 Pueblo in North Korea, 2014 | |
| History | |
|---|---|
 United States | |
| Name | Pueblo |
| Namesake | Pueblo, Colorado andPueblo County, Colorado |
| Builder | Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering |
| Laid down | 1944 |
| Launched | 16 April 1944 |
| Commissioned | 7 April 1945 |
| In service | 1945 |
| Reclassified |
|
| Honors & awards |
|
| Captured | 23 January 1968 |
| Fate | Captured by North Korea;39°02′26″N125°44′23″E / 39.04051°N 125.73974°E /39.04051; 125.73974 |
| Status | Active, in commission (held byNorth Korea as a museum ship) |
| Badge |  |
| General characteristics | |
| Class & type |
|
| Type |
|
| Tonnage | 345 tonsdwt |
| Displacement | 550 tons light, 895 tons full |
| Length | 177 ft (54 m) |
| Beam | 32 ft (9.8 m) |
| Draft | 9 ft (2.7 m) |
| Propulsion | two 500hp GM Cleveland Division 6-278A 6-cyl V6 Diesel engines |
| Speed | 12.7 knots (23.5 km/h; 14.6 mph) |
| Complement | 6 officers, 70 men |
| Armament | 2 ×M2 Browning .50 cal. (12.7×99 mm) machine guns |
USSPueblo (AGER-2) is aBanner-classtechnical research ship, placed into service duringWorld War II, then converted to aspy ship in 1967 by theUnited States Navy. She gatheredintelligence andoceanographic information, monitoring electronic and radio signals fromNorth Korea. On 23 January 1968, the ship was attacked and captured by a North Korean vessel, in what became known as the "Pueblo incident".[1]
The seizure of the U.S. Navy ship and her 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came less than a week after PresidentLyndon B. Johnson'sState of the Union address to theUnited States Congress, a week before the start of theTet Offensive inSouth Vietnam during theVietnam War and three days after 31 men ofNorth Korea'sKPA Unit 124 had crossed theKorean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and killed 26 South Koreans and 4 Americans in an attempt toattack the South Korean Blue House (executive mansion) in the capitalSeoul. The taking ofPueblo and the abuse and torture of her crew during the next eleven months became a majorCold War incident, raising tensions between western and eastern powers.
North Korea stated thatPueblo deliberately entered their territorial waters 7.6 nautical miles (14 km) away fromRyo Island, and that thelogbook shows that they intruded several times.[2] However, the United States maintained that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident and that any purported evidence supplied by North Korea to support its statements was fabricated.[3]Pueblo remains held in North Korea, officially acommissioned vessel of theUnited States Navy.[4]
Since early 2013, the ship has beenmoored along thePothonggang Canal inPyongyang and is displayed there as amuseum ship at theVictorious War Museum.[5]Pueblo is the only ship of theU.S. Navy still on the commissioned roster and held captive.[6]
The ship was launched at the Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering Company inKewaunee, Wisconsin, on 16 April 1944, as theUnited States Army Freight and Passenger (FP)FP-344. The Army later redesignated the FP vessels as Freight and Supply changing the designation toFS-344.[7] The ship, commissioned at New Orleans on 7 April 1945, served as a Coast Guard–manned Army vessel used for training civilians for the Army. Her first commanding officer was Lt. J. R. Choate, USCGR, succeeded by Lt. J.G. Marvin B. Barker, USCGR, on 12 September 1945.[8]FS-344 was placed out of service in 1954.
In 1964 theDepartment of Defense became interested in having smaller, less expensive, more flexible and responsivesignals intelligence collection vessels than the existingAGTR andT-AG vessels. The mothballed light cargo ships were the most suitable existing DOD ships, and one was converted toUSS Banner in 1964 and began operations in 1965.[9]Banner's mission was to surveil high-frequency electronic emissions with line-of-sight propagation requiring operating closer to shore than previous intelligence gathering missions.Banner was unarmed, but the crew were issued fiveM1911 pistols and threeM1 Garand rifles.Banner was confronted bySoviet Navy ships while operating off the Pacific coast of theSoviet Union. These ships would sometimes display international signal flags meaning: "Heave to or I will fire," butBanner kept steaming with scrupulous attention toInternational Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Soviet recognition of possible American reciprocity against Soviet ships on similar missions discouraged attacks.[10]
FS-344 was transferred to theUnited States Navy on 12 April 1966 and was renamed USSPueblo (AKL-44) afterPueblo andPueblo County, Colorado on 18 June. Initially, she was classified as a light cargo ship for basic refitting atPuget Sound Naval Shipyard during 1966. AsPueblo was prepared under a non-secret cover as a light cargo ship, the general crew staffing and training was on this basis, with 44% having never been to sea when first assigned. Installation of signals intelligence equipment, at a cost of $1.5 million, was delayed to 1967 for budgetary reasons, resuming service as what is colloquially known as a "spy ship" and redesignatedAGER-2 on 13 May 1967.[9] The limited budget for conversion caused disapproval of several improvements requested by the prospective commanding officer, Lloyd Bucher. Requested engine overhaul was denied despiteBanner's experience of drifting for two days unable to communicate following failure of both engines on patrol. A requested emergencyscuttling system was denied, and Bucher was subsequently unable to obtain explosives for demolition charges. Replacement ofburn barrels with a fuel-fedincinerator to allow speedy destruction of classified documents was denied. After Bucher's subsequent request to reduce the ship's library of classified publications was similarly denied, he was able to purchase a less capable incinerator using some discretionary funds intended for crew comfort. Following theUSSLiberty incident on 8 June,Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)Horacio Rivero Jr. ordered that no Navy ship would operate without adequate means of defending itself. VCNO staff directed the shipyard to install a3-inch/50-caliber gun onPueblo'smain deck with provisions for ammunition storage, but Bucher successfully argued against such installation because of reducedship stability by addition of weight above the main deck.[10] After testing and deficiency reworkPueblo sailed from the shipyard on 11 September 1967 toSan Diego for shake-down training.[9]
When the unarmedPueblo reached the U.S. Navy base atYokosuka,Japan, the commander ofUnited States Naval Forces Japan directed the ship to take twoM2 Browning .50 caliber machine guns as a substitute for the missing deck gun. In the limited time available for training, ten of the ship's crew fired five rounds each. Bucher opted to mount these guns in exposed positions on thebow andstern to keep them as far as possible from his position on thebridge. These positions eliminated possible use of the ship'ssuperstructure to protect the gunners and conceal the guns and ammunition service lockers. The exposed guns, with no nearby ammunition supply, were disguised under canvas covers which became rigid with frozen spray.[10]
| Pueblo incident | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theKorean DMZ Conflict and theKorean conflict | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United States |  North Korea | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Lloyd M. Bucher | Kim Il-chol | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 1 Spy ship | 2 Fishing trawlers 2 Submarine chasers 4 Torpedo boats 2MiG-21 fighters | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 killed 9 wounded 82 captured | None | ||||||
On 5 January 1968,Pueblo leftYokosuka in transit to theU.S. naval base atSasebo, Japan; from there she left on 11 January 1968, headed northward through theTsushima Strait into theSea of Japan. She left with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance ofSoviet Navy activity in the Tsushima Strait and to gather signal and electronic intelligence fromNorth Korea.[11] Mission planners failed to recognize that the absence of similar North Korean missions around the United States would free North Korea from the possibility of retribution in kind which had restrained Soviet response.[10] The declassifiedSIGAD for theNational Security Agency (NSA) Direct Support Unit (DSU) from theNaval Security Group (NSG) onPueblo during the patrol involved in the incident was USN-467Y.[12] AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval andNational Security Agency (NSA) program.[13] Aboard were the ship's crew of five officers and 38 enlisted men, one officer and 37 enlisted men of the NSG, and two civilianoceanographers to provide acover story.[10]
On 16 January 1968,Pueblo arrived at the42°N parallel in preparation for the patrol, which was to transit down the North Korean coast from 41°N to 39°N, and then back, without getting closer than 13 nautical miles (24 km) from the North Korean coast, at night moving out to a distance of 18 to 20 nautical miles (33 to 37 km). This was challenging as only two sailors had good navigational experience, with the captain later reporting, "I did not have a highly professional group of seamen to do my navigational chores for me."[9]
At 17:30 on 20 January 1968, a North Korean modifiedSO-1 class Soviet stylesubmarine chaser passed within 4,000 yards (3.7 km) ofPueblo, which was about 15.4 nautical miles (28.5 km) southeast of Mayang-do at a position 39°47'N and 128°28.5'E.[9]
In the afternoon of 22 January 1968, the two North Korean fishingtrawlersRice Paddy 1 andRice Paddy 2 passed within 30 yards (27 m) ofPueblo. That day, a North KoreanKPA Special Operations Force unit made anassassination attempt at theBlue House executive mansion against South Korean presidentPark Chung Hee, but the crew ofPueblo was not informed.[9]
According to the American account, the following day, 23 January,Pueblo was approached by a submarine chaser and her nationality was challenged;Pueblo responded by raising theU.S. flag and directing the civilian oceanographers to commence water sampling procedures with their deck winch.[10] The North Korean vessel then orderedPueblo tostand down or be fired upon.Pueblo attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the submarine chaser. Several warning shots were fired. Additionally, threetorpedo boats appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack.[9]
The attackers were soon joined by twoKorean People's Air ForceMiG-21 fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second submarine chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition onPueblo was stored below decks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them. An NSA report quotes the sailing order:
( ... ) Defensive armament (machine guns) should be stowed or covered in such manner so that it does not cause unusual interest by surveyed units. It should be used only in the event of a threat to survival ( ... )
and notes:
In practice, it was discovered that, because of the temperamental adjustments of the firing mechanisms, the.50-caliber machine guns took at least ten minutes to activate. Only one crew member, with former army experience, had ever had any experience with such weapons, although members of the crew had received rudimentary instructions on the weapons immediately prior to the ship's deployment.[9]
_(cropped).jpg)
U.S. Navy authorities and the crew ofPueblo insist that before the capture,Pueblo was miles outside North Korean territorial waters. North Korea claims that the vessel was well within North Korean territory. ThePueblo's mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1,852 m) of that limit. However, North Korea describes a 50-nautical-mile (93 km)sea boundary even though international standards were 12 nautical miles (22 km) at the time.[14]
The North Korean vessels attempted to boardPueblo, but she was maneuvered to prevent this for over two hours. The submarine chaser then opened fire with a 57 mm cannon and the smaller vessels fired machine guns, injuring Signalman Leach in his left calf and upper right side. Captain Bucher, too, received slight shrapnel wounds, but they were not incapacitating. The crew ofPueblo then began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great that it was impossible to destroy it all. An NSA report quotes Lieutenant Steve Harris, the officer in charge ofPueblo'sNaval Security Group Command detachment:
( ... ) we had retained on board the obsolete publications and had all good intentions of getting rid of these things but had not done so at the time we had started the mission. I wanted to get the place organized eventually and we had excessive numbers of copies on board ( ... )
and concludes:
Only a small percentage of the total classified material aboard the ship was destroyed.
Radio contact betweenPueblo and the Naval Security Group inKamiseya, Japan had been ongoing during the incident. As a result,Seventh Fleet command was fully aware ofPueblo's situation. Air cover was promised but never arrived. TheFifth Air Force had no aircraft on strip alert, and estimated a two-to-three-hour delay in launching aircraft.USS Enterprise was located 510 nautical miles (940 km) south ofPueblo, yet her fourF-4B aircraft on alert were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement.Enterprise's captain estimated that 1.5 hours (90 minutes) were required to get the converted aircraft into the air.[9]
Eventually the shelling forcedPueblo to stop, signal compliance, and follow the North Korean vessels as ordered.Pueblo stopped again immediately outside North Korean waters in an attempt to obtain more time for destroying sensitive material, but was immediately fired upon by the submarine chaser, and a sailor, fireman Duane Hodges, was killed, after whichPueblo resumed following the North Korean vessels. The ship was finally boarded at 05:55 UTC (2:55 pm local)[15] by men from a torpedo boat and the submarine chaser. Crew members had their hands tied and were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets. OncePueblo was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.[citation needed]
The first official confirmation that the ship was in North Korean hands came five days later, 28 January 1968. Two days earlier, a flight by a CIAA-12 Oxcart aircraft from the Project Black Shield squadron atKadena,Okinawa, flown by pilot Jack Weeks, made three high-altitude, high-speed flights over North Korea. When the aircraft's films were processed in the United States, they showedPueblo to be in theWonsan harbor area surrounded by two North Korean vessels.[16]
There was dissent among government officials in the United States regarding the nation's response to the situation.CongressmanMendel Rivers suggested that President Johnson issue an ultimatum for the return ofPueblo under penalty of nuclear attack, while SenatorGale McGee said that the United States should wait for more information and not make "spasmodic response[s] to aggravating incidents."[17] According toHorace Busby, Special Assistant to President Johnson, the president's "reaction to the hostage taking was to work very hard here to keep down any demands for retaliation or any other attacks upon North Koreans", worried that rhetoric might result in the hostages being killed.[18]
On Wednesday, 24 January 1968, the day following the incident, after extensive cabinet meetings Washington decided that its initial response should be to:
The Johnson Administration also considered a blockade of North Korean ports, air strikes on military targets and an attack across theDemilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.[23]
Although American officials assumed that the seizure ofPueblo had been directed by the Soviet Union, declassified Soviet archives later showed that the Soviet leadership was caught by surprise, and became fearful of war on the Korean peninsula.Eastern Bloc ambassadors urged North Korea to exercise caution after the incident. Several documents suggest that North Korea's aggressive action may have been an attempt to signal a tilt towards theChinese Communist Party in the aftermath of theSino-Soviet split in 1966.[24]
Pueblo was taken into port atWonsan and the crew was moved twice toprisoner-of-war (POW) camps. The crew members reported upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody. This treatment turned worse[25] when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "the finger" in staged propaganda photos.[26]
CommanderLloyd M. Bucher was psychologically tortured, including being put through amock firing squad in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the North Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented and agreed to "confess to his and the crew's transgression." Bucher wrote the confession since a "confession" by definition needed to be written by the confessor himself. They verified the meaning of what he wrote, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the DPRK [North Korea]. We paean their great leaderKim Il Sung".[27] (Bucher pronounced "paean" as "pee on.")[28]
Negotiations for the release of the crew took place atPanmunjom. At the same time, U.S. officials were concerned with conciliating the South Koreans, who expressed discontent about being left out of the negotiations. Richard A. Ericson, a political counselor for theAmerican embassy in Seoul and operating officer for thePueblo negotiations, notes in his oral history:
The South Koreans were absolutely furious and suspicious of what we might do. They anticipated that the North Koreans would try to exploit the situation to the ROK's disadvantage in every way possible, and they were rapidly growing distrustful of us and losing faith in their great ally. Of course, we had this other problem of how to ensure that the ROK would not retaliate for the Blue House Raid and to ease their growing feelings of insecurity. They began to realize that the DMZ was porous and they wanted more equipment and aid. So, we were juggling a number of problems.[29]
He also noted how the meetings at Panmunjom were usually unproductive because of the particular negotiating style of the North Koreans:
As one example, we would go up with a proposal of some sort on the release of the crew and they would be sitting there with a card catalog ... If the answer to the particular proposal we presented wasn't in the cards, they would say something that was totally unresponsive and then go off and come back to the next meeting with an answer that was directed to the question. But there was rarely an immediate answer. That happened all through the negotiations. Their negotiators obviously were never empowered to act or speak on the basis of personal judgment or general instructions. They always had to defer a reply and presumably they went over it up in Pyongyang and passed it around and then decided on it. Sometimes we would get totally nonsensical responses if they didn't have something in the card file that corresponded to the proposal at hand.[29]
Ericson and George Newman, theDeputy Chief of Mission in Seoul, wrote a telegram for theState Department in February 1968, predicting how the negotiations would play out:
What we said in effect was this: If you are going to do this thing at Panmunjom, and if your sole objective is to get the crew back, you will be playing into North Korea's hands and the negotiations will follow a clear and inevitable path. You are going to be asked to sign a document that the North Koreans will have drafted. They will brook no changes. It will set forth their point of view and require you to confess to everything they accuse you of ... If you allow them to, they will take as much time as they feel they need to squeeze every damn thing they can get out of this situation in terms of their propaganda goals, and they will try to exploit this situation to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the ROK. Then when they feel they have accomplished all they can, and when we have agreed to sign their document of confession and apology, they will return the crew. They will not return the ship. This is the way it is going to be because this is the way it has always been.[29]
Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. thatPueblo had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members, although the written apology was preceded by an oral statement that it was done only to secure the release.[9][30] On 23 December 1968, the crew was taken by buses to the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) border with South Korea and crossing at the "Bridge of No Return", carrying with them the body of Fireman Duane D. Hodges, who was killed during the capture. Exactly 11 months after being taken prisoner, the captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the executive officer, LieutenantEd Murphy, the last man across the bridge.[9][31]
Bucher and all of the officers and crew subsequently appeared before aNavy Court of Inquiry. Acourt-martial was recommended for Bucher and the officer in charge of the research department, Lieutenant Steve Harris, for surrendering without a fight and for failing to destroy classified material, butSecretary of the NavyJohn Chafee, rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.[32]
In 1970, Bucher published an autobiographical account of the USSPueblo incident entitledBucher: My Story.[33] Bucher died inSan Diego on 28 January 2004, at the age of 76. James Kell, a former sailor under his command, suggested that the injuries that Bucher suffered during his time in North Korea contributed to his death.[34]
Along with theBattle of Khe Sanh and theTet Offensive, thePueblo incident was a key factor in turning U.S. public opinion against theVietnam War and influencingLyndon B. Johnson into withdrawing from the1968 presidential election.[35]
USSPueblo is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, she was towed from Wonsan on the east coast, around theKorean Peninsula, to the port ofNampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters, and was undertaken just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoyJames Kelly toPyongyang. After the stop at theNampo shipyard,Pueblo was relocated to Pyongyang and moored on theTaedong River near the spot where theGeneral Sherman incident is believed to have taken place. In late 2012,Pueblo was moved again to thePothonggang Canal in Pyongyang, next to a new addition to theFatherland Liberation War Museum.[5]
Today,Pueblo remains the second-oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy, behindUSS Constitution ("Old Ironsides").Pueblo is one of only a few American ships to have been captured since theFirst Barbary War.[citation needed]
Reverse engineering of communications devices onPueblo allowed the North Koreans to share knowledge with the Soviet Union that led to the replication of those communications devices. This allowed the two nations access to the US Navy's communication systems until the US Navy revised those systems. The seizure ofPueblo followed soon after US Navywarrant officerJohn Anthony Walker introduced himself to Soviet authorities, setting up theWalker spy ring. It has been argued (by John Prados in the June 2010 issue ofNaval History Magazine[36]) that the seizure ofPueblo was executed specifically to capture the encryption devices aboard. Without them, it was difficult for the Soviets to make full use of Walker's information.[37][38] Mitchell Lerner and Jong-Dae Shin argue that Soviet-bloc Romanian dossiers demonstrate that the Soviets had no knowledge of the capture of the ship and were taken by surprise when it happened.[39]
After debriefing the released crew, the U.S. prepared a "Cryptographic Damage Assessment" that was declassified in late 2006.[40] The report concluded that, while the crew made a diligent effort to destroy sensitive material,[41] most of them were not familiar with cryptographic equipment and publications, had not received training in their proper destruction, and that their efforts were not sufficient to prevent the North Koreans from recovering most of the sensitive material. The crew itself thought the North Koreans would be able to rebuild much of the equipment.
Cryptographic equipment on board at the time of capture included "oneKL-47 for off-line encryption, two KW-7s[42] for on-line encryption, threeKWR-37s for receiving the Navy Operational Intelligence Broadcast, and four KG-14s[43] which are used in conjunction with the KW-37 for receiving the Fleet Broadcasts." Additional tactical systems andone-time pads were captured, but they were considered of little significance since most messages sent using them would be of value for only a short time.
The ship's cryptographic personnel were subject to intense interrogation by what they felt were highly knowledgeable electronics experts. When crew members attempted to withhold details, they were later confronted with pages from captured manuals and told to correct their earlier accounts. The report concluded that the information gained from the interrogations saved the North Koreans three to six months of effort, but that they would have eventually understood everything from the captured equipment and accompanying technical manuals alone. The crew members were also asked about many U.S. cryptographic systems that were not on board thePueblo, but only supplied superficial information.
ThePueblo carriedkey lists for January, February and March 1968, but immediately after thePueblo was captured, instructions were sent to other holders of those keys not to use them, so damage was limited. However it was discovered in the debriefing that thePueblo had onboard superseded key lists for November and December 1967 which should have been destroyed by January 15, well before thePueblo arrived on station, according to standing orders.[40]: p. 19 The report considered the capture of the superseded keys for November and December the most damaging cryptographic loss. The capture of these keys likely allowed North Korea and its allies to read more than 117,000 classified messages sent during those months.[40]: p. 30 The North Koreans would also have gained a thorough knowledge of the workings of the captured systems but that would only have been of use if additional key material was compromised in the future. The existence of the Walker spy ring was, of course, not known at the time of the report.
The report noted that "the North Koreans did not display any of the captured cryptographic material to the crew, except for some equipment diagrams, or otherwise publicize the material for propaganda purposes. When contrasted with the international publicity given to the capture of other highly classified Special Intelligence documents, the fact that this material was not displayed or publicized would indicate that they thoroughly understood its significance and the importance of concealing from the United States the details of the information they had acquired."[40]: A.7
Documents released fromNational Archives of Romania suggest it was the Chinese rather than the Soviets who actively encouraged the reopening of hostilities in Korea during 1968, promising North Korea vast material support should hostilities in Korea resume.[24] Together with the Blue House raid, thePueblo incident turned out to be part of an increasing divergence between the Soviet leadership and North Korea. Fostering a resumption of hostilities in Korea, allegedly, was seen in Beijing as a way to mend relations between North Korea and China, and pull North Korea back in the Chinese sphere of influence in the context of theSino-Soviet split. After the (then secret) diplomatic efforts of the Soviets to have the American crew released fell on deaf ears in Pyongyang,Leonid Brezhnev publicly denounced North Korea's actions at the 8th plenary session of the23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[24] In contrast, theChinese (state controlled) press published declarations supportive of North Korea's actions in thePueblo incident.[44]
Furthermore,Soviet archives reveal that the Soviet leadership was particularly displeased that North Korean leader Kim Il-sung had contradicted the assurances he previously gave Moscow that he would avoid a military escalation in Korea. Previously secret documents suggest the Soviets were surprised by thePueblo incident, first learning of it in the press. The same documents reveal that the North Koreans also kept the Soviets completely in the dark regarding ongoing negotiations with the Americans for the crew's release, which was another bone of contention. The Soviet reluctance at a reopening of hostilities in Korea was partly motivated by the fact that they had a1961 treaty with North Korea that obliged them to intervene[45] in case the latter got attacked. Brezhnev however had made it clear in 1966 that just as in the case of thesimilar treaty they had with China, the Soviets were prepared to ignore it rather than go to all-out war with the United States.[46]: 12–15
Given that Chinese and North Korean archives surrounding the incident remain secret, Kim Il-sung's intentions cannot be known with certainty. The Soviets revealed however that Kim Il-sung sent a letter toAlexei Kosygin on 31 January 1968 demanding further military and economic aid, which was interpreted by the Soviets as the price they would have to pay to restrain Kim Il-sung's bellicosity. Consequently, Kim Il-sung was invited to Moscow, but he refused to go in person owing to "increased defense preparations" he had to attend to, sending instead his defense minister,Kim Chang-bong, who arrived on 26 February 1968. During a long meeting with Brezhnev, the Soviet leader made it clear that they were not willing to go to war with the United States, but agreed to an increase in subsidies for North Korea, which did happen in subsequent years.[46]: 15–18
.jpg)
.jpg)
Major General Pak Chung-kuk represented North Korea (DPRK) and U.S. Navy Rear Admiral John Victor Smith represented theUnited States until April 1968, at which point he was replaced byU.S. Army Major GeneralGilbert H. Woodward. The timeline and quotations are taken fromMatter of Accountability by Trevor Armbrister.[47]
| Date | Chief Negotiator | Event / Position of respective government |
|---|---|---|
| 23 January 1968 (around noon local time) | Pueblo is intercepted by North Korean forces close to the North Korean port city of Wonsan. | |
| 24 January 1968 (11 am local time) | Admiral Smith | Protests the "heinous" Blue House raid and subsequently plays a tape of a captured North Korean soldier's "confession" ... |
| I want to tell you, Pak, that the evidence against you North Korean Communists is overwhelming ... I now have one more subject to raise which is also of an extremely serious nature. It concerns the criminal boarding and seizure of ... Pueblo in international waters. It is necessary that your regime do the following: one, return the vessel and crew immediately; two, apologize to the Government of the United States for this illegal action. You are advised that the United States reserves the right to ask for compensation under international law. | ||
| General Pak | Our saying goes, 'A mad dog barks at the moon', ... At the two hundred and sixtieth meeting of this commission held four days ago, I again registered a strong protest with your side against having infiltrated into our coastal waters a number of armed spy boats ... and demanded you immediately stop such criminal acts ... this most overt act of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces was designed to aggravate tension in Korea and precipitate another war of aggression ... | |
| The United States must admit that Pueblo entered North Korean waters, must apologize for this intrusion, and must assure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that such intrusions will never happen again. Admit, Apologize and Assure (the "Three As"). | ||
| 4 March 1968 | Names of dead and wounded prisoners are provided by the DPRK. | |
| late April 1968 | Admiral Smith is replaced by U.S. Army Major General Gilbert H. Woodward as chief negotiator. | |
| 8 May 1968 | General Pak presents General Woodward with the document by which the United States would admit thatPueblo had entered the DPRK's waters, would apologize for the intrusion and assure the DPRK that such an intrusion would never happen again. It cited the Three A's as the only basis for a settlement and went on to denounce the United States for a whole host of other "crimes". | |
| 29 August 1968 | General Woodward | A proposal drafted by U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach [the "overwrite" strategy] is presented. |
| If I acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to you as well as to us, would you then be prepared to release all of the crew? | ||
| General Pak | Well, we have already told you what you must sign ... | |
| 17 September 1968 | General Pak | If you will sign our document, something might be worked out ... |
| 30 September 1968 | General Pak | If you will sign the document, we will at the same time turn over the men. |
| General Woodward | We do not feel it is just to sign a paper saying we have done something we haven't done. However, in the interest of reuniting the crew with their families, we might consider an 'acknowledge receipt' | |
| 10 October 1968 | General Woodward | (demonstrating to General Pak the nature of the 'signing') |
| I will write here that I hereby acknowledge receipt of eighty-two men and one corpse ... | ||
| General Pak | You are employing sophistries and petty stratagems to escape responsibility for the crimes which your side committed ... | |
| 23 October 1968 | The "overwrite" proposal is again set out by General Woodward and General Pak again denounces it as a "petty strategem". | |
| 31 October 1968 | General Woodward | If I acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to you as well as to us, would you then be prepared to release all of the crew? |
| General Pak | The United States must admit that Pueblo had entered North Korean waters, must apologize for this intrusion, and must assure the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that this will never happen again. | |
| 17 December 1968 | General Woodward | Explains a proposal by State Department Korea chief James Leonard: the "prior refutation" scheme. The United States would agree to sign the document but General Woodward would then verbally denounce it once the prisoners had been released. |
| General Pak | [following a 50 min recess] | |
| I note that you will sign my document ... we have reached agreement. | ||
| 23 December 1968 | General Woodward on behalf of the United States signs the Three As document and the DPRK at the same time allowsPueblo's prisoners to return to U.S. custody. |
Pueblo is a tourist attraction in Pyongyang, North Korea, since being moved to theTaedong River.[48]Pueblo used to be anchored at the spot where it is believed theGeneral Sherman incident took place in 1866. In late November 2012Pueblo was moved from the Taedong river dock to a casement on the Pothong river next to the newVictorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum. The ship was renovated and made open to tourists with an accompanying video[49] of the North Korean perspective in late July 2013. To commemorate the anniversary of theKorean War, the ship had a new layer of paint added.[50] Visitors are allowed to board the ship and see its superstructure, secretcode room and crew artifacts.[51] Sailors of theKPN, as well as officers of theKPA, lead tourists through the ship.[52]
During an August 2005 diplomatic session in North Korea, former U.S. Ambassador to South KoreaDonald Gregg received verbal indications from high-ranking North Korean officials that the state would be willing to repatriatePueblo to United States authorities, on the condition that a prominent U.S. government official, such as the Secretary of State, come to Pyongyang for high level talks. While the U.S. government has publicly stated on several occasions that the return of the still-commissioned Navy vessel is a priority,[53] there has been no indication that the matter was brought up by U.S. Secretary of StateMike Pompeo on his April 2018 visit.
FormerPueblo crew members William Thomas Massie, Dunnie Richard Tuck, Donald Raymond McClarren, and Lloyd Bucher sued the North Korean government for the abuse they suffered at its hands during their captivity. North Korea did not respond to the suit. In December 2008, U.S. District JudgeHenry H. Kennedy, Jr., in Washington, D.C., awarded the plaintiffs $65 million in damages, describing their ill treatment by North Korea as "extensive and shocking."[54] The plaintiffs, as of October 2009, were attempting to collect the judgement from North Korean assets frozen by the U.S. government.[55]
In February 2021 a U.S. court awarded the survivors and their families $2.3 billion. It is uncertain if they will be able to collect the money from North Korea.[56]
Pueblo has earned the following awards:
| As FS-344 | ||
|---|---|---|
 |  |  |
| American Campaign Medal | World War II Victory Medal | National Defense Service Medal |
| As USSPueblo | |||
|---|---|---|---|
  | |||
 |  |  | |
| Combat Action Ribbon | National Defense Service Medal with twoservice stars | |||
| Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal | Global War on Terrorism Service Medal | Korea Defense Service Medal |
As for the crew members, they did not receive full recognition for their involvement in the incident until decades later. In 1988, the military announced it would awardPrisoner of War medals to those captured in the nation's conflicts. While thousands of American prisoners of war were awarded medals, the crew members ofPueblo did not receive them. Instead, they were classified as "detainees". It was not until Congress passed a law overturning this decision that the medals were awarded; the crew finally received the medals at San Diego in May 1990.[32]
The 1968Star Trek episode "TheEnterprise Incident" was very loosely based upon thePueblo incident. In the episode written byD. C. Fontana, CaptainKirk takes theFederationstarship USSEnterprise, apparently without authorization, into enemyRomulan space.[57]
ThePueblo incident was dramatically depicted in the 1973ABC Theater televised productionPueblo.Hal Holbrook starred as Captain Lloyd Bucher. The two-hour drama was nominated for threeEmmy Awards, winning two.[58][59]
A 2000 North Korean film titledPueblo based on the incident starsCharles Robert Jenkins. This was his final role in a North Korean film.[60]
Other conflicts:
General:
The treatment would become better or worse depending upon the day, the week, the guard, the duty officer or the situation.
The finger became an integral part of our anti-propaganda campaign. Any time a camera appeared, so did the fingers.
Yet, as this e-Dossier makes clear, the Soviets were not only uninvolved in the planning but they were also exceedingly unhappy with both the attack itself and Kim's unwillingness to accept an early resolution.
Sources
Dec. 23 marks 50 years since the release of USSPueblo crew members from North Korea's custody. One died heroically and the rest were tortured daily for nearly a year. The ship, to this day, remains in North Korean custody.
