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TheBuddhist doctrine ofthe two truths (Sanskrit:dvasatya,Wylie:bden pa gnyis) differentiates between two levels ofsatya (Sanskrit;Pāli:sacca; meaning "truth" or "reality") in the teaching ofŚākyamuni Buddha: the "conventional" or "provisional" (saṁvṛti) truth, and the "absolute" or "ultimate" (paramārtha) truth.[1][2]
The exact meaning varies between the variousBuddhist schools andtraditions. The best known interpretation is from theMādhyamaka school ofMahāyāna Buddhism, whose founder was the 3rd-centuryIndian Buddhist monk and philosopherNāgārjuna.[1] For Nāgārjuna, the two truths areepistemological truths.[2] The phenomenal world is accorded a provisional existence.[2] The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable.[2] Ultimately,all phenomena are empty (śūnyatā) of an inherent self or essence due to thenon-existence of the self (anātman),[3] but temporarily existdepending on other phenomena (pratītya-samutpāda).[1][2]
InChinese Buddhism, theMādhyamaka thought is accepted, and the two truths doctrine is understood as referring to twoontological truths. Reality exists in two levels, a relative level and an absolute level.[4] Based on their understanding of theMahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, the Chinese Buddhist monks and philosophers supposed that the teaching of theBuddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha) was, as stated by that Sūtra, the final Buddhist teaching, and that there is an essential truth aboveemptiness (śūnyatā) and the two truths.[5]
The doctrine ofemptiness (śūnyatā) is an attempt to show that it is neither proper nor strictly justifiable to regard anymetaphysical system as absolutely valid. The two truths doctrine doesn't lead to the extreme philosophical views ofeternalism (orabsolutism) andannihilationism (ornihilism), but strikes amiddle course (madhyamāpratipada) between them.[1]
Satya is usually taken to mean "truth", but also refers to "a reality", "a genuinely real existent".[6]Satya (Sat-yá)[7] is derived fromSat andya.Sat means being, reality, and is thepresent participle of the rootas, "to be" (Proto-Indo-European*h₁es-; cognate to Englishis).[7]Ya andyam means "advancing, supporting, hold up, sustain, one that moves".[8][9] As a composite word,Satya andSatyam imply that "which supports, sustains and advances reality, being"; it literally means, "that which is true, actual, real, genuine, trustworthy, valid".[7]
The two truths doctrine states that there is:
The 7th-century Buddhist philosopherChandrakīrti suggests three possible meanings ofsaṁvṛti:[1]
The conventional truth may be interpreted as "obscurative truth" or "that which obscures the true nature" as a result. It is constituted by the appearances of mistaken awareness. Conventional truth would be the appearance that includes a duality of apprehender and apprehended, and objects perceived within that. Ultimate truths are phenomena free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended.[10]
The teaching ofŚākyamuni Buddha may be viewed as aneightfold path (mārga) ofrelease fromthe causes of suffering (duḥkha). TheFirst Noble Truth equates life-experiences with pain and suffering. The Buddha's language was simple and colloquial. Naturally, various statements of the Buddha at times appear contradictory to each other. Later Buddhist teachers were faced with the problem of resolving these contradictions.
The 3rd-centuryIndian Buddhist monk and philosopherNāgārjuna and otherBuddhist philosophers after him introduced an exegetical technique of distinguishing between two levels of truth, the conventional and the ultimate.[1]
A similar method is reflected in the Brahmanical exegesis of theVedic scriptures, which combine theritualistic injunctions of the Brahmanas and speculative philosophical questions of theUpanishads as one whole "revealed" body of work, thereby contrasting thejñāna kāņḍa withkarmakāņḍa.[1]
The concept of the two truths is associated with theMādhyamaka school ofMahāyāna Buddhism, whose founder was the 3rd-centuryIndian Buddhist monk and philosopherNāgārjuna,[1][11] and its history traced back to theearliest years of Buddhism.
In thePāli Canon, the distinction is not made between alower truth and ahigher truth, but rather between two kinds of expressions of the same truth, which must be interpreted differently. Thus a phrase or passage, or a wholeSūtra, might be classified asneyyattha,samuti, orvohāra, but it is not regarded at this stage as expressing or conveying a differentlevel of truth.
Nītattha (Pāli; Sanskrit:nītārtha), "of plain or clear meaning"[12] andneyyattha (Pāli; Sanskrit:neyartha), "[a word or sentence] having a sense that can only be guessed".[12] These terms were used to identify texts or statements that either did or did not require additional interpretation. Anītattha text required no explanation, while aneyyattha one might mislead some people unless properly explained:[13]
There are these two who misrepresent theTathāgata. Which two? He who represents aSutta of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and he who represents a Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta of indirect meaning.[14]
Saṃmuti orsamuti (Pāli; Sanskrit:saṃvṛti), meaning "common consent, general opinion, convention",[15] andparamattha (Pāli; Sanskrit:paramārtha), meaning "ultimate", are used to distinguish conventional or common-sense language, as used in metaphors or for the sake of convenience, from language used to express higher truths directly. The termvohāra (Pāli; Sanskrit:vyavahāra, "common practice, convention, custom" is also used in more or less the same sense assamuti.
TheTheravādin commentators expanded on these categories and began applying them not only to expressions but to the truth then expressed:
TheAwakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events.[16]
ThePrajñaptivāda school took up the distinction between the conventional (saṃvṛti) and ultimate (paramārtha) truths, and extended the concept tometaphysical-phenomenological constituents (dharma), distinguishing those that are real (tattva) from those that are purely conceptual, i.e., ultimately nonexistent (prajñāpti).
The distinction between the two truths (satyadvayavibhāga) was fully developed byNāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE), founder of theMādhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy.[1][11] Mādhyamika philosophers distinguish betweensaṃvṛti-satya, "empirical truth",[17] "relative truth",[web 1] "truth that keeps the ultimate truth concealed",[18] andparamārtha-satya, ultimate truth.[19][web 1]
Saṃvṛti-satya can be further divided intathya-saṃvṛti orloka-saṃvṛti, andmithya-saṃvṛti oraloka-saṃvṛti,[20][21][22][23] "true saṃvṛti" and "false saṃvṛti".[23][web 1][note 1]Tathya-saṃvṛti or "true saṃvṛti" refers to "things" which concretely exist and can be perceived as such by the senses, whilemithya-saṃvṛti or "false saṃvṛti" refers to false cognitions of "things" which do not exist as they are perceived.[22][23][18][note 2][note 3]
Nāgārjuna'sMūlamadhyamakakārikā provides a logical defense for the claim thatall things are empty (śūnyatā) anddevoid of any inherently-existing self-nature (anātman).[11] Emptiness itself, however, is also shown to be "empty", and Nāgārjuna's assertion of "the emptiness of emptiness" prevents the mistake of believing that emptiness may constitute a higher or ultimate reality.[28][29][note 4][note 5] Nāgārjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth".[29] According to Siderits, Nāgārjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.[29]Jay L. Garfield explains:
Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...] So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness […]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table’s lack of inherent existence [...] To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent.[28]
InNāgārjuna'sMūlamadhyamakakārikā, the two truths doctrine is used to defend the identification ofdependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) withemptiness itself (śūnyatā):
The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.[31]
In Nāgārjuna's own words:
8. The teaching by the Buddhas of the Dharma has recourse to two truths:
The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.
9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth
Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.
10. The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior,And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvana.[32]
Nāgārjuna based his statement of the two truths on theKaccāyanagotta Sutta. In this text,Śākyamuni Buddha, speaking to the monk Kaccāyana Gotta on the topic of right view, describes themiddle course (madhyamāpratipada) between the extreme philosophical views ofeternalism (orabsolutism) andannihilationism (ornihilism):
By and large, Kaccāyana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.[33]
According to theTibetologist Alaka Majumder Chattopadhyaya, although Nāgārjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of thehistorical Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.[34]
TheYogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy distinguishes theThree Natures and theTrikāya. The Three Natures are:[35][36]
TheLaṅkāvatāra Sūtra, one of the earliestMahāyāna Sūtras, took an idealistic turn in apprehending reality. Japanese Buddhist scholarD. T. Suzuki writes the following explanation:
TheLaṅkā is quite explicit in assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering into the realm ofMind-only, and the other for understanding existence in its dual aspect in which logic prevails and thevijñānas are active. The latter is designateddiscrimination (vikalpa) in theLaṅkā and the formertranscendental wisdom or knowledge (prajñā). To distinguish these two forms of knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy.
WhenBuddhism was introduced to China byBuddhist monks from theIndo-Greek Kingdom ofGandhāra (now Afghanistan) andclassical India between the 2nd century BCE and 1st century CE, the two truths teaching was initially understood and interpreted through various ideas inChinese philosophy, includingConfucian[37] andTaoist[38][39][40] ideas which influenced the vocabulary ofChinese Buddhism.[41] As such,Chinese translations of Buddhist texts and philosophical treatises made use of native Chinese terminology, such as"T’i -yung" (體用, "Essence and Function") and "Li-Shih" (理事, Noumenon and Phenomenon) to refer to the two truths. These concepts were later developed in severalEast Asian Buddhist traditions, such as theWéishí andHuayan schools.[41] The doctrines of these schools also influenced the ideas ofChán (Zen) Buddhism, as can be seen in theVerses of the Five Ranks ofTōzan and other Chinese Buddhist texts.[42]
Chinese thinkers often took the two truths to refer to twoontological truths (two ways of being, or levels ofexistence): a relative level and anabsolute level.[4] For example, Taoists at first misunderstoodemptiness (śūnyatā) to be akin to the Taoist notion of non-being.[43] In theMādhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy, the two truths are twoepistemological truths: two different ways to look at reality. TheSānlùn school (Chinese Mādhyamikas) thus rejected the ontological reading of the two truths. However, drawing onBuddha-nature thought, such as that of theMahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, and onYogācāra sources, other Chinese Buddhist philosophers defended the view that the two truths did refer to two levels of reality (which were neverthelessnon-dual and inferfused), one which was conventional, illusory and impermanent, and another which was eternal, unchanging and pure.[5]
TheHuayan school or "Flower Garland" school is a tradition ofChinese Buddhist philosophy that flourished inmedieval China during theTang period (7th–10th centuries CE). It is based on theAvataṃsaka Sūtra, and on a lengthy Chinese interpretation of it, theHuayan Lun. The name "Flower Garland" is meant to suggest the crowning glory of profound understanding.
The most important philosophical contributions of the Huayan school were in the area of itsmetaphysics. It taught the doctrine of the mutual containment and interpenetration of all phenomena, as expressed inIndra's net. One thing contains all other existing things, and all existing things contain that one thing.
Distinctive features of this approach to Buddhist philosophy include:
Huayan teaches theFour Dharmadhātu, four ways to view reality:
The teachings ofChán (Zen) Buddhism are expressed by a set of polarities:Buddha-nature (tathāgatagarbha),emptiness (śūnyatā),[45][46] absolute-relative,[47]sudden andgradualenlightenment (bodhi).[48]
ThePrajnāpāramitā Sūtras andMādhyamaka philosophy emphasized the non-duality of form and emptiness: "form is emptiness, emptiness is form", as it's written in theHeart Sutra.[47]The idea that the ultimate reality is present in the daily world of relative reality fitted into theChinese culture, which emphasized the mundane world and society. But this does not tell how the absolute is present in the relative world. This question is answered in such schemata as theVerses of the Five Ranks ofTōzan[49] and theOxherding Pictures.
The polarity of absolute and relative is also expressed as "essence-function". The absolute is essence, the relative is function. They can't be seen as separate realities, but interpenetrate each other. The distinction does not "exclude any other frameworks such asneng-so or "subject-object" constructions", though the two "are completely different from each other in terms of their way of thinking".[50]
InKorean Buddhism, essence-function is also expressed as "body" and "the body's functions":
[A] more accurate definition (and the one the Korean populace is more familiar with) is "body" and "the body's functions". The implications of "essence/function" and "body/its functions" are similar, that is, both paradigms are used to point to a nondual relationship between the two concepts.[51]
A metaphor for essence-function is "A lamp and its light", a phrase from thePlatform Sutra, where "essence" is the lamp and "function" its light.[52]
TheNyingma tradition is the oldest of the four major schools ofTibetan Buddhism.[2] It is founded on thefirst translations of Buddhist scriptures fromSanskrit intoTibetan (8th century CE). Tibetan Buddhist philosopher and polymathMipham the Great (1846–1912) in his commentary to theMadhyamālaṃkāra ofŚāntarakṣita (725–788) says:[53]
If one trains for a long time in the union of the two truths, the stage of acceptance (on the path of joining), which is attuned to primordial wisdom, will arise. By thus acquiring a certain conviction in that which surpasses intellectual knowledge, and by training in it, one will eventually actualize it. This is precisely how the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas have said that liberation is to be gained.[54][note 6]
The following sentence fromMipham the Great's exegesis ofŚāntarakṣita'sMadhyamālaṃkāra highlights the relationship between the absence ofthe four extremes (mtha'-bzhi) and thenon-dual orindivisible two truths (bden-pa dbyer-med):
The learned and accomplished [masters] of the Early Translations considered this simplicity beyond the four extremes, this abiding way in which the two truths are indivisible, as their own immaculate way.[55][note 7]
The 2nd-centuryDigambaraJain monk and philosopherKundakunda distinguishes between two perspectives of truth:
For Kundakunda, the mundane realm of truth is also the relative perspective of normal folk, where the workings ofkarma operate and where things emerge, last for a certain time, and then perish. The ultimate perspective, meanwhile, is that of the liberatedindividual soul (jīvatman), which is "blissful, energetic, perceptive, and omniscient".[57]
TheAdvaita school ofVedānta philosophy took over from the BuddhistMādhyamaka school the idea of levels of reality.[58] Usually two levels are being mentioned,[59] but the school's founderĀdi Śaṅkara usessublation as the criterion to postulate an ontological hierarchy of three levels:[60][web 3][note 8]
Chattopadhyaya notes that the 8th-centuryMīmāṃsā philosopherKumārila Bhaṭṭa rejected the two truths doctrine in hisShlokavartika.[62] Bhaṭṭa was highly influential with his defence ofVedic orthodoxy and rituals against theBuddhist rejection of Brahmanical beliefs and ritualism.[3] Some believe that his influence contributed to thedecline of Buddhism in India,[63] since his lifetime coincides with the period in which Buddhism began to disappear from the Indian subcontinent.[64]
According to Kumārila, the two truths doctrine fundamentally is anidealist doctrine, which conceals the fact that "the theory of the nothingness of the objective world" is absurd:
[O]ne should admit that what does not exist, exists not; and what does exist, exists in the full sense. The latter alone is true, and the former false. But the idealist just cannot afford to do this. He is obliged instead to talk of 'two truths', senseless though this be.[62][note 9]
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Thomas McEvilley notes a correspondence between GreekPyrrhonism and the BuddhistMādhyamaka school:
Sextus says[65] that there are two criteria:
- [T]hat by which we judge reality and unreality, and
- [T]hat which we use as a guide in everyday life.
According to the first criterion, nothing is either true or false[.] [I]nductive statements based on direct observation of phenomena may be treated as either true or false for the purpose of making everyday practical decisions.
The distinction, as Conze[66] has noted, is equivalent to the Madhyamaka distinction between "Absolute truth" (paramārthasatya), "the knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion,"[67] and "Truth so-called" (saṃvṛti satya), "truth as conventionally believed in common parlance.[67][68]
Thus in Pyrrhonism "absolute truth" corresponds toacatalepsy and "conventional truth" tophantasiai.
TheBuddha's "middle path" strategy can be seen as one of first arguing that there is nothing that the word "I" genuinely denotes, and then explaining that our erroneous sense of an "I" stems from our employment of the useful fiction represented by the concept of the person. While the second part of this strategy only receives its full articulation in the later development of the theory of two truths, the first part can be found in the Buddha's own teachings, in the form of severalphilosophical arguments for non-self. Best known among these is theargument from impermanence (S III.66–8) [...].
It is the fact that this argument does not contain a premise explicitly asserting that thefiveskandhas (classes of psychophysical element) are exhaustive of the constituents of persons, plus the fact that these are all said to be empirically observable, that leads some to claim that the Buddha did not intend to deny the existence of a selftout court. There is, however, evidence that the Buddha was generally hostile toward attempts to establish the existence of unobservable entities. In thePoṭṭhapāda Sutta (D I.178–203), for instance, the Buddha compares someone who posits an unseen seer in order to explain our introspective awareness of cognitions, to a man who has conceived a longing for the most beautiful woman in the world based solely on the thought that such a woman must surely exist. And in theTevijja Sutta (D I.235–52), the Buddha rejects the claim of certainBrahmins to know the path to oneness withBrahman, on the grounds that no one has actually observed this Brahman. This makes more plausible the assumption that the argument has as an implicit premise the claim that there is no more to the person than the fiveskandhas.
Works related toSaṃyukta Āgama 301: Kātyāyana Gotra Sūtra at Wikisource
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