many of them ofUzbek,Georgian,Azerbaijani andTatar origin joined the UPA in 1943.[64]
A UPAleaflet, which reads "No to Yoska (Joseph Stalin), no to Fritz (Hitler)"
The relationship between Ukrainian Insurgent Army and Nazi Germany varied on account of the intertwined interests of the two actors, as well as the decentralized nature of the UPA.Despite the stated opinions of Dmytro Klyachkivsky andRoman Shukhevych that the Germans were a secondary threat compared to their main enemies (the Communist forces of the Soviet Union and Poland), the Third Conference of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, held near Lviv from 17 to 21 February 1943, decided to begin open warfare against the Germans[76] (OUN fighters had already attacked a German garrison earlier that year on 7 February).[77] Accordingly, on 20 March 1943, the OUN-B leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the collaborationistUkrainian Auxiliary Police in 1941–1942 to desert with their weapons and join with UPA units in Volhynia. This process often involved armed conflict with German forces trying to prevent this. The number of trained and armed personnel who joined the ranks of the UPA was estimated to be between 4 and 5 thousand.[76]
Anti-German actions were limited to situations where the Germans attacked the Ukrainian population or UPA units.[78] According to German generalErnst August Köstring, UPA fighters "fought almost exclusively against German administrative agencies, the German police and the SS in their quest to establish an independent Ukraine controlled by neither Moscow nor Germany."[79][unreliable source?] During the German occupation, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on police stations and military convoys. In the region ofZhytomyr insurgents were estimated by the German General-Kommissar Leyser to be in control of 80% of the forests and 60% of thefarmland.[80] According to the OUN/UPA, on 12 May 1943, Germansattacked the town of Kolki using several SS-Divisions (SS units operated alongside theWehrmacht who were responsible for intelligence, central security, policing action, and mass extermination), where both sides suffered heavy losses.[81][better source needed]Soviet partisans reported the reinforcement of German auxiliary forces atKolki from the end of April until the middle of May 1943.[82]
In June 1943, German SS and police forces under the command ofErich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the head ofHimmler-directedBandenbekämpfung ("bandit warfare"), attempted to destroy UPA-North in Volhynia during Operation BB (Bandenbekämpfung).[83] According to Ukrainian claims, the initial stage of the operation produced no results whatsoever. This development was the subject of several discussions by Himmler's staff that resulted in General von dem Bach-Zelewski being sent to Ukraine.[84][better source needed] He failed to eliminate the UPA, which grew steadily, and the Germans, apart from terrorizing the civilian population, were virtually limited to defensive actions.[85][better source needed] In order to combat the UPA, the German command used both military force and propaganda methods, with leaflets spread by Germans to the local population claiming the insurgents to be "allies of Moscow".[64]
From July through September 1943, in an estimated 74 clashes between German forces and the UPA, the Germans lost more than 3,000 men killed or wounded, while the UPA lost 1,237 killed or wounded. According to post-war estimates, the UPA had the following number of clashes with the Germans in mid-to-late 1943 in Volhynia: 35 in July, 24 in August, 15 in September and 47 during October–November.[77]: 186 [86][87] In the fall of 1943, clashes between the UPA and the Germans declined, so thatErich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech could claim that "nationalistic bands in forests do not pose any major threat" for the Germans.[77]: 190
In the autumn of 1943, some detachments of the UPA attempted to find rapprochement with the Germans, despite a 25 November OUN/UPA order to the contrary.[77]: 190–194 By the end of the year UPA had liberated from Germans large part ofRivne,Volyn andZhytomyr regions, and engaged in raids in the areas ofKyiv andKamianets-Podilskyi. According to Soviet sources, Ukrainian nationalist units were also active inChernihiv andKirovohrad regions. UPA also fought against German units in Galicia, which starting from October 1943 initiated a campaign of terror against the local Ukrainian population.[64]
In early 1944, UPA forces in several Western regions cooperated with the GermanWehrmacht,Waffen-SS,SiPo andSD.[77]: 192–194 [88] Nevertheless, the winter and spring of 1944 did not see a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and German forces, as the UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against the repressive actions of the German administration.[77]: 196 For example, on 20 January, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village ofPyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hour long firefight with 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.[77]: 197 In March–July 1944, a senior leader of OUN-B in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, resulting in a German decision to supply the UPA with arms and ammunition. In May of that year, the OUN-B issued instructions to "switch the struggle, which had been conducted against the Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets."[77]
In a top-secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadeführer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer GeneralHans-Adolf Prützmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that "The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into the enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group" on the southern front.[89] By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for the UPA for their anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"[90] In the latter half of 1944, Germans were supplying the OUN/UPA with arms and equipment in exchange for the end of attacks on German positions, along with further UPA attacks on the Soviets.[26] In theIvano-Frankivsk region, there even existed a small landing strip for German transport planes. Some German personnel trained in terrorist and intelligence activities behind Soviet lines, as well as some OUN-B leaders, were also transported through this channel.[91]
Adopting a strategy analogous to that of theChetnik leader GeneralDraža Mihailović,[92] the UPA limited its actions against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the Communists. Because of this, although the UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukraine and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine.[92] Due to its focus on the Soviets as the principal threat, the UPA's anti-German struggle did not contribute significantly to the recapture of Ukrainian territories by Soviet forces.[77]: 199
Fight against Poland
Massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia
Polish victims of a massacre committed by UPA in the village ofLipniki, 1943
In 1943, the UPA adopted a policy of massacring and expelling the Polish population,[64] east of theBug River.[93][94] In March 1943, the OUN-B (specificallyMykola Lebed[95][96]) imposed a collective death sentence on all Poles living in the former south-easternKresy region of theSecond Polish Republic, and a few months later, local units of the UPA were instructed to complete the operation.[97] The UPA commanders behind the decision, wereDmytro Klyachkivsky, Vasyl Ivakhov,Ivan Lytvynchuk and Petro Oliynyk.[98]
Theethnic cleansing against Poles began on a large scale in Volhynia in late February (or early Spring[94]) of that year and lasted until the end of 1944.[99]Taras Bulba-Borovets, the founder of the original UPA, criticized the attacks as soon as they began:
The axe and the flail have gone into motion. Whole families are butchered and hanged, and Polish settlements are set on fire. The “hatchet men,” to their shame, butcher and hang defenceless women and children.... By such work Ukrainians not only do a favor for the SD [German security service], but also present themselves in the eyes of the world as barbarians. We must take into account that England will surely win this war, and it will treat these “hatchet men” and lynchers and incendiaries as agents in the service of Hitlerite cannibalism, not as honest fighters for their freedom, not as state-builders.[100]
11 July 1943, theVolhynian Bloody Sunday, was one of the deadliest days of the massacres, with UPA units marching from village to village, killing Polish civilians. On that day, UPA units surrounded and attacked 99 Polish villages and settlements in three counties –Kovel,Horokhiv, andVolodymyr. On the following day, 50 additional villages were attacked.[101] In January 1944, the UPA campaign of ethnic cleansing spread to the neighboring province of Galicia. Unlike in Volhynia, where Polish villages were destroyed and their inhabitants murdered without warning, Poles in eastern Galicia were in some instances given the choice of fleeing or being killed.[94] Ukrainian peasants sometimes joined the UPA in the violence,[94][102] and large bands of armed marauders, unaffiliated with the UPA, brutalized civilians.[103] In other cases however, Ukrainian civilians took steps to protect their Polish neighbors, either by hiding them during the UPA raids or vouching that the Poles were actually Ukrainians.
The methods used by the UPA to carry out the massacres were particularly brutal and were committed indiscriminately without any restraint. HistorianNorman Davies describes the killings:
"Villages were torched. Roman Catholic priests were axed or crucified. Churches were burned with all their parishioners. Isolated farms were attacked by gangs carrying pitchforks and kitchen knives. Throats were cut. Pregnant women were bayoneted. Children were cut in two. Men were ambushed in the field and led away."[104]
In total, the estimated numbers of Polish civilians killed in Volhynia and Galicia is between 60,000 and 120,000.[105][110][111][23] Victims of the UPA included Ukrainians who did not adhere to its form of nationalism and so were considered traitors.[112] After the initiation of the massacres, Polish self-defense units responded by attacking the UPA and their accomplices, however specific order were given not to target the general Ukrainian population.[113] Estimates of Ukrainians killed in acts of reprisal range from 2,000 to 30,000.[114][115][116] On 22 July 2016, theSejm of the Republic of Poland passed a resolution declaring the massacres committed by the UPA agenocide.[117]
Westward shift of Poland after World War II. The respectiveGerman,Polish andUkrainian populations were expelled.The village ofBukowsko was attacked and burned several times by UPA between January and November, 1946.
After Galicia had been taken over by the Red Army, many units of the UPA abandoned the anti-Polish course of action and some even began cooperating with localPolish anti-Communist resistance against the Soviets and the NKVD. Many Ukrainians, who had not participated in the anti-Polish massacres, joined the UPA after the war on both the Soviet and Polish sides of the border.[118] Local agreements between the UPA and the Polish post-Home Army units began to appear as early as April/May 1945 and in some places lasted until 1947, such as in theLublin Voivodeship. One such joint action of the UPA and the post-Home ArmyFreedom and Independence Association (WiN) took place in May 1946, when the two partisan formations coordinated their attack and took over of the city ofHrubieszów.[119] Despite such agreements, other UPA units continued their attacks against the Polish civilian population. In one such action, UPA insurgents and German deserters led by aSS Colonel, burned several villages in theSanok region.[120]
The tactical cooperation between the UPA and the post-Home Army underground came about partly as a response to increasing Communist terror and the forced population exchange between Poland and Ukraine. According to official statistics, between 1944 and 1956 around 488,000 Ukrainians and 789,000 Poles were transferred.[119][121] On the territories of present-day Poland, 8,000–12,000 Ukrainians were killed and 6,000–8,000 Poles, between 1943 and 1947. However, unlike in Volhynia, most of the casualties occurred after 1944 and involved UPA soldiers and Ukrainian civilians on one side, and members of the Polish CommunistSecurity Office (UB) andBorder Protection Troops (WOP).[119] Out of the 2,200 Poles who died in the fighting between 1945 and 1948, only a few hundred were civilians, with the remainder being functionaries or soldiers of the Communist regime in Poland.[119]
The total number of localSoviet partisans acting in Western Ukraine was never high, due to the region enduring only two years of German rule (in some places even less).[122][better source needed] In 1943, the Soviet partisan leaderSydir Kovpak was sent to theCarpathian Mountains, with help fromNikita Khrushchev. He described his mission to western Ukraine in his bookVid Putivlia do Karpat (FromPutyvl to theCarpathian Mountains). Well armed by supplies delivered to secret airfields, he formed a group consisting of several thousand men which moved deep into the Carpathians.[123] Attacks by the GermanLuftwaffe and military forced Kovpak to break up his force into smaller units in 1944; on their way back these groups were attacked by UPA units, which had first appeared inGalicia in June 1943 under the name of Ukrainian People's Self-Defence.[64] SovietNKVD agentNikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform.[124]
As the Red Army approached Galicia, the UPA avoided clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military.[125] Instead, the UPA focused its energy on NKVD units and Soviet officials of all levels, from NKVD and military officers to the school teachers and postal workers attempting to establish Soviet administration.[126][self-published source]
In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded front commander Army GeneralNikolai Vatutin, who captured Kiev when he led Soviet forces in theSecond battle of Kiev.[127] Several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by the UPA nearRivne. This resulted in a full-scale operation in the spring of 1944, initially involving 30,000 Soviet troops against the UPA in Volhynia. Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. In a letter to theState Defense Committee of the USSR,Lavrentiy Beria stated that in spring 1944 clashes between Soviet forces and the UPA resulted in 2,018 killed and 1,570 captured UPA fighters and only 11 Soviets killed and 46 wounded. A captured UPA member, quoted in Soviet archives, stated that he received reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters against 2,000 Soviet losses.[128]: 213–214 The first significant sabotage operations against communications of the Soviet Army before their offensive against the Germans was conducted by the UPA in April–May 1944. Such actions were promptly stopped by the Soviet Army and NKVD troops, after which the OUN/UPA submitted an order to temporarily cease anti-Soviet activities and prepare for the further struggle against the Soviets.[129]
Despite heavy casualties on both sides during the initial clashes, the struggle was inconclusive. New large-scale actions of the UPA, especially inTernopil Oblast, were launched in July–August 1944, when the Red Army advanced West.[129] By the autumn of 1944, UPA forces enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area of 160,000 square kilometers in size and home to over 10 million people, and had established a shadow government.[130]
In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on the UPA throughout Western Ukraine, involving—according to OUN/UPA estimates—at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armoured units. Soviet forces blockaded villages and roads, and set forests on fire.[126][self-published source] Soviet archival data states that on 9 October 1944, one NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with a total of 26,304 NKVD soldiers were stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, two regiments with 1,500 and 1,200 persons, one battalion (517 persons) and three armoured trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as one border guard regiment and one unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them.[131]
By the end of 1944, the number of UPA fighters had declined to 20-25,000, down from over 40,000 at the beginning of the year.[64] During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data[dubious –discuss], the UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 killed, approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and the disappearance of 427 others.[132] Despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, manybattalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in Western Ukraine.[133]: 489 In February 1945 the UPA issued an order to liquidatekurins (battalions) andsotnyas (companies) and to operate predominantly inchotys (platoons).[134]
After Germany surrendered in May 1945, the Soviet authorities turned their attention to the guerrilla wars taking place in Ukraineand the Baltics. Combat units were reorganized and special forces were sent in. One of the major complications that arose was the local support the UPA had from the population.[citation needed] Areas of UPA activity were depopulated. The estimates on numbers deported vary; officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1952 a total of 182,543 people[135][136] were deported while other sources indicate the number may have been as high as to 500,000.[137]
Mass arrests of suspected UPA informants or family members were conducted; between February 1944 and May 1946 over 250,000 people were arrested in Western Ukraine.[138] Those arrested typically experienced beatings or other violence. Those suspected of being UPA members underwent torture; reports[specify] exist of some prisoners being burned alive. The many arrested women believed to be affiliating with the UPA were subjected to torture, deprivation, and rape at the hands of Soviet security in order to "break" them and get them to reveal UPA members' identities and locations or to turn them into Soviet double-agents.[89] Mutilated corpses of captured rebels were put on public display.[103] Ultimately, between 1944 and 1952 alone as many as 600,000 people may have been arrested in Western Ukraine, with about one-third executed and the rest imprisoned or exiled.[139]
The UPA responded to the Soviet methods by unleashing their own terror against Soviet activists, suspected collaborators and their families. This work was particularly attributed to theSluzhba Bezpeky (SB), the anti-espionage wing of the UPA. In a typical incident in the Lviv region, in front of horrified villagers, UPA troops gouged out the eyes of two entire families suspected of reporting on insurgent movements to Soviet authorities, before hacking their bodies to pieces. Due to public outrage concerning these violent punitive acts, the UPA stopped the practice of killing the families of collaborators by mid-1945. Other victims of the UPA included Soviet activists sent to Galicia from other parts of the Soviet Union; heads of village Soviets, those sheltering or feeding Red Army personnel, and even people turning food into collective farms. The effect of such terrorist acts was such that people refused to take posts as village heads, and until the late 1940s villages chose single men with no dependents as their leaders.[103]: 109
The UPA also proved to be especially adept at assassinating key Soviet administrative officials. According toNKVD data, between February 1944 and December 1946 11,725 Soviet officers, agents and collaborators were assassinated and 2,401 were "missing", presumed kidnapped, in Western Ukraine.[103]: 113–114 In onecounty inLviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed 10 members of the Soviet active and a secretary of the county Communist party, and also kidnapped four other officials. The UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members.[103]: 113–114
According to a 1946 report by Khrushchev's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A. A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against the UPA bydestruction battalions in Western Ukraine, only 10 percent had positive results – in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped.[103]: 123 Morale amongst the NKVD in Western Ukraine was particularly low. Even within the dangerous context of Soviet state service in the late-Stalin era, West Ukraine was considered to be a "hardship post", and personnel files reveal higher rates of transfer requests, alcoholism, nervous breakdowns, and refusal to serve among NKVD field agents there at that time.[103]: 120
The first success of the Soviet authorities came in early 1946 in the Carpathians, which were blockaded from 11 January until 10 April. The UPA operating there ceased to exist as a combat unit.[140] The continuous heavy casualties elsewhere forced the UPA to split into small units consisting of 100 soldiers. Many of the troops demobilized and returned home, when the Soviet Union offered three amnesties during 1947–1948.[125] By 1946, the UPA was reduced to a core group of 5,000–10,000 fighters, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border. Here, in 1947, they killed the Polish Communist deputy defence minister GeneralKarol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and US.[141]
End of UPA resistance
The turning point in the struggle against the UPA came in 1947 when the Soviets established an intelligence gathering network within the UPA and shifted the focus of their actions from mass terror to infiltration and espionage. After 1947 the UPA's activity began to subside. On May 30, 1947, Shukhevych issued instructions for joining the OUN-B and UPA in underground warfare.[142] In 1947–1948 UPA resistance was weakened enough to allow the Soviets to begin implementation of large-scalecollectivization throughout Western Ukraine.[143]
In 1948, the Soviet central authorities purged local officials who had mistreated peasants and engaged in "vicious methods". At the same time, Soviet agents planted within the UPA had taken their toll on morale and on the UPA's effectiveness. According to the writing of one slain Ukrainian rebel, "the Bolsheviks tried to take us from within...you can never know exactly in whose hands you will find yourself. From such a network of spies, the work of whole teams is often penetrated...". In November 1948, the work of Soviet agents led to two important victories against the UPA: the defeat and deaths of the heads of the most active UPA network in Western Ukraine, and the removal of "Myron", the head of the UPA's counter-intelligence SB unit.[103]: 125–130
The Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by making significant economic investments in Western Ukraine,[citation needed] and by setting up rapid reaction groups in many regions to combat the UPA. According to one retiredMVD major, "By 1948 ideologically we had the support of most of the population."[125] The UPA's leader,Roman Shukhevych, was killed during an ambush nearLviv on 5 March 1950. Although sporadic UPA activity continued until the mid-1950s, after Shukhevich's death the UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA manpower by Soviet authorities on 17 April 1952 claimed that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. The UPA's last commander,Vasyl Kuk, was captured on 24 May 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by theMGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956".[142]
NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters[144] are known to have committed atrocities against thecivilian population in order to discredit the UPA.[145] Among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD.[146] TheSecurity Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information that about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954.[147] Prominent people killed by UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of theUkrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church, killed while traveling in a German convoy,[148] and pro-Soviet writerYaroslav Halan.[125]
In 1951, CIA covert operations chiefFrank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of Ukrainian nationalists during the period 1944–1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 Communist party leaders, 205Komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data, the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks.[149] Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.[150] Many UPA members were imprisoned in the Gulag. They actively participated in Gulag uprisings ofNorilsk,Vorkuta, andKengir.[citation needed]
Soviet infiltration
In 1944–1945 the NKVD carried out 26,693 operations against the Ukrainian underground. These resulted in the deaths of 22,474 Ukrainian soldiers and the capture of 62,142 prisoners. During this time the NKVD formed special groups known asspetshrupy made up of former Soviet partisans. The goal of these groups was to discredit and disorganize the OUN and UPA. In August 1944,Sydir Kovpak was placed under NKVD authority. Posing as Ukrainian insurgents, these special formations used violence against the civilian population of Western Ukraine. In June 1945 there were 156 such special groups with 1,783 members.[151][better source needed]
From December 1945 to 1946, 15,562 operations were carried out in which 4,200 were killed and more than 9,400 were arrested. From 1944 to 1953, the Soviets killed 153,000 and arrested 134,000 members of the UPA. 66,000 families (204,000 people) were forcibly deported to Siberia and half a million people were subject to repression. In the same period, Polish Communist authorities deported 450,000 people.[151] Soviet infiltration of British intelligence also meant that MI6 assisted in training some of the guerrillas in parachuting and unmarked planes used to drop them into Ukraine from bases in Cyprus and Malta, were counter-acted by the fact that one MI6 agent with knowledge of the operation wasKim Philby. Working withAnthony Blunt, he alerted Soviet security forces about planned drops. Ukrainian guerrillas were intercepted and most were executed.[152]
Ukrainian Insurgent Army, September 1944 Instruction abstract.Text in Ukrainian: "Jewish question" – "No actions against Jews to be taken. Jewish issue is no longer a problem (only few of them remain). This does not apply to those who stand out against us actively."
The OUN-B pursued a policy of infiltrating the German police to obtain weapons and training for fighters. In that role, it helped the Germans to carry out theHolocaust.[153] TheUkrainian Auxiliary Police, working for the Germans, played a crucial supporting role in the murder of 200,000 Jews in Volhynia in the second half of 1942. Most of the police deserted in the following spring and joined the UPA.[154] HistorianShmuel Spector estimated in 1990 that the UPA and OUN together hunted down and killed several thousand Jews.[155] With the first antisemitic ideology and acts traced back to theRussian Civil War, by 1940–1941 the publications of Ukrainian political organizations became explicitly antisemitic.[156] German documents of the period give the impression that Ukrainianultranationalists were indifferent to the plight of the Jews and would either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate for their political goals.[153]
According toTimothy D. Snyder, the Soviet partisans were known for their brutality by retaliating against entire villages suspected of working with the Germans, killing individuals deemed to becollaborators, and provoking the Germans to attack villages. The UPA would later attempt to match that brutality.[157]John-Paul Himka notes that "it is reasonable to assume that the [UPA]--like its Polish counterpart, theHome Army (AK)--liquidated Jewish partisan bands because they were pro-Communist".[153]
By early 1943, the OUN-B had entered into open armed conflict with Nazi Germany. According to Ukrainian historian and former UPA soldierLev Shankovsky, immediately upon assuming the position of commander of the UPA in August 1943,Roman Shukhevych issued an order banning participation in anti-Jewish activities. No written record of this order, however, has been found.[158] In 1944, the OUN-B formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity".[133]: 474 Nevertheless,Jews hiding from the Germans with Poles in Polish villages were often killed by the UPA along with their Polish saviors, although in at least one case, they were spared as the Poles were murdered.[157] Some Jews who fled the ghettos for the forests were killed by members of the UPA.[159]
Jewish UPA membership
According toHerbert Romerstein, Soviet propaganda complained about Zionist membership in the UPA,[160] and during the persecution of Jews in the early 1950s, they described the alleged connection between Jewish and Ukrainian nationalists.[161] One well-known claimed example of Jewish participation in the UPA was most likely a hoax, according to sources such as Friedman.[162][163] According to the report,Stella Krenzbach, the daughter of a rabbi and a Zionist, joined the UPA as a nurse and intelligence agent. She is alleged to have written, "I attribute the fact that I am alive today and devoting all the strength of my thirty-eight years to a free Israel only to God and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I became a member of the heroic UPA on 7 November 1943. In our group I counted twelve Jews, eight of whom were doctors".[164] Later, Friedman concluded that Krenzbach was a fictional character, as the only evidence for her existence was in an OUN paper. No one knew of such an employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she supposedly worked after the war. A Jew,Leiba Dubrovskii, pretended to be Ukrainian.[165]
Legacy
Attempts at reconciliation
During the following years, the UPA was officially taboo in the Soviet Union, mentioned only as a terrorist organization.[31] Since Ukraine's independence in 1991, there have been heated debates about the possible award of official recognition to former UPA members as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans.[31] UPA veterans have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition fromSoviet Army veterans and some Ukrainian politicians, particularly from the south and east of the country.[31]
Exhumation of Polish victims, many of whom were identified as children (pictured), at the site of theGaj massacre committed by UPA, 2013
Attempts to reconcile former PolishHome Army and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former UPA members have expressed their readiness for a mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organizations have met and asked for forgiveness for their past misdeeds.[34] However, the subject of exhumations remains a contentious issue between the Polish and Ukrainian governments, and in the past, the Ukrainian authorities were accused of trying to cover up the scale of the massacres perpetrated by UPA on the Polish civilian population.[166] Restorations of graves and cemeteries in Poland where fallen UPA soldiers were buried have been agreed to by the Polish side.[167]
2019 official veteran status
In late March 2019 former members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (and other living former members of Ukrainian irregular nationalist armed groups that were active during World War II and the first decade after the war) were officially granted the status of veterans.[30] This meant that for the first time they could receive veteran benefits, including free public transport, subsidized medical services, annual monetary aid, and public utility discounts (and will enjoy the same social benefits as former Ukrainian soldiers who served in theSoviet Union'sRed Army).[30]
There had been several previous attempts to provide formerUkrainian nationalist fighters with official veteran status, especially during the 2005–2009 administration ofPresidentViktor Yushchenko, but all failed.[30] Prior to December 2018, legally only former UPA members who "participated in hostilities against Nazi invaders in occupied Ukraine in 1941–1944, who did not commit crimes against humanity and were rehabilitated" were recognized as war veterans.[168]
Monuments for combatants
Without waiting for official notice from Kyiv, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA's history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials, and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have been erected. Ineastern Ukraine's city ofKharkiv, a memorial to the soldiers of the UPA was erected in 1992.[169]
"If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979... the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million... however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950."[172]
Ukrainian postage stamp honoringRoman Shukhevych on 100th anniversary (2007) of his birthGolden Cross "25th anniversary of UPA" ofAlbert Hasenbroekx [pl;uk] (1967)
Since 2006, the SBU has been actively involved in declassifying documents relating to the operations of Soviet security services and the history of the liberation movement in Ukraine. The SBU Information Centre provides an opportunity for scholars to get acquainted with electronic copies of archive documents. The documents are arranged by topics (1932–1933 Holodomor, OUN/UPA Activities, Repression in Ukraine, Movement of Dissident).[173] In 2007, theSecurity Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) to make public original sources.[174]
On 10 January 2008, Ukrainian PresidentViktor Yushchenko submitted a draft law "on the official Status of Fighters for Ukraine's Independence from the 1920s to the 1990s". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920 to 1990 as part of or assisting theUkrainian Military Organization (UVO), Karpatska Sich, OUN, UPA, and Ukrainian Main Liberation Army would be recognised as war veterans.[175] Since September 2009, Ukrainian schoolchildren take a more extensive course of the history of theHolodomor and the fighters of the OUN and the UPA fighters.[176] Yushchenko took part in the celebration of the 67th anniversary of the UPA and the 65th anniversary ofUkrainian Supreme Liberation Council on 14 October 2009.[177]
On 16 January 2012, the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld the presidential decree of 28 January 2010 "About recognition of OUN members and soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as participants in the struggle for independence of Ukraine" after it was challenged by the leader of theProgressive Socialist Party of Ukraine,Nataliya Vitrenko, recognising the UPA as war combatants.[178][179] On 10 October 2014, the date of 14 October asDefenders of Ukraine Day was confirmed by Presidential decree, officially granting state sanction to the date of the anniversary of the raising of the Insurgent Army, which has been celebrated in the past by Ukrainian Cossacks as theFeast of the Intercession of the Virgin Mary.[citation needed] The date would be moved to 1 October in 2023 with the move of all Orthodox fixed solemnities to the Revised Julian Calendar, but minor commemorations on the 14th continue as usual it was the date in 1942 wherein the UIA was founded.
On 15 May 2015, Ukrainian PresidentPetro Poroshenko signed a bill into law "On the legal status and commemoration of the fighters for the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century", including Ukrainian Insurgent Army combatants.[32] In June 2017, theKyiv City Council renamed the city's General Vatutin Avenue into Roman Shukhevych Avenue.[180][181] According to Russia'sRIA Novosti in 2018, inKyiv,Lviv,Ivano-Frankivsk andZhytomyr, the UPA flag may be displayed on government buildings "on certain holidays".[182] In December 2018, Poroshenko confirmed the status of veterans and combatants for independence of Ukraine for UPA fighters.[183]
The Ukrainianblack metal bandDrudkh recorded a song entitledUkrainian Insurgent Army on its 2006 release,Кров у Наших Криницях (Blood in our wells), dedicated toStepan Bandera. Ukrainian Neo-Nazi black metal bandNokturnal Mortum have a song titled "Hailed Be the Heroes" (Слава героям) on theWeltanschauung/Мировоззрение album which contains lyrics pertaining to World War II and Western Ukraine (Galicia), and its title,Slava Heroyam, is a traditional UPA salute.[citation needed]
Cross of Combat Merit
TwoCzech films byFrantišek Vláčil,Shadows of the Hot Summer (Stíny horkého léta, 1977) andThe Little Shepherd Boy from the Valley (Pasáček z doliny, 1983) are set in 1947, and feature UPA guerrillas in significant supporting roles. The first film resemblesSam Peckinpah'sStraw Dogs (1971), in that it is about a farmer whose family is taken hostage by five UPA guerrillas, and he has to resort to his own ingenuity, plus reserves of violence that he never knew he possessed, to defeat them. In the second, the shepherd boy (actually a cowherd) imagines that a group of UPA guerrillas is made up of fairytale characters of his grandfather's stories, and that their leader is the Goblin King.[citation needed]
Also films such asNeskorenyi ("The Undefeated"),Zalizna Sotnia ("The Company of Heroes") andAtentat ("Assassination. An Autumn Murder in Munich") feature more description about the role of the UPA on their terrain.The Undefeated is about the life ofRoman Shukhevych and the hunt for him by both German and Soviet forces,The Company of Heroes shows how UPA soldiers had everyday life as they fight againstArmia Krajowa,Assassination is about the life ofStepan Bandera and howKGB agents murdered him.[citation needed]
The rally on European Square in Kyiv, 24 November 2013Headquarters of the Euromaidan. At the front entrance there is a portrait ofStepan Bandera, a 20th-century Ukrainian nationalist.
The red-and-blackbattle flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was a popularsymbol among Euromaidan protesters, and the wartime insurgents have acted as a large inspiration for them.[184] Serhy Yekelchyk of theUniversity of Victoria says the use of UPA imagery and slogans was more of a potent symbol of protest against the current government and Russia rather than adulation for the insurgents themselves, explaining "The reason for the sudden prominence of [UPA symbolism] in Kiev is that it is the strongest possible expression of protest against the pro-Russian orientation of the current government."[185]
The most obvious characteristic of the insurgent songs genre is the theme of rising up against occupying powers, enslavement and tyranny. Insurgent songs express an open call to battle and to revenge against the enemies of Ukraine, as well as love for the country and devotion to her revolutionary leaders (Bandera,Chuprynka and others). UPA actions, heroic deeds of individual soldiers, the hard underground life, longing for one's girl, family or boy are also important subject of this genre.[187]
^Alexander Statiev (2010).The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands. Cambridge University Press. p. 80.ISBN978-0521768337.Although OUN-B rejected collaboration with the Germans as a strategic principle after the German crackdown on its members in the early fall of 1941, it continued sporadic cooperation on the tactical level, hoping to reach a compromise with the German administration.
^Hans-Joachim Torke; John-Paul Himka (1994).German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective. University of Alberta Press. p. 171.ISBN0920862918.Contacts between the UPA and the Wehrmacht, which developed in the last few months of German presence on Ukrainian territory, were rather sporadic and tactical in nature.
^Michael O. Logusz (1997).Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th grenadier Division 1943-1945. Schiffer Publishing. pp. 44–45.ISBN0764300814.
^Hans-Joachim Torke; John-Paul Himka (1994).German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective. University of Alberta Press. pp. 168–171.ISBN0920862918.
^Franklin Mark (Ed. ) Osanka (1962).Modern Guerrilla Warfare. [New York] Free Press Of Glencoe. pp. 114–115.
^Rudling, Per A. (2011)."The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths".The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies (2107). p. 14.doi:10.5195/cbp.2011.164.While anti-German sentiments were widespread, according to captured activists, at the time of the Third Extraordinary Congress of the OUN(b), held in August 1943, its anti-German declarations were intended to mobilize support against the Soviets, and stayed mostly on the paper.
^Delphine, Bechtel (2013).The Holocaust in Ukraine – New Sources and Perspectives – The 1941 pogroms as represented in Western Ukrainian historiography and memorial culture(PDF). United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. pp. 3, 6.Some Ukrainian immigrant circles in Canada, the United States, and Germany had been active for decades in trying to suppress the topic and reacted to any testimony about Ukrainian anti-Jewish violence with virulent diatribes against what they dismissed as 'Jewish propaganda'... the Ukrainian Insurrectional Army (UPA), which was responsible for ethnic 'cleansing' actions against Poles and Jews in Volhynia and Galicia.
^abJ. P. Himka.Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian history. University of Alberta. 28 March 2011. p. 4,reproduced inThe Convolutions of Historical Politics, edited by Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman, 211–238. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2012, p. 214Cite error: The named reference "Himka2" was defined multiple times with different content (see thehelp page).
^abAhonen, Pertti (2008).Peoples on the Move: Population Transfers and Ethnic Cleansing Policies During World War II and Its Aftermath.Bloomsbury Academic. p. 99.Cite error: The named reference "ahonen" was defined multiple times with different content (see thehelp page).
^Piotrowski, Tadeusz (1998).Poland's holocaust. Internet Archive. McFarland. p. 234.ISBN978-0-7864-0371-4.By October (1944), all of Eastern Poland lay in Soviet hands. As the German army began its withdrawal, the UPA began to attack its rearguard and seize its equipment. The Germans reacted with raids on UPA positions. On July 15, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, or UHVR, an OUN-B outfit) was formed and, at the end of that month, signed an agreement with the Germans for a unified front against the Soviet threat. This ended the UPA attacks as well as the German countermeasures. In exchange for diversionary activities in the rear of the Soviet front, Germans began providing the Ukrainian underground with supplies, arms, and training materials
^abTimothy Snyder.The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999. Yale University Press. 2003. pp. 175–178.
^Ahonen, Pertti (2008).Peoples on the Move: Population Transfers and Ethnic Cleansing Policies During World War II and Its Aftermath.Bloomsbury Academic. p. 99.
^Motyka 2011, p. 447. sfn error: no target: CITEREFMotyka2011 (help)
^Aleksander V. Prusin.Ethnic Cleansing: Poles from Western Ukraine. In: Matthew J. Gibney, Randall Hansen. Immigration and asylum: from 1900 to the present. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO. 2005. pp. 204–205.
^Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe."The Ukrainian National Revolution" of 1941. Discourse and Practice of a Fascist Movement. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History. Vol. 12/No. 1 (Winter 2011). p. 83.
^abPiotrowski, Tadeusz (1998).Poland's Holocaust. McFarland. pp. 224, 233, 234.ISBN978-0-7864-0371-4 – via Internet Archive.... after the massive exodus of the Polish people created a hiatus in the flow of requisitions, the Germans decided to stop the UPA terrorist attacks against civilians ... These anti-Jewish actions were carried out by the members of the Ukrainian police who eventually joined the UPA ... By October (1944), all of Eastern Poland lay in Soviet hands. As the German army began its withdrawal, the UPA began to attack its rearguard and seize its equipment. The Germans reacted with raids on UPA positions. On July 15, 1944, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada, or UHVR, an OUN-B outfit) was formed and, at the end of that month, signed an agreement with the Germans for a unified front against the Soviet threat. This ended the UPA attacks as well as the German countermeasures. In exchange for diversionary activities in the rear of the Soviet front, Germans began providing the Ukrainian underground with supplies, arms, and training materials.
^Snyder, Timothy (2012).Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. Basic Books.
^Plokhy, Serhii (2015).The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. New York: Basic Books. p. 320.The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which had close to 100,000 soldiers at its height in the summer of 1944, was fighting behind the Soviet lines, disrupting Red Army communications and attacking units farther from the front ... Among the UPA's major successes was the killing of a leading Soviet commander, General Nikolai Vatutin. On 29 February 1944, UPA fighters ambushed and wounded Vatutin as he was returning from a meeting with subordinates in Rivne, the former capital of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. He died in Kyiv in mid-April. Khrushchev, who attended Vatutin's funeral, buried his friend in the government center of Kyiv ... not all the UPA fighters shared the nationalist ideology or belonged to the OUN.
^Michael O. Logusz (1997).Galicia Division: The Waffen-SS 14th grenadier Division 1943-1945. Schiffer Publishing. p. 49.ISBN0764300814.
^abNowakowska, Jadwiga (13 July 2003)."Pojednanie na cmentarzu" [Reconciliation in the cemetery] (in Polish). Wprost.pl. Archived fromthe original on 23 August 2004. Retrieved15 October 2013.
^Символіка Українських Націоналістів [The symbolism of Ukrainian Nationalists] (in Ukrainian). Virtual museum of Ukrainian phaleristics. 22 June 2010. Archived from the original on 8 December 2013.
^Sodol, Petro R. (1987).UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin. New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. p. 36.LCCN87-72380.
^However it is not true that UPA had a SovietT-35 tank.
^Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994ISBN5-325-00599-5 p. 585
^(in Ukrainian) Українська Повстанська Армія – Історія нескорених – Львів, 2007 p. 203
^abcdefghЕнциклопедія українознавства. Словникова частина (ЕУ-II). Vol. 9. 2000. pp. 3377–3381.
^Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p. 69
^Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2, p. 92
^Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2, pp. 95–97.
^Shevchuk, Dmytro (20 January 2006).Бандерівці ідуть! [The Banderists are coming!] (in Ukrainian). ukrnationalism.org.ua. Archived fromthe original on 30 January 2009.
^Halik Kochanski (2014).The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War. Harvard University Press. p. 361.ISBN978-0674284005.
^Franklin Mark (Ed. ) Osanka (1962).Modern Guerrilla Warfare. [New York] Free Press Of Glencoe. p. 115.
^Tadeusz Piotrowski (2000).Genocide and Rescue in Wolyn: Recollections of the Ukrainian Nationalist Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Against the Poles During World. McFarland & Co Inc. p. 13.ISBN0786407735.
^Debriefing of General Kostring Department of the Army, 3 November 1948, MSC – 035, cited in Sodol, Petro R., 1987,UPA: They Fought Hitler and Stalin, New York: Committee for the World Convention and Reunion of Soldiers in the UIA, p. 58.
^Toynbee, T.R.V. (1954).Survey of International Affairs: Hitler's Europe 1939–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[page needed]
^Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent ArmyLCCN72-80823 pp. 58–59
^Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol. 2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994ISBN5-325-00599-5 pp, 384, 391
^James K. Anderson, Unknown Soldiers of an Unknown Army,Army Magazine, May 1968, p. 63
^Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent ArmyLCCN72-80823 pp. 238–239
^Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaluk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine. New York, N.Y. Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent ArmyLCCN72-80823 pp. 242–243
^Mukovsky, Ivan; Lysenko, Oleksander (2002).Українська повстанська армія та збройні формування ОУН у другій світовій війни [Ukrainian Insurgent Army and armed formations of the OUN in World War II].Military History (in Ukrainian) (5–6). Archived fromthe original on 3 April 2023. Retrieved31 March 2016.(Translation) ... 35 clashes took place in July, 24 in August, 15 in September; the insurgents lost 1,237 soldiers and officers, enemy losses amounted to 3000 people.
^L. Shankovskyy (1953).History of Ukrainian Army (Історія українського війська). Winnipeg: Ukrainian Book Friends Club. p. 32.
^"16"(PDF).Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. pp. 247–295.[dead link]
^Himka, John-Paul (2010). "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome Elements of an Identity Project".Ab Imperio.2010 (4): 83–101 [96].doi:10.1353/imp.2010.0101.S2CID130590374.
^Grzegorz Motyka, Ukraińska Partyzantka 1942–1960, Warszawa 2006, p. 329
^11. Українсько-польське протистояння [11. Ukrainian-Polish confrontation](PDF) (in Ukrainian). Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. p. 24. Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 28 August 2008.
^Snyder, Timothy (1999). "'To Resolve the Ukrainian Problem Once and for All': The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943–1947".Journal of Cold War Studies.1 (2):86–120.doi:10.1162/15203979952559531.S2CID57564179.
^The exact number of ethnic Polish fatal victims is unknown. Most estimates vary between 50,000,[106] or 100,000,[12][107][13] depending on the source used;[108] lower and higher numbers are occasionally cited too when different regions and perpetrators are included. A neutral halfway point between the most often cited numbers that was mentioned in an IPN conference of Polish and Ukrainian scholars is 85,000 deaths.[109]
^A. Rudling.Theory and Practice. Historical representation of the wartime accounts of the activities of OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Ukrainian Insurgent Army). East European Jewish Affairs. Vol. 36. No. 2. December 2006. pp. 163–179.
^G. Rossolinski-Liebe.Celebrating Fascism and War Criminality in Edmonton. The Political Myth and Cult of Stepan Bandera in Multicultural Canada. Kakanien Revisited. 29 December 2010.
^Kataryna Wolczuk, "The Difficulties of Polish-Ukrainian Historical Reconciliation," Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2002.
^abBilas, Ivan (1994).Репресивно-каральна система в Україні (1917–1953) [The Repressive-Punitive System in Ukraine (1917–1953)] (in Ukrainian). Vol. 2. Kyïv: Lybid. pp. 549–570.ISBN5-325-00599-5.
^According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armoured trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol. 2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994ISBN5-325-00599-5 pp. 478–482
^Exact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February – December 1944 the UPA suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from 1 January 1945 until 1 May 1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. The UPA's actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from 1 January 1945 until 1 May 1945 – 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994ISBN5-325-00599-5 pp. 604–605
^Складна доля української діаспори [The complicated fate of the Ukrainian diaspora].Ukrainian World Coordinating Council (in Ukrainian). 2005. Archived fromthe original on 5 March 2007.
^Theses include deported (1944–47): families of OUN/UPA members – 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917–1953 Vol. 2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994ISBN5-325-00599-5 pp. 545–546
^abViatrovych, V.; Hrytskiv, R.; Dereviany, I.; Zabily, R.; Sova, A.; Sodol, P. (2007).Viatrovych, Volodymyr (ed.).Українська Повстанська Армія – Історія нескорених [Ukrainian Insurgent Army – History of the unconquered] (in Ukrainian). Lviv Liberation Movement Research Centre. pp. 307–310.
^Timothy D. Snyder. (2004)The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press: p. 162
^Burzlaff, Jan (2020). "Confronting the Communal Grave: a Reassessment of Social Relations During the Holocaust in Eastern Europe".The Historical Journal.63 (4):1054–1077.doi:10.1017/S0018246X19000566.S2CID212957318., citingSpector, Shmuel (1990).The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944. Yad Vashem. p. 256.ISBN978-965-308-014-0.
^Barkan, Elazar (2007).Shared History- Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet Occupied Poland, 1939–1941. Leipziger Universitätsverlag. p. 311.
^abTimothy Snyder. (2008). "The life and death of Volhynian Jewry, 1921–1945." In Brandon, Lowler (Eds.)The Shoah in Ukraine: history, testimony, memorialization. Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 101
^Friedman, Filip (1980). "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation. In: Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust".New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies: 203.
^The World Reacts to the Holocaust edited by David S. Wyman, Charles H. Rosenzveig с. 320
^Koropecky, Iwan S. (ed.).The Selected Works of Viacheslav Holubnychy. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. p. 123.
^John Paul Himka.Falsifying World War II history in Ukraine. Himka notes that Bohdan Kordiuk, an OUN member who had been incarcerated in Auschwitz, described Krenzbach's memoirs as false in the newspaperSuchasna Ukraina (no. 15/194, 20 July 1958), and he wrote, "None of the UPA men known to the author of these lines knows the legendary Stella Krenzbach or have heard of her. The Jews do not know her either. It is unlikely that anyone of the tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees after the war met Stella Krenzbach". Himka also noted that Friedman failed to find evidence of her existence.
^Friedman, Filip (1980). "Ukrainian-Jewish Relations During the Nazi Occupation. In: Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust".New York: Conference on Jewish Social Studies:203–204.
^Grishenko, Aleksei (12 January 2015).В Харькове восстановят памятник УПА [The monument to the UPA in Kharkov will be restored] (in Russian). sq.com.ua. Archived fromthe original on 8 June 2023. Retrieved7 March 2017.
^Zenon Lavryshyn. Songs of the UPA. Toronto: Litopys UPA, 1996, p. 19
^"Синам УПА. Тарас Житинський" [Sinam UPA. Taras Zhytynsky] (in Ukrainian). YouTube. 11 February 2010.Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Retrieved15 October 2013.
^"До витоку Дністра! Ой у лісі, на полянці.УПА" [To the source of the Dniester! Oh in the woods, on the glade] (in Ukrainian). YouTube. 23 September 2009.Archived from the original on 10 November 2021. Retrieved15 October 2013.
Володимир В'ятрович, Ігор Дерев'яний, Руслан Забілий, Петро Солодь.Українська Повстанська Армія. Історія Нескорених. Третє видання. Львів (2011).ISBN978-966-1594-03-5.
В´ятрович В. М. Друга польсько-українська війна. 1942–1947. – Вид. 2-е, доп. – К.: Вид. дім "Києво-Могилянська академія", 2012. – 368 с.
Polish
Wołodymyr Wiatrowycz, Druga wojna polsko-ukraińska 1942–1947, Warszawa 2013,ISBN978-83-935429-1-8
Za to że jesteś Ukraińcem ... : wspomnienia z lat 1944–1947 / wybór, oprac., wstęp i posłowie Bogdan Huk. Koszalin [etc.] : Stowarzyszenie Ukraińców Więźniów Politycznych i Represjonowanych w Polsce, 2012. 400 s. : il.; 23 cm.ISBN978-83-935479-0-6
Sowa, Andrzej (1998).Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939–1947. Kraków: Towarzystwo Sympatyków Historii.OCLC48053561.