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Treaty of Breda (1667)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Peace ending the Second Anglo-Dutch War
For other uses, seeTreaty of Breda (disambiguation).

Treaty of Breda
Contemporary engraving of the signing of the peace atBreda Castle
ContextEngland, the Dutch Republic, France and Denmark–Norway end theSecond Anglo-Dutch War
Signed31 July 1667; 358 years ago (1667-07-31)
LocationBreda
Effective24 August 1667
MediatorsSweden Göran Fleming;Count DohnaPeter Coyet
NegotiatorsKingdom of EnglandDenzil Holles;Henry Coventry
Dutch RepublicHieronymus van Beverningh;Allart Pieter van Jongestall;Adolph Hendrik Ripperda;Pieter de Huybert;Ludolf Tjarda van Starkenborgh
Kingdom of FranceD'Estrades; Honoré Courtin
Denmark–Norway Paul Klingenberg; Peter Canizius[1]
SignatoriesKingdom of EnglandCharles II of England
Dutch RepublicStates General of the Netherlands
Kingdom of FranceLouis XIV
Denmark–NorwayFrederick III
Parties England
 Dutch Republic
 France
 Denmark–Norway

ThePeace of Breda, orTreaty of Breda was signed in the Dutch city ofBreda, on 31 July 1667. It consisted of three separate treaties betweenEngland and each of its opponents in theSecond Anglo-Dutch War: theDutch Republic,France, andDenmark–Norway. It also included a separate Anglo-Dutch commercial agreement.

Negotiations had been in progress since late 1666 but were slow, as both sides tried to improve their positions. This changed after theFrench invasion of theSpanish Netherlands in late May, which the Dutch viewed as a more serious threat. War-weariness in England was increased by the JuneRaid on the Medway. Both factors led to a rapid agreement of terms. Among the terms was confirmation of colonial territories taken in the War, includingSuriname to the Dutch andNew Netherland (New York) to the English.

Prior to 1667, the Anglo-Dutch relationship had been dominated by commercial conflict, which the treaty did not end entirely. However, tensions decreased markedly and cleared the way for the 1668Triple Alliance between the Dutch Republic, England and Sweden. With the brief anomaly of the 1672 to 1674Third Anglo-Dutch War, the treaty marked the beginning of an alliance between the English and the Dutch that would last for a century.

Background

[edit]
The island ofRun was a key flashpoint in the conflict; Dutch determination to preserve their monopoly of the Asian spice trade led to wars with Portugal, Spain and England

TheSecond Anglo-Dutch War was caused by commercial tensions, heightened byCharles II, who saw trade as a way to reduce his financial dependence onParliament. In 1660, he and his brotherJames founded theRoyal African Company (RAC), challenging the Dutch in West Africa. Investors included senior politicians such asGeorge Carteret,Shaftesbury andArlington, creating a strong link between the RAC and government policy.[2]

Huge profits from Asianspices led to conflict even in times of peace, as theDutch East India Company, or VOC, first created, then enforced, their monopoly over production and trade. By 1663, indigenous and European competitors like thePortuguese had been eliminated, leaving onlynutmeg plantations onRun.[3] These had been established by the BritishEast India Company in 1616, before being evicted by the VOC in 1620; when the English re-occupied Run in late 1664, the Dutch expelled them again, this time destroying the plantations.[4]

There was a similar struggle over theAtlantic trade between the DutchWest-Indische Compagnie, or WIC, and competitors from Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and England.[5] Sugar plantations in theAmericas were cultivated by slaves from Africa, fed by colonies in North America, leading to conflict in all three regions. In August 1664, the English occupiedNew Netherland, later renamed New York; when another attack captured WIC slave trade posts in modernGhana, the Dutch sent a fleet to recapture them.[6] The result was to bankrupt the RAC, whose investors saw war as the best way to recoup their losses.[7]

Despite the Franco-Dutch treaty of April 1662,Louis XIV initially remained neutral, as French and Dutch economic interests increasingly diverged over theSpanish Netherlands. The 1648Peace of Münster permanently closed theScheldt estuary and the port ofAntwerp, which did not recover economically until the 19th century. The combination gaveAmsterdam effective control of trade in North-West Europe.[8] Louis considered the Spanish Netherlands his by right of marriage toMaria Theresa of Spain but hoped to acquire them peacefully. Negotiations with the Dutch continually broke down over his desire to re-open Antwerp as an export route for French goods. By 1663, he concluded they would never make concessions voluntarily and began planning a military intervention.[9]

The Dutch suffered a serious defeat atLowestoft, in June 1665 but the English were unable to take advantage

In early 1665, England signed an alliance withSweden against the Dutch, who suffered a serious defeat atLowestoft in June, followed by an invasion fromMünster.[10] Louis responded by activating the 1662 treaty, calculating this would make it harder for the Dutch to oppose his occupation of the Spanish Netherlands.[11] He also paid Sweden to remain neutral, while influencingDenmark–Norway to join the war. Danish assistance saved the Dutch merchant fleet at theBattle of Vågen in August, although this turned out to have been the result of miscommunication.Frederick III of Denmark had secretly agreed to help the English capture the fleet in return for a share of the profits, but his instructions arrived too late.[12]

By late 1666, Charles was short of money, largely due to his refusal to recall Parliament, while English trade had been badly affected by the war and domestic disasters. In contrast, the Dutch economy had largely recovered from its post-1665 contraction, while public debt was lower in 1667 than 1652; however, naval warfare was enormously expensive and financing it a challenge even for the Amsterdam markets.[13] Both sides wanted peace, since the Dutch had little to gain from continuing the war and faced external challenges from competitors. Denmark resented concessions imposed at Christianopel in 1647, while the WIC's confiscation of Danish ships was an ongoing source of dispute; in early 1667, they joined Sweden and France in imposing tariffs on Dutch goods, impacting the Balticgrain trade.[14]

In October 1666, Charles opened discussions with theStates-General of the Netherlands, under the pretext of arrangements to return the body of Vice-AdmiralWilliam Berkeley, killed in theFour Days' Battle. He invited the Dutch to negotiations in London and withdrew previous demands for the appointment of his nephewWilliam of Orange asstadtholder, payment of damages, the return of Run and a trade deal on India. The States-General refused to attend peace talks without France; on territorial claims, they offered to continue the present situation, or revert to theposition before the war, an option clearly unacceptable to the English.[15]

It is questionable how sincere this offer from Charles actually was, since his envoy in Paris, theEarl of St Albans, was simultaneously holding secret talks on an Anglo-French alliance. Louis agreed to ensure the Dutch complied with English demands, in exchange for a free hand in the Spanish Netherlands; by April 1667, diplomats inThe Hague were predicting a deal was imminent. When talks eventually began, the English delegation felt their position was extremely strong.[16]

Negotiations

[edit]
The JuneRaid on the Medway brought a quick end to negotiations but Charles never forgot the humiliation

Grand PensionaryJohan de Witt and the States of Holland rejected English proposals to negotiate inThe Hague, a town dominated by theOrangist opposition. They were supported by Louis, who viewed the Orangists as English agents.[17] Angered by the delay, theStates of Zeeland,Gelderland,Groningen,Overijssel andFriesland threatened to stop paying for a war 'continued only by Holland's obstinacy.'[18]

The parties eventually settled on Breda, but French military preparations led the Orangists to accuse De Witt of deliberately stalling to allow Louis a free hand in the Spanish Netherlands.[19] This put De Witt under pressure to reach agreement, which increased after France and Portugal agreed ananti-Spanish alliance in March.[20]

The role of mediator in peace talks provided prestige and the opportunity to build relationships; since Louis and Leopold both wanted the position, they compromised by using Swedish diplomats.[21] Key players in the vital Baltic trade in grain, iron and shipping supplies, the Swedes hoped to remove commercial concessions imposed by the Republic in the 1656Treaty of Elbing and end its alliance with Denmark.[22] Göran Fleming was based at Breda, withPeter Coyet in The Hague; after Coyet died on 8 June, he was replaced byCount Dohna, who was instructed to negotiate a Swedish-English-French alliance if talks at Breda failed.[23]

TheStates General appointed eight delegates but only those fromHolland,Zeeland andFriesland were actually present. Two of the three were Orangists, ZeelandicPensionary Pieter de Huybert and Friesland'svan Jongestall; the delegate from Holland,Van Beverningh, was a member of De Witt'sStates Party.[24] The English lead negotiators wereDenzil Holles,Ambassador to France, andHenry Coventry,Ambassador to Sweden.

War of Devolution; French forces besiegeKortrijk in the Spanish Netherlands

On 24 May, Louis launched theWar of Devolution, French troops quickly occupying much of the Spanish Netherlands andFranche-Comté.[9] To focus on this, Spain needed to end the long-runningPortuguese Restoration War. On 27 May, the Anglo-SpanishTreaty of Madrid formally concluded the1654 to 1660 war and in return for commercial concessions, England agreed to mediate with Portugal.[25]

The threat to the Dutch economy presented by French expansion made ending the Anglo-Dutch War a matter of urgency. Backed by assurances from Louis that he would force the Dutch to agree concessions, the English increased their demands and Van Beverningh told De Witt a major military victory was needed to improve their bargaining position.[26] An opportunity was provided by Charles, who decommissioned most of theRoyal Navy in late 1666 as a cost-saving measure. The Dutch took full advantage in the June 1667Medway Raid; although the action itself had limited strategic impact, it was a humiliation Charles never forgot.[27]

Holles and Coventry initially assumed this would extend negotiations, but the need to create an alliance against France meant Spain threatened to withhold implementation of the Madrid treaty, supported by Leopold. Combined with economic losses caused by the war and theGreat Fire of London,Clarendon instructed Holles to agree terms "to calm people's minds" and "free the king from a burden...he is finding hard to bear".[28]

Terms

[edit]
New Netherland; area claimed by the Dutch, with modern state boundaries

Article 1 of the treaty stipulated a limited military alliance, obliging fleets or single ships sailing on the same course to defend each other against a third party.[29] Article 3 established the principle ofuti possidetis, or "what you have, you hold", with an effective date of 20 May. The Dutch keptSurinam, now part of modernSuriname,Fort Cormantin andRun while the English keptNew Netherland, which was subsequently divided into thecolonies ofNew York,New Jersey,Pennsylvania,Massachusetts,Connecticut andDelaware.[30]

Articles 4 to 8 applied the same principle to losses of goods or ships, including those that occurred before the war. No indemnities could be levied or punishments imposed, but all existingLetters of Marque were declared void.[31] To allow time to communicate these instructions, Article 7 varied the date on which they would be enforced: 5 September for theEnglish Channel and theNorth Sea, 5 October for the other European seas, 2 November for the African coast north of the Equator and 24 April 1668 for the rest of the world.[29]

Article 10 required all prisoners to be exchanged without ransom although the Dutch later demanded reimbursement of their living expenses, which the English viewed as the same thing.[32] After their failed 1666 coup, many Orangists sought refuge in England, with English and Scots dissidents going the other way. In Articles 13 and 17, both sides undertook not to protect each other's rebels; in a secret annex, the Dutch undertook to extraditeregicides who voted for theExecution of Charles I in 1649, although in practice these provisions were ignored.[29]

A separate treaty amended theNavigation Acts; goods transported along theRhine orScheldt to Amsterdam could be carried by Dutch ships to England without being subject to tariffs. England also accepted the principle of "free ships make free goods", which prevented theRoyal Navy from intercepting Dutch ships during wars in which the Dutch were neutral.[33] These terms were preliminary, with a definitive text signed on 17 February 1668.[29]

The Danish and French treaties followed the Anglo-Dutch version in waiving claims for restitution of losses. In addition, England returned the French possessions ofCayenne andAcadia, captured in 1667 and 1654 respectively, but the exact boundaries were not specified, and the handover was delayed until 1670. England regainedMontserrat andAntigua, and the Anglo-French division of the Caribbean island ofSaint Kitts was restored.[34] After the treaties were signed on 31 July, they were sent to each country for ratification, a process which was completed by 24 August and followed by public celebrations in Breda.[35]

Aftermath

[edit]
Syndics of the Drapers' Guild byRembrandt; the period immediately after 1667 marked the highpoint of Dutch prosperity and power

By exchanging New Netherland and Run, Breda removed two major areas of dispute, reducing Anglo-Dutch tensions overall and clearing the way for the 1668Triple Alliance between the Republic, Sweden and England.[36] The Alliance is often credited with forcing France to return most of their gains atAix-la-Chapelle, whereas the terms had already been agreed by Louis and Leopold in January 1668.[37] In the longer term, Breda was the point when the English and Dutch came to view France as a greater threat than each other; whilst Charles' preference for a French alliance led to the 1670Secret Treaty of Dover, the long-term trend was against him.[38] Support for re-asserting English naval power provided limited backing in theThird Anglo-Dutch War but ended once that had been achieved.[39]

The treaty disappointed Orangists by failing to restore theHouse of Orange or allow exiles home, as promised by Charles. When Zeeland and Friesland, in response to the French advance, proposed William be made Captain-General of theDutch States Army, the States of Holland responded on 5 August with thePerpetual Edict. This abolished the position of Stadholder of Holland, while a second resolution agreed to oppose that any confederate Captain-General or Admiral-General would become stadtholder of another province.[40] Since the army was viewed as an Orangist power base, spending on it was deliberately minimised; this had catastrophic effects in 1672.[41]

Breda was also a success for Sweden, which used its position as mediator to improve the Elbing provisions, break the Dutch-Danish agreement and join the Triple Alliance. The Spanish regained the Franche-Comté and most of the Spanish Netherlands; more significantly, the Dutch now viewed them as a better neighbour than an ambitious France.[42] Overall, the Dutch considered Breda and the creation of the Alliance a diplomatic triumph; the period immediately following is often considered the high point of theDutch Golden Age.[43]

References

[edit]
  1. ^Davenport & Paullin 1929, p. 120.
  2. ^Sherman 1976, pp. 331–332.
  3. ^Le Couteur & Burreson 2003, pp. 30–31.
  4. ^Le Couteur & Burreson 2003, p. 32.
  5. ^Rommelse 2006, p. 91.
  6. ^Rommelse 2006, p. 112.
  7. ^Rommelse 2006, p. 196.
  8. ^Israel 1989, pp. 197–99.
  9. ^abGeyl 1936, p. 311.
  10. ^Rommelse 2006, p. 168.
  11. ^De Périni 1896, p. 298.
  12. ^Kelsall 2008, pp. 206–07.
  13. ^Veenendaal 1994, p. 124.
  14. ^Kelsall 2008, p. 223.
  15. ^Geyl 1939, pp. 257–58.
  16. ^Pincus 1996, pp. 389–90.
  17. ^Grever 1982, p. 237.
  18. ^Grever 1982, p. 241.
  19. ^Grever 1982, p. 243.
  20. ^Gooskens 2016, p. 69.
  21. ^Gooskens 2016, pp. 65–66.
  22. ^Gooskens 2016, pp. 57–58.
  23. ^Gooskens 2016, p. 70.
  24. ^Grever 1982, pp. 245–46.
  25. ^Newitt 2004, p. 228.
  26. ^Blok 1925, p. 153.
  27. ^Boniface 2017.
  28. ^Geyl 1939, p. 266.
  29. ^abcdLesaffer 2016, pp. 124–138.
  30. ^Farnham 1901, pp. 311, 314.
  31. ^Davenport & Paullin 1929, pp. 129–130.
  32. ^Pepys 1667.
  33. ^Israel 1997, pp. 316–317.
  34. ^Davenport & Paullin 1929, pp. 138–140.
  35. ^Gooskens 2016, p. 71.
  36. ^Boxer 1969, p. 70.
  37. ^Davenport & Paullin 1929, pp. 144, 152.
  38. ^Lee 1961, p. 62.
  39. ^Rommelse 2006, pp. 198–201.
  40. ^Geyl 1939, pp. 269–70.
  41. ^Geyl 1936, pp. 312–13.
  42. ^Lynn 1996, p. 108.
  43. ^Swart 1969, pp. 1–24.

Sources

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  • Boniface, Patrick (14 June 2017)."The Royal Navy's Darkest Day: Medway 1667".Military History. Retrieved25 October 2019.
  • Boxer, C. R. (1969). "Some Second Thoughts on the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1672–1674".Trans. R. Hist. Soc.19:67–94.doi:10.2307/3678740.JSTOR 3678740.S2CID 159934682.
  • Britannica.com."Treaty of Breda".Britannica.com. Retrieved26 October 2019.
  • Davenport, Frances; Paullin, Charles (1929).European treaties bearing on the history of the United States and its dependencies: Volume II. Carnegie Institution.
  • De Périni, Hardÿ (1896).Batailles françaises, 1660–1700 V4. Ernest Flammarion, Paris.
  • Farnham, Mary Frances (1901).Documentary History of the State of Maine, Vol. 7: Containing the Farnham Papers; 1603 1688 (2019 ed.). Forgotten Books.ISBN 978-1528484718.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  • Geyl, P (1936). "Johan de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1653–72".History.20 (80):303–319.doi:10.1111/j.1468-229X.1936.tb00103.x.JSTOR 24401084.
  • Geyl, Pieter (1939).Orange & Stuart 1641-1672 (1969 ed.). Oosthoek's.ISBN 1842122266.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  • Gooskens, Frans (2016).Sweden and the Treaty of Breda in 1667 – Swedish diplomats help to end naval warfare between the Dutch Republic and England(PDF). De Oranje-boom; Historical and Archeology Circle of the City and Country of Breda.
  • Grever, John (1982). "Louis XIV and the Dutch Assemblies: The Conflict about the Hague".Legislative Studies Quarterly.7 (2):235–249.JSTOR 439669.
  • Haythornthwaite, Shavana."The Peace of Breda (1667)".OPIL. Retrieved23 October 2019.
  • Israel, Jonathan (1989).Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740 (1990 ed.). Oxford University Press.ISBN 978-0198211396.
  • Israel, Jonathan (1997).England's Mercantilist Response to Dutch World Trade Primacy, 1647–74 in Conflicts of Empires; Spain, the Low Countries and the struggle for World Supremacy 1585–1713. Hambledon Press.ISBN 978-1-85285-161-3.
  • Kelsall, Philip (2008). Brand, Hanno; Müller, Leos (eds.).The changing relationship between Denmark and the Netherlands in The dynamics of economic culture in the North Sea- and Baltic region in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern period. Uitgeverij Verloren.ISBN 978-9065508829.
  • Le Couteur, Penny; Burreson, Jay (2003).Napoleon's Buttons: How 17 Molecules Changed History. Jeremy Tarcher.ISBN 978-1585422203.
  • Lesaffer, Randall (2016).De Vrede van Breda en de Europese traditie van vredesverdragen inGinder 't Vreêverbont bezegelt : Essays over de betekenis van de Vrede van Breda 1667. Van Kemenade.
  • Lee, Maurice D (1961). "The Earl of Arlington and the Treaty of Dover".Journal of British Studies.1 (1):58–70.doi:10.1086/385435.JSTOR 175099.S2CID 159658912.
  • Lynn, John (1996).The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (Modern Wars in Perspective). Longman.ISBN 978-0582056299.
  • Newitt, Malyn (2004).A History of Portuguese Overseas Expansion 1400–1668. Routledge.ISBN 9781134553044.
  • Pepys, Samuel (8 September 1667)."The Diary of Samuel Pepys; 8 September 1667".PepysDiary.com. Retrieved26 October 2019.
  • Pincus, Steven CA (1996).Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668. Cambridge University Press.ISBN 978-0521434874.
  • Rommelse, Gijs (2006).The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667): raison d'état, mercantilism and maritime strife. Uitgeverij Verloren.ISBN 978-9065509079.
  • Sherman, Arnold A (1976). "Pressure from Leadenhall: The East India Company Lobby, 1660-1678".The Business History Review.50 (3):329–355.doi:10.2307/3112999.JSTOR 3112999.S2CID 154564220.
  • Swart, KW (1969).The miracle of the Dutch Republic as seen in the seventeenth century;: An inaugural lecture delivered at University College London 6 November 1967. HK Lewis.
  • Veenendaal, Augustus (1994). Hoffman, Philip (ed.).Fiscal Crises and Constitutional Freedom in the Netherlands, 1450–1795 in Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450–1789. Stanford University Press.ISBN 978-0804722926.
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